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Sir Walter Raleigh wrote his History of the World in a prison; and it was in a prison that Cervantes wrote Don Quixote.

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TO THE READER.

After having published seventeen volumes of this Work, embracing the period of eight years and a half, during which time I have written with my own hand nearly two thousand articles upon various subjects, without having, except in one single instance, incurred even the threats of the law, I begin the Eighteenth Volume in a prison. In this respect, however, I only share the lot of many men, who have inhabited this very prison before me; nor have I the smallest doubt, that I shall hereafter be enabled to follow the example of those men. On the triumphing, the boundless joy, the feasting and shouting, of the Peculators, or Public Robbers, and of all those, whether profligate or hypocritical villains, of whom I have been the scourge, I look with contempt, knowing very well, feeling in my heart, that my situation even at this time, is infinitely preferable to theirs; and, as to the future, I can reasonably promise myself days of peace and happiness, while continual dread must haunt their guilty minds; while every stir, and every sound must make them quake for fear. *Their day is yet to come.*

Before I renew my usual intercourse with my Readers, and offer to them, as heretofore, my remarks upon political subjects, and subjects connected with politics, I think it necessary to say something, relative to the proceedings in the Court of King's Bench, the end of which proceedings has been my imprisonment here. It is not my intention to publish a full report of the Trial: that would be unnecessary; but on many accounts, it may be useful merely to record the transaction, previously to any remarks upon any part of it.

First, then, I was prosecuted by way of Information of the Attorney General, for an article, published in the Political Register of the 1st of July, 1809, respecting the flogging of certain men, in the Local Militia, in the town of Ely, and also respecting the use made, upon that occasion, of a corps of foreign soldiers, called the King's

German Legion — SECONDLY, the Trial took place on Friday, the 15th of June, 1810, when I was found guilty, by a Special Jury. — THIRDLY, on Wednesday, the 20th, I was compelled to give bail for my appearance in court to receive judgment, and, as I came up from Botley (to which place I had returned on the evening of the 15th) a Tip-Staff went down in order to seize me personally, and to bring me up to London to give bail. — FOURTHLY, I was brought up to receive judgment on Thursday the 5th of July, when, after the Attorney General had made the speech, which I shall notice by-and-by, I was sent to the King's Bench Prison, and ordered to be brought up again on Monday the 9th of July. — FIFTHLY, on this last mentioned day, I was sentenced to be imprisoned in this prison for Two Years, to pay a fine of a Thousand Pounds to the King, and, at the expiration of the Two Years, to give bail myself to the amount of Three Thousand Pounds with two sureties to the amount of One Thousand Pounds each for my keeping the peace for Seven Years. — The Attorney General was Sir Vicary Gibbs, who was assisted by Mr. Garrow; the Judge, who sat at the Trial, was Lord Ellenborough; the four Judges who sat when the Sentence was pronounced were Lord Ellenborough and Judges Grose, Le Blanc, and Bailey; the Sentence was pronounced by Judge Grose; and the persons composing the Jury were as follows:

THOMAS RHODES, Esq.	Hampstead Road
JOHN DAVIS, Esq.	Southampton Place
JAMES ELLIS, Esq.	Tottenham Ct. Road
JOHN RICHARDS, Esq.	Bayswater
THOMAS MARSHAM, Esq.	Baker Street
Rev. HEATHCOTE, Esq.	High St. Marylebone
JOHN MAUD, Esq.	York Pl. Marylebone
GEORGE BAXTER, Esq.	Church Ter. Pancras
THOMAS TAYLOR, Esq.	Red Lion Square
DAVID DEANE, Esq.	St. John Street
WM. PALMER, Esq.	Upper St. Islington
HENRY FAYRE.	Pall Mall.

So much for the mere names and dates belonging to the transaction. Now, as to the publication itself; as to the sort of

prosecution and the manner of conducting it ; as to the charge of the Judge ; as to the verdict of the Jury ; as to the nature and amount of the Sentence : these are all before the public, whose attention to them has been very great, and to the judgment of the public I leave them. But, on the last of the Attorney General's three speeches (for he had *three* to my *one*) I cannot refrain from making some observations, and I think myself fully justified in doing this, because I was told, that I could not be permitted to answer him verbally. The speech, to which I here allude, was made on Thursday, the 5th of July, when I was called up for judgment ; and, that no one may say, that I do not treat even this Attorney General fairly, I will first insert here the whole of his speech, as it stands reported in the Morning Chronicle of the 6th of July, that report being the most correct that I have seen. In the charge of Lord Ellenborough and in the Sentence-Speech of Judge Grise, there were some passages relating to questions appertaining to general and foreign politics and to the profounder departments of *political economy*. On these I shall hereafter have occasion to offer some observations ; but, for the present, I shall confine myself to the Speech of the Attorney General, which is reported in the following words :—“ The ATTORNEY GENERAL agreed in all that had been said by his Learned Friends, in behalf of the three Defendants, for whom they appeared, as to the distinction between their guilt and that of Mr. Cobbett, as to whom he should speak by and by. “ They had allowed judgment to go against them by default ; they had never denied that the publication was a libel ; nor that they themselves, in their concern in it, had acted a criminal part. “ They had not made their defence a vehicle for other calumnies and slanders, almost as bad as the original libel. “ In all these respects, their case stood contradistinguished from that of Mr. Cobbett. There was also another distinction between their case and that of most printers and publishers. “ They had not employed the author, as some printers and publishers did, but the author had employed them. Yet these Defendants, and every other person who might chance to stand in the character of printer or publisher, must understand, that these circumstances could never exculpate them. All who lend themselves

“ to the publication of any work or “ writing whatever, must know that they “ become responsible for all the consequences thence arising.—He now came “ to the case of Mr. Cobbett. The Court “ would observe that from him the publication proceeded, and to him, as the “ author, all the profits, if any, appertained. Whatever of malignity resulted “ from the publication, to him was it attributable ; and whatever, there arose “ from it of base lucre and gain accrued “ to him alone. The Court had heard the “ Libel read, and sentiments widely different from those of the author of it must, “ on the reading of it, arise in the mind of “ every honest man. At the present time, “ when from the ambition and increased “ power of our enemy, we were obliged to “ maintain a large military force, how necessary was it that a good understanding “ should subsist between the military and “ the people. How essential was it, that “ at such a period, the soldier should “ be convinced that no unnecessary hardship was thrown on him,—that he was “ not forced to engage in any disgraceful task ? How essential that the community should be satisfied that however “ necessary a great military force at “ present is for the protection of the “ country, yet that nothing tyrannical, “ that no force beyond the law, is employed in compelling the inhabitants of “ this country into the ranks of our armies. “ The situation of the soldiers of this “ country was more comfortable than at “ any former period ; every means that “ could be devised to add to their comfort had been adopted. Our armies “ had by their zeal and valour evinced “ what were the consequences of such liberal treatment ; and by the glorious “ exertions they had made in their country's cause, had made more than an “ ample return for the comforts thus afforded them. These, he was satisfied, “ were, and must be, the sentiments of “ every good man in the kingdom. Need “ he call on the Court to look back to the “ libel, and shew them that the sentiments “ there expressed were directly contrary “ to this, he presumed to think, almost “ universal feeling ? To encourage the soldiers to “ impatience, insubordination and disgust, to tell them that they were harshly, cruelly, and tyrannically dealt with “ by their superiors, and thereby to render that duty of obedience which they

"owe their superiors disagreeable and
 "disgusting. To go back to the situation
 "of matters at the time the libel in ques-
 "tion was written. At that moment, in-
 "stead of lending a ready obedience to
 "the commands of their officers, a body
 "of Local Militia had in a mutinous man-
 "ner surrounded those very officers whom
 "it was their duty to obey. The place
 "where the transaction took place, did
 "not afford a force sufficient to quell the
 "mutiny, but a reinforcement was called
 "in from the nearest place whence a mi-
 "litary force could be properly spared,
 "and order was restored.—The aggres-
 "sors, however, were not dealt with as
 "Buonaparté would have treated his re-
 "fractory troops. The ring-leaders were
 "selected and brought before a tribunal
 "where their cases were tried and exa-
 "mined, and where, after the fairest in-
 "quiry, they were found guilty of muti-
 "ny, and had an adequate sentence
 "passed on them, part of which was
 "mildly remitted. What was the inter-
 "pretation, however, which Mr. Cobbett
 "gave to this transaction? That it was
 "not to be called a mutiny; that it was
 "a mere squabble between the men and
 "the officers for a trifle of money; that
 "the men were persons who had just
 "thrown off their smock frocks to put on
 "the garb of a soldier, and still continued
 "so much labourers as to be ignorant of
 "their duty as soldiers, and had become
 "so much soldiers as to have lost the in-
 "clination to labour. What, he asked,
 "would be the result of mutiny, if libel-
 "lers of this nature were to escape with
 "impunity? What, however, was the
 "conduct of the same person to the men
 "themselves? He taunts and upbraids
 "them with not having acted like men;
 "and instructs them, that they ought not
 "to have submitted to the chastisement
 "inflicted on them. Not only was this
 "so, but he held up to contempt and in-
 "dignation the German Legion for having
 "assisted, when called in, in quelling the
 "mutiny. He represents them as per-
 "sons who could be of no use in the ge-
 "neral service of the country, whose aid
 "could only be useful in quelling dis-
 "turbances among our native troops, and
 "that they were employed on this occa-
 "sion only because the British troops
 "would not have interfered in such a ser-
 "vice, for which the German Legion alone
 "were fit. Could we expect zealous and
 "cordial co-operation on the part of the

"foreign troops whom we were, in the
 "present situation of affairs, obliged to
 "employ, if we suffered them thus to be
 "taunted in their own persons, and to be
 "exposed to unmerited obloquy and dis-
 "grace in the eyes of the public of this
 "country? As if this, however, were not
 "enough, the Defendant, Mr. Cobbett,
 "goes the length of telling the inha-
 "bitants of the place where the trans-
 "action occurred, that they are base
 "miscreants for having seen and not
 "having assisted in resisting so infa-
 "mous and abominable a chastisement.
 "I do not know," says Mr. Cobbett, in
 "the libel in question, 'what sort of a
 "place Ely is; but I really should like
 "to know how the inhabitants looked
 "one another in the face whilst this
 "scene was exhibiting in their town. I
 "should like to have been able to see their
 "faces," and to hear their observations to
 "each other at the time.' What was
 "this but upbraiding the inhabitants of
 "Ely for sitting quietly by and seeing
 "this punishment inflicted on mutineers
 "who had been regularly tried, con-
 "victed, and sentenced to receive this
 "punishment; and telling them that
 "they ought to be ashamed to look each
 "other in the face, in consequence of their
 "not having assisted in resisting it? Black
 "as this was, this, however, was not the
 "blackest feature in the present publica-
 "tion. The author went on to hope that,
 "after this occurrence at home, we would
 "be a little more cautious in drawing
 "conclusions against Buonaparté, and
 "that we should no longer hear of the
 "cruelty, and of the tyrannical acts of
 "Buonaparté. By looking back to for-
 "mer parts of the publication, the Court
 "would find that this meant, that the
 "subjects of Buonaparté were subject to
 "a less severe measure of restraint than
 "the inhabitants of this country. "On this
 "principle, alluding to the means em-
 "ployed or said to be employed by Bu-
 "onaparté to get together and discipline
 "his conscripts, the publication states
 "that there is scarcely any one of the
 "persons who wish to cry him down that
 "has not 'at various times cited the
 "hand-cuffings, and other means of force,
 "said to be used in drawing out the
 "young men of France,' and who has
 "not cited these as affording a complete
 "proof that the people of France hate
 "Napoleon and his Government, assist
 "with reluctance in his wars, and would

"fain see another Revolution.' Should
 "it be suffered that the lawless libeller
 "should tell the inhabitants of this coun-
 "try that they were pressed into the
 "ranks of our army with more severity
 "than that which was exercised by the
 "iron hand of oppression employed by
 "the Ruler of France? There was in-
 "deed, a degree of delicacy perceptible
 "in the present publication, but it was
 "delicacy only for the enemies of this
 "country. The author, after alluding to
 "the means which Buonaparté employs
 "in filling up the ranks of his army, cor-
 "rects himself, and represents them not
 "as acts practised, but said to be prac-
 "tised, by Buonaparté, in accomplishing
 "this object.—The means which Napo-
 "leon employs (or rather which they
 "say he employs) in order to get to-
 "gether and to discipline his conscripts.
 "And who were these whom he thus
 "marks out as the 'they?' whom he thus
 "taunts as with the term of the greatest
 "reproach—the loyal? a term which
 "ought to ensure respect and regard, as
 "embracing the first duty of subjects in
 "a well regulated state towards their
 "Sovereign. This was the character of
 "the libel which the Defendant, Mr.
 "Cobbett, was now called on to answer
 "for. If this was the character of the
 "libel, which, he presumed to think,
 "could not be denied, their Lordships
 "could readily see the tendency of such
 "a publication, and they would easily
 "estimate what the consequences would
 "have been if the publication had pro-
 "duced the effects which it was calcu-
 "lated to have produced. What if the
 "soldiers had caught the spirit of dissa-
 "tisfaction and disgust, which was thus
 "suggested for their adoption? What if
 "the flame thus sought to be kindled
 "throughout the whole kingdom had
 "been lighted up? The consequences
 "were too fatal even to be pointed at.
 "It would have gone to break up every
 "thing that was estimable in society—it
 "would have gone to the destruction of
 "civilization and good government in the
 "country. It might be said by the Defen-
 "dant that the publication in question
 "had no such tendency, and that these
 "effects had not been produced. That it
 "had not the tendency contended for, he
 "(the Attorney General) denied, though
 "he admitted that, happily, it had not
 "produced the effects which it was calcu-
 "lated to produce. That the publication

"in question had not produced the effects
 "which might have been expected from
 "it, we owed to the love of the subjects of
 "this country towards their Sovereign and
 "the established Government. We owed
 "no thanks of this kind, to Mr. Cobbett.
 "It became, however, the duty of that
 "Court to prevent and guard against the
 "recurrence of such libels in time coming.
 "Mr. Cobbett himself had taught the
 "Court what the consequences of passing
 "by such publications with impunity
 "would be. He had told the Court that
 "other libellers had been passed by, and
 "argued upon that as a ground for his
 "own impunity. If he were to-day to be
 "passed by, or to be visited with a light
 "punishment, would not this, to-morrow,
 "be adduced as a precedent in favour of
 "other libellers? Would they not be en-
 "titled to say, "If I, by libelling, be
 "enabled to make a fortune, and to amass
 "wealth, when, in return, I will only have
 "to sustain so slight a punishment as that
 "passed on Mr. Cobbett, will I not cheer-
 "fully incur the penalty." If the Court
 "should now visit Mr. Cobbett with a light
 "punishment, could they answer for it
 "that their arm would be strong enough,
 "next year, to check the evil to which
 "he (the Attorney-General) contended
 "they were called on to give a vital blow
 "this day? It now lay in the Court to in-
 "flict on the Defendant, Mr. Cobbett, a
 "just and wholesome punishment, ade-
 "quate to his offence. They had had
 "before them libellers on the private cha-
 "racter of individuals; such they had
 "esteemed proper objects of punishment;
 "and that the punishment so inflicted
 "would tend to diminish the frequency
 "of the offence, if not to prevent it en-
 "tirely. They had had before them those
 "even who had been guilty of libelling
 "the administration of justice in the
 "country. That was a high offence, be-
 "cause it tended to take from the credit
 "and authority due to the judgments of
 "the Courts of Law, and tended to make
 "them of less effect. Such offences, and
 "justly too, were visited with a severe
 "chastisement. But, if that offence, great
 "as it was, were to be compared with
 "that now under consideration, it must
 "sink into utter insignificance. The pre-
 "sent libel went to subvert society itself,
 "and whatever might be thought of the
 "atrociousness of others which had preceded
 "it, the present was one of a much darker
 "and blacker hue. The Court were

"therefore called on to inflict such a punishment as should, at least, make men pause before they embarked in libels similar to that published by the Defendant, Mr. Cobbett. The army, against whom this libel was in a peculiar manner directed, called on the Court for justice against its traducer. The Government called on them for confirmation of its legal powers; for what Government could possibly exist if it were not protected against such attacks as these? The country; which looked with horror on the mischievous tendency of the libel now under consideration, called on them for protection against the numerous evils which the propagation of such publications were calculated to engender, going, as they did, to the total subversion of social order, and to the existence of this country as a nation. Being once brought before the Court, they (the Public) knew that they might have confidence in their protection, and that they would no longer have occasion to dread a repetition of such outrageous insult. He called on the Court, therefore, for judgment on the Defendant. He called for justice; and that justice he knew would be tempered with mercy, but he trusted, that the Court would not forget that mercy was equally due to the public as to the Defendant at the bar."

Now, as to the necessity of a great military force in this country, and as to the cause of that necessity; as to the general treatment of the soldiers in this country and their being better treated than at any former period; as to the punishment inflicted upon the Local Militia at Ely; as to the employing of the Germans upon that occasion; as to the use of German Troops in this country at all; as to the people of Ely being able to look one another in the face; as to the manner in which Napoleon would have treated the Local Militia; and as to my "delicacy" towards the enemies of my country: these are all matters upon which I shall say nothing at all. They have all been fully discussed; they are all well understood; there can be, in the mind of no man of common-sense, a mistake with respect to them. There is, indeed, one little sentence, made use of by the Attorney General, respecting the treatment of the Soldiers, which is rather obscure; at least to me it is so. He is stated to have said: "How essential is it that the community should be satisfied, that nothing tyrannical,

that no force beyond the law, is employed in compelling the inhabitants of this country into the ranks of the army." I do not understand the meaning of this. These two phrases are, in my view of things, by no means synonymous; because, if they were, the oppressions, which, as we are told, and, perhaps, truly, the people of France are compelled to undergo, would not properly form a subject of complaint, seeing that they are all exercised under the sanction of law. There are *Decrees* or *Senatus Consulta* for the forcing of the young men of France to go into the army; yet, the forcing of them so to go has been, and yet is, represented, in this country, as being most abominably tyrannical. I perfectly agree with the Attorney General, that it is essential, that the community should be satisfied that "nothing tyrannical" is employed in compelling the inhabitants of this country into the ranks of the army; but, towards the producing of this desirable effect his statement is not at all likely to contribute; and, indeed, unless he had stopped at the word "tyrannical," and spared the subsequent definition, he would have done well to hold his tongue upon this part of the subject.

There are THREE assertions made by the Attorney General, during this memorable speech, which assertions materially affect me, and upon which, therefore, I must beg leave to trouble my readers with some observations. The FIRST of these assertions is, that I made my "defence a vehicle for other calumnies and slanders, almost as bad as the original libel."—The SECOND, that I wrote the publication in question, and, generally, every thing I wrote, for "base lucre." He does not say this in so many words; but, in speaking of the cases of the other defendants, as *contradistinguished* from mine, he says, that whatever arose from it (the publication) of "base lucre and gain" accrued to me alone. And then, in another part of his speech, where he is stating the evil consequences, which, in the way of example, will arise from a slight punishment of me, he asks if other libellers will not, in such case, be entitled to say: "If I, by libelling, be enabled to make a fortune, and to amass wealth, when, in return, I will only have to sustain so slight a punishment as that passed on Mr. Cobbett, will I not cheerfully incur the penalty?"—The THIRD assertion is, that the Army called upon the court to punish me. The

words are these, as given in the report :
 " The *army*, against whom this libel is in
 " a peculiar manner directed, calls on the
 " court for justice against *its traducer*."

—There are several other assertions, which, as occasion offers, I may be disposed to notice ; but, these three are all that I shall notice at present.

With respect to the FIRST, namely, that I had made my defence a vehicle for *other calumnies and slanders*, much more need not be said, than was said by every one who heard or read the speech, and that is, that it is very strange, that these new calumnies were not *named* by the person who was speaking in aggravation. He had had nearly a month to consider of, and to inquire into, the *facts* (for I dealt not in *insinuations*) stated by me in my defence ; and, how comes it that he did not *contradict* any one of those facts ? How came he to content himself with a general assertion, unsupported with even an alledged fact ? Had he not *time* to go more minutely into the matter ; or did he, out of mercy, forbear to *prove* these new calumnies upon me ? Was it compassion that operated with him upon this occasion ? —These " calumnies," as he calls them, were brought forth in *answer* to, and in *contradiction* of, assertions made by him in his first speech. It is, therefore, very surprizing, that he should not have made an attempt, at least, to refute them. He seems to have been very anxious to *put every thing right* in the public mind ; and how comes he, then, to have left these " calumnies" totally unanswered, especially when he looked upon them as being " almost as bad as the original libel ?"

Upon the SECOND assertion, that I had written the publication in question for gain's sake ; that I had *amassed wealth*, made a *fortune* by libelling ; and that, I had, in short, in my writings, been actuated by a craving after *base lucre* ; upon this, the first observation to make, is, that it contains a beautiful compliment to the people of this country, and comes in with peculiar fitness close after the assertions, that their *good sense* prevented the mischiefs which the publication was calculated to excite, and that they even called upon the court to punish me. No ! the people of this country were so sensible, so discerning, so loyal, and held libelling in such abhorrence, that they were not to be excited to sedition by me ; and, in a minute afterwards, to publish libels is, in this country, the way to *make a fortune*.

The *Army*, too, abhorred this work of libelling, and even called upon the court to punish me for it ; and yet, but only a minute before, there was great danger of my creating disaffection in the army, of throwing every thing into confusion, and of producing the destruction of " Social Order and our Holy Religion," as John Bowles has it. The Attorney General was in a difficulty. It would not do to say, that my writing had *no effect* upon either the people or the army ; it would not do to say, that what I wrote dropped still-born from the press, or, that it made no impression upon any body ; it would not do to say this, and yet it was paying me too great a compliment to suppose that I had the power of inducing any body to think or to feel with me ; therefore, I was, in one and the same speech, represented as a most *mischievous* and a most *insignificant* writer.

But, to return to the charge of writing for " *base lucre*," I think the public will have perceived, that there was nothing *original* in this part of the Attorney General's speech ; for, the charge had, in all forms of words, been long before made by the basest of my calumniators, by the vile wretches, who notoriously use their pens and their pencils for pay, and who do not, like me, look for remuneration to the *sale* of their works to the public. The idea of my having " *amassed wealth*," arose in the first place, perhaps, from the envy of the worst and most despicable part of those, who wished to live by the press, but who did not possess the requisite talents to insure success to their endeavours, and at the same time preserve their independence ; or, who were so deficient in point of industry as to render their talents of no avail ; and who, therefore, resorted to that species of traffic, which exposed them to my lash. Such men would naturally hate me. Such men would naturally wish for my destruction. Such men would naturally stick at no falsehood, at no sort or size of calumny against a man, whose success was at once an object of their envy and the means of their continual annoyance. But, from a person in the situation of Attorney General one might have expected a little more caution in speaking of the character and motives of any man.

Let me, before I come to my particular case, first ask why the gains of a writer or of a book or news-paper proprietor are to be called " *base lucre*," any more than the gains of any other description of per-

sons. MILTON and SWIFT and ADDISON received money for their works; nay, POPE received more, perhaps, than all of them put together, and wrote, too, with ten times more severity and more personality than I ever did; and yet, no one ever thought, I believe, of giving to his gains the name of "*base lucre*." This is a most sweeping blow at the press. Let no one connected with it, in any way whatever, imagine that his pecuniary possessions or his estate, if he has gained one, will, or can, escape the application of this liberal charge. The fortunes of Mr. Walter and Mr. Perry and Mr. Stuart and Mr. Longman and Mr. Cadell and of all the rest of them, are all to be considered as "*base lucre*." Base lucre is the fruit of the industry and talents of every man who works with his pen; and those whose business it is to inform and instruct mankind are either to be steeped in poverty, or to be regarded as sordid and base hunters after gain. Dr. Johnson, if now living, must at this rate, be liable to be charged with hunting after "*base lucre*," for he really lived by the use of his pen. Paley also sold his writings, and so, I dare say, did Locke; and why not, then, impute baseness to them on this account? It is notorious, that thousands of priests and even Bishops have sold their writings, not excepting their sermons; and is not that hunting after "*base lucre*?" It is equally notorious that Lawyers are daily in the habit of selling reports of cases and other writings appertaining to their profession; and what can their gain thereby be called, then, but "*base lucre*?" Burke sold his writings as well as Paine did his; nay, the former, for many years, and being a member of the Honourable House all the while, actually wrote for pay in a periodical work, called the *Annual Register*; and, of course, he sought therein after "*base lucre*." Base lucre it was, according to this doctrine, that set Malone to edit Shakespeare, and that induced Mr. Tooke to write his *Divisions of Purley*; and, in short, every writer, whether upon law, physic, divinity, politics, ethics, or any thing else, if he sell the productions of his pen, is exposed to this new and hitherto-unheard-of charge.

There is, indeed, a species of gain, arising from the use of the pen, which does well merit the appellation of "*base lucre*;" but, the "*Learned Friend*" seems to have mistaken the mark. When a man bargains for the price of maintain-

ing such or such principles, or of endeavouring to make out such or such a case, without believing in the soundness of the principles or the truth of the case; such a man, whether he touch the cash (or paper-money) before or after the performance of his work, and whether he work with his tongue or his pen, may, I think, be pretty fairly charged with seeking after "*base lucre*;" for he, in such case, manifestly sells not only the use of his talents, but his sincerity into the bargain, and drives a traffic as nearly allied to soul-selling as any thing in this world can be; nor does it signify a straw from what quarter, or in what shape, the remuneration may come, for the motive being base, the gain or lucre must be base also. Again, if a man receive from the taxes, that is to say, from the people's money, a reward for writing any thing, especially upon controverted political questions, the lucre accruing to him may fairly be called base; for here, as in the former case, he makes a base bargain for the use of his talents. It is the same with those, who are mere proprietors of works and not writers, and who vend their pages for a like consideration, coming from a like source. But, if a man sell to the public, sell to any one that chooses to buy with his own money, and resort to no means of cheating the purchaser out of the price of what is sold, there can be nothing of baseness attached to his gains. The article is offered to the public; those who do not choose to purchase let it alone; there is no compulsion; there is no monopoly in the way of purchasing elsewhere, and there is nothing of baseness belonging to the transaction; the gain is fair and honourable; it is the right of the possessor, and more perfectly his right, perhaps, than gain of any other sort can possibly be.

After these general observations, it is hardly necessary for me to say much upon my particular case, it being impossible that the reader should not have already perceived clearly, that the charge of seeking after "*base lucre*" is quite inapplicable to me. But, I cannot, upon such an occasion, refrain from stating some facts, calculated to show the injustice and falshood of this charge, when preferred against me as proprietor of a public print. I have now been, either in America or England, sole proprietor of a public print for upwards of fourteen years, with the intermission of about a

year of that time, and I never did upon any occasion whatever, take money or money's worth, for the insertion of the suppression of any paragraph or article whatsoever, though it is well known, that the practice is as common as any other branch of the business belonging to newspapers in general. Many hundreds of pounds have been offered to me in this way, as my several clerks and agents can bear witness; and, had I hankered after "*base lucre*," the reader will readily believe, that I should have received all that was so offered. From the daily newspaper, which I published after my return to England, I excluded all Quack-Advertisements, because I looked upon them as indecent and having a mischievous tendency, and because to insert them appeared to me to be assisting imposture. These advertisements are, it is well known, a great source of profit to the proprietors of news-papers; and, if I had been attached to "*base lucre*," should I have rejected my share of that profit? I lost many hundreds of pounds by my daily news-paper, which failed, not for want of readers, but solely because I would not *take money* in the same way that other proprietors did. Whether this were wise or foolish is now of no consequence; but, the fact is, at any rate, quite sufficient to repel the charge of seeking after "*base lucre*."

From my out-set as a writer to the present hour I have always preferred principle to gain. In America the king's minister made, and not at all improperly, offers of service to me, on the part of the ministry at home. The offer was put as of service to any relations that I might have in England, and my answer was, that if I could *earn any thing myself* where-with to assist my relations, I should assist them, but that I would not be the cause of their receiving any thing out of the *public purse*. Mr. Liston, then our minister in America can bear testimony to the truth of this statement. And, was this the conduct of a man, who sought after "*base lucre*?" Is this the conduct which is now fashionable among those who call themselves "*the loyal*," and the "*king's friends*?" Do they reject offers of the *public purse*? Do they take care to keep their poor relations out of their own earnings or property, or do they throw *earn, neck and heels*, upon the public to be maintained out of the taxes, as a higher order of paupers? I have acted up to my

professions. I have, at this time, dependent upon me, for almost every thing, nearly *twenty children* besides my own. I walk on foot, where others would ride in a coach, that I may have the means of yielding them support; that I may have the means of preventing every one belonging to me from seeking support from the public, in any shape whatever. Is this the fashion of "*the loyal*?" Do "*the loyal*" act thus? Do they make sacrifices in order that their poor relations may not become a charge to the public? Let that public answer this question, and say to whom the charge of seeking after "*base lucre*" belongs.

I wonder whether it has ever happened to the Attorney General to reject the offer of *two acres of plate*, tendered him for the successful exertion of his talents? This has happened to me, though the offer, on each occasion, was made in the most delicate manner, though the service had been already performed, though the thing was done with, and the offer could not have a prospective view, and though the service had been performed without any previous application. I wonder whether Sir Vicary Gibbs did ever reject an offer of this sort? And I do wonder, how many there are amongst the whole tribe of "*learned friends*," who have, or ever will have to accuse themselves of such an act? Yet has he the assurance to impute my writings to motives of "*base lucre*." The truth is, that I am hated by the pretended "*loyal*," because I am proof against all the temptations of *base lucre*. I have spoken of the offer made me, while in America. Upon my return home the ministers made me other offers, and, amongst the rest, they offered me a share of the *True Briton news-paper*, conducted and nominally owned by Mr. HERRIOT. I, who was what the country people call a *green-horn*, as to such matters, and who was gull enough to think, that it was *principle* that actuated every writer on what I then deemed the right side; I was quite astonished to find, that the *Treasury* was able to offer me a share in a news-paper. I rejected the offer in the most delicate manner that I could; but, I never was forgiven. I have experienced, as might have been expected, every species of abuse since that time; but, I did not, I must confess, expect ever to be accused of writing for "*base lucre*." This is a charge, which, as I shewed upon the trial, originated with the very scum of the

press, and had its foundation in the worst and most villainous of passions.

In general it is a topic of exultation, that industry and talent are rewarded with the possession of *wealth*. The great object of the teachers of youth, in this country, seems always to have been the instilling into their minds, that *wealth* was the sure reward of industry and ability. Upon what ground, then, is it that the "*amassing of wealth*," the "*making of a fortune*," by the use of industry and talents, is to be considered as meriting reproach in me? The fact is not true. I have not *amassed wealth*, and have not *made a fortune*, in any fair sense of those phrases. I do not possess a quarter part as much as I should, in all probability, have gained, by the use of the same degree of industry and ability, in trade or commerce. But, if the fact were otherwise, and if I rode in a coach and four instead of keeping one pleasure horse, and that one only because it is thought necessary to the health of my wife; if I had really a fortune worthy of being so called, what right would any one have to reproach me with the possession of it? I have been labouring seventeen years, since I quitted the army. I have never known what it was to enjoy any of that which the world calls pleasure. From a beginning with nothing I have acquired the means of making some little provision for a family of *six children* (the remains of *thirteen*), besides having, for several years, maintained almost wholly, three times as many children of my relations. And, am I to be reproached as a lover of "*base lucre*," because I begin to have a prospect (for it is nothing more) of making such provision? And, am I now, upon such a charge, to be stripped, in one way or another, of the means of making such provision? Was it not manly and brave for the Attorney General, when he knew that I should not be permitted to answer him, to make such an attack, not only upon me but upon the future comfort of those, who depend upon me for support? Verily, *this* is not to be forgotten presently. As long as I or my children are able to remember, *this* will be borne in mind; and, I have not the smallest doubt of seeing the day, when Sir Vicary Gibbs, and those who belong to him, will not think of any such thing as that of reproaching us with the possession of our own earnings.

During the time that I was absent from home for the purpose of giving bail, as be-

fore stated, a man, dressed like a gentleman, went upon my land in the neighbourhood of Botley, got into conversation with my servants, asked them how much property I had, where it lay, of whom I had purchased it, what I had given for it, whether I was upon the point of purchasing any more, and a great many other questions of the same sort. When he went away from one of them, he told him: "You will not have Cobbett here again for one while;" or words to that effect. I leave the public to form their opinions as to the object of this visit, and of the person who made it. The truth of the fact can, at any time, be verified upon oath. If this scoundrel had been put to the test, I wonder what account he could have rendered of the source of his means; of the money which had purchased the clothes upon his back. Not long before the time just mentioned, another person of a similar description went to another man who works for me, asked him what sort of a man I was, what he had ever heard me say about the king of the government, and told him that some people thought me a very great enemy of the government. The person went into a little public house in the neighbourhood of my farm, where he got into conversation with those whom he found there, and contrived soon to make that conversation turn upon me. He heard nothing but good of me as a neighbour and a master; and, as to *politics*, not a soul that he talked to knew what he meant, never having in their lives heard me utter a word upon any subject of that sort. Of the two servants, whom I have alluded to above, the name of the former is JOHN DEAN and that of the latter JAMES COWHERD; both of them men, upon whose word I can rely, and who, as I said before, are ready to verify this statement upon their oaths.—The modesty and good manners of my men induced them to give answers to the questions of these base rascals, without suspecting any thing of their real character or design; nor had either of them the smallest notion of that design, until my return home, and until I had acquainted them with the nature of my situation. If the design (which must, I think, be manifest enough to the reader) had been known, their bones, or, at least, their skin, would, I am afraid, have carried off a testimonial of their baseness and of the indignation of my servants. The base miscreants would then have had a *feeling proof* of the sentiments entertained

towards me by those who know me best and have had the greatest experience of my disposition.—I leave the public to ruminate upon what I have here stated, relative to the inquiries of these villains. The miscreant, who went to make the inquiries about the extent of my property, did not, it seems, go to Botley, but appeared to go from, and to return to, some town or village upon the Gosport road, fearing, apparently, to be known, or, at least, traced, if he put up at the inn at Botley.—I leave the public, I say, to form their opinion upon these facts. It is, I think, quite unnecessary for me to give any opinion of my own.

One cannot, however, help observing how very finely all these things agree with the notion, now and occasionally heretofore endeavoured to be propagated, that I am *a person not worthy of notice*. This notion agrees admirably with all that the public has seen and heard for the last twelve months, during which time there has been more written and printed against me individually than would, if collected together, make twenty thick quarto volumes; and, (melancholy to relate!) without producing the loss of one of my friends, the falling off of one of my readers, or the robbing me of one wink of my sleep, while my enemies, if upon any occasion, they dare shew themselves, become objects of public hatred and scorn; and I solemnly declare, that I would rather commit the horrid and cowardly act of suicide than change names and characters with the very best, or rather, the least bad, of all those enemies, whether I look amongst the young or the old, amongst the profligates of the hypocrites, amongst the daring robbers or the sly and smooth cheaters.

My readers know, that, besides the Political Register, I have undertaken and am carrying on three other publications, namely, *THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY*, *THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES*, and *THE STATE TRIALS*; and, under the present circumstances, I think it will not be deemed egotistic if I say something about them. These works, particularly the former and the latter, so far from being undertaken with a hope of merely *gaining money*, were undertaken with the *certainly of making money* for some time, at least; probably for many years; and possibly for ever. They were works which, though absolutely necessary to the completing of our political libraries, none of the booksellers in London, though many of them

are possessed of ten times my pecuniary means, would venture to undertake. After long waiting they promise profit; but, it must be evident to every man at all acquainted with the matter, that "*base lucre*" could form no part of the object with which they were undertaken. I have heard others applauded for their *public-spirit* in encountering what have been called *great national works*. What a clutter was made in this way about large editions of Shakespeare and Milton, which were, at last, got rid of by the means of a *Lottery*, authorised by act of parliament. The terms *liberality* and *munificence* were given to the undertakers of those works; but, was there any thing in them of *national utility* worthy of being compared with these works of mine? I have encountered these works, unaided by any body; I shall ask the Honourable House for no Lottery to carry them through; I trust solely to their real *intrinsic merit* for their success; and, if they do succeed, shall I therefore be accused of seeking after "*base lucre*?" This work, of which I now begin the *Eighteenth Volume*, has had nothing to support it but its own merits. Not a pound, not even a pound in paper-money, was ever expended upon advertising it. It came up like a grain of mustard seed, and, like a grain of mustard seed it has spread over the whole civilized world. And why has it spread more than other publications of the same kind? There have not been wanting imitations of it. There have been some dozens of them, I believe. Same size, same form, same type, same heads of matter; same title all but the word expressing my name. How many efforts have been made to tempt the public away from me, while not one attempt has been made by me to prevent it! Yet all have failed. The changeling has been discovered, and the wretched adventurers have then endeavoured to wreak their vengeance on me. They have sworn that I write badly; that I publish nothing but trash; that I am both fool and knave. But, still the readers hang on to me. One would think, as Falstaff says, that I had given them love powder. No: but I have given them as great a rarity, and something full as attractive; namely, *truth in clear language*. I have stripped statement and reasoning of the foppery of affectation; and, amongst my other sins, is that of having shown, of having proved beyond all dispute, that very much of what is called "*learning*" is imposture, quite useless to any man whom

God has blessed with brains. The public, however much in many cases, some of them dissent from my opinions, will never be persuaded that my views are *inimical to my country*, or have any *dishonourable object*. Nothing will ever persuade any man, be he who he may, sincerely to believe this. There are many, who will pretend to believe it; but, they will not believe it at bottom, and they will read on. The public has perceived in me a sort of conduct towards my adversaries, which they never witnessed in any other public writer. They have seen, that I always insert and give publicity to, whatever is sent in answer to myself. This is a proof of my love of truth ten thousand times stronger than any professions however strong. It is a *speaking fact*, which is always the thing to produce the most impression. The Register has created in England, and even in other countries, a new taste in reading, and an entirely new set of notions upon political matters; and, can it be possible, that any one is to be persuaded, that such an effect is to be produced by mere *libelling*? No: nor will any one believe, that it is to be produced by a mind bent upon "*base lucre*." If "*base lucre*" had been my principal object, or, indeed, if it had been a considerable object with me, I never should have written with effect; because to write with effect, one's mind must be *free*, which it never can be if the love of gain be uppermost. Besides; how inconsistent is this charge of "*base lucre*" with the charge of *seditions intentions*? The two things are absolutely incompatible with one another; for, if insurrection and confusion were to take place, all the works above mentioned, all the numerous volumes of those works, whence my profits are to come, if they come at all, would, at once, cease to be of any more use than so many square bits of wood. For a man, who has real property, to wish for the annihilation of those laws, by which alone that property is secured to him, is not very likely; for a man, who, like me is planting trees and sowing acorns and making roads and breaking up wastes, to wish for the destruction of order and law and property is still less likely; but, for a man, the chief part of whose property consists of what must of necessity become mere waste paper in case of a destruction of order and law, for such a man to wish for such destruction is utterly out of belief, and quite *impossible* if he be a seeker after "*base lucre*."

So much for the two first assertions of the Attorney General. The *THIRD*, namely, that the ARMY was anxious to see me punished, I will inquire into in my next. It will take up some considerable space; for, I am resolved to show, and that in a manner to leave *no doubt* in the mind of any man, that the Army has no reason to find fault with me, that I have always been the friend of the soldier, and that, of course, I merit not his bad wishes. —I shall have much to bring up next week, and I propose, in order *at once* to get things smooth, to publish a *double number*. —The reader will, I am sure, excuse me for giving, under the present circumstances, the precedence to observations more immediately relating to myself; but, he need not fear, that I shall trespass much upon him in this way. I shall resume my usual course of proceeding, and, according to my former practice, leave my calumniators to choke in their own gall.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
13th July, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

HOLLAND.—*From the Royal Amsterdam Gazette, July 4, 1810.*

Amsterdam, July 3.—Louis Napoleon, by the Grace of God and the Constitution of the Kingdom, King of Holland, Constable of France.—To all those who may see, or hear, or read these presents, health.—Hollanders! Being convinced that nothing more for your interest or your welfare can be effected by me, but, on the contrary, considering myself as an obstacle which may prevent the good will and intentions of my brother towards this country, I have resigned my rank and royal dignity in favour of my eldest son, Napoleon Louis, and of his brother, Prince Charles Louis Napoleon.—Her Majesty, the Queen, being of right, and according to the Constitution Regent of the kingdom, the Regency shall, till her arrival, be vested in the Council of Ministers.—Hollanders! never shall I forget so good and virtuous a people as you are. My last thought, as well as my last sigh, shall be for your happiness. On leaving you I cannot sufficiently recommend you to receive well the military and civil officers of France. This is the only means to gratify his Majesty the Emperor, on whom your

fate, that of your children, and that of your whole country, depends. And now, as ill-will and calumny can no longer reach me, at least so far as relates to you, I have a well-founded hope, that you will at length find the reward for all your sacrifices, and for all your magnanimous firmness.—Done at Haerlem, July 1, 1810.

LOUIS NAPOLEON.

Louis Napoleon, by the Grace of God, and the Constitution of the Kingdom, King of Holland, Constable of France.—Considering that the unfortunate state in which this country now is arises from the displeasure which the Emperor my brother has conceived against me;—Considering that all endeavours and sacrifices on my part to support this state of things, have been fruitless;—Considering lastly, that it cannot be doubted that the course of the present state of things is to be attributed to my having been unfortunate enough to displease my brother, and to have lost his friendship, and that I therefore am the only obstacle to the termination of these incessant differences and misunderstandings;—We have resolved, as we by these letters, published by our own free will, do resolve to resign, as we do from this moment resign, the royal dignity of this Kingdom of Holland, in favour of our well beloved Son Napoleon Louis, and in failure of him, in favour of his brother Charles Louis Napoleon.—We further desire, that according to the constitution under the guarantee of his Majesty the Emperor our Brother, the Regency shall remain with her Majesty the Queen, assisted by a Council of Regency, which shall provisionally consist of our Ministers, to whom we commit the custody of our minor King, till the arrival of her Majesty the Queen.—We further order, that the different corps of our guard, under the command of Lieutenant-General Bruno, and General Bruno, second in command, shall render their service to the Minor King of this Kingdom; and that the Great Officers of the Crown, as well as the Civil and Military Officers of our Household, shall continue to render their customary services to the same high personage.—The present act done and concluded, and signed by our hand, shall be transmitted to the Legislative Body, and then deposited copies shall be taken, and these letters be published in a legal manner, and in the customary form.

LOUIS NAPOLEON.

Haerlem, July 1, 1810.

In the name of his Majesty Napoleon Louis, by the Grace of God and the Constitution of the Kingdom, King of Holland, the Provisional Council of Regency of the Kingdom of Holland, to all those who may see, hear, or read these presents makes known.

That in consequence of the resignation of the Royal dignity and authority made by his Majesty, Louis Napoleon, in favour of the Crown Prince, his Majesty's eldest son, Napoleon Louis and his brother, Prince Charles Louis Napoleon, and by virtue of his Majesty's authority contained in the open and sealed letters published by him on the 1st of July 1810, the Provisional Regency has this day constituted itself, under the Presidency of the Minister Van Der Heim, waiting the arrival of her Majesty the Queen, as constitutional Regent of the kingdom, and guardian of the minor King, and in expectation of the measures which her Majesty shall be pleased to adopt relative to public affairs.—Amsterdam, July 3, 1810.

“VAN DER HEIM.

By order of the Provisional Council of Regency.

“A. J. J. H. VERHULSTEN,

“First Secretary of the Cabinet of the King.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs hereby notifies to the inhabitants of the capital, by special order of his Majesty the King, that on Wednesday next, the 4th of July, the French troops will enter this capital.—As it is his Majesty's express will and desire that the troops of his illustrious Brother may be received and treated in a suitable manner, he expects that every one will concur in receiving those brave troops with friendship and esteem, and treat them as is due to friends and allies, and especially to the troops of the Emperor Napoleon.—The justly famed military discipline, which, besides so many other military virtues, distinguishes these troops, is a guarantee to the inhabitants of this capital for the safety of their persons and property; and also assures these troops that they will every where be received and treated as friends and allies, as every one must be sensible of how much importance it is to the whole country in general, and the capital in particular, to fulfil in this respect the utmost wishes of his Majesty. His Majesty, therefore, trusts that the inhabitants of the capital, feeling their duty in this respect, will zealously co-operate

in that which is of such importance to this city, and to the whole kingdom, and avoid the destructive consequences which must ensue, should they, contrary to all expectations, be guilty of an opposite conduct.

The above-mentioned Minister,
VANDER CAPELLAN.

Amsterdam, July 2, 1810.

AMERICA.—*Circular.*—*Treasury Department, May 14, 1810.*

Sir—You will herewith receive a printed copy of an Act concerning the Commercial Intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their Dependencies, and for other purposes.—The instructions formally given respecting the execution of provisions of a similar nature, being applicable to the two first sections of the Act, it is only necessary to observe, that the exclusion from the harbours or waters under the jurisdiction of the United States, embraces (subject only to the exceptions made by the act) every description of British or French armed vessels, whether public or private, and whether sailing with or without a commission, authorising the capture of vessels.—All other restrictions on the Commercial Intercourse with France or Great Britain, not previously repealed, have expired on the 1st instant. I am, &c.

ALBERT GALLATIN.

SPAIN.—*Order to convoke the Cortes.*

Ferdinand, by the Grace of God, King of Spain and the Indies, and in his Royal name, the Council of Regency, to all Presidents, Governors, &c. be it made known, that under the 18th of the present month of June, I have thought fit to issue the following Decree:

“The Council of Regency of Spain and the Indies, desirous of giving to the whole nation an irrefragable proof of its ardent zeal for its benefit, and to adopt the means for its salvation, has determined, in the Royal name of our Sovereign, that the Extraordinary and General Cortes, already ordered, shall be immediately assembled; and for this purpose it is directed, that such elections shall be completed, as have not yet been concluded. Those Members already chosen, and such as shall be chosen pursuant to this Decree, are hereby required to meet in August next, in the Royal Isle of León.

As soon as the major part are there collected, that instant the Sessions shall be opened, and in the mean while the Council of Regency shall occupy itself in removing the difficulties which might obstruct the design of this solemn Convention. XAVIER DE CASTAÑOS, Pres. &c.”

To Don Nicolas Maria de Sierra.

“This Royal Decree has been communicated by my order to my Supreme Council, &c. that it may be printed and published, and punctually obeyed. For which purpose I command all Presidents, Governors, &c. in their respective districts to execute the same, &c.

I, THE KING.”

ESTEVAN VAREA, Secretary, &c.

June 20, 1810.

SOUTH AMERICA.—The Council of Regency of Spain and the Indies being informed that a publication has been made, purporting to be a Royal Order, of the date of the 17th of May last, on the Commerce with America, which is contrary to the established law in those dominions.—We hereby declare, that no such order has been issued, and we further direct, that all copies of such a fictitious order be collected and burnt, and that this notice be published in the Gazette of the Regency, and other public Journals, that all may be obedient thereto.

SUPERIOR JUNTA OF CATALONIA.—The Junta of this principality being informed that some ill-intentioned persons, disregarding the public good, and those patriotic sentiments by which all Spaniards should be animated, have dared, from sordid motives, to purchase the estates of certain individuals who have emigrated from the districts occupied by the enemy, and have done this in open defiance of the order of the 20th Nov. last, which makes such practices high treason; the Junta, to restrain such offences, again declares the like practices, so pernicious to the State, treasonable, and commands that the effects of the delinquents be confiscated. It also declares that the property of such persons be confiscated who, having emigrated on the approach of the enemy, have returned to their estates from the fear that the enemy would seize upon their possessions. The value so acquired shall be devoted to those faithful Spaniards who have been driven from

their homes and have preserved their integrity. A reward of 320 rials shall be given to any one who will mention the name of any offender against this order, and the name of the informer shall not be exposed.

SWEDEN.—From the *Stockholm Gazette*,
June 21, 1810.

Gottenburgh, June 25.—By a Courier arrived this morning from Stockholm, we have learnt the intelligence of a riot having broken out in that city on the 21st, the day on which the corpse of the late Crown Prince was conducted to the Palace previous to its interment. Count Fersen, who led the procession in capacity of Riks Marshal (High Marshal) of the kingdom, was attacked by the mob, on suspicion of having been accessory to the death of his Royal Highness. They commenced by assaulting his carriage with stones, &c. but the Count having escaped into a house was followed by the infuriated populace, who literally tore him to pieces.—Another account states, having got out of his carriage, the mob entirely surrounded him, and stoned him to death; after which they retired to their homes.—Since the above-mentioned courier, another express is said to have been received, bringing an account of the mob having re-collected on the following day, and surrounded the houses of Count Uglas and Countess Piper, but fortunately neither of them fell into their power.—From subsequent accounts it appears, that several lives were lost, as ultimately the soldiers were, in their own defence, compelled to fire on the people. General Adlereritz was struck a violent blow on his back, but secured the man. The mob at one time agreed to a parley, and consented to proposals made by the General that Count Fersen should be carried to prison; but another party of insurrectionists arriving, he was torn from the soldiers and murdered, by being stoned and trampled on: it is positively said, that his eyes were beat out.

"Public notice is hereby given, that the intercourse of post, which, during the war, was established between Gottenburgh and England, is now to cease.

"General Post Office in Stockholm;
June 20, 1810."

The following Proclamation was yesterday issued:—

"We Charles by the Grace of God, King of Sweden—It was with the most profound concern, we received the unexpected intelligence, that on the occasion, when the corpse of his royal highness the late Crown Prince was brought to this capital, and when, by a general mourning, attended by tranquillity and order, the deep sense of the irreparable loss which we have sustained, and which we deeply lament, was to be manifested, some evil disposed persons, forgetful to the duty they owe to their fellow-subjects, atrociously committed murder, disgraceful to the Swedish name. We consider it as a consolation necessary to our wounded feelings hereby publicly to express how much we feel concerned on account of the unfortunate consequences occasioned by the disturbances which again took place last night after all possible admonitions had been used in vain by the Commander of our troops to prevail upon the multitude to disperse; and after public notice had been given, that force would be resisted by force, and strong means employed to restore public tranquillity and secure personal safety, the mob attacked the peaceful troops with stones and insulting language, until the latter found themselves necessitated by our gracious command for the protection of the law and public order, and in their lawful defence, to meet force by force, which at length produced the beneficial result, that the multitude dispersed, and public order was restored. We entertain the confident hope, that public tranquillity will in future be preserved, and that even those who for a moment would forget their duty, and suffer themselves to become the tools of lawless and perfidious intrigues, will entertain a proper sense of the dangers to which they are exposed if they continue their criminal conduct. All our faithful and beloved subjects we graciously desire and exhort, mindful of the duty which religion, as well as the laws of our country imperiously impose on them, to rely with confidence on the measures which we are determined to pursue for the purpose of preventing all acts of violence, and preserving public tranquillity and peace, and to listen with obedience to the order which will be given them on our part by their superiors, Magistrates and Commanders. We commend all to the peculiar attention of Almighty God.

CHARLES F. A. BORTZELL.
Stockholm Castle, June 21.

GENERAL SARRAZIN.—*Report made to the French Emperor concerning General Sarrazin, June 30, 1810.*

"Sire—Your Majesty has directed me, by your order of the date of the 18th of this month, to make a report of all that concerns the Ex-General Sarrazin.—John Sarrazin was born in the borough of Saint Silocshe, in the canton of Penne, in the department of the Lot and Garonne, on the 15th of August, 1770, his parents were farmers. On the 27th of September, 1786, he enrolled himself in the 5th Regiment of Dragoons which was disbanded on the 14th of September, 1787.—At this time he settled at Reole, in the department of La Gironde, where he exercised the profession of teacher of mathematics. On the 1st of September 1790, he obtained the place of professor of mathematics in the school of Sorreze, which was then under the direction of the Benedictines, and it was no doubt this circumstance which gave rise to the report that he had been a monk, an assertion which certainly has never been proved. He left this employment two years afterwards, to follow the movement which almost the whole French nation then made towards the frontiers, and he repaired to the army of the North. Being sent to Chalons for the instruction of the young engineers in the school of artillery, he was there when after the taking of Verdun, the inhabitants of Chalons formed a battalion, of which he was appointed Adjutant-Major, the functions of which appointment he performed till the 20th of September 1792, the time of the disbanding of the battalion; but these circumstances, found in a memoir signed by himself, are only warranted by his own declaration. What is certain is, that he was appointed at Metz, Lieutenant of a Volunteer Company, called the Saint Maurice, at the end of 1792, and Captain of the same company on the 18th of March, 1793.—On his first entrance into the service, he gave proofs of that restless intriguing spirit which he has constantly shewn in his military career. He confesses himself in the memoir above cited, that, for having taken part in some remonstrances which appeared seditious, he was broken and degraded by order of General Houchard in 1793, and obliged to serve as a common soldier. He adds, that on the 1st of October 1793, he joined at Chatillon, the chasseurs of the Gironde, that he was present in different affairs, in

the army of La Vendée, in which he was in quality of Secretary to General Marceau, and was appointed adjunct to the Adjutant's General, on the 9th of Prairial, year 2. On the 6th of Fructidor, of the same year, he was appointed adjunct of the first class to the corps of artillery by the representative of the people, Gilet, who had been sent to the army of the Sambre and the Meuse.—On the 6th of Brumaire, year three, the same representative appointed him Adjutant-General Chief of Battalion in consideration of the testimonies which General Marceau had given of his conduct after the expedition of Coblenz.—The 18th Brumaire, third year, his appointment was confirmed by the Committee of Public Welfare; and on the 5th Prairial following he obtained the Commission of Adjutant-General Chief of Brigade.—He made the campaigns of the year three, year four, and year five, with the armies of Sambre, and Meuse, and Italy.—On the 27th Fructidor, sixth year, he received orders to proceed to Rochefort, to serve in one of the divisions of the army of England. He was one of the small number of Frenchmen who made good their descent in Ireland, and he was appointed by General Humbert, General of Brigade, at the capture of Killala, and General of Division at the affair of Castlebar, where he took a standard from the enemy's horse. On his return to France he found the Executive Directory very little disposed to confirm so rapid a promotion. He demanded to serve as Adjutant-general of the army of Italy commanded by General Foubert. Having been charged to conduct a body of troops to the army of Rome, he made with that army the campaign of the seventh year in Naples, and was appointed General of Brigade on the field of battle, after the affair of Trebia. At the army of Italy his suspicious and doubtful conduct exposed him to suspicions humiliating to a military person; he was charged with acting the part of an informer; his constant opposition to the orders of his chiefs strengthened that opinion, and the unpleasant treatment he experienced, compelled him to ask leave to retire. On the 11th (Pluviose) he received orders to return to France. On the 1st Prairial year 9, notice was given him that he was no longer in the list of Staff Officers. Retired to private life, his natural inquietude inspired him with several plans. He requested sometimes to be employed in America and sometimes in the East

Indies. He expressed a desire to serve in the troops of the Batavian Republic, but he fulfilled none of these resolutions, and he was still in France, when on the 10th of Vendemiaire, he was re-established on the staff of Generals of Brigade in the room of General Colli, appointed General of Division. Two months afterwards he was appointed to go to St. Domingo. He remained there only a year, the bad state of his health inducing General Rochambeau to send him back to France, where he arrived on the 22d Frimaire, year 12. General Augereau then commanded a camp; General Sarrazin applied, and obtained to be employed under his command. His character, ever inclined to accusation, soon raised against him numerous enemies. He avowed himself the accuser of the Generals and Administrations of the Army in a memoir which he transmitted to the Emperor, under date of the 23d of Frimaire, year 13. The cry of indignation which was raised against him, deprived him of the courage of supporting publicly the part he had undertaken, and raised such a storm against him, that he saw himself again, for the second time, obliged to request leave to resign. He was nevertheless retained in his post, and made with that part of the army, the campaigns of the year 14, or 1806.—Some disputes, which he had with General Houdelet, in whose division he served, obliged the Government to recal him to France.—On the 31st of October, 1806, he was employed in the 24th Military Division, under the orders of General Chambarlhac, who confided to him the command of the department of the Lys. The misunderstanding which soon took place between the Prefect and him, evinced the necessity of giving him another destination, and he was sent to the Isle of Cadsand. His conduct continually extravagant, and his arbitrary proceedings, incensed against him the inhabitants, the authorities and General Chambarlhac. The complaints which reached Government induced it again to change his residence, and he received letters of service for the 16th Military Division. He served in this division from the 11th of February, 1809, and had the happiness to live there in excellent harmony with both his superiors and subalterns, till by the most disgraceful desertion he imprinted an indelible opprobrium on his name.—Such is the history

of General Sarrazin, which, to speak properly, is only that of the extravagance of his mind, the errors of his character, and his numerous absurdities.

“THE DUKE DE FELTRE,
Minister at War.”

SPAIN.—General Orders—Fourth Division.

Head-quarters, Elche, June 12.

Soldiers; Our flying parties have obtained on the 9th considerable advantages in the town of Galera: Our cavalry, to the number of 120, was attacked by 230, of which 80 were killed and 19 made prisoners. Individual acts of valour have been performed, which shall be rewarded accordingly; but among these we have to notice Don Gaspar de Bobadella, Captain of the Regiment of Cavalry of Farnisco, who with his own hand killed one of the enemy's officers, who in the act of offering him protection, returned the generous offer by a stroke of his sword. The defenders of Cazorla, to the number of 360, were attacked on the 4th instant by 1,600 foot and 600 horse. The superiority of the enemy obliged them to retire from that town, after having defended it with admirable valour. The enemy left behind them on this day 200 in their first attack, and in the streets of the town; nor had they courage to follow our valiant soldiers. These actions are only the preludes of others more important, in which we are to distinguish ourselves; to destroy and teach the enemy, that the Spanish nation will not cede in valour to any nation in the world.

FREYRE.

PETERSBURG, June 13.—The day before yesterday the most eminent merchants and bankers were sent for to the Minister of Finances, who informed them of the measures for improving the finance of the empire. A loan of 100 millions of roubles is to be opened, on which account the Emperor has published a Manifesto, of which the chief tenor is as follows:—

1. *Of the Establishment of a Fund of Liquidation of State Debts.*

As the property of the State ought always to be considered as a mortgage of the public debt, part of its mass is to be taken off and publicly sold.

(To be continued.)

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[Price 1s.

"The Army, against whom this Libel is in a peculiar manner directed, calls on the Court for Justice against its traducer."—*Attorney General's Speech.*

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TO THE READER.

In my last Number, at page 10, I stated the *Three* famous assertions of the Attorney General. On two of them I made my intended observations; and, if I may judge from the letters I have received upon the subject, and from other indications not less certain, the public are of opinion, those two assertions, though so boldly made, received from me a complete refutation. It remains for me to notice the *THIRD*, which was that *THE ARMY called upon the Court to punish me*. The words, as given in the report, were these:—"THE ARMY, against whom this libel is in a peculiar manner directed, CALLS ON THE COURT for Justice against its traducer."

Now, in the first place, in what way have I, in writing and publishing the article in question, deserved the appellation here given to me? In what way have I *traduced* the army? Where is there, in that article, an expression levelled at the character of the army, or at the interest of the army? I was *accused*, indeed, by the Attorney General, of endeavouring to *injure the military service*; but, what proof; what fact; what argument, was produced, in support of this assertion of my having *traduced the army*? Not a word did I utter against the army, or against the military profession. Nay, that this assertion might not yield to any of the others in point of consistency, it is made in the same speech, in which I am accused of endeavours to *seduce* the army. I am represented as being, at one and the same moment, and with reference to one and the same act, both a *traducer* and a *seducer*. The audience were told of the dreadful consequences that might have ensued from my acts of seduction. I was represented as deserving of peculiarly heavy punishment on account of the dangerousness of my efforts, which efforts did, as was asserted, directly tend to excite the army to mutiny. Well? But was this to be done by *traducing* that army? Are men, or at least, men with

brains in their skulls, given to yield to the incitements of those who *traduce* them? I deny the fact; indeed, there is not the semblance of truth in it; but, for a moment and merely for argument's sake, admit the fact, is it to be believed, is it credible, is it possible, that the Army should look upon me as its *traducer*, that, as such, it should call for punishment on my head, and yet, that, at the very same time, my efforts obviously tended to *seduce* them from their lawful obedience, and to invite them to follow my wishes in works of mutiny. That this should be true is impossible. I was accused of representing the Local Militia at Ely of being *too hardly dealt with*. But, let us take the Attorney General's own words. The former, in the Speech now referred to, which see, in the last Number at page 3, said, that the tendency of my publication was, "to encourage the soldiers to impatience, insubordination and disgust; to tell them that they were *hardly, cruelly and tyrannically dealt with*." That I said, that the affair at Ely "was *not to be called a mutiny*, and that it was *a mere squabble between the men and their officers for a trifle of money*." Well, no matter what was the fact, here, the effect was not, surely, to excite *anger and resentment* in the bosoms of the army, and to induce them to call for punishment upon my head. Here was nothing of *traduction* at any rate. But, in this as in every other respect, assertion was quite secure; there being no answer on my part allowed.

Let us now view this assertion in another light. We have, of late years, grown wonderfully familiar with *military* notions and influence. From some cause or other; from the fear of invasion, or of revolution, or from some cause that we ourselves perhaps do not clearly perceive, we have become most miraculously reconciled to *military* means. A bookseller advertises for sale "*A Digest of the Military Law of England*." I could not help remarking, that, during the debates upon the petition of poor CAPTAIN FOSKETT, the phrase "*military government of*

the country," was frequently made use of; and, I believe, in one or two instances, even by MR. WHITBREAD. But, I must confess, that, when the Attorney General told the Judges in so many words, that "THE ARMY called upon them" to do justice upon me, I was surpris'd. He had said every thing else that he could think of to induce them to inflict a heavy punishment upon me; and, as if nothing was sufficient without it, he concluded with a declaration, that I was a *traducer of the Army*, and that, as such, the army called upon the Judges to punish me. Very strange things have, at different times, been witnessed in that court; but, I believe, this was the very first time, that English Judges had been told to their teeth, in so many plain words, that the army, that the military, that men with arms in their hands, called upon them for such or such a sentence on a man standing at their bar. A great deal has been said about the Constitution prohibiting a standing army in time of peace, without consent of Parliament: such is our dread of the precious "*freedom of election*" being violated by the military, that soldiers are kept at a distance from places where elections are going on: the changes have, indeed, been rung upon the perfect *subserviency of the military to the civil power*: but, what, in the name of common sense, does all this mean, if the Judges, when sitting to pass judgment, are to be told, and by an officer of the king too, that *the army calls upon them for such or such a judgment*? The prosecution was by information of the Attorney General; that is, the Attorney General, an officer appointed by the king, and holding his office during pleasure, commences the prosecution in the king's name, and, when he comes to apply for judgment, he tells the Judges, that *the army calls upon them to punish the person prosecuted*, because that person is a *traducer of that army*! I will not ask what this is like, or what it is not like. I will make no comparisons, and, indeed, to make any, or to observe further upon this point would be quite useless. Every reader will turn the thing over in his mind, and will, I am sure, come to a proper conclusion.

But, let no one suppose, for a moment, that I believe, that it was true that the ARMY called on the Judges to punish me. Let no one suppose, that I believe this to be true; for, I must first believe, that the Army is the most ungrateful and

most base of all mankind, I never having, in all my life, done or said any thing respecting the Army, that was not intended for its good.

Those who have been in the habit of reading the Register for some years, must have witnessed the pains that I have taken, upon numerous occasions, to exalt the character of the soldier, to remove the prejudices that existed against his profession, and to make those engaged in the military service an object of respect and affection amongst the people in general. Many are the instances, in which I have been blamed for this; many are the instances, in which I have been most grossly abused for this, aye, and by those, too, who are now my assailants upon the opposite group. It will be recollected, that I have constantly objected to every thing, which tended to lower the military character; that every scheme (and schemes enough we have had) which had a tendency to degrade the profession of a soldier by giving of the military dress and rank to those who were not soldiers, has received my marked disapprobation; that the tinker and pastry-cook race of officers have always been an object of ridicule with me, not because I disapproved of them in their *proper place*, but because they were put forward in a way to do wrong to the really military men.

In the defence of *injured officers*, who is there belonging to the press, besides myself, that has devoted one single page of their works? And, when have I refused the application of any such officer? I have, at various times, urged the propriety of making legal provision that no commissioned officer should be cashiered without a previous sentence of a court-martial to that effect. This proposition might be thought very foolish by the officers of the army, who might like it best to be liable to cashiering at pleasure; but, it will, I think, be looked upon as very improbable, if not as quite impossible, that the officers of the Army should harbour any resentment against me on this account; and, indeed, that they should not feel, for this cause alone, some small degree of gratitude towards me. It is impossible, that they should feel anger towards a person, who, with all his means, endeavoured to render them somewhat more independent than they were.

Upon several occasions, I have recommended an advance in the *pay of the Commissioned Officers* particularly; and, in one

instance, I shewed the justice of this, upon the same principle that the salaries of the judges and other persons in office with fixed salaries, had been raised. I reminded the late Ministry of this, when they brought forward the proposition for augmenting the pecuniary allowances to the several branches of the king's family. The great argument in support of such augmentation was, that provisions of every sort, and, indeed, every article necessary to support life or to give splendour to rank, had almost *doubled in price*, since the salaries then in existence were fixed. It was not said, that *money had depreciated one half*. But, that was no matter. To vulgar minds a *rise in prices* is the clearest idea. Well, said I (without now questioning the propriety; or, rather, without making that a matter of discussion), if the *rise of prices* be a good ground for augmenting the allowances to the Duke of Cumberland, for instance, it is surely as good a ground for augmenting the *pay of the army*, and especially of the commissioned officers, who are not, like the non-commissioned officers and private men, protected, in some measure, against this rise in prices, by the rations of bread and meat, which they always have at a fixed price. I do not know, whether the commissioned officers have this allowance also; but, if they have, their mere eatables, their mere bread and meat, make but a very small portion of their expences.—Here again I might be mistaken; there might be no analogy in the cases of the officers of the army and the members of the king's family; it might be quite fit to augment the allowances of the latter, upon an argument of a rise in prices, and not to augment the pay of the former: all this might be, and, of course, I might be wrong, and what I said extremely foolish; but, I am sure, that no one will believe it possible that *the Army should dislike me for it*; no one will believe it possible, that what I said upon that occasion could be construed into *traduction* of the army; no one will believe it possible, that I, by the augmentation I then proposed to be made to the pay of the army, wished to render that army inefficient and mutinous; no; nor will any one ever believe, that the man, from whom that proposition came, was a seeker after "*base lucre*," seeing that part of that augmentation must have been borne by himself, without the possibility of his ever deriving any individual benefit therefrom.

Upon a very recent occasion, when

much ill-blood existed against the Army, especially in this metropolis, did I join those, whose pens or tongues were at work against the military? On the contrary, every word that I said manifestly tended to allay the resentment that had been excited against the soldiers. I allude to the time of Sir Francis Burdett's commitment to the Tower, and to my Register (Vol. XVII. p. 364.) where I endeavoured to allay this popular resentment. In speaking of the blood that had been spilt, I said: "I cannot help exhorting such of the people as my Register may reach, to reflect well before they fix upon the objects of their blame in this respect. Soldiers are but mere machines; they are bound to, implicit obedience; a refusal to obey is mutiny; mutiny is punished with death. The people should, therefore, upon such occasions, bear this in their minds; and should, besides, consider, that men in red coats have feelings as well as other men, and cannot be expected to bear without resentment, the scoffings and pellings of the people, whom, in fact, they can have done nothing to offend. The people should bear in mind, that the soldiers are their own countrymen; that they have, in reality, all the same interests, as to public matters, that the people have; that they are their sons and their brothers and their nephews; and, though there may be, and doubtless are, persons, who may, upon some occasions, endeavour to persuade the soldiers, that they have an interest separate and different from that of the people, the fact is not so; for all of us, whether clad in red coats or in brown coats, must, in the end, be equally affected by every public measure."—

Was this spoken like an enemy of the army? Could the man, who wrote and published and sent these words to the ends of the earth, be a *traducer* of the army? And, will the reader believe, that any single soul in that army, worthy of the name of soldier or of Englishman, has now called upon the Judges to punish me as the *traducer* of the army? Read my work from the first page to the last, and, if you therein find a single instance of my having attempted, though in the slightest way, to detract from the character or profession of a soldier, and especially from the character of the English army, I will give you leave to treat me even worse than I have already been treated. It has been my constant endeavour, as often as

opportunity has offered, to remove from the minds of the people all prejudices against the army, being of opinion that those prejudices must, in every way in which they can operate, be injurious to the country, and may, possibly, endanger its independence; for after all, in any case of great emergency, what would any army be able to do without the people were with them? The people are the country, and no country, as Prussia and Austria and Italy and Naples and many other nations can tell, was ever yet defended without its own aid, without its own native and cordial exertions. For these reasons I have constantly inculcated a regard and affection for those of our countrymen who are kept in arms; as far as my influence has been able to reach there is no prejudice existing against soldiers; I have endeavoured to shew, and I have shown, that it is to be very *stupid* as well as *ungenerous*, to consider a man as being the worse because he has entered upon a way of life that exposes him to bleed in defence of his country; and, that, if there were no other reason for combatting this prejudice, it would be a quite sufficient reason, that the existence of it must of necessity be desired by every enemy of the liberties of the country. To such persons it must be gratifying in the highest degree to see an animosity existing between the people and the soldiery. It has made part of the system of every despot to keep the soldiers and the people in a state of hostility, in a state of constant suspicion and hatred of one another. Let the reader judge, then, whether I, who am accused of a desire to introduce revolution, am a likely man to introduce the army to the people; or to do any other act, calculated to make the people dislike the army. Were there not a single fact to shew the contrary, reasoning upon general principles would forbid any man to believe, that I disliked the army, or that the army could possibly dislike me.

To the army, to every soldier in it, I have a bond of attachment quite independent of any political reasonings or considerations. I have been a soldier myself, and for no small number of years, at that time of life when the feelings are most ardent and when the strongest attachments are formed. "Once a soldier always a soldier," is a maxim, the truth of which I need not insist on to any one who has ever served in the army for any length of time, and especially if the service he has

seen has embraced those scenes and occasions where every man, first or last, from one cause or another, owes the preservation of his all, health and life not excepted, to the kindness, the generosity, the fellow feeling, of his comrades. A community of monks hate one another, because they are compelled to live together, and do not stand in need of each other's voluntary assistance in the procuring of the things necessary to health and life. It is precisely the contrary with soldiers. And, a soldier has not only a regard of all the men of his own corps, but, in a degree a little fainter, for all the soldiers in the army. Nay, the soldiers of two hostile armies have a feeling of friendship for each other; and, this feeling and the acts arising from it, have, when occasion has offered, always been found to exist in proportion to the bravery with which they have fought against each other.—Of this military feeling I do not believe that any man ever possessed a greater portion than myself. I was eight years in the army, during which time I associated less with people out of the army than any soldier that I ever knew. This partiality I have always retained. I like soldiers, as a class in life, better than any other description of men. Their conversation is more pleasing to me; they have generally seen more than other men; they have less of vulgar prejudice about them; to which may be added, that, having felt hardships themselves, they know how to feel for others. This does not, indeed, apply to such as those of whom Mrs. Clarke was the protectress; but to those who have seen service, or who depend solely upon their merit for their success. Amongst soldiers, less than amongst any other description of men, have I observed the vices of *lying* and *hypocrisy*. I do not recollect a single instance of a soldier in any corps, having betrayed, or given up, or exposed, another soldier, even for the sake of saving himself from most terrible punishment; and as for selfishness, a soldier, who would not give his dinner, his day's provisions, to a comrade in want, would be looked upon as an unnatural brute. It is not to be expected that such generosity of feeling should be found amongst the mass of mankind: those who have not known the vicissitudes and the many wants of the soldier's life, cannot be expected to have the soldier's feeling: I have known the one, and I possess the other; and, notwithstanding, I have now been accused of hankering

after nothing but "*base lucre*," upon this feeling I have always acted. Aye, and upon this feeling I shall have been known to have acted, too, in spite of all that can be done to misrepresent me to the army.

Under the present circumstances there is nothing which I can say of myself that can fairly be called egotism; and there is nothing in praise of my conduct, which can with truth, be said, that ought not to be said. Being of this opinion, and being sure that every just and sensible man will join therein, I will here introduce a fact or two, which, under any other circumstances, it would be a shame to mention.—*Lover as I am of "base lucre,"* no soul in distress was ever sent empty from my door, be the cause of that distress what it might. But, to soldiers, and their wives and children; to every creature bearing the name or mark or sign of military service about it, I, nor any one belonging to me, ever omitted to shew particular marks of compassion and kindness. I wish the public could now pass in review before them all the unfortunate soldiers that have come to my door and those who have been to the door of the man who has called me the "*traducer*" of the army. Would to God that this exhibition could take place, and that an enquiry could be made as to the reception that each had met with! I should not be afraid of the comparison, though he represents me as the *enemy of the army*; as a man whom *the army calls upon the Judges to punish*.—Late in October, or early in November last, returning home in the dusk of the evening, I found our Village full of soldiers. There were about *five hundred* men (a number nearly equal to the whole population of the parish), who had arrived at Portsmouth, last from Portugal; many of whom had been at the battle of Talavera, and had served in both the arduous and fatal campaigns in Spain; and most of whom had suffered either from sickness or from wounds actually received in battle. These men, who had landed at Portsmouth that same morning, had marched *eighteen miles* to Botley, where they found for their accommodation *one small Inn and three Public-Houses*. All the beds in the whole village, and in the whole parish to its utmost limits, including the bed of every cottager, would not have lodged these men and their wives and children, and all the *victuals* in the parish would not, of course, have furnished them with a

single meal, without taking from the meals of the people of the parish. The stables, barns, and every other place, in which a man could lie down out of the way of actual rain, were prepared with straw. Every body in the village was ready to give up all his room to these people, whose every garment and limb and feature bespoke the misery they had undergone. It was rather unfortunate that both myself and my wife were from home when they arrived in the village, or I should have lodged a company or two of the privates at least. I found the greater part of them already gone to their straw lodging, and, therefore, I could do nothing for them; but, I brought two of the officers (the Commanding Officer and another) to my house, not having spare beds for any more, upon so short a notice. The next day, which happened to be a Sunday, the whole of the officers, thirteen or fourteen in number, lived at my house the whole of the day; and of all my whole life, during which I have spent but very few unpleasant days, I never spent so pleasant a day as that. After a lapse of sixteen years, I once more saw myself at table with nothing but soldiers; nothing but men in red coats; and I felt so happy at being able to give them proofs of my attachment. I never, upon any occasion, so much enjoyed, never so sensibly felt, the benefits of having been industrious and economical. My guests, on their part, soon found that they were at home, and gave full scope to that disposition to gaiety, which prevails amongst soldiers, and particularly after long-endured hardships. It was the first whole day of their being in England from the time they had quitted it; and certain I am, that not a man of them has since seen a happier. On the Monday morning, before day-light, my whole family, children and all, were up to prepare them a breakfast and to bid them farewell; and, when they left us, the Commanding Officer, who was a modest and sensible Scotsman, observed, that he had, in his life, heard much of English Hospitality, but that, at Botley, he had seen and felt it.—Now, this was no more than what it was my duty to do towards these gentlemen, some of whom had been wounded, and all of whom had greatly suffered, in their endeavours, at least, to serve their country, while I and my family had been living at home in ease, comfort, and security; and, it was a duty

peculiarly incumbent upon me, who had been a soldier myself, and who knew to what hardships they had been exposed by sea as well as by land. There might, too, perhaps, if the workings of my heart could have been nicely analysed, be something of vanity in my motives, though I do not believe that there was. But, at any rate, I think I may defy even the Devil, in whatever character he may choose to appear, to ascribe this action to *enmity to the army*; or to a disposition, or a feeling, towards the army, that would lead me to traduce them. What, then!

Was it that army, to which these gentlemen belonged, who called upon the Judges to punish me? Did this call come from those who experienced the hospitalities of Botley? Did they accuse me of being their *traducer*, and as being such, call upon the Judges to shut me up in prison and to load me with fines and securities? And would they have accused me of being a lover of "*base lucre*?"

To bring forward to the public, and especially in a work of my own, the relation of a fact like this, would, as I observed before, be a shame, under almost any other circumstances than the present; but, under these circumstances, it will, I am confident, be, by every lover of truth, deemed perfectly justifiable. I am, however, less anxious to clear myself to the public from the charge of being a "*traducer*" of the army, than I am to clear myself of that charge to the army itself. I wish not to be thought, and I will not be thought an enemy or a traducer of the army. I have always been a friend of the army; I have never traduced it. I have spent hours and days and weeks in studying how the bettering of the situation of the army might be combined with its efficiency and both with the security of the country's civil and political liberties. The plan of *service for term of years*, which was so generally approved of, was, I believe, first suggested to Mr. Windham by me. Soon after he was in office, I drew up, in consequence of previous communication with him, the Plan which I afterwards published, on the 22nd of March, 1806, Vol. IX, p. 385; and this Plan I will here re-publish. With some slight alterations (which, perhaps, I myself would now make) Mr. Windham would, if he could, have adopted this plan. I by no means look upon it as a perfect thing. I have not the vanity to suppose, that, in so great a matter, it was likely

that I should devise a faultless scheme. But, the plan, such as it is, contains quite sufficient proof, that I was no *enemy of the army*; that I was no *traducer* of the army; and that I *wished*, at least, to see formed such a military force as should, at all times, under all circumstances, in all emergencies, render England perfectly safe, defended by the arms of her own sons, who while they were soldiers, and well-disciplined and efficient soldiers, should have all the interests and all the feelings of citizens, and who, in defending the soil of their country, should be sensible that they were defending its rights and liberties. I must beg leave to press upon the reader the request, that he will have the patience to peruse the whole of this Plan, together with the *Introduction*, long as they are; for here I have put upon record a full statement of my opinions and principles, relating to the Army. At the time when I was so zealously engaged in endeavouring to cause this plan to be put into execution, little did I imagine, that I was one day to be held forth as an *enemy to the army*, as a *traducer* of the army, and to hear the Judges told, that that army called upon them to shut my person up in a prison and to fine me to the amount of, perhaps, more than what would fall to the share of one of my children; but, galling and grievous as this is, I would rather endure it ten times told, than be for one moment thought a "*traducer* of the army," and such, I again repeat it, *I will not be thought*.—I now insert my Plan, just as it was published in 1806*.

A PLAN

FOR THE FORMING AN EFFICIENT AND PERMANENT ARMY.

"Whilst we describe, however, the advantages of standing armies, we must not conceal the danger. These properties of their constitution—the soldiery being separated, in a great degree, from the rest of the community, their being closely linked amongst themselves by habits of society and subordination, and the dependency of the whole chain upon the will and favour of the prince—however essential they may be to the purposes for which armies are kept up, give them an aspect in nowise favourable to public liberty. The danger, however, is diminished by maintaining, upon all occasions, as much alliance of interest, and as much intercourse of sentiment, between the

* At the end of the Plan, the Reader will find the SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"military part of the nation and the other people, as are consistent with the union and discipline of an army."—PALEY: Moral and Political Philosophy; Book VI. Chap. 12.

INTRODUCTION.—Many have been the occasions upon which, from different motives perhaps, different persons have endeavoured to throw blame upon me for having, in a manner so unqualified, condemned the present military system (if, indeed, it be worthy of that name, or of any other conveying the idea of something resulting from fixed principles), without having proposed any other system as a substitute for it; and, upon this ground, a correspondent, in page 412 of [that] present number, who is, I think, more kind in his manner than in his matter, revives this subject of censure, for the effect of which censure he appears to consider the present time peculiarly favourable. But, as the "heaven-born minister" used to say with respect to his audience, I am in the hearing of my readers when I say, without fear of contradiction, that I have, upon scarcely any one occasion, ever condemned the constitution of our present military force, without at the same time, pointing out what appeared to me to be proper to be adopted in its place. In doing this, I have, indeed, confined myself, in most cases, to general terms; to the statement of principles; but, with those who read the Register, that must, I think, be regarded as quite sufficient to protect me against the blame of which we have been speaking; for, the principles being once laid down, the detail is a mere matter of professional arrangement. Now, however, when every man in the kingdom is so anxiously waiting to hear *precisely what is to be done* for the purpose of obtaining an efficient and permanent army; now, when the minister at the head of the war-department is so keenly pursued and so hardly pressed for an explicit declaration of his intentions relative thereto; at such a moment, though I think the impatience of some impertinent, and of all, unreasonable in the extreme, especially when the shortness of the time be compared with the magnitude of the subject; though I think it perfectly justifiable and proper in him to refuse to gratify such impertinence, and such childish impatience; yet, with respect to myself, I have no desire, and ought to have no desire, to suspend an ample declaration of my opinions, which, compared to his, are of trifling importance.—As, from the Plan which I am about to submit to the public, being in the form of a letter;

addressed to a friend, it might, were I to observe a silence upon the subject, be concluded, that this is the Plan that Mr. WINDHAM intends, or wishes, or has intended, or wished, to put in execution, it is proper that I should, before I proceed any further, explicitly declare, that there is not, that I know of, and that there never has been, any intention or wish, on the part of that gentleman, to adopt this plan, or to see it adopted; and, that, if he has, as it is probable he has, been induced to take the trouble to read it, I am almost (and might spare even the *almost*) entirely ignorant with regard to his opinion thereof. The advantage to have been derived from leaving this fact as a matter of doubt, will, when the weight justly attached to a supposed approbation from such a person be considered, be evident to every one; but, it is an advantage which justice to Mr. Windham commands me to forego, and of which, I am, besides, desirous not to avail myself; because I wish the Plan to come before the public without any other recommendation than that of its own bare merits, however small they may appear to be.—In speaking to the person, to whom the following Letter was (more than a month ago) addressed, it was unnecessary, in the preliminary observations, to express myself in a manner quite so full as I should have expressed myself had I been speaking to the public; and, therefore, I must beg leave to supply the deficiency by adding to the length of this INTRODUCTION.—The reader will not have forgotten, that, in speaking of what ought to be done for the purpose of effecting the great object in view, I have always given it as my decided opinion, 1st, that, there ought to be, as far as related to the nature of the engagement of the soldier, but *one sort of army*; 2dly, that that army should be of an *efficient and permanent* description; and, 3dly, that it should be constituted upon principles that would render it efficient and permanent, thereunto adding the important and most desirable property of being *necessarily innoxious* to the liberties of the people; that, to express myself in the words of the admired writer, from whom I have borrowed my motto, its constitution should be such as "to maintain, upon all occasions, as much alliance of interest, and as much intercourse of sentiment; between the military part of the nation and the other orders of the people, as are consistent with the union and discipline of an

"army." Upon the two first heads I have nothing now to add; and, as to the third, a few remarks upon the opinions of the enlightened, the scandalously neglected, and the now lamented PALEY may suffice.—After describing in the former part of the chapter referred to, the many great advantages which a standing army has over a temporary military force, he comes to speak, in the words chosen for my motto, of the single disadvantage, namely, the possible danger to public liberty; but this danger, he says, is diminished by the means described in the passage just quoted. *How these means are to be obtained*; how that alliance of interest and that intercourse of sentiment, which he justly represents as so essential to the great purpose in view; how these are to be obtained and insured he does not state, in a manner, at least so full and satisfactory as one could have wished. "For which purpose" (the purpose of maintaining an alliance of interest between the military and the rest of the people) "officers of the army, upon whose disposition towards the common-wealth a great deal may depend, should be taken from the principal families of the country, and at the same time also be encouraged to establish in it families of their own, as well as be admitted to seats in the senate, to hereditary distinctions, and to all the civil honours and privileges that are compatible with their profession: which circumstances of connection and situation will give them such a share in the general rights of the people, and so engage their inclinations on the side of public liberty, as to afford a reasonable security, that they cannot be bought by any promises of personal aggrandizement, to assist in the execution of measures, which might enslave their posterity, their kindred and their country." When the letter, which I am now introducing to the reader, was written, I had in my mind no recollection of this passage of PALEY; and, I was not a little pleased upon discovering the perfect coincidence, as to principle, between him and myself, upon this very interesting subject. But, if this reasoning be sound, and that it is I think no one will deny, with respect to the officers of the army, is it not equally sound with respect to the men? PALEY wrote at a time very different indeed from the present; his opinions applied to a state of Europe and of England when a comparatively small military force was

necessary in this country; if he had written with the present awful scene before him, with the present difficulties of collecting together men to serve in the army, I leave the reader to determine, whether the principles he has laid down would not have carried him much further. He would now have perceived, that from the great number of officers necessary to command the army, the tie growing out of mere family connection would have been of little avail; that, as to the admission of officers to seats in the parliament and to hereditary honours, it could not have been rendered sufficiently extensive to make it a motive powerful enough for the purpose he had in view; and, that, in short new rewards, a new set of motives, not only of attachment to public liberty, but of love for the military service, must have been created in order to obtain an army of the description of that which he wished to obtain. For my part, I am of opinion, that, if the other motives which I should propose, were created, it would be quite unnecessary to admit, during their actual service, military officers into parliament, where, to say nothing of several other weighty objections, they cannot possibly attend, without a neglect of that duty for the performance of which they become military officers. The members of parliament are chosen for the purpose of assisting at the making of laws and at inquiries relative to the disposition of the public money; therefore, to pass over the constitutional view of the matter, how can one reconcile to reason the choosing of men who are, at any moment, liable to be sent out of the kingdom, and who, in all probability, must pass, or ought to pass, more than one half of their time beyond the seas? Yet, in the present state of things, in the present want of motives to a military life, in the present predominance of trade, in the present preponderance of every other profession over that of the military, in point of civil and political advantages, it would be hard indeed to shut the doors of parliament against military men.—I have now before me the plans of two writers, which plans have been recently published, for the forming of a complete system of military defence: the first, who puts no name to his work, addresses himself to Mr. Windham, in a pamphlet "ON THE PUBLIC DEFENCE," published for the author by SKELTON at Southampton; the other is MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, who, after a

dedicatory address to Mr. Fox, proceeds, in a very elaborate and ingenious performance, entitled "ENGLAND'S ÆGIS, OR THE MILITARY ENERGIES OF THE CONSTITUTION," calls upon us, to awaken the spirit of ancient times, and to depend for our defence upon those exertions, which a love of the country ought to inspire, and which, were his plan adopted, he expresses his confidence it would inspire. The former of these writers strongly and ably represents the magnitude of our danger; he describes the nature and amount of the enemy's force; he contends that no force but that of a regular one is at all competent to our defence; he shows by an argument of experience the utter impracticability of raising a sufficient force by the means hitherto employed; and, the only means, that, in his opinion, remain, are those of mere compulsion, as far, at least, as relates to the raising of men. "The legislature," says he, "must lay its hand upon the people; and, the levy must be immediate, personal, and compulsory." To attempt, in the short compass that I have before me, to present the reader with an analysis of a work so full of information and of thought as that of MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, would be to deceive the reader, and to do great injustice to the laborious, the ingenious, and public-spirited writer. He does not exclude the establishment of a regular military force; but, his reliance for efficient, permanent and safe defence, is upon the hearts and the arms of the people, animated by a love of their country, a love founded in their feeling of the super-excellence of its constitution, insuring to them the enjoyment of that freedom, and of all those blessings attendant upon freedom, which no other country enjoys. "Without freedom," says he, "complete military defence is only the evidence of complete subjugation; and, as the Batavians can tell you, my countrymen, the more triumphant the success, the more hopeless the condition of the defended. But, would we know how freedom and defence are to go hand in hand, and how civil liberty is ever to gain strength with the increase of military power, then that constitution, which is the table of our duties, the record of our rights, and the depository of our liberties, must be the object of our study and the guide of our steps."—Upon a proposition for the government's "*laying its hand upon the people*" it must, surely, be unnecessary

to say any thing; or, if it be at all necessary, one may content oneself with asking the author of the proposition, what could be the object of a defence to be effected by such means? What he thinks that a people, so "*laid hands on*," would have to defend? Whether, in speaking of the defence of the nation, we are to consider the people as not at all interested in the result? In short, and to make but one question of it, what, in his opinion, Buonaparté could do to the people more than "*lay his hand*" upon them? Until this question be answered, it would be loss of time to attempt to reason with this writer, to whose motives, however, I am inclined to attach nothing calling for blame. As to the principles, generally speaking, upon which the plan of MAJOR CARTWRIGHT is founded, they are such as every man, who wishes to see the energies of the constitution exerted to the best of all ends, must agree in. But, though the Major has evidently bestowed much time and thought upon the subject, has he duly considered the great change which has now taken place in this country as well as in Europe? Has he duly considered what is that species of force which we shall have to resist? Has he duly considered how much depends upon celerity in preparing our means of resistance? Has he duly considered what are the real causes of the state of decline in which he finds the constitutional energies of England? Has he duly reflected upon the *where-about*, if we would obtain success, we must begin in effecting the restoration of those energies? And, which is, perhaps, all I am entitled to ask of him, does he, upon a calm view of all the circumstances of our situation, not think that some such plan as that now proposed by me, would, under these circumstances, be likely to render the defence of the country efficient, without endangering the liberties of the people or the constitutional prerogatives of the Crown? I ask him, and not by way of rhetorical figure, but really with a view of obtaining an answer? Whether he does not think, that, while my plan would not fail "to give strength to civil liberty at the same time that it increased military power," it would not be more likely to be attended with immediate effect, than the plan which he has proposed? He will observe, that I take the state of things as it now is; I view the nation loaded with a debt demanding 27 millions annually to pay the interest; I see 2 or 3 millions annually raised for the

purpose of paying tax-gatherers and other dependents upon the ministry of the day; I perceive the existence of a trading and fiscal influence over-shadowing and over-bearing every thing; and, my object is to aid in the cure of these evils, by the very means that I provide for an efficient defence of the country and of the throne.

—I am not so wedded to this or to any other project as to be deaf to the voice of reason; and, if objections are made to it, I shall give them my attention, and shall not fail to communicate them to my readers. But, of one thing all reasonable men seem to be thoroughly convinced, namely that some change is absolutely necessary; some great change; something new and something great; something capable of producing a powerful effect upon the minds of the people; something even, that shall produce a renovation in the public mind with regard to military service and national defence.

Money has been tried in all the shapes that it can be presented; and, I am, for my part, perfectly satisfied, that *compulsory enrolment*, supposing it to succeed, would, if the day of trial came, prove to be much worse than nothing. We are now arrived at that point, when a mere hired army will no longer suffice; when we want the hearts of the people wherewith to preserve the independence of the country; and, to make a successful appeal to this excellent and never-failing mass of means, what can be better calculated than the plan I propose? England, fortunate in her local situation, in the form and natural tendency of her constitution of government, in the industry, the honesty, the bodily and mental capacities, the hardihood, and the bravery of her sons, has, notwithstanding the present unfavourable and even ominous appearances, many solid advantages over her enemy, all covered as he is with the brilliancy of war and of triumph. She has, as I have recently heard it well remarked, a settled government; he has none. She has laws and institutions which, at the most, want only amendment, or reform; he has neither laws nor institutions that are as yet held in habitual reverence. She has an order of things that depends not for existence upon the life, or the lives of any man, or any number of men; the order of things which he has founded hangs, perhaps, upon a single life. If she be cut off from the continent of Europe, she is, by the same means, relieved from

all the burden of dependence upon foreign aid; while he, in proportion as he extends the arm of his power, multiplies the object of his attention and the chances of demolishing the rampart, by which he is surrounding himself. The world has never yet witnessed a long duration of harmony amongst numerous contiguous states, more especially when held by sovereigns connected by ties of consanguinity; and, therefore, even from the recent disasters, even from the general overthrow of Europe, there breaks forth a prospect of future hope to England. But, to be able to profit from the events that time may bring with him, we must have the wisdom and the virtue to put ourselves in a condition to wait for his arrival. We must now place no dependence on the immediate success either of war or of peace. Whether at war or peace, the enemy will seek our subjugation; and, therefore, to meet this his settled purpose, we must be equally steady, persevering, and patient, in our plans and our execution. No man should now throw away his time in devising any means, whether for external or internal effect, which are not, in their very nature, durable, which have not in them consequences of twenty years or of fifty years to come. The man, whose mind stretches not forward beyond the days of his probable life, is now fit neither for statesman nor legislator. Before the preservation of the liberties and of the renown of England all views of personal aggrandizement, of family interest, and of party triumph, must now vanish like the pleasures of the world before the awful approach of eternity, or, we may indeed anticipate the disgraceful hour when we shall be numbered amongst the slaves of France, having, for our sole privilege, the conferring upon our children the infamous entail. With such reflections in his mind (and what mind is there unvisited by some such reflections?) where is the man that can hesitate to make sacrifices for his country's defence? And, where, then, is the man who can grudge to its defenders a share in its privileges, its immunities, and its marks of distinction, especially when the request comes so strongly supported by the reason and the justice of the case?—With an anxiety proportioned to the apprehensions whence it has arisen, I now commit my Plan to the cool and impartial consideration of the public, beseeching them to try it upon its own merits, and to dis-

card from their minds, during the perusal at least, whatever degree of error they may, as to other matters, be disposed to attribute to the opinions of its author.

Parson's Green, Fulham, 20th Feb. 1806.

SIR;—The attention with which you have, upon different occasions, listened to my representations upon the subject of the regular army, encourages me to submit to you, in a more methodical way, my opinions as to what ought now to be done, in order to obtain an efficient, safe, and permanent military force, for offensive as well as for defensive operations. As to the Volunteers and the Militia, as I cannot bring myself to regard either of them as being of any thing more than a mere temporary nature, I shall trouble you with nothing respecting them, except with an expression of my earnest hope, that, at all events, the ballot, the terrific, the disgust-creating ballot, will be at once, gotten rid of; for, until this be done, the military life must always be looked upon with hatred.

The measures, which I am about to propose, would certainly cause a great change, not only in the character of the army, but also in that of the whole nation. But is not a great change necessary, absolutely necessary, to the efficiency of the former and to the safety and honour of the latter? Is not this the very thing we want? Have not little temporary expedients been long enough upon trial? In short, if we do not come to the consideration of this subject with minds deeply penetrated with the truths, that the state of Europe has undergone a great change; that our enemy must, in the common course of things, subdue all that is not military; and that England must become a really military nation, or must become, at no distant day, a dependence of France: if we do not come to the consideration with minds thus penetrated, we shall, I am fully convinced, act wisely to keep aloof from it altogether. But, if such be the impression upon our minds, the only question, left for us to decide, appears to be this: *How is the nation to be rendered military?* How is it to be rendered truly military; military, not in shew, not in the abundance of red coats; not from terror and merely upon the spur of the occasion: but, military in spirit, a spirit arising out of a permanent system, founded on principles of sound philosophy, interwoven with the civil and political institutions of

the country, and, from its very nature, obviously tending to support, from all internal as well as external dangers, the just prerogatives of the king and the due rights and privileges of the people?

That this most desirable object is not to be accomplished by any of those means, which have heretofore been employed, no man will now venture to deny. These means have been of three descriptions: *fraud, money, and compulsion.* The plan, which I am about to submit to you, has in it nothing of either. Its main principle is, the exaltation of the profession of arms; the raising of that profession to a level, at least, with trade and agriculture, in point of respectability in society. I am aware, that, with those whose minds are filled with the notion, that national power is only another term for national wealth, that this wealth is to be obtained and secured only by a continued extension of trade and a continued improvement in agriculture, and that these again, are to be secured only by the rights, immunities, and advantages, which await, now almost exclusively, the successful exertion of trading and agricultural ingenuity and industry; with all those whose minds are thus filled, I am aware, that there will be much to overcome. But, to all such persons the answer is: will you not let the profession of arms share with you in the privileges and immunities which the nation has to bestow? If you will not, you will have no army, wherewith to protect you in the enjoyment of your own; you will have no permanent force, a consciousness of the existence of which will enable you to lay your heads down in safety. Long enough have you been tendering your money; in all manner of ways you have found it to fail; and, now, after the expenditure of millions upon millions for the avowed purpose of providing for your safety, you proclaim from your palace of commerce, that the question at issue is, whether you shall remain as you are, or become the slaves of Frenchmen. Another set of objectors will, perhaps, still reason upon the old ground of prejudice against a standing army. But, not to dilate upon the absurdity of applying the maxims of a century and a half ago to the totally altered circumstances of the present day; not to dilate upon the greater absurdity of objections to a standing army (upon the score of danger to public liberty) from those who approve of the present system, according to which the soldier is

cut off for life from civil society, and is rendered perfectly hopeless, except solely as to what he may be able to obtain from the crown; not to dilate upon the absurdity of these objections, it will soon appear, from the bare statement of my plan, that it would be to suppose an utter perversion of nature in the soldier, to fear, that, in consequence of his enlistment into the army, his attachment to the rights and liberties of the people should not be, I will not say not diminished, but that it should not be increased. The army, as it at present stands, is made up of persons entirely divested of all those prospects, all those hopes, all those feelings, which bind men to their country. "*The Liberties of England*," which, in every battle, ought to be the signal for the onset, is an empty sound, nay a galling insult, to those and to those only, who have abandoned their homes, and who are destined to spend their days and to shed their blood for the preservation of those liberties.

In addition to these preliminary observations, some others will be made with reference to particular parts of the plan. You will perceive, that for the sake of avoiding complication, I have spoken only of the army; but there can be no doubt, that the navy must also feel the cherishing hand of the government. You will also perceive, that as to the Commissioned Officers I have said but little. But, the principles once established, the application of them in detail will be matter of very easy accomplishment.

I. AS TO PAY, that of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers is quite high enough; and, in case of great advance in prices, arising either from the depreciation of money, or from scarcity of produce, a specific additional grant, for a limited time only, should be made. And, with regard to men, thereafter enlisted, a diminution might at any time, be made, if rendered politic either by the abundance of recruits, or by a rise in the value of money.

II. TERM OF YEARS to be the condition of enlistment; each term of five years, and three terms in the whole. The service of fifteen years will, in general, be found quite as long as is useful; and, by ending at fifteen years, you will throw back into society a much greater number of men accustomed to the use of

arms, and, upon occasions of emergency, able to be eminently useful, than could be so thrown back, if the service were continued to twenty years. The force embodied would, also, be much more efficient; for, if we take the average age of enlistment at 25 years, we shall find, that the age of forty is the time, especially after hard military duty, when a man becomes unfit for the endurance of great bodily fatigue, and particularly for very rapid movements; and, besides, the other parts of the plan will render a very long service unnecessary, as it will ensure you an ever-teeming source of young men.

III. PARENTS of Soldiers. As one great obstacle to the entrance of men into a military life arises from the remonstrances and lamentations of parents, about to be bereft of the probable aid of their children; as this is generally a powerful tie, and is always strong in proportion to the goodness of the heart upon which it operates, it should be a main object with us, not to weaken the tie, not to enfeeble the filial feelings of the soldier, but, to enable him to gratify those feelings, and that, too, by the very act which severs him, though for ever, from his parents and his home. To this end, and for the purpose of establishing the principle, that, to every mother who has borne and to every father who has reared a son ready to venture his life in the service of his country, some mark of that country's gratitude is due: for the establishing of this just, this high, this valour-inspiring principle, as well as for the purpose of removing a great obstacle to enlistment, I would allow to the parents, or the survivor of them, whatever might be their pecuniary circumstances, 3 pounds a year for each son that they, or either of them, might have serving in the army, to be paid out of the king's exchequer, without deduction of any sort, or upon any account whatever, taking care that it should be duly paid to them at their homes. In case of the son being of illegitimate birth, the mother should have the allowance; but, if no mother alive, there should be no allowance to the father. These allowances I would not suffer to work a diminution of the claim

which the parties might otherwise have to parish or other relief; and a heavy penalty should be imposed upon all attempts of parish-officers or others to thwart, in this respect, the intentions of the law. The allowance to parents should continue during the actual service of the son. If the son die, or be killed, in the service, or, if he serve out the three terms, the allowance should then be settled on them for their lives, or for the life of the longest liver. But, if the son desert, or be dismissed for bad behaviour, or quit the service before the expiration of the third term, then the allowance to the parents should cease, the reasonableness of which will be seen, when we come to contemplate the advantages with which, in case of good behaviour, the son is restored to them, in prime of life, at the end of his first or his second term. But, as a further mark of distinction, and more firmly to establish the great principle upon which I proceed, that the mother who has borne and the father who has reared a son for the service of the country is entitled to its especial indulgence and protection, I would give to the parent or parents of every soldier the faculty of becoming, in virtue solely of their son's service, a parishioner or parishioners in any parish immediately adjoining that to which they may belong at the time of his enlistment; and this right they should enjoy thereafter for their whole lives. I would, besides, restore, with respect to them, and for their whole lives, the spirit of the famous and cherishing act of *Forma Pauperis*, making the sum of qualification 50 pounds instead of five, which, when the depreciation of money is considered, is much about what it ought to be, in order to place these meritorious persons upon the same footing that all the people of England were placed upon in the reign of Henry the Seventh. The cost of this allowance to parents will hardly be objected to by those who reflect that, supposing the army to consist of 200,000 men, every individual of whom has a father or a mother alive, the amount would be only 600,000*l.* annually; a sum which is a mere trifle when compared with the annual

charge on account of apprehending deserters, on account of depôts for lodging and guarding recruits, and on account of remuneration to crimps and others belonging to the odious establishment for the entrapping of men, and, as if it were expressly, for the exciting of a hatred and a loathing of the military service. Think, too, of the effect of having scattered over the country 200,000 fathers and mothers, deriving, and known to be deriving, benefit and honour for the faithful military services of their sons! Proud of this honour; boasting, instead of lamenting, that their sons are soldiers; while those sons, at whatever distance from their homes, and even in the hour of death, would have the grateful recollection, that, by their services, they had added to the comforts and had exalted the character of the parents from whom they sprang. As things now stand, the common saying of parents, even in the most wretched state of existence, is, that they "would rather see their son clad in a shroud than in a red coat;" and the son, if, perchance, he be suffered ever to see their face again, sneaks home and away again in the dark, unless he be able to procure a dress, wherewith to disguise the unfortunate fact, that he is a soldier, which fact is sure to make him an object either of compassion or of scorn. This is the primary cause why we have not such an army as we can at all times safely rely upon; and, never shall we, never can we, have such an army, while the same engagement that binds the son breaks the heart of the mother.

IV. REWARDS. Proceeding always upon that principle so congenial to honourable minds, that distinctions in society, and not mere money, is the motive that is wanted to fill the ranks of the army, I would propose the following rewards for faithful military services.—For the 1st TERM, duly completed, the man should have a right of settlement, merely as a parishioner, in any parish in the United Kingdom, without a single exception. In the like extent, he should have a right of pursuing any trade or calling, whether as journeyman or master. He should (subject to the local laws and customs as to

degree) have a right of common and forest, in any parish where he may be settled though the nature of his tenure would, according to the existing laws and customs, give him no such right. He should be exempted from serving on juries, from the services of all civil and parish-offices, and from all offices growing out of the revenue, unless he chose to perform any such duties, in which case, as well as in all others, his military service should work no injury to the claim thereunto which he would otherwise have. For his whole life he should have the benefit of the act of *Forma Pauperis* as revived in spirit for the protection of his parents. And, finally, he should have a right to kill game (subject to the laws upon that head), or, in other words, should be placed upon the footing of a mere "qualified man," within the limits only of the parish where he was born. Of the reasonableness, of the justice, of granting this privilege, more will be said hereafter, when it will have been seen that the men born in towns will have an equivalent for it, and, the force of example being duly considered, the policy of sending men, as far as may be, back to enjoy their privileges in the places where they were born will not need to be dwelt upon.—For the 2ND TERM the man should acquire all the rights and immunities, before mentioned, with the following additions; to wit: all the privileges and capacities of whatsoever nature or degree appertaining to the corporation of any town or place wherein he may have been born. A right of common and of forest within the limits of the parish, the church of which shall be nearest to that of the parish in which he may, at any time, reside. If born in a place which sends burgesses or citizens to parliament, he should have a vote in their election; and, if not born in any such place, he should have a vote for the Knight of the Shire in which he was born; so that every man, having duly completed his military service of ten years, should, after his return to civil life, have a claim to and enjoy the elective franchise. And, lastly, his right of killing game (under the laws aforesaid) should extend as far, and in like man-

ner, as his right of common and forest, with this difference, that the latter applies to the parish of his settlement, whereas the former applies to the parish in which he was born.—For the 3RD TERM the man should acquire all the rights and immunities given to the second term, and with this extension and addition, that he should have a right of common and of forest in any parish, and in all the parishes, immediately adjoining that in which he may be settled; that, to the other exemptions, should be added that of an exemption from the operation of impressments of waggons, carts and horses, for the public military service, except in cases of invasion; that, as to his corporate rights and capacities, they should extend to any corporation in the kingdom where he may have been a year settled; that, as to the elective franchise, he should be put upon the footing of a territorial freeholder, and, if born in an election borough or city, should, of course, have a vote for the county where he was born also; and, that, as to his right of killing game, it should (subject as aforesaid) extend to the utmost limits of all the parishes immediately adjoining that in which he was born.

V. RELIGION. There should be no distinction as to religious creeds, except that it should be provided that none but Christians, in the common acceptation of the word, should be admitted. An oath, merely of fidelity to the King, should be taken upon the Holy Evangelists.

VI. ALL ALIENS, having faithfully completed one Term, should be considered as being, to all intents and purposes, subjects of the King, and should be rewarded accordingly. Having no birth-place in the realm, they should be allowed to fix upon a place for the enjoyment of privileges arising from birth. No allowance should be made to the parents of Aliens; and all Blacks and Mulattoes should be carefully shut out of the army.

VII. INVALIDS. For men disabled or worn out in the service, an annual provision should be made, and punctually paid, without bringing them from their homes, equal in amount to the annual full pay and clothing

of the private soldier upon actual service; and such men should, besides, enjoy the several rights and exemptions allotted to the several terms, during, or at the end of either of which, their disability longer to serve may have produced their discharge from the service. In case of discharge on account of disability in the son, the parents, of course, would be entitled to the allowance for life.

VIII. SOLDIERS KILLED in battle, or dying, from whatever cause, while in actual service abroad, should have, in the Church or Church-yard (the latter if possible) of the parish where they were born, a stone erected to their memory; stating the names of their parents, the time of their birth, the length of their service, and the time and place of their death; and the charge in this case, as well as in all others arising out of this code, should be defrayed out of the King's Exchequer.

IX. FORFEITURES. A soldier who deserted should (besides being subject to banishment, or other lighter punishment, but never to whipping), from the day of his return, begin his terms anew; and, after his quitting the army, a conviction of treason, misprision of treason, or of felony, should work, for ever, a forfeiture of all the rights and immunities acquired by his military services. And, in the parents of soldiers, a like conviction, for crimes committed by themselves or either of them, should, for ever, work a forfeiture of all their claims, arising from the military services of their children. But this forfeiture would take place, of course, only on account of conviction in consequence of crimes committed after the entrance of their sons into the army, the provision, in no case, being made to have a retrospective effect.

Such are the principal parts of the Plan, which I have long had in contemplation for the forming of an efficient, cheap, honourable, and perfectly safe military force for this kingdom. Much would, of course, require to be said with regard to rewards and distinctions for the commissioned officers. It is easy to conceive, that, with an army like this in existence, loan-jobbers, Jew-brokers, whether native or alien, that contractors and pursers, would stand a very poor chance of becoming

lords or baronets; and, that barkers of Moorfields, though with millions of money in their pockets, would not easily become knights. But, this is all a matter of degree and of detail; and, if the principles as embraced in the above-proposed part of the plan, be rejected, it will be useless to take up your time with any thing naturally growing out of them. There are, however, some things, which, as it is possible that they may be regarded as omissions, I shall, for the purpose chiefly of saving you trouble, here notice.

And, first, you will perceive, that I contemplate no sort of provision for the wives or the children or the widows of soldiers. This, at the first glance, appears hard, if not unjust. But, we are here proposing a permanent system; we are considering what is the most likely to ensure the safety and the greatness of the nation; and, though a natural feeling of compassion may arise in behalf of soldiers' wives and children, we shall, upon due reflection, find, that in whatever way a provision for them may be made to arise out of military services, such provision must necessarily operate as a premium for marriage and for population, than which, independent of the military consideration, which is, however, very important, nothing can be more contrary to all sound principles of political oeconomy. The institution at Chelsea, ascribed to Mr. Windham and the Duke of York, and, in itself considered so amiable, and discovering so tender a regard for the army, I must nevertheless, regard as having been determined on without due reflection as to the probable, nay the inevitable, consequences. It must operate as an encouragement for the breeding of beggars, just as the Foundling Hospital, and all the fine sermons preached there, operate as an encouragement for the begetting of bastards. How great is the nuisance of women and children in the army, how miserable the life of those women and children, may be asked of those who have been upon service abroad, or who have even seen a regiment in camp, or moving from place to place, at home; and, we may rest assured, that if our men of war were but tolerably well furnished with women and children, we never should have heard of battles like those of Copenhagen and Trafalgar. Besides, there is nothing unjust in the omission. The soldier will see that no provision is made for wife, child, or widow; no man will be forced from his home; and the parishes

will not have to accuse the military code of inviting husbands to leave them burdened with starving families.

Another omission will, perhaps, appear in the not having made provision for the advance of pay, in the second and third terms of service. But, after full consideration, I have been induced to reject all distinctions of this sort; first, because money, in the hands of a soldier, beyond what is absolutely necessary for his subsistence, is not only unnecessary to his good, but is really mischievous; and secondly, because such distinctions must give rise to invidious feelings amongst men, whose rank and whose duties are exactly the same.

As to a distinction in the rewards bestowed, after service, I once thought, that a man who had served a certain time as a serjeant, for instance, might, with propriety, be rewarded with privileges and immunities somewhat higher than those allotted to men, who had never attained that rank; but, upon further reflection, this does not appear either just or politic. Not just, because the promotion to the rank of either corporal or serjeant, though, generally speaking, it argues superior capacity, is, of itself, during the time of service, attended with a competent reward, in ease, comfort, respectability and emolument. Not politic, because promotion arises, in many, not to say in all cases, from the circumstances of advantageous figure, engaging address, good voice, or an understanding in reading, writing; and arithmetic; all of them, in their different degrees, estimable, but none of them proofs of intrinsic merit, and not all of them together, to be, for one moment, placed in competition with the great virtue which we are seeking to inculcate, to encourage, and to cherish; namely, a *disposition to serve*; which, upon reflection, I am sure you will be convinced is not to be cherished by holding out a premium for scholarship. A disposition to serve, is what we want; and to obtain it, there is no other rational scheme than for the nation to measure its rewards by the length of service, and by no other standard whatever.

After what has been said, I really do flatter myself, that no solid ground of objection can be made to the principles of this plan; nevertheless, my anxiety for its adoption will not permit me to close this letter without offering a few additional observations. Upon the doing away of all

distinctions as to religious sects, for which distinctions we have paid and are paying so dearly; upon the admission of aliens, when we see so many Jews and jobbers daily naturalized in order to enable them to retain the blood they have sucked from our veins; upon the making of a competent provision for invalids, instead of suffering them to starve in the streets, a shocking disgrace to the nation, and a most awful warning for men to shun those ranks wherein the privilege to beg has been earned: upon these parts of the plan I shall add nothing, because, where any serious objection can be raised to them there cannot be the most distant hope of accomplishing any change worthy of the attention of a cabinet for a single hour. The privilege of voting for members of parliament and that of killing game, are all, for the granting of which, I think it necessary to offer any thing in the shape of an argument. As to the former, the addition which this plan would make to the number of persons exercising the elective franchise will not be very great, and, whatever it may be, it will certainly not be urged as an objection by those who still feel an alarm at a standing army, as the means of destroying the liberties of the people, by giving to the monarchical and aristocratical branches, too much power over that of the democracy. Indeed, to give the soldiers this privilege appears to be absolutely necessary, in order to make them feel, that they have rights in common with their fellow subjects; in order to make them feel, that that country which they have to fight for, is theirs as well as others; in order to make them feel, that they are not mere mercenaries, that they are not selling their blood for the protection of more happy and more highly privileged mortals. And, in itself, what can be more just or more reasonable? for, what can be more unjust or more unreasonable, than that the elective franchise should be acquired by seven years apprenticeship to the hammering of a lap-stone or the driving of a needle, or by the gaining in trade wherewith to purchase a cottage of 40 shillings a year, while, to the service of ten years in a military capacity, venturing health and life in a thousand ways, such acquirement is denied? It is not merely a privation to the soldier; it is a punishment for his service; for, as in the case of free-boroughs, he is deprived of the privilege which he would have had, if he had remained at home and served an apprentice-

ship. And, while this continues, while there is a bounty, the most tempting of all bounties too, held out for staying at home, and plodding along, in peace and safety, in pursuit of pelf, is it not madness to think that, generally speaking, any but the profligate, or the miserable will enter the army? And, is it not still greater madness to hope, that they will be faithful and zealous soldiers? Am I told, that the armies of France are formed without the granting of any such privileges? I answer, that, in France, there are no such privileges to grant; there are no privileges or immunities whereof a military life can deprive a man; every man, soldier or not, is, in these respects, upon a footing; but, great care is taken to give the soldier, and the parents of soldiers too, favours and marks of distinction; and, without this, we may be well assured, that the military power of France would not, at this hour, have been an object of terror to England. In France, the soldiers are at the absolute command of the Sovereign; but they themselves are the masters of every body else. All that I wish to see in England, is, to place the soldier upon the same footing, in point of rights and immunities, with his fellow subjects in general.

With respect to the right, or rather the permission to kill game, a privilege of little value in itself, but become most highly esteemed by all the people of this country, it arose, you must well remember, not out of success in trade, not out of acquisitions of wealth, not out of the inheritance or the occupancy of lands, but, out of military services, performed by the Nobles, the Knights and Esquires, to whom the King granted permission to kill part of his game. That this assumption, on the part of the monarch, of the sole proprietorship of wild animals, might be too great a stretch of the kingly power, too bold a deviation from the law of nature, which gives to every man as free an use of wild animals as it does of the air and of the water, may be a question; but, there can be no question, that when the Sovereign's permission, granted in consequence of services, for the defence and honour of the realm, has degenerated into a right to be claimed, exclusively or almost exclusively, by those, who have been able, no matter how, to obtain a certain portion of wealth deposited in house or in land; when, this is become the state of the case, there can be no question as to the justice, not to say the policy, of restoring a part, at

least, of the much esteemed privilege to that service, as a reward to which alone, it was, at first, most justly and most wisely confined. Every vender of ribbons or of pins, who has accumulated the sum of about two or three thousand pounds, and who feels a disposition for the chase, lays out his money in a box and a few more, and then upon he swaggers about with his gun and his dogs, in any and every parish and county, in the kingdom: and, in the name of justice, of reason, of common sense, I ask, shall not the man who has served his country, who has ventured his life for the safety of this same esquire and haberdasher, have a right to kill a hare within the narrow precincts of the parish, or the neighbouring parishes, where he was born? Yet, little as it is in itself, perfectly costless as it is to the nation, its value in the eyes of the common people is beyond all estimation; and, I have no scruple in saying, that the prospect of enjoying it, and the examples of its enjoyment, would send more countrymen into the army, than any other, and than all the other, inducements, that the most eloquent description could present to their views.

Now, in closing the letter, I shall only say, that, with respect to the practicability, the easy execution of the whole of this plan, after a due consideration of every difficulty that my mind can conceive, after asking myself how all this is to be done without confusion, without bustle, without clashing, without embarrassments either at the seat of government, or in the parishes, or in the army itself, I am fully convinced, that a new office, consisting of a superintendent of the civil and political concerns of the soldiers and their parents, aided by a secretary and about six clerks, the whole establishment costing about ten thousand pounds a year, would completely manage the business, leaving all the other departments connected with the army precisely as they are, and without one additional object to divide their attention. If this be too much, nothing can be too little; and it were better that nothing at all should be done.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PAPER-MONEY.—As the time seems to be approaching, when even the most stupidly blind must, whether willingly or not, open their eyes upon this subject, it

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might, perhaps, be sufficient for me just to notice *what has happened* to the Paper-Money within the last few days, and there leave the matter. But, I cannot so far master myself as to forbear from doing a little more than this, upon the present occasion, especially when I recollect how *much* abuse the pretended "loyal" have, at different times, heaped upon me for the opinions, which I have expressed about the paper system. These persons, these "King's friends," these friends of "Social Order and our Holy Religion," have given to me every appellation expressive of baseness and maliciousness, because I have, upon so many occasions, endeavoured to caution people against the consequences of trusting to this system of paper-money; and, I have been informed, that there have not been wanting paper-money men openly to declare, that I ought to be considered as much the enemy of the country as Buonaparté, and to be treated as such. It is curious enough, that, at the very moment when I am condemned to a jail, fear has come upon the paper-money people, and that, too, to such a degree as to cause some of them already to cut their throats, and, in other ways, to lay violent hands upon their carcasses, notwithstanding their pious devotion to "our Holy Religion."

—It is well known, and, when the names, nay, when the places of abode, of these *my* "holy" enemies shall have been forgotten, it will be well known, that I was the first public writer in England who warned the people against the consequences of this species of currency, and generally against the whole of the paper system. For the nation to do me justice in this respect, at least, will not require long. It will not require many years. There is this difference between sound and unsound doctrines, or, in other words, between *truth* and *falsehood*, that time, which is sure to destroy the latter, is as sure to cause the former to triumph in the end, and, in the mean while, to give it daily additional strength. It is not many years ago, that Mr. SHERIDAN denounced me to the "Great Council of the Nation," as some of our bombastical editors call it; he denounced me as a "conspirator against the credit of the country," because I expressed, in plain language, my decided opinion, that the act of taking money out of one pocket and putting it into the other could not be productive of *gain*; that the way to redeem a mortgage, be it on what it might, was to *pay the amount to the lender*, and take

up his bond; and that it was not reconcileable to my notions, or to any notions that I could get into my head, that any part of a mortgage could be said to be *redeemed*, while he who had borrowed the money was obliged to *continue to pay interest for the whole of the sum originally borrowed*. Because I ventured to express this my opinion, the patriotic and loyal Sheridan denounced me as a conspirator against the credit and prosperity of the country. Because I was not able to comprehend the profound mysteries of the Pitt system of redemption, I was branded as almost a traitor.—Since that time, the system has been working on at a great rate. The war, which set out with almost a positive pledge of costing not more than *twenty six millions* annually now costs about *fifty millions*. I say *about*; for if one is within ten or a dozen millions now-a-days, one is as near the mark as can be reasonably expected. Such is the expence of the war grown to in the space of six years; and, what will it be, then, before another six years have passed over our heads? I always said that it would go on increasing thus: and, for so saying I was abused in the most foul and base manner.—But, to return to the PAPER MONEY, how often, when I have been endeavouring to impress upon the minds of my readers the necessity of guarding betimes against its ruinous consequences; how often, upon such occasions, have I been called a "*libeller* of the credit of the nation," and tauntingly asked, whether my guinea would go, in the market, for more meat and bread than a *pound note and a shilling*? How often has this question been put to me within the last twelve months, by those who have attempted to answer my articles under the head of "*Jacobin Guineas*?" Where are now those who so questioned me? I imagine that their boldness is a little diminished; if it be not, they may be pronounced absolutely incurable. Who, of the whole of this paper-money loving tribe, would have asked this question at Salisbury last market day? The MORNING POST, of the 17th instant, gives the following, as an extract of a letter from Salisbury of the 15th instant.—"*Salisbury, July 15.*—The distress in this place is extreme, it being with the *greatest difficulty* provisions can be procured here, as we have nothing apparently in circulation but the paper of the place, which is no longer current. On Saturday

"night numbers of women and children were seen in a deplorable condition, from the unfortunatè pressure under which we at present labour. It is hoped that some means will be immediately taken to remedy the evil."—Remedy the evil indeed! What means? Who can take such means? Is it the government? That would be making a precedent of a most dangerous nature and tendency.—The nation have been often told of the great effect which the paper-money system has had in advancing the prosperity of the country; it has been amused with glowing pictures of the improvements arising from the use of this species of currency; it has been by shallow-headed men, or by impostors, such as the pretended "AMERICAN," who has written a book under the title of "A Letter on the Genius and Dispositions of the French Government," and which work, in order to render the deception more complete, has been contrived to be first published in Philadelphia; by such persons every good thing now to be found in England has been attributed to the paper-money system. They have carefully kept out of sight that increase of misery, which is most clearly proved by the increase of the number of paupers; but, in the present situation of Salisbury we have a proof of the effect of the paper system, which even the grossest of fools cannot misunderstand, and which no impostor can explain away. It was impossible to conceive how a paper-money, a fictitious currency, could cause the grass to grow or the grain to kern or the cattle to fat; but, here we have the plain visible fact, stated in so many words, that this paper-money did render it difficult to procure provisions for the people of one of the county towns of England, and that, in consequence thereof, numbers of women and children were seen in a deplorable condition. Women and children! Aye, and men too, I warrant you; for men cannot live without eating and drinking any more than women and children.—The light manner in which this calamity is treated by some persons is truly surprizing to me; and, I am sure, that Mr. Perry cannot have duly reflected upon the matter, when he says, that what has happened "must make a sensation for a week;" but, that "the slight shock which credit has suffered (arising, undoubtedly, in the first instance, from unwise speculation) will speedily subside, and like a thunder storm

to the air, it will serve to purify the trading hemisphere."—More civet, sweet Apothecary! Purify, indeed! I am sure, that this was written without thought. But, I must say, that I do not approve of a great public print, like The MORNING CHRONICLE, having suppressed (for not to publish is, in such case, to suppress) information of what has been going on at Salisbury, of which no London print, that I have seen, except the Morning Post, has taken even the slightest notice.—Yes, Mr. PERRY, the trading hemisphere may be purified, as you call it; that is to say, the paper-system may be propped up; but, in the mean-while, Sir, I beg you, who are a sensible, an honest, and a humane man, to turn your eyes towards the people in and about Salisbury and Shaftsbury, and indeed, the whole of the West of England. You will there see the farmer, perhaps, his last sack of corn turned into paper-money, with not a pound left wherewith to get in his harvest. In many instances rents are due, and have long been collecting together in the now-worthless paper-money. The shop-keepers, the public-house keepers, people in trade of every sort and size, have, in an instant, in the twinkling of an eye, been left penny-less; absolutely without a farthing of money; and, what is much worse, many of them in debt, the means of discharging which, the last remaining means, thus, in an instant, swept away, never to return. In such a state of things, every man runs at once to his books to see who are his debtors; every debt is instantly demanded, and not a soul has the means of paying. Judge you, Mr. Perry, what must be the distress; judge you what the ruin, that must inevitably arise out of such a state of things. Away, at once, goes all confidence between man and man; away goes, in a short time, the shame of acting fraudulently; as in the case of shipwreck, in the magnitude of the distress every act of unfairness and of cruelty sinks out of sight. "Every one for himself" is the cry, and honesty and compassion are effaced from the heart.—Is this, Mr. PERRY, "a sensation for a week?" Is this calculated to "purify the trading hemisphere,"—What must be the situation of the labourer or the journeyman, in such a state of things? He can lose, you will say, perhaps, but one week's wages. Those who do not economize cannot; but, every labourer and journeyman has rent to pay and fuel

to purchase, and has certain other motives that demand some little provision beforehand, especially if he be married and has an *increasing* family. This provision is made in the currency of the place; and, Good God! how many poor and worthy creatures must, by the blowing away of that currency, have been plunged into misery unspeakable! Those, who were but one remove from pauperism, would, indeed, only become paupers; that is to say, be thrown for maintenance upon the farmers and tradesmen just at the moment when they themselves were half-ruined; but, how hard, how cruel the case of those, who, by dint of industry and care and economy were just enabled to keep the wolf from the door; just enabled to pay their rent, to have a comfortable meal, to dress decently, and to provide the means of fitting out their children for service? Such people must always have a few pounds by them. Such little hoard is a necessary part of their establishment. And, thus, at "one fell sweep," have all this very best description of persons been reduced to the most poignant misery, through the whole of the district, in which the now-dishonoured paper-money formed the currency of the country.—And, yet, I have been abused; I have been vilified; I have been represented as an enemy to my country, and as the advocate of Buonaparte's, because I cautioned that country against the effects of this paper-money!—In another of the Morning Chronicles, it is observed, that there has been a consultation upon the subject of *affording relief* from the Bank in Thimblecandle Street; but what is meant by "*relief*?" Is it that sort of thing which will enable other smaller banks to go on? This may be done, and, I suppose, will be done; but, will this *relieve* the people in Wiltshire and elsewhere, who field notes that are now little better than waste paper? This is the description of persons, to whom one would wish to see "*relief*" given; and, if the government cannot give them relief, of what use, conscientiously speaking, is its interference?—As to talking about *indiscreet speculation* having been the cause of this explosion, it is nonsense. The cause is, the want of confidence in the paper. Whence the first alarm has proceeded is of no consequence at all. In proportion to the magnitude of the quantity of paper in circulation men will be disposed towards alarm. They will be so disposed, with-

out being able to assign any particular reason for it. Every man knows that paper-money has no intrinsic value; that a breath destroys it; and, when once a comparative view of the worth of paper-money and real money is taken by any considerable portion of the community, nothing that the human mind can devise will long keep the paper afloat, unless it be *openly pitted against the coin*, and a money price and a paper price take place. It is perfectly notorious that a traffic has long been carried on of paper for guineas, the latter bearing a value beyond their nominal value. It is decidedly impossible, that such a circumstance should not diminish the general confidence in the solidity of paper-money; not only of this or of that description of paper-money, but of all the paper-money current in the country. And, therefore, to talk of "*purifying the trading hemisphere*," by which, I presume, is meant, making the general confidence in paper-money greater than it was before, argues a great want of reflection upon the subject.—The Morning Post of the 19th instant, has a remark, which merits some notice on account of the source, whence one may reasonably suppose that it has, either directly or indirectly, proceeded. It is this:—"The depreciated value of country Bank-paper has already occasioned a *reduction in the price of provisions of every description*. This is not only of high importance, with reference to the *labouring classes* of the community, but affords a decisive conviction, that the *abolition* of these *destructive assignats* would *reinstale commercial confidence*." Would not one think, that the last part of this paragraph had been dropped on its way to my Printer Mr. HANSARD, and picked up and carried to the office of the Morning Post? "*Destructive Assignats!*" Why, I never made use of any thing so contemptuous as this; and, does the editor of the Morning Post carry in mind, *who are the persons*, who issue these "*Assignats*," as he calls them; and who have so long been profiting from such issue?—Let me, however, put him right upon a point of doctrine here. He has a confused notion of the effect of the quantity of money upon prices, and seems not clearly to understand the meaning of the word *depreciation*.—When money *depreciates*, prices *rise*. This must be obvious to every one; and, indeed, most people, now-a-days, know that *high prices* is, upon a general scale, nothing more

than another word for *depreciated currency*. Therefore, to say that "the depreciation of the country bank paper has occasioned a *reduction* in the price of provisions," is clearly erroneous. The writer meant, or his oracle meant, to say, that *the lessening of the quantity*, that is to say, the *annihilation* of part of the country bank paper, has occasioned a *reduction* in the price of provisions; and, in this, he is, I dare say, nay, I know that he must be correct.—But, what does he mean by what follows? Does he mean to tell the public, that this circumstance will do the labourer any good? Does he really believe, that, if provisions be lower in price, the wages of the labourer will not be lower in price too? Does he seriously intend to persuade us, that, when the farmer sells his wheat for ten shillings a bushel, he will give the labourer as many shillings a week as he gives him when wheat is sold at fifteen shillings a bushel? Absurd as this is, however, it is the meaning of the paragraph, or else the paragraph has no meaning at all.—A word or two more, now, about "these *destructive assignats*." The writer knows, I presume, that there is no country money, the issuers of which are not connected with some persons in town. He is aware, I presume, that there is scarcely a money-man in England, who is not, in some way or other, connected with the country mills. But, waiving this, for the present, has it occurred to my "*Learned friend*" (for, surely, he must be of that tribe.) to reflect on the *several consequences*, that might be reasonably expected to grow out of the "*abolition* of these *destructive assignats*," as he has the cruelty to call them? Has he considered duly upon the *means of supplying their place*? I have, at different times, heard much talk against the country banks, and their tendency to depreciate the value of money by increasing its quantity; but, to me it appears as clear as day light, that the paper of this sort is full as necessary to the keeping up of the system as is the paper of Threadneedle street. I can see no mischievous quality in the former, which does not belong to the latter, while, on the contrary, I can see, with respect to the former, some proportion, at any rate, of real property liable to the making of it good in case of failure, and can see no real property in the case of the latter. Be this as it may, however, what is to supply the place of the "*abolished assignats*?"

Would "my *learned friend*" have *no paper at all* to supply its place? And, does he, learned gentleman, think that guineas, "Jacobin guineas," would circulate at Salisbury, while not a piece of coin was to be seen at Winchester? Will he seriously say, that he believes, that, if such were the case on Monday, the Tuesday's Salisbury coaches would not be broken down by the weight of Jews, setting off with notes, wherewith to purchase up the said Guineas? This is too plain to be dwelt upon for a moment. Well, then, he would have *Bank of England notes* to supply the place of "these *destructive assignats*." Has he reflected on the consequences of that? Is he quite sure, that, every one feeling, that the notes of the Bank of England *having thus been so greatly increased in quantity*; is he quite sure, that that feeling would not transfer the want of confidence from one description of paper-money to the other? Does he think, now, for instance, that, if *all* the country money were instantly destroyed; does he think, *can* he think, can any creature with brains in his skull believe, for only one half minute, that, with their pocket-books full of dishonoured "*assignats*," with ruin spread all around them; can he seriously believe, that, in such a state of things, *any sort* of paper money would possess the confidence of the people?—For the reasons, which I should now state, if I had room, and which I will hereafter state, but which will, probably, suggest themselves to the reader, I am of opinion, that the country money *must be supported*, or that the whole of the paper-money system will go to pieces. Upon the consequences of which latter event it would be premature to calculate, but which consequences I, for my part, think, as I always have thought, would not at all tend to endanger the safety and well-being of the nation.

IRISH-PAPER-MONEY.—Upon this subject I have only room to insert the following Proclamation.—"From the Dublin "*Gazette Extraordinary*.—His Grace, the Lord Lieutenant having been pleased to appoint John Patrick, Alexander Jaffery, Randal McDonald, Francis Beggs, Richard Litton, John Lindsay, John McCrétton, Richard Darling, John Orr, Joseph Hone, and Alexander Shaw, Esqrs. to receive the applications and look into the securities of such persons in trade as are possessed of funds ultimately more than sufficient to answer all demands upon them, but have not

"the means of converting those funds into money or negotiable securities in time to meet the pressure of the moment, and the governors and directors of the bank of Ireland having agreed to advance to those gentlemen sums, not exceeding in the whole 200,000*l.* to enable them to give relief to manufacturers so situated, conformably to the recommendation made to his Grace the Lord Lieutenant by the Lords of his Majesty's Privy Council, persons desirous to avail themselves of such aid may make their application to the gentlemen above named accordingly. By his Grace's command. W. W. POLE."—Something of this sort will, I suppose, be done in England. The government will, in this way, cause the private traders in paper-money to be kept up; and, indeed, thus does appear to be the only thing that, at present, can be done to put a stop to the general run, which is taking place.—This is a subject of the greatest importance. It requires, to keep the nation steady, under the approaching circumstances, all the coolness, all the reflection, all the profundity of wisdom, of which the human mind is capable. Any shallow head may hatch and execute expedients; but, expedients will not long do; and, whether we are to witness any thing better than expedients time alone can determine.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
20th July, 1810.

MY OTHER WORKS.

At this time I think it right to state to the Public something respecting the OTHER WORKS, which I alluded to, in a cursory manner, in my last Number, and which works I shall, I hope, now be able to push forward with increased advantage and activity.

OF THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, the next Volume (being the Seventh) will appear in the month of October; and, after that, one Volume every three months at farthest; and, I have no doubt, that the whole of the work will be completed in the course of this present year and the two following years. Much unexpected matter has occurred, as I have proceeded with this work, the labour attending which has been infinite, and the expence not small. Before the work is completed I think it is probable, that more than two thousand vo-

lumes will have been read and consulted, for the purpose of obtaining materials, or of insuring correctness; besides the singular advantage of my having been assisted with a great number of manuscripts, containing most interesting and valuable matter, never yet committed to the press, in any shape whatever.

THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES for the last Session will be published on or before the first of September. All the numerous communications, which have been made to me, relating to that Session, will be carefully attended to; but any, which are yet to be made, must be received before the 1st of August.

OF THE STATE TRIALS I can only say, that the publication of the succeeding Volumes will be regularly continued, without any delay, until the work be completed. The praises which have been bestowed upon the execution of this work, by many persons of eminence, I should not mention, were they not due to another. The Gentleman, on whom the editing of the State Trials has rested, has bestowed upon the work as great pains, certainly, as it is possible to bestow, and the success has been commensurate with the means used to secure it. To render this work complete, nay, faultless, if that be possible, there is no expence that has been grudged, no sort or degree of trouble spared. The number of Trials introduced into this work will exceed, by nearly one half, that of the Trials in the Old Collection; and some of those now added, will be found to be among the most interesting. The work will include the STATE TRIALS OF IRELAND. My thanks are due to all those, who have imparted Manuscripts connected with this work; and I take this opportunity of promising, that, of every thing of this sort, that may be communicated, the greatest care shall be taken. The Seventh Volume will be published on the 1st of September. Of the Two Hundred and Seventy-One Trials or Proceedings, of which the first seven Volumes consist, ONE-HUNDRED and TWELVE never before came into any Collection. The following is a List of the Articles contained in the Seventh Volume:

* * The new Matter is marked [N.]

244. The Trial of Edward Coleman, at the King's-Bench, for High Treason, A. D. 1678.
245. The Trial of William Ireland, Thomas Pickering, and John Grove, at the Old Bailey for High Treason, A. D. 1678.

246. The Trial of the Lord Cornwallis, before the Lords at Westminster, for the Murder of Robert Clerk, A. D. 1678.
247. The Trial of Robert Green, Henry Berry, and Lawrence Hill, at the King's-Bench, for the Murder of Sir Edmundbury Godfrey, A. D. 1679.
248. The Trial of Mr. Samuel Atkins, at the King's-Bench, for being accessory to the Murder of Sir Edmundbury Godfrey, A. D. 1679.
249. The Trial of David Lewis, a Jesuit, (pretended Bishop of Llandaff), at Monmouth Assizes, for High Treason, A. D. 1679.
250. The Trial of Nathanael Reading, esq. for a Trespass and Misdemeanor, A. D. 1679.
251. The Trial of Thomas White, alias Whitebread, Provincial of the Jesuits in England, William Harcourt, pretended Rector of London, John Fenwick, Procurator for the Jesuits in England, John Gavan, alias Gaven, and Anthony Turner, all Jesuits and Priests, at the Old Bailey, for High Treason, A. D. 1679.
252. The Trial of Richard Langhorn, esq. at the Old Bailey, for High Treason, A. D. 1679.
253. The Trial of Sir George Wakeman, bart. William Marshal, William Rumley, and James Corker, Benedictine Monks, at the Old Bailey, for High Treason, A. D. 1679.
254. The Trial of Charles Kerne, at Hereford Assizes, for High Treason, being a Romish Priest, A. D. 1679.
255. The Trial of Andrew Brommich, at Stafford Assizes, for High Treason, being a Romish Priest, A. D. 1679.
256. The Trial of William Atkins, at Stafford Assizes, for High Treason, being a Romish Priest, A. D. 1679.
257. The Trial of Francis Johnson, a Franciscan, at Worcester, for High Treason, A. D. 1679. [N.]
258. The Trial of Thomas Knox and John Lane, at the King's-Bench, for a Misdemeanor, A. D. 1679.
259. The Trials of Lionel Anderson alias Munson, William Russel alias Napper, Charles Parris alias Parry, Henry Starkey, James Corker, William Marshal, and Alexander Lumsden, with the Arraignment of David Joseph Kemish, at the Old Bailey, for High Treason, being Romish Priests, A. D. 1680.
260. The Trial of John Tasborough and Anne Price, at the King's-Bench, for Subornation of Perjury, A. D. 1680.
261. The Trial of Benjamin Harris, Bookseller, at Guildhall, for causing to be printed and sold, a Libel, entitled "An Appeal from the Country to the City, for the Preservation of his Majesty's Person, Liberty, Property, and the Protestant Religion," A. D. 1680.
262. The Trial of Francis Smith, Bookseller, at the Guildhall of London, for publishing a Libel, A. D. 1680.
263. The Trial of Jane Curtis, at Guildhall, for publishing the same Libel, A. D. 1680.
264. The Trial of sir Thomas Gascoigne, bart. at the King's-Bench, for High Treason, A. D. 1680.
265. The Trial of Elizabeth Cellier, at the King's-Bench, for High Treason, A. D. 1680.
266. The Trial of Roger Palmer, esq. Earl of Castlemaine, in the Kingdom of Ireland, at the King's-Bench, for High Treason, A. D. 1680.
267. The Trial of Henry Carr, or Care, at the Guildhall of London, for a Libel, A. D. 1680.
268. The Trial of John Giles at the Old Bailey, for assaulting and attempting to Murder John Arnold, esq. A. D. 1680.
269. The Trial of Thomas Thwing and Mary Pressicks, at York Assizes, for High Treason, A. D. 1680.
270. The Trial of Elizabeth Collier, at the Old Bailey, for writing and publishing a Libel, A. D. 1680.
271. Proceedings against the Five Popish Lords, viz. the Earl of Powis, Lord Viscount Stafford, Lord Petre, Lord Arundel of Wardour, and Lord Bellasyse, for High Treason: Together with the Trial of Lord Viscount Stafford, A. D. 1678—1685. [N.]

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PETERSBURG.—*Imperial Manifesto, respecting the New Loan.* (Continued from p. 32.)

This property consists in lands, meadows, fisheries, &c. in forests of the Crown and other territorial possessions of the Crown. The mass of Crown property thus detached shall be sold in five years. All persons of free state, also foreign capitalists, may buy estates, &c. under certain conditions. The payments may be made by installments of 5 years each.

2. Of an Establishment of a Commission of Liquidation of the State Debts.

The proceeds of the Sale of said Estate, are destined for the establishment of a Fund for the Liquidation of the Debts. The commission shall consist of a Director General, and five directors. It receives all the sums arising from the Sale of Estates, is independent of the Treasury, and applies the money to liquidate the Debts.

3. Of the Opening of the Loan.

To accelerate the liquidation of the State debt, a loan in Bank obligations shall be opened; those which are obtained by the loan shall be publicly burnt. Foreigners can participate in the

loan.—Agreeable to the plan annexed to the loan, its maximum shall consist of 100 millions of roubles in Bank obligations. It shall be divided into five series, each of twenty millions.—The interest of the first series amounts to six per cent.; and the capital lent is repaid in 1817. The loan begins on the 15th of July. The commission of mortgages, on application, gives obligations for the sums lent, of at least 1000 roubles.—The Imperial Manifesto is of the 27th, of M.y. (Old Style), and countersigned by Count Romanzow, Chancellor of the Empire.—The colonial products remain at a low price. Yesterday the Course of Exchange was somewhat better, which is to be attributed to the great purchase of Russian products to freight neutral vessels.—(*Correspondent.*)

HOLLAND.—*Report to the Emperor, dated Paris, July 9, 1810.*

I have the honour to lay before your Majesty an Act of the King of Holland, dated the 3d inst. by which the Monarch declares, that he abdicates the Crown in favour of his eldest son, leaving, according to the Constitution, the Regency to the Queen, and establishes a Council of Regency composed of his Ministers.—Such an act, Sire, ought not to have appeared without a previous concert with your Majesty. It can have no force without your approbation. Ought your Majesty to confirm the disposition taken by the King of Holland?—The union of Belgium with France has destroyed the independence of Holland. Her system has necessarily become the same with that of France. She is obliged to take part in all the maritime wars of France, as if she were one of her provinces. Since the creation of the arsenal of the Scheldt, and the annexation to France of the provinces composing the departments of the mouths of the Rhine, and the mouths of the Scheldt, the commercial existence of Holland has become precarious. The merchants of Antwerp, Ghent, and Middleburgh, who can, without any restriction, extend their speculations to the extremities of the Empire, of which they form a part, necessarily carry on the commerce which Holland transacted. Rotterdam and Dordrecht are already on the verge of ruin; these cities having lost the commerce of the Rhine, which goes direct, by the new frontier, to the ports of the Scheldt, pass-

ing through the Blesboch. The part of Holland, which is still alien to the Empire, is deprived of the advantages enjoyed by the part united thereto. Compelled, nevertheless, to make common cause with France, Holland will have to support the charges of this allowance without reaping any of its benefits.—Holland is sunk under the weight of her public debt; which amounts to between 85 and 90 millions, that is to say, a fourth more than the debt of the whole Empire; and if a reduction had been projected by the Government of the country, it would not have been in its power to give a guarantee for the inviolability and permanence of such a measure, inasmuch as the debt, if even reduced to 30 millions, would still be beyond the actual means and ability of that country. It is estimated Holland pays triple the sum that France pays. The people groan under the weight of 23 distinct descriptions of contributions. The Dutch nation sinks under its contributions, and can no longer pay them.—Nevertheless, the necessary expences of the Government require that this burden should be augmented. The budget for the marine amounted, in 1809, to three millions only of florins, a sum scarcely sufficient to pay the administrators, the officers, and seamen, and to defray the expence of the arsenals, and which has not admitted of the equipment of a single ship of war. To provide for the armament ordered in 1810, and which is the minimum of the naval force necessary for the defence of Holland, triple that sum would be requisite. The war budget has scarcely afforded a sufficiency for maintaining the fortresses and 16 battalions; and whilst two branches of such importance are so far from having what is necessary for supporting the honour and dignity of independence, the interest of the public debt has ceased to be paid. It is more than a year and a half in arrear.—If, in such a state of things, your Majesty maintain the recent dispositions, by assigning to Holland a provisional government, you will only be prolonging her painful agony. If the Government of a prince in the vigour of life has left the country in so distressed a situation, what can be expected from a long minority? It cannot, therefore, be saved but by a new order of things. The period of the power and prosperity of Holland was when it formed part of the greatest monarchy then in Europe. Her incorporation with the

great Empire is the only stable condition in which Holland can henceforth repose from her sufferings and long vicissitudes, and recover her ancient prosperity.—Thus ought your Majesty to decide in favour of such an union, for the interest, nay more, for the salvation of Holland. She ought to be associated in our blessings, as she has been associated in our calamities. But another interest still more imperiously indicates to your Majesty the conduct which you ought to adopt.

Holland is, in fact, a shoot from the French territory; it constitutes a portion of soil necessary to complete the form of the Empire. To become full master of the Rhine, your Majesty should advance to the Zuyder Sea. By this means all the rivers which have their source in France, or which wash the Frenchieux, will belong to you as far as the sea. To leave the mouths of your rivers in the possession of strangers, would, in fact, Sire, confine your power to an illimited Monarchy, instead of erecting an Imperial Throne. To leave in the power of foreigners the mouths of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, would be tantamount to submitting your laws to them; it would render your manufactures and commerce dependent on the Powers who should be in possession of those mouths; it would admit a foreign influence in that which is most important to the happiness of your subjects. The annexation of Holland is still necessary to complete the system of the Empire, particularly since the British Orders in Council of November 1807. Twice since that period your Majesty has been obliged to close your Custom house to the trade of Holland, in consequence of which Holland was isolated from the Empire and the Continent. After the peace of Vienna, it was in your Majesty's contemplation to annex this kingdom. You were induced to abandon this idea from considerations that no longer exist. You agreed with reluctance to the treaty of the 14th March, which aggravated the calamities of Holland, without meeting any one view of your Majesty. The obstacle which prevented it has now disappeared of its self. Your Majesty owes it to your Empire to take advantage of a circumstance which so naturally leads to the Union. There can be none more favourable for the execution of your project.—Your Majesty has established at Antwerp a powerful arsenal. The aston-

ished Scheldt swells with pride to behold 20 vessels of the first rate bearing your Majesty's flag, and protecting its shores that were formerly scarcely visited by some trading vessels. But the great designs of your Majesty in this respect, cannot be fully accomplished except by the union of Holland. It is necessary to complete so astonishing a creation. Under your Majesty's energetic Government, the ensuing year will not terminate before, by calling into action the maritime resources of Holland, a fleet of 40 sail of the line, and a great number of troops shall be assembled in the Scheldt and Texel, to dispute with the British Government the sovereignty of the sea, and repel its unjust claims.—So that it is not the interest of France alone, that calls for this union: it is that of continental Europe, who applies to France to repair the losses of her marine, and combat, on her own element, the enemy of the prosperity of Europe; whose industry it has not been able to stifle, but whose communications it obstructs by its insolent claims, and the vast number of its ships of war. Finally, the union of Holland augments the Empire, in rendering more close the frontiers she defends, and in adding to the security of its arsenals and docks. It enriches it by an industrious, thrifty and laborious people, who will add to the stock of public wealth, in increasing their private fortunes. There are no people more estimable, or better adapted to derive benefit from the advantages which the liberal policy of your Government affords to industry. France could not have made a more valuable acquisition.—The annexation of Holland to France is the necessary consequence of the union of Belgium. It completes your Majesty's Empire, as well as the execution of your system of war, politics, and trade. It is the first, but a necessary step towards the restoration of your navy, in fact; it is the heaviest blow which your Majesty could inflict upon England.—As to the young Prince, who is so dear to your Majesty, he has already felt the effects of your good will. You have bestowed on him the Grand Duchy of Berg. He has therefore no occasion for any new establishment.—I have the honour to propose to your Majesty the project of the following Decree. I am, &c.—CHAMPAIGNY, Duke of CADORE.

Extract from the Registers of the Office of the Secretary of State.

Palace of Rambouillet, July 9th, 1810.

We Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, &c. &c. have decreed, and hereby decree, as follow :—

TITLE I.

Art. 1. Holland is united to France.

2. The City of Amsterdam shall be the third City of the Empire.

3. Holland shall have six Senators, six Deputies to the Council of State, twenty-five Deputies to the Legislative Body, and two Judges in the Court of Cassation.

4. The officers by sea and land, of whatever rank, shall be confirmed in their employments. Commissions shall be delivered to them signed with our hand. The Royal Guard shall be united to our Imperial Guard.

TITLE II.—Of the Administration for 1810.

5. The Duke of Placentia, Arch Treasurer of the Empire, shall repair to Amsterdam in the capacity of our Lieutenant General. He shall preside in the Council of Ministers, and attend to the dispatch of business. His functions shall cease the 1st of January 1811, the period when the French Administration shall commence.

6. All the Public Functionaries, of whatever rank, are confirmed in their employments.

TITLE III.—Of the Finances.

7. The present contributions shall continue to be levied until the 1st of January, 1811, at which period the country shall be eased of that burden, and the imposts put on the same footing as for the rest of the Empire.

8. The budget of receipts and disbursements, shall be submitted to our approbation before the 1st of August next.

Only one-third of the present amount of interest upon the public debt shall be carried to the account of expenditure for 1810.

The interest of the debt for 1808 and 1809, not yet paid, shall be reduced to one-third, and charged on the budget of 1810.

9. The Custom-houses on the frontier, other than those of France, shall be organized under the superintendence of our Director-General of the Custom-houses. The Dutch custom-houses shall be incorporated therewith.

The line of custom-houses, now on the French frontier, shall be kept up until the 1st January, 1811, when it shall be removed, and the communication of Holland with the empire become free.

10. The colonial produce, actually in Holland, shall remain in the hands of the owners, upon paying a duty of 50 per cent. ad valorem. A declaration of the amount shall be made before the 1st of September at farthest.

The said merchandize, upon payment of the duties, may be imported into France, and circulated through the whole extent of the empire.

TITLE IV.

11. There shall be at Amsterdam a special Administration, presided over by one of our Counsellors of State, which shall have the superintendence of, and the necessary funds to provide for the repairs of the dykes, polders, and other public works.

TITLE V.

12. In the course of the present month, there shall be nominated by the Legislative Body of Holland, a Commission of 15 Members, to proceed to Paris, in order to constitute a Council, whose business shall be to regulate definitively all that relates to the public and local debts, and to conciliate the principles of the union with the localities and interests of the country.

13. Our Ministers are charged with the execution of the present decree.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

By the Emperor,

(Signed) H. B. Duke of BASSANO.

The Minister Secretary of State.

SPAIN.—French Official Relation of the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

On the night between the 15th and 16th, the trenches were opened before Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy being deceived by a double false attack, one made on the left, the other on the right of the Agueda, we suffered less loss by their fire than we had reason to expect. Before day-break the parallel was open to the extent of 1,000 yards; it was four feet wide and three feet deep. Its right was little more than 600 yards from the fortress, and its left not above 200. When the day broke the enemy found out their mistake, and kept up a heavy fire until ten o'clock. We had 10 men killed, and

70 wounded.—The day of the 16th and the following night, were employed in widening the parallel and its communications. The work was considerably impeded by the water.—From the 17th to the 18th the parallel was widened to ten feet throughout its whole extent. The parapets were commenced and completed at several points. Channels were dug to carry off the water. The communication by the right was made perfectly dry, but that on the left is very moist, as well as at the right end of the parallel.—On the 17th, the enemy made some sorties and endeavoured to turn our left, which compelled us to extend the parallel; in the course of the night it was lengthened 120 yards.—From the 18th to the 19th, we were employed in widening and deepening the continuation of the left of the parallel, for the purpose of getting under shelter from the fire of the suburbs.—The whole of the communications and all that part of the parallel contained between them, were widened ten feet at the bottom, and the parapets finished. That part of the parallel between the Bishop's house and the extremity of the right, was abandoned on account of the water: it will be completed to-morrow night. Thus the first parallel may be considered as finished.—The enemy threw a great many shells, but without doing us any injury.—Our artillery arrives slowly; the roads are very bad.—From the 19th to the 20th: The parallel was completed throughout its whole length. A part of it to the right, of about 60 yards long, has not the parapets yet finished. The communication on the left is entirely completed. The earth fell in some places on the right; but it was thrown up again.—The batteries are constructing.—All the 16-pounders and 12-inch mortars are arrived in the park.—We had 24 men killed and wounded, among whom is an officer of the 50th regiment. From the 20th to the 21st: In the course of the night we began the second parallel by two approaches; one of the length of 224 yards, the other of 160. These approaches bring us 140 paces nearer the fort.—The enemy kept up a very brisk fire, particularly with musketry. We had 15 men, and one officer wounded.—The 24 pounders arrived on the 21st, so that all the artillery is now in the park.—The soil upon which many of the batteries are constructing, presents difficulties which will retard the work a little. There will not, however, be much time lost, because all

the guns cannot be brought to the batteries the same night they will be according as the platforms are finished.

To his serene Highness the Prince of Wagram and Neufchatel, Vice-Constable, Major-General.

"Sir;—I arrived at Caridad [Ciudad] on the evening of the 24th; yesterday, the 25th, at four in the morning, I ordered the fire to be commenced against the fort with 46 guns; it appears that the garrison did not expect it so soon. They were very much disconcerted for the first few hours, and only returned it feebly. Soon after they began to fire with a great deal of activity. The fortifications were damaged, the parapet and embrasures were much injured, and several guns dismounted. The fire broke out several times, and in various parts of the town; one of the magazines exploded with a tremendous noise. That part of the wall to the east, which it adjoined, was damaged. The same accident befell us. Two small depots also took fire, and occasioned us the loss of some men. Our loss in the whole amounts to two officers and ten men killed, one officer and 41 wounded. It might have been more, considering how near the batteries were, and the pebbly nature of the soil. That of the enemy, confined within stone ramparts and encumbered with inhabitants, must have been much greater. Our sharpshooters, posted almost above the glacis, embarrassed much the cannoniers of the garrison, of whom they killed a great many. The enemy remained in possession of a part of the convent of the Holy Cross, from which they enfiladed our approaches on the left. They were driven from it in the night, and the whole convent is occupied by us. Our approaches are proceeding.—I have driven the English beyond the Arava. My cavalry are on the right bank of that streamlet, with some artillery and a few battalions of light infantry. The English army still occupies the same positions at Espeja, Villa Formosa, and Gallegos. A deserter came in yesterday, who states that Lord Wellington was in this last village.—Accept, Sir, a fresh assurance of the respectful devotedness, with which I have the honour to be,—Your Highness's most humble and obedient servant, The Marshal Prince of ESSLING, Commander in Chief of the Army in Portugal. MASSENA."

SPAIN.—*Manifest of the Supreme Junta of Cumana, dated April 28, 1810.*

The Supreme Junta of Government established in this capital, in the name of his Majesty Ferdinand the Seventh (whom God preserve,) to its inhabitants and to those of the Provinces of New Andalusia and New Barcelona.—People of Cumana!—People of Barcelona!—Inhabitants who dwell on the soil of these provinces of New Andalusia, and New Barcelona; loyal and beloved countrymen, listen and give ear to the reasons and causes from which has originated the form of government recently instituted—listen and attend to them, that if by chance there should be among you any who, doubting of the existence of such serious circumstances, disapprove without sufficient reflection of the plan, or from too much timidity think it impracticable, or from want of information suppose the respectable members who compose it not properly authorised; you may now come to the knowledge of facts of which the whole universe is and has been witness; remain quiet in the hope, that harmony, unanimity, and all the social virtues being combined in the appointments which form the basis of the edifice of our common security, we shall render our names immortal, and hand down to our posterity the enjoyment of peace and future felicity.—You must have heard, since our beloved Sovereign Don Ferdinand the Seventh, was proclaimed King, the state of confusion with which Spain has been overwhelmed for want of its lawful head; you must also have heard of the ruin and destruction caused to its inhabitants by the criminal and perfidious Godoy, in intelligence with the Emperor of the French, assisted by some of its own unnatural children, who, seconding the views of that ferocious tyrant, did not stop to sacrifice their country by every means in their power; and finally, you are not ignorant that the Central Junta of Government of the Kingdom of Spain, created in the name of our Sovereign Lord, Ferdinand the Seventh, has dissolved itself in consequence of the irruptions of the enemy, or what is yet more certain, by the unfortunate corruption and venality inherent to the anterior despotic Government. In this state of things, not being possible to preserve the country without a Chief to govern it, the provinces of America begin to reflect on the best mode of

constituting a Government to preserve themselves, from the disorders attendant on anarchy, and the invasion of the Tyrant; and, finally, some of them have established legal Congresses, by means of the authority, which, though vested by the people in their Kings, have nevertheless, preserved in their Cabildos a similar authority, which might be brought into action in all cases of emergency, and more especially in such a crisis as the present.—One of the first which has signalized itself on this occasion is the capital of Venezuela (Caracas;) which, well aware of the melancholy situation of affairs in Spain, and extinction of its authority, determined, at once, on the wisest and proper measures to be adopted, by convoking the Notables of the district, and electing, by suffrage, a certain number from the whole, to form a Supreme Junta, and by suspending from their respective offices all those who held the principal employments under Government; either because the authority under which they were constituted having ceased to exist, or because their opinions, being opposed to those which we cherish, they were considered hostile to the present order of things.—This change has not been made by a tumultuous mob, but by a wise, prudent, and deliberate convocation. Do not imagine that although the principal authorities have been deposed, others have not been appointed to fill their places!—No! the Government has been changed as to individuals, but the legitimate authorities have been re-established, and acknowledged in their successors.—This important and urgent determination has been communicated by the wise Junta of Caracas, to the illustrious Cabildo of this city (and not to the former Governor, Colonel Don Ensebio Escudero, who has been deposed,) and enjoining the necessity of conspiring all to the same end, by coalescing together, to work for the common cause.

The Cabildo, no less prudent than penetrated by the natural impulsion which actuated the minds of those faithful people, immediately assembled to decide on what was expedient to be done, in following so laudable an example; and having met in congregation, in the Town-hall, all the individuals who compose it, and many of the principal inhabitants of the city, they there celebrated a solemn act, by which the following persons were elected to govern the province, by the

unanimous suffrage of the votes of the whole Cabildo and a great part of the inhabitants.

PRESIDENT, Don Francisco Xavier Mayz, Alcalde of first election.

VICE PRESIDENT, Don Francisco Yllas, Alcalde of second election.

MEMBERS ELECTORS.—Don Joseph Ramierez, D. Geronimo Martincz, D. Francisco Sanchez, D. José Jesus Alcalá, D. Manuel Millán, D. Domingo Mayz, D. Jose Santos, Doctor D. Mariano Cova, for the people; Licentiate Don Andre Callejon, for the Clergy; Captain Jose Flores, for the military; D. Juan Bermudez, for the planters; D. Juan Manuel Texada, for the merchants; D. Pedro Mexias for the people of colour; Doctor D. Juan Martinez, assessor; D. Diego Vallenilla, secretary.

In consequence whereof, this body corporate has assumed all the faculties and offices which were vested in and administered by the Colonel Don Eusebio Escudero, to whom, nevertheless, gratitude and respect will always be manifested, as well for his laudable conduct, as for the spontaneous resignation he immediately made of his appointment.—You have now heard concisely the motives upon which this change in the government has been founded; nor can you be ignorant that the Cabildos are vested with faculties to take upon themselves the reins of government in such critical circumstances, and to adopt legal means for the appointment of persons, through whom the public may both represent their opinions, and be acquainted with the resolutions of government; and finally, you have now a national authority with which you may unite in brotherly love to aid and assist one another reciprocally.—We may now exclaim that we are no longer apprehensive of seeing our city destroyed, by being divided against itself. We have now the satisfaction to see that we bear a share in promoting the welfare of our country, which, hitherto, we were always deprived of, as an exclusive privilege of foreigners; we, therefore hope that reciprocal harmony will, henceforward prevail, and that you will acknowledge the Representative Authority, temporarily established as your protectors. By waiting patiently the result which must ensue, from precautions so wise, you and your children will be happy. You will be convinced more by future experience than by any promises

we may at present make of the utility of the Junta; of the mildness with which it will act, and which will always be inseparable from their mode of government; and of their exertions and vigilance to promote the happiness of the inhabitants of the district under their command.—Do not disapprove or censure, prematurely, the resolutions of the Junta, because, at first sight, you may condemn them, or because you do not comprehend their views; you may hear individuals describe or propose plans which may appear preferable, but do not believe that such plans would have been disregarded had they been found advantageous. Beware of criticising the individual merits and talents of the members who have been elected: we will assist each other in carrying the burthen, observing the precepts of Jesus Christ, by exercising the duties of society which Providence has been pleased to confide to us, and that every man be rewarded according to his merits. And, the better to confirm that union and tranquillity, so essential to the maintenance of peace and harmony, we recommend and enjoin that the Judges and Justices, as well Ecclesiastical as Secular, and the men of property under our government, do unite with us in patriotic zeal, to aid and assist, with their best endeavours, vigilance and loyalty, the accomplishment of our good intentions, by sending an individual from every Cabildo, town or corporation, as a deputy, to remain at the seat of Government; with such instructions as may be thought conducive to the end proposed. And we hereby declare, that our pretensions are no other than the preservation of the throne of Ferdinand VII. the safety of the country, the triumph of religion, union with our neighbours, and destruction of tyranny.—By command of the Supreme Junta of Government, **DIEGO DE VALLÉNILLA, Sec.**
Cumana, April 28, 1810.

AMERICA.—*Correspondence between the Marquis Wellesley and Mr. Pinckney, and between General Armstrong and Mr. Secretary Smith.*

Gen. Armstrong to Mr. Pinckney.

A letter from Mr. Secretary Smith, of the 1st of December last, made it my duty to inquire of his Excellency the Duke of Cadore, what were the conditions on which his Majesty the Emperor would annul his decree, commonly called the

Berlin Decree; and whether, if Great Britain revoked her blockades of a date anterior to that decree, his Majesty would consent to revoke the said decree? To these questions I have this day received the following answer, which I hasten to convey to you by a special Messenger.

Answer.

The only condition required for the revocation by his Majesty the Emperor, of the decree of Berlin, will be, a previous revocation by the British Government of her blockades of France, or part of France (such as that from the Elbe to Brest, &c.) of a date anterior to the aforesaid decree.—I have the honour to be, with very high respect, &c.

• (Signed) JOHN ARMSTRONG.

(COPY.)

Great Cumberland-place, Feb. 15, 1810.

My Lord—In pursuance of the intimation which I had the honour to give to your lordship a few days ago, I beg to trouble your lordship with an inquiry whether any, and if any, what blockades of France, instituted by Great Britain during the present war, before the 1st day of January, 1807, are understood by his Majesty's government to be in force. I am not able at present to specify more than one of the blockades to which this inquiry applies; namely, that from the Elbe to Brest, declared in May 1806, and afterwards limited and modified; but I shall be much obliged to your lordship for precise information as to the whole.

The Most Noble the Marquis Wellesley, &c. WM. PINKNEY.

Foreign Office, March 2.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of the 15th ult. whether any, and if any, what blockades of France, instituted by Great Britain during the present war, before the 1st day of January, 1807, are understood by his Majesty's Government to be in force? I have now the honour to acquaint you, that the coast, rivers, and ports, from the River Elbe to Brest, both inclusive, were notified to be under the restrictions of blockade, with certain modifications, on the 16th of May, 1806; and that these restrictions were afterwards comprehended in the Order of Council of the 7th of January, 1807, which Order is still in force. (Signed) WELLESLEY.

William Pinkney, Esq.

(COPY.)

Great Cumberland-place, March 7, 1810.

My Lord—I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's Answer, of the 2d instant to my letter, of the 15th of last month, concerning the blockades of France, instituted by Great Britain during the present war, before the 1st day of January, 1807. I infer from that answer that the blockade notified by Great Britain in May, 1806, from the Elbe to Brest, is for itself in force, and that the restrictions, which it established, rest altogether, so far as such restrictions exist at this time, upon an Order or Orders in Council issued since the 1st day of January, 1807. I infer also either that no other blockade of France was instituted by Great Britain during the period above-mentioned, or that, if any other was instituted during that period, it is not now in force. May I beg your Lordship to do me the honour to inform me whether these inferences are correct, and if, incorrect, in what respects they are so.

• (Signed) WM. PINKNEY.
The Most Noble the Marquis Wellesley, &c. &c.

Foreign Office, March 26, 1810.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant requesting a further explanation of my letter of the 2d, concerning the blockades of France instituted by Great Britain during the present war, before the 1st of January, 1807.—The blockade, notified by Great Britain in May, 1806, has never been formally withdrawn; it cannot therefore be accurately stated that the restrictions which it established, rest altogether on the Order of Council of the 7th of January, 1807; they are comprehended under the more extensive restrictions of that Order. No other blockade of the ports of France was instituted by Great Britain between the 16th of May, 1806, and the 7th of January, 1807, excepting the blockade of Venice, instituted on the 27th of July, 1806, which is still in force.—I beg you to accept the assurances of high consideration, with which I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) WELLESLEY.
William Pinkney, Esq., &c. &c.

Extract of a Letter from General Armstrong to Mr. Smith, dated Paris, April 4, 1810.

After seven weeks detention in England,

the John Adams has at length got back to France. She arrived in the roads of Havre on the 28th ult.

I informed Mr. Champagny first, that Mr. Pinkney had not been able to send by this conveyance the result of his application to the British Government concerning the blockades of France prior to the Berlin Decree; but that he hoped to be able to send it in a few days by another conveyance; and second, that if he (Mr. Champagny) had any thing to communicate which would have the effect of changing the present relations of the two countries, and which he wished to be early known to the Government of the United States, he would do well to let me know it within 24 hours, as the Messengers would leave Paris within that time. To this Message I received from him the following answer: That "for many days past nothing in the nature of business and unconnected with the marriage of the Emperor could be transacted; and that for some days to come the same cause of delay would continue to operate; that my letters were still before the Emperor, and that he would seize the first moment to get some decision in relation to them." Thus you see every thing is yet in air.

Extract of a Letter from General Armstrong to Mr. Smith, dated Paris, April 7th, 1810.

The Emperor left Paris two days ago for St. Cloud, whence he goes to Compeigne, where he will remain till Easter. It is not probable that I shall have an answer to my propositions till he returns to Paris. The day before he set out he gave me a ship to carry myself and family to the United States. The Minister recommended that I should not pin myself down to a day as to departure, as circumstances might make it proper for me to stay some what longer than I now intended. The treaty between France and Holland was ratified the 30th Marsh, and will be published this day in Holland. I am assured that it contains the following article:—

"All the merchandize conveyed into the ports of Holland on board American vessels since the first day of January, 1809, shall be put under sequestration, subject to the disposition of France, according to circumstances, and the political relations with the United States."

You will see by the copy enclosed of a decree of the King of Naples, that he has put his gains beyond the reach of Negotiation. The ports of Prussia are open to

our commerce. Avoid both Prussia and Denmark till you have other assurances.

Paris, April 16, 1810.—Sir, the John Adams being yet detained, I am able to inform you, that on the 11th instant the Emperor directed the sale of all the American vessels taken in the ports of Spain, and that the money arising therefrom should be placed in his *caisse privet*. He has also refused to give up the Hero, and has ordered that the case be brought before the Council of Prizes, where condemnation necessarily awaits it. I send a copy of a note upon which this last order was taken, and another relating to our business at Naples; and am, Sir, with very high consideration, your most obedient, and very humble servant,
Hon. R. Smith, &c. JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Mr. Pinckney to the Hon. R. Smith.

London, Feb. 19, 1810.

Sir; I received, on the 12th inst. by Mr. Powell, whom I had sent some time before to France, a letter from General Armstrong, of which a copy is inclosed; and keeping in view the instructions contained in your letter to me of the 11th of November last, I have written to Lord Wellesley, to inquire whether any, and if any, what blockades of France instituted by Great Britain during the present war, before the 1st of January, 1807, are understood here to be in force. A copy of my letter to Lord Wellesley is inclosed.—It is improbable that this official inquiry will produce a declaration in answer to it, that none of those blockades are in force; and I should presume that such a declaration will be received in France as substantially satisfying the condition announced to me by General Armstrong.—I am not aware that this subject could have been brought before the British Government in any other form than that which I have chosen. It would not, I think, have been proper to apply for a revocation of the blockades in question (at least before it was ascertained that they are in existence) or to have professed in my letter to Lord Wellesley, to found, upon General Armstrong's communications, my inquiry as to their actual state. I have however, supposed it to be indispensable (and have acted accordingly) that I should explain to Lord Wellesley in conversation, the probability afforded by General Armstrong's letter, that a declaration by this Govern-

ment to the effect above-mentioned, would be followed by the recal of the Berlin Decree.—I cannot perhaps expect to receive from Lord Wellesley an answer to my letter in time to send a copy by the John Adams, now in the Downs, or at Portsmouth; but I will send it by an early opportunity, and will take care that General Armstrong shall be made acquainted with it without delay. I have the honour to be, &c. WM. PINCKNEY.

P. S. March 23.—Since the writing of this letter, Lord Wellesley has sent me the answer (of the 2d inst.) of which a copy is now inclosed. It was not satisfactory, and I pointed out its deficiencies to Lord Wellesley in conversation, and proposed to him that I should write him another letter, requesting explanations. He assented to this course, and I have written him the letter of the 7th instant, of which also a copy is inclosed. His reply has been promised frequently, but has not yet been received. I have reason to expect that it will be sufficient, but I cannot think of detaining the corvette any longer. The British packet will furnish me with an opportunity of forwarding it to you, and I will send Mr. Lee with it to Paris by way of Moulins.

WM. PINCKNEY.

The Hon. R. Smith, &c.

Copy of a Letter from General Armstrong to the Duke of Cadore, dated Paris, 21st of February, 1810.

The Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States has the honour to submit to his Excellency the Duke of Cadore the copy of a letter this instant received from Bayonne, and begs from him an explanation of the circumstances mentioned in it. "The Ministerial dispatch, under date of the 5th instant, is arrived at St. Sebastian, bearing an order for the immediate transportation in small vessels, of all the sequestered American cargoes, to Bayonne, to be placed in the Custom-house there. This news is public at St. Sebastian's; but what is not so as yet, is, that the same order says—1st. That these cargoes are to be sent to Bayonne, whether the commodities of which they are composed may have come from English commerce or from the produce of the soil of the United States.—2ndly, That they should be sent to the Custom houses of

that place to be sold there."—The Minister Plenipotentiary offers to his Excellency the assurances of his high consideration, (Signed) JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General Armstrong to Mr. Smith.

Paris, 18th Feb. 1810.

Sir,—I wrote a few lines to you yesterday announcing the receipt and transmission of a copy of the Duke of Cadore's note to me of the 14th inst. After much serious reflection I have thought it best to forbear all notice at present of the errors as well of fact as of argument, which may be found in the introductory part of that note: to take the Minister at his word: to enter at once upon the proposed negotiation, and, for this purpose, to offer him a project for renewing the convention of 1800.—This mode will have the advantage of trying the sincerity of the overtures made by him, and perhaps of drawing from him the precise terms on which his master will accommodate. If these be such as we ought to accept, we shall have a Treaty, in which neither our rights nor our wrongs will be forgotten; if otherwise, there will be enough both of time and occasion to do justice to their policy and our own, by a free examination of each.—I have the honour to be, Sir, with very great respect, your most obedient and very humble servant.

(Signed) JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Hon. Robert Smith.

Extract of a Letter to the Same from the Same, 10th March.

I have at length received a verbal message in answer to my note of the 21st ult. It was from the Minister of Foreign Relations, and in the following words:—"His Majesty has determined to sell the American property seized in Spain, but the money arising therefrom shall remain in depot." This message has given occasion to a letter from me marked No. 22.

(No. 22.) *Paris, 10th March, 1810.*

Sir—I had yesterday the honour of receiving a verbal message from your Excellency, stating that "his Majesty had decided, that the American property seized in the ports of Spain should be sold, but that the money arising therefrom should remain in depot."

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

Vol. XVIII. No. 3.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 28, 1810.

[Price 1s.

We want our money on the nail;
The Banker 's ruin'd if he pays;
They seem to act an ancient tale;
The birds are met to strip the jays.

Riches, the wisest monarch sings,
Make pinions for themselves to fly:
They fly like bats, on parchment wings,
And geese their silver plumes supply.

Conceive the works of midnight hags
Tormenting fools behind their backs;
Thus Bankers o'er their bills and bags
Sit squeezing images of wax.

Conceive the whole enchantment broke;
The witches left in open air,
With power no more than other folk,
Exposed with all their magic ware.

SWIFT.

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[99

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PAPER MONEY.—In my last Number, at page 74, I laid the ground for some further observations upon this important subject; but, before I enter on those observations, it seems necessary to give a little sketch of the facts of what has now happened to the paper-money system.—About three or four weeks ago, a banker in London stopped payment, that is to say, he refused to pay (from want of the means, I suppose) those persons, who had been fools enough to put their money into his hands.—This man's breaking was followed by others; but, more especially by some paper-money makers at Salisbury and Shiftshury, and, they being money-grinders of the first rate and reputation, an alarm became pretty general all through the counties of Wilts and Dorset, which, it appears, spread itself even to the lower parts of Devonshire. Two paper-money makers are said to have *cut their throats*; and, though one cannot help being sorry to hear of any such end to any human being (not excepting *Sellis* and *Truster*!) yet, neither can one help feeling indignation against those, be they who or what they may, who have been the cause of all the suffering and all the ruin, which have now taken place in the district just named. As far, indeed, as the ruined persons consist of fund-holders, of those who approve of the paper system, of those many of whom would gladly see the massacre of all men who, like me, have written against that system; as 'ar as the ruin confines itself to those people, it is pretty fairly due. All such persons are to be looked upon as participators with the actual makers of paper-money, and, indeed, they are associates with them; but, not so the people in Wilts and Dorset generally speaking: not so, the

shop-keeper, the publican, the handicraftsman, the farmer, and the labourer, who, at the stoppage of the banks, had paper-money in their hands, where it instantly became as useless as a like quantity of cabbage-leaves. These people are not only to be pitied, but they ought to be legally indemnified, if the means are to be found in the hands of the makers of paper-money in any part of the kingdom; or, at any rate, the parliament ought, the moment it meets (and why should it not meet on purpose?) to take the matter into consideration, and provide a remedy of some sort; with this express declaration, however, that, *in future*, no relief of the kind would be granted.—It has been stated in the news-papers, that the Salisbury bankers can pay all their notes, from the sale of their estates and other sources. But, in the mean while, what becomes of the man who has laid up their notes to the amount of his rent, and has nothing else to pay his rent with? What becomes of the little shop-keeper, who is in the same situation with regard to his London dealer? What becomes of the shoe-maker, the taylor, every journeyman and labourer, who had a pound note by him? All these, in their several degrees, are, in effect, bankrupts; they are all *insolvent*; as far, as the want of money can ruin them, they are ruined. Those who are able to *work* may, indeed, yet live out of a poor-house; but, what are old or infirm men, and women, to do in such a case? Many a widow, who maintained her children decently by the means of a shop, must now be ruined; and, yet so *delicate*, so *just*, and so *humane*, are our public prints, that they take special care never to *name* those by whom this ruin has been occasioned. If a highway robbery be committed, or any theft whatever, and the hue and cry catches the perpetrator, the *saitiff* is

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named at full length, and is called villain at every second word, even before he is convicted: nay, if any one had counterfeited only one single bit of this very paper-money, and only one day before it became worthless, "*hang him!*" would have resounded through the city of Salisbury. He would have been named, and described, and biographized, and put to the torture, if his mind had been susceptible of torture, in a thousand different ways. Yet what *forgers*, ever produced; or, did all the forgers that ever existed in the whole world, do a thousandth part so much harm to the people as has been done by the paper-money makers, who have now left their promissory notes unpaid, and sought shelter for their persons under the bankrupt law? They will not even be sent to a prison. They are at large, and their persons are as safe as if they had never caused any injury to any human being.—It is a fact, well worthy of being recorded, that a number of persons of great property, with the *Bishop of Salisbury* at their head, published, in the shape of a *posting-bill* (of much about the same size as the bills stuck up against me) a declaration of their conviction of the solidity of the paper-money concerns in that city, and stating that they would take the said money. This was done, I believe, on the *Saturday* and the paper money shop stopped on the next *Monday*. It could not stop the run. The alarm was begun. *Want of confidence* had seized the people; and when once that is the case, adieu to paper-money, be it of what sort it will, or let who will be its sponsors.—Let us now take a few facts, as published in the newspapers, respecting the paper-money and its consequences. There is some little to be inserted of the nature of observation; and which will be, hereafter, useful; because it will shew how men, even men of sense, deceived themselves.—I copy from the *MORNING CHRONICLE*.—July 21.—"Yesterday was the settling-day at the *Stock Exchange*, and, by the heavy fall, it was severely felt by the Bulls. No fewer than ten or eleven lame Ducks waddled out of *Capel-court*. We do not believe that the differences amount to a great sum, because a sensible revolution had taken place in the spirit of gambling at this place within the last two or three years, and no extensive speculations are now attempted:—Indeed, both on this *Exchange*, and on

the *Royal Exchange*, the failures have not extended to the old established firms, but have affected only the new and more desperate adventurers. The persons who were so eager for commercial import-
 "ance as to consign merchandize to every quarter of the world, where our shipping could find a port, without orders, and in which only they were to look for a market, are alone the persons who now find themselves embarrassed by the want of returns. Their engagements to the manufacturers must be completed, and they have not even deposits to give to Government as a security for Debentures, even if relief should be thought advisable to be offered to them in that way. This is the case of those who went beyond their means in the way of exports.—Those persons on the contrary, who are in distress by the depreciation of articles brought into the country, have incurred so severe a loss by the fall of prices that the original goods are not a sufficient security for the sum they are in want of, to answer the demands on them.—It is therefore a question, whether it will not be wise to permit the whole of these floating speculations to sink or swim, according to their specific weight. They will all then come to their proper draught, and whatever shall afterwards be found necessary, may be applied with more effect." This is one of the many ways, in which the public is deceived. The writer himself is deceived: there is no doubt of that; but, the deception will not be less fatal to the country. Here is an endeavour to account for what has happened upon other grounds than that of a depreciated paper-money. But, how is it reconcileable to common sense, that speculations in foreign commerce can have brought discredit upon the paper-money of New Sarum? Or, if the effect at New Sarum can be traced to such a cause, how insecure are all the holders of paper-money? What a pretty foundation does this money rest upon?—As a sort of specimen of the magnitude of the failure, take the following: 23 July.—"Friday evening a meeting was held, consisting of the principal Bankers and Merchants of the City, for the purpose of taking into consideration the propriety and means of supporting such Merchants as were under temporary difficulties, and deserving of assistance. Among the Bankers who attended the meeting were Smith, Payne and Smith;

“Masterman and Co.; Everett and Co.; Vere, Druce and Co. besides several others, and a number of the most eminent Merchants. After some discussion, it was determined that a proposal should be made to the creditors of some of the houses under embarrassment, to receive the full amount of their several demands by four equal payments, in bills drawn at six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months, bearing interest. This proposal was immediately accepted, and a list of debts and assets, of which the following is a copy, was laid before the meeting:—

	Debts.	Assets.
Grave, Sharpe, Fisher and Fisher.....	503,000 0 0	672,112 15 7
Rowlandson and Bates.....	28,804 7 10	30,111 10 2
Rowlandson, Ivace, and Co.....	285,008 7 6	39,412 0 2
Waldy, Outley, and Co.....	311,982 19 0	377,755 13 3
John Goodair.....	301,952 15 9	457,000 9 9
	£. 1,766,642 6 6	£. 2,107,104 8 11

“Four of the most respectable merchants in the linen trade have been selected to superintend the affairs of the above parties, viz. Richard Fort, Sir Robert Graham, Mr. Shaw (of the house of Shaw and Fletcher) and another, whose name we have not been able to ascertain.”—It was, I suppose, from the probable necessity of rags in abundance being wanted, that these “four most respectable gentlemen in the linen trade” were chosen to superintend this concern. But, what “relief” does this bring to the poor people at New Sarum and thereabouts? To those persons it is that I want to see relief given. Sharpe and Fisher and the others here named may be very good men, but, they are few in number. Any man, though a day-labourer, at Salisbury or Shaftsbury, is as much in my eyes as Mr. Rowlandson or Mr. Goodair, and, perhaps, is full as able and as likely to take a part in the defence of his country’s rights.—24 July.—“Great fears are entertained that thousands of workmen will be dismissed in the manufacturing districts, from the shock that credit has received, particularly in Manchester. This is the only serious evil to be dreaded; for the stoppage has been confined to the new Adventurers, and it is perhaps salutary that they should be proved to the bottom; but unfortunately it was to the speculations of these new men, and not to the natural demands of trade, that employment was given to our weavers and workmen.”—Thus, then, this trade is not such a fine thing as it has been thought? This is, however, all fallacious. It is another invention to

turn the eyes of the public from the real cause of the distress. “New-adventurers” are to be blamed now. But, the fact is, that there has been no more of adventure now than formerly, except what has grown out of the paper-money itself.—In Ireland the distress is still greater than in England, and from the same cause. A debate in the Common Council of Dublin proves, that the misery must be very great indeed. The public will, perhaps (but I do not know that they will) remember, that some thousands a year were during the last session of parliament added to the salary of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; and, it will be seen by the following paragraph, that he has given three hundred towards freeing, towards keeping from starvation, the people whom he is appointed to govern.—26th July.—“A Meeting has been held in Dublin, of the Bankers, &c. for the purpose of alleviating the public distress at this period, when the following subscriptions were immediately made, viz. the Lord Lieutenant, 300 guineas; Lord Chancellor, 200; Mr. W. W. Pole, 200; the Attorney General, 100; Sir Charles Saxton, 100; and twelve other Gentlemen, 50 guineas each.”—So, the Lord Lieutenant gave the poor miserable Irish £.300, the Lord Chancellor gave them £.200, Mr. W. W. Pole gave them £.200, and the Attorney General (I do not know his name, nor does it signify) gave the poor Irish 100 pounds! Well, if that be not a proof of kindness, and tenderness, and mercy and so forth towards the said Irish, I do not know what is! That the bankers should call the meeting, too, is a “monstrous good thing.” The bankers call a meeting for the relief of the poor Irish!—An extract from the proceedings in the Common Council of Dublin, on the 20th July, 1810, will give us a full view of the object of this subscription.—“After the dispatch of the usual business relative to the admission of persons to the freedom of the city, Mr. Simmett moved for the appointment of a Committee to take into consideration the condition of their poor fellow citizens, the manufacturers of Dublin, and to devise the method of affording them relief.—Mr. GIFFARD seconded the motion. He thought it the bounden duty of every man to endeavour to alleviate the distresses of the poor artisans of Dublin; and hoped, however, Gentlemen might differ on other topics, that there would be only one opinion

"on the question before them. He could
 "assure them, that at the Meeting of
 "the Privy Council, men of opposite po-
 "litical principles had attended, and that
 "all party dissension had given way to
 "the feeling of humanity; that they all
 "most cordially concurred in endeavour-
 "ing to give effect to the benevolent in-
 "tention of the Lord Lieutenant, to alle-
 "viate the miseries of the wretched artisans
 "of the City of Dublin. He then recom-
 "mended the consumption of home-made
 "manufactures, and entered into a cal-
 "culation to shew the great relief that
 "would be given to the poor, if only
 "5000 persons could be found (though he
 "was sure that more could be found) to
 "expend £.10 each in the purchase of
 "articles of wear. Let us imitate, in our
 "little Council, the unanimity which pre-
 "vailed at the Castle. I hope that all
 "party dissension will be forgotten in our
 "endeavours to relieve the miseries of our
 "fellow citizens, and that our only con-
 "tention will be in yielding to each
 "other who will be the foremost.—A
 "Committee was accordingly appointed,
 "who having retired, came to three Re-
 "solutions: the first, highly approving
 "the plan of subscription proposed by
 "his Grace the Lord Lieutenant; the se-
 "cond, to promote the use and consump-
 "tion of Irish Manufactures; and the
 "third to appoint Committees to go
 "through the several parishes, and re-
 "ceive the signatures of such persons as
 "were disposed to follow those humane
 "and necessary measures.—Mr. HUT-
 "TON then made his promised motion for
 "the repeal of the Union. He prefaced
 "it by a very short speech, in which he
 "adverted to the misery of his fellow-ci-
 "zens, bereft of employment, and perish-
 "ing from absolute hunger. He said, that
 "their unparalleled wretchedness ought to
 "awaken the feelings of humanity to
 "make every possible exertion to alle-
 "viate their sufferings."—Now, is all
 "this false? Are these inventions by Jaco-
 "bins and Levellers and Reformers, the
 "enemies of our "invaluable constitution,
 "of social order, and our Holy Religion?"
 "Are these inventions, or are they rea-
 "lities? Is it true, that the poor, the la-
 "borious poor, of Ireland are "perishing from
 "absolute hunger?" And, if it be true, I
 "wonder what will be said by the IMPOSTOR,
 "who, under the name of "AN AMERICAN,"
 "has published an eulogium upon our pa-
 "per-money system, and has described our

people as being almost *too well off and too
 happy?* This vile Impostor, who has re-
 ceived the unqualified praises of those
 conjurers, the Edinburgh Reviewers, has
 occupied several pages with assertions
 respecting the *solidity of our pecuniary
 means*, and with a description of the *happy
 and contented state of the people, owing to that
 solidity*. What would the Impostor have said,
 if he had been at Salisbury the other day,
 and if some one of the ruined shop-keepers
 had caught him by the throat, and bidden
 him produce gold for the paper-money in
 his hands? What would the Impostor have
 said to that? Would that he were now
 tossed down amongst the poor famishing
 people of Ireland! They would, as they
 ought, soon squeeze out of the mercenary
 wretch the fruits of his lying performance.
 They would make him, in one shape or
 another, disgorge his vile gains, and con-
 vince him, that a publication at *Phila-
 delphia* is not a sufficient disguise.—The
 Morning Chronicle of the 24th July con-
 tains a curious paragraph, copied, it would
 seem, from a news-paper, published at
 Taunton in Somersetshire. I beg the reader
 to pay attention to it. The style of it is
 quite original, unless, indeed, one should
 be inclined to derive it from that of the
 celebrated Doctor Solomon.—"A great
 "deal has been said, and much agitation has
 "occurred in most parts of the west of Eng-
 "land, respecting the failures of the pro-
 "vincial banks, but it appears that the
 "public have had, in fact, little or no
 "grounds to justify the sensation occasion-
 "ed on this subject. The insolvency in
 "the house of Brickwood and Co. of Lon-
 "don—the bankruptcy of Willcocks and
 "Co. of Exeter—and of Bowles and Co.
 "of Salisbury and Shaftesbury, occasion-
 "ed what is termed a run upon almost
 "every bank in the western counties; but
 "it is very certain that a great deal of pri-
 "vate malignity has been too successfully
 "exerted in spreading the alarm on the
 "present occasion. Almost every bank,
 "however respectable its proprietors, and
 "however well established its duration, has
 "been reported to be insolvent. Little
 "minds are amused by marvellous state-
 "ments; and in the same proportion in
 "which ignorance predominates over the
 "sober sense of the community, so does
 "the stories it adopts become transfused
 "from one to another with a correspond-
 "ing celerity. The truth is, that not
 "more than four banks in the west of
 "England have stopped payment, of

“which number Willcocks and Co. and Bowles and Co. may be considered as three.—All the Taunton banks have fully justified the high character for which they have been for many years so pre-eminently distinguished. The Honiton, Upottery, Chard, and Bridgewater banks have all alike been emulous in displaying a *dignified competency* to meet every requisition; and several of them, with an unaffected readiness, paid the demands on them *in guineas*, to an amazing amount. In a few days, the impression occasioned by the late failures, will, we have no doubt, be entirely dissipated; and we are happy in stating that *with very few exceptions*, no serious inconvenience had or is likely to ensue to the commercial or individual concerns of this or the adjoining counties. We believe it may with safety be averred, that no bank in the county of Somerset has suffered in its claim to public credit by any of the events which have recently transpired.”—So, those who felt alarmed at the prospect of losing every shilling they had in the world, were men of *little minds*, in which minds *ignorance* predominated over *sober sense*. These are very decent assertions to make to the poor people at Salisbury and in Ireland, who are starving amidst bales of paper-money.—“Private Malignity,” indeed! Just as if private malignity could shake any man’s solid means. If I had a thousand guineas, does this Taunton Gentleman suppose, that it would be possible for any enemies of mine, private or public, to persuade the mass of the people, that it would be *dangerous for them to take any of my guineas*? Oh, no; you cannot persuade people to this. Here, then, is the distinction between real money and paper-money: the latter may be destroyed by a breath; while the former sets all whispering and calumny at defiance.—I will now leave these *facts*, which, though imperfect, and collected merely from the news-papers, which have been most obstinate in their reluctance to speak upon the subject, are quite sufficient to show what the effects of paper-money will, one of these days, be, unless timely provision be made for the prevention of those effects.—Of the observations that I have now to add, the first relates to what has been said about the *wild speculations*. It is said, that the sending of goods to the continent, where they cannot be sold; the importing of West India produce, for which

there is no market; and the sending of manufactures to the Brazils, are the chief causes of this blow up amongst the bank-paper. Now, if this be true, what a pretty, plump, solid thing this bank-paper is! What a fine contrivance, then, that must be, which exposes people in Wiltshire to be starved in virtue of operations at Tonningen and Rio Janeiro; and that, in fact, exposes the people of England to be thrown into confusion and ruin, in part at least, by the decrees of the Emperor Napoleon. Mind, I do not say, that this is the fact; but if it be, as is alledged by the friends of the paper system, what a contrivance that system is.—I thought, that, the other day; or, at most, but a few months ago, I heard the cannon fire for the taking of Guadaloupe. And so I did. And I heard of new governors and judges and officers without end appointed to rule this new conquest. Well, and what does it bring us? What is our gain in it? More sugar and more coffee to be added to the immense loads already rotting in our warehouses, and the want of a market for which is, as we are told, one of the causes of the blowing up of the Wiltshire paper-money. Yes, we fire cannons; we make bonfires; *we rejoice* at the taking of an island, the produce and the inhabitants of which must perish, or the former must be brought to England to assist in producing the effects now witnessed at Salisbury and in Ireland.—This is taking a very narrow view of the subject. It is *muddling* along half blind and half seeing. It is like a view of a chace through hollow ways and thickets. Let us, therefore, mount the eminence, and see the whole thing clearly at once.—It has constantly happened, that, when paper currency could no longer be, *at the will and pleasure of the holder*, changed into gold and silver to its full nominal amount, such currency degenerated; that is, it became of less value, and, in the end, or no value at all. The difference between *bank-notes* and *paper-money* is this, the former are, *at the will and pleasure of the holder*, exchangeable into gold and silver of the same nominal value; the latter is not. A bank-note is nothing more than a *promissory note*. I have one now before me. It says, “I PROMISE to PAY to Mr. Henry Hase, or BEARER, on demand, the sum of one pound.—London, 28 June, 1810.—For the Governor and Company of the Bank of England.—(Signed) J. KNIGHT.”—Well, now,

this is all very regular. I am the "BEARER" of this note; and, as Mr. Knight promises to pay me the *sum* of one pound on demand, I may, if I like, send my note in *for payment*. But, what will Mr. Knight give me in lieu of it? What will he pay it off in? Why, if he pleases, in *another note* as much like this one as if they were two twin brothers.

• Same colour, same substance, same weight and same feel. It is, in fact, therefore, a *promise* to give the Bearer, on demand, a *promise to pay*. I can compel the Bank in Threadneedle Street to give me no "*sum of one pound*," except in paper. Formerly, indeed, when a man chose to have gold instead of his bank notes, he sent the latter to the Bank, where he was paid a *sum of money* in exchange for his notes, and he could compel the Bank by law to pay him such sum of money, but now he cannot. When once he has taken a bank of England note, he must keep it, unless any one may choose to give him any thing else for it.—When once

• this came to be the case, it would have been miraculous indeed if the paper-money had not *increased in quantity*, there being no check whatever other than the moderation and forbearance of those who had the making of it in their hands; and the necessary consequence was, that this paper depreciated; that is to say, it sunk in value when compared with money that had a real value in itself.—This fact of depreciation became visible enough in the year 1804, at the time when the re-stamped Dollars were issued at *five shillings* when their sterling value never had been more than *four shillings and six pence*. And, I here wish to carry the reader back, for a while, to that period, for the purpose of introducing him to an article of some interest, contained in another part of this present Number, the author of which was the REVEREND JOHN BRAND, late Rector of St. George's, Southwark, and of Wickham Skeith in Suffolk.—This gentleman, who had written a great deal upon the sinking fund, and who was, upon all occasions, very anxious to uphold the credit of every part of the paper system, contended, in conversation with me, that the advance put upon the dollar was no proof of a depreciation in the value of the paper. Other symptoms of depreciation had begun to make their appearance in Ireland. And, an article or two written by me upon the subject, and published in the Register, induced Mr. WINDHAM, with

whom Mr. Brand was very intimate, to request the latter to look into the question. In consequence of this request, and of a sort of challenge that I threw down to him in a subsequent Register (Vol. V. page 703,) at which challenge he was a good deal stung, he wrote the Letter to Mr. Windham and the Letters to myself, which will be found in another part of this sheet. They were not published at the time, owing to an application from Mr. Brand to stay the publication till he came to town (he was then in Suffolk) in order that he might make some alterations. He was taken ill, and did not come up to town for some time, when the subject was grown out of date. He, however, made his intended alterations, and left the papers in the state, in which I now publish them.—The reader will see, that these papers do nothing at all in the way of removing the charge of depreciation, which, even at that time, I openly urged against the bank-paper. They contain a good deal of ingenious matter; but, their ingenuity is, of itself, no bad proof of the difficulty in which the writer found himself involved.

—As will be seen by his letter to Mr. Windham, Mr. Brand was very anxious to shew, that the advance in the price of the Dollar was not a proof of the depreciation of the bank-paper; and he says, in that same letter, that he has traced the high price of the dollar to other causes. Whether he was, or was not mistaken, the reader will be able to determine.—There are only three or four passages, which I shall particularly notice, as applying more immediately to the present state of the paper-money.—I had said in a former Register (Vol. V. page 571.) that *guineas* had depreciated; that the metal was degraded by the society of the paper. To this, Mr. Brand answers, that coin is not more degraded by the society of paper, than it would be by the society of more coin equal in nominal value to the paper.—This is a very important point, and therefore I request the reader's attention to it.—Money of whatever sort, is of *high or low value* in proportion to its *quantity* compared with the *quantity of purchase* which it has to perform. If, for instance, there be only ten horses to be sold in a year in any community, and there be ten thousand pounds to be laid out in horses, horses will be ten times as dear, or, which is the same thing, money will be worth only ten times as much, as they would be, if there were only an hun-

dred pounds to lay out, and the same number of horses to purchase. If, to take another illustration, the quantity of money in England were to be doubled to-morrow, as there would be no addition made to the quantity of purchase in England, the price of every thing would instantly be doubled. This holds good in speaking of coin as well as in speaking of paper; but, here is the difference, that, if the money be coin, which has a real value in itself, and, of course, is ready to carry that value along with it to any country upon earth, there *is sure never to be any more money than is wanted*; for, the moment there is a piece more than the society requires, away it goes into some other country, where it can better employ itself; where, in fact, it will bring more food and raiment. But, the paper, which has no intrinsic value in it, must remain at home; and, upon the principle above laid down, as it increases in quantity, it must decrease in value. It must become less and less powerful in the way of purchase. In this state of things the coin must, as long as it continue to *circulate* with such paper, become of less value than it used to be. It is *degraded* by the paper. It sinks in value along with the paper. If, for instance, there were a thousand guineas only in a nation, and each of these would purchase *twenty* quartern loaves, if there were to be issued nine thousand guineas in paper-money, and if the real guineas were to continue to circulate, each of them would, after this emission of paper, purchase only *two* quartern loaves. But, the real guineas, having an intrinsic value in them, and being able to go into foreign parts, would not stay in such society. They would go where they could still get their twenty loaves. Hence it is, I think, very clear, that though guineas may and do, in passing from hoard to hoard, or from a hoard to the sea-side, circulate along with the paper, that it is impossible they should circulate in such society for any length of time.—This is the true cause of the disappearance of the gold. The law, as it now stands, forbids all *exportation* of the coin. Therefore it would be useless to purchase up. Yet, it does, day after day, disappear from circulation. There is not, as yet, a money and a paper price openly made in the market. There have been many causes to prevent this; but, when the paper-money has increased somewhat more, this distinction will be made, and

then we shall see the guineas come back again immediately.—A very old and much esteemed correspondent of mine, referring to the close of my last-week's article, page 74, expresses his surprize at hearing me say, that I should not dread any danger to the welfare of the nation if the whole paper-money system were to go to pieces. And then he points out the consequences as to *rents* and *taxes*. But, surely, he could not suppose, that I ever imagined that *rents* and *taxes* would remain what they now are? I see, however, no difficulty at all in providing against any injury, and even against any inconvenience in that respect.—Mr. Brand, at the close of his first letter, acknowledges that the paper now rests *wholly upon opinion*; and he thinks that no one can, *at such a time*, wish to see it annihilated, which he apprehends would create a great defalcation and long confusion in our public ways and means. But, a *wish* will neither hasten nor retard this annihilation; and, what wise men will, therefore, endeavour to do, is, to prepare the public mind for the event. Indeed, the only real danger that I can see in the fall of the paper-money lies in the endeavours that are made to keep the truth from the people at large; though, I believe, that such has always been the case in similar circumstances.—The best thing that could, in my opinion, happen (and, perhaps, it soon will happen) is an open difference of prices in the market. Then the public confidence in the paper would be fairly tried; the loss upon paper-money would be fairly divided; and things would quietly jostle themselves into order, without any danger from popular commotion. If, on the contrary, the paper system should go on uninterrupted until a general want of confidence take place, what will then be the consequence? The consequence may be easily imagined, if we attentively look at the situation of Salisbury the other day; and add the circumstance of there being *no possibility of relief of any sort from any quarter*. Bundles of Bank of England notes have, in this instance, been hastened off to fill up the void made by the blowing away of the country-money; but, if the paper-money system go on unchecked and the currency unmixd with coin, until all England, all the kingdom, be in the situation of Salisbury, without any source to apply to for a supply of currency, what must be the consequences? I leave the reader to answer this question, though he

will find it much easier to imagine than to describe those consequences.—The view, which we have now taken of this subject, has quite driven away all thoughts about the “speculations” and other imaginary causes of the partial explosion that has recently taken place. We here see, that the cause is no a temporary or accidental one; but permanent, natural, and regular. That it is radical, and belongs to the system, as much as mortality belongs to the human frame. The time when the mortal principle shall produce its fatal effect, it is difficult to say; but, as I observed at page 74 of my last Number, I am quite satisfied, that the country paper-money must be propped up, or, that the day of total annihilation is not far distant. The Morning Post may call the country-money “destructive assignats” as long as it pleases; but, that money must continue to go, or all the paper money must speedily come to an end.—Rents and taxes are now paid in paper money. Take it away, and where are the means of paying rents and taxes? Would you have Threadneedle street money to supply the place? Where, then, is the difference to the people? Why not call this money assignats as well as the other? Besides, do you consider what numbers of forgeries would be committed, when the detection would become so very difficult? These forgeries alone would soon blow up the whole of the paper by exciting a want of confidence in it all over the country. But, were there none of these reasons, there is one other more than sufficient of itself; and that is, that the system would, if the country money were put an end to, lose the support of those who own the country money shops, and who have so considerable a part of the influence of the country in their hands. All this description of persons are linked to the system by the interest they have in the issuing of the country-money and, if that interest were to cease, they would become as decided enemies, as they now are friends, of the system.—It is to me, therefore, utterly unaccountable how it came to pass, that a print like the MORNING POST should recommend the “abolition” of those “destructive assignats,” commonly called country bank notes.

CORN CROPS.—In the Morning Chronicle, a few days ago, appeared the following remark:—“All apprehensions respecting the ensuing harvest are now removed, and it is generally understood

“that it will prove a fair average crop.”—And, on the 25th instant appeared, in that, and several other of the London prints, this paragraph:—“Extract from a letter of ARTHUR YOUNG, Esq. Secretary to the Board of Agriculture, England, dated Bradfield, Suffolk, July 11, 1810, to a Gentleman near Belfast:—“COBBETT talked nonsense about the crops, nor is there at the time I write, the least appearance of mildew, which was most dreaded; every thing now looks well but hay.”—The words, “generally understood,” in the first of these paragraphs, are not sufficiently specific. If there be an error in the proposition that follows, that error may be attributed to the public. This is the disadvantage (to the reader) of all anonymous writings. There is nobody responsible to him. If Mr. Perry, or any one else, had said in his own name, “there will be a fair average crop of corn this year,” he would have been responsible for the delusion, which such assertion is calculated to produce, or keep alive; but, now there is no responsibility at all.—The second paragraph gives me pleasure, in as far as it is a proof that Mr. YOUNG has recovered from a state of bodily affliction, under which I was extremely sorry to hear that he, some time ago, laboured, and which was nothing short of total blindness. Whether grovelling senseless brutes in human shape, lose their eyes, or keep them, is of little consequence to themselves and less to the world; but, to see a man like Mr. ARTHUR YOUNG, who has made, in his agricultural pursuits, such excellent use of his seeing faculties, and who has communicated so much information to his countrymen; to see such a man deprived of his sight, and to whom so large a part of the pleasure of his life must consist in the using of that sight; to see this would be truly melancholy.—I will not suppose Mr. Young capable of any thing base, and, therefore, I shall not attribute his contemptuous expressions to the circumstance of my being lodged in Newgate for two years, just two days before his letter was written. But, his correspondent, the “Gentleman near Belfast,” I am not inclined so easily to acquit. Mr. Young’s was a private letter, and it does not appear that the publication of any part of it was authorized by Mr. Young. It was, therefore, a very unjustifiable act to send this part of the letter forth to the world; and especially as the publisher of

it keeps his own name out of sight. I might, in a private letter, say, "YOUNG talked nonsense;" but, I should not speak thus in print. It is the publication of these expressions that is blameable, and that blame is wholly due to the publisher, who seems to have been quite regardless of the possible and even probable consequences to his correspondent, whose confidence he has basely betrayed.—As to the point in dispute, I am persuaded that I did not talk nonsense, and that, notwithstanding the very favourable turn which the weather has since taken, wheat will be, at least, *forty pounds a load*, that is to say, *twenty shillings for a Winchester bushel*, before next Christmas. It is quite useless to continue the dispute now, seeing that the fact *must* be known in a few months. If it should appear that I am wrong in my opinion, I shall have done no harm, because all the effect which it is possible for me to have produced will be a little holding back of corn, which, in fact, is only a little *economizing*; but, if, unfortunately, it should turn out that I am right in my opinion, what mischief will not have been done by those, who are publishing these flattering accounts of the state of the crops! If it should turn out, that, instead of a fair average crop, there is not *half* such a crop, will not these flatterers deserve most heavy censure? And what way will they go to work to make us amends for the mischief they have done? Will they join the famished poor, whom they have first deluded, and cry aloud against forestallers, regraters, and hoarding-farmers? Will they, thus, rather than acknowledge that they were wrong, set on the deluded people to burn barns and ricks, and mills and baker's shops? I suspect they will; but, a little time will show us what they will do.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.—Whether it be true that our army is retreating I know not; nor can any one in England, perhaps, tell what is *likely* to happen in Portugal within these few weeks. *Speculations* are useless here; but, a fact or two may be of some use.—It was, a few days ago, stated in the London newspapers, that Baron Douro and Viscount Alavara's army consisted of only 25,000 men; and that, as to the Portuguese army, no one knew *any thing at all of its existence*.—So, then, if the Baron Viscount were to be beaten; if he were to be most confoundedly pummelled; threshed like a blighted sheaf; or were to get off with "devil take the hindmost" as the prole

of the day: if any thing of this sort were, unfortunately, to happen, these writers are prepared to say, that he had only 25,000 of our troops; and that, as to the Portuguese army, it was nothing at all.

—It would, to be sure, be a little too *abominable* even for these writers to make such assertions; but, lest they should be tempted to do it, let me remind them beforehand, that the people of this kingdom, those of Salisbury, Dublin, and Cork not excepted, are now *actually paying 30,000 Portuguese troops*. There ought, then, to be some *army's* existence; there ought to be something in a "*tangible shape*;" there ought to be something able to fight too for all this pay.—From a statement, laid before the Honourable House on the 22nd of February last, it appears, that, *on the 30th of September last*, we paid 16,050 Portuguese soldiers. From the same document it appears, that *we now pay 30,000 Portuguese troops*, besides allowing increased pay to Portuguese Officers.

"£.600,000 for 20,000 troops in our pay in January last.

" 250,000 for 10,000 additional troops.

" 130,000 for increased pay to Portuguese officers."

£.980,000

This is stated as the allowance for a year. Here is pretty nearly a million of our money. Here is a sum to be given to these Portuguese equal to one sixth of what is annually paid for the maintenance of all the poor in England and Wales, who, of one sort and another, are nearly forty times as numerous as this Portuguese army.—Banishing, driving out of the mind these reflections, it is, I humbly hope, not going too far to say, that there ought to be something *visible*, at least, for this 980,000 pounds a year.—Come, come, then! let us not be jostled by these writers. Let us insist upon it, that we have an army of 30,000 Portuguese in Portugal and Spain. Mr. Villiers, in the documents above referred to says: "not a shilling" (*a skilling mind!*) "has been advanced for any man *which* was not in existence as a soldier."—A vulgar fellow, unacquainted with the elegancies of the diplomatic school, would have said *who* was not, &c. But, the *substance* is every thing. "Not a shilling" but for men actually "*in existence*;" that is to say being *alive*, and not only so, but really present, bodily present, in Portugal.—Well, then,

what do these writers mean by saying, that "no one knows any thing of the existence of the Portuguese army?"—In the above-mentioned documents, it is stated, that we have 30,000 men of our own army in Portugal; or, rather, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informs Mr. Villiers, on the 5th of January last, that the king intends to employ 30,000 effective British soldiers in Portugal. Now 30 and 30 make 60, and, I think, after what has been here said, that, independent of all Spanish forces, we have, or ought to have, an army of 60,000 men in Portugal, or upon the confines of that country; an army of 60,000 men, under the command of Viscount Talavera.—Let us not be cajoled and jostled out of our senses, then, by these writers, who treat us with pretended extracts of letters from the army, in which it is stated, that Talavera has only 25,000 men, and that nobody knows any thing of the Portuguese army. Oh, no! we will not be thus cozened and choused and flammed out of an army that we are paying for. Oh, no! Say what they will, we have an army of 60,000 men, British and Portuguese ("his majesty's ancient allies,") and to this army we will look as the sufficient means of defending Portugal against the inroads of the French, especially as we are now told, that the French Commander in Chief has under his command only 35,000 men, capable of being brought against our army. The words are these, in the Morning Chronicle of this day (Friday, 27 July:): "We are in hourly expectation of a battle, of the success of which we are but little apprehensive, as MARSENA (according to the most accurate information) cannot bring against us more than 35,000 men."—These are said to be words taken from a letter from an officer of rank in our army, dated the 10th instant. Aye, to be sure! There can be no doubt of our success, seeing that we have 60,000 men and the French only 35,000 men capable of being brought against us. At any rate, *let what will happen*, we are not, I trust, destined to be told, that the army in Portugal consisted of only twenty or thirty thousand men.

MR. O'CONNOR.—In consequence of certain publications, respecting Mr. ROGER O'CONNOR, which appeared in some of the public prints, in the month of April and May last, a brief Statement of Facts, in reply to those publications, appeared in the Register of the 12th of May; in answer to which a Speech, reported to have

been made, in the year 1799, by Mr. TOLER, the then Attorney General in Ireland, was republished, which, so far from controverting any part of Mr. O'CONNOR's Narrative, went to corroborate the whole of it. But, as matter, seemingly new, was introduced, Mr. O'CONNOR addressed a Letter to me on the 14th of May, which appeared in the Register of the 19th, whereby he pledged himself to account most satisfactorily for every thing relating to him; and that, as he therein says, he might do so with effect, he went to Ireland for dates, and original letters. He returned on the 7th of June, and saw me in a few days after; but, owing to the peculiar circumstances in which I was then placed, I could not peruse with proper attention the "APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE," which Mr. O'CONNOR brought with him. Whereupon he handed the manuscript to Mr. Wright for the purpose of publication, the first moment that I could bestow that attention on it to which it was entitled, as a public record of some of the most interesting affairs of Ireland, and which I never had it in my power to do until the 18th of this month, when I did carefully peruse it, and a most heart-rending tale it is. Every assertion, every insinuation, against this gentleman's honour and real loyalty is completely exposed and refuted in this Address. But, in giving way to his just indignation, and, indeed, in only saying what TRUTH demanded, he has uttered sentiments and stated facts, which I do not think it prudent to publish; though it is due to him for me, to say, that he himself had no apprehensions upon this score; and was, I say, *had it been possible*, to have taken all the responsibility on himself.—Let those who had the baseness to calumniate him exult at his being thus debarred from making a further exposure of them: the feelings of every just and honourable man will be on his side.

WM. COBBETT.

State Paper, Newgate, Friday,
27th July, 1810.

LETTERS OF THE LATE REV. JOHN BRAND,
RELATIVE TO DEPRECIATION OF PAPER-
MONEY.—1804.

LETTER TO MR. WINDHAM.

Wickham Skeith, May 10, 1804.

Dear Sir; When in consequence of your recommendation to me to consider Mr. Cobbett's arguments, to show a depreciation of the value of bank paper,

from the circulation of dollars at 5s. I flung hastily upon paper some reasonings which seemed to me to set them aside, you appeared to me in a conversation upon them, to think that whatever their validity or invalidity might be, the depreciation being begun in Ireland, it would or might extend hither. Of the circumstances of the money market in Ireland I knew little and therefore could not enter on the subject in that point of view. I afterwards judged it proper to send to Mr. Cobbett the substance of what I had written to you, and as it was the second time of my going over it, I suppose somewhat enlarged.

This communication he notices in his last Register, in which there is given a statement of the elements from which a depreciation of the Irish paper is inferred, and its rate per cent. is thence attempted to be deduced, and he effectively puts his question to me, Can you trace the advance of the current value of the dollar in Ireland to any cause other than that of a depreciation of the bank paper?

In this paper I have answered his question in the affirmative, and the form of the answer is this, the cause is the same as in England, and the measure of its effect precisely the same, it adds in both countries, 3d. to the market price of the dollars. I have also further considered the English question.

As you first started the difficulty to me, which from want of knowledge of the circumstances, I then could make nothing of, and an occasion has imposed some necessity upon me to write upon it, I have taken the liberty to lay what I have said upon it before you, and then to trouble you to seal it up for Mr. C. as it is very possible that it is of such a length that he will think himself obliged to leave out much of it; yet I was drawn into this length by my own belief of the importance of the subject, and my belief that if these positions with respect to England and Ireland be true, ~~our~~ danger is great, and if an erroneous popular belief of the truth of them should be established it will not be much less, for it may very probably produce almost the same effect, and a writer of Mr. Cobbett's nervous and popular eloquence, when he falls into an error, is of all others most likely to render it so. I know, Sir, that I have no excuses to make to you for supporting by all such arguments as occurred to me, an opinion which I may suppose does not coincide with your own as far as respects Ireland,

and that you will on the contrary take it for a mark of that real respect with which I have the honour to be, Dear sir, yours, &c.
J. BRAND.

LETTER I. To MR. COBBETT.

Wickham Skeith, May 9, 1804:

DEAR COBBETT;—Without any ceremony I shall proceed, in the form of propositions, with what I have to say upon your writing about the Irish Dollars.

1st. If there be no seignorage in a time of hoarding, a new emission of coin being necessary, and the price of the metal in the market be higher than that of the Mint, the Mint price ought to be raised to equal it.

For there will be fewer pieces to hoard otherwise and, *ceteris paribus*, there will elapse less time before the hoarding comes to a maximum, and the number of pieces then left in circulation will be less; or in other words, the difficulty come on with greater celerity, and ultimately rise higher.

The gold price of the dollar being 1s. 9d. at the refiner's: if there had been no seignorage it must thus have been issued at 4s. 9d.: even if the average price taken in gold, which is sometimes much under the market price, had been 4s. 6d.

2. What is said of seignorage above being true, the current value of every piece should exceed the market value of the bullion it contains, in the ratio of 21 to 20.

Therefore the market value of the dollar in such a time as above described being 4s. 9d. (57d.) the current value ought to be $\frac{21}{20} \times 57d.$ or 59 $\frac{1}{2}d.$ that is more than 1s. 4d.

3. In a state where the coin is of different metals, every monied payment is to be taken not as made in one species separately, but partly in each; and of each in the proportion as its total sum in the country.

Now let the coin of a state consist of 3 parts: one of gold its quantity as 44; a second silver of former denominations; its quantity as 3: and a third a silver coin of a new denomination (the dollar) its quantity as unity: let its first, current value be 4s. 9d.

In every payment of £. 912, each of the three species is here to be taken to be mixed in the proportion in which they circulate, as according to the equality of chance they will be, that is for £. 912 in bank notes I shall receive £. 19 in dol-

quiet times. And the charge against the company is very much aggravated, when the difficulties then existing from the calling in of the bad silver is considered. But I hope the bank is able to give some better account of this: If the charge shall obtain an extensive belief, it will be incumbent upon them so to do, if in their power.

Upon the face of your correspondent's account also, no slight blame will attach itself to the Irish treasury; for an attempt, at a period of embarrassment in the national coin, to issue dollars at so high a rate as *10s.* sterling, when their value in bullion in the Irish market was only *5s. 3d.* This was in effect the same as imposing a seigniorage of *£. 14 5s. 8d.* per cent. upon them. Under the French Monarchy, its rate was *£. 8* per cent. which, perhaps, may be regarded as the maximum.

The fault of the measure, according to this account, soon demonstrated itself: in a week's time the dollar could be passed for *5s 6d* only: but in this the good sense of the people deserves praise: silver coin they greatly wanted, and although they refused to allow so high a rate as *£. 14 5s. 8d.* per cent. profit on the importation; yet by a tacit universal assent, evidenced in the value at which they received the dollar, they agreed still to leave a profit of *£. 1 1/4* per cent. for the encouragement of further importation.

I have hitherto considered the argument for the depreciation of the paper in Ireland from the current value of the dollar, and on a more limited ground than you required; showing not only that its price had a cause "other than the depreciation of paper," but also that it was the same cause, operating in the same manner, raised that value by the same sum, *3d.*, above its market price in Ireland and England.

§ 3. But your correspondent by another argument, endeavours to show the depreciation of the bank paper to be nearly *£. 11* per cent. He gives the elements from which he draws this conclusion: but in his process there is an error singular in its magnitude, for first it appears, even on his own statement, that it does not exceed *£. 1 19s. 6d.* per cent. I repeat his reasoning.

"The Exchange between this country and England during last week, was about *£. 16* per cent; so that had I wanted *£. 100* payable in London of

"British Currency, I must have carried to market *£. 116* Irish in the national bank notes: but I did carry *£. 105* only in specie, and I obtained *£. 100* British. "I insist therefore, that the depreciation of bank paper is nearly 11 per cent."

This passage in several particulars is vaguely worded: what the writer obtained evidently was a bill of *£. 100* upon England, the consideration paid for it was *£. 105* in specie: he does not state whether the *£. 105* was Irish or British, yet circumstances prove that he paid for it *£. 105* British, for otherwise the exchange between the countries, at the time must have been in favour of Ireland, which is contrary to the fact and his own admission; as at the par, *£. 100* English is worth *£. 108 1/2* Irish, exceeding *£. 105* money of that country, whence the additional *£. 5* was for the difference of the Exchange and the rate of the day against Ireland; and the sum *£. 105* British. He therefore paid for his order *£. 105* British, or which is the same thing *£. 113 15s.* Irish, being equal thereto, but he admits that he could have purchased the same order for *£. 116* Irish in the national bank notes: whence if there were any real disparity between them, *£. 100* Irish money would then have purchased *£. 101 19s. 6d.* only in Irish paper, which would thus appear to have been depreciated (*£. 1 19s. 6d.*) *£. 2* per cent. only.

§ 4. But there does not appear to me to be precision enough in his statement, to conclude the existence of this disparity, or any other. He says that the Exchange of Irish paper for British money payable in London, was about *£. 16* per cent. against the former. And in the first place it is to be noted that the accurate rate might differ from this by no small fraction, reducing the depreciation of *£. 2* the paper *£. 2* found by the corrected process, by no inconsiderable part of so small a rate. Let this be omitted: still it is to be noted, that an adverse balance subsisting for a considerable term, has its average; from which it varies by temporary rises and falls. On the day on which your correspondent purchased his bill of *£. 100* on England, the exchange against Ireland might be lower than such average, and in the course of the week higher; and at each time by *£. 1* per cent., and this will amount to a variation of *£. 2* per cent. in the term. The statement not precluding the possibility of these suppositions decides nothing certainly. And we

frequently see as great variations as this take place in the English stock market, from no very powerful causes, in as little time: and then Irish money and notes would have been absolutely at par: for if immediately after he had obtained his bill for £.100, during such temporary depression; it should have come to the knowledge of the exchangers, that there was a very considerable unforeseen demand to come into the market for remittances to England; it would raise the price of such a bill to more than £.105 British or £.113 $\frac{1}{4}$ Irish; or even than £.116 of the latter, either in paper or specie. Neckar has said enough of the "imperious necessity," which such circumstances impose on merchants who have payments to make, to comply with the demand of the exchanger; who will make his full advantage thereof, to render this clear; and nothing but the transaction of the same day will serve the purpose to which your correspondent applies his elements, and even the average of several such, would be necessary to decide any thing as to the real existence of such small differences.

§ 5. It may be here added, that Banks whose obligations to discount their paper in money are in a state of temporary suspension, may be willing during such a period to purchase coin to assist an embarrassed circulation: but as they are not virtually compelled to provide it as at other seasons, they will demand a profit in the first instance on the advance of it, partly for the sake of the gain by keeping it in their hands until the new money be called in; and partly for the greater gain on the sum which never will return to them. And all the effect of the issue of such coin which I can see is, that by increasing the quantity of the national currency it may depress its value in proportion to its amount, but this depression will fall equally on paper and coin. Except that it is of the nature of a seignorage, and that for a time of public alarm, money current at such advanced rate will be of less value to hoard; of less value to the workers in the metals, and the counterfeiters of coin to melt down, than if it had been of the standard weight, and will therefore remain longer in circulation and be less subject to frauds.

§ 6. But there is another mode in which it may be shown, that there has no fall taken place in the value of paper against coin from the cause assigned; it is as

follows. If the issuing dollars here at 5 shillings has any effect to depreciate bank paper, that effect would not be done away by increasing the amount of that issue; or the proposition it shall bear to the whole of the other silver coin, in any assignable rate. Let now the silver money of a state be one million, and in a condition perfectly like our own; which let us admit to be so good, that the bullion contained in every 20 shillings, would on the average, be worth 15 shillings in the market. I have not before me the trials relating to the state of the silver coinage lately made at the Tower, or a nearer value might be assumed which would be much inferior to this; while this money is current, nothing less than a Bank note of £.10 will exchange for 200 such shillings; the real value of which is £.7 10s. only. And their nominal value, £.10, is neither their value by the standard, which they have long ceased to possess; nor their legal value, for if each be of equal weight which must be supposed, having suffered other reductions than waste from wearing, all are liable by law to be cut and defaced when tendered in payment; nor is it their market value in bullion, as is the undeniable fact. It is therefore barely their nominal though current value; and a million in Bank notes so employed, will purchase or exchange against the whole of the debased silver. The current although nominal value thereof is one million also; but its real market value £.750,000, and this coin debased £.25 per cent, circulating with the paper and exchanged by tale for it, the latter must, according to the principle of argument I am considering, be debased £.25 per cent also.

Let this debased silver be now all called in; and instead thereof, let one million be issued in dollars and convenient fractions of dollars, at 5 shillings each: And first by royal authority: And let the market value of the metal each contains be 4s. 9d. A note of £.10 will purchase 40 such dollars, the market value of which is £.9 10s.; exceeding that of the old silver it would have purchased by £.2: their value indeed is not equal to the standard, but the old coin is far less so, and in that they are superior. The law having provided, that the king can by proclamation fix the value at which foreign coin shall legally pass, their legal value is £.10 also; which cannot be said of 200 of the old shillings each of the average weight as shown above; and in this they are also

superior. It is admitted that the bullion they contain is not in market value £.10; but it is much more nearly so than £.10 of the old silver coin, to which therefore in all these circumstances they are superior. If in their standard and their market value they are somewhat deficient, the old silver was more so: their value is not purely nominal, for it is legal also; and when they are gotten into circulation they will instantly acquire a current value equal to the legal.

And if as before, we take a million of Bank notes to be employed in the purchase of these dollars, it must indeed be admitted that the market value of the silver so purchased will be only £.950,000, and here according to the principle of the argument considered, the depreciation of the paper circulating with them will be only £.5 per cent; therefore in this mode of reasoning, this substitution of the dollars at 3*d.* each above their market value, in the place of the whole of the old coinage, would diminish the depreciation of Bank paper £.20 per cent nearly; or, which is the same thing, relatively raise their value at that rate: so by the mode of reasoning here considered an appreciation is proved from the issuing of the dollars, it is therefore erroneous.

This consequence from the principle of the argument which attempts to show, from the issue of dollars in England of the present value of 4*s.* 9*d.* for 5 shillings, that its Bank paper is depreciated one twentieth, must be admitted. Or a clear reason must be assigned, why legal money, one twentieth below the value of the bullion it contains (to which the standard itself ought to be made as nearly as possible to conform) circulating with Bank paper, depreciates it in that proportion; while the same notes, circulating with the old money, which taken all as of the average value was depressed 5 twentieths below the standard and therefore not legal money, was not depreciated at 5 times that rate, but as the argument tacitly assumes, continued at par.

§ 7. And to infer a greater depreciation of the paper of Ireland, from the higher rate at which dollars pass in that country, involves a contradiction the same in nature and kind, but in magnitude much greater; for the market value of the bullion in a dollar being there 5*s.* 3*d.*, and its current value 5*s.* 6*d.* British: if it

be said that the bank paper circulating with it is thereby depressed £.4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent; the principle of the argument will lead us to reason thus: the Letter from Dublin states, "That the value of the best of the late silver coin was on the average 8*s.* in the pound only;" Now let it be taken that the average state of the whole of the silver was equal to that of the best; then the market value of £108 $\frac{1}{2}$ Irish silver (£.100 British) or 2000 such shillings was £.43 $\frac{1}{4}$ Irish (£.40 British) or 800 good shillings, the notes therefore circulating before with coin, debased £.60 per cent. must according to the principles of this argument have been depreciated £.60 per cent. also; but it proceeds on a tacit assumption joined with that principle, that at that very time they were not depreciated at all: but that the bringing the whole of the silver coin £.55 $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. nearer the market value of the metal, or reducing its deficiency from £.60 to £.4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. set the depressing power of that deficiency free, and that it instantly and not before began to act.

§ 8. These observations have already run to a great length; but it must be added, in the mode in which the dollars are to be issued, there is another proof that they cannot depreciate the value of the paper with which they circulate. If the bank had flung into circulation a number of five shilling notes equal to that of the dollars to be re-stamped at Birmingham; no one from that would have inferred, that their paper was at a discount, relatively either to gold or silver; any more than if they had issued the same amount in larger notes, although there might be other reasons against such an issue.

The paper itself on which a five shilling note would be so drawn, may without doubt be said to have no saleable value. Now I would ask whether any one of these notes together with the total aggregate of bank notes of all amounts which circulate with it, would be depreciated; if the substance on which the obligation was written should have a saleable value after the writing was expunged, as a shilling, half a crown, four shillings and nine-pence, nobody, I presume, could or would answer in the affirmative.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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[Price 1s.

"They" (the French Revolutionists) "forget that, in England, not one shilling of Paper Money of any description is received but *of choice*; that the whole has had its origin in *cash*, actually deposited; and that it is convertible, at pleasure, in an instant, and without the smallest loss, *into cash* again. Our Paper is of value in commerce, *because in England it is of none*. It is powerful on Change, because in Westminster-hall it is impotent. In payment of a debt of twenty shillings a creditor *may refuse all the paper of the bank of England*. Nor is there among us a single public security, of any quality or nature whatsoever, that is enforced by authority. In fact it might be easily shewn, that our paper wealth, instead of *lessening* the real coin, has a tendency to *increase* it; instead of being a *substitute* for money, it only *facilitates* its entry, its exit, and its circulation; that it is the *symbol* of property, and not the *badge* of distress. Never was a *scarcity* of cash, and an *exuberance* of paper, a subject of complaint in this nation."—BURKE. Reflections, 1790.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PAPER-MONEY.—Look at the Motto, English Reader. Look at the Motto; and, when you have looked well at it, you, too, will, I think, be disposed to make some "REFLECTIONS;" or, if you are not so disposed, I beg leave to recommend to you to lay this paper aside at once; for, I will venture to affirm, that no reading whatever upon political subjects, can be of any use to you.—It was just *twenty years* ago when Mr. Burke thus described the state of the bank-paper in England, and thus taunted (not altogether unjustly) the Revolutionists in France, who had just at that time set afloat a paper-money system. But, view the state of things *now*!—The war, which Pitt began soon after these Reflections of Mr. Burke's were published, was, by Pitt and his followers, called a *war of finance*. How, then, has that war succeeded thus far? The reader must remember Pitt's frequent boasts of having reduced the French to the utmost distress as to pecuniary and financial matters. His notorious assertion, that they were "*in the very gulph of bankruptcy*," has frequently been quoted; and, the writings of Sir FRANCIS D'IVERNONIS and of GENTZ cannot be forgotten. Where are *now* all their foretellings?—The useful train of reflection for the English reader, upon looking at the motto, is this:—How changed are things since 1790! What a great, and, to us, what a fearful change, has taken place! Whence has it proceeded? What has been the cause? Who have been the actors?—Has the change proceeded from the superior wisdom and virtues of the French? No: that we will not allow. From the interposition of Divine Providence in

their favour? No: for we cannot allow that such people, who have openly railed at religion, should be the favourites of Divine Providence; and, besides, is there a Speech, made by the king to the parliament, during this long war, in which the king does not express his gratitude for the great aid which he has received and hopes to receive from Divine Providence? Is the cause to be looked for in the liking, which the people of the several nations of Europe have had for the French Revolutionists in preference to their old rulers? No: for we all along have, and still do, aver most positively, that the people of these several countries of Europe love their good old rulers and hate the French Revolutionists, and especially Buonaparte.—Here, then, is, for once, a great, a tremendous, effect without a cause.—But, as to the actors; as to those, who have had the management of things, on our part, we know them very well. Pitt and his followers (for the poor Foxites were, in effect, quite sunk into that same description of persons) have had the whole affairs of the nation in their hands from 1790 to the year 1810, and in those hands the nation's affairs are to this moment. Let not the OUTS pretend, that they would have done better; for, there is not a single man of them, who has not eulogized Pitt, whose debts they voted that the nation should pay upon the score of his merits as a minister; and whose system of finance, in particular, every man of them has applauded.—No: there are no distinctions to make; but, to get rid of all ground for cavil, upon this score, let us say, that, between them and amongst them, the two sets, the INS and the OUTS, have had in

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'their hands all the resources of this nation since the day when Mr. Burke wrote the passage here taken as a motto. Well, then, to whom, if not to them, are we to look for a responsibility for this awful change? Never tell about this accident or that accident; those accidents should have been provided against. You would have done so and so, perchance you will say, if the Dutch had fought or if the Neapolitans had not run away. Aye; but, it was your business to foresee what the Dutch and the Neapolitans and the Prussians and Bavarians and every body else would do. At any rate, you cannot say, that this change is to be ascribed to *Sir Francis Burdett*. He has had none of the powers of the state in his hands. He has had the expending of none of our taxes. He has, indeed, and so have I, found fault, with measures; given it as our opinion, that such and such measures would and must lead to harm; but, these opinions, so far from being acted upon, have insured us an abundance of malevolent abuse. Of this fact, then, there can be no doubt: that, let what will be the state of affairs; let the change since 1790 be what it will, *Sir Francis Burdett* and those who think with him have had no hand, no act or part, in the producing of that change; and that the whole of the change, be it for good or for evil, belongs exclusively to the INS and the OUTS between them, and to those of the people, who approve of either the one set or the other. The change is the work of their own hands; to them it wholly belongs; to them, therefore, must be left the task of making the world see and the nation feel, that it is a change for the better.'—I shall now add some observations to those which I made upon the subject of paper-money last week; but, before I proceed to those observations, it is necessary to correct an error, committed at the bottom of page 108, and in the bottom line save one. It is this: instead of "ten times" read "*a tenth part*." The context does, indeed, pretty clearly point out to the reader to make this correction; but, it happens in a passage of so much importance, that it would not have been right in me to leave it unnoticed.—I now come to my intended observations, which have been suggested by a little paragraph that appeared in the news-papers of Saturday last, the 28th of July, in these words:—"A seizure of nine thousand

"guineas, intended for exportation, was, on Thursday, made in the River. The specie was discovered on board a small vessel which had cleared out in ballast: "A Captain in a Volunteer Corps was the fortunate detector of this prohibited merchandize."—Thus, then, on Thursday, the 26th of July, on the very day, and, perhaps, at the very hour, when I was writing the 109th page of my last Number: at the very time when I was telling my readers, that the guineas, being degraded by the society of the paper, would go away to countries where they would not be so degraded, and where they would pass for their real worth; that the guineas would still pass from hoard to hoard in company with the paper, *or from a hoard to the sea side*; but that it was impossible they should circulate in such society for any length of time: on the day, and, perhaps, at the very moment, that I was putting this opinion upon paper, it now appears, that no less than nine thousand of these Jacobin vagabonds were detected in the act of getting off out of the country. They were, it seems, got upon the river; fairly afloat; just about to hoist sail, when the *Volunteer Captain* discovered and stopped them. Jacobin rascals! What, then, they will not stay here to keep company with the loyal paper!—It would be a curious thing to follow these Jacobin Guineas now, after their being brought back. It would be curious to follow them in their dispersion, and to see through what new channels they would endeavour again to make their escape.—Every one must, I think, be now convinced that the gold will never again circulate upon a footing with the present paper-money; and that the only way to bring it back again into circulation, and, indeed, into the country, is to remove every obstacle to the purchase or sale of it. A Jew was, as the reader will, probably, remember, sometime ago prosecuted for selling guineas for more than their nominal worth in bank-notes. *A bill of indictment was found against him.* I have not seen, that he has been brought to trial. But, this prosecution, though left in this state, would be quite sufficient to prevent an open traffic in guineas; and, that being the case, the possessors will inevitably hoard or smuggle; for, to suppose that any person will voluntarily lay out a guinea, while there is paper of our present sort to be had, is an absurdity too gross to be tolerated for one single moment.—In 1803, there was

a work published under this title : "GUINEAS AN ENCUMBRANCE." —The author spent much more time than was necessary in shewing, that if *paper* answered all the purposes of *gold*, it was a great saving to the nation to make use of a paper instead of a gold currency. Then, taking it for granted, that our paper *did* answer all the purposes of *gold*, he, of course, came to the conclusion, that the nation derived great advantages from the paper-system, and that *Guineas* were an *encumbrance*, agreeably to the proposition in the title page.—The error of this gentleman was a very vulgar one indeed. He had no other notion of the purposes of money than *merely that of its passing from hand to hand*, without any reference whatever to its losing or retaining its original worth. He took up the notion that the mere circumstance of its passing was a complete proof of its goodness in every respect. And, hence he took it for granted, that the paper answered *all the purposes* of gold. But, we have now seen, and the people of Salisbury, Shaftsbury, Cork, and other places, have most severely *felt*, that paper does not answer *all* the purposes of gold; for, if there had been a gold in place of a paper currency, it is evident to every man, that the miseries recently occasioned, by the latter, would not have befallen the people, who now find, I fancy, *paper*, and not *guineas*, to be a sad *encumbrance*.—What has now happened is, however, but a *little taste* of the evils appertaining to a paper-money, not exchangeable into gold or silver at the will of the owner. There are many other evils which are now in operation, working heavily against the happiness of the nation; but, were there no other than that at this moment experienced, that one would be quite enough to silence the author of "GUINEAS AN ENCUMBRANCE." —The motto, which I have placed at the head of this sheet, was written long before the present system of paper-money took place. The author little imagined, at the time when he wrote that passage, that the day was so near at hand when a *law* would be passed rendering the tender of bank-notes to the amount of a debt a *protection against an arrest for such debt*. Since that time, the bank in Threadneedle street has been quite another thing than what it was before. The bank-note has, *now* some power in *Westminster Hall*. And, do we not see the consequences? Yes; some of them; but, good God! how

small a part of those consequences, unless some means be soon adopted effectually to counteract the natural consequences of the fall of the paper-money! —I have some observations to offer now upon the still *more recent* failures; but, I will first notice the letters of two correspondents, which will be found in another part of this Number.—The *FIRST* relates to a remark of mine (in the last Number, page 110,) in the way of answer to a letter then before me, from this same correspondent, upon the subject of *rents* and *taxes*, as affected by the paper-money. The letter, now inserted from that correspondent (MR. CAMPBELL) explains his meaning; and, at the same time, suggests to me the utility of proposing and discussing before-hand, the measures that it would, in the contingency contemplated, be proper to adopt, so as to prevent the *spirit of contracts*, of all sorts, from being violated. Nothing would, in my opinion, be more easy. All that the government would have to do would be to appoint persons to examine into the matter, and the principle of adjustment being so very clear, they would only have to revert to the time when the contract was made, and see what the value of money was then, and make their revision accordingly. I do not perceive how any serious difficulties or discontents could possibly arise from this source, if there were only common prudence used on the part of the government. —From the *SECOND* letter, it appears, that the writer *formerly* believed, that the high prices arose, not from the increase of paper-money, but from the *increase of gold and silver coin* in Europe. He has now discovered his error; or, at least, he now acknowledges, that the paper-money has depreciated; and says it must continue to depreciate, "*so long as the note shall not be readily exchanged for gold.*" He then goes on to say, that even if *light gold* were issued to put coin upon a level with the paper, the latter would sink beneath even that *light gold*, unless the paper was, at the pleasure of the holder, *convertible into gold*.—This gentleman calls upon the bank for *SOME PLAN* to give to a pound sterling of their paper *some certain value in gold*. It is very easy to call upon the bank for such a plan; but, it would be better to make an attempt at least to *chalk out* such plan, the people in Threadneedle street being no more conjurors than other folks.—My opinion as to the *only effectual remedy* for the dreaded

evil is so well known, that I need not repeat it here. It must, indeed, be now manifest to every person, capable of thinking, that an *open competition* between the paper-money and metallic money is the only thing that can bring gold back again into free circulation; and, without such circulation, what must, first or last, be the consequences!—The public have heard of a Report, made by a certain set of gentlemen, belonging to the Honourable House, called "*the Bullion Committee.*" This Report was, I believe, *ordered to be printed*; but, before it returned to the Honourable House in its typographical shape, that Honourable House adjourned. This Report is said to contain, amongst other useful things, a plan for the bringing back of gold coin into circulation; and, I have heard, that the plan is this: that the bank in Threadneedle Street shall pay, on demand, all their small notes (notes of one and two pounds) in metallic money, or coin; that is to say, in gold and silver; but that the said bank shall not be compelled to *begin* this sort of payment in less than *two years* from the time of passing the act!—I give this as mere *hearsay*, mind. I have not seen the Report, nor have I my information from any one who has given it upon his own word as derived from a sight of the Report. It is, therefore, merely *hearsay*; but it is very generally talked of amongst politicians, and, therefore, I notice it.—Now, not to waste our time upon the ludicrous idea of the *two years* postponement, what would be the effect of such a measure, if it were, at this time, adopted, all the other laws relative to money remaining in force? Suppose, now, that we were to read, in the news-papers, to-morrow: "The bank in Threadneedle Street is now ready to give gold and silver in exchange for all its one and two pound notes." Does the reader imagine, that he would be able to get to the bank door, or even to Threadneedle Street? There have been seen crowds in London; but never such a crowd as such a notification would draw together. Every small note would be tendered instantly. And *how long* does the reader imagine, that the guineas would remain in circulation after they got out of the bank? But, really, it is to insult the understanding of the reader to dwell any longer upon the consequences of such a plan, which, I still think, never can have been seriously proposed.—Upon the subject of the more recent stoppages of

payment at the Banker's shops, it would be useless to say much; though I cannot help observing, that, in his paper of the 27th of last month, MR. PERRY was rather premature in calling my observations *querulous*; and in saying that he was proved to have been right in his prediction, that "the failures *would not extend to old established Houses*; that the alarm "would *subside in a week*; and that it was "not on the side of want of credit that any serious calamity was to be apprehended." In announcing to us, however, as he has done to day (1st August) the stoppage of MESSRS. DEVAYNES AND Co. of Pall Mall, he has furnished us with a pretty good presumptive proof of his being wrong in all the above points. It is *want of confidence*, and that alone, which has produced the effects which we now behold: and that want of confidence has arisen from the currency of the country not being convertible into gold.—I do not say, that this want of confidence *will*, at this time, become general; but, there is no security that it *will not*; and, it is not, at any rate, to be supposed, that it will be stopped all at once. The fall of DEVAYNES must naturally produce the fall of others; and, if not of other banks, of other men, whose fate will be a warning to their neighbours.—While this is going on, the *hoarding* and *exporting* of the gold, and even of the silver, will proceed with redoubled activity. They are, in effect, the same thing for the present. The consequence of both is, an *increase of the paper*, to supply the place of the absconding Jacobin Guineas; and the consequence of that is a *further depreciation of the paper*, which as naturally produces a *further want of confidence*: and thus the system must and will proceed, until the day when there shall be an *open competition between gold and paper*.

CORN CROPS.—While we hear such positive assertions as to the abundance of the crops now upon the ground, and hear so much anger expressed against those, who venture to doubt of that abundance, it is not a little surprising, that wheat, that *foreign* wheat, should still keep up to *thirty pounds a load*; that is to say, six pounds a quarter, or, fifteen shillings for the Winchester Bushel. So that, really, to talk of the prospect of a *fair average crop* is to discover either very great ignorance upon the subject, or a most outrageous determination to persevere in error.—But, what has struck me most

forcibly, upon this subject, is the accounts which we hear of the state of *Ireland*, in which country, be it well remembered, it was asserted, during the last session of parliament, that the corn in Ireland was so abundant, that the distilleries ought to be re-opened to grain; and opened they were accordingly.—What is now the fact? Let the reader judge of the state of the corn crops in Ireland from the following paragraph, published in the *Morning Chronicle* of the 30th of last month as an extract from the then-last-received *Dublin Journal*.—"The people of this metropolis, and of Ireland in general, should feel truly grateful to those distillers, who, we understand, have come to the laudable resolution of stopping until the 29th of September.—To so high a price have provisions come, (wheat, three guineas a barrel—flour forty shillings a cwt.!) that had those gentlemen not come to this determination, nothing could ensue in these lamentable times but a general starvation!"

—This is what one may call "a broad hint" to the distillers to discontinue the use of corn; for, as to any such resolution having been voluntarily entered into by any of the distillers, that is by no means to be believed.—I do not know what a barrel of wheat is; but, supposing the hundred weight to be 112lb. as it is in England, the flour, at forty shillings a hundred weight, is rather more than 4d. $\frac{3}{4}$ a pound, and that is, I believe, 1s. 8d. $\frac{1}{2}$ for four in weight equal to a quartern loaf. A pound of flour and a pound of bread are of the same price at the baker's shop; at least so it is in that part of England which I am most acquainted with. At any rate, there can be no great difference; for, though a pound of flour will make more than a pound of bread, there is the expence of baking to be put to the bread side of the account.—Now, therefore, the hundred weight in Ireland is greater than that in England; or the statement in this paragraph, respecting flour, is false; or, the price of the quartern loaf, in Dublin, is twenty pence halfpenny; that is, within the half-pence of being as dear as it was in England at the dearest time in the year of the great scarcity, 1801.—And, this was the country, in which, no longer ago than the month of March last, there was such plenty of corn, that it was necessary to re-open the Distilleries in order to make away with it! Aye, and upon this very ground of abundance in Ireland was the

renewal of the law of prohibition rejected! —Not to Dublin only is the misery confined, as appears clearly from the following article published in the *Courier* of the 26th of July, whence the situation of the unfortunate Irish will be easily imagined.—"The present melancholy condition of business, and the utter want of employment for the manufacturing poor, casts upon the better orders of society at this juncture a very necessary and imperative duty. It is in seasons of this sort that affluence has the opportunity of rebuking in poverty those sensations of envy which the natural and unavoidable inequality of life usually excites, by a generous and munificent assistance; such as may show that comparative prosperity does not always render the heart callous, and that charity may be the companion, as doubtless it may, of opulence.—Relief to a considerable extent has been afforded to the distresses of the poor of this city, and very pointed discrimination has been used to direct the public bounty to proper objects; yet so general is the pressure of poverty at this period, that all the means provided to afford relief, threaten to become inadequate, and many interesting objects of genuine misery yet want the solace of necessary sustenance to keep life from sinking.—The present system of granting relief by allowing bread and soup on tickets, which are given gratis to applicants, would, in less than a month, consume the sum of nearly 500*l.* which is all that now remains of 1440*l.*, the sum originally collected; and as the distress of the poor is not likely to abate for much more than that time, it is become necessary that some other arrangement should be adopted.—The Committee, therefore, have resolved to withdraw the tickets which are at present held by any persons, who are not tradesmen or persons dependent upon them, and to have a quantity of soup and biscuits ready to be delivered for tickets which may be purchased by the well disposed part of the community, at 1s. 8d. per dozen, by which means other deserving objects, besides tradesmen (who are the immediate objects of the institution) may be relieved, and the original fund be preserved against sudden exhaustion. The public, it is hoped, will lend their co-operation to the Committee in this plan by purchasing the tickets, and by taking care, in

"the distribution of them, to give no ticket to any person who holds a *daily ticket* from the Committee."—Now, thou mercenary "AMERICAN," wilt thou say, that this is "all imaginary?" You knew well of the existence of miseries like these, when you were drawing your lying picture. Oh! that *you* had to subsist upon these tickets for biscuit and soup!—This is no representation of mine. It is no "jacobin" account. It proceeds from no jacobinical conspiracy. It comes to me through the columns of a *misericord* newspaper.—Poor Irish! Their situation is, indeed, such as demands our kindest thoughts and our kindest acts; and, I am confident, that there are none but the *hardened*, in England, whose hearts will not have answered to the impressive call of Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, the other day, at the Crown and Anchor, in behalf of this suffering nation. The whole of his speech was admirable; but that part of it which related to Ireland most admirable. He alluded to the Subscriptions, made in this country for *foreigners*; why not make such subscriptions for our unfortunate fellow subjects in Ireland? Do we suppose, that the well-being of the people of Ireland is less interesting to us, than the well-being of a swarm of foreign refugees? Why, then, do not the turtle-patriots and their abettors open subscriptions for the unfortunate Irish? Really, to look at the conduct of some people, one would suppose, that they looked upon Ireland as a country, with which this country has nothing at all to do.—To return a little to the manner, above described by the *Courier*, of affording relief to the Irish people, what a spectacle, Good God! must the city of Cork (the second in the kingdom) exhibit at this moment! The "*tradesmen*" suing for a passport to a mess of biscuit and soup! The real value of each mess may be easily ascertained by the circumstance of the tickets being proposed to be sold for *1s. 8d.* a dozen, or, a little more than *three half-pence each*. A three-halfpenny meal, received once a day, is a thing which it really makes one's heart ache to think of. My daily allowance of bread in this prison is worth three times as much, and costs *three times as much*. What, under such circumstances, must be the miseries of the mass of the people? We have seen Subscriptions for all sorts of foreigners; and I do hope, that something in the same way will be done, or attempted at least,

for the unfortunate people of Dublin and Cork.—In speaking of the *sort of food*, which, as appears from the *Courier*, the rich are doling out to the poor in Ireland, it has occurred to me to give it as my opinion, that the best sort of all, to be given to people in want, is *good bread*, which is, as it was in the time when the Old Testament was written, *the stuff of life*. But, some how or other, almost all your professed philanthropists, and especially your agricultural improvers, appear to have racked their imaginations to discover the means of making labourers live without bread, quite forgetting that just and forcibly expressed injunction of Holy Writ: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox as he treadeth out the corn." And, if not the ox, shall the man, shall the labourer, be muzzled?—Talk not to me, then, of *substitutes* for bread; you may as well talk to me at once of substitutes for food. We hear many of these improvers talk of *bettering* the condition of the poor; but, the great end of their labours always is, to make those, who till the land; those to whose sweat and pain and care we owe the whole of the produce of the earth; to make these live upon something not heretofore known as human food; or, at best, to lower the quality of that food.—Too much of this description are the endeavours of Mr. CURWEN, the *parliamentary reformer*, who, upon a recent occasion, was the first to declare his resolution of " *rallying round His Majesty's Government*," and who has published a book, entitled: "*HINTS on Agricultural Subjects, and on the best means of improving the condition of the labouring classes*."—Now, if I were to set about an improvement of this sort, I should certainly begin by *adding to the wages of the labourer*, in order that he might be able to buy himself food in greater abundance and of a better quality than the food he now consumes. So far, however, is this from being the mode of proceeding recommended by Mr. CURWEN, that he speaks of "*fermented flour*," that is to say, *brad*, as being a great waste in a poor man's family. He tells us, that to *ferment* the flour produces a great loss; attributes the use of *fermented bread* to luxury and affected delicacy; says that the use of it was formerly confined to great towns and even to the higher classes in those towns; and adds, that the wheat formerly appropriated to bread was ground only into *meal*, which was mixed with that of peas, beans, or barley, and used by all the

working people in *solid bread*! That is to say, in heavy lumps of baked dough! The use of fermented bread, which is here called "*a waste of bread-corn*," is called "*a most serious and efficient evil*." This is not, however, a set of original remarks. Mr. Curwen only quotes them from "an *Anti-Jacobin* Writer;" but he says, they "are *highly deserving attention*, and as such," (any knowledge of grammar is beneath him) "he takes the liberty of recommending them most strenuously." This is a *hint*, is it, for "improving the condition of the labouring classes!" That a professed *Anti-Jacobin*, keeping his name out of sight, should have the merciless insolence to publish such observations, does not at all surprize me; but, that they should receive the unqualified approbation of Mr. Curwen, or of any man, putting his name to his work, is what I could not have believed. What! tell us that your object is to *improve* the condition of the labouring classes, and then propose that they shall no longer eat fermented bread, but eat the *lumpish dough*, made of the *meal* of wheat mixed with that of peas, beans, or barley; far worse food than any man attempts to give to his dogs; food which dogs would almost starve before they would eat? Is this your way, Mr. Curwen, of *improving* the condition of the labouring classes? It is not *my* way, fond as the Attorney General says I am of "*base-lucres*." I add to the quantity of bread, and I put meat with the bread. I am for none of your *milk diets*. I take care that every man who works for me has the means of having one good meal of *meat* in every day, and a pot or two of beer once or twice a week. That's my way; that's the "*base-lucres*" way of "*improving* the condition of the labouring classes."—Another time I will enter upon a little fuller exposure of the work of this great manufacturer of milk; but, there is one more "*hint*," which I must notice even now. It makes part of what Mr. Curwen calls an "*interesting communication*," sent him by "a very intelligent officer, who had served long in India." A good school, wherein to study the mode of treating the labouring classes! This intelligent friend of Mr. Curwen, is giving an account of the manner in which they fed the horses, in the army of LORD LAKE; and that leads him to "*hint*," in the following words: "The general scarcity of grain which prevailed at that time induced many thousands to flock to the British Camp in

"search of food, and I daily witnessed, for weeks together, many hundreds, of all ages and sexes, coming into the lines of our cavalry, and anxiously collecting and carrying away, the EXCREMENT as it fell from the horses. This they exposed for a few hours to the sun, and, by rubbing and sifting it, procured a large supply OF FOOD!"—Was there ever before related a fact so degrading to human nature as this! What must have been the turn of mind of the man, who could have put this fact upon paper, without accompanying it with an expression of his abhorrence? Mr. Curwen does not, indeed, actually point out this way of collecting food to the use of the labouring classes in England, he does not recommend that they, or any part of them, should be thus fed from our cavalry camps or barracks in England; but, neither does he discover any symptom of horror at seeing human nature so foully dishonoured in India, nor the smallest sign of pity for the poor creatures, impelled by hunger to court degradation unparalleled, degradation bringing them to a level with the very lowest of the brute creation.—To return, for a moment, to Ireland, is it not a mortifying, is it not a heart-piercing, reflection, that, in that fine country, so favoured by nature, marked out seemingly by Providence as the seat of plenty and happiness, the people should be in want of a sufficiency of food; and, that in the city of CORK, the emporium of provisions, the strand whence are shipped no small part of the beef and pork and butter and flour that feed our fleets our armies and our colonies; that, in this city, the principal trade of which consists in shipping off the *superabundance* of the kingdom, the inhabitants should be driven to accept of three-half-penny soup-tickets to keep them from absolute starvation!—When the people of Cork are beholding, as it appears they now are, thousands of miserable wretches parading their streets, crying out for food, let them reflect upon what was said by me, last winter (Vol. XVII. p. 211), in the hope of prevailing upon the parliament to continue the prohibition of the use of corn in the Distilleries. If my advice had been followed, the flour in Ireland would not now have been 40 shillings the hundred weight.—One thing that now ought to be done, is, to let all the soldiers in the kingdom have leave to work during the harvest. This measure, especially if the weather should prove

what is called a *catching time*, would make a very material difference in the price of bread after the harvest. And this is a measure completely in the power of the government.

PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.—The accounts from our army in these countries have been very flattering of late. To be sure, Lord Talavera has sent word (see another part of this Number), that the French have taken a Spanish city, Ciudad Rodrigo; and, it is, I believe, understood that *he was very near to the spot* with his army, while the siege was going on. The French state roundly (in an article published in the *Times* of the 2nd instant) that the English army was within six leagues of the walls of the now-taken city; and this does not very well agree with the accounts, noticed in my last Number, and which accounts stated that the French had but 25 thousand men. The French do, some how or other, *get on*; we are told, in our newspapers, from “most respectable authority,” that all manner of evils betide the French; that Colonel Talbot, with 50 men under him, totally defeated 300 French, killing 110 and making 33 prisoners, 2 of whom were officers, though, unfortunately Colonel Talbot was killed and *his body had not been recovered*; that the French have recently been beaten by the Spaniards at Pandoe, whence 400 carts loaded with wounded French were sent into Madrid; that the French have been beaten by the Spaniards at Ciudad Real; that the peasants of Olot have destroyed 1 000 of the French and cleared that part of the country of them; that the Marquis of Romana’s army is in good case; that, while all this was going on in the way of beating the French, the French armies were greatly suffering from desertion; that it had been announced officially at Lisbon, on the 6th of July, that, of the *Polish* division (*foreigners*, mind!) which had entered Spain, 1,500 had deserted, and had actually joined the Spanish army, and that the rest, with bayonets fixed, had declared to their officers, that they should march back to Poland; and, besides all this, that the desertion from the French army in Castile was *equal to what it was in other provinces*; that *not a day* passed without some deserter coming in; that, in the beginning of July, 50 men had come over at one time; that of a *Swiss* Regiment (*more foreigners*, mind!) in garrison at Astorga, the greater part had, in like manner deserted; that these men were going to

incorporate themselves with the Spanish corps. — Such is the deplorable state of the French, as described in the *Morning Chronicle* (and in most of the other London News-papers) of the 31st July and 1st August. My Lord Talavera tells us, that the *Portuguese* soldiers have *behaved well*; so that, it seems, there is a Portuguese army, then, notwithstanding what was, last week, said by the newspapers in London, about the *not knowing* any thing of the existence of a Portuguese. One of these papers, on the 23rd of July, published, as part of an extract of a letter from an officer of rank in our army, the following words: “As to the “Spanish and Portuguese armies *no one seems to know any thing about them.*” I said, that this must be false, seeing that we were *paying* 30,000 Portuguese Soldiers for the year. And, it now appears that I was right; for, not only is there a Portuguese army in *existence*, but my Lord Talavera says, that the soldiers of it actually fight. He says, in his official letter, that a battalion of Portuguese Chasseurs have “displayed their *steadiness* and “*courage*, during the movements of the “advanced guard, and in several skirmishes with the enemy.” — This is very satisfactory intelligence; and, I think, when taken into view, accompanied with the above-mentioned lamentable condition of the French army, the soldiers of which were, apparently, deserting in every direction, would fairly warrant a conclusion decidedly favourable to the cause of us and our allies; nay, a conclusion, that, in a few months, we should hear of the French being completely driven out of Spain and Portugal. — Let me be understood, however. I mean, of course, that such a conclusion is warranted only on condition that the premises are *true*; only on condition that our newspapers have spoken *truth* in telling us (from the Spanish and Portuguese Gazettes), that the French were every where beaten, and that their army was daily wasting away in consequence of desertion. — As the public will, doubtless, be disposed to indulge the hope, that the pleasing side of the prospect is the real one, they will feel relieved from all apprehensions as to the ulterior consequences of Buonaparté’s conquering Spain and Portugal; they will be relieved from the horrors of an invasion of Ireland from the ports of Spain and Portugal, while a numerous French fleet shall appear at the mouths of the Scheldt, the

Meuse and the Rhine, or in the ports and harbours near them. From these and all like apprehensions the public will be relieved, if they give credit to the recent accounts from Spain and Portugal; and which accounts, observe, are mostly said to have been taken from the *Lisbon Gazette*, which, as every one must be aware, contains nothing which has not the sanction of those in authority, who, doubtless, would not sanction the publication of falsehoods.—I beg leave, however, to be understood as not giving even any *opinion* as to the authenticity of these accounts. I act the humble part of a mere abridger, giving my author in every instance. I give no intelligence of my own. I only presume to retail, at second hand, what is issued out from the great manufactories. Nay, I hardly dare do this; and I get myself, sometimes, most grossly abused for nothing in the world but repeating, in substance, after these worthies, what they have said at large. Aye! it is not convenient for *some* of them to have their assertions recorded. Their villainous falsehoods; their base endeavours to baup up, to deceive, to cheat, the public, having answered the special purpose for which they were intended, would, were it not for me, be rubbed off the memory of the public by succeeding endeavours of the same sort; but, I put the falsehoods upon record, I give the public a retrospect, a bird's-eye view of past attempts to deceive; I place the facts in a situation easily to be recurring to; thus I render the manufacturing of falsehoods not so pleasant a trade; and, for this cause it is that the worthies do so hate and so abuse me.—At the risk, however, and even with the certainty, of being hated and abused by them, I shall persevere, and now with more attention than ever, in my detections and exposures of their falsehoods. I have now more time; and I am sure that that time cannot be better employed than in increased efforts in the cause of truth. Let political *humbug* and *fraud*; let the hirings of the press; let those who cheat with the pen, beware, therefore; for, I have now *the time* as well as the inclination and the ability, to do towards them that which truth and justice demand.—It must be obvious to every man of any reflection, that no small part of the present difficulties and dangers of this country have arisen from that delusion, which has been propagated by the press. To every such person it must be manifest, that, had it

not been for this delusion, the nation never could have been brought into the state, in which it now is. I have done much to prevent such delusion, and I have sometimes succeeded; but, it is now my intention, and my firm resolution to do more than I hitherto have done. Peculation, Public Robbery, Political fraud, shall, if it please God to preserve my life and health, have no cause for exultation.

THOUSAND LASHES.—For the following article, which I shall insert without comment, and merely for the sake of having the thing upon record, I am indebted to the MORNING POST news-paper, of the 1st of August 1810.—“A general Court Martial has lately been held at Brighton on Robert Curtis, a corporal in the Oxford regiment of militia, on charges preferred against him, viz. Charge 1. for having on different occasions, endeavoured to excite a spirit of discontent and dissatisfaction, by attempting to persuade the men of the Oxford regiment of militia that they had been defrauded by their colonel of certain articles; viz. shoes, stocks, &c.—Charge 2. for also having spoke disrespectfully of his colonel and his officers, particularly on the 24th of June last.—Charge 3. for having made a false accusation against colonel Gore Langton, commanding the Oxford regiment of militia, in a letter addressed to lord Charles Somerset commanding the Sussex district, stating that he had laid the circumstances of his complaint before the colonel, who had refused him satisfaction.—Upon which charges the prisoner has been found *Guilty* of the whole, and is sentenced to receive 1,000 *lashes*, and to be reduced to the ranks.”

It was my intention to have given here a view of the *affairs of Holland*, and to have offered some observations on the *probable consequences* of the recent measures of the Emperor Napoleon with regard to that country; but I have not room. King Louis's Manifesto will be found in another part of this sheet.—The Article from the MONITEUR (which I have copied from the TIMES news-paper of yesterday,) is well worthy of attention. With its *sentiments* I have nothing to do; but, the *facts* are well worthy of *inquiry* at least; nor shall we, if we are wise, be too hasty in despising its *threats*.—The wise way, that which *prudence*, even cold and cautious prudence, points out to us, is to endeavour to come at a *true estimate* of our situation. • Nothing but the greatest

folly joined with the basest of cowardice can make us shut our eyes to open, flagrant, broad-day truth; and, if we should be deluded into such wilful blindness, our ruin is at hand. A hireling slave's bombastical flattery, whether in prose or verse, will not turn aside a ball or blunt the point of a bayonet; neither will it supply the place of gold or bread.—I, therefore, beseech those of my countrymen, who really love that country; who would rather die *Englishmen* than live in affluence unworthy of that name, to endeavour, while it is of any use, to form a correct opinion as to the state of the country, its resources, its powers, its difficulties, its dangers; for, they may be well assured, that, unless the danger is *known before hand*, it cannot be resisted.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
3d August, 1810.*

LETTERS OF THE LATE REV. JOHN BRAND,
RELATIVE TO DEPRECIATION OF PAPER-
MONEY.—1801.—(*Concluded from p.
128.*)

Letter to Mr. Cobbett.

Now the dollars are to be issued as "tokens for five shillings." In the first case, the obligation would be written on a worthless piece of paper; in the second, stamped on a valuable piece of silver. It is a metallic bank note for 5s, as a guinea has been called a bill for a certain quantity of commodities on the whole world, that is, the civilized world. Has this new kind of bill less credit because it has a value independent of the solvency of the emitting company, and that nearly equal to its current value? or does this additional security debase it, and not only so, but all its paper with which it before was at par?

§ 3. I must yet in conclusion add, that the depreciation of one part of the national currency, the bank paper here spoken of, is a relative depreciation only, taking place when a discount is to be fixed between the holder and the purchaser is allowed to obtain coin for a bill. And when such a discount takes place, the depreciation of the currency is partial. Such was truly the case with respect to bank paper in the reign of William; when only £.85 in money could be obtained for a bank note of the then nominal value of £.100, or it was at £.15 per cent. discount. But the effect of such a fall will

be to reduce the price of commodities paid for in coin; or as it has been sometimes called to appreciate the latter, for it will evidently produce the same consequence with respect to the value of coin, as taking fifteen 100ths of the paper out of circulation. I only add, that I think that the consideration of the rise of prices of commodities, or the reciprocal circumstance, the fall of the value of the whole aggregate of the currency taken collectively, should not enter into this question, which has nothing to do with the absolute value of the currency as measured by commodities, but which simply relates to the *ratio* which the values of equal nominal amounts of metallic and paper currency may come to bear to each other, when they shall vary from that of equality; and whether such variation has taken place; but to go into the reasons of my entering this caveat, would lengthen my letter too much. I am, Dear Sir,
Yours truly, &c. J BRAND.

PAPER MONEY.

Sir;—If the allusion which you have made in your last number, p. 110, to "a very old and much esteemed correspondent," refers to the author of the article entitled "The Bankruptcies of Bankers," which I sent you in the beginning of the week, I have to express my regret, that I have been so unfortunate in the expression of my meaning as to leave you room to ask, "could I suppose that you ever imagined that rents and taxes would remain what they are?" No, Sir, for every possible reason it was impossible for me to do any such thing. All I supposed possible was; that it might have escaped your notice, that to begin to lower rents and taxes, indeed all claims in money, with the commencement of the decline of the paper system, and to lower the first in the ratio, in which the want of confidence brings down the latter, is the only possible means of preventing the exit of that system from destroying the relation, in which the possessors of real property at present stand to each other; and from aggravating the calamities that have resulted from its establishment. And I only supposed this possible, because I do not recollect (many years as I have been the constant reader of the Political Register) that you have ever touched upon the principle. It is, however, possible, that, with all the attention I have paid to the bearings of the

paper system, I may be mistaken as to the adequacy of this principle to avert the calamities, which I dread from its fall; but, if so, to whom can I look for correction but you? At any rate I am under the conviction, that the means of letting down the paper system, without calamities, similar to those, which have resulted from its fall in Salisbury, is among the most important subjects that can occupy your attention.—I beg leave, with every sentiment of esteem, to subscribe myself, Sir, yours truly,

H. CAMPBELL.

Surrey Street, July 31st, 1810.

PAPER-MONEY.

SIR;—In the 14th Volume of your Register, page 245, you did me the honour to publish a few observations which I sent you relative to the Public Debt and Sinking Fund. I also took occasion to remark that whilst the pound sterling was annually suffering a depreciation in its value; compared with coin or labour, the precious metals had, in the general market of the world, sustained a similar depreciation; which prevented any inconvenience being felt from the restriction on the Bank of England in their cash payments; as a one pound note and a shilling would constantly purchase the same in the market as a guinea. I attributed this alteration of value in the precious metals to the increased quantity furnished from America, and the lessened demand for them in France, and on the Continent, since the Revolution, where church and family plate have been melted down and thrown into the market as bullion. It, at that time, appeared probable to me, that a contrary effect would be produced, whenever confidence should be again restored on the Continent, and a demand for the precious metals should return. This seems to have been gradually taking place for some time past, and, as bullion was not to be obtained freely at the Bank for their notes, the market price has risen above the mint price; in other words the pound note will not procure the same weight of gold as it used to do.—This is a matter entirely distinct from the alteration of the prices of every necessary of life in consequence of the altered value of the metals themselves; for we have seen for some years past, that whilst there was little demand for gold in exchange for notes, the market and mint prices continued nearly the same. It was, in all respects, as if

specie could have been demanded. But the moment that specie was demanded, and could not be obtained, a difference in these prices became conspicuous. I suspect this is the natural effect, and so long as the note shall not be readily exchanged for gold, the difference will encrease. If the pound sterling be not made to represent a certain weight of gold and silver, for which it used to be readily exchanged, it will become worth only so much as it can be exchanged for. Suppose the Bank were now to issue guineas of a reduced weight to be equal to the present market price of bullion, but that the supply of these reduced coins should not be as abundant as the demand, a depreciation would become again apparent, and a further diminution of weight would be necessary. The value of every thing is that for which it may be exchanged readily; and unless the Bank adopt some plan to give the pound sterling, (itself a fictitious coin) some certain value in gold, a money price and a paper price for every commodity seems the natural result.—The country bankers' notes are measured by Bank of England notes, which may be demanded for them at the option of the holders, therefore their circulation is assisted by the system of withholding specie; but if the latter could be demanded, both the Bank of England and the country banks must issue their notes with more caution.—In the present moment when alarm is excited by some recent failures, it becomes of the first importance to prevent the circulating medium being further depressed.—If you think these remarks deserving a place in your impartial Register, I shall be gratified by your inserting them as early as may be convenient to you. I am, Sir, &c.

LASEY.

Bristol, 29 July, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ABDICATION OF THE KING OF HOLLAND.—
The King to the Legislative Body.

Gentlemen;—I charge the Ministers, met in Council, to present to your Assembly the Resolution to which I have seen myself driven by the military occupation of my capital. The brave soldiers of France have no other enemies than those of the common cause of Holland and myself. They should have been, and ought to be, received with all possible regard and attention; but it is, nevertheless, true,

that in the actual situation of Holland, when an entire army, a crowd of Custom-house officers, and the National Army itself were placed out of the power of the government—when every thing, with the exception of the capital, may be said to be under the order of a foreign officer, I was bound to declare to Marshal the Duke of Reggio, and the *Chargé d’Affaires* of the Emperor, that if the capital and its district were occupied, I should consider that proceeding as a manifest violation of the laws of nations, and those rights that are deemed most sacred among men. It was this that induced me to refuse the Custom-house officers admission into Muiden, Naarden, and Diemer. I had a right so to do; inasmuch as the treaty only authorizes the presence of the Custom-house officers on the sea-coasts, and at the mouths of the rivers.—On the 16th of last month, I received, through the *Chargé d’Affaires* of his Majesty the Emperor, an assurance, that it was by no means his intention to occupy Amsterdam; and this led me to hope that a treaty, the conditions of which had been imposed by his Majesty the Emperor himself, would be strictly observed, and be in no respect infringed upon. Unfortunately my error was not of long duration. When I received a communication, that 20,000 French troops were assembling in Utrecht and its environs, notwithstanding the extreme penury and embarrassment of our finances, I consented to furnish them with provisions, and other necessaries; though the treaty stipulates that only 6,000 men shall be maintained at the expence of Holland. But I was apprehensive that the assembling of this force would disclose other intentions unfavourable to our government; and accordingly, I did not fail to receive, the day before yesterday, June 29th, official information that his Majesty the Emperor insisted upon occupying Amsterdam, and establishing the head-quarters of the French army in this capital.—In this situation, gentlemen, you cannot doubt, that I should have resigned myself to suffer for my people new humiliations, could I have entertained the hope of preventing new calamities; but I could no longer deceive myself. I assented to the treaty dictated by France, under the conviction that those parts of it that were disagreeable to the nation and myself, would not be enforced; and that, satisfied with that self-denial, if I may so speak, which is the result of this treaty, every

thing would thenceforward go on smoothly between France and Holland.—The treaty, it is true, offers a great number of pretexts for fresh complaints, and fresh accusations. But can pretexts be at any time wanting? I was, therefore, entitled to rely upon the explanations and communications made to me on the subject of this treaty, and the formal and express declarations which I did not fail to make—that the Custom-house officers should interfere only in matters relative to the blockade—that the French troops should be stationed only on the coasts—that the domains of the creditors of the State, and the Crown, should be respected—that the debts of the ceded territories should be charged upon France—and, finally—that from the number of troops to be furnished, a deduction should be made for those actually at the disposal of France in Spain; and also, that the necessary time should be given for the maritime armament. I even continued to flatter myself, that the treaty would be mitigated. I have deceived myself; and, if the absolute devotion which I manifested for the discharge of my duties on the 1st of April last, has served only to drag on, or to prolong, the existence of the country for three months, I have the cruelly painful satisfaction, but the only one I can now have, that I have performed my duty to the last; and that, if I may be permitted so to express myself, I have carried my sacrifices for the existence, and what I conceived to be the welfare of the country, to an unjustifiable extent.—But after the submission and resignation of the 1st of April, I should be extremely culpable if I could rest satisfied with the title of King, being no longer but an instrument; and no longer commanding, not only in the country, but even in my capital; and soon, perhaps, not even in my own palace. I should, nevertheless, be witness to every thing that should be done, without the power of doing any thing for my people; responsible for all events, without being able to prevent, or to influence them. I should have exposed myself to the complaints of both sides, and perhaps have occasioned great misfortunes; by doing which, I should have betrayed my conscience, my people, and my duty! I have for a long time foreseen the extremity to which I am now reduced, but I could not have prevented it without sacrificing my most sacred duties—without ceasing to have at heart the interest of my people—and without ceasing to con-

nect my fate with that of the country. This I could not do! Now that Holland is reduced to this condition, I have, as King of Holland, but one course to take, and that is, to abdicate the throne in favour of my children. Any other course would have only augmented the misfortunes of my reign. I should have, with deep regret, discharged that tender duty; and I should perhaps have seen the peaceful inhabitants, too often the victims of the quarrels of government, ruined at one blow. How could the idea of any sort of resistance have entered my mind? My children, born Frenchmen like myself, would have seen the blood of their fellow countrymen shed in a just cause, but one which might nevertheless be supposed to be exclusively mine. I had therefore but one course to adopt.—My brother, so violently irritated against me, is not so against my children; and doubtless he will not destroy what he has done, and deprive them of their inheritance; since he has not, nor can have, any subject of complaint against this child, who will not, for a long time to come, reign himself. His Mother, to whom the regency appertains by the constitution, will do every thing that shall be agreeable to the Emperor, my Brother, and will succeed better than myself, who have had the misfortune never to be successful in my endeavours of that kind; and at the conclusion of a maritime peace, perhaps before, my brother, knowing the state of things in this country, the esteem its inhabitants merit, how much their welfare accords with the interests well understood of his empire, will do for this country all it has a right to expect, as the reward of its numerous sacrifices to France, of its fidelity, and the interest with which it cannot fail to inspire those who judge of it without prejudice. Perhaps I am the only obstacle to the reconciliation of this country with France; and should that be so, I might find some kind of consolation in dragging out the remainder of a wandering and a languishing life at a distance from the first objects of my whole affection—this good people, and my son. These are my principal motives; there are others equally powerful with respect to which I must be silent, but they will easily be divined.—The Emperor, my brother, must feel that I could not act otherwise. Though strongly prejudiced against me, he is great, and when his irritation subsides, cannot but be just.—As to you, Gentlemen, I should be much more

unhappy even than I am, if possible, could I imagine that you would not do justice to my intentions. May the end of my career prove to the nation and to you, that I have never deceived you; that I have had but one aim—the true interest of the country; that the faults I may have committed are solely to be ascribed to my zeal, which led me to aim at not what was absolutely the greatest good, but the best that could be attained under all the difficulties of existing circumstances. I had never calculated upon governing a nation so interesting, but so difficult to govern, as yours. Be pleased, gentlemen, to be my advocates with the nation, and cherish a confident attachment to the Prince Royal, who will deserve it, if I may judge from his good disposition. The Queen has the same interests as myself. I cannot, Gentlemen, conclude, without recommending to you, in the most earnest manner, and in the name of the interest and of the existence of so many families, whose lives and property would be infallibly compromised, to receive the French with the attention, with the kindness and the cordiality which is due to the brave troops of the first nation in the world; to your friends, to your allies, who consider obedience as the first of duties, but who cannot fail to esteem the more, the more they become acquainted with it, a nation brave, industrious, and worthy of esteem under every consideration.—In whatever place I may terminate my existence, the name of Holland, and the most lively prayers for its happiness, will be my last words, and occupy my last thoughts.

LOUIS NAPOLEON.

Haarlem, July 1, 1810.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.—*From the Moniteur, July 22, 1810.*

The English newspapers never were so full of false news as they have been for these fifteen days past; the reason is, that the English people were never more uneasy; that the English government never stood more in need of deceiving them respecting the mad system which they follow, of wishing to struggle alone on the continent with France! The good sense of the English nation enables them to foresee the dishonour and destruction of their army in Portugal; they are convinced that the most fortunate event which could befall that army would be a catastrophe like that of Moore. The English

are too much accustomed to calculate chances and events not to know that alone against France, they can, in such a contest, meet with only disasters, and obtain only disgrace. Men of sound judgment, like Grenville or Grey, are numerous in England; but they are at present without any influence.

Ministers, therefore, not being able to change the public opinion, endeavour to deceive the people. For instance it is said that General Sebastiani has capitulated: this report is soon contradicted; but it is not the less repeated in a thousand different ways; at one time it was a mule-driver, at another it was the master of a ship which had arrived at Cadiz, who brought these great news!!! They also wish to occupy the minds of the people about the army of Lord Wellington; this army, it is said, amounting to the dreadful number of 21,000 English! It is arrived at such a state of discipline, and the soldiers have so much confidence in their Commander in Chief, that they will be able to beat 70,000 Frenchmen, for it is proved that a British soldier is, for courage, worth at least four French grenadiers!—

The French army says nothing; but it has invested Ciudad Rodrigo, opened the trenches, and is battering in breach. The cries of the inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo are heard in Lord Wellington's camp, which is only six leagues distant; but all ears are shut against them. It was thus that the inhabitants of Madrid endeavoured to move Gen. Moore by their cries; but he also shut his ears against them, and Madrid was taken in his sight. And it was thus that very lately the inhabitants of Seville and Andalusia called their most faithful allies to their assistance, and that Wellesley answered them, according to the constant custom of his country, Get out of the scrape the best way you can!—

The following particulars respecting the affairs of Spain are positive:—That the French and English armies are in sight of each other on the frontiers of Portugal.—That in this situation the French are besieging Ciudad Rodrigo;—That the English do not attempt any thing towards giving succour to that city; and that after all their boasting, they will be the laughing stock of Europe, if it is captured within the reach of their cannon.—The editors of the English newspapers turn and twist themselves in a thousand different ways; they intercept letters,

copy libels on the insurrection, and wind themselves into every possible shape in order to induce the nation to believe, that the French armies in Spain are but a confused crowd without discipline; discouraged or incapable to act as soldiers, and commanded by chiefs who are ignorant and without any experience: that the only good troops are those of which the English, Portuguese and Spanish armies consist: but while all this is proclaiming by them, the French armies are in sight of the English army, capturing Astorga, besieging Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and Cadiz; capturing in Catalonia and Arragon, Lerida, Mequinenza and Hostalrich; the French army in Arragon is besieging Tortosa, and that in Catalonia, Tarragona. The French armies are carrying on five great sieges, and have just terminated five others; they occupy the provinces of Spain from the North to the South, and from the East to the West, and they everywhere repress the robberies which are excited by the intrigues of England.

This necessity felt by the English of deceiving the public respecting the real situation of things, leads them a great way; they published pretended letters from the Emperor Napoleon to the former Queen of the Two Sicilies; ridiculous letters, in which the Emperor Napoleon is represented as making numberless apologies to that furious woman; and while they are printing such absurdities, their cannon of alarm is resounding throughout Sicily! and the Neapolitan navy are covering themselves with glory in the presence of their king, by beating the Anglo-Sicilian fleet.

Respecting the affairs of the continent, they publish at one time, that they are going to have peace with Russia; that a war between France and Russia is going to break out, and that a new coalition is about to be formed; at another that the Emperor Napoleon is forming such or such a project against the tranquillity of Russia, &c.

The great Powers of the Continent are daily drawing tighter the knot by which they are united; they are daily becoming more convinced of the folly of fighting for the English. When Ciudad Rodrigo is captured, the catastrophe will be more imminent for England, and it will then be necessary to call to the helm of the state men who are more prudent, and who are better acquainted with the nature of the resources and of the strength of

their country, and therefore more moderate. Such men will be sensible of the urgent necessity of liquidating the national debt, of calming their passions, and of giving peace to the world. But never will such results be obtained from presumptuous and ignorant men, who mistake what is well known by every coffee-house waiter in Europe, viz. the influence of the English at sea, and their weakness on land!

AMERICA.—*Correspondence between the Marquis Wellesley and Mr. Pinckney, and between General Armstrong and Mr. Secretary Smith.*

Gen. Armstrong to the Duke of Cadore.

(Continued from p. 96.)

On receiving this information two questions suggested themselves.—1. Whether this decision was or was not extended to ships as well as to cargoes? and 2. Whether the money arising from the sales which might be made under it, would, or would not, be subject to the issue of the pending negotiation? The Gentleman charged with the delivery of your message not having been instructed to answer these questions, it becomes my duty to present them to your Excellency, and to request a solution of them. Nor is it a less duty on my part, to examine the grounds on which his Majesty has been pleased to take this decision, which I understand to be that of reprisal, suggested for the first time in the note you did me the honour to write to me on the 14th ultimo. In the 4th paragraph of this note, it is said, that "his Majesty could not have calculated on the measures taken by the United States, who, having no grounds of complaint against France, have comprised her in their acts of exclusion, and since the month of May last, have prohibited the entry into their ports of French vessels, by subjecting them to confiscation."—It is true that the United States have since the 20th of May last forbidden the entry of French vessels into their harbours; and it is also true that the penalty of confiscation attaches to the violation of this law. But in what respect does this offend France? Will she refuse to us the right of regulating commerce within our own ports? Or will she deny that the law in question is a regulation merely municipal? Examine it both as to object and means—what does it more than forbid American ships from going into the ports

of France, and French ships from coming into those of the United States? And why this prohibition? To avoid injury and insult: to escape that lawlessness, which is declared to be "a forced consequence of the Decrees of the British Council." If then its object be purely defensive, what are its means? Simply a law, previously and generally promulgated, operating solely within the territory of the United States, and punishing alike the infractors of it, whether citizens of the said States, or others. And what is this but the exercise of a right, common to all nations, of excluding, at their will, foreign commerce, and of enforcing that exclusion? Can this be deemed a wrong to France? Can this be regarded as a legitimate cause of reprisal on the part of a power, who makes it the first duty of nations to defend their sovereignty, and who even denationalizes the ships of those who will not subscribe to the opinion?—But it has been said that the "United States had nothing to complain of against France." Was the capture and condemnation of a ship, driven on the shores of France by stress of weather, and the perils of the sea—nothing? Was the seizure and sequestration of many cargoes brought to France in ships violating no law, and admitted to regular entry at the Imperial custom-houses—nothing? Was the violation of our maritime rights, consecrated as they have been by the solemn forms of a public treaty—nothing? In a word, was it nothing that our ships were burnt on the high seas, without any other offence than that of belonging to the United States; or other apology than was to be found in the enhanced safety of the perpetrator? Surely if it be the duty of the United States to resent the theoretical usurpations of the British Orders of November 1807, it cannot be less their duty to complain of the daily and practical outrages on the part of France! It is indeed true, that were the people of the United States destitute of policy, of honour, and of energy (as has been insinuated), they might have adopted a system of discrimination between the two great belligerents; they might have drawn imaginary lines between the first and second aggressor; they might have resented in the one a conduct to which they tamely submitted in the other, and in this way have patched up a compromise between honour and interest equally weak and disgraceful. But such was not the course they pursued, and it is perhaps a

necessary consequence of the justice of their measures that they are at this day an independent nation. But I will not press this part of my subject; it would be affrontful to your Excellency (knowing as you do, that there are not less than one hundred American ships within his Majesty's possession or that of his allies) to multiply proofs that the United States have grounds of complaint against France.

—My attention is necessarily called to another part of the same paragraph, which immediately follows the quotation already made:—"As soon," says your Excellency, "as his Majesty was informed of this measure (the non-intercourse law), it became his duty to retaliate upon the American vessels not only within his own territories, but also in the countries under his influence. In the ports of Holland, Spain, Italy, and Naples, the American vessels have been seized, because the Americans seized French vessels."

These remarks divide themselves into the following heads:

1st. The right of his Majesty to seize and condemn American vessels within his own territories. 2d. The right to do so within the territories of his allies; and, 3d. The reason of that right, viz. "because Americans had seized French vessels."

The first of these subjects has been already examined; and the second must be decided like the first, since his Majesty's rights within the limits of his ally cannot be greater than within his own. If then it has been shewn, that the Non-intercourse Law was merely defensive in its object; that it was but intended to guard against that state of violence which unhappily prevailed; that it was restricted in operation to the territory of the United States, and that it was duly promulgated there and in Europe before execution, it will be almost unnecessary to repeat, that a law of such description cannot authorise a measure of reprisal, equally sudden and silent in its enactment and application, founded on no previous wrong, productive of no previous complaint, and operating beyond the limits of his Majesty's territories, and within those of Sovereigns, who had even invited the commerce of the United States to their ports.

It is therefore the third subject only, the reason of the right, which remains to

be examined; and with regard to it I may observe, that if the alleged fact which forms this reason be unfounded, the reason itself fails, and the right with it. In this view of the business I may be permitted to enquire, when and where any seizure of a French vessel has taken place under the non-intercourse law? and at the same time to express my firm persuasion, that no such seizure has been made: a persuasion founded alike on the silence of the Government and of the journals of the country, and still more on the positive declaration of several well-informed and respectable persons, who have left America as late as the 26th of December last. My conclusion therefore is—that no French vessel having violated the law, no seizure of such vessel has occurred, and that the report, which has reached Paris, is probably founded on a circumstance altogether unconnected with the non-intercourse law or its operation.

Though far from wishing to prolong this letter, I cannot close it without remarking the great and sudden change wrought in his Majesty's sentiments with regard to the defensive system adopted by the United States. The law, which is now believed, to furnish ground for reprisal, was communicated to his Majesty in June or July last, and certainly did not then excite any suspicion of feelings unfriendly to the American Government. Far from this, its communication was immediately followed by overtures of accommodation, which, though productive of no possible arrangement, did not make matters worse than they found them.

On the 22d of August last I was honoured with a full exposition of the views and principles which had governed, and which continue to govern his Majesty's policy in relation to the United States, and in this we do not find the slightest trace of complaint against the provisions of the law in question.

At a period later than the 22d of August, an American ship, destined to a port in Spain, was captured by a French privateer. An appeal was made to his Majesty's Minister of War, who, having submitted the case, received orders to liberate all American vessels destined to Spanish ports which had not violated the Imperial Decrees.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"Our Paper is of value in commerce, because in law it is of none. It is powerful on 'Change, because in Westminster Hall it is impotent."—BURKE. Reflections, 1790.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.—There seems to be a sort of fatality belonging to what I write. At the moment when I am writing about a thing, no matter what, some occurrence is taking place with regard to it. In my last Number, towards the bottom of page 132, I spoke of *the Jew*, who had been, some months before, *prosecuted for selling guineas* for a price higher than their nominal worth in bank notes. I observed, that, though a bill of indictment had been found against him, I had not heard that he had been brought to trial; but, that the prosecution itself, though left in that state, would be quite sufficient to prevent an *open* traffic in guineas, and that, such being the case, the possessors of guineas would inevitably *hoard* or *smuggle*.—While I was writing this, the trial of the Jew, whose name is DE YONGE, was, it now appears, actually going on, at Guildhall, before the Lord Chief Justice, where the man was, by a Special Jury, found *guilty*.—This trial, considering the nature and bearings of the questions connected with it, I hesitate not to pronounce the most important that has taken place for many years; for, as to the trials in which Mr. WARDLE, and I, have been concerned, they were things which all the world understood; and, with regard to no part of which was any man in the nation, however blind and stupid, at all *deceived*. But, this trial of DE YONGE has circumstances belonging to it, which are not generally known; and, besides, there will, in all human probability, consequences arise from it, that will be most sensibly felt. This being my opinion, I cannot refrain from beseeching the reader to bestow on the subject his serious attention. —Before I submit, upon it, any observations of my own, I shall, agreeably to my usual custom, insert the fullest report that I have been able to find of the trial itself; begging the reader to observe, however, that I do not give this report as a thing for the correctness of which I am answerable. It is a *publication*, which I find in

the news-papers; as such I give it, and as such I shall comment upon it. For aught I know, it may be partly incorrect; or, it may be false altogether. I take it as I find it published in print, and in the news-papers of the day; and, as such I shall make it, perhaps, a subject of criticism.

—“SALE OF GUINEAS. The King against JAMES DE YONGE.—The Defendant was indicted for unlawfully exposing to sale a certain quantity of the current coin of the realm, called guineas, and disposing of them at £1. 2s. 6d.; the standard, by his Majesty’s proclamation, having been settled at £1. 1s.

—MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL stated, that this indictment was founded on the Act of the 5th and 6th of the reign of Edward the Sixth: which enacted, that if any person gave more, or disposed of any current coin of the realm for a profit, or gave or received more in exchange than was authorized by the standard which was fixed by royal proclamation, he or they should be guilty of a misdemeanour, and be liable to the confiscation of such coin so exchanged, and be subject to a fine and imprisonment for such offence. *The chief object of the Act was to prevent persons collecting and disposing of the coin of the realm to persons leaving the kingdom; he was sorry to say, that latterly it had become a prevalent trade. It was unnecessary for him to state how injurious it was to the nation at large, and particularly to the commercial part of the community. He would prove that the Defendant had carried on this illicit trade to a great extent. The Commissioners of the Mint had got information of it, and wisely provided for his detection. It was unnecessary for him to state the circumstances, as they would be detailed in evidence. He was afraid that this traffic had been too long carried on without being detected; it was counted for the circulation of British gold on the Continent, and its disappearance at home. He had not a doubt, that when the Jury were in possession of the circumstances of the case, they would find*

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"the Defendant guilty."—*Mr. Leonard*, from the Council Office, produced the "Gazette containing the proclamation of George the First, dated from Saturday the 21st of December, to Tuesday the 24th, in the year 1717, settling the standard of a guinea at 1*l.* 1*s.*—The proclamation was read by *Mr. Lowten*.—*Mr. MARRYATT*, Counsel for the Defendant, objected to it as proof, as the indictment set out that it was proclaimed under the Great Seal, and there was no proof that the Proclamation in The Gazette had the Great Seal affixed to it. —*MR. ATTORNEY-GENERAL* was happy this objection had been taken, for it was impossible that the Sovereign could issue a Proclamation without its passing under the Great Seal. —*LORD ELLENBOROUGH*—"I am convinced that the Proclamation published in a Gazette, authorised by His Majesty, is sufficient proof, and we are not at this day to doubt that Proclamations do not go under proper scrutiny. It is the only mode the Sovereign has of communicating his wishes to his people. I am convinced that The Gazette is good evidence of the existence of the Proclamation."—*MR. ATTORNEY-GENERAL*—"My Lord, I have got the original Proclamation, with the Seal affixed to it, in Court; but I wished it to be laid down by your Lordship, that The Gazette was good evidence, that it might act as a precedent in other places where they have not the advantage of your lordship's presiding."—*Mr. Edward C. Powell* deposed, that he was Assistant-Solicitor to the Mint; that from some information which came to the Office, he gave instructions to two men, of the names of Caul and Nash, to proceed to the Defendant's house, on the 26th of December last, and purchase some guineas. In order the better to disguise themselves, they both spoke the Dutch language. Caul was to perform the part of a Dutch Supercargo, who could not speak English; and Nash to act as his interpreter. He gave Nash 50*l.* in Bank of England Notes, which he took an account of, and made Nash examine them with him; he also gave him two Bank of England Dollars, which he marked. They went to the Defendant's house; he attended in a coach at no great distance off, accompanied by a person of the name of Browne, an officer of Shadwell Police-office. Upon a pre-

concerted signal being given, he went to the Defendant's house, and found that Leadbeater, a City Marshal, who accompanied Caul and Nash, had the Defendant in custody. Leadbeater produced 50 guineas, which he said he took from the person of Caul. The witness asked Nash who Caul had received them from? he answered, from the Defendant, and that Caul had paid him 56*l.* 5*s.* for them in notes, and a Bank dollar. He asked the Defendant if it was true? he said it was; but added, that the difference between 52*l.* 10*s.* and 56*l.* 5*s.* was given him by Caul, as a present for the exchange; that he had not charged more than 1*l.* 1*s.* for each guinea. Leadbeater then produced a parcel of Bank of England notes, which, he said, he took from a drawer in a bureau in the room. They were the notes the witness had given to Nash; there were three short. He asked the Prisoner if he had any silver? He put his hand in his pocket, and brought it out full of dollars and other silver. The witness took from amongst them the dollar he had marked. He asked the Defendant if he had much more gold? He shewed him a bag containing 90 guineas; a second, containing a great quantity of half-guineas; and a third with seven-shillings pieces. There were several empty money-bags in the room. The three other Bank of England notes were produced by Leadbeater; he took them from Caul, with the other Bank dollar. —*J. Caul* fully corroborated the evidence of the last witness, as to his and Nash's instructions. When they went first to the house of the Defendant, they saw his wife. Nash said the witness was an acquaintance of his, just come from Holland. She inquired from the witness what he wanted; he replied, in Dutch, a little gold; she asked who recommended him, in the same language; he answered Capt. Kaysoll, who was gone to Gottenburgh; she shewed them into the parlour, and sent a boy for the Defendant, who shortly made his appearance, and asked nearly the same questions his wife had done. He said, he knew Captain Kaysoll. The witness told him he hoped he would let him have the gold on the same terms as Captain Kaysoll. The Defendant answered, he could not; he let him have 900 guineas, at an advance of 1*s.* 3*d.*; but the price had rose, and he could not take

"less than 1s. 6d. advance. The witness told him he must even agree to that; for paper would be of no use to him in Holland; and he only wanted 50 guineas. The Defendant gave him the guineas and he paid him 56*l.* in notes and 5*s.* by a Bank dollar. The Defendant told him he must take care how he took them out of the country, for by the law of the land he was not entitled to take more than five. He told him he need not be afraid, for he would wind them round his waist. Nash said he knew a better way than that, for he could sew them in a garter and fasten his stockings with them. The Defendant's wife said she knew a better way than either, and asked the witness if he did not wear a cushion in his neck-handkerchief; he answered in the affirmative. She brought a piece of flannel, and rolled some shillings in it, and said, "Thus you may put your guineas, and when folded in your handkerchief, it will be beyond suspicion." The witness proposed they should have something to drink, which was sent for. They took a glass of rum a-piece. The Defendant requested that the witness would recommend some of his countrymen to him, and, by mentioning his name, it would be a passport. Nash and the witness were going out of the street door, attended by the Defendant and his wife, when they were all shoved back by Leadbeater and Browne; the Defendant seemed much frightened, and whispered the witness in Dutch to say, that he did not give more than 1*l.* 1*s.* for each guinea. On his cross-examination he said he gave bank-notes for guineas, and not coin for coin.—*Leadbeater* and *Nash* corroborated the evidence of the other two witnesses.—*MR. MARRYATT* said, the exchange was admitted; but he had humbly to submit to his Lordship, that the indictment could not be maintained. It was founded on an Act of Parliament which was nearly obsolete; the Act stated that it was unlawful to exchange gold coin for silver, or silver coin for gold, for profit; but not a word was mentioned of bank-notes, they could not be contemplated, for they were unknown for many years after; and by the statute, the penalty was as great on the purchasee as on the purchaser.—*LORD ELLENBOROUGH*—"If you wish, Mr. Marryatt, you can save this point: not that I hold a doubt of

"its invalidity, but because we have a vast deal to do, and there will be more time to argue it in terms; I have not a doubt but the statute was intended for the exchange of the truck of the then present day; but I think it *wide enough* to admit Bank-notes, or even gross goods, if it is agreed to take a certain value over the standard currency."—*MR. MARRYATT*—"The only reason, my lord, that I should wish to argue the question now is, that the Defendant is liable to a specific punishment, if found guilty, and the Crown may arrest him."—*MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL*—"I will, my Lord, do away with Mr. Marryatt's uneasiness, for I will give my promise the Defendant shall not be disturbed until after his Counsel has an opportunity of moving for a new trial. He is already under bail."—*LORD ELLENBOROUGH*—"Gentlemen of the Jury, I am of opinion that the Defendant did receive more than he was allowed by the Proclamation; and I would recommend that you should find your verdict *as such*; at the same time I will wave the point for the Defendant; but don't let it be understood that I am of opinion that it is not a breach of the statute. I would not wish it to go abroad that there was any doubt upon the subject, for it is a most injurious traffic."—The Jury returned a verdict of—"GUILTY."—Here are two distinct questions presenting themselves for discussion; a question of law, and a question of political economy, the former of which, as being of the least importance (though by no means unimportant), we will first dispose of.—*DE YONCE* was, it would appear from this report, indicted on an Act of Parliament of the 5th and 6th of Edward VI. And, in this report, the reporter makes "Mr. Attorney General" say, that "the chief object of the act was to prevent persons collecting and disposing of the coin of the realm to persons leaving the kingdom."—As I said before, I do not give this as a correct report; but, be it what it may, I do not understand the meaning of words, or, the Act, which this Jew is said to have been indicted, has no such meaning as this. But, that the reader may be able to judge for himself, the best way is to lay the Act before him.—"Whereas in the Parliament ment holden at Westminster the 25th year of the reign of king Edward the Third, it was accorded, That it should

"be lawful for every man to exchange "*Gold for Silver, or Silver for Gold, or for Gold and Silver*, so that no man did hold the same as exchanged*; nor take no profit for making such exchange, upon pain of forfeiting the money so exchanged, except the king's exchangers, which take profit of such exchange, according to an ordinance before that time made: which statute notwithstanding, divers covetous persons of their own authorities have, of late, taken upon them to make exchanges, as well of *coined gold as of coined silver*, receiving and paying therefore more in value than hath been declared by the King's Proclamation to be current for within this his realm and other his dominions, to the great hindrance of the Commonwealth of this realm.—Be it, THEREFORE, enacted, that, if any person, or persons, after the first day of April next coming, exchange any *coined Gold, coined Silver, or money, giving, receiving, or paying*, any more in value, benefit, profit, or advantage, for it, than the same is, or shall be, declared by the king's proclamation to be current for within this his Highness's realm, and other his dominions, that then all the said *coined Gold, Silver, and money*, so exchanged, and every part and parcel thereof, shall be forfeit, and the parties, so offending, shall suffer imprisonment by the space of one whole year, and shall make fine at the king's pleasure."—Such is the Act, on which, it seems, De YONGE has been indicted and found guilty, the fact of his having exchanged, or sold, guineas for a price higher than the one fixed in the king's proclamation not being denied.—But, the question is, and that is a question yet to be argued, it appears; the question is, whether this Act, of Edward VI. can be construed in such a way as to extend to an exchange of *gold or silver coin* against *paper currency*. Not only is there, in this Act, no mention of *paper-money*, or of any thing but *coined gold and silver*; but, it is a truth perfectly notorious, that no such thing as *paper-money* existed at the time when the Act was passed, and, what is more, such a thing never had existed at that time, either in England, or, as far as we can gather from history, in any other country upon earth.—The Attorney General is, as was before observed, represented, by the re-

* That is; hold a common exchange.

porter, as having said, that "the chief object of the Act was to prevent persons *collecting and disposing of the coin of the realm to persons leaving the kingdom.*" Whence is this conclusion drawn? On what premises is it founded? There is not, in the Act, a word respecting the *exportation* of coin: not a word about coin being *taken out of the kingdom*: such a consequence of the prohibited exchange is not even glanced at in any part of the Act. Nay, I cannot see how the Act could possibly have such an object in view. Instead of such being the chief object of the Act, it does not appear to me possible, that it was any object at all of the Act. For, why should such work be carried on for the purpose of getting *coin* out of the kingdom? If a man had wanted to carry or send *coin* out of the kingdom, why, in the name of common sense, should he go to exchange it into *other coin*? Had there been, indeed, a *paper-money* in the kingdom, and a *paper-money* not exchangeable into *coin* at the will of the holder; had this been the case in the reign of Edward VI, there would, then, as now, have been some sense in exchanging one sort of money for the other when a man wanted to send money out of the kingdom, because one sort would pass in foreign countries and the other would not; but, when *all was coin*, what sense could there be in making an exchange, for such a purpose? This, however, has nothing to do with the law of the matter, De YONGE being indicted for unlawfully *exchanging* coin; and not for *exporting*, or attempting to export, coin, which is a quite distinct offence, and made so by other acts of parliament.—If further illustration of the meaning of this Act of Edward VI. be wanted, we have, I think, only to look back to the Act of Edward III, out of which it grew, and solely to add to the penalties of which it was clearly intended. This is it, Statute V, Chapter 12. "That it shall be lawful for every man to exchange *Gold for Silver, or Silver for Gold, or for Gold and Silver*, so that no man hold a common Exchange, nor take no profit for making such Exchange, upon pain of forfeiture of the money so exchanged; except the king's Exchangers, which take profit of such exchange, according to the ordinance afore-made."—Now, is it not evident, that this applies to a state of things, wholly different from the present state of things? There were, when this and the other Act were passed, *Exchangers* ap-

pointed by the king. Are there any now? And, the objects of the acts were, to prevent people from being cheated in the exchange of money, but, more particularly to prevent individuals from *sharing in the profit of exchanges*, which profit was a branch of the king's *revenue*. Is there any such thing now? And could the makers of these Acts have a state of things like the present in their contemplation? The offence contemplated by this Act, is, the doing of that by an *unauthorized individual*, which the king's officers only were *authorized to do*. But, are there now any king's officers regularly appointed to do that which De Yonge has done? Are there any officers now appointed to *exchange bank-notes for gold*? Yet, would not this be necessary, in order to make these Acts bear upon the case?—So much for the question of LAW, which I may now, I think, safely leave to the decision of any man, who has plain common sense for his guide. The question of *political economy* is of a nature to require greater powers of mind, or, at least, greater attention, in the discussion of it.—The report, which I have inserted above, represents the ATTORNEY GENERAL as saying, that "it was quite *unnecessary* for him to state how injurious "the practice" (of selling guineas) "was to the nation at large, and particularly to the commercial part of the community."—Yes, this was indeed, quite *unnecessary*, seeing that the man was not tried for *injuring the merchants*, but for *violating a written law*, and whether his conduct had, or had not, a tendency to injure the merchants, that had nothing at all to do with the question of *guilt*, which was the only thing, upon which the jury had to decide. "MR. ATTORNEY," as he is called, said well, therefore, when he said, that it was *unnecessary* for him to state the injurious effects of DE YONGE's traffic. Nor would he have done ill, if he had wholly held his tongue upon the subject of those effects; for, though I have been uncommonly diligent in my endeavours to discover how such a practice as that of De Yonge could possibly be injurious to the nation at large, and especially how it could injure commercial people *more than others*, I have not been able to make any such discovery. The judge is also represented as having said, that the traffic is "a *most injurious traffic*;" but, as in the case of MR. ATTORNEY, no reason is given in the report, to *show how* such a traffic operates injuriously.—MR. ATTORNEY

is represented as having said, that "he "was afraid that this traffic had been too "long carried on without being detected; "it accounted for the circulation of British "gold upon the continent, and its disappearance at home." Indeed! So! the selling of guineas to people who take them on board of ship and sail down the Thames with them accounts for the said guineas going out of the country! Bless us, what a discovery! Well, but, let us hope now, that since the "learned gentleman" has pronounced this to be an injury to the nation; yes, let us hope, that we shall hear no more about *guineas* being an *encumbrance*. We were wont to hear such bragging assertions about the super-excellence of bank-paper, and to be so abused for pretending that it was depreciating, that, at last, some people seemed to wish never more to hear of coin; but, now, behold! we are told by the Attorney General, that the sending away of guineas, the getting rid of the "*encumbrance*," is a great national injury, and is particularly injurious to the *commercial* part of the community! Let us hope, then, that the author of "GUINEAS AN ENCUMBRANCE," will, in future, be more cautious as to what he writes; for, I think, he may be fairly looked upon as an abettor or instigator of De Yonge. —That no law can prevent the exportation of the coin, while the paper-money continues to circulate in such quantities, no man can, I think, seriously doubt. It is notorious, that the Jews go on board of the ships at Spithead, when the latter are about to sail for foreign parts, and openly sell the gold and silver at an enormous premium. This fact, I remember, was stated to me very much in detail, so long as about *six years ago*. Indeed, how should it be otherwise? If a ship or a regiment be paid off in paper-money, of what use is that money to the sailors and soldiers, when they arrive in Nova Scotia, in Canada, in Sicily, at the Cape of Good Hope, or, any where else abroad? What are they to do then? Why, change their paper into coin to be sure? And, who will do that for them without a premium? It is nonsense to suppose that any body will; and, of course, they must keep the useless paper, or must give such premium. —But, is it not, after all that I have written, upon this subject, and after all that we have witnessed; is it not, after all this, a waste of time to insist upon the great and immutable principle, upon which these operations of sale and export-

tation of coin take place? In 1804 a "learned friend" and a member of the Honourable House, famous for the making of poetical puns, took it into his noddle to cry out against the "disloyal people," who were then hoarding the coin, in which cry he was joined by Mr. ADDINGTON, who, however, had too much sense not to discountenance the idea, hinted at by Mr. Jekyll, of passing a law to put a stop to the practice. A law to prevent hoarding! Why not a law to prevent a man from doing what he pleases with his house or his land or his any thing else? Next after this would have come the code of Robespierre. "Disloyal!" Why, the hoarders were, and still are, chiefly the old women, whose loyalty is proverbial.—No, Mr. Jekyll, it is not disloyalty that makes people hoard: it is human nature: it is the first law of that nature; *self-preservation*: The next law, the *desire of gain*, makes people in more active life sell and export the coin. And, unless you can change human nature, Mr. Jekyll; until you can, by punning poetry or plain prose, efface these laws from the human breast, it will be full as well for you to hold your tongue with respect to the "disloyalty" of putting one's guineas into a chest and locking them up, when one pleases.—That the paper-money has depreciated is proved by the common practice, of selling the coin for more than its nominal value in the paper-money. The cause of this depreciation, and also the cause of the migration of the coin, were, I trust, so fully and clearly stated in my Register of the 28th of July (this present Volume, pages 108, 109, and 110,) that there is no longer any good ground for dispute upon those points. If those causes were, then, rightly stated, can it be believed, that the depreciation of the paper, or the migration of the coin, can be stopped, or even checked, by any powers of the law? The words taken for my motto (and which, owing to an error of the Printer, were incorrectly inserted last week) express, very forcibly, the opinion of Burke as to the effect of the law, when used for the purpose of giving validity to a paper-currency. Burke, you know, was no Jacobin. He was the mortal enemy of Jacobins. Hear him, then, if you will not hear me.—The moment the assignats in France began to depreciate, that moment the coin began to quit the country. It went off in every direction, and in all manner of ways. To England it came in barrels, many hundreds of

which were received full. All the coin, down to the very lowest size and sort, disappeared at last. We see, too, that our's is going in the same way. De Yonge, it appears, had even seven shilling pieces for sale. This is the natural, and inevitable progress. It must be so, while men are prone to pursue their own private interests; and, we have now the proof, the legal proof, of the truth of what I have all along been asserting. The trial of De Yonge has brought us acquainted with the detail of the operation of selling coin. We here behold the parties at work. We see the Jacobin Guineas come forth from their retreat in the Jews' bag; and, under the auspices of Mrs. De Yonge, make preparations for their voyage. Mrs. De Yonge appears to be a great practical political economist. A lesson or two from her would be of great benefit to the "learned friends" of the Edinburgh Review, who are mighty talkers about capital, and with whom the paper-money system is a great favourite. Mrs. De Yonge would soon put them right as to these matters, if they were not too conceited to listen to her. She would teach them how the capital of the nation was increased by putting guineas into the stuffer of a neck-cloth. Oh! the incomprehensible nonsense that these pretenders to profundity have talked about the powers and the blessings of capital!—To what an extent even the coins of smaller value have been hoarded or exported must have long been evident to the public in general from the almost impossibility of getting change, upon any terms whatever; but, I think, that it is not generally known, because it was not, until within these few days, known to me, that, in England, the pieces of paper-money had already been carried so low as seven shillings. That such is the case, in one part of the country, at any rate, will appear from the following, which is a copy of a note now lying before me.

N^o 332 TUNBRIDGE-WELLS ACCOMMODATION N^o 332

*I Promise to pay the Bearer on demand
Seven Shillings, for Value received.
Tunbridge-Wells, 21 day of July 1810.*

For Jas^s Sprange, Sam^l Guy

Seven

& Edw^d Palmer

Jas^s Sprange

Ent^l J. Clifford.

Now, I ask the reader, whether he *can* believe it to be *possible*, that gold and silver coin will circulate in *company*, and upon *par*, with paper like this? Well, then, if it will not circulate with such paper, what is to become of it? Must it not go to the hoard, or to foreign parts?—Here, then, I think, we have the whole of this subject of JACOBIN GUINEAS completely before us; *practice* as well as *theory*. The latter we were long ago masters of, and Mr. and Mrs. De Yonge have now put us in complete possession of the former.—There remains but very little more to be said about *paper-money*, the nature of which seems now to be pretty generally understood, and the final consequences of which seem to be pretty generally anticipated.—There appears to me to remain for discussion nothing but the question, *whether it be wise to adopt any measure tending to extinguish the country banks*. I mean, wise in those who wish to see the *paper system* upheld. This question has been started in the MORNING POST news-paper, and, in a way, that would almost lead one to suppose, that it was intended to feel the public pulse upon the subject. That print began, as was noticed by me, page 72 of this Volume, by calling the country bank notes "*destructive assignats*," and to recommend their "*abolition*," as the only means of "*reinstating commercial confidence*." This was in the Morning Post of the 19th of July. This object has been laboured in in several articles since that date. These articles, in which the country bank-notes are called "*vile, dirty rags*," I shall notice in my next; and shall endeavour to make the question between the *country money* and the *Threadneedle Street money* as clear as all the other part of the subject now appears to be to almost every reader.

COMMERCE WITH FRANCE.—It is stated, in the news-papers of the 9th instant, that our government have agreed to admit *French wine* to be brought into England! This is something well worthy of attention. The following are stated to be the conditions, upon which licences may be obtained for trading with France.—"That if France would agree to admit one-third of the tonnage of vessels from England in colonial produce, British manufactures, or East India goods, Government would permit such British vessels to import one-third of their return cargoes in wine (brandies are prohibited as before); and the remainder in grain, flour, &c." So! their stomachs are come to at last!

Oh! We were to ruin France! we were to annihilate her commerce; we had done both: we were to plunge her into the very gulph of bankruptcy: we had done it: we were at one time, to starve her. Aye, were we! Aye! and, if the above statement of the Morning Post be true, our stomachs are now brought to bear even French wines, provided Buonaparté will consent to take some of our goods, and let us have some of his corn to eat. The logic, too, by which this measure is justified, is truly curious. Observe how the writer endeavours to prepare us for a rejection of even this humiliating offer; and, what a way he goes to work to console us for such rejection. "Such an arrangement would be at least as useful to France as it would be to this country. France has an abundance of wines and grain, and it is understood that the farmer and the wine grower are unable to pay the imposts laid upon them, because they cannot find a market for their produce. While she has this abundance of her own produce, she is in the greatest want of colonial produce, with which we abound. It would seem therefore natural that she would, with the greatest readiness, accede to an arrangement which offers mutual advantages; but if Buonaparté had been influenced by a desire to benefit the commerce of France, would he ever have imposed such restrictions as he has imposed? restrictions by which he has brought the trade of his own subjects to ruin, hoping that their ruin would lead to ours. The experience of every year has or ought to have taught him the folly as well as the cruelty of his system, but, with an obstinacy that frequently marks the conduct of men who have been guilty of errors, he still persists in it. It is this mutuality of advantage offered by the present arrangement, that will in all probability induce him to reject it. He will not confer a benefit upon France if England is to derive the slightest profit from it—at least such is the opinion we are justified in entertaining.—However, we are glad such an arrangement is to be proposed to him, because if he reject it, it will afford the people of France a proof (though we should suppose they hardly want any) of his utter inattention to every thing that can really contribute to their comfort and prosperity."—Well, now mind, here is this ministerial paper praising a measure, which it says would be useful to

France; which would enable her farmers and wine growers to pay taxes to Buonaparté that they are now unable to pay; which would furnish her with things of which she is in the greatest want. Ah! Indeed! And does this ministerial writer; does this furious hater of Buonaparté, really praise a measure like this? Yes; and he says he is glad, that such an arrangement is to be proposed to that same Buonaparté; he is glad that such immense advantages are offered by us to Buonaparté. Oh, yes, will he say, "but the arrangement offers mutual advantages." He afterwards says, that "England will derive the slightest profit from it." But, suppose this to be a slip of the pen; suppose it to have arisen from a little over-acting; and let us take it for granted, that the advantages would be mutual. What follows from that? Why, that the measure would be useful to England; that it would enable some of our people to pay taxes to the government that they are now unable to pay; that it would furnish us with things of which we are in the greatest want. Ah! Indeed! And do these ministerial writers; do they allow, do the "loyal" allow, that such is our situation? What would they have said of me, if I had represented England as being, to this extent, in the power of Buonaparté?—Either we are thus in his power, or we are not: if we are not, then the arrangement is not mutually advantageous, and we are making a sacrifice to Buonaparté: and, if we are, then what a fine pass have we at last been brought to by those who constantly reject the advice of Sir Francis Burdett?—Surely these writers did not foresee this dilemma, when they were talking of the ruin that Buonaparté had brought upon the commerce of France. What assurance or what ignorance! What a complete want of sense in themselves, or what a contempt for their readers, when, in this same article, they could talk of the "errors," the "folly," of Napoleon's commercial restrictions; restrictions, through the means of which our ministers have been induced to make to him an offer to admit French wines into England! Nay, at the very moment when the intention to make this proposition to Napoleon is announced to the public, an opportunity is taken to say, that "the people of France can want no proof of his utter intention to every thing that can really contribute to their comfort and prosperity;" and, upon this ground, it is predicted, that he will not consent to the arrangement. Yet

this writer says, that he is glad, that the arrangement is to be proposed to him. This is, I suppose, what is called "loyalty" in the highest strain.—What a liking we have taken for the people of France all at once! How anxious we are to make exchanges with them for the "mutual advantage" of the two nations! How desirous we are to see them comfortable and prosperous; and how enraged at Buonaparté upon the bare suspicion, that he will thwart this new endeavour of ours to "contribute to their comfort and prosperity?" This is the age of hypocrisy and meanness. After what we have said and done, we ought to suffer every thing short of absolute starvation, rather than apply to the French for bread. But, if we do apply to them, in the name of manhood, let it not be done under the hypocritical pretence of wishing to contribute towards their comfort and prosperity, when the people of France must recollect the endeavours made by our government, not many years ago, to deprive them of the means of existence; or, at any rate, to starve them into submission; not an endeavour contrary to the laws of war, perhaps, but an endeavour the remembrance of which ought to be quite sufficient to restrain us from the use of language like that now used by this writer.—Before I quit this subject, let me call the reader's attention, for one moment, to the Impostor-Pamphlet, published in America, but, unquestionably manufactured here, and sent over, "for more grace," as Master Mathew says, to be published in Philadelphia. This writer's business being to shew the people of England, and not the people of America, about whose opinions he cares nothing at all: his business being to shew the people of England, that the Revolution in France has produced great evils and nothing but evils; and, more especially, that the taking of the enormous wealth away from those who were enriched by the spoils of the nation, has been productive of great injury to the people; a pretty difficult thing, indeed, to make appear, or to make any man of common sense believe; but, this being a favourite object with him, and the object, perhaps, which, for obvious reasons, his setters-on had most at heart, he has used a good deal of his sort of theoretical reasoning for the purpose of effecting that object, of which reasoning it would be very easy to shew the absurdity, the gross, the almost matchless ignorance. We will, for the present,

content ourselves with one specimen, furnished us in a passage immediately connected with the subject now before us.—The author asserts, that all public-spirit has been extinguished in France; that all influence of public opinion is gone; that the great towns have fallen into depopulation and decay; that *agriculture has declined*. Then he goes on to account for this decline of agriculture in particular; and, I do beseech the reader to pay a little attention to his Edinburgh-Review-like theory.—“The first ‘spring,’ says he, ‘of industry is the ‘certainty of enjoying its fruits. Capital is essential to the prosperity of agriculture in France: but the few capitalists who remain in the provincial cities and in the country, are too prudent to expend their wealth in the cultivation of large estates, which may be at any moment, wrested from them, by a new revolution, or by the rapacity of their rulers. The great proprietors, as has been already mentioned, are few in number. They, together with the monied men, reside chiefly in the metropolis, and are wholly inattentive to agricultural pursuits. Their fortunes flow from them through channels which convey but little aliment to the labours of the farmer. I scarcely remarked a single landholder of any consequence, engaged in sowing on a large and prospective plan, or even applying his surplus income to the embellishment of his grounds. From these and various other causes, AGRICULTURE LANGUISHES in almost every part of the empire. In one thousand eight hundred and seven, the fields were principally cultivated by women:—the long succession of wars having swept away that male population, which, under the auspices of a pacific government, would now have been the instrument of an unequalled production of the best fruits of the earth.”—Now, what says the MORNING POST? What says our own ministerial writer, as I have quoted him above? What does he say to the agricultural state of France? Why, that “France has an abundance of wine and grain;” that “she has an abundance of her own produce.” What will the author of the IMPOSTOR-PAMPHLET say to this? What, in the face of these declarations, made by our own ministerial writers, will he, or can he say? What now becomes of his fine Edinburgh-Review theory about the necessity of capital to the prosperity of agriculture; about “capitalists”

being the upholders of the farmers? What will the *fecklesfer* say to the *fact* here proclaimed by the writers in England; aye, and those of the most “loyal” cut too? To be plain with him, where, except amongst his abettors and applauders, the Edinburgh Reviewers, will he find a stock of brass sufficient to look in the face that public, whom he has lent his hand in assisting to deceive? How disgraceful is it to this country, that, at the very moment, when it is making overtures to Buonaparté, in which it proposes to make great sacrifices for the sake of getting a little of his corn, a publication should be going forth, and industriously circulated, representing the agriculture in France as being in a state of ruin! How disgraceful this is to our public character!—One more remark. We offer, it seems, to take French wines, upon condition that the Emperor Napoleon will permit us to send some colonial produce. Now, mark. We, last winter, refused to renew the act for preventing the distilling of corn in Ireland, and for causing sugar and molasses to be distilled in the place of corn. This we refused; and, accordingly, they are distilling corn in Ireland now, to the rejection of sugar and molasses; and this, you will observe, is going on at the very time that we are supplicating Buonaparté to take sugar and molasses and give us corn for it! We will not use our colonial produce in our stills and keep our corn to eat in bread; but we make whiskey of our corn, and then throw ourselves at the feet of our enemy, and beg him to let us have some corn in exchange for colonial produce! Aye, and with this staring the world in the face, our ministerial writers have the modesty to talk of the “folly” and “cruelty” of Buonaparté’s commercial measures.—Before I take my leave of this subject, I must observe, that I do not object to the proposition in itself. If Napoleon has more corn than he wants, and we more sugar than we want, it is very natural that we should wish to make the exchange proposed, and especially at a time when it is likely we shall experience a great want of corn. I commend the ministers for making the proposal. But, at a time when they are making such a proposal, let not the prints devoted to them speak of the French as a people steeped in misery, owing to the “folly” and “cruelty” of him to whom this proposal is addressed; and let not encouragement be given to IMPOSTOR-PAMPHLETS,

describing *the agriculture of France in a declining and even a perishing state*. For, while it is totally impossible, that this can do us any good, it must, I think, expose us, in the end, to the derision of the whole world, and particularly of our enemy.

PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.—I stated in my last, at page 145, that, as far as related to the state and operations of the armies upon this great theatre, I only presumed to retail, at second-hand, and in compact parcels, what was issued out from the great manufactories. The last parcel I retailed was closed at line 2nd, page 144, the last packed up commodity being the account of the *amazing desertions* from, and the perishing state of, the French army. —This agreeable intelligence was soon followed by other, not less agreeable; and, since the closing of my last parcel, the great manufactories have promulgated: —that a dreadful action was fought, on the 19th and 20th of July between the British, the Portuguese, and Spanish armies (under Romana) and the French, in which the latter sustained a loss of *twenty thousand men*, and the whole of his baggage and artillery, which intelligence was received by a *respectable House* in the City, and was brought to Portsmouth by a Spanish Vessel; —that no such battle, nor, indeed, any battle at all, had taken place; —that, if my Lord Talavera should *retreat* from necessity or discretion, he would *certainly* conduct it in a *leisurely and orderly* manner; —that there was *no ground* for any *apprehensions* as to the *result* of the campaign on the frontiers of Portugal; —that we ought still to “*cling fondly*” to the hope, that the cause of Spain and Portugal was *not desperate*; —that independently of the natural strength of Portugal, there are various fortified places, which are adequately garrisoned, and must be regularly besieged, among which are Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, St. Julien and Cáceres: —that besides we have complete military possession of the country; —that all its resources are at our disposal; —that the people are hearty in the cause, and strenuous in their exertions; —that we have again a large fleet, and the whole sea-coast is within our controul; —that under such and all these circumstances, it would be *bastardly* to despair of the fate of Portugal; —that it is quite clear on the other hand that the French have not yet collected troops enough to conquer Spain and Portugal at the same time; —that as long as we can hold Portugal, they

cannot subdue Spain, and if they weaken themselves in Portugal, in order to conquer Spain, they will then lose Portugal; —that our great advantage consists in the extent of the Peninsula, and in the *unabated spirit of the people* and their dauntless resolution to resist; —that the French cannot be every where, and the moment they quit one quarter, the people will rise again, knowing they will have our assistance, and then the French must return to put them down anew, while they leave room in other quarters for the explosion of the same sentiment, and the operation of similar events; —that a letter from a Spanish general of the highest integrity and courage, and whose opinion deserves the highest respect, says, that, at *no time* have the affairs of Spain been viewed by him in *so favourable* a light, and that this is the critical moment for making exertions to save the Peninsula, the people being all well-disposed, and wanting *nothing* to insure success but *an ally in earnest* and *ten millions of dollars* from South America; —that this letter, written by a person as remarkable for his *caution* as his *sincerity*, is certainly *cheering*; —that ministers are disposed to exert themselves to second the Spaniards; —that several of our greatest generals have been ordered to proceed forthwith to Cadiz, with every soldier in England who shall be judged fit for service; —that the general opinion at Paris, a few days ago, was, that the war in Spain would be *protracted*. —Such is the intelligence issued, since my last, from the great manufactories. It is called “*cheering*,” but, if I were permitted to offer an opinion about it, I should say, that I am unable to discover any grounds of joy in it. There, doubtless, are such grounds, else these manufacturers would not say so; but, in defiance of all threats, I will say boldly, that I do not *see* them. —I do not pretend to any knowledge about campaigns, and especially campaigns in Spain and Portugal; but, if a *retreat* is now to be expected, and naturally looked for; if our army is to retreat before the army that took Rodrigo, I am unable to beat into my head any reason whatever for *our army's having delayed the beginning of its retreat, until Rodrigo was actually taken*. —However, as all the people of Portugal are “*hearty in the cause*,” as “*all the resources of Portugal are at our disposal*,” as we have such “*complete military possession of the country*,” and are covered by so many strong “*fortified places, which are adequately gar-*

"*reasoned*," it would, as the MORNING POST says, be "*dastardly to despair of the fate of Portugal*."—At any rate, whatever may be our *opinions*; whatever turn our *speculations* may take; be our *hopes* or our *fears* what they may; I trust we shall not lose sight of *facts*, and, above all things, of that most important fact, that we, the people of this kingdom, *are now paying THIRTY THOUSAND PORTUGUESE TROOPS*, stated to be serving in Portugal, or, at least, for the defence of Portugal, besides our own army, which, agreeably to the documents laid before the Honourable House, was to consist, and, most likely, *doe*, consist, of another THIRTY THOUSAND MEN, also paid by the people of this kingdom.

GENERAL SARRAZIN.—Perhaps, upon some future occasion, I shall bestow a column or two upon this gentleman. At present, I shall only notice a passage in his "*LETTER TO GENERAL BUONAPARTE*." He is speaking of Buonaparté's designs against his life; and he says: "*You had your private reasons, which will be known some time hence: I saw them in your eyes, when you reviewed at Boulogne on the 25th of May. FOUCHÉ would not put me under an arrest, because you only went upon suspicion*."—Indeed, General! what, then, Buonaparté cannot cause people to be imprisoned upon suspicion? Really, if this be what you are going to tell the people of Ireland about Buonaparté, I much question whether you will be looked upon as a very useful missionary. You here tell the world, in so many words, that Buonaparté, though he so anxiously desired to oppress you, *could not get you put into prison upon the bare allegation of his suspicions*. And you are going over to tell the Irish such things as this, are you, in order to make the Irish hate Buonaparté, and to fill them with a horror of his government?—Why, General, you have said, in this one sentence, more in favour of Napoleon and his government, than the Moniteur has said in favour of them during the last seven years. I see, that, if the news-papers speak truth, you are dining with SIR ROBERT WILSON and MR. CROKER. Dine upon your own words for once, General; for, if what you have said about Buonaparté's want of power to imprison you, be suffered to pass un-eaten, you will have been the best friend he ever had in England.

CORN CROPS.—I insert below a letter from MR. ARTHUR YOUNG, which will be

read with great interest. I notice it under this head merely to direct the reader's attention towards it. Let those, who have had the baseness to accuse me of "*malignant*," and, some of them, of "*disloyal*," views, in stating my opinions about the produce of the approaching harvest, now turn their arms upon MR. YOUNG, who, it will be seen, commends my line of conduct in this respect; says it is the only safe way of proceeding in such a case; because, as I myself had said, it *may do much good, and cannot possibly do any harm*.—I am sincerely sorry that any expression of mine should have given MR. YOUNG a moment's uneasiness: such an effect was far from my intentions: I have derived great pleasure from the perusal of his agricultural writings; and, though I have differed, and still do differ, from him as to some points, I entertain a very high respect for his literary talents, which are of a cast to dignify subjects, in their nature low or trivial, and not, like those of MR. CURWEN, which give to dirt a double degree of dirtiness.

TO THE

READERS OF THE REGISTER.

Many Gentlemen have, by letter as well as verbally, proposed to me the putting forward a SUBSCRIPTION, for the purpose of indemnifying me and my family against the heavy expences and loss, which have been, and must be, incurred, in consequence of that prosecution, the nature, the progress, and the result of which are too well known to be here dwelt upon.—It must be manifest to every one, that these expences, including all the various sorts of them, will extend to several thousands of pounds, besides the loss, which I must suffer in my concerns at home, and, indeed, in many ways, which cannot well be mentioned, and which it is not at all necessary to mention, or to hint at, to those who have ever known what it is to be so situated as to lead the world to believe, that pecuniary distress, if not ruin, is even the possible consequence.—I am, however, happy to say, that I have been not only able to withstand all pressure of the sort here alluded to; but, that, without any extraordinary aid, from any quarter, I should feel confident of my ability, to proceed, and, with the blessing of continued health, make a suitable provision for all my children. Yet, though

I neither feel, nor dread, *poverty*, I do not think that I ought to neglect any means, consistent with honesty and honour, to guard myself, and, which is of more consequence, my *family*, against it. My health, thank God, is as good as ever it was. But, I have no *security* for either health or life, any more than other men; and, if I were now to attempt an *insurance* upon my life, *Newgate* would tell pretty strongly against me. It is, therefore, impossible for me not to feel an anxious desire to see my family, at least, guarded against the *certain* expence and loss above-mentioned. But, I have, as has been stated to two in particular of the gentlemen, who have proposed the *Subscription*, an objection to that mode of obtaining indemnity. There is, however, another mode, which, though, perhaps, attended, in the end, with little positive and numerical gain, would answer all my views full as well, while it would remove every objection, which the mode of Subscription presents.—It is this: upon reviewing my stock of printed books, I find that I have a number of SETS OF THE REGISTER, from its commencement to the present time, which by re-printing one whole Volume and part of another, I can make complete. There will be in each set, SEVENTEEN VOLUMES, the price of which, bound in the usual way, will be, what it always has been, 25½ guineas; about one third of which goes to the book-binder and the publisher, exclusive of the cost of paper and printing. The exact number that I have of these Sets I do not yet know, but, this I know, that, when these are disposed of, there will never be another complete copy to be sold, as I shall now have every set that can be completed made up and prepared for sale.—In the course of a *few years* all these Sets would be disposed of in the usual course of book-selling; but an *immediate sale of the whole* would, from the considerations before-mentioned, produce great convenience to me, besides the *case of mind*, which would arise from reflecting on the security that it would give to my family, in case my long imprisonment should, as I trust it will not, be attended with consequences fatal to myself. Such Gentlemen, therefore, as wished for the opening of a Subscription for the purpose above mentioned, will, in this mode, have an opportunity of doing that which will be equally advantageous, and much more agreeable, to me; and, all that I

shall say, in the way of *request*, is, that *each individual* disposed to further the object in view, would recollect, that, in this case, as in all others where success depends upon the co-operation of many, *each individual*, so disposed, should look upon that success as depending wholly upon *himself*; and should conclude that, unless he act up to his wishes, every one else will content himself with wishes alone. The SETS are now completing as fast as possible, and will be ready for delivery on the 1st of September. MESSRS. BAGSHAW, of Brydges Street, Covent Garden, and MR. BUDD, of Pall Mall, will, of course, receive applications; but it is not intended to make any list of names, as in the case of a Subscription to a Work; and, indeed, if gentlemen choose rather to send their orders through their own Booksellers, or Newsmen, either in town or country, it will be equally agreeable to me; only, that it would, for the sake of *regulating our preparations*, be desirable for the orders to be notified to MR. BAGSHAW or MR. BUDD as soon as possible from this time; and, at any rate, before the *first of September*.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
10th August, 1810.

LETTER FROM MR. ARTHUR YOUNG.

SIR;—You may imagine the surprise I felt, at seeing the postscript of a letter, every word of which was private, find its way into the newspapers: my imprudent correspondent had asked in a postscript to his own letter, “is Cobbett right in what he says of the crops?” the answer was dashed off, as private replies often are. But I was more particularly hurt, because I conceived, that when there is the least doubt respecting crops, there is but one safe language to hold publicly; that which is most likely to create alarm: should a crop prove greatly deficient, the only remedy is a diminished consumption, and of course, the sooner that begins the more effectual it must prove, as I have shewn more than once on former occasions; for this reason I was glad to see your apprehensions in print, as they might do good, and could not possibly be the cause of any evil; further, being connected as I am with a board of very extensive correspondence, more reliance might be placed on my opinion, than it personally merited; and this added to the impropriety of the publication. But, Sir, there is one pas-

sage in your remarks, which is the chief inducement of my taking the pen at present; "I shall not attribute his contemptuous expressions to the circumstance of my being lodged in Newgate for two years, just two days before his letter was written." No, Sir, I am not so base as that; for I should merit the heaviest denunciations of your vigorous pen, if I felt any thing in my heart approaching to such meanness; and I do assure you, that had you been resident on your estate in Hampshire, you would not have been troubled with a line from me; but labouring under the evils of a very different situation, I desire to remove the remotest suggestion of such an idea: nor am I altogether pleased with your epithet of "contemptuous expressions;" for in truth there was no feeling of contempt in the case; the words are common, and used upon a thousand occasions without any mark of contempt; and this is so true, that it would have been more just to yourself, had you omitted those words; millions may, and do differ from you on a variety of topics; many may think your political principles highly dangerous; but it is not likely any should hold you in contempt. I have the honour, &c. ARTHUR YOUNG.
Bradfield Hall, August 10, 1810.

P. S. You would have received this note sooner, but I have been tormented with a perpetual blister for an inveterate rheumatism, which leaves me scarcely power to dictate ten lines.

PAPER CURRENCY.*

Sir;—No essays in your admirable Register ever attracted more attention, than those in your last numbers relative to our circulating paper medium: And for this obvious reason, because that, on matters of trade and commerce, our deductions and analogies are more defective than on any other rational or practical subject.—All, Sir, that I shall presume to submit, may happen, either to illustrate some of your positions, or to urge a further examination of the others.

Of the latter description, I shall solely submit, but with confidence, "That an increased internal reciprocal confidence and credit, like that which generates 130 millions (for in notes, bills of exchange, and exchequer bills, we have that amount in Great Britain only) instead of 10 or 20 millions of specie as

formerly, does, in fact, add so much more to the aggregate powers of a country, provided that we possess the actual assets of such a substitute, and that our external commerce is kept within the boundaries of advantage."—You say that the latter is not the case. I have not the means to disprove it. If you are correct, this substituted medium is already an evil of the first magnitude: If, however, you are not so, your direful apprehensions fall to the ground, unless indeed your objectionable positions can be further illustrated.—Perhaps, Sir, you will admit that, all property is either real, as specie, land, or merchandize, or it is derivable from a credit or a confidence—the visible sign of which is merely a paper ledger or a paper note of hand.—Here then is the distinction between money and paper. The former is transferable to any clime; the latter, as in the awful cases of America and of France, is incessantly liable to be depreciated either by timidity or by caprice!—A wise people, then, would not recur to the latter, but as a temporary *succedaneum*; and this very truth was acted upon when the Directors of the Bank publicly promulgated, at the stoppage of payment, "That such suspension should only continue a very short period."—Why have I a confidence in paper, or give a credit? Because that I believed that my paper could be realized, or, (as in credit) that the debtor has some actual *bona fide* assets. But, instead of a confidence of 12 months, if I find that such debtor takes a credit of as many years, it certainly then becomes a subject of most serious alarm.—During this 12 years, Sir, nearly 800 country banks have been brought into embryo by the scheme and liberality of the Discount Office in Threadneedle-street. It is too many by 700. A certain quantity however were absolutely necessary, to protect the Threadneedle-street note from that false fabrication, which would have inevitably ensued, if the illiterate and ignorant in the extremes of the empire had not enjoyed their local note, which, from its contracted circulation, it would have been futile to imitate.—I will now descend into the country; and my vicissitudes of life shall not prevent me from giving you what I found the state of banking ten years ago. I have minutely examined my books; and I find that on many occasions, in a circulation of my bank notes, through a county (I mean Kent) where I did not possess a single acre of land, of

from 40 to £.60,000, I did not keep a higher balance to meet the payment of my notes, than 1-10th or a 20th, and sometimes only a 40th part of such circulation.—Perhaps critics will cry out, You obtained your reward. Did this prosper? **Yes.** When I closed the concern, I had withdrawn every note: And if adversity has subsequently visited me, I beg to refer such critics to a petition, which I purpose submitting to the Parliament, and that will embrace subjects of great national importance. Thus much, then, for one fact of country banking.—Your position, Sir, that paper does not bear an adequate value with the precious metals, is, in my opinion, self-evident, and I always take this criterion: calculate the production and the imports of corn for any six years before the bank restrictions, which shall tally with the total quantity of the last six years, and then see whether the loaf was not 1s. 3d. lower in the former period, than in the latter.—Indeed, Mr. Cobbett, it is high time that wise and good men should deeply investigate this problematical “great good,” as some say, and, “great curse and calamity,” as others pronounce, upon the Paper Currency of the United Kingdom.—The importance of the subject is my apology for this long letter. I am, Your admirer,

S. F. WADDINGTON.

London, Aug. 6, 1810.

CIRCULATING MEDIUM.

Sir;—Permit me to attempt to corroborate your observation in your last Register. that the inundation of paper has driven the gold and silver away. I happened lately to receive in that elegant retreat of taste and fashion, Tunbridge Wells, a bank note for seven shillings, and I found that to this envied spot annually come some 200 of the first families, and such has been the increased scarcity of small specie, (guineas we now rarely see) from their importing their 15 to £.20,000 to expend around them, that the community have heartily consented to accept of this beautiful substitute, rather than endanger the loss of such valuable customers. But here it is enclosed.*—This note, however, is not an original discovery. Such precious traits of national prosperity have been occasionally introduced into other

districts of the kingdom.—Perhaps, Sir, you may have original ideas on the emission of small notes: The inquisitive world will be anxious to receive instruction from your pen.—I am, Sir, yours truly,

PATRICK DOWLAS.

Walling Street, Aug. 8, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Extract of a Dispatch from Licut.-Gen. Lord Viscount Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool; dated Alverca, 11th July, 1810.*

The enemy passed the Agara in force on the morning of the 11th instant, and obliged brig.-gen. Craufurd to fall back with his advanced guard to the neighbourhood of the fort of La Concepcion, which had been occupied by a part of the third division of infantry.—In making this movement captain Krauckenburg and cornet Cordeman, at the head of a small body of the 1st Hussars, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves by making a gallant charge upon a superior body of the enemy.—Upon mentioning the 1st Hussars, it is but justice to inform your lordship, that they have been with the advanced guard throughout the winter, and have performed their duty in the most satisfactory manner.—The 3d battalion of Portuguese Chasseurs, under lieutenant-col. Elder, had also an opportunity of shewing their steadiness during this movement of the advanced guard, and the skirmishing of the enemy which attended it.—The 1st Hussars had five men and three horses wounded, and the 16th Light Dragoons three horses killed.

Alverca, 11th July.—Since I wrote to your lordship this day, I have received a report that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered to the enemy yesterday evening. There was a large practicable breach in the place, and the enemy had made preparations for a storm; when marshal Ney having offered terms of capitulation, the garrison surrendered.—The enemy took up their ground before this place on the 20th of April; they invested it completely on the 11th June, and opened their fire upon it on the 24th of June; and, adverting to the nature and position of the place, to the deficiency and defects of its works, to the advantages which the enemy had in their attack upon it, and to the numbers and formidable equipment by which it was attacked, I consider the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo to

* The copy of the *Seven Shilling* bank-note will be seen in the Summary, p. 172.

have been most honourable to the governor, Don Andres Hervasti, and its garrison; and to have been equally creditable to the arms of Spain with the celebrated defence of other places by which this nation has been illustrated during the existing contest for its independence.—There was an affair between our piquets and those of the enemy this morning, in which the enemy lost two officers and 31 men and 29 horses prisoners. We have had the misfortune to lose lieut.-col. Talbot, and eight men of the 14th Light Dragoons killed, and 23 men wounded.

AMERICA.—*Correspondence between the Marquis Wellesley and Mr. Pinckney, and between General Armstrong and Mr. Secretary Smith.*

Gen. Armstrong to the Duke of Cadore.

(Concluded from p. 160.)

Another American ship, at a point still later than the capture of the preceding, was brought into the port of Bayonne, but having violated no law of his Majesty, was acquitted by his Council of Prizes; and lastly, in the long conversation I had the honour of holding with your Excellency, on the 25th January, no idea of reprisal was maintained by you, or suspected by me; but, on the contrary, in speaking of the seizure of American property in Spain, you expressly declared, that it was not a confiscation.

Can proofs be more conclusive than, from the first promulgation of the law down to the 25th January last, that nothing in the nature of reprisal was contemplated by his Majesty?

What circumstance may have since occurred to produce a change in his opinion, I know not; but the confidence I feel in the open and loyal policy of his Majesty, altogether excludes the idea, that the rule was merely found for the occasion, and made to justify seizures, not otherwise justifiable. I pray your Excellency to accept, &c. &c.

(Signed)

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

His Excellency the Duke of Cadore, Minister of Exterior Relations.

Gen. Armstrong to the Duke of Cadore.

Paris, March 20, 1810.

Sir; The United States, wishing to fulfil their engagements to the holders of their public debt in Holland, but unable from the present state of commerce to do

so by the ordinary mode of remitting bills of exchange, found it necessary to enter into contracts with certain merchants of the said States, to make remittance in tobacco. A cargo of this article was accordingly put on board the American ship *Hero* and dispatched for the port of *Tonningen* in Denmark, with orders that the net proceeds should be placed in the hands of the American Bankers in Amsterdam for the purpose above-mentioned. The passage having been uncommonly stormy, the ship much damaged, and the crew quite exhausted, the Captain believed it to be his duty, on the principle of self-preservation, to enter the first port he could make. He accordingly entered that of the *Texel*, and after having taken on board two pilots, and being within the fourth buoy, was captured by a boat belonging to a French privateer. Besides the customary papers, all of which are in rule, the *Hero* sailed under a certificate, granted by the Government, that the voyage was undertaken for the purpose of effecting a national remittance.—I have thought, Sir, that the peculiarity of the circumstances made it proper for me to ask a special decision of his Majesty on this case, and with this view I have the honour of offering to your Excellency the present representation.—Accept, Sir, &c.

(Signed)

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Gen. Armstrong to the Duke of Cadore.

Paris, March 21.

Sir; I had yesterday the honour of stating to your Excellency the case of the American ship *Hero*, and requesting thereon his Majesty's decision:—I have now that of informing you that a number of American ships, coming directly from the United States to the port of Naples, under a promise of protection from his Majesty the King, have notwithstanding been seized and their cargoes sold "for the benefit of the fisc." Nor does the injury stop here. Though thus deprived of all means of subsisting themselves, the Captains have been obliged to subsist the crews (amounting nearly to 300 men), and are now menaced with a farther exaction for port charges. This, in the strong language of one of the sufferers, is literally to strip them naked, and then demand from them the expence of doing so. As the Consular Agent of the United States at Naples has made several unavailing representations on this subject, to the King, and he has reason to believe that

the system, of which this treatment is a branch, emanates from his Majesty the Emperor, it becomes my duty to submit the facts to your Excellency, and to seek, through your intervention, such correction of the evil as humanity and justice may conspire to dictate. A remark which exquisitely applies to the crews of the ships captured in Spain and Naples, is, that should the vessels to which they belong be confiscated, means ought to be afforded to them of returning to their country. In this event, therefore, I have to propose to your Excellency that two or more ships be put at the disposition of the nearest American Consul, and permitted to sail for the United States, under bond for amount of their valuation.—Respectfully I am, Sir, &c. J. ARMSTRONG.

HOLLAND.—*Proclamation, dated Amsterdam, July 13.*

"Dutchmen; Charged with the provisional government of the kingdom of Holland, we have this day received the order of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, to notify to you, that his Imperial Majesty, having taken into consideration the state of affairs in Europe, the geographical position of Holland, and the pretensions of the common enemy, has, by a decree, issued from the palace of Rambouillet, 9th July, 1810, resolved, that the kingdom of Holland should be united with the French empire: In communicating to you the decree, we are also charged by his Majesty the Emperor to inform you, that his Majesty finding himself compelled to put an end to the intermediate Governments, which for sixteen years have harassed this part of the empire, the inhabitants of Holland shall be the objects of his care, and his Imperial Majesty will rejoice as much in their prosperity as in that of his good city of Paris; whilst the spacious field, from Rome to Amsterdam, which is laid open to the industry of the inhabitants, may encourage, to look to the period of the extension of their mutual commercial relations in those regions, which their ancestors rendered so renowned, and which have carried to so high a pitch the glory of the Batavian and Dutch name.—We finally notify to you, that the general govern-

ment will continue on the present footing until the arrival of his illustrious Highness the prince Arch-Treasurer of the Empire, the Duke of Placentia.

(Signed) VAN DER HEIM.
A. J. J. H. VERBEGUEN.

AMERICA.—*Massachusetts Legislature: Extract from the Answer of the House of Representatives to the Governor's Speech: Monday, June 11.*

"In adverting with your excellency to the convulsed state of Europe, the mind involuntarily shudders at the afflicting spectacle. A war exterminating in its nature, extends its ravages, and what will be its final catastrophe is known only to that Being who maketh darkness his pavilion. In the wide rage of its desolation, inauspicious events have resulted to the best interests of this country. England and France, without any pretext or complaint in relation to our conduct, on the professed principle of annoying each other, have wantonly introduced a system equally repugnant to the usages of nations, the immunities of neutrals, and the dictates of justice. In both nations we perceived the same spirit, modified to purposes that will comport with the actual situation of each. England, on the one hand, in the insatiable spirit of commercial monopoly, has interfered with some of the most beneficial branches of our commerce, in order to afford her own a more extensive expansion. On the other, the ruler of France, with an ambition as inordinate, as his mind is vigorous and capacious, in his favourite scheme of bearing upon the commerce of England, has violated the sanctity of neutral rights, and the obligations of positive compact. The one with the mastery of the ocean, and the other with the dominion of the Continent, have waged war upon our dearest interests, and produced incalculable private distress, and public embarrassment. For either of them there is no apology, no excuse, which, in the moment of returning reason and candour, justice would not blush to own. Instead of being benefactors to mankind, instead of promoting the prosperity of nations, and extending the circle of human happiness, the destructive consequences of their conduct are felt in every quarter of the globe.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 6.] LONDON, SATURDAY, AUGUST 18, 1810. [Price 1s.

" Cast on the wildest of the Cyclad isles,
 " Where never human foot had mark'd the shore,
 " These ruffians left me—yet believe me, Arcas,
 " Such is the rooted love we bear Mankind,
 " All ruffians as they were, I never heard
 " A sound so dismal as their parting oars."

THOMSON; *Agam.* Act III.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ROBERT JEFFERY.—It has been stated in the news-papers of the 9th instant, that MR. JACKSON (our Envoy and Plenipotentiary in the United States of America) has transmitted a deposition, made by the poor fellow, ROBERT JEFFERY, so late as the 18th of June last, giving an account of the transaction "which has attracted so much public notice."—Stop here, reader, and mark, for a moment, the phraseology of this ministerial writer. "*Attracted so much public notice.*" How did it *attract* notice? In what way did the most abominable act come to the knowledge of the public? It did not suit this writer to say: "the transaction, which, *owing to the humanity and integrity of Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, has been made known to the public and the world.*" Till he took up this affair, not a word did any one say about the matter. LAKE was tried by a court-martial, at Portsmouth, on the 5th and 6th of February last; and, on the 23rd of that month Sir Francis moved in the Honourable House for a copy of the minutes of that court-martial. But, first of all, he mentioned the matter in the Honourable House; and asked the ministers, whether they meant to *take any steps* relative to it. He told them, that, if they did not, he should. He accordingly made his motion in a few days afterwards. The effect of that motion was the production of the proof of the horrid deed of putting the poor fellow on shore upon a barren uninhabited rock, and there deliberately leaving him. The publication of the papers in the Register of the 17th of March, and in other public prints, excited a general feeling upon the subject. Still, however, *nothing was DONE*, 'till Sir Francis again took up the matter, and, upon his motion, made just two days before the Honourable House voted the sending of him to the Tower, an address was presented to the

king requesting him to cause inquiries to be made to ascertain the fate of Jeffery. —The ministerial writer tells the public, that "Mr. Jackson's inquiries were, of course, made in consequence of official *directions from home.*" Yes; to be sure, they were; but, it was SIR FRANCIS BURDETT; it was SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, who caused those directions to be given, and that, too, by a motion made about 48 hours before the Honourable House ordered him to be imprisoned in the Tower! —This writer is happy, he tells us, that "the result of these inquiries has proved so completely satisfactory as to the *existence of Jeffery;*" but, he does not tell us, what is the precise cause of his satisfaction; and, whether his satisfaction arises from the *safety of Jeffery*, or the *safety of Lake*. His expressions are quite equivocal; but, if the context be examined, I think it will appear, that he cared very little about the poor seaman.—He tells us, that Jeffery "was *nine days* upon the island, and "supported himself upon *limpets*, and *rain water from crevices in the rocks*!" So! This is treatment for one of our "*Jolly tars*," is it? Verily, this is a thing that ought never to be forgotten. What feelings must not this treatment of Jeffery have excited amongst the people of America; and, especially amongst the sailors of New-England! I wonder what sort of commentary the author of the IMPOSTOR-PAMPHLET will make upon this transaction?—I know, or, at least, I have heard, that there are not wanting persons; wretches, cold-blooded wretches! let me, rather, call them, who scruple not to say, that Sir Francis's conduct, as to this matter, was *mischievous*; for, that the exposure of Lake's "*irregularity*," as SIR ALEX COCHRANE calls it (See Register of 24th March; 1810. Vol. XVII. p. 464), would be likely to *excite discontents in the navy*. Never was any thing more detestable than this reasoning, according to which no ill-

treatment of a seaman by his superiors could ever be made a subject of complaint, without the risk of doing harm to the sea-service. How much more forcible is the reasoning on the other side? How much more likely are such exposures (especially if proper steps be taken by the government in consequence of them) to prevent discontents from swelling into open mutiny, by shewing the seamen, that, however distant from home, when cruelly treated, they will, when their treatment be made known, not fail to meet with protection in England. What could possibly be better calculated to inspire the seamen in general with confidence in the justice of their country, than this vote for an address to the king in behalf of a common sailor? And, I am not easily to be persuaded, that the satisfaction and confidence of the seamen will be the less on account of the circumstance of the merit of the proceeding belonging exclusively to Sir Francis Burdett.—The poor fellow was set on shore in December, 1807; the act was known to Sir Alex. Cochrane soon afterwards; the Admiralty knew of it early in the summer of 1809; a court of inquiry was held upon the subject in December 1809; the court martial was held in about two months afterwards; Lake had, *after the deed*, and after Sir Alex. Cochrane *knew of it*, been promoted from a *Commander* to a *Post Captain*. All this time had elapsed, and nothing at all did the public know of the matter; till, on the 23rd of February last, Sir Francis Burdett took it in hand. To him, therefore, and to him alone, the thanks of Jeffery, and the thanks of all those who wished to see justice done in this case, are due. It may be said, that any other member could have done the thing as well as he. But, why *did* no other member do it? The *power*, the *capacity*, being possessed by *any other member*, is only another circumstance in proof of the superiority of Sir Francis Burdett's public virtue. When the thing was once before the House (and had *already been placed before the public*), there were enough to join him in reprobating the cruelty of Lake; but, what great merit was there in that? It would have been strange indeed if no one had joined him then. But, who was there that joined him before? Was there a single voice raised to second him when he first made inquiries into the matter?—This is a memorable transaction altogether, and must not soon be let drop. It is one of

the things to be kept *everlastingly alive*. But, it is, I should suppose, impossible that some further proceeding should not be adopted with respect to it. At any rate, as often as it is revived, either in conversation or in thought, let those who converse and think about it, always remember to whom we are indebted for all that has been done in this case, towards the obtaining of justice.—The *mother* of Jeffery, who is a widow, is alive. What joy must it be to her to find that her son is yet in existence! She, too, has to thank Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, had it not been for whom she would, in all likelihood, never have heard of that son again.—After all, however, let me not be understood as stating it for *fact*, that Mr. JACKSON has sent home proof of Jeffery's being alive. I must see Mr. JACKSON's report, and examine it well, before I shall be convinced of the truth of what is now reported. The shortest way, and, in every respect, the best way, would be, to *bring Jeffery home to England*. There can be no reason for not doing it. The means are always at hand; and, there can be only one objection, which, indeed, may naturally occur: namely, that the poor fellow may be resolved never again to set his foot in England, or upon any land, or in any place or situation, where he may be exposed to the possibility of being again pressed on board an English ship of war; for, though, it is to be hoped, that his fears of a repetition of such treatment would be totally groundless, seeing that Lake is no longer in the naval service; yet, no one could blame him for entertaining such fears, and, of course, for resolving never to quit the country where he now is, and where, besides being amongst those who rescued him from the most horrid of deaths, he is in perfect security. Much, therefore, as one would wish, on some accounts, to see the man return to England; it would require, with me, some time for consideration, before, if my advice were asked, I should advise him to return. Where he is now, it is impossible for him to fall under a power sufficient to condemn him, without trial, to a desert rock. Where he is now, he is safe from the operation of any such power. Where he is now (in the *State of Massachusetts* it is said) he cannot be exposed to death for having taken a drink of spruce beer that did not belong exclusively to him. Where he is now, in short, if he has not both *liberty* and *property*, the fault is his, and not that of any body else.

FAREWELL OF THE ARGUS.—In another part of this sheet, I have inserted the FAREWELL of the famous public print, called the ARGUS. The editor, who is said to have been Mr. ARTHUR O'CONNOR, has not failed to demonstrate, in this his last Number, that the work does not cease for want of *talents* to keep it on.—The coyness of *our* public prints, with respect to this article, is well worthy of notice. They, in general, inserted little fragments of it for the purpose of speaking against it. Most of them *mentioned* it; but I have seen but two London papers, which have given it at full length, and those are THE TIMES and THE STATESMAN, the last of which, really, talks like a statesman upon the subject. It advises all those, who wish to see the country saved, to *read* this article, and *seriously reflect on its contents*; and observes, very justly, that the smile of *contempt*, which some of our prints affect to cast upon this production, will not save us.—It is, indeed, a most important paper; and, think what we will about it, the effect it will have produced on the continent must be very great.—It is quite useless for us to call the person who has written it “an *unnatural wretch*.” The Edinburgh Reviewers did the same, in reviewing a work of Mr. O'Connor's on the English paper-money. But this, whatever might be the justice or the injustice of it, had nothing to do with the writer's *facts* or his *reasonings*. There may, perhaps, be two opinions upon the subject of Mr. O'Connor's conduct, some persons thinking, that he ought still to love the government, by which he was banished from, and rendered an out-cast of, his native country; while others think, that it is most scandalous meanness in us, who support and approve of that government, to *complain of the loss of his friendship for it*, and especially to make this complaint in the very same breath, wherein we *speak of his talents with contempt*. But, in whatever way this question may be decided; whatever we may think of Mr. O'CONNOR's motives; whether we think his conduct unnatural in the extreme, or perfectly natural; still his *facts* and his *arguments* remain the same; and, we should be very careful not to disbelieve that which is *true*, merely because it comes from the *pen* of a man, whom we think it right to speak of as the blackest of villains, and, at the same time think it quite becoming in *us* to *complain*, that he betrays evident marks of his not loving us, in return for those kind sen-

timents.—In short, it is the very height of stupidity; of stupid, senseless, animal pride and conceit, and that alone, which can induce us to turn a deaf ear to the writer, merely because we hate the man, who, by the bye, is totally unaffected by our hatred.—Besides, we should, I think, be a little cautious how we speak of Mr. O'Connor, while we are *praising* and *dining* GENERAL SARRAZIN! There is, indeed, some difference in their cases. Mr. O'Connor was *banished*: General Sarrazin came away of his own accord; took French leave; or, as Vandamme calls it, *deserted*. Mr. O'Connor was *forced* from his *native* country. He was *compelled* to *adopt* another country; or, have no spot to call his country, and be like a Jew, a wanderer upon the face of the earth. In America there are hundreds of English merchants, all *staunch* *Parties*, who have not only taken an oath of fidelity to the United States, but also AN OATH ABJURING ALL ALLEGIANCE TO THE KING OF ENGLAND. There are hundreds of these, many of whom have returned to England, and even now cut a most conspicuous figure amongst the *Turtle Patriots*. Many of these, under their American Citizenship, have supplied the enemies of England with war-like stores. Let the Edinburgh Reviewers, then, fall upon these fellows, and dispatch them, before they fall upon a gentleman who was *banished* from his country; who was *compelled* to *adopt* another country, or to have no spot to claim as his country, and to become a wanderer and a vagabond upon the face of the earth. Oh! “Wicked, malignant wretch!” Not chouse to become a wanderer and a vagabond upon the face of the earth! But, to choose, rather, to write an exposure of the English system of finance, and to puzzle the *feelosofers* of Edinbro'! Time, which tries all things, has tried both the *work* and the *criticism*, here alluded to; and, in a future Number, I shall shew, that it would have been good for this nation, had it listened to what Mr. O'Connor then wrote, instead of greedily swallowing what was said by those, who garbled the work and foully abused its author.—Let us avoid a repetition of what took place then. Let us, at any rate, *read* what Mr. O'Connor has written. Let us look upon him as a mortal enemy, of our government at least; but, let us calmly inquire, whether he speak *truth*, and whether he *reason*

correctly. The picture that he exhibits is, perhaps, exaggerated; the eagerness of his wishes may have been too powerful for his reason; but is there any man, who really feels anxious; who feels any portion of *anxiety*, for the permanent security of England against the arms of France; is there any such man, who can refrain from being deeply impressed with apprehensions, that the part of the article, which relates to maritime force and operations, has but too much truth in it? We do not see, because we will not see, the danger to be apprehended from the inevitably increasing marine of Napoleon. It must, if he wishes it, increase to a size enormous, and that, too, in a comparatively short space of time. There is now nothing for Napoleon to do upon the continent except in Spain and Portugal; and, when that last continental labour is finished, will there be no apprehensions for Ireland, which as we are daily told, is, even now, *agitated with a French faction*?—What is, in this essay, said about the South American colonies is well worthy of attention. It is what every one of us should read every hour in the day; because there is yet time to avoid or avert what is here predicted; and this is the use, to which sensible people put the predictions of their enemies. I do not say, that, if we had listened to Mr. O'Connor in the year 1804, upon the subject of paper-money, we could have done any thing to prevent the accomplishment of his predictions; but, we should have sooner perceived the real state of our affairs, and sooner got rid of the shackles of delusion.

CORN CROPS.—In my Register of the 4th instant, page 142, I recommended the *permitting of all the soldiers in the kingdom to work during the harvest*, observing, that if it should be *catching weather*, this would make a material difference in the price of bread.—The news-papers now tell us, that an order has been issued from the "war-office, for not more than *one-fourth of each battalion of the regular infantry and militia stationed in the Kent district to be employed in getting in the harvest*, and that "it is left entirely in the power of the Commanding Officer whether any or what part of that number shall be so employed."—This is *something*; and especially if the same be done in all the other districts. I can see no reason why the whole should not have such permission; and, I shall not be found fault with, in this instance, by the ministerial writers,

who tell the public; who are labouring and sweating like negroes to hammer it into the heads of their readers, that we are in such a state of safety, in England, "*that we do not want a single regular soldier in the island.*" This is, indeed, somewhat different from the opinions of Mr. Attorney General, and Judge Grose; but, this is what they say; that *we do not want a single regular soldier in England, of any sort whatever*, and that every regular soldier ought to be sent out of it, to learn, in Spain, Portugal, Walcheren, and elsewhere, to beat the French. Of this we may say more, perhaps, hereafter; but, if it be true, that we do not want a single regular soldier in England, notwithstanding the opinions of the above-mentioned grave personages; if this be true, surely all the regular soldiers between this and the time that they are sent off to learn to beat the French in Spain, Walcheren, and Portugal, might be safely employed in works of agriculture?—At any rate, let it be remembered, that the measure, as far as it has been adopted, originated in a recommendation of mine; and, what is of more importance, in an act of the government itself we have here a recognition of the principle, *that agriculture suffers from the raising and maintaining of armies*; that is to say, in the changing of labourers into unproductive people; a principle which has never been sufficiently inculcated in this country, where, however, men do really, at last, seem disposed to listen.—The loaf, I see, continues to rise; and, I shall be very much surprized if it stops short of 2 shillings. I, at one time, thought it would go higher; and, appearances then warranted my opinion. The very great change, however, which has taken place in the appearance of the Barley and Oats more than in the Wheat, and the favourable appearance of the potatoes, induce me to think, that bread will be less dear than I expected at first; but still I think it will be very dear.—From a letter, which I insert in another part of this sheet, it would seem that the harvest in Ireland *promises to be abundant*. The price of the quartern loaf, however, appears to have been *sixteen pence*, at Dublin, on the 3rd instant. Irish money, of course; but, this is very dear for Ireland, and quite inconsistent with the fact, as stated by my correspondent, of an approaching greatly abundant crop.—As to imports, my opinion is, that, if we have a *decided scarcity*, we shall get very little

corn from abroad. The reason of which is plain. Napoleon will not, perhaps, be foolish enough to entertain the hope of starving us; but, it is not unnatural to suppose, that he will endeavour to add to our distress; or, rather, that he will do nothing, and suffer nothing to be done (if he can prevent it) to alleviate that distress. Indeed, they who suppose that he will not act thus must be downright fools. There may be persons, who believe, that our ministerial papers (see the *Morning Post* of the 9th instant) calling Napoleon a "*base born villain*," will tend to prevent him from acceding to our wishes in letting us have corn. In the paper, here referred to, the ministerial editor says: "*Englishmen* will mourn, that human nature can so debase itself?" (as in the case of the people of France) "while they will exult in the happy lot of their own country, which, favoured by Heaven, is exempted from the controul of the *base-born villain*, who, through a strange combination of unfortunate circumstances, at present sways the destinies of the continent." ~~Very well.~~ But, why do we go crouching to him for corn, then? Why do we go with our *overtures* to "the base-born villain?" If we be so much better off than his people; if our lot be so much more happy; if we ought to exult in the comparison; if Heaven has favoured us in putting us beyond the reach of his controul, why do we seek any thing from him? Why do we court a commercial intercourse with him? To be sure, any thing so inconsistent; so foolish; so contemptible, as this abuse of Napoleon, at a time when we are making *overtures*, which, say what we will, fall little short of *appeals to his humanity*, has been seldom met with even in these ministerial prints. Yet, this is surpassed by their impudence in calling upon us to *exult in our happy lot compared to that of the people of France*, at the very moment when they are telling us, that they are in hopes that we shall get some food from the abundance of that people to make up for the deficiency, with which we are threatened; and which we actually experience. Under such circumstances, we should hold our tongues about the miseries of France. For mere decency's sake we should do this. For the sake of avoiding the contempt of the world, we should do this. For the sake of not being despised as impudent, empty, bragging fools, we should do this.—Napoleon, however, will not be at all in-

fluenced by any thing that these writers say. Their revilings, if they were to reach his ears, would be full as agreeable to him as would be their adulation, and, perhaps, more so; certainly more so, if he could form an idea of what are, in general, the objects of that adulation.—He, however, we may be assured, will not, in his measures, be at all influenced by any thing that they say. If he finds, that the keeping of his corn from us, will tend to add to our distress, he will keep his corn from us; and with this we must lay our account. From America we can get but very little corn. It cannot supply us with much. Therefore, if we are wise, we shall make up our minds to live through the year upon the produce of our own soil, and the soil of our colonies.—We should, however, take every precaution in the way of *economising*; and, I still think, that a great deal may be done by *reducing the number of the cavalry horses*, especially if it be true, as the *Morning Post* says, that we have no need of a regular soldier in England or Scotland. Suppose, however, that there are only twenty thousand, that might be, for a time, at least, dispensed with. The food of *twenty thousand horses* is immense. Enough, probably, to support two hundred thousand poor, if you take waste into consideration.—This is a matter, which I think well worth the serious attention of the government, who, having, in part, at least, followed my advice in one case, may have less scruple to do it in another case; if there be a *plenty* of corn, it is another thing; but, if there be a scarcity, it behoves the government to neglect nothing within its power to prevent the people from suffering. Mr. CURWEN, perhaps, will say that there is no danger, for, that, though bread should be a crown a loaf, that will not make *milk* scarce, and that *milk* is the staff of life; but, as in the case of the tanner's recommendation to fortify the town with leather, the advice would only excite a laugh at so admirable a demonstration of stupid selfishness.

TAXING WORK.—The following paragraphs are copied from the newspapers of the 14th instant.—They speak of what is *fact* I dare say; and such facts are of great importance to the public; and, especially when we consider what is the cause of the tax, to insure the collection of which such laws have been made.

"A respectable paper maker, in Devonshire, and hitherto a man of unblemished character, has suddenly absconded, having been detected in forging the Excise-man's stamp on the wrappers of his paper. The iron instrument with which he did it, was found in his wife's pocket, and she has in consequence been committed to Exeter gaol.—An opulent tanner, at Kingsbridge, has absconded for a like offence, having been detected in forging the stamp for marking hides. The poor fellow who inadvertently made the implements for him, and who is armourer in the Hants Militia, is to be tried for his life, at the Assizes, which commence at Exeter this day."—Here is food for reflection. Here is a man, an Englishman, to be arraigned for his life; the cause, of that is, that he has made a stamp to mark leather with; the cause of that was, that he was hired to do by a tanner who wished to put a mark upon his own leather; the cause of that was, that the tanner, by such means, would avoid paying a tax upon the leather so marked. Then there *easy* remains to ask *what was the cause of the tax?* Or, in other words; what becomes of the money, *how is the money expended*, that is raised upon the people in taxes? *To what uses is applied that money*, to insure the collecting of which those laws have been made which put this man upon a trial for his life?—Here is food for reflection. I should like to see an essay upon this subject from the pen of Mr. WILBERFORCE, or any other person of his description.—The IMPOSTOR PAMPHLET has a good deal upon the subject of taxing work, but it has nothing that exactly meets this point. In another edition of it, which will, possibly, be preparing, by the time that this Register reaches Philadelphia, the author may, perhaps, be disposed to say a little something in reference to facts like those mentioned in these paragraphs; and, in the mean while, I will go on collecting more of them, and putting them upon record.

FLOGGING SOLDIERS.—The following articles are copied from the Morning Chronicle of the 13th and 14th instant. They are very well worthy of being placed in a situation where they can be referred to some months, or perhaps, some years, hence. Those, who take the trouble of preparing such articles for the press, would do well to be a little more circum-

stantial as to names and dates, without which such articles are likely to fail of answering the purpose, for which they are intended.—"CORPORAL CURTIS, lately sentenced to receive 1,000 lashes, but who was remanded on his petition to be sent to a condemned regiment, has been permitted, after receiving 200 lashes, to volunteer into a regiment on foreign service.—GREENWOOD, and the other private of the Oxford Militia, who were tried by a Brigade Court Martial, at Shoreham, have been sentenced to receive 500 lashes each, but have escaped punishment, by volunteering into a regiment on foreign service.—WILLIAM CLIFFORD, a private in the 7th Royal Veteran Battalion, was lately sentenced to receive 1,000 lashes for repeatedly striking and kicking his superior officer. On Thursday he underwent part of the sentence by receiving 750 lashes, at Canterbury, in presence of the whole garrison.—A private of the 4th Foot, 2d battalion, has been sentenced by a Court Martial to receive 500 lashes, for drawing his bayonet on his serjeant whilst on board a transport at Spithead. Another man of the same regiment has been sentenced to receive 600 lashes, for striking his serjeant.—A garrison Court-Martial has been held on board the Metcalf transport, at Spithead, on some men of the fourth regiment of foot, for disrespectful behaviour to their Officers. Two thousand six hundred lashes were to be inflicted among them yesterday."—Among them 'This is an odd way of putting such a fact upon record. How many men were there? "Some men" leaves the matter very doubtful. And, what corps did they belong to? Who was the Commander of them? If a fact be worth stating at all, it is worth stating fully and accompanied with the names of the parties and of the corps.—By stating such facts in a very clear and circumstantial manner great public good may, in time, be produced. At any rate, they are matter of history; they belong to the history of our country and of our times; it is due to the nation and fair towards all the parties concerned to record them; but, again I must express my hope, that, in future, they will be recorded rather more fully and circumstantially, by those, who think it worth their while to prepare the statement of them for the press. They appear, at first sight, to be mere gossiping paragraphs; but, certain I am, that the publication of them,

in a circumstantial way, would be of great public benefit.

PAPER-MONEY.—In my last, at page 173, I made a remark or two respecting certain articles, that had appeared in the *Morning Post* news-paper, the object of which articles appeared to be, to feel the pulse of the public with regard to a proposition, started in the same print, a little while before, for *abolishing* what it called “those *destructive assigns*,” the Country Bank notes.—At the same time, that I noticed these articles, in the brief way here described, I intimated my intention of noticing them more fully in this present Number, and of endeavouring to make the question between the *country money* and the *Threadneedle Street money* as clear as all the other parts of the subject now appear to be to almost every reader.—In fulfilment of this intention, I shall first state the substance, or, at least, the chief points in the several articles alluded to. They are five in number, and their dates are 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 14th of this present month. To insert them of full length would require more room than I have now to spare; but, I think, I shall preserve them in my next; for, insignificant as they are *in themselves*, they are of great importance as being the *first symptoms of the abandonment of the paper-system by the adherents of Pitt*, besides being, perhaps, actually intended, by the ministers themselves, to sound the public as to a scheme for *giving to the Bank of England an exclusive power of making paper-money*.—The truth is, as the reader will see at every step, the partizans of the paper-system do not know what to be at. They are at their wits’ end. To give up the *whole system* is, however, what they cannot think of doing. They therefore give up one branch of it; and they hope, thereby, to save the remainder.—We will first take a view of their description of the *EVIL*, and then we will hear what they have for a *REMEDY*, or, rather, for remedies, the projects in this way being not a little numerous.—They say, that the paper-money of this country has long been working the ruin of the man of real property;—that, at last, it has swollen to an enormous evil;—that the land-holder is robbed by the paper-money maker;—that the country bankers do not possess a valuable consideration as security for their notes;—that, if the country banker break, he can seldom, or never, pay ten shillings

in the pound;—that every bank-note, issued by a country-banker, is issued to the prejudice of the public, and to that of the man of fixed income in particular.—This is pretty well to begin with. A “*READER*,” this gentleman signs himself. The next assailant of country-banks takes the signature of *CLERICUS*, and he lays about him with a degree of zeal that proves him to belong to the true Church militant. He calls the country banks “*horrid nuisances*,” says they have been, of late, most “*indcently*” multiplied; gives the scene of action the vulgar name of “*shop*,” says, that the bankers collect up all the hard-money to sell; complains that even the poor labourers are obliged to go unpaid, week after week, because they can neither give nor get change for “*the vile, dirty rags, that are offered to them in payment, called bank-notes*,” inveighs most bitterly against the farmers, who, by the means of loans of this “*vile paper*,” are enabled to keep back their corn; avers that the “*honest shop-keeper, artisan and mechanic*, are robbed of the fruits of their labour by these covetous and crafty bankers.”—Another Letter is signed, “*A CONSTANT READER*,” and, the author of it says, that he has been lately in the West of England, where the distress, owing to the stoppage of the banks at Salisbury and elsewhere, is hardly to be described.—Another writer states himself to be a person, who has an annual income of several hundreds of pounds, which, for nine or ten years past has been paid him wholly in country bank-notes; and he says, that, in all that time, he has not received a guinea or a bank of England note.—Now, before we proceed to speak of the *remedies*, proposed by these writers (who, perhaps, are all one and the same person,) let me beg the reader to look a little better at this language, and to recollect how often I have been abused in this same *Morning Post* for having spoken contemptuously of the paper-money system. But, stop a little, the time is not far distant, when we shall hear language a great deal worse than this. The tide is just beginning to turn; but it is only beginning. It will roll backward as fast as ever it rolled forward.—As to *REMEDIES*, the first of these projectors says, that he is firmly convinced, that *Government alone*, or the *bank of England under the controul of the government*, should have the power of issuing bank-notes.—The next goes more into detail. He proposes, that

no man should have a license to be a paper-money maker without first making oath that he has property sufficient to answer all the notes that he intends to issue; or that he should find good bondsmen to bind themselves to pay all his banking debts, in case he should be unable to pay them himself; or that he should satisfy the Commissioners of Taxes in his district, and should from them obtain a certificate, that he has property sufficient for all the purposes of his intended business; or, that he should obtain a public notification from the Governor and Company of the Bank of England that they would, at all times, be ready to exchange his notes.—These are the suggestions of CLERICALS, of which the next writer approves, particularly of the last; and he adds, as a scheme of his own, the sending of a quantity of *half-pence* weekly into the country, as a means of *relieving the present distress of the poor*! —Good father!—But, let us hear them out.—The next projector would have one *government bank*, established in every county, conducted by the *Treasury*, or by the Directors of the Bank of England, to be called the “County Government Bank,” or the “Bank of England County Bank.” He would have all taxes, collected, paid into these banks; and, he is quite confident, that, while this is the most popular measure that government could adopt, it is “*plain, clear, and easy of experiment*.”—Such are the REMEDIES proposed by these projectors; and, foolish as they are; absurd and ridiculous as they are, the public may be assured, that they are entertained, and seriously entertained by many persons not destitute of influence.—It has, for some time past, been the fashion amongst the great fund-holders and money-dealers to cry aloud against the *country bank paper*. Their reasons for this were obvious enough; and, it really does appear to me, that persons of this description, including all those more immediately connected with the Bank of England, are pleased at what has now happened to the country banks; nay, I am decidedly of opinion, that if it fell in their way, they would, as the saying is, lend a hand to help the lame dog over the stile. Their purposes may, indeed, be answered by the abolishing of country banks, in just the same way that the interests of three or four great porter-brewers would be furthered by a law to put down all other breweries; but, what good the

public would derive from the establishment of such a monopoly it is not, I think, easy to point out.—The evils produced by the country money are, *First*, an *enhancing of the nominal price of every thing*, and thus operating to the great injury of people of fixed incomes in particular.—But, how would the proposed change alter this? How would it remedy this evil? This evil is produced by the *quantity* and not by the *kind* of the circulating paper; and, what is proposed, is, to change the kind merely without at all reducing the quantity.—*Secondly*, the difficulty of *getting change* would be just as great when the country money had given place to the Threadneedle Street money as it is now, unless the quantity of the notes were reduced.—*Thirdly*, supposing it to be an evil to enable farmers to hold their corn back from sale, why could they not do it by the means of one kind of paper as well as another?—*Fourthly*, it may be said, that there would be less danger from *bankruptcy*. From *partial* bankruptcy there certainly would; but, I think, ~~there would be no doubt~~ that, if any of these schemes were adopted, a *general bankruptcy* would be greatly hastened on. As matters now stand, there is for part of the *country money*, at any rate, *land security*; though, from Mr. Waddington's letter, inserted in my last Number, it would seem, that capital, or *property*, is the last thing that a money maker thinks of. Still, however, there is *land security* for a part of the country money. But, if it were all Threadneedle street money, or, as these projectors seem to wish, *government money*, which would indeed, be the same thing, what *security* would there then be? And, who would then prescribe limits to the printing of paper-money? Will these wisacres ask us what *better security* we want than that of the government, supported as it is? If they do, we have only to remind them, that the *Assignats of France* had government security, and, to make them still more solid, each bit of paper bore upon the face of it, that the holder had a *mortgage* for the amount upon the *National Lands*. The assignats, or, mortgage bonds, did, nevertheless, become waste paper, and the holders, in the habit of smoking, had the advantage of possessing nice convenient snips for lighting their pipes. Just the same took place in the case of the Congress-Money in America. And the same will always take place, when the *government* becomes the issuer of a currency

which has not an intrinsic value. This seems strange to such people as those whom I have quoted above. They look upon the government as being the safest debtor, because it has *so much power*. But, do we reason thus in common life? Do we wish for *powerful debtors*? Do we find it most easy to get our money from such debtors? Do men like to have *peers* for their debtors? What reason, then, should induce them to prefer a debtor, who, if there be no law to exempt him from the payment of his debts, *can make such law*, at any moment that he pleases? What should induce them to prefer a debtor like this to a debtor, who is amenable to the existing and known law? In France and America the government was the debtor, and they paid with a sponge; and, we have, in Holland, an example not many weeks old, of what sort of a debtor a *government* may become when it chooses. Not that I take upon me to *blame* what has been done in Holland, any more than I do the *deduction made from the interest on English bonds, under the name of property tax*; or of the law, passed, to *prevent the Creditors of the Bank of England from recovering money due to them from that bank, upon promissory notes*. I do not take upon me to blame any of these measures; but, really, it is being a little too foolish for "A READER," and even for "a constant READER," of the Morning Post, to suppose, that a paper-currency, not exchangeable, at pleasure, into coin, would be *less liable* to an excessive issue; if it proceeded directly from under the authority of the government; to believe that such excess would find a *check* in the circumstance of the issue being in the hands of *uncontroulable power*. This is, one would have thought, a little too absurd and stupid even for a "Clerical READER" of the Morning Post. —Now, all that has been said here as to the consequences of the government taking into its *own hands* the issuing of paper-money to supply the place of that now issued from the country banks, applies, with nearly equal force, to the putting of a like power *in the hands of the Threadneedle Street Company*, which, in such case, would, in appearance as well as in fact, become identified with the government. —In short, all these schemes and projects are the effect, not of reflection, but of a conviction of danger. They bear no distinctive marks of any thing but haste; haste, not of courage or of zeal, but of trepidation and ignorance; of folly

in a fright. As in most other desperate cases, the patient, having been given up by men of science, who have left her to die quietly, has become a subject whereon for ignorant and conceited quacks to make experiments. —It is, however, a *growing persuasion*, that the *country bank-notes* are the cause of the pecuniary evils we experience, as a proof of which, and as a document hereafter to be referred to, I shall here insert a set of Resolutions, which, it appears, have been passed in the Town of CARNARVON, against receiving Country bank-notes:—"At a Meeting of the "Tradesmen and others of the Town of "Carnarvon, convened at the Guild-Hall, "on Friday the third day of August, 1810, "to take into consideration the propriety "of rejecting or accepting local Notes in "consequence of the numerous Failures "that have taken place among the Coun- "try Banks.—It was resolved unani- "mously,—That it is the opinion of this "Meeting, that ~~no Local Notes whatever~~ "ought to be received; and we pledge our- "selves not to accept any Notes in payment "except those of the Bank of England, from "and after the 20th day of August instant. "—That this Resolution be published "twice in the North Wales Gazette, and "by Hand Bills, to be circulated in the "Town of Carnarvon, and be signed by "the Gentlemen attending the Meeting. "—That the Thanks of the Meeting be "presented to the Chairman, for his con- "duct in the Chair."—This pledge is signed by *fifty persons*, and, as the whole is in a *printed hand-bill*, we may easily suppose, that the alarm and uproar will become pretty general in Wales. How foolish these resolutions are, in a general view, we have seen above; but, they are not to be wondered at. People, and especially those who have been partizans of the Pitt paper system, feel a degree of mortification, hardly to be conceived, at seeing the system totter. They fret and fume and know not on what to vent their anger. The correspondent (to whom I am much obliged) who was so good as to forward this hand-bill to me, says, that "most of the persons, signing the Resolutions, are Members of the MENAI "PITT CLUB." Oh! how just is all this! How good it is! Ah! They thought that a turn was never to come. They will now, perhaps, begin to reflect upon the past. No: they will not do that. They will still persevere. They will go on to the last in their insolent accusations

against all those, who doubt of the goodness of that system, which has naturally produced all these alarms and distresses. Let them; let them go on! Let them, since nothing has, for so long a time, been able to mollify their malignity, be caught, at last, with curses upon their lips. Let them, as the thing comes on, fly with the continual vexation that it will not fail to engender; and, at last, let them be smothered with the overflowings of their gall.

BULLION REPORT.—I mentioned this Report, in my Register of the 4th instant, page 135. It is now out; but, I must not attempt to touch it here. I must not attempt to touch it, till I can do it *ample justice*. This is a thing not to be garbled. This Report has given me more delight than any thing I ever set my eyes on, my wife and children only excepted. If any one had left me an estate in land of ten thousand a year; nay, if the whole of Hampshire, Culliners and all, had been given to me in fee simple, my pleasure would not have been a millionth part so great as that inspired by the reading of this Report. For how could all the riches, all "the base lucre," in the world give me, in the way of gratification, any thing equal to that, which, in the most solemn manner, and coming from the highest authority, confirms the truth of those doctrines, which, during many years, I have been inculcating, and for inculcating which I have been so foully belied and so grossly abused.—Yes, reader, I am in a prison, to be sure, but my principles are at large; they are spread far and wide, and have made greater progress than ever within the last two months.—This **BULLION REPORT**, reader, you and the nation and the whole civilized world, shall possess, with such explanations, such a commentary, as shall make the whole as clear as the GISS CROSS ROW. But, to give it you in this state requires time; and, though I shall not rest till it be done, I cannot promise it *next* week, it being (in order to do the thing in a complete manner) necessary for me to refer to many books, some of which I find it difficult to get at, and the reference to which must take up a great deal of time. Your patience, however, shall not, if I have life, go unrequited.—I cannot, however, for the life and soul of me, refrain from begging you to think of the Bank's paying in gold **AT TWO YEARS FROM THIS TIME!** Do,

pray, think of that. Oh! what precious work we are going to have! We are now going to see things that none of us ever thought, or ever dreamt, of.

PORTUGAL.—The dispatch from my lord the Viscount of Talavera and Baron of Douro will have been read by every one long before this sheet can get to the press. The *dispatch*, did I say? I mean a *part* of the dispatch; and "Extract of a Letter, &c." My readers remember, doubtless, how we were treated with extracts from my lord Talavera de la Reyna's letters, about the time of the great victory, which gave rise to that title.—The Morning Post tells us, that our army in Portugal is "*full of confidence*;" that "the Portuguese soldiers behave admirably; and, that, in General Craufurd's affair, "British soldiers gave "the enemy an earnest of what may be expected in a general engagement." Did they indeed? What! is the same to happen to the whole army, that then happened to one division of it? Call you that back on your friends? I am not saying that General Craufurd committed any fault; but, he went away from the place where he was. The enemy having come to the spot where he was, he went away, and the enemy went after him. Now, if this was an earnest of what was to happen, when a general engagement takes place, there can, I imagine, be but little doubt as to what will be the fate of Portugal.—This "extract" from my Lord Talavera de la Reyna's letter does not contain any account of the *strength of the enemy*; which I the more marvel at, seeing that (as we were before informed, you know, reader) so many of the French soldiers were continually deserting, and coming over to us and our allies. It was, therefore, very easy, one would have thought, to ascertain the exact numbers of the enemy. There are, doubtless, very cogent and wise reasons for not publishing the whole of Lord Talavera's dispatch, and for not stating to us the *force of the enemy*; but, there is no reason why I should not remind my readers that we have a very numerous army to meet that enemy; that we are paying no less than 30 thousand Portuguese troops, besides 30 thousand of our own, in that country; that we have there, in short, an army of sixty thousand men, with horses in abundance, with a numerous train of artillery, attended by ships of war and

transports and boats without end. The Morning Post seems to *complain*, that Lord Talavera has not had *force enough* sent to him, and it calls aloud for our *last man* to be instantly sent off. But, if the force he has, be not sufficient, what will, or what can, be sufficient? At any rate, *we are paying*, in Portugal, an army of *Sixty thousand men*! Always bear that fact in mind; and, when the thing is over, you will easily judge whether the effect be worthy of the means.—I regret, for another reason, that we have been fed so scantily upon this letter of my Lord Talavera de la Reyna. My brains had been puzzled to discover, *why my Lord TALAVERA sailed with his army to see the French take Rodrigo, before he began to move off*. This perhaps, might have been explained by the letter, if we could but have seen the whole of it.—But, in the absence of this explanation, let us bear in mind; let us repeat it to ourselves and to others; “first, last, middle and without end,” let us repeat, that we, the people of this country, are *paying an army of Sixty thousand men in Portugal*.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
17th August, 1810.

N. B. In consequence of numerous letters inquiring, whether *broken sets* of the REGISTER can be completed, I think it necessary to state here that they may, *at present*; but, that gentlemen who wish to have their sets completed, must apply without loss of time; at least before the 15th of September.

IRISH CORN.

Sir;—In consequence of your observations in the Register of the 4th respecting Irish Grain, I beg to trouble you with the following accurate statement of prices taken from the enclosed return of the markets. In Dublin, week ending August 2nd, wheat per barrel of 20 stone, middle price 68s., or about 108s. 9d. per English quarter of 32½ stone, or 100s. exchange being at par.—Oats per barrel of 14 stone 19s. 9d. or about 29s. per English quarter of 21¼ stone, or 26s. 7d. exchange at par.—At Cork wheat is at 52s. 8d. per barrel, which is 77s. English per English quarter. At Wexford wheat is at 48s. per barrel, which is 70s. 5d. English per English quarter. At the same place oats are 14s. per barrel which is 19s. 3d. English per

English quarter. At Ennis they are 15s. 6d. At Galway 12s. 6d. At Youghal 15s. 5d. Irish per barrel.—With respect to the new harvest, there never was known such a prospect of abundance. The wheat crop is particularly promising, so is the potatoe crop.—In case you, or any of your readers, wish to compare the prices of grain in these two countries, you may do so by taking the English quarter of wheat at 32½ stone of 14 lb.; of barley at 28 stone; of oats at 21¼ stone. The Irish barrel of wheat at 20 stone, of barley at 16 stone, of oats at 14 stone. A. B.

9th August, 1810.

FRENCH ARGUS.

The Situation and Prospects of England, as described in the ARGUS, a News-paper published in the English language at Paris; which News-paper is said to have been conducted by MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR.

“At the moment when we are terminating our labours, we naturally look back upon the career we have traversed; and the changes produced in Europe in less than nine years, appear to us, as it were, the work of nine centuries.—We recollect what was the origin of this. The *ultimatum* that preceded the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens is still fresh in our memory. The Britannic Cabinet scarcely needed pretexts to break a treaty which it openly avowed to have been no more than a truce. Its object and policy at that period was to reduce the power of France, by stirring up enemies against her on the Continent; but on comparing the situation of the belligerent parties, and considering what they were then, and what they are now, we are struck at seeing how far England is from having realized the hopes held out to her, and how much France has surpassed even all that her most ardent friends could have conceived. On both sides, the results of this war are so many important lessons to be treasured up.—To begin this picture, with an examination of the finances of England. It is known with what emphasis the Ministers, every year, announce their prosperous state. Their speeches are pompous; their calculations rigorously just; but the result of their labours uniformly is, to augment the taxes, and open fresh loans! In 1802, the general produce of the taxes, exclusive of the interest of the debt, was estimated at £31,000,000 sterling; in

1809, it was £53,000,000, and the expenditure of 1810 must carry it still higher. Men of sense are struck with this progressive augmentation, to which, if we add about £20,000,000 sterling, for the interest of the National Debt, the whole territorial income of Great Britain is scarcely adequate. These are results that speak more plainly than the hypothetical calculations of Gentz, Ivernois, &c. Though the system of the Sinking Fund, when subjected to mathematical examination, can extinguish this enormous debt in a given space of time, yet this certainly has, hitherto, been in the hands of the English Ministry only a lure to gull the people, and to make them support, without murmuring, the oppressive weight of loans. At the creation of the Sinking Fund, the public debt was only £238,000,000. What then have been the results to England of this marvellous invention? An increase of more than £400,000,000 in twenty-four years. Either the calculations were false, or the Ministers have governed ill. Mr. Pitt calculated the extinction of the debt upon the supposition of fifty years of peace, and his Ministry was remarkable only for his obstinate perseverance in a war ruinous to his country! Accordingly, his fantastic calculations were constantly disappointed. His successors have followed his system, and while boasting of the wealth of the nation, they have been daily enlarging the abyss which is open before it. The facility with which the loans are filled up, dazzles the vulgar. We have repeatedly had occasion to shew how burdensome they are to the State. The intimate connection between the Bank and the Exchequer renders them still more dangerous. The bill, which suspended the payments at the Bank in specie, which, though it ought to have been only a few months in force, has now existed 13 years, actually placed the Bank and the Government in a state of insolvency. The confidence of individuals may certainly make them content themselves with the fictitious value they receive; but this confidence will have an end. The successive depreciation of the paper-money must necessarily lead to a crisis which the union of the Bank and Government cannot prevent.—The administration of the finances of France presents quite another aspect. There the revenue is equal to the expenditure. Foreign and expensive war has not in the least deranged the

system. The safety of the State does not rest on hypothetical calculations. The economic regimen of this vast empire is as simple as that of a family; the system of loans leaves no uneasiness for the future—the debts of the past are provided for, and there is no intention of contracting new debts. In a word, the largest State in Europe is the least in debt; and the institution of the Bank augments the circulation of specie, without creating any apprehension as to the solidity of its paper.—If, from an examination of the finances, we proceed to that of the internal administration of the two countries, we find every Session of the British Parliament offering fresh enormities, or teeming with fruitless accusations for the punishment of past misconduct, or unavailing complaints in order to prevent the future errors of Ministers. Still the blood and treasures of the nation are lavished in disastrous expeditions, and the citizens are a prey to a spirit of fiction, the forerunner of anarchical disturbances. Ireland, still separate, notwithstanding its union, is in a manner severed from the three-fourths of her population, and subject, with regard to her worship, her peasantry, and her existence, to iniquitous restrictions. In France, on the contrary, every Session of the Legislative Body has been distinguished by institutions adapted to the interests and the manners of the nation. Every people called to make part of this vast empire, have instantly entered upon the enjoyments of the benefits of a legislation to all protective and equal. Thus have the arts, the sciences, and literature, every where taken a new flight; and the distinguished productions which have characterised this reign, will not be lost to future generations. Here agriculture, the first of arts, has made a most remarkable progress; and France, thus fertile, may barter her surplus for the commodities she wants. The well judged prohibition of English merchandize has supported the national industry; a few years perseverance in this wise policy will secure the existence of the new manufactures that have sprung up in the interior. The English Government, perhaps at this moment, persists in making war only for the interests of its commerce, and every day diminishes its advantages; every campaign precipitates its ruin. The manufactories of London, Birmingham, and Manchester, are asserted. Thousands of artisans have no other means of subsistence but the poor-rates. The markets,

of the continent are shut to their productions, whilst French merchandize every where finds vent and purchasers. The interruption of colonial commerce is to France only a transient evil, from which result permanent advantages. She pays dearer for a few foreign commodities, but she abounds in the necessities of life. During this interruption of her communications with different countries, her internal navigation is improving, and highways are, in all directions, opening between provinces, the diversity of whose productions presents the most advantageous and solid commerce to the ingenuity of the speculator, the industry of the artisan, or the labour of the agriculturist.—What are the advantages that England derives from a monopoly odious to all nations? A few individuals grow rich, but the mass of the people suffer. To a particular speculation, that of having the brokerage of foreign commodities, the Government sacrifices the more solid advantage which it previously drew from the national industry. It has reduced a part of its population to a state of misery; it teaches the rest of Europe to dispense with its productions; it places itself at the mercy of events; it makes its power and wealth subordinate to resources which are quite foreign to it. The superiority of its marine dazzles its eyes. It is by having a few vessels more, that it thinks to avert the inevitable ascendancy of France. It is by the acquisition of a few petty islands, that it thinks to counterbalance the incorporation of many large States with the great Empire! But how much has the relative power of England and France changed since 1803?—With less pride in his pretensions, with more frankness in his policy, the genius of Napoleon has laid the foundations of a power henceforth immovable. The war of 1805, which Mr. Pitt looked upon as a master-piece of policy, gave rise to the League of the Rhine, and the kingdoms of Westphalia, Holland, and Naples. That of Prussia extended the boundaries of the League of the Rhine to the Vistula; and the obstinacy of the British Government, in refusing every overture of peace, after the Treaty of Tilsit, and during the conferences at Erfurth, and the intrigues carried on in Spain and Portugal against France, have put the Peninsula under the inevitable dominion of the Empire. Finally, the last efforts of the disciples of Mr. Pitt to seduce the Austrian Cabinet,

have laid, between two nations made to esteem each other, the foundations of a peace, of which a recent august alliance will perpetuate the duration. Thus has France been successively strengthened by all the Allies that England had at the commencement of the war of the Revolution; and the English Ministry, constantly blundering in the employment of its military means, has shewn an equal want of foresight in its political combinations.—They might have appeared with some advantage, or, at all events, with some honour, in the field of battle, when the armies of the Coalitions maintained the contest with France. During those memorable campaigns, there were twenty occasions in which 40,000 English, landed in Italy or Germany, might have created a diversion truly beneficial. But then the English Ministry were employed only in such expeditions as that of Copenhagen. They thought less of serving their allies than of weakening all of them, and of destroying even the very shadow of a maritime and commercial power. Their conduct has discovered their secret. They became sensible of their error, when the unexpected victories of France deprived them of all hope of repairing it. From that moment, as to a war by land, they ought only to have taken a defensive attitude; yet, all of a sudden, they assumed the offensive, when they had nothing else to expect but the useless loss of men and money. Out of one error they have fallen into another, and put to hazard their internal security, without re-conquering the military honour they had lost. The same spirit of absurdity made them undertake and misconduct the expeditions to Spain and Walcheren. They will exhibit nearly the same results in the history of the war. Hitherto the English army seems only to have kept its ground because there was no French army to contend with it. But the Ministry themselves have no serious intention of defending Portugal when it shall be regularly attacked. Soon they will only be embarrassed as to the means of saving the fragments of an army that would have been better employed in the defence of their own territory.—Thus is the sum total of the present war, that of having given to France all the Allies that England had at the commencement of it—having augmented the direct dominion of France by a population of from 25 to 30,000,000 of inhabitants—having given her an extent of more than 1,200 leagues

of coast, many maritime ports of the first rank, and several new dock-yards on the North Sea, the Ocean, Mediterranean, and Adriatic—having given her a continental commerce, which the whole British navy cannot obstruct—an influence which nothing can henceforward diminish. As to England, the result of 8 years of war has been such an increase of her debt and expenditure, that she can no longer do without paper-money, the first step towards Bankruptcy—the augmentation, and the necessity of a still greater augmentation, of a maritime establishment, which is out of all proportion to her population, and her demands for the defence of her colonies—that of being left, as to her foreign concerns, in the same insulated state in which she wished to place France, with the loss of all her commercial relations with the Continent of Europe; (for the alliance she still maintains with Turkey will be as short lived, as the alliance which prolongs the calamities of the Spanish peninsula)—that of soon having to watch 2,000 leagues of coast, and sixty maritime ports, whence, in defiance of her, will sail forth numerous fleets, capable of disputing with her the freedom of the seas; when that moment shall have arrived, England will be struck with terror at the abyss dug by a succession of weak or perfidious Ministers.—If the present can supply any certain data for calculating the future, this war must gradually produce the absolute ruin of that once flourishing nation. Hitherto she has supported her financial system by uncommon efforts and extraordinary advantages that are daily diminishing. She has supported her maritime and military establishment by the divisions she has fostered among the Continental Powers—by the treachery and desertion of foreign soldiers and sailors, whom she has taken into her pay. She has for a time prolonged the existence of her commerce by smuggling. She had no fear of her colonies, owing to the necessity to which she reduced France of attending exclusively to the affairs of the Continent. But, at length, general tranquillity is on the point of being established; and England, which hitherto has had to defend only foreign interests, is on the eve of fighting *pro aris et focis*; and then it is that her weakness will become manifest. The actual superiority of her marine, and the vast extent of her colonies, cannot save her. We have just shewn, that she will be com-

pelled to augment her naval expenditure to which the profits of her commerce will be inadequate. Meanwhile, she will neither have foreign seamen, nor ship-timber, nor iron, and the other materials, which she has hitherto procured at a low price from the North. If she designs to follow up her system of blockade, she will require an establishment double of what she now has; and her cruising squadrons, always weak or ill supplied, will be, at length, beaten or forced to shun the conflict. The loss of 20 naval engagements will not compel France to abandon her system; within her own territory, or that of the allies, she will possess all the means of repairing her losses. If she gains a single battle, the maritime superiority of England, will have vanished, and 60,000 men, encamped at Boulogne, will make those birds of the ocean tremble to all eternity.—In the enormous extent of the colonies of England, there is undoubtedly something to flatter the pride of those who judge superficially of the force of a state. But this colossal power carries within itself the seeds of destruction. The colonial system received a violent shock by the separation of the United States of America. The revolt of St. Domingo gave the second example. The bloody intrigues of the English Ministry in Spain, may lead to the independence of the Spanish colonies; and this revolution, in which it absurdly seems to rejoice, advances the epoch of that which must inevitably effect, in both hemispheres—the independence of colonies powerful enough to defend themselves, and rich enough to subsist upon their own resources. The English Ministry, blinded by ambition, hatred and cupidity, has, long beforehand, been preparing those calamities which will prove fatal to England alone. The French Empire, where the revenue, the expenditure, the population, and the military establishment, are so completely harmonized, requires, in reality, nothing but a free commerce, in order to avail herself of all the wealth of the universe. Her industry, and the surplus of her territorial produce, will procure for her all the enjoyments of Asiatic luxury, at a less expence than the establishment of distant colonies.—England, on the contrary, cannot behold this revolution without sinking into a Power of the third order. In vain would she pretend to engross the commerce of the whole world by the superiority of her navy. This superiority, as we have al-

ready observed, may be disputed with her. Besides, she eagerly clings to the extent of her colonial possessions, which she must defend. In the event of a general separation of the great colonies from their mother-countries, they will desire commercial independence after establishing political independence. England will then have to maintain, in all parts of the world, that contest which has been protracted, for these last three years, with the United States. The terms of the contest may vary, but the substance will remain the same; and its inevitable result must be the abolition of the odious laws which Great Britain wishes to impose upon the rest of the world.—Whilst this grand epoch is in train, a change, fatal to the interests of England, is operating in the commerce of Europe. The continental communications, of one State with another, are beginning to be carried on with more regularity; their industry is improving; their agriculture makes remarkable progress. The impolitic war in which Turkey has been involved, retards the epoch when a free route will be opened to European commerce into the very heart of Asia. But whatever be the issue of this struggle, Constantinople must be the rampart of the Continental system.—Great rivers form a conveyance from the extremities of Europe to the very foot of its walls; a land-locked sea carries its vessels to the centre of Asia; and against such advantages the English Navy will be absolutely inefficient. Constantinople is the terror of the British commerce. Hence the ministry has always endeavoured to keep that Power in ignorance of her means, or to make her misapply them. But the revolution which must occur in the commerce of the world is approaching, and that revolution will reduce England to her proper station, if some catastrophe do not precipitate her ruin in a more violent manner.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Gazette Account of General Craufurd's Defeat near Almeida.*

DOWNING STREET, 11 Aug. 1810.—*A Dispatch, of which the following is an extract, was this morning received at Lord Liverpool's Office, addressed to his Lordship by Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, dated Alverca, July 25, 1810.*

The cavalry attached to general Craufurd's advanced guard remained in the

villages near the fort of La Concepcion till the 21st instant, when the enemy obliged it to retire towards Almeida, and the fort La Concepcion was destroyed.—From the 21st till yesterday morning, brigadier-general Craufurd continued to occupy a position near Almeida, with his left within 800 yards of the Fort, and his right extending towards Junco. The enemy attacked him in this position yesterday morning, shortly after daylight, with a very large body of infantry and cavalry, and the Brigadier-General retired across the bridge over the Coa.—In this operation, I am sorry to say, that the troops under his command suffered considerable loss.—The enemy afterwards made three efforts to storm the bridge over the Coa, in all of which they were repulsed.—I am informed that throughout this trying day the commanding officers of the 13th, 52d, and 90th regiments, lieut. col. Beckwith, lieut. col. Barclay, and lieut. col. Hill, and all the officers and soldiers of these excellent regiments, distinguished themselves. In lieut. col. Hill, who was killed, his Majesty has lost an able and deserving officer.—Brigadier-general Craufurd has also noticed the steadiness of the 3d regiment of Portuguese Chasseurs under the command of lieut. col. Elder.—Since yesterday the enemy have made no movement.

Copy of General Craufurd's Report, inclosed in Lord Wellington's Dispatch of the 25th July, dated Carrethol, July 25, 1810.

My Lord; I have the honour to report to your Lordship, that yesterday morning the enemy advanced to attack the light division with between three and four thousand cavalry, a considerable number of guns, and a large body of infantry. On the first appearance of the heads of their columns, the cavalry and brigade of artillery attached to the division advanced to support the picquets, and captain Ross, with four guns, was for some time engaged with those attached to the enemy's cavalry, which were of much larger calibre.—As the immense superiority of the enemy's force displayed itself, we fell back gradually towards the fortress, upon the right of which the infantry of the division was posted, having its left in some inclosures near the windmill, about 800 yards from the place, and its right to the Coa, in a very broken and extensive position, which it was absolutely necessary to

occupy, in order to cover the passage of the cavalry and artillery through the long defile leading to the bridge. After this was effected, the infantry retired by degrees, and in as good order as it is possible in ground so extremely intricate. A position close in front of the bridge was maintained as long as was necessary, to give time for the troops which had passed, to take up one behind the river; and the bridge was afterwards defended with the greatest gallantry, though I am sorry to say with considerable loss, by the 43d and part of the 95th regiments. Towards the afternoon the firing ceased; and after it was dark, I withdrew the troops from the Coa, and retired to this place. The troops behaved with the greatest gallantry.—(Signed) R. CRAUFURD.

Those returned as prisoners and missing were taken in a charge of the enemy's cavalry just after our cavalry and guns had begun to retire.

Names of Officers killed, wounded and missing.

KILLED—43d Foot—Lieut.-col. Edward Hull, captain E. Cameron, lieut. John Nison.—95th Foot—Lieut. Donald M'Leod.—WOUNDED—Staff—Lieut. Shaw, 43d Regiment, aid-de-camp to brig.-general R. Craufurd, slightly. 14th Light Dragoons—Lieut. Blatchford, severely. 1st Battalion of the 43d Regiment—Captains P. Deshon, T. Lloyd, and W. F. P. Napier, slightly; captain J. W. Hall, severely; lieut. George Johnstone, slightly; lieut. J. P. Hopkins, severely; lieut. Horatio Hancot, slightly; lieutenants J. M'Dermid, J. Stevenson, Roger Frederick, severely.—52d ditto—Major Henry Ridewood, slightly; captain R. Campbell, ditto.—95th ditto—Captain Jasper Creagh and Samuel Mitchell, severely, since dead; 1st lieutenant H. C. Smith, slightly; 1st lieutenants Mathias Pratt, Peter Riley, Alex. Coane, and Thomas Smith, severely; 2d lieutenant George Simmons, ditto.—MISSING—1st Battalion of the 95th Regiment—Lieut. J. G. M'Culloch, taken prisoner.

Return of the Number of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of a Division of the Army under the Command of his Excellency Lieut.-Gen. Lord Viscount

Wellington, K. B. in Action with the French Army near Almeida, on the 24th July, 1810.—Head Quarters, Alverca, July 15, 1810.

Staff—1 Staff, wounded.—Royal Horse Artillery—2 horses, killed; 2 horses, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—14th Light Dragoons—1 serjeant killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 rank and file, 4 horses wounded.—16th Light Dragoons—3 horses wounded.—1st Hussars, King's German Legion—1 horse killed; 2 rank and file, 3 horses wounded.—1st Battalion 43d Foot—1 lieut.-col., 1 captain, 1 lieut., 2 serjeants, 13 rank and file killed; 4 captains, 6 lieutenants, 8 serjeants, 77 rank and file wounded; 1 drummer, 14 rank and file missing.—1st Battalion 52d Foot—1 rank and file killed; 1 major, 1 captain wounded; 3 rank and file missing.—1st Battalion 95th Foot—1 lieutenant, 11 rank and file killed; 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 54 rank and file wounded; 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 52 rank and file missing.—1st Battalion Portuguese Cassadores—2 rank and file killed; 7 rank and file wounded; 7 rank and file missing.—3d Ditto—2 rank and file killed; 1 serjeant, 23 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—TOTAL—1 lieut.-colonel, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 29 rank and file, 3 horses killed; 1 Staff, 1 major, 7 captains, 12 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 10 serjeants, 164 rank and file, 12 horses wounded; 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 80 rank and file missing.—N. B. One Officer of the Portuguese Cassadores wounded, rank and name not ascertained. (Signed) C. STEWART, Brig.-Gen. and Adj. Gen.

COBBETT'S

Parliamentary Debates:

The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Volumes of the above Work are in the Press, and will be published with all proper dispatch. All Communications will be carefully attended to; but it is particularly requested that they may be forwarded as early as possible.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 7.] LONDON, SATURDAY, AUGUST 25, 1810. [Price 1s.

"The ARMY, against whom this Libel is in a peculiar manner directed, calls on the Court for justice against its seducer."—ATTORNEY GENERAL'S Speech, Thursday, 5th July, 1810.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

DUKE OF YORK.—For some days past, there has been in the town a sort of *hubbub* respecting an *Address*, which, it was said, was handing about, from regiment to regiment, for signatures, the object of which *Address* was to cause the Duke of York to be restored to his office of *Commander in Chief*. The *Address*, as published in the *COURIER* news-paper of the 22nd instant, was as follows.—"To

THE ARMY.—The auspicious hour has arrived, that enables the friends of truth to justly appreciate the injuries and oppression that have been heaped upon the character of his Royal Highness the Duke of York. The base and unprecedented secret motives, so unsuccessfully practised, to degrade his Royal Highness, and also to destroy the happiness and repose of the Royal Family, are now completely developed! by the late trials and publications that have succeeded: events that are disgraceful to the annals of Britain! and must reflect an odium upon the age that has tolerated proceedings that will ever be recollected with contemptuous pity and regret!!!—When we reflect what must have been the sufferings of an aged and excellent Monarch, in experiencing a diminution of his family's dignity—by the disaffected and mercenary proceedings of a party, who had neither principle, truth, or honour, for their support; we are amazed that noble characteristic of Englishmen should have been subverted by the intrigue of faction.—We must at this moment sincerely regret the hasty, yet dignified resignation of the Duke of York, which we are now sensible, did not proceed from a self conviction of error, but from a disposition to comply with the public mind, which was at that period led away by the torrent of prejudice, then most nefariously raised against his Royal Highness.—From a thorough conviction of the injuries his Royal Highness has suffered in his character, and re-

putation, we anticipate the wishes of the military, in the restoration of his Royal Highness to that situation his conduct so dignified, evinced in the regulations, and benevolence he most liberally and impartially extended to all ranks in the army.—The army is, therefore, requested to afford their signature to a Petition, intended to be presented to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, to humbly intreat his Majesty will be graciously pleased to restore his Royal Highness Frederick Duke of York, to the office of *Commander in Chief*, &c. &c.—Books for the signature of those Officers, who are disposed to subscribe to the above Petition, are now opened at, &c."

—Now, as to what this *Address* says about the *base means used against the Duke of York*, it will pass for nothing as long as the two *Darling Letters* remain, and indeed as long as the proceedings of 1809 are in existence. However, this is not the subject now to be considered. Nor do I, for my part, think that it signifies one straw, whether the Duke of York be restored or not. To put him out of his place was an object not worth an hour of the time of any man above the rank of a common day-labourer; and very stupid indeed must those be, who supposed that Mr. Wardle's undertaking was directed to this point. For my own part, I have declared over and over again, that I would not have taken my right leg and thrown it across my left knee for the sake of ousting him from his place. There was, and there is, to me nothing that I can form an idea of more indifferent than whether he be or be not *Commander in Chief*. Whether the fly that is now moving about upon my paper be a male or a female is a matter of full as much importance in my sight as whether the Duke of York or Sir David Dundas be *Commander in Chief*.—But, as to this *Address* to the ARMY to sign a petition, calling upon the King to restore the Duke of York, that is a matter worthy of something in the way of observation, especially considering the manner, in which it has

been spoken of by the news-papers, those of the ministerial side not excepted.—The *Courier* of the 22nd, has these remarks upon the subject.—“We have inserted in our last page the Address to which we alluded yesterday, purporting to be an Address to the Army relative to the restoration of the Duke of York as Commander in Chief. We had prepared some remarks upon it. But we understand that the Address has been *disavowed*; and a Morning Paper asserts that his Royal Highness *has expressed his indignation* at this pretended interference of the army, which has given serious offence to many military Officers of high rank, and that *measures are now taking to detect the person or persons with whom this application originated, in order to adopt measures to bring the parties to punishment.*”—The idea of an Army constituting itself a deliberative body, cannot be too deeply reprobated as the most unconstitutional and most hostile to our FREEDOM that could possibly be entertained.”—But, if this be true, what are we to think of the Attorney General’s positive declaration, made to the face of the Judges, that the ARMY called upon them for justice against me? It, surely, cannot be worse for the army to interfere in military than in civil matters. It, surely, cannot be worse for them to call for the promotion of a superior officer, than for them to call upon the Judges to inflict punishment to *avenger* them. And, after reading in the news-papers, that the Judges had been told to their teeth, that the army called upon them to do thus or thus, was it at all wonderful if they thought themselves at liberty to call upon the king to promote his son? And yet the *Courier*, who said not a word about the speech of the Attorney General, has now discovered, that it is “the most unconstitutional and most hostile to our freedom,” for the army to constitute itself a deliberative body. Why was not this remark made, when, in the court of King’s Bench, the Judges were told, that the army called upon them to punish its traducer? “Unconstitutional,” indeed! “Hostile to our freedom!” And, does the man who writes and sells this, think that any living creature is to be deceived by it? Does he think that even those who believe that a man can add to his money by taking it out of one pocket and putting it into the other, are to be, now-a-days, deceived by this? If he does, I really

pity him. There is not a mad-house in the three kingdoms that contains any poor soul idiot enough to be any longer imposed upon by such cant.

HOLLAND.—So many things, nearer home, or, at least, of more pressing interest, have, of late, offered themselves, that I have been induced to postpone the observations, that I intended to make upon the late change in Holland, by which the Emperor Napoleon has taken that country wholly into his own hands, or, in other words, has in name as well as in fact, united it to France.—A great deal has been written, in the English prints, upon this change; but, the writers have confined themselves almost wholly to the taking of such views of the matter as men might be expected to take, who were excessively angry with Napoleon. But, it appears to me, that we should bestow our time, as far as is connected with this subject, in considering whether the change recently made in Holland will affect us; and, if it be likely to do so, *how it will affect us.*—Nevertheless, as being matter of history, we ought not to omit that part of the subject, with which we may be less directly concerned. Let us, then, consider the change, 1st, as a matter between Napoleon and his brother Louis; 2ndly, as a thing affecting the people of Holland; and, 3rdly, as an event affecting England.—As to the first, had I never read any of the English commentaries upon the conduct of the Emperor, in this respect, I should have regarded the change as nothing more than the mere displacing of an agent, and taking the care of the thing into the principal’s own hands; for, I never looked upon king Louis as any thing more than the agent, or the servant, of the Emperor; and, if the writers in our public prints ever looked upon him in any other light, they were guilty of most shameful hypocrisy; for, where is the reader, who can fail to bear in mind, that these writers have, ever since Louis was appointed king of Holland, continually insisted, that Holland was a province of France? Where is the reader, who can fail to have this fact fresh in his memory? But, behold! now that the use of a name is thrown aside, these writers affect to have looked upon Holland as an independent kingdom! Aye; but that is not all. They not only affect to have regarded Holland as an independent kingdom; but, have regarded king Louis as a very good sort of a king. Oh! how many

times have these same writers spoken of this same Louis in terms the most harsh and degrading! What abuse have they not heaped upon him! And in what melting strains have they poured forth their tender hearts in pity towards the poor good Dutch, who were wailing the loss of the House of Orange, under the cruel compulsion of submitting to this upstart tyrant of the House of Buonaparté! But, the moment that Napoleon turned this "upstart tyrant" off, the tyrant became a very good king in the eyes of these gentlemen. Whether the letter of Louis (see Register, present Volume, page 150) be genuine or not, I do not pretend to say, though if I were to give my *opinion* I should give it in the negative; but, be that as it may, what ground is there for any one to say that Louis was a good king? What did he ever do for the people of Holland? Why, however, do I ask any question of this sort, when it is notorious, that these writers all of them treated him as the tool in the hands of a more powerful despot; and, that they represented him as being particularly detestable, because his office served to disguise, in some sort, the real tyranny that he was employed to exercise over the poor good Dutchmen, who, up to the hour that it was known, or reported, that Napoleon meant to dethrone his brother, were represented as being in the situation the most deplorable in the world. From that hour, however, Louis became an object of praise with the London prints, who called him "the *honest and excellent* Louis;" who styled his Letter "an *affecting publication*;" who lamented that "he could no longer be of service" to the Dutch; who said that he was unable, by the power of "his *intreaties* to rescue them from the most horrible of all calamities, the quartering of FOREIGN TROOPS in their towns and cities;" who, in short, from a base instrument of hard-hearted despotism, transformed him, in the twinkling of an eye, into a most just, mild, humane, tender-hearted sovereign, who, rather than oppress his people, the poor good Dutch, or be an instrument in the hands of their oppressor, voluntarily resigned his crown, and was almost, if not quite, ready to resign his life.—All this would be matter for mere laughter, were it not amongst the means, by which this nation has been deceived. This false view of the event is a great deal worse than nothing, because it counteracts, or obstructs, the operation of the common sense of the public; who, if

these writers had been silent, would have seen, in the change in Holland, nothing more than the turning out of an unfit agent, or, the putting an end to an agency, which it was no longer thought proper to continue; and, they would, according to that opinion, have formed a proper estimate of the power of Napoleon as far as relates to Holland. But, from being told that Louis's Letter is a "most interesting document;" from being told about the discoveries made by Louis, in the "simplicity of his heart;" that it was the "constant wish of Louis to ameliorate the lot of the Dutch;" that he abdicated his throne "rather than be an instrument in their oppression;" that Louis, having become a king, "set about performing the duties of his station with a sincere desire to fulfil them for the welfare of the people over whom he was placed;" that he was continually thwarted "in his praise-worthy career;" that, in taking up the pen, Louis has "wielded a weapon more terrific to his brother than the sword;" that, though Napoleon had "fettered the press, it would be no easy task for him to preclude the complaints of his brother from reaching the ears of those over whom he rules." From being told this (as they were in our papers of the 28th of July) and a great deal more of the same sort, the public mind was led away from the foreright and natural view of the subject, and was induced to entertain hopes, that the change in Holland was calculated to produce some great convulsion favourable to us, because injurious to Napoleon. Thus was the public misled; and, in like manner, have they been misled from the year 1793 to this present hour. It was the grossest of all follies to suppose, that the Emperor had, at any moment, left Holland to be ruled, or made use of, in any other way, than the way that he should point out; that, in short, Holland was any thing, either more or less than a province of France. The Emperor made his brother a king in order that he might be in rank above his great generals; but, it was not to be believed, that he would ever, for one moment, put out of his absolute power, the vast resources of a country like Holland, by the means of which he can more annoy us, than by all his other means put together. Louis, it would seem, was seized with notions of independence; and he talks, in good set terms, about his affection for his people; about injustice; about oppression; about seeing

his capital occupied by foreign troops; about his *Queen*, and the *Prince Royal*. This is a little too ludicrous. It is a little too stupid to be authentic. Either, however, he wrote this Letter or he did not. If he did not, why, then, it is a mere imposture all together; and, if he did, I am sure he was too great a fool to be trusted with the government even of the Dutch. —Such is the light, in which the common sense of Englishmen would have seen the change in Holland, as far as related to Napoleon's conduct towards his brother, if the operation of that common sense had not been obstructed by the combined efforts of our public prints. —Let us now consider the change as *affecting the people of Holland*. And, here, we may first observe, that we have no evidence of the people of Holland *disliking* the change. To hear our public prints, who would not have expected to hear of riots at the Hague and at other places. Nothing of the kind. A report is made to the Emperor upon the state of Holland. This report shews, or, rather, asserts, that Holland ought to be united to France; and, what happens then? Why, a decree is drawn up, and the thing is done. There have been no commotions; there has been no opposition to the execution of this decree; and Napoleon has been to visit Holland with as little ceremony as he would go to visit one of his gardens or parks. There is no reasoning with us any more, then, if we will persist in believing that the poor good Dutch dislike him to such a degree, that each individual would gladly cut his throat. —But, what has he *done* to the Dutch? What measures has he adopted, that they should so hate him? In what way has he made their situation *worse* by this change? We are told (*Morning Chronicle* 30th July), that *French troops have been brought into Holland*, while many of the *native troops* have been *sent abroad*. Indeed! —We are told, that about 2,000 officers of police were to be appointed with special powers and authority to *enter, at any time, the dwellings, warehouses, and other buildings* of the people. Indeed! —We are told, that the outraged people *submitted* to all this with the *greatest patience*. Indeed! —So; Napoleon brings *foreign troops* into the country, does he, while he takes care to *send the native troops into foreign countries*? And he authorizes his spies and police-men to *enter peoples' houses*, does he, *at any hour in the night*? And the people

submit to all this with the *greatest patience*, do they? Poor Dutch! —One of our writers seems to have become quite enraged upon the subject; and says (*See Times* 2nd August) that “*he for his part will never cease from relating the acts of Buonaparté just as he performs them, with all the fidelity and precision he is able, and that, having done so, he will, aye will he, apply to them such terms and epithets as they merit; and this he esteems to be a duty, which, as a public journalist, he owes to his country, and to mankind in general.*” There is *boldness* for you! There is *liberty of the press*! He is not afraid, this man is not, of attacking Buonaparté by name. That is something like liberty of the press. —But, to return, for a moment, to the Dutch: we are told (*See Morning Chronicle* 31st July) that the people are kept in awe by the *foreign troops*, who take even their food from them, who *help themselves*, at pleasure, to every thing they want; which is, indeed, what might be very reasonably expected. We are further told, that the people are *quite broken down in spirit*; and that they submit most patiently to all that is done by the French. —Now, either this is all true, or it is not; if the latter, there is no more to be said about it; and, if the former, I shall leave the reader to settle the question of whether the Dutch *deserve* what they get, or not. But, at any rate, it appears very clear to me, that the change in the government can have made *no difference* at all to the Dutch; for, what is it to the *people* of Holland, who enters their houses and who robs them, so that their houses are entered, and so that they are robbed! What signifies it whether the Robbers come from the South or the North; what sort of clothes they wear; what sort of language they speak? Just as if the robbery could be the less distressing for being committed by a man in a particular dress. Nothing is so stupid; so despicably stupid, as partiality in the choice of Public Robbers. Would you, reader, if robbed upon Hounslow Heath, care one straw what dress the highwayman was clad in, or what country he came from? And, why should the Dutch be affected by any such distinction? They are, it seems, compelled to submit to Public Robbery; and, if it be so, I think it is *better* to be robbed by the principal than by his deputy. —But the *debt*, the National Debt of Holland, is to be wiped off with a *sponge*; or, *two thirds* of it are, at

least, so to be disposed of. This may be subject of deep complaint with the *few*, who own the debt; but, it will be a subject of great joy with the *many* who pay the interest upon that debt. Our writers, when they were at work upon this part of the subject, and estimating the *hatred* that this spurning work would infallibly engender against Napoleon, seem to have wholly forgotten the circumstance, that the interest upon the National Debt in Holland was paid by the *Dutch*; and, further, that, whatever might be the justice or injustice of the measure, Napoleon himself got nothing by it; having, by his abolition of two thirds of the debt, merely relieved the great mass of the people from the payment of two thirds of the amount of what they before paid in the way of interest upon the debt. Why, therefore, should the people of Holland hate him on account of this change? To be relieved from such a burden of taxation must be of much more importance to them than the mere name of their ruler, or the insignificant circumstance of dress in the persons who were to enter their dwellings and out-houses at their pleasure. What is it to the Dutchman, whether his food be taken from him by the soldier *in person*, or by *some one else*, who comes and takes it, while the soldier is waiting, with his musket cocked, round the corner of the street? This seems to be the only material change, lately introduced amongst the Dutch by Napoleon; and, I am inclined to think, that the Dutch find it full as well to pay the soldier directly, and in kind, as to be fleeced and sweated and squeezed by an intermediate agency, which, call it by what *name* you will; smooth it over, varnish it, disguise it, do what you like with it, was, at last, neither more nor less than the *power of the musket*.—We hear, from Holland, and from many other countries, of discontents after discontents; but none of them ever break out into action. If what our public prints tell us be true, Napoleon is hated by every soul upon the Continent of Europe. The Dutch hate him, the Spaniards hate him, the Swiss hate him, the Italians hate him, the Germans hate him, the French hate him mortally. All his Generals hate him. Every living creature wishes him dead. But, in the midst of this universal hatred, we see him quitting his capital and his kingdom, for weeks and months together, without any attempts being made against his authority, and we see him in battle

after battle without any hurt to his person. We have had him several times poisoned, or stabbed, and he is yet unhurt.—It is quite astonishing that we should still believe these things. We have gone on believing in this way from the year 1792; and, it really does now seem, that nothing will ever cure us.—Had we not been thus under the influence of a blindness, not to be accounted for, our condition would not have been what it now is. We should not have acted upon those false hopes, which, day after day, have only tended to pave the way for our ruin. We have not seen, because we would not see; because we appear to have made a vow not to see, that it was *public opinion*, that it was a *new way of thinking*, in the nations of Europe, and not any thing peculiar to Buonaparté, that was operating the changes in government and dominion. He is a great Soldier and a great Statesman; but, he would have done little, or nothing, without public opinion. That has been at work for him every where, and he has merely attended to its invitations.—We allow, indeed, that he has a *faction in Ireland*. It was openly declared in parliament, that there was a *French faction* in Ireland, and a law was passed upon a presumption of the truth of the fact. The *Morning Post* of the 13th instant says: “Ireland, indeed, DEMANDS “AN ARMY, worried and distracted as she is “by *French conspiracies and machinations*.” Now, how does this agree with all our assertions about a *universal* hatred existing against Napoleon? What a handsome compliment do we, in these assertions, coupled with our declarations regarding Ireland, pay ourselves, or rather our government? We insist, that all the people of all the nations on the continent hate Napoleon; that even the French hate him; and yet that, such is his influence in Ireland, that that country *demand*s a *regular army*. It will not do to shuffle here, and say, that, by *French factions* and *French conspiracies*, we do not mean persons attached to the Emperor Napoleon; because, if that be not our meaning, there is no sense in our words, especially when accompanied with the declaration of the necessity of an army.—One would think that, in this single fact respecting Ireland, there was quite enough to undeceive us as to this belief of Napoleon's being an object of universal hatred. One would think, that, at any rate, it would set us to reflecting upon the matter; that it would

induce us to make an effort to get rid of the influence of a prejudice so fatal; but, greatly do I fear that neither it nor any thing else ever will, and that we shall still cling to the imposture, by which we have been brought into our present situation.

—The third light, in which I wish the reader to consider the recent change in Holland, namely, *as it may affect England*, does not appear to have been at all thought of by any of our public writers; or, at least, has not been bestowed upon it that attention which it evidently calls for.

Till the interior part of the continent was settled, Napoleon could not attend to Holland. He could neither attend to it in person nor could he conveniently spare either the army or the men of talent necessary to give to it its full degree of utility, or, even to put it in motion. He seems to have placed Louis in it for a time, and to have given him the title of *king* for the purpose of amusing, not only the Dutch but the world. But, having settled the interior of the Continent, his next object was, of course, to make use of Holland, that country, which of all others, he must have known, was the most valuable as a means of annoying and injuring England. He might not have originally entertained the design of displacing his brother; but, there can be no doubt of his never having intended to leave this valuable country under the *control* of any one but himself. If, therefore, he found, that Louis was a man, incapable of executing his designs as far as related to Holland; or, that he was puffed up with any notions of independence; or that he was really a man to be softened by the wailings of individual distress, necessary to the effecting of the great warlike projects in view; he would, of course, oust him with very little ceremony. To have supposed the contrary, would have argued a wonderful degree of folly. There has, in the whole of Napoleon's history, appeared a very strong desire to aggrandize his family. His brothers, his mother, his sister, his uncle: he has neglected none of them. He has not turned his back upon any of them. He has brought them all forward. He has done great things for them all and for all those allied to them, in even the most distant degree. We should not, in estimating his views upon the present occasion, overlook this circumstance; because it ought to satisfy us, that, in displacing his brother Louis, he must have been actuated by some powerful mo-

tive. The fact is, that it is very clear, that he would sacrifice much to his family of any thing but his views of dominion; but, that he would, if necessary, sacrifice family or any thing else to those views. I do not mean to the *mere possession of territory*; for, possess, in the true sense of the word, or even *govern*, he cannot, the half of the territory that now owns his sway. His ambition is of a higher order: what he aims at, is, *commanding* the world; levelling old establishments; pulling down whatever opposes him; revolutionizing the world; in the accomplishment of which views he has been most wonderfully aided by most of the old establishments themselves. Indeed he is not so much the leader of an *army* as the agent of a *moral principle*. To do what he has done he must have been a great captain; but, if *arms* alone had aided him, he would at this day have been, at most, the commander of a brigade, and, perhaps, not that. He would, very likely, feel humiliated at the thought, but, it is nevertheless true, that every man, who views with a philosophic eye what is now going on in the world, looks upon Napoleon as nothing more than an unconscious instrument for giving effect to a great pervading principle.—It is not the interest of those who fatten upon corruption to suffer this to be believed, if they can prevent it. It is their interest to make men believe, that Buonaparté has been elevated by *mere accident*; that mere accident may kick him down; and, that, at any rate, all danger would end with *his life*. But, are not our own declarations regarding Ireland a sufficient answer to this? What can the Irish know *personally* of Buonaparté? What can they care about him personally? No: it is the *principle*, of which he is the agent, and which principle would find another agent if he were gone; just, as in other cases, the *AGENTS* of the principle of *corruption* and *public-robbery*, are supported by the *Robbers* for the sake of the principle, and not for *their own sakes*. The Miscreant of the day is puffed up with the notion, that it is to him personally that the adulation is paid; but, each succeeding Miscreant receives just the same quantity and kind of adulation: the name only is changed; the principle continues the same.—In Holland the mass of the people will, probably, be pleased with the change that has taken place. When we landed in ZEALAND, there was not, that I ever heard of, any of the Dutch, who came to join us;

which does not agree with what we have been told of the hatred, that the people of those countries bear towards the government of Napoleon. There is no harm in our *wishing* the Dutch to hate him and his government any more than there was in General Sarrazin's wishing, (some years ago,) the Irish to hate our king and his government: there is no harm in our endeavouring to make all the world hate him: the harm is, in our believing that such hatred exists, when it does not exist; because, the effect of such belief is, to make us slack in our efforts to procure the adoption of such measures as are necessary to our defence against him. When we heard, that he had ousted his brother from Holland, and was directing all his own attention and energy that way, we should immediately have followed him with our eyes, and with our pens. We should have set to work to consider what were our means of defence against a hundred ships of war poured out of the mouths of the rivers and out of the ports of Holland, a country once the rival of England upon the seas, and the naval means of which country nothing can destroy; we should have begun seriously to calculate the consequences, not of a landing in England with a force of fifty thousand men, at the end of eight or ten hours sail, but, surely, we might have begun to calculate the consequences of *known preparations for such an expedition*. It appears to me, that Napoleon is now setting about the preparation of an invading armament in Holland. There, I think, he will make his grandest preparation. And, if, in the course of a year, or a year and a half, he has a numerous fleet ready for sea, with *an army on board*, will the effect here be to make us *laugh*; especially if the Flotilla at Boulogne be again in a state of readiness, while a fleet at Brest, another at Rochfort, at Ferrol, and Lisbon, all with *troops on board*, stare us in the face at the same time? Shall we then *laugh*? Such a combination of means of attack may, perhaps, never be seen; but, it is much less improbable than was the battle of Wagram, the conquest of Vienna, and the last marriage of Napoleon. It being far within the scope of possibility, that we shall behold such a combination, we ought, I think, to be looking forward to the consequences. That we shall be able to defend our country, though attacked in many parts at once, is what I will not doubt of; though I do think, that, when the ministerial writers themselves

declare, that *an army* is necessary to defend Ireland against *French factions and conspiracies*, even now, we ought to reflect a little on what would be wanted in the case contemplated; that is to say, in the case of there being French armies afloat at Rochfort, Brest, Ferrol, and Lisbon. Let me not be interrupted here and abused for counting these two last places amongst the ports of Buonaparté. I am merely supposing what is *possible*. I am aware, that while we have an army of *sixty thousand men* in Portugal, under my Lord Talavera, to whose army the French general's soldiers are deserting by hundreds at a time; I am aware, that, while this is the case, it would, as the Morning Post says, be dastardly to the last degree, to entertain any apprehensions for the final safety of Portugal. But, though we can have no such apprehensions, there is a *possibility* of the ports of Ferrol and Lisbon falling under the domination of Napoleon: and, *if they should*, then the case, which, for argument's sake, I have supposed, may happen; and, *if it should happen*, what will be the consequences, not of a *landing* in England, but of a *menace* to land? And, what will be the consequences *in Ireland*, either of an actual landing, or of a menace to land?—If I am asked, now, why I point out these dangers without pointing out the means of prevention, I answer that I am not bound to point out any means of prevention, and for this plain reason, that I may know of none, and yet I have a right to shew, and it may be very useful to shew, that the danger exists, or may very soon exist. The means of prevention that *I should be disposed to point out* might bring me a great deal of abuse, if not *something worse*; and, therefore, I shall, for the present, at least, keep them to myself; but, it does not follow, that I am not to speak of the danger, because, if this principle were to be adopted, no man would be allowed to complain of any evil, for which he had not a remedy. Something very much like this was, indeed, attempted to be urged against Mr. Fox, at the time of the stoppage of cash payments at the Bank, in 1797; but, he replied: "What! do you call upon me for a remedy, who have been, for so many years, warning you against the evil that has now arrived: if there be no remedy, so much the greater your fault, and no fault at all of mine." Still, however, the adherents of Pitt insisted, that it was Mr. Fox's business, to *find a remedy* for the

evil, to *hold his tongue*, and they flew at him, in a pack, open-mouthed, and that, too, at the very moment that the holders of bank notes were slinking back, with empty hands and lopping ears, from Threadneedle Street.—Such may be the case with respect to me and my warnings; but, no abuse of me will mend the matter; no abuse of me will retard either the armaments or the armies of Napoleon, and, I am quite sure, that it will never give me a moment's uneasiness.

PORTUGAL.—To be sure, when we look at the present posture of our affairs in this country (where we have an army of *sixty thousand fighting men*) as described by the Editors of our ministerial prints, there is not much ground for fear of the result of the campaign now going on, and, of course, not much reason to fear, that Napoleon will ever get possession of the ports of Ferrol and Lisbon.—By the COURIER news-paper of the 23d instant, we are informed, that Massena had been outwitted by my Lord Talavera; that the former (great fool!) hoped we should *relieve Rodrigo*; next, that we should *make a stand* at Fort Conception; and, lastly, that we should *risk a battle* for the sake of Almeida; in all which hopes my Lord Talavera had completely disappointed the Frenchman, who, though the favourite of Napoleon, had been out-generalled by my Lord of Talavera.—We had, the same authority informs us, on the 7th instant fairly beat the French at manoeuvring. It appears, that the enemy made a movement forward, with a view of what is called "*turning*" us, and evidently would have brought up a large force for the purpose; but that my Lord Talavera, "with great judgment and promptitude, foresaw his project, and disappointed it by *throwing back his flank*" and placing the winding Mondego between him and the enemy." This, it would seem, made the enemy *retreat* with all possible speed.—In another part of the same print, we are informed, that, if a general battle should take place, it will *end in our favour*; that the conquest of Lisbon is no easy task; that the British army is in high spirits and abundantly supplied; that nearly a whole regiment of Swiss Soldiers, with most of their officers, amounting to about 700 men, had deserted to our army, and that Massena was so distrustful of any troops but French and Italians, that he took care that

the others should very seldom come within sight of the British colours; and, finally, that our Portuguese allies had *uniformly conducted themselves very gallantly*.

—This being the state of our army in Portugal, there can be very little apprehension entertained, *as to the result*.—

The Morning Post, indeed, of this day (Friday) has an assertion, which, were it to be believed, would form a sort of drawback from this most consoling and heart-cheering intelligence. It is this:—

"GENERAL BERESFORD has lately issued a number of General Orders to the Portuguese army under his command, by which, it appears, that several hundreds of the peasants have deserted their standard, and fled, not to the enemy, but to their homes. Several of them have been apprehended and punished, the General having with him Magistrates duly appointed for that purpose, and others have been sent to work the mines."

—What! Is this Field Marshal Beresford? But, surely, these deserting people cannot be any part of the Portuguese army "who have uniformly conducted themselves so gallantly?" They cannot belong to "our Portuguese companions in arms and in glory?" No, no: upon looking at the paragraph again, I see, that they were "*peasants*." I really began to fear, that they composed part of the thirty thousand allies that we, the people of this country, are paying. It would, indeed, have been a shocking disappointment to find, that, just when the French began to come near them, they, our allies, whom we are paying, should set off to their homes; should desert their standard, should require to be punished, and, some of them to be condemned to the mines.—During the two last weeks this same print assured us, that the Portuguese soldiers behaved admirably and that the people of Portugal were hearty in the cause and strenuous in their exertions. It must, then, be an abominable slander to hint, that the Portuguese army; that any portion of our thirty thousand men, have gone away, slunk off home, actually turned tail, at the first approach of the enemy.—No, no: hushed be our fears upon this score. We have, and we know it well, an army of SIXTY THOUSAND MEN in our PAY in Portugal, and we know that Mr. Villiers assured us, that none were paid of the Portuguese who did not make their corporeal appearance; and, therefore, let us believe none of these stories,

which seem calculated to make us believe, that *our* army, instead of that of the French, is wasting away.—We have seen, week after week, that the *army of Massena is deserting*. Poles, Swiss, and many besides, to a total amount of a considerable army. We have, at the same time, been told of the fidelity and gallantry of our allies. And, shall we now listen to such stories as this about the “desertion from the *Portuguese army*” under the command of Marshal Beresford? Oh! no: we will not believe this: or, at any rate, let us not believe, that the deserters, some of whom have been *punished*, and others *condemned to the mines*, make any part of the thirty thousand Portuguese that we pay: let us never believe this. It may be that Portuguese “*peasants*” have been thus treated. Here is a contradiction in terms: they are called the *army* and *peasants* in one and the same sentence. There must be some mistake. It may be that Portuguese peasants have been *punished*, or *condemned to the mines*, with a view of inducing them, or others, to fight in defence of their native country; this may be; but, nothing shall make me believe, and I never will believe, that this has been the case with respect to any part of the thirty thousand men whom we are paying in Portugal, where, with the exception of the deaths of the year, I still look upon us as having an army of SIXTY THOUSAND fighting men.—It is very odd, that we are still in the dark as to the *numbers of the French army*. We have intelligence of all sorts except this. We are told about every movement that takes place; the most exact and minute details are given us, as to all other points; but, upon this point, yielding to no other in importance, we never hear one word. I am very anxious to know the numbers of *MASSENA*; because, after all, what glory shall we and our allies gain in beating him, unless it appears, that he has a superiority of numbers? The *Morning Post*, during the week before last, stated, that we had complete military possession of Portugal, and that, “besides the natural strength of the country, there were various fortified places, which were adequately garrisoned, and must be regularly besieged” before the enemy could get on; further, that all the resources of the country were in our hands; and, that the *people* were all hearty in the cause and strenuous in their exertions. This being the case, what have we to fear; and

especially from an enemy like the French, who is “so execrated in Portugal,” and who has been in Portugal before; nay, who is now bringing along with him, that very Tartar, Junot, who was caught in Portugal before? It were a jest indeed that the Portuguese army should desert from Marshal Beresford under such circumstances!

INDIAN ARMY.—It is not often, that I think it worth while to meddle with any thing belonging to “*our Empire in the East*,” nor would it be very consistent for me to do so, considering what my opinions are with respect to the utility of that famous “*empire*,” but, there is a paper, which has been published in some of our public prints, and especially in the *Courier* of the 22d instant, which seems to require particular notice.—It purports to be a letter written to one of our governors in India by the Commander of a Division of the army of the East India Company, on the 21st of July, 1809. Its contents are so interesting, that I think it right to place them here immediately under the eye of the reader; and, I am the more disposed to make this an object of general observation, because I have not yet seen any public print that has made a single remark upon it.—“To LIEUTENANT COLONEL BARCLAY, MILITARY SECRETARY TO THE HON. THE GOVERNOR.—*Trichinopoly, July 21, 1809.*—SIR; “On a further consideration of your letter of the 13th inst. I think it necessary for the information of the Hon. the Governor, to enter more fully into a detail of the state of the native troops under my command, with a view to the measures most likely to prevent the evils that must ensue from the present *sedition* state of the European officers. Upon a general view of the European officers of the corps, taken from a constant close attention to their own manner and opinions, and from various reports I have heard at different times, directly and indirectly, I believe that most, if not the whole of the European officers hold opinions that are incompatible with the subordination necessary to make an army useful to its country. The sentiments that I alluded to are, the conceiving themselves labouring under grievances, and uniformly avowing their right to claim and enforce from Government a redress of them, according to the temper, pursuits, and circumstances of the different officers, as

“they are more or less inclined to desperate measures; many of them being ruined in their fortunes, would be willing to undertake any thing that might probably produce a change. Although I do not think that any native corps will risk any opposition to Government when in garrison with a King’s regiment, yet I should much question their conduct if removed to any distance by themselves; and I am fully of opinion, if in any case they were called upon to act against each other, they would instantly become non-efficient.—Having an army of officers so generally disaffected, you will observe that my conclusions are guided much by the information contained in your letter of the 14th inst. However well inclined the sepoys may be at present (and which I believe him to be most perfectly), it must follow by the means of misrepresentations and promises, which officers always have the means of making to the soldier, that the whole of the native troops must, sooner or later, become a seditious army and hostile to government. Such appearing to be the present situation of the Company’s troops, in order to avoid the calamity of a civil war, I beg leave to offer my opinion, that stronger measures ought to be pursued, instead of those that have hitherto been adopted, no less than a reform of the native troops appearing to be necessary. There seems to be only one mode that will answer that purpose, besides that of its entire reduction, which is that of removing the whole of the European officers from the native corps. It is an undertaking certainly unprecedented, and at first view may be thought difficult to be accomplished. I am, notwithstanding, convinced that, with secrecy, proper arrangement, and a simultaneous movement, the most of the native troops in the Carnatic may be changed in one day, from a seditious to a loyal army. I have the honour to be, &c. W. WILKINSON, Colonel Commanding S. Division.”—One would almost suppose this to be a forgery. Not on account of its contents, but on account of its publication.—If, however, it be authentic, what a state must the “Empire” be in? What should we think of Napoleon’s empire, if one of his commanders were to make such a report? This is the way to judge of the effect that such news as this will produce in the world. What would our public prints have said,

if such a paper had been written by one of the French Commanders in Spain or Italy or Holland?—I do not, however, wish to represent this as a matter to excite alarm amongst the people of this kingdom; for I am quite of Mr. SPENCE’S opinion, that the nation would be more powerful and safe without India than with India; but, if there be persons who think differently, it is, I think, time for them to look about them; for, if this letter do not contain intelligence alarming to them, I do not know what can alarm them.—Government purely military may, for a time at least, be strong and firm; but, to a government, where there is any mixture of civil rights tolerated, a vast military force must finally be dangerous. The officers, serving in India, have, I dare say, carried out with them, those opinions that are incompatible with the subordination “necessary to make an army useful to its country” in the sense in which Mr. WILKINSON takes the word useful; and, how are those principles to be got out of them? It is very likely, indeed, that their opinions are not compatible with the subordination necessary in India; but, what will be gained by displacing them? That is the question.—With such scanty information before us, we cannot form any very correct judgment upon the subject; but, if the letter be really what it purports to be, the intelligence from India must very soon be of an important nature.

Mr. A. O’CONNOR.—The following paragraph has appeared in all the London prints.—“The following is the extract of a letter from Arthur O’Connor, dated from his farm about 18 miles from Paris, the 13th July, 1810.—‘You did me but justice in contradicting that I ever had the smallest connection or hand in any Newspaper in this Country. They little know my feelings who think I could ever meddle in such things in these times. Neither my head, hand or heart have been engaged by such affairs for many years; and since I left Scotland scarce have I written a line for any Newspaper, nor have I had the most distant connection with any: of this be assured!’”—I insert this without any knowledge at all of the fact. The reader will recollect, that, last week, I inserted the FAREWELL OF THE ARGUS, and supposed this gentleman to have been the Editor of that celebrated Journal. It would not be at all surprising,

if all that we have been told, day after day, for years past, and which we have, therefore, believed, upon this subject, were wholly false. It was known, that Mr. O'Connor was at Paris; and, as it suited the ends of those, who made the assertion, to assert, that he wrote the *Argus*, they made the assertion without any ceremony; and, I should not at all wonder, if, at last, they themselves believed it to be an established truth.—I cannot say, however, that I fully believe in the authenticity of this “*extract of a letter*,” for, I do not see any motive either for the writing or the publishing of it, seeing that, in point of *talent*, the *Argus* would have disgraced no man; while, as to its sentiments, none of them that I have ever seen were more hostile to this government, nor calculated to annoy it more, than the pamphlet, published under Mr. O'Connor's name, in the year 1804.—It is, however, right that the *truth* should be known; and, if it be true, that Mr. O'Connor was not the author of the *Argus*, it only appears, that our government has one more enemy than we thought for, and that, too, an enemy of great ability; an enemy much more formidable than an army of moderate strength; an enemy, so situated, that his statements and his reasonings are to be answered only by the press.

BULLION REPORT.—I next week enter upon the discussion of this subject, before I have done with which, I trust that there will not be many persons in this country, or in any other country, where people can read, who will not clearly understand the whole science and mystery of Paper-Money.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
24th August, 1810.*

N. B. In consequence of numerous letters inquiring, whether *broken sets* of the REGISTER can be completed, I think it necessary to state here that they may, *at present*; but, that gentlemen who wish to have their sets completed, must apply without loss of time; at least before the 15th of September.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent*

of Portugal.—Signed at Rio de Janeiro, the 19th of February, 1810.

In the name of the most Holy and Undivided Trinity.—His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, being equally animated with the desire not only of consolidating and strengthening the ancient friendship and good understanding which so happily subsist, and have during so many ages subsisted between the two crowns, but also of improving and extending the beneficial effects thereof to the mutual advantage of their respective subjects, have thought that the most efficacious means for obtaining these objects would be, to adopt a liberal system of commerce, founded upon the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, which by discontinuing certain prohibitions and prohibitory duties might procure the most solid advantages on both sides, to the national productions and industry, and give due protection at the same time to the public revenue, and to the interests of fair and legal trade. For this end, his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, have named for their respective Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries, to wit, his Britannic Majesty the most illustrious and most excellent Lord Percy Clinton Sidney, Lord Viscount and Baron of Straungford, one of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, Knight of the Military Order of the Bath, Grand Cross of the Portuguese Order of the Tower and Sword, and his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Portugal; and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal the most illustrious and most excellent Lord Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, Count of Linhares, Lord of Payalvo, Commander of the Order of Christ, Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Benito and of the Tower and Sword, one of his Royal Highness's Council of State, and his Principal Secretary of State for the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War; who, after having duly exchanged their respective full powers, and having found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—ARTICLE I. There shall be a sincere and perpetual friendship between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and between their heirs and suc-

cessors; and there shall be a constant and universal peace and harmony between themselves, their heirs and successors, kingdoms, dominions, provinces, countries, subjects, and vassals, of whatsoever quality or condition they be, without exception of person or place; and the stipulations of this present Article shall, under the favour of Almighty God, be permanent and perpetual.—II. There shall be reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation between and amongst the respective subjects of the two high contracting parties in all, and several the territories and dominions of either. They may trade, travel, sojourn, or establish themselves in all and several the ports, cities, towns, counties, provinces, or places whatsoever belonging to each and either of the two high contracting parties, except and save in those from which all foreigners whatsoever are generally and positively excluded, the names of which places may be hereafter specified in a separate article of this treaty. Provided, however, that it be thoroughly understood, that any place belonging to either of the two high contracting parties, which may hereafter be opened to the commerce of the subjects of any other country, shall thereby be considered as equally opened, and upon correspondent terms, to the subjects of the other high contracting party, in the same manner as if it had been expressly stipulated by the present treaty. And his Britannic Majesty, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, do hereby bind and engage themselves not to grant any favour, privilege, or immunity, in matters of commerce and navigation, to the subjects of any other State, which shall not be also at the same time respectively extended to the subjects of the high contracting parties, gratuitously, if the concession in favour of that other State should have been gratuitous, and on giving, *quam pressime*, the same compensation or equivalent, in case the concession should have been conditional.—III. The subjects of the two Sovereigns respectively shall not pay in the ports, harbours, roads, cities, towns or places whatsoever, belonging to either of them, any greater duties, taxes, or imposts (under whatsoever names they may be designated or included) than those that are paid by the subjects of the most favoured nation; and the subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall enjoy within the dominions of the other, the same rights, privileges, liberties, favours, immunities,

or exemptions, in matters of commerce and navigation that are granted or may hereafter be granted to the subjects of the most favoured nation.—IV. His Britannic Majesty, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, do stipulate and agree that there shall be a perfect reciprocity on the subject of the duties and imposts to be paid by the ships and vessels of the high contracting parties within the several ports, harbours, roads, and anchoring places belonging to each of them; to wit, that the ships and vessels of the subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall not pay any higher duties or imposts (under whatsoever name they be designated or implied) within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, than the ships and vessels belonging to the subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal shall be bound to pay within the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, and *vice versa*. And this agreement and stipulation shall particularly and expressly extend to the payment of the duties known by the name of Port Charges, Tonnage, and Anchorage Duties, which shall not in any case, or under any pretext, be greater for British ships and vessels within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, than for Portuguese ships and vessels within the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, and *vice versa*.—V. The two high contracting parties do also agree, that the same rates of bounties and drawbacks shall be established in their respective ports upon the exportation of goods and merchandizes, whether those goods or merchandizes be exported in British or in Portuguese ships and vessels, that is, that British ships and vessels shall enjoy the same favour in this respect within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, that may be shown to Portuguese ships and vessels within the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, and *vice versa*. The two high contracting parties do also covenant and agree, that goods and merchandizes coming respectively from the ports of either of them, shall pay the same duties, whether imported in British or in Portuguese ships or vessels, or otherwise, that an increase of duties may be imposed and exacted upon goods and merchandizes coming into the ports of the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal from those of his Britannic Majesty in British

ships, equivalent, and in exact proportion to any increase of duties that may hereafter be imposed upon goods and merchandizes coming into the ports of his Britannic Majesty from those of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, imported in Portuguese ships. And in order that this matter may be settled with due exactness, and that nothing may be left undetermined concerning it, it is agreed, that tables shall be drawn by each Government respectively, specifying the difference of duties to be paid on goods and merchandizes so imported in British or Portuguese ships and vessels; and the said tables (which shall be made applicable to all the ports within the respective dominions of each of the contracting parties) shall be declared and adjudged to form part of this present Treaty.—In order to avoid any differences or misunderstanding with respect to the regulations which may respectively constitute a British or Portuguese vessel, the high contracting parties agree in declaring, that all vessels built in the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, and owned, navigated, and registered according to the laws of Great Britain, shall be considered as British vessels. And that all ships or vessels built in the countries belonging to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, or in any of them, or ships taken by any of the ships or vessels of war belonging to the Portuguese Government, or any of the inhabitants of the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, having Commissions or Letters of Marque and Reprisal from the Government of Portugal, and condemned as lawful prize in any Court of Admiralty of the said Portuguese Government, and owned by the subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, or any of them, and whereof the master and three-fourths of the mariners, at least, are subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, shall be considered as Portuguese vessels.—VI. The mutual commerce and navigation of the subjects of Great Britain and Portugal respectively in the ports and seas of Asia, are expressly permitted to the same degree as they have heretofore been allowed by the two Crowns. And the commerce and navigation thus permitted, shall hereafter, and for ever, be placed on the footing of the commerce and navigation of the most favoured nation trading in the ports and

seas of Asia; that is, that neither of the high contracting parties shall grant any favour or privilege in matters of commerce and navigation, to the subjects of any other state trading within the ports and seas of Asia, which shall not be also granted *quam proximè*, on the same terms to the subjects of the other contracting party. His Britannic Majesty engages in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, not to make any regulation which may be prejudicial or inconvenient to the commerce and navigation of the subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal within the ports and seas of Asia, to the extent which is or may hereafter be permitted to the most favoured nation. And his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal does also engage in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, not to make any regulations which may be prejudicial or inconvenient to the commerce and navigation of the subjects of his Britannic Majesty within the ports, seas and dominions opened to them by virtue of the present Treaty.—VII. The two high contracting parties have resolved with respect to the privileges to be enjoyed by the subjects of each of them within the territories or dominions of the other, that the most perfect reciprocity shall be observed on both sides. And the subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have a free and unquestionable right to travel, and to reside within the territories or dominions of the other, to occupy houses and warehouses, and to dispose of personal property of every sort and denomination, by sale, donation, exchange or testament, or in any other manner whatsoever, without any the smallest impediment or hindrance thereto. They shall not be compelled to pay any taxes or imposts under any pretext whatsoever, greater than those that are paid or may be paid by the native subjects of the Sovereign in whose dominions they may be resident. They shall be exempted from all compulsory military service whatsoever, whether by sea or land. Their dwelling-houses, warehouses, and all the parts and appurtenances thereof, whether for the purposes of commerce or of residence, shall be respected. They shall not be liable to any vexatious visits and searches, nor shall any arbitrary examination or inspection of their books, papers, or accounts be made under colour of the supreme authority of the State. It is, however, to be understood, that in the

cases of treason, contraband trade, and other crimes, for the detection of which provision is made by the law of the land, that law shall be enforced, it being mutually declared that false and malicious accusations are not to be admitted as pretexts or excuses for vexatious visits and searches, or for examinations of commercial books, papers or accounts, which visits or examinations are never to take place, except under the sanction of the competent Magistrate, and in the presence of the Consul of the nation to which the accused party may belong, or of his deputy or representative.—VIII. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal engages in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, that the commerce of British subjects within his dominions shall not be restrained, interrupted, or otherwise affected by the operation of any monopoly, contract, or exclusive privileges of sale or purchase whatsoever, but that the subjects of Great Britain shall have free and unrestricted permission to buy and sell from and to whomsoever, and in whatever form or manner they may please, whether by wholesale or by retail, without being obliged to give any preference or favour in consequence of the said monopolies, contracts, or exclusive privileges of sale or purchase. And his Britannic Majesty does on his part engage to observe faithfully this principle thus recognized and laid down by the two High Contracting Parties.—But it is to be distinctly understood, that the present article is not to be interpreted as invalidating or affecting the exclusive right possessed by the Crown of Portugal within its own dominions to the farm for the sale of ivory, Brazil wood, urzela, diamonds, gold dust, gun-powder, and tobacco in the form of snuff: provided however, that should the above-mentioned articles, generally or separately, ever become articles of free commerce within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, the subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall be permitted to traffic in them as freely and on the same footing as those of the most favoured nation.—IX. His Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal have agreed and resolved, that each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to nominate and appoint Consuls General, Consuls, and Vice Consuls in all the ports of the dominions of the other Contracting Party, wherein they

are or may be necessary for the advancement of Commerce, and for the commercial interests of the trading subjects of either Crown. But it is expressly stipulated, that Consuls, of whatsoever class they may be, shall not be acknowledged nor received, nor permitted to act as such, unless duly qualified by their own Sovereign and approved of by the other Sovereign in whose dominions they are to be employed: Consuls of all classes within the dominions of each of the High Contracting Parties are respectively to be placed upon a footing of perfect reciprocity and equality; and being appointed solely for the purpose of facilitating and assisting in affairs of commerce and navigation, they are only to possess the privileges which belong to their station, and which are recognised and admitted by all Governments as necessary for the due fulfilment of their office and employment. They are in all cases, whether civil or criminal, to be entirely amenable to the laws of the country in which they may reside, and they are also to enjoy the full and entire protection of those laws so long as they conduct themselves in obedience thereto.—X. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, desiring to protect and facilitate the commerce of the subjects of Great Britain within his dominions as well as their relations of intercourse with his own subjects, is pleased to grant to them the privilege of nominating and having special Magistrates to act for them as Judges Conservator in those ports and cities of his dominions in which Tribunals and Courts of Justice are or may hereafter be established. These judges shall try and decide all causes brought before them by British subjects, in the same manner as formerly, and their authority and determination shall be respected; and the laws, decrees, and customs of Portugal respecting the jurisdiction of the Judge Conservator are declared to be recognised and renewed by the present Treaty. They shall be chosen by the plurality of British subjects residing in or trading at the port or place where the jurisdiction of the Judge Conservator is to be established; and the choice so made shall be transmitted to his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, or Minister resident at the Court of Portugal, to be by him laid before his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal in order to obtain his Royal Highness's consent, and confirmation, in

case of not obtaining which, the parties interested are to proceed to a new election, until the royal approbation of the Prince Regent be obtained. The removal of the Judge Conservator, in cases of neglect of duty or delinquency, is also be effected by an application to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal through the channel of the British Ambassador, or Minister resident at his Royal Highness's Court. In return for this concession in favour of British subjects, his Britannic Majesty engages to cause the most strict and scrupulous observance and obedience to be paid to those laws by which the persons and property of Portuguese subjects residing within his dominions are secured and protected, and of which they (in common with all other foreigners) enjoy the benefit through the acknowledged equity of British Jurisprudence, and the singular excellence of the British Constitution. And it is further stipulated, that in case any favour or privilege should be granted by his Britannic Majesty to the subjects of any other State, which may seem to be analogous to, or to resemble the privilege of having Judge Conservators, granted by this article to British subjects residing in the Portuguese dominions, the same favour or privilege shall be considered as also granted to the subjects of Portugal residing within the British dominions, in the same manner as if it were expressly stipulated by the present Treaty.—XI. His Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, agree severally to grant the same favours, honours, immunities, privileges, and exemptions from duties and imposts to their respective Ambassadors, Ministers, or accredited Agents at the Courts of each of them, and whatever favour either of the two Sovereigns shall grant in this particular at his own Court, the other Sovereign engages to grant the same at his Court.—XII. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal declares and engages, in his own name and in that of his heirs and successors, that the subjects of his Britannic Majesty residing within his territories and dominions shall not be disturbed, troubled, persecuted, or annoyed on account of their religion, but that they shall have perfect liberty of conscience therein, and leave to attend and celebrate divine service to the honour of Almighty God, either within their own private houses, or in their own particular churches and cha-

pels, which his Royal Highness does now and for ever graciously grant to them the permission of building and maintaining within his dominions: Provided however, that the said churches and chapels shall be built in such a manner as externally to resemble private dwelling houses; and also, that the use of bells be not permitted therein, for the purpose of publicly announcing the time of divine service; and it is further stipulated, that neither the subjects of Great Britain, nor any other foreigners of a different communion from the religion established in the dominions of Portugal, shall be persecuted or disquieted for conscience-sake, either in their persons or property, so long as they conduct themselves with order, decency, and morality, and in a manner conformable to the usages of the country, and to its Constitution in church and state; but if it should be proved that they preach or declaim publicly against the Catholic religion, or that they endeavour to make proselytes or converts, the parties so offending may, upon manifestation of their delinquency, be sent out of the country in which the offence shall have been committed; and those who behave in public with disrespect or impropriety towards the forms and ceremonies of the established Catholic religion, shall be amenable to the civil police, and may be punished by fine or by confinement within their own dwelling houses. And if the offence be so flagrant and so enormous as to disturb the public tranquillity, or endanger the safety of the institution of church and state (as established by law), the parties so offending may, on due proof of the fact, be sent out of the dominions of Portugal.—Liberty shall also be granted to bury the subjects of his Britannic Majesty who may die in the territories of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in convenient places to be appointed for that purpose; nor shall the funerals or sepulchres of the dead be disturbed in anywise, nor upon any account. In the same manner the subjects of Portugal shall enjoy within all the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, a perfect and unrestrained liberty of conscience in all matters of religion, agreeably to the system of toleration established therein. They may freely perform the exercises of their religion publicly or privately within their own dwelling houses, or in the chapels and places of worship appointed for that purpose, without any the smallest hindrance,

annoyance, or difficulty whatsoever, either now or hereafter.—XIII. It is agreed and covenanted by the high contracting parties, that packets shall be established for the purpose of furthering the public service of the two Courts, and of facilitating the commercial intercourse of their respective subjects. A convention shall be concluded forthwith on the basis of that which was signed at Rio de Janeiro on the 14th day of September, 1808, in order to settle the terms upon which the said packets are to be established, which convention shall be ratified at the same time with the present Treaty.—XIV. It is agreed and covenanted, that persons guilty of high treason, forgery, or other offences of a heinous nature, within the dominions of either of the high contracting parties, shall not be harboured nor receive protection in the dominions of the other. And that neither of the high contracting parties shall knowingly and wilfully receive into and entertain in their service persons, subjects of the other power deserting from the military service thereof, whether by sea or land; but that on the contrary they shall each respectively discharge any such person from their service upon being required: but it is agreed and declared, that neither of the high contracting parties shall grant to any other state any favour on the subject of persons deserting from the service of that state, which shall not be considered as granted also to the other high contracting party, in the same manner as if the said favour had been expressly stipulated by the present treaty. And it is further agreed, that in cases of apprentices or sailors deserting from vessels belonging to the subjects of either of the high contracting parties while within the ports of the other party, the Magistrates shall be bound to give effectual assistance for their apprehension, on due application to that effect being made by the Consul General, or Consul, or by his Deputy or Representative; and that no public body, civil or religious, shall have the power of protecting such deserters.—XV. All goods, merchandizes, and articles whatsoever of the produce, manufacture, industry or invention of the dominions and subjects of his Britannic Majesty, shall be admitted into all and singular the ports and dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal as well in Europe as in America, Africa,

and Asia, whether consigned to British or Portuguese subjects, on paying generally and solely duties to the amount of fifteen per cent. according to the value which shall be set upon them by a tariff or table of valuations, called in the Portuguese language *pauta*, the principal basis of which shall be the sworn invoice cost of the aforesaid goods, merchandizes and articles, taking also into consideration (as far as may be just or practicable) the current prices thereof in the country into which they are imported. This tariff or valuation shall be determined and settled by an equal number of British and Portuguese merchants of known integrity and honour, with the assistance on the part of the British merchants of his Britannic Majesty's Consul General, or Consul, and on the part of the Portuguese merchants with the assistance of the Superintendent, or Administrator General of the Customs, or of their respective Deputies. And the aforesaid tariff or table of valuations shall be made and promulgated in each of the ports belonging to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in which there are or may be Custom-houses. It shall be concluded, and begin to have effect as soon as possible after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, and certainly within the space of three months reckoned from the date of that exchange. And it shall be revised and altered if necessary, from time to time, either in the whole or in part, whenever the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, resident within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, shall make a requisition to that effect through the medium of his Britannic Majesty's Consul General or Consul, or whenever the trading and commercial subjects of Portugal shall make the same requisition on their own part. (*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates:

The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Volumes of the above Work are in the Press, and will be published with all proper dispatch. All Communications will be carefully attended to; but it is particularly requested that they may be forwarded as early as possible.

Cobbett's Weekly Political Register.

VOL. XVIII. No. 8.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1810. [Price 1s.

"I ever abominated that scheme of politics, (now about 30 years old) of setting up a monied interest in opposition to the landed. For I conceived, there could not be a truer maxim in our government than this, that the possessors of the soil are the best judges of what is for the advantage of the kingdom. If others had thought the same way, funds of credit and South Sea projects would neither have been felt nor heard of."—SWIFT, 1720.

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TO THE PUBLIC.

This was the week for publishing the second *Double Number* of this Volume of the Register; but, in consequence of the increase of time that I have now upon my hands, and in the hope that I shall be able to employ that time with advantage to the public, I have determined upon the following alteration in the publication of this work; that is to say; to publish two SHEETS IN EVERY WEEK, one on the *Saturday*, as at present, and the other on the *Wednesday*; and, to discontinue wholly the *double numbers*, except at the close of the Volumes, when a second sheet will be absolutely necessary for the insertion of the Tables of Contents and Indexes.—

The first WEDNESDAY'S NUMBER will be published on the Wednesday after next; that is, on the 12th of this month.—

The hour of publication will, after the 12th instant, be TWO o'clock, instead of THREE.—The Wednesday's Numbers will, of course, be sent, by the newsmen, to the gentlemen who take the work, unless a special direction be given to the contrary.

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION
OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER I.

Appointment of the Bullion Committee—Main points of the Report—Proposition for the Bank to pay in two years—To merit the appellation of a thinking people, we must shew that our thinking produces knowledge—Go back into the history of paper-money—Definition of money—Increase of paper—What is the cause, of this increase?—Origin of the Bank of England—How it came to pass that so much paper money got afloat—Increase of bank-notes wanted to pay the increase of the interest on the National Debt—Progress in issuing bank-notes from 20 to 1 pounds—Suspicion awakened in 1797, which produced the stoppage of gold and silver payments at the Bank of England.

Gentlemen,

During the last session of parliament, a Committee, that is to say, ten or twelve members, of the House of Commons were appointed to inquire into the cause of the high price of Gold Bullion, that is, Gold not coined; and to take into consideration the state of the circulating medium, or money, of this country. This Committee have made a *Report*, as they call it; but, it is a great book that they have written, and have had printed; a book much larger than the whole of the New Testament. Of this Report I intend to enter into an Examination; and, as you have recently felt, and are still feeling, some of the effects of

Paper-Money, I think it may not be amiss, if, upon this occasion, I address myself to you. I have introduced myself to you without any ceremony; but, before we part, we shall become well acquainted; and, I make no doubt, that you will understand the distinction between Paper-Money and Gold-Money much too well for it to be in the power of any one ever again to deceive you; which understanding, will, in the times now fast approaching, be of great utility to all those amongst you, who may have the means of laying up money, however small the quantity may be.

The Committee above-mentioned, which, for brevity's sake, I call the Bullion Committee, sent for several persons, whom they examined as *witnesses*, touching the matters in question. There was SIR FRANCIS BARING, for instance, the great loan-maker, and GOLDSMID, the rich Jew, whose name you so often see in the newspapers, where he is stated to give grand dinners to princes and great men. The *Evidence* of these, and other money-dealers and merchants, the Bullion Committee have had printed; and, upon this evidence, as well as upon the Report itself, we shall have to make some remarks.

The result of the Committee's inquiries is, in substance, this; *that the high price of gold is occasioned by the low value of the paper-money; that the low value of the paper-money has been occasioned* (as, you know, the low value of apples is) *by the great abundance of it; that the only way to lower the price of the gold is to raise the value of the paper-money; and that the only way to raise the value of the paper-money is to make the quantity of it less than it now is.* Thus far, as you will clearly see, there was no conjuration required. The fact is, that, not only do these propositions contain well-known, and almost self-evident, truths; but, these truths have, during the last two or three years, and especially during the last year, been so frequently stated in print, that it was next to impossible, that any person in England, able to read, should have been unacquainted with them. But, having arrived at the conclusion, that, in order to raise the value of the paper-money, *its quantity must be lessened*; having come to this point, the rest of the way was more difficult; for, the next object was, to point out *the means of lessening the quantity of the paper-money*, and this is an object,

which, in my opinion will never be effected, unless those means include the destruction of the whole mass.

Not so, however, think the Gentlemen of the Bullion Committee. They think, or, at least, they evidently wish to make others think, that it is possible to lessen the quantity of the paper-money, and to cause guineas to come back again and to pass from hand to hand as in former times; they would fain have us believe, that this can be done without the total destruction of the paper-money; and, indeed, they have actually recommended to the House of Commons to pass a law to cause the Bank in Threadneedle Street, London, commonly called the Bank of England, *to pay its notes in real money, at the END OF TWO YEARS* from this time. Two years is a pretty good lease for people to have of this sort. This Bank *promises to pay, on demand.* It does this upon the face of every one of its notes; and, therefore, as a *remedy* for the evil of want of gold, to propose, that this Bank should *begin to pay* in two years time, is something, which, I think, would not have been offered to the public in any age but this, and, even in this age, to any public except the public in this country. The notes of the Bank of England bear, upon the face of them, a promise that the Bankers, or Bank Company, who issue the notes, will *pay the notes upon demand.* Now, what do we mean by *paying a note*? Certainly we do not mean, the giving of *one note for another note.* Yet, this is the sort of payment, that people get at the Bank of England; and this sort of payment the Bullion Committee does not propose even to begin to put an end to in less than *two years* from this time.

Gentlemen; we, the people of this country, have been persuaded to believe many things. We have been persuaded to believe ourselves to be "the most thinking people in Europe;" but, to what purpose do men think, unless they arrive at useful knowledge by thinking? To what purpose do men think, if they are, after all their thinking, to be persuaded, that a Bank, which has not paid its promissory notes in gold for *thirteen years and a half*, will be able to pay them in gold at the end of *fifteen years and a half*, the quantity of the notes having gone on regularly *increasing*? If men are to be persuaded to believe this, to what purpose

do they think? But, before I proceed any further in my remarks upon the Report of the Bullion Committee; before I proceed to lay before you the *exposures* now made by the labours of this Committee; the facts now become *evident* through this channel; the *confessions* now made by these members of the House of Commons: before I proceed to lay these before you, and to remark upon the remedies, proposed by the Committee, it will be necessary for me to go back a few years into the *history of the paper-money*; because, without doing this, I shall be talking to you of things, of which you will have no clear notion, and the reasonings, relating to which, you will, of course, not at all understand. It is a great misfortune, that any portion of your time should be spent in reading or thinking about matters of this kind; but, such is our present situation in this country, that every man, who has a family to preserve from want, ought to endeavour to make himself acquainted with the nature, and with the probable consequences, of the paper-money now afloat.

Money is the *representative*, or the *token* of property, or *things of value*. The money, while used as money, is of no other use; and, therefore, a bit of lead or of wood or of leather, would be as good as gold or silver, to be used as money. But, if these materials, which are every where found in *such abundance*, were to be used as money, there would be so much money made, that there would be no end to it; and, besides, the money made in one country would, however there enforced by law, have no value in any other country. For these reasons *Gold* and *Silver*, which are amongst the most *scarce* of things, have been, by all the nations that we know any thing of, used as money. While the money of any country consists of nothing but these scarce metals; while it consists of nothing but gold and silver, there is no fear of its becoming *too abundant*; but if the money of a country be made of lead, tin, wood, leather, or paper; and, if any one can make it, who may choose to make it, there needs no extraordinary wisdom to foresee, that there will be a great abundance of this sort of money, and that the gold and silver money, being, in fact, no longer of any use in such a state of things, will go, either into the hoards of the prudent, or into the bags of those, who have the means of sending or

carrying them to those foreign countries where they are wanted, and where they will bring their value.

That a state of things like that here spoken of, does now exist in this country, is notorious to all the world. But, while we are all acquainted with the fact, and while many of us are most sensibly feeling the *effects*, scarcely a man amongst us takes the trouble to inquire into the *cause*: yet, unless the cause be ascertained, how are we to apply, or to judge of, a *remedy*? We see the country abounding with paper-money; we see every man's hand full of it; we frequently talk of it as a strange thing, and a great evil; but, never do we inquire into the cause of it.

There are few of you, who cannot remember the time, when there was scarcely ever seen a bank note among Tradesmen and Farmers. I can remember, when this was the case; and, when the farmers in my country hardly ever saw a bank-note, except when they sold their hops at Weyhill fair. People, in those days, used to carry little bags to put their money in, instead of the paste-board or leather cases that they now carry. If you look back, and take a little time to think, you will trace the gradual increase of paper-money, and the like decrease of gold and silver money. At first there were no bank notes under 20 pounds; next they came to 15 pounds; next to 10 pounds; at the beginning of the last war, they came to 5 pounds; and, before the end of it, they came down to 2 and to 1 pounds. How long it will be before they come down to parts of a pound, it would, perhaps, be difficult to say; but in Kent, at least, there are country notes in circulation to an amount so low as that of seven shillings. It is the *cause* of this that is interesting to us; the cause of this change in our money, and, in the *prices* of goods of all sorts and of labour. All of you who are forty years of age can remember, when the price of the gallon loaf used to be about ten pence or a shilling instead of two shillings and sixpence or two shillings and ten pence, as it now is. These effects strike you. You talk of them every day; but the *cause* of them you seldom, if ever, either talk or think of; and, it is to this cause that I am now endeavouring to draw your attention.

You have, during the last seventeen years, seen the quantity of paper-money

rapidly increase; or in other words, you have, day after day, seen less and less of gold and silver appear in payments, and, of course, more and more of paper-money. But, it was not 'till the year 1797, that the paper-money began to increase so very fast. It was then that the *two* and *one* pound notes were first made by the Bank of England. It was then, in short, that paper-money became completely predominant. But, you will naturally ask me, "what was the cause of *that*?" The cause was, that the Bank of England *stopped paying its notes in gold and silver*. What! stop paying its notes? Refuse to pay its *promissory notes*? The Bank of England, when its notes were presented, *refuse to pay them*? Yes: and, what is more, an Act of parliament, brought in by Pitt, was passed, to protect the Bank of England against the legal consequences of such refusal. So that, the people, who held promissory notes of the Bank, and who had, perhaps, given gold or silver for them, when they went to the Bank for payment, were told, that they could have no gold or silver, but that they might have other notes, *more paper*, if they pleased, in exchange for the paper they held in their hands and tendered for payment. From that time to this, the Act of parliament, authorizing the Bank of England to refuse to pay its notes in gold and silver, has been in force. At first it was passed for *three months*; next 'till the parliament should meet again; then it was to last to the end of the war; then, when peace came, it was continued just for a year, 'till things should be settled; then, as things were not quite settled, it was continued till parliament should meet again; and, as this present war had begun by that time, the act was made to continue 'till *six months after the next peace*. The reasons given upon the different occasions, it will be very material to notice; for, it is this stoppage in the payment of gold and silver at the Bank of England upon which the whole question turns. Every thing hangs upon this; and, when we come to examine that part of the Report, which treats of the Bank's reviving its payments in gold and silver, we shall find it of great use to us to recur to the *reasons*, the divers, the manifold, reasons that were given, at different times, for suspending those payments. Since that suspension took place, you have seen the gold and silver disappear; you have seen, that paper has supplied the place of gold; paper-money makers have

set up all over the kingdom; and might not this well happen, when, to pay paper-money nothing more than paper money was required? But, the *reasons* given for this measure of suspension;—the reasons given for the passing of an Act of Parliament to protect the Bank of England against the demands of its creditors are seldom recurred to, though, as you will presently see, without recurring to those reasons, and without ascertaining the *true* cause of the passing of that Act of Parliament, we cannot form so good a judgment relative to the *remedy* now proposed; namely, that of the Bank of England's reviving its payments in gold and silver. This is the remedy, which the Bullion Committee propose; and, you will say, a very good remedy it is; a very good remedy indeed; for people, who have, for so long a time, not paid their notes in gold and silver, to begin to pay their notes, in gold and silver, is a very good remedy; but, the thing to ascertain, is, *can the remedy be applied*? This is the question for us to discuss. It required nobody to tell us, that *paying in gold and silver* would be an effectual remedy for the evils arising from *not paying in gold and silver*; but, it required much more than I have yet heard to convince me, that to pay again in gold and silver *was possible*.

The chief object of our inquiries being this: *Whether it be possible, without a total destruction of all the paper-money, to restore gold and silver to circulation amongst us*; this being the chief object of our inquiries, we should first ascertain *how the gold and silver was driven out of circulation*, and had its place supplied by a paper-money; for, unless we get at a clear view of this, it will be next to impossible for us to reason satisfactorily upon the means of bringing gold and silver back again into circulation.

Some people suppose, that paper *always* made a part of the currency, or common money, of England. They seem to regard the Bank of England as being as old as the Church of England, at least, and some of them appear to have full as much veneration for it. The truth is, however, that the Bank of England is a mere human institution, arising out of causes having nothing miraculous, or supernatural, about them; and that both the institution and the agents who carry it on, are as mortal as any other thing and any other men, in

this or in any other country. THE BANK, as it is called, had its origin in the year 1694, that is, a hundred and sixteen years ago; and it arose thus: the then King, WILLIAM III, who had come from Holland, had begun a war against France, and, wanting money to carry it on, an act was passed (which act was the 20th of the 5th year of his reign) to invite people to make voluntary advances to the government of the sum of 1,500,000 pounds, and for securing the payment of the interest, and also for securing the re-payment of the principal, *taxes* were laid upon beer, ale, and other liquors. Upon condition of 1,200,000*l.* of this money being advanced, within a certain time, the subscribers to the loan were to be incorporated; and, as the money was advanced in due time, the incorporation took place, and the lenders of the money were formed into a trading Company, called "THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF 'THE BANK OF ENGLAND.'" In time, when more and more and more money had been borrowed by the government, in this way of mortgage upon the taxes, there grew up a thing called the *Stocks*, or the *Funds* (of which we will speak hereafter); but the Bank Company remained under its primitive name, and, as the *debt* of the nation increased, this Company increased in *riches* and in consequence.

Thus, you see, and it is well worthy of your attention, the Bank had its rise in *war* and *taxation*. But, we must reserve reflections of this sort for other occasions, and go on with our inquiries how *gold and silver have been driven out of circulation* in this country, or, in other words, how it came to pass, that so much paper money got afloat.

The Act of Parliament, which I have just referred to, points out the manner in which the Bank Company shall carry on their trade, and the articles in which they shall trade, allowing them, amongst other things, to trade in gold, silver, bills of Exchange, and other things, under certain restrictions; but, as to what are called *bank-notes*, the Company was not empowered to issue any such, in any other way, or upon any other footing, than merely as *promissory* notes, for the amount of which, in the coin of the country, they were liable to be sued and arrested. Having, however, a greater credit than any other individuals, or company of individuals, the Bank Company

issued notes to a greater amount; and, which was something new in England, they were made payable, not to any *particular person*, or his *order*, and not at any *particular time*; but to the *bearer*, and on *demand*. These characteristics, which distinguished the promissory notes of the Bank from all other promissory notes, gave the people greater confidence in them; and, as the Bank Company were always ready to pay the notes in Gold and Silver, when presented for payment, the notes became, in time, to be looked upon as being as good as gold and silver. Hence came all our country sayings: "*As good as the Bank*;" "*As solid as the Bank*;" and the like. Yet, the Bank was, as we have seen, merely a company of mortal men, formed into an association of traders; and their notes nothing more than written promises to pay the bearer so much money in gold or silver.

We used to have other sayings about the Bank; such as, "*As rich as the Bank*;" "*All the gold in the Bank*;" and such like, always conveying a notion, that the Bank was a *place*, and a *place*, too, where there were great heaps of money. As long as the Company were ready and willing to pay, and did actually pay, their notes in gold and silver, to all those persons who wished to have gold and silver, it is clear that these opinions of the people, relative to the Bank, were not altogether unfounded; for, though no bit of paper, or of any thing which has no value in itself, can be, in fact, so good as a bit of gold; still, if it will, at any moment, whenever the holder pleases, bring him gold or silver to the amount written upon it, it is very nearly as good as gold and silver; and, at the time of which we are speaking, this was the case with the promissory notes of the Bank Company. But, it must be evident, that, though the Company were ready, at the time now referred to, to pay their notes in gold and silver, they had never in their money chests a sufficiency of gold and silver to pay off *all* their notes, if they had been presented all at once. This must be evident to every man; because, if the Bank Company kept locked up as much gold and silver as their notes amounted to, they could get nothing by issuing their notes, and might full as well have sent out their gold and silver. A farmer, for instance, who is generally using a hundred pounds of money to pay his workmen, might lead the hundred

pounds and get interest for it, if he could persuade his workmen to take promissory notes of his own drawing, instead of money, and, if he were sure, that these promissory notes would not be brought in for payment; but, if this was not the case, he would be compelled to keep the hundred pounds in his drawer ready to give those who did not like to keep his promissory notes; and, in such case, it is clear, that the money would be of no use to him, and that he might full as well have none of his notes out. Just so with the Bank Company, who, at no time, could have in hand gold and silver enough to pay off *all* their notes at once; nor was this necessary as long as the people regarded those notes as being equally good with gold and silver. But, it is clear, that *this opinion of the goodness* of the Company's notes, or, rather, the *feeling of confidence*, or, still more properly, perhaps, the *absence of all suspicion*, with respect to them, must, in a great degree, depend upon the *quantity* of notes seen in circulation, compared with the quantity of gold and silver seen in circulation. At first, the quantity of notes was very small indeed; the increase of this quantity was, for the first twenty years, very slow; and, though it became more rapid in the next twenty years, the quantity does not appear to have been large till the war which took place in 1755, before which time the Bank Company put out no notes under 20 pounds in amount. Then it was that they began to put out 15 pound notes, and afterwards, but during the same war, 10 pound notes. During all this time, loans, in every war, had been made by the government. That is to say, the government had borrowed money of individuals, in the same way as above-mentioned, in the year 1694, when the system of loans and stocks and funds was begun. The money thus borrowed was never paid off, but was suffered to remain at interest, and was, as it is now, called the NATIONAL DEBT, the interest upon which is annually paid out of the taxes raised upon the people. As this debt went on increasing, the bank-notes went on increasing, as, indeed, it is evident they must, seeing that the interest of the Debt was, as it still is and must be, *paid in bank-notes*.

It is not simply the quantity of bank-notes, that are put out into circulation, which will excite alarm as to their solidity; but, it is that quantity, if it be great, com-

pared with the quantity of gold and silver, seen in circulation. If, as the bank-notes increased, the circulating gold and silver had increased in the same proportion; then, indeed, bank-notes would still have retained their usual credit; people would still have had the same confidence in them. But, this could not be. From the nature of things it could not be. The cause of the increase of the bank-notes, was, the increase of the interest upon the National Debt; and, as it grew out of an operation occasioned by poverty, it would have been strange indeed had it been accompanied with a circumstance, which would have been an infallible indication of riches. Without, however, stopping here to inquire into the cause of the coin's not increasing with the increase of paper, suffice it to say, that such was the fact. Year after year we saw more of bank-notes and less of gold and silver; till, in time, such was the quantity of bank-notes required to meet the purposes of gold and silver in the payment of the interest of the still increasing Debt, and in the payment of the taxes, many other banks were opened, and they also issued *their* promissory notes. The Bank Company's notes, which had never before been made for less sums than 10 pounds, were, soon after the beginning of PITT's war, in 1793, issued for *five pounds*, after which it was not to be supposed, that people could have the same opinion of bank-notes that they formerly had. Every part of the people, except the very poorest of them, now, occasionally, at least, possessed bank-notes. Rents, salaries, yearly wages, all sums above five pounds, were now paid in bank notes; and, the government itself was now paid *its taxes* in this same sort of currency.

In such a state of things it was quite impossible that people should not begin to perceive, that gold and silver was better than bank-notes, and that they should not be more desirous of possessing the former than the latter; and, the moment this is the case, the banking system must begin to tremble; for, as the notes are payable to the *bearer*, and payable on *demand*, it is very certain, that no man, with such a preference in his mind, will keep in his possession a bank-note, unless we can suppose a man so absurd as to keep a thing, of the goodness of which he has some suspicion, however small, while, for merely opening his mouth or stretching forth his hand, he can exchange it for a thing of the

same nominal value, and of the goodness of which it is impossible for him or any one else to entertain any suspicion. "Public Credit," as it has been called, but, as it may more properly be called, "*The credit of bank-notes*," has been emphatically denominated, "*Suspicion ASLEEP*." In the midst of events like those of 1793 and the years immediately succeeding; in the midst of circumstances like those above-mentioned, relating to the bank-notes, it was impossible that Suspicion should sleep any longer. The putting forth of the 5 pound bank-notes appear to have roused it, and, in the month of February, 1797, it became broad awake. The stoppage of payment on the part of the Bank Company was the immediate consequence; but, a particular account of that important event, which totally changed the nature of all our money transactions, and which will, in the end, produce, in all human probability, effects of the most serious nature, must be the subject of a future letter. In the mean while I am,

Your friend,

WM. CORBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,
30th August, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

HOLLAND (*continued from page 239.*) When I was writing the article, here referred to, I was deeply impressed with the persuasion, that we should very soon find, that the Emperor Napoleon did not mean to leave Holland any longer in a state of inactivity. I had thought of the matter for some time, and I had made up my mind to this settled opinion; that he would now set seriously and sedulously to work to make use of the immense naval resources of Holland for the purpose of annoying, and, if possible, of subjugating England. This being my sincere conviction, I endeavoured to bring my readers over to that conviction, and, as a preliminary thereto, to remove from their minds the notions, with which some of our writers had been endeavouring to buoy them up, relative to *discontents*, which were said to exist amongst the Dutch, *on account of the change* which had recently taken place, for which *discontents* I could see no reason, seeing that the change had merely put away one, who could never be considered in any other light than that of an *agent* of Napoleon, and had introduced a

few more *foreign troops* than were already in the country.—I am satisfied, that the danger of this country consists chiefly in the want of preparation in the minds of the people. The object of but too many amongst us appears to be to keep the people in the dark, at all events, to the last moment. Else, why should attempts be made to persuade them, even to this day, that the Dutch are about to resist the Emperor Napoleon's orders and decrees? The danger, which this country has to apprehend from the side of Holland is, one would think, so evident, that every man must see it. Yet, instead of preparing the minds of the people for this danger, our ministerial writers seem to have formed a deliberate plan for making the people of England believe, that, so far from Napoleon's being able to attack us from Holland, he is likely to be attacked himself by Holland. Shocking infatuation! If this infatuation continue, what must be the consequence?

—As I wish for the people of this country to see their danger, to see the real state of Holland and of its means of attacking us, I have resumed, or rather continued, my former article upon the subject, and I shall now add some observations, for which I had not then time.—It is said, in speaking of the Dutch *National Debt*, that Napoleon has decreed a bankruptcy in Holland, and "*appropriated TO HIMSELF the two third parts of the public stocks of that nation*." This is said in the *Courier* news-paper of the 29th of August. I did not so understand the matter; nor do I, upon a second look at the decree, so understand it now. It may be considered as being rather bold, to differ from so wise a man as the Editor of the *Courier*; but, I am pretty certain, that I am right in my construction of the decree, which, if words when used by Napoleon have their usual meaning, says that two thirds of the interest of the Debt shall be no longer paid; and, of course, that there will not be taxes raised to pay those two thirds, as there used to be, in consequence of which there must, of necessity, be less taxes raised in Holland, on account of the Debt.—See the decree, at page 83 of this volume, and see also the Report of the Duke of Cadore, at page 79. It is impossible to read these documents; and not to see that what the *Courier* has published upon this subject is not true; and that, if it be not intended to deceive the public, it must have a tendency thereunto.—This matter of the *Dutch Debt* is very ma-

terial indeed, because it is, as we have been told, on account of the reduction of the interest upon this Debt, that the people of Holland are so outrageously discontented. If the decree be what I have described it to be; that is to say, if it relieves the Dutch from paying two thirds of the taxes that they used to pay on account of the Debt, I really cannot, in that, discover any cause for discontent amongst the people in general. The persons who have to receive one third, that is to say, *ten* shillings where they used to receive *thirty* shillings; such persons may, indeed, very reasonably be discontented; but, when we are calculating upon the effects of popular discontent against the power of a government, we always speak of the feelings of the *many* and not of the *few*. Besides, if it be really true, that the dear good Dutchmen are angry and seditiously inclined, because they have ten shillings instead of thirty to pay to the Stock-holder; if this be really true, there is a very easy, expeditious, and safe remedy. they have only to take the money out of their pockets and pay the creditors the two third parts themselves, which Napoleon would hardly prevent by "a restriction bill." Let them, then, be as discontented as our news-papers can make them on any other account; let them rise in insurrection in every corner of the country; but, let it not be under the pretence, that they are *not permitted to pay their debts honestly*, which they may do if they please, notwithstanding Napoleon's decree.—Let us now turn to what has transpired since my last Number was written: I allude to the declarations, made by Napoleon, relative to Holland, in his answer to the address of the Dutch, presented to him, on the occasion of his birth-day.—We have always found, in all the stages of the French government, that they *intended* to do what they *threatened* to do; and, I can see no reason why this should not still be the case.—Let us, therefore, hear, and pay good attention to what Napoleon now threatens; for, we may be assured, that, if he fail to put his threats in execution, it will not be for want of the disposition.—He says to the Dutch:—"I gave you a Prince of my blood for your Ruler; this was intended as a bond to unite the concerns of your Republic with the rights of this Empire. My hopes have been deceived; and on this occasion I have shewn more forbearance than my character gene-

rally admits and my rights required. "I have at length put a period to the painful uncertainty of your future fate, and warded off the fatal blow which threatened to annihilate all your property and all your resources. I have opened the Continent to your national industry. *The day shall come when you are to conduct my eagles to the seas celebrated by the exploits of your ancestors. Then shall you shew yourselves worthy of yourselves and of me. From this moment till that period, all the changes that take place in Europe shall have for their first motive the destruction of that tyrannical and irrational system which the English Government, unmindful of the pernicious consequences which arise therefrom to its own country, has adopted, to outlaw commerce and trade, and subject it to the arbitrary authority of English licences.*—Gentlemen, Deputies of the Legislative Body, and of the land and sea forces, of Holland—and Gentlemen Deputies of my good City of Amsterdam, tell my subjects of Holland, I feel perfectly satisfied they possess the sentiments they profess for me; tell them, that I doubt not their loyal attachment, and depend on their heartily joining their exertions to those of the rest of my subjects, to *re-conquer the rights of the sea*, the loss of which, five coalitions, incited by England, have inflicted on the continent; tell them, that in all circumstances they may reckon on my peculiar protection."—Thus, as the reader will see, my opinions, upon this subject, as given last week, were pretty correct. I then said, that the change had been made principally, if not wholly, with a view to the execution of designs against England; and, I, therefore, besought my readers not to be cheated, not to be lured away from this object, by any stories, any hatched tales, about the *discontents*, which the change had created amongst the Dutch. The same writers, who made these attempts at cheating and luring the public with Dutch discontents, are now, upon seeing the Address of the Dutch Deputies, which, in point of "*loyalty*" may, perhaps, equal, but, in point of *adulation* certainly does not equal many other addresses that I have read in my lifetime; upon seeing this address, which it was impossible to keep out of print in England, and equally impossible to alter very materially, without detection and exposure; upon seeing this address, so flatly contradicting all their assertions,

and baffling all the false hopes, which they had found it their interest to endeavour to excite; upon seeing this address, they tack short about, and, after pretty nearly a month spent in condoling with the poor good Dutch, and lamenting that so worthy, such an excellent, discontented, and seditious people should be so cruelly oppressed; after this, kept up for nearly a month, they, upon seeing the "*dutiful*" and *loyal*" address before-mentioned, turn short round upon the charmingly discontented Dutch, and assail both them and their "*prince and father*" in the following terms.—"The MONITEUR of the 18th contains the Address of the Dutch Deputies to Buonaparté, and the Reply of the Tyrant to the *meanly adulatory*, and *disgustingly fulsome* language of the *degenerated* sons of the once noble; independent, and high spirited Hollanders, who, in making their abject submission to the common oppressor of the Continent, do not blush to allude to the heroic and successful exertions of their ancestors to resist a *foreign tyranny*, and by which they obtained and so long preserved that independence which formerly had been the proud and just boast of every true and honest Batavian. Never, certainly, was a reply more suitably made to such an Address; for, while the *degraded* Hollanders *exult* in the state of thralldom to which, by his *egregious infamy* they have been reduced, Buonaparté boasts of the conquests he has, in like manner, obtained over the independence of so many other nations of the Continent, and does not hesitate to take credit to himself to have rivetted the chains of the *once happy* countries of Italy, Switzerland, &c. as well as of the once "*High and Mighty*," but now poor and wretched States of Holland. If any additional proof were wanting of the total disregard of every principle of truth and honour in this *detestable tyrant*, it would be found in the allusion which he makes to the recent acts of the British Government. It is not necessary for us now to remind our Readers that our Orders of Council, of which the *Tyrant* continues to complain, were merely retaliative of his *most unprincipled* and *outrageous* Decrees against us; and yet has he the *shameless effrontery* to say, even to the face of those very people who have most suffered by his wanton restraints upon every commercial pursuit, that the system of the

British Government is "*tyrannical* and "*irrational*," and that to its destruction all his future exertions are to be directed. *What matchless impudence and falsehood!* As to the threat of his eagles being about to be conveyed to the sea, we shall only for the present observe, that the sooner they are sent, the sooner will our brave tars be afforded the opportunity they desire of effectually "*clipping their wings*."—Yes, let us hope so; but, we could have hoped this, and we could have said this, without accompanying it; without accompanying either the hope or the prayer, with any of the nonsense or the hypocrisy that precedes it. It is very laudable in any Englishman to meet a menace like that of Napoleon with defiance; because, however erroneous the judgment, the feeling is right; but, this defiance derives no credit from the blustering abuse, the falsehood, the nonsense, and the hypocrisy with which it is accompanied, and which seems to be far too much overstrained to flow from a disinterested source.—But, before we make any further observations upon this article from the Morning Post (of the 27th of August), let us hear what its twin brother, the Courier, of the same day, contained upon the same subject.—"If any thing can add to the degradation of a people, cursed and conquered by Buonaparté, it is the manner in which he *makes them return thanks* for having destroyed their prosperity and rights, and celebrate him as the worker of good, who has proved himself in every action the demon of evil. Our readers will find in another part of our Paper, the Address of the Dutch Legislature and Council of State, the Deputies of the Land and Sea Forces, and of the City of Amsterdam. The *hatred*, the *loathing*, and *disgust* which the Dutch have against the French Government and its Chief, are notorious; yet are these Deputies made to thank him for having united them with his happy subjects; and to hope that, by their obedience and attachment to their Prince and Father, they shall preserve the protection of a *generous, upright, and benevolent* Government!!! And to add to the *insult* and *mockery* of the scene, and to make their shame and their disgrace complete, they are made to take a retrospective view of their history, and say, "*they are still possessed of a strong re-*

"collection of the virtues of their fore-fathers." What a grovelling and contemptible shape do men and nations sometimes assume! To have read such an Address, without knowing from whence it proceeded, one would have supposed it to be an Address to some *Persian Satrap*, an Address from some of those Eastern Nations which have never enjoyed the *light and life of Liberty*, and in which man is the only growth that lingers."—"But that the Dutch, the descendants of De Witt, and Trompe and De Ruyter, of men who defied and defeated all the power of Spain, that they should be compelled to class slavery among the blessings of life, and to bestow (except by way of irony and scorn) upon that *Prince of Darkness*, Buonaparté, the appellation of *Father*, is most galling and afflicting indeed!"—The *Courier* has this difference from his brother: he looks upon the poor good Dutch as having been made to thank Buonaparté. This idea is not quite original; and, indeed, it has been suspected, that many and many a most dutiful, loyal, and affectionate address would never have seen the light, without the assistance of the *fears* or the *hopes* of the addressers; and, in every such case, disguise the thing how you may, the addressers are made to do what they do; but, there is this difference, that, to yield to open palpable force is not a millenth part so disgraceful as the base hypocrisy of pretending to act in such a case from motives of real affection. A brave and faithful people may have the misfortune to be made slaves, and may be compelled, at the point of the bayonet, to do many acts of apparent meanness; but, then, where this is the case, the facts are known to the world; the baseness, the *insult*, the *mockery*, is, in cases, where all the names, and all the outward forms, of freedom are preserved, and all the substance of slavery and tyranny practised: there it is, that men's feelings are outraged; there it is that *insult* and *mockery* sting the soul.—Both these editors seem to be particularly offended with the word "*father*," made use of, upon this occasion, by the Dutch Deputies; but for what reason I know not, except that they grudge the French and Dutch even their fooleries. Why should not they use the word *father*, upon such occasions, as well as other people? I am sure I have seen it used with as little truth, and with even less propriety. Scores of addresses have I seen

much more fulsome and more impudently false than this of the Dutch Deputies; and, though that may be no justification for the Dutch Deputies, it may, at least, form something of an excuse for them. Aye, take my word for it, there are baser slaves upon earth than the Dutch Deputies. They, it what these editors say be true, are compelled to do what they do; while there are in the world wretches, who do worse from choice, or, at least, without any other motive than that of gain; and who, at the same time, have the "matchless impudence and falshood" to boast of the possession of liberty, about which neither Napoleon nor the Dutch Deputies say one word.—Now, as to the threats of the Emperor, they do not, I must confess, contain any thing, which I did not expect to hear from him much sooner; and, I am thoroughly persuaded, that he will leave nothing unattempted in order to fulfil them. Our fault has hitherto been, that we have set dangers wholly at defiance, or have suffered ourselves to be alarmed out of our senses. And, mind this, the latter will always be the case with those, who will never see danger at a distance. I want my country to see its danger now, while that danger is at a distance; and I beseech my readers to bear in mind, that I now warn the public against believing those, who are using all their endeavours to persuade us, that we are safe in consequence of the discontents and the seditious movements now existing and going on against Napoleon.—Holland is, it must be evident to every one, the point from which England is the most easily assailed. The land is nearly in sight; and, the distance, with a fair wind, is not more than four or five hours sail. The Duke of Cadore, in his report upon Holland, states, that, in the course of the ensuing year (from the 9th of July) there can be 40 sail of the line assembled in the Scheldt and the Texel. Perhaps this is a little over-strained; but, suppose there should be 30 sail, well crammed with troops; and this number, I think, may and will be assembled. The consequence of the bare existence of such an armament would be, a fleet of ours kept off the coast of Holland, all weathers and seasons; and, besides that, an army kept embodied in our Eastern counties. The Fleet, so prepared, need never stir, except for the purpose of making demonstrations. By remaining pretty nearly still, it would find occupation for a very large fleet, a

large body of land troops, and for all our news-papers. If people hoarded their money (the gold and silver money, I mean) in 1803, when there was little more than bare threats, what would they do, if such an armament were *actually seen on float*? "They would not hoard gold," says Mrs. de Yonge, "I'll answer for that." Very likely, Madam; but would you answer for their not hoarding the shillings and the big copper pennies?—I hope, and trust, that, if such an armament were to make an attempt to come out, it would be defeated; but, what have *hopes* to do in the forming of *opinions*? We are, in a case like this, to calculate what is likely to be, or what is possible to be; and not what we, or any body else, may *wish* for or *hope* for. Base and wicked is he who does not wish for the welfare of his country; but, what has that wish to do in influencing the fate of his country?—In the case before us, we are to consider, not what we wish might be, but what reason says is likely to be, and also what is possible to be. In the first place, then, no one can doubt, I think that it is *possible* for Napoleon to assemble, in the 'Territories of Holland, in the course of one year, a *fleet of thirty sail of the line*; and, that he could easily fill them with troops all the world knows. Our fleet, placed to watch this fleet, could not *always* keep the sea. There would be times when, for its own preservation, it must come from its station, and seek shelter in port. In that case, the enemy may come over if he will. All must depend upon winds and tides, and on whatever depends upon winds and tides no dependence is to be placed. If twenty or thirty thousand men were *landed*, I shall, as a matter of course, suppose, that, after a little while, at least, they would be defeated, and destroyed, or captured. But, the worst of it is, that even in that case, our *success* does not *put an end to our danger*; for, to our enemy, what is the loss of 20 or 30,000 men? In such a case, the loss of lives to us must be considerable, and who can fail to perceive the mischiefs that must arise from the alarm, especially if, at the same time, we were threatened from Boulogne or any other port of France? Such attempts, supposing Napoleon to have no other object but this kingdom to attend to, might be made several times in a year, without any very serious inconvenience to him; while, with respect to us, unless we pursue, and steadily pursue, a system of defence, at once cheap and ef-

ficacious, the inconvenience would be intolerable. It is to be observed that if an armament, such as I have been speaking of, would require on our part an *additional naval force*; and, of course, a heavy additional expence. Indeed, it must be manifest to every one that reflects, that the season for great exertions on our part is now approaching. It requires merely a look at the situation of Europe to enable one to determine this point. For years past, the whole of the forces of Napoleon have been carried away from us. He himself has been, no small part of that time, on the other side of Europe. And therefore, we must necessarily conclude that our exertions must now be greater, than they have of late years been, and that the necessity for such exertions will every day increase. Yet, it is at this time that we are told that retrenchments in expence are absolutely necessary. We were told this, during the last session of Parliament by Mr. Huskisson, Mr. Rose, and several others, who did not indeed propose to begin by the cutting off of *sinecures*; but who did very distinctly declare that retrenchment was necessary, and absolutely necessary. We shall probably see, during the next session of Parliament, the branches, upon which these gentlemen propose to begin with their retrenchments; but, if I am not very much deceived indeed, they will have to provide a new fleet for a defence against Holland, or to acknowledge that our present naval establishment has long been too great. —In estimating the failings of the Dutch towards Napoleon, and, of course, in estimating his means of raising a naval force in Holland, there are two circumstances, which we are apt to overlook. The first of these is, that the Dutch nation have now been *seventeen* years under the dominion of France. The children who were ten years of age, when the French conquered Holland, are now men and women of twenty seven years of age. The active population of Holland, therefore, have been brought up under the French, and with a taste for French principles. — The other circumstance is, that there were great discontents prevailing in Holland, long before the invasion by the French. The people had not forgotten or forgiven the *calling in of the Prussians*, in 1786, which gave rise to the banishment, voluntary, or involuntary, of great numbers of the most intelligent and most spirited men in the country. These men, in general,

sought refuge in France; and when the French revolution took place, they became the representatives of all the discontented in Holland, with whom they held constant communication; they urged the French government to invade their country, and they themselves opened the way for the invaders.—This circumstance, so important when estimating the disposition of the Dutch towards the French, has scarcely ever been noticed in this country. We have *wondered* and *wondered* how it was that the French walked through the chain of formerly strong fortresses into Holland; we have been indignant at the Dutch for not fighting in *defence of their country*; we have called them by all manner of names because they did not bury themselves in the last ditch of their fortifications; but, if we had borne in mind the event, which I have here referred to, our wonder would have ceased; or, rather, it would never have existed.—Upon the whole, then, according to any view that I am able to take of Holland, I cannot help being fully persuaded, that Napoleon will be able to draw forth all its immense naval means, and to give them a terrible direction towards this country; and this being my persuasion, I cannot refrain from again and again calling upon the public to be so prepared for the event as to be able to look it steadily in the face. It is very injurious to the *reputation* of the country to give way to such shameful abuse as that above-quoted from the Morning Post and the Courier. It misleads many persons. It gives a passionate and foolish direction to the mind; and it must, if those abusive prints can ever be read abroad, do our character great injury amongst foreigners, who will, doubtless, say, what is eternally true, that, those who resort to abuse, feel the want of truth on their side.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.—Mrs. de Yonge gave us a pretty good account of the manner, in which these disaffected gentry got off out of the kingdom; and, it seems, that a considerable part of them have made their way into France, in spite of all obstacles; for, it appears that there has been a decree recently passed in France, for the purpose of regulating the rate, at which foreign coin shall pass. Some part of our gold has gone to France in exchange for corn; but I take it, the far greater part of the English gold now in France, has gone thither after the manner so ably ex-

plained by Mrs. de Yonge.—Whether the report of the Bullion Committee will induce any of these Jacobin Guineas to return home, is more than I can say; but I am very certain, that, it will not induce them to return, until there be a paper price and a gold price openly acknowledged and acted upon.—It is worthy of remark how much greater the interest is, which is now excited in the country, respecting paper money, than it ever was upon any former occasion. Men seem to have taken quite new views of the subject. The day light of science seems to have broken in upon them all at once. The vulgar notions about *balance of trade* and *dearness* and *paying off the national debt* and the like have all vanished in an instant, and you can hardly meet with a man who retains any such phrases in his conversation. This is a great thing gained; for when once men understand the matter clearly, they will not be long before they will act as they ought.—There have been, within these ten days, some more articles published in the Morning Post, levelled at the Country Banks. From these articles, the source of which it is by no means difficult to guess at, I should imagine, that there was really some scheme on foot with respect to these banks; and if there is we shall see most curious work before next First of April.

“**MATCHLESS IMPUDENCE.**”——This is a quality, which the Morning Post, in a passage above-quoted, has given to the Emperor Napoleon; but, while we give this writer full credit for his modesty, let us do him that justice, which he has not done himself; for, I think, that there can be no doubt at all, that, as to the quality here spoken of he surpasses all the world. This one might fairly conclude from his general conduct; but, he has yesterday (30th of August) furnished us with an instance, which, even as a trait of impudence in him, does deserve particular notice.—The French news-paper, the *Moniteur*, has, it seems, cut some unsavoury jokes upon the state of our *foreign commerce* and our *paper money*. A part of what it has said the Morning Post has published; and, some of it is very sensibly written.—The Morning Post, however, says that “a more preposterous farrago of false reasoning, gross misrepresentation, and rank falshood, has never insulted common sense.”—But, it seems, that the efforts of the writer are calculated, accord-

ing to this same Morning Post, to produce *mischievous* effects.—Let us take his words:—"We received last night a regular series of *Moniteurs* and other Paris Papers to the 21st. The most remarkable article of their contents is a pretended letter from Hamburg, in which the most hostile language towards England is used, and in which the writer most zealously co-operates with COBBETT and the other mischievous scribes of faction among us, who so incessantly labour to bring our Government into disrepute, to destroy the public credit of the country, and give a mortal stab to its best interests. A more preposterous farrago of false reasoning, gross misrepresentation, and rank falsehood, has never insulted common sense. We have neither time nor space to animadvert particularly upon it at present; nor indeed is any animadversion necessary, where falsehood is so exposed as to be open to detection, even by the most shallow understanders."—This writer does not attempt to give any *proof* of these charges; but, at the conclusion of the article, which he has taken from the *MONITEUR*, he says, that the French writer, in aid of his arguments, makes a quotation from *Colbette's Register*. Why does not the Morning Post publish this quotation; or, at least, refer to it. I have not the *Moniteur*; and should be very much obliged to any one, who may possess the Number alluded to, to lend it me for an hour.—This writer of the Morning Post talks of writers, who labour to destroy public credit; but, what does he mean by public credit? There is no credit wanted except that of *bank-notes*, the largest class of which this writer himself has called "*destructive assignats*."—In his paper of the 19th of July, he called the Country Bank notes (forming more than the half of our circulating medium) "*destructive assignats*", and in his paper of the 9th of August, he calls them "*vile, dirty rags*;" and yet, when the French writers repeat something of this sort, and foretell that our paper will never be exchanged into gold and silver, he has the impudence to tell his readers, that the French are co-operating with *Cobbett and the other mischievous scribes of faction*. If this be not "*MATCHLESS IMPUDENCE*" where are we to look for it in this world? He himself calls our bank-notes "*destructive assignats*;" he calls them "*vile, dirty rags*;" he publishes article after article intended to shew the worthlessness of

them; nay, he strenuously recommends their abolition; and, after all this; after all these endeavours to annihilate all the credit that is now given to more than one half of our circulating medium; after all this, upon seeing that the French writers say the same thing of our paper money that he has said, he turns round upon those whom he chooses to call *scribes of faction*, and imputes to them the *mischievous* act of having given the French their cue upon this subject.—But, leaving this modest gentleman to the opinions of the public, what a stupid thing it is for us to suppose, that a matter like that of the state of our paper-money can be kept a *secret*. What gross folly this must be; and especially now that the Report of the Bullion Committee has been published in all the news-papers. Such nonsense never was before heard of. One would really think the man was mad. Both he and his fellow labourer of the *Courier* have fallen upon the poor French writer with their whole stock of filth. Just as if we should not do the same, were we in the place of the French. Nay; just as if we *did* not do the same, with respect to the paper-money in France, the destruction of which we so long wished for, and at the accomplishment of which wish we so loudly exulted. It is, therefore, childish to the last degree; it is quite babyish; it is despicable beyond description, for us to make complaints against the French writers, and to get into a passion with, and abuse, them, because they make themselves merry upon the subject of our Bank-notes. Were the French, indeed, to set people at work to forge our Bank-notes; were the French government to employ and pay people for forging Bank notes, and other people to introduce them into the country; in that case, indeed, we might have something to say; but, even then, perhaps, we might just as well hold our tongues.—Besides, what, after all, do these French writers expect that their country will get by the destruction of our paper? Did we get any thing by the destruction of their paper? To hear the Morning Post, one would imagine, that the French were to gain, and that we were to be undone, by the destruction of our paper-money. But, France was not undone by the destruction of her paper-money; and, let it be observed too, that that destruction took place in the midst of a most expensive war. The like, and under like circumstances, took place in America; but, so

far was the event from being ruinous to America, that it was, in fact, one of the great causes of her success and prosperity. The paper-money of AUSTRIA was *not destroyed*; but, Austria herself was subdued; and now she is doing away her paper-money. So that, though our paper-money may be a very good subject for a joke with the French writers, there are none of them who reflect that will anticipate any very great advantage to their country from its destruction, and this destruction of it is the very worst that even they suppose can take place. I have, from the time that I first touched upon the subject, given it as my opinion that our paper-money would be destroyed; but I have always insisted, that it would rather add to than diminish the power of the nation, and to all the means of its happiness and security.

PORTUGAL.—Cheering as our prospects, with regard to the war in this country, were last week, they appear, from our ministerial news-papers (which ought to be the best informed) to be much more so now, seeing, that, as these papers inform us, MASSENA's forces are afflicted with a dysentery, while our troops are happily free from this disease;—that the main body of the French army, instead of advancing so rapidly as their *admirers* in this country anticipated, have retreated behind the Coa, perhaps for the want of provisions;—that general Balhazar, with 20,000 Portuguese militia was in the province of Braganza, fully prepared to meet the French;—that Romana had 20,000 men under him, and was marching to intercept another body of French;—that the *spirit* of desertion still continued to prevail among the enemies ranks;—that several deserters had come home by the last convoy, and that several more had arrived at Lisbon;—that the enemies languid operations had falsified the predictions of lords Grenville and Grey;—that the Portuguese troops looked like real soldiers, and from what they had already done much might be expected from them;—that it is doubted whether Massena with 100,000 men would be able to carry one particular point of our defence;—that there are reports, that Massena is in full retreat, owing to want of provisions, great desertion, disaffection of the foreigners in his army, and sickness;—that it is well known that the mortality in the French army had, for a long time,

been prodigious;—that my lord Talavera's army was in the highest health and spirits;—that the anxiety for a battle with Massena's army was general in our army;—that my lord Talavera certainly once offered battle to Massena, and that Massena as certainly declined the offer;—that the English army was in a most healthy state and that provisions and vegetables were in great abundance;—that the average number of deserters from the French army was from 90 to 100 a day, and that the number would be six times as great, were it not for the zeal of our friends the Portuguese, who, whenever they saw any thing in the *shape* of a French man, dispatched him without mercy;—that the first regiment of Portuguese dragoons had fallen upon some French cavalry, and had beaten and pursued them;—that a French corps had been fallen upon by a body of Spanish and had been driven back with great loss;—that a Portuguese corps had beaten the French near Braganza, and totally destroyed the whole body, except two officers, and one private, who made their escape;—that on the 16th of August Massena had retreated five leagues, and that the Spaniards were rising in the north of Spain;—that in the provinces in the north of Spain near Portugal 30,000 men may easily be raised;—that there are several thousands already on foot;—that between 6 and 700 German troops, who had deserted from the French, were fighting together with the Spanish and *seemed hearty in the cause*;—that in these parts also, the desertion from the French was continual, and the enthusiasm of the Spanish and Portuguese so great that they were determined to go *all lengths*.—But, what is of most importance is the *proof* that we now possess of the excellent disposition of the Portuguese both civil and military; and this we have now under the hand of MARSHAL BERESFORD himself. In my last, as the reader will remember, I commented (at page 240) upon a paragraph, whence one might have supposed, *that the Portuguese were deserting from us*, it being stated that some of them had gone away from us, and that some of these had been *punished*, and others sent to *work in the mines*. Now, however, we have a complete contradiction of this, and that, too, under the hand of Marshal Beresford, in whose part of the army the desertion was said to have taken place. The fol-

lowing letter from the Marshal to his Excellency Don P. Forjaz, dated Lagiosa, 7 August, 1810, settles the point with regard to the disposition and conduct of the Portuguese.—“It gives me much pleasure to inform your Excellency of the *“excellent dispositions of all classes of people* throughout this part of the kingdom, *“shewing every where the utmost zeal and* loyalty in defence of their country, and *“the most decided detestation of the common* enemy, who justly deserves it, by his unwarrantable conduct, and by the acts of violence and excesses of every description, which he daily commits. In all places, the people rather leave their homes, than submit to the necessity of affording the enemy any kind of assistance, and thus evince the most ardent love of their country. *The peasants also oppose the enemy*, wherever it is in their power, and a light party of them, consisting of one hundred men, under the command of a person called Joze Hiberio, attacked, on the 3d instant, in St. Cacta, a detachment of French troops, 25 of whom they killed, and took several heads of cattle, which they brought to me, but which I gave them leave to sell for their own use and benefit. I have formed them into a company, and given the command thereof to the above Hiberio, on account of his gallant and patriotic conduct, with the rank of ensign in the army.”—Here, then, we have it officially stated to us, that the Portuguese, of all classes, behave in the most excellent manner. I am a little puzzled, indeed, to reconcile this with the official notification of Lord Viscount Talavera, who says, under the date of the 1st of August: “It having come to my knowledge, that certain persons have been sent by the enemy into the interior of the kingdom with letters and messages for different individuals, cities, and towns, all such persons shall be arrested as criminal, and sent with the letters, with which they may be charged, to my head-quarters. Those who shall receive letters from the enemy’s army, and not apprehend the bearers of them, shall be considered as accomplices, and subjected to the most rigorous punishment.”—Now, at first sight, it would appear strange, that such an order as this should be necessary in a country, where Marshal Beresford’s Order had just been issued; for, if the people, of all classes, entertained and showed “the most decided detestation of the enemy,”

where was that enemy to find individuals and cities and towns to send his letters and messages to? But, though to reconcile the contents of these two documents may be too much for me, it will, I dare say, be very easily done by the editor of the Morning Post, and, for the present to him I will leave the performance of so pleasing a task, adding, upon this occasion, only this one other observation, namely, that, if the above information (all taken from the Morning Post) be true, there are now 20,000 Portuguese Militia, and 20,000 Spaniards under Romana, together with all the bodies of deserters from the French army, to be added to the SIXTY THOUSAND FIGHTING MEN, whom we are paying in Portugal, and who are all in good health and have an abundance of provisions, while the French army is wasting away daily and hourly with sickness, famine, and desertion. Under such circumstances we may, I think, without any anxiety, wait with patience for the result, and that that result may be such as to spare the lives and limbs and health of the British army is the sincere hope of

W^M. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
31st August, 1810.

N. B. In consequence of numerous letters inquiring, whether *broken sets* of the REGISTER can be completed, I think it necessary to state here that they may, at present; But, that gentlemen who wish to have their sets completed, must apply without loss of time; at least before the 15th of September.

COBBETT’S Parliamentary Debates:

The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Volumes of the above Work are in the Press, and will be published with all proper dispatch. All Communications will be carefully attended to; but it is particularly requested that they may be forwarded as early as possible.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—Official Proclamation, dated Cadiz,
July 12.

Citizens of Cadiz;—Your wishes are now to be accomplished with those of all

Spain. Your sacred rights, forgotten and nearly lost, will be restored by the Cortes to be convened in the following month. You are about to exercise the solemn functions of Legislators, of which you have been deprived by tyranny, falsely called legitimate and sovereign authority. With difficulty we have arrested the sword of power, which has caused the evils that we deplore, to return to you your just claim to have independent Representatives who shall watch over your happiness. The oppressor of human nature would not have advanced so far in his attempts at universal despotism, if the nations under his iron sway had known how to maintain the dignity of men and citizens, which knowledge constitutes the vigour and strength of empire. History, citizens, has taught us by more than one example how much Spain has been indebted to that heroic fortitude, which, in our Cortes, has made Kings themselves amenable for the abuse of their power. Remember that Princes have sometimes treated you as if they had no duties, and you no rights, and as if the uttering of your complaints were a crime against the State.—Commence then your duties in Spain, which is as free to you as it was to your ancestors. For this purpose employ the right of suffrage, which you enjoy, by nature and by the Constitution of your country; and let not intrigue and seduction surprise you in the very asylum of your liberty, dictating to you the selection which ought to be the unbiassed exercise of your will and pleasure. Favour, friendship, rank and property give no title, and it is not by men possessing these that the country is to be saved. Patriotism, talent, merit proved by experience, these it is that should claim your attention. He who solicits your vote, and employs artifices to attract public approbation, estimates at a low rate the independence of a generous people, and ought to be marked by you as a suspicious character. True patriotism possesses too much genuine modesty to be the hero of its own story; and would rather convince you by deeds than words that it deserves your confidence.—Neither ought you to forget that you are responsible to your children and posterity for the

faithful discharge of your duty on this occasion. Since the re-establishment of the Monarchy you are perhaps the only Spaniards who have enjoyed so fair an opportunity to give permanence and solidity to civil institution. If, after two years of uncertainty and vacillation, when you have been so often brought to the edge of the precipice, you do not yet discover the origin of your calamities to consist in the imperfect representation of the national will, what will be the consequence? The Government and all good citizens will lament your culpable blindness, and they will have at least the negative consolation of knowing that history will point out you as the destroyers of your family, and the assassins of your country.—You cannot now justify yourselves; as at the commencement of the revolution, by the consternation into which the enemy threw the country, so that having no means of chusing and examining, you were given up to clamorous pretenders, who availed themselves of the confusion to domineer over you; nor can you vindicate yourselves by professing that you are the dupes of intrigue, as the painful experience of two years has taught you how to detect and despise it. You are now enabled to exercise calm reflection, and to overcome those influences which designing men would dispense to deceive you.—Recollect, that according as you act rightly or wrongly, you establish the honour or fix the disgrace of Spain; every thing depends upon the integrity of the Members of the august Assembly, which is solemnly to declare the immutable principles of justice, and to consecrate before tyrants the hallowed rights of nations.—This Superior Junta earnestly hopes, that considering the importance of the business entrusted to you, and rigidly observing the rules prescribed to you for the election, you will prevent any corrupt interference, and you will preserve in your recollection, that if you are unfaithful, you will do all in your power to promote the eternal disgrace of your posterity.—By order of the Superior Junta,
LOUIS DE GARGILLO, Sec.

*To Andres Lopez, President,
Cadiz, June 8, 1810.*

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 9.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1810. [Price 1s.

"Hear the just Law, the Judgment of the Skies:
"He that hates Truth, shall be the Dupe of Lies:
"And he that will be cheated to the last,
"Delusion strong as Hell shall bind him fast."

COWPER.

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The next Number of the Register will be published on Wednesday next, agreeably to the former Notification. — The hour of publishing will be, as heretofore, at THREE o'clock, both on Wednesday and Saturday.

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER II.

What are the Funds and Stocks and National Debt?—Necessity of clearly understanding what these words mean—Meaning of them—Inquiry into the origin of the Funds and Debt—The English Revolution—Act of Parliament, 4th William III, Cap. 3, begins the Funding and Debt system—First loan to government—Nature of Funds and Stocks and National Debt—Explanation of how "money is put in the Funds"—Illustration in the case of Messrs. Muckworm and Company and that of Farmer Greenhorn—The Funds shown to be NO PLACE, nor any thing of a mystical nature—P. S. Relates to articles; upon the same subject, published in other papers, and especially to a letter in the Morning Chronicle of the 6th instant.

Gentlemen,

Having in the foregoing letter, taken a sketch of the history of the Bank of England, and of its Notes, from their origin down to the time when that Bank stopped paying its notes in gold and silver, the next thing to do, in our regular course of pro-

ceeding, will be to inquire into, and clearly ascertain, the cause of that stoppage; for it is very evident, that without ascertaining this cause, we shall not be able to come to any thing like a decided opinion with regard to our main question, namely, WHETHER THERE BE ANY PROBABILITY, THAT THIS BANK WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR PAYMENTS IN GOLD AND SILVER, in which question every man of us from the highest to the lowest, is so deeply interested.

But, it is necessary for us to stop a little where we are, and not go on any further with our inquiries into the cause of the stoppage at the Bank of England, until we have taken time to look a little at the FUNDS and the NATIONAL DEBT. These are words, which are frequently made use of; but, like many other words, they stand for things which are little understood, and the less, perhaps, because the words are so very commonly used. As in the instance of *Shrove Tuesday*, or *Shrovetide*, words which we all, from the oldest to the youngest, make use of; but, as to their meaning, we content ourselves with supposing (or appearing to suppose,) that they contain a commandment for us to eat Fritters and Pancakes and to murder poor unoffending cocks; whereas they mean, the Tuesday, or the Time, for going to confess our sins to, and to get absolution from, the Priests; to shrieve, being a word equal in meaning to confess, and *shrove* to confessed; and the use of them in the case here mentioned having being handed down to us from the days of our forefathers, when the Catholic worship was the worship of the country.

Strange, however, as is the perversion of the meaning of words, in this instance, it is scarcely greater than in the case of the Funds and the National Debt; but, there is this very important difference in the two cases; that, while, in the former, the pervers-

sion is attended with no mischief to either individuals, or to the nation; in the latter, it is attended with great mischief to both; with the ruin and misery of many a thousand of widows and orphans, and with woes unnumbered to the nation at large. But, if a right understanding of the meaning of these words be, in all cases where the words are used, of some consequence, it is of peculiar consequence here, where, as may have been gathered from the preceding letter, we shall find the *Funds*, the *Stocks*, and the *National Debt*, to be so closely interwoven with the *Bank Notes*, as to be quite inseparable therefrom in every possible state or stage of their existence.

The word *FUND* means, *a quantity of money put together, for any purpose.* The word *STOCK*, as applied to such matters, has the same meaning. Both words may admit of meanings somewhat different from this; but, this is the meaning which plain men commonly give to these words; and, it is, too, the fair and sensible meaning of them. Now, we shall presently see, in what degree this meaning belongs to what are commonly called the *Funds*, or the *Stocks*, into the origin and progress of which, we are now going to inquire; and, an inquiry it is, worthy of the undivided attention of every true Englishman; every man who wishes to see this country of his forefathers preserved from ruin and subjugation.

Soon after the *ENGLISH REVOLUTION*; that is to say, soon after our ancestors, who had too much spirit to be *dragged* out of their liberty and their property, had driven away king, James the Second, and had brought over the Prince of Orange and made him king in his stead, and had, at the same time, taken measures for stripping the family of Stuart of the crown for ever and putting it upon the heads of his present Majesty's family; soon after this Revolution, the existence of *Funds*, *Stocks*, and a *National Debt* began, under the auspices of that same Prince of Orange, who was then become our King William III, and who appears to have lost but very little time in discovering, the effectual way of obtaining money from the English, without resorting, as the Stuarts had, to those means, the use of which had, ever and anon, excited commotions against them; which had brought one of them to the scaffold; and which, at last, after

driving another from the land, had for ever stripped them of their crown. The real motives for creating a *National Debt* we shall, by-and-by, perhaps, have occasion to notice; but, at present, our business is to get at a clear notion of *the way in which it was created.*

William the Third was hardly seated upon the throne before a war was begun against France, and, in the 4th year of his reign, being the year 1692, an act of parliament was passed imposing "Certain Rates and Duties upon Beer, Ale and other Liquors, for securing certain Reconnances and Advantages in the said Act mentioned, to such Persons as shall voluntarily advance the sum of Ten Hundred Thousand Pounds towards carrying on the War against France." This is the Title of the Act, being Chapter 3rd of the 4th year of William and Mary. These are the very words; and fatal words they were to England.

In the body of this Act, it is enacted, that the persons, who shall advance the million of pounds shall, out of the rates and duties imposed by the act, receive a certain interest, or annual payment, for the use of the money so advanced. They were to have, and they had, their money secured to them by the way of *annuity for life or lives*; and, they were to have certain advantages in cases of survivorship; and the annuities were to be redeemed upon certain conditions and at certain times. But, it will be quite useless for us to load our subject with a multitude of words, and to ring the changes upon all the quaint terms, which, as appertaining to these matters, have, one would think, been made use of for no other purpose than that of confusing the understandings of plain men. The light wherein to view the transaction is this: The Government was (no matter how, or from what cause) got into a war with France; and, for the alleged purpose of pushing on this war with "*vigour*" (it is odd enough that the very word was made use of, just as it is now) they borrowed a million of pounds of individuals, and, at the same time, imposed taxes upon the whole nation for the purpose of paying the interest of the money so borrowed; or, in other words, the nation's taxes, or property, were *mortgaged* to the lenders of this million of pounds.

The lenders of the money, who, in time,

became to be called *fund-holders*, or *stock-holders*, did, as the work of lending and fund-making advanced, make their loans in various ways, and the bargains between them and the government were of great variety in their terms, and in the denominations made use of; but, it was always the same thing in effect: the government borrowed the money of individuals; it mortgaged taxes for the payment of the interest; and those individuals received for their money, promises, or engagements, no matter in what shape, which enabled them to demand annually, or quarterly, the share of interest due to each of them; and any single parcel of interest, so received, is what is, in the queer language of the funding trade, called a "*dividend*." No matter, therefore, what the thing is called; no matter how many nick names they choose to give to the several branches of the Debt. We daily see, in the news-papers, what is called the "*PRICE OF STOCKS*," as in the following statement, which is in all the news-papers of this day :

Bank Stock 257 $5\frac{1}{2}$
 3 per Cent. Red. 68 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$
 3 per Cent. Con. 67 $\frac{1}{2}$ $8\frac{1}{2}$
 4 per Cent. 85 $4\frac{1}{2}$ $5\frac{1}{2}$ $4\frac{1}{2}$
 5 per Cent. Navy 99 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$
 Long Annuities 18 $\frac{1}{2}$
 Omnium 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ dis.
 Excheq. Bills 1 dis. 5 prem.
 Bank Stock for oper. 257 $\frac{1}{2}$
 Consols for—68 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$

These are names, which the dealers, or jobbers, in Stocks give to the several classes of them. But, as I said before, let us avoid confusing our heads with this worse than Babylonish collection of names, or sounds, and keep fully and clearly and constantly in our sight, these plain facts: FIRST, that the *Funds*, the *Stocks*, and the *National Debt*, all mean one and the same thing; SECONDLY, that this Debt is made up of the *Principal* money lent to the Government at different times since the beginning of the thing in 1692; THIRDLY, that the *Interest* upon this principal money is paid out of the taxes; and, FOURTHLY, that those persons who are entitled to receive this interest, are what we call *fund-holders* or *stock-holders*, or, according to the more common notion and saying, have "*money in the funds*."

Being here in the elementary, the mere horn-book, part of our subject, we cannot make the matter too clear to our compre-

hension; and, we ought, by no means, to go a step further, 'till we have inquired into the sense of this saying about people's "*having money in the Funds*;" from which any one, who did not understand the thing, would naturally conclude, that the person who made use of the saying, looked upon the *Funds* as a *place*, where a great quantity of gold and silver was kept locked up in safety. Nor, would such conclusion be very erroneous; for, generally speaking, the notion of the people of this country is, that the *Funds* or the *Stocks* (they are made use of indiscriminately), is a *PLACE*, where money is kept. A place, indeed, of a sort of mysterious existence; a sort of financial Ark; a place not, perhaps, to be touched, or even seen; but, still the notion is, that of a place, and a place, too, of more than mortal security.

Alas! the *Funds* are no place at all! and, indeed, how should they, seeing that they are in fact, one and the same thing with the *National Debt*? But, to remove, from the mind of every creature, all doubt upon this point; to dissipate the mists, in which we have so long been wandering about, to the infinite amusement of those who invented these terms, let us take a plain common-sense view of one of these *loaning* transactions. Let us suppose, then, that the Government wants a *loan*, that is, wants to *borrow money*, to the amount of a million of pounds. It gives out its wishes to this effect, and, after the usual ceremony upon such occasions, the loan is made, that is, the money is lent, by Messrs. Muckworm and Company. We shall see, by-and-by, when we come to talk more fully upon the subject of loans, what sort of a way it is, in which Muckworm pays in the money so lent, and in what sort of money it is that he pays. But, for the sake of simplicity in our illustration, we will suppose him to pay in real good money, and to pay the whole million himself at once. Well: what does Muckworm get in return? Why, *his name is written in a book; against his name is written that he is entitled to receive interest for a million of money; which book is kept at the Bank Company's house, or shop, in Threadneedle Street, London. And, thus it is that Muckworm "puts a million of money into the Funds."* "Well," you will say, "*but what becomes of the money?*" Why, the Government *expends it*, to

be sure: what should become of it? Very few people borrow money for the purpose of locking it up in their drawers or chests. "What? then, the money all vanishes; and nothing remains in lieu of it but the lender's name written in a book?" Even so: and this, my good neighbours, is the way that "money is put into the Funds."

But, the most interesting part of the transaction remains to be described. Muckworm, who is as wise as he is rich, takes special care not to be a fundholder himself; and, as is always the case, he loses no time in selling his stock, that is to say, his right to receive the interest of the million of pounds. These funds, or stock, as we have seen, have no bodily existence, either in the shape of money or of bonds or of certificates or of any thing else that can be seen or touched. They have a being merely in name. They mean, in fact, a right to receive interest; and, a man, who is said to possess, or to have, a thousand pounds' worth of stock, possesses, in reality, nothing but the right of receiving the interest of a thousand pounds. When, therefore, Muckworm sells his million's worth of stock, he sells the right of receiving the interest upon the million of pounds which he lent to the government. But, the way in which sales of this sort are effected is by parcelling the stock out to little purchasers, every one of whom, buys as much as he likes; he has his name written in the book for so much, instead of the name of Muckworm and Company; and, when Muckworm has sold the whole, his name is crossed out, and the names of the persons, to whom he has sold, remain in the book.

And, here it is that the thing comes home to our very bosoms; for, our neighbour, farmer Greenhorn, who has all his life long been working like a horse, in order to secure his children from the perils of poverty, having first bequeathed his farm to his son, sells the rest of his property (amounting to a couple of thousands of pounds), and, with the real good money, the fruit of his incessant toil and care, purchases two thousand pounds worth of Muckworm's Funds, or Stocks, and leaves the said purchase to his daughter. And, why does he do so? The reason is, that, as he believes, his daughter will always receive the interest of the two

thousand pounds, without any of the risk, or trouble, belonging to the rents of house or land. Thus neighbour Greenhorn is said to have "put two thousand pounds in the funds;" and thus his daughter (poor girl!) is said to "have her money in the funds;" when the plain fact is, that Muckworm's money has been spent by the government, that Muckworm has now the two thousand pounds of poor Grizzle Greenhorn, and that she, in return for it, has her name written in a Book, at the Bank Company's house in Threadneedle street, London, in consequence of which she is entitled to receive the interest of the two thousand pounds; which brings us back to the point whence we started, and explains the whole art and mystery of making loans and funds and stocks and national debts.

It will be very useful to show the effect of this "putting money in the funds," with respect to the party, who is said to put it in. I do not know of any duty more pressing upon me, than that of showing, in this plain and practical way, what have been, what are, and what must be, the consequences to those, who thus dispose of their property; especially if they have no property of any other sort. But, this will be found to belong to another part of our subject; and, as we have now seen what the Funds and the Stocks really are; as we have blown away the mist in which we had so long been wandering; as the financial Ark is now no more in our sight than any veritable box made of deal boards and nails; as we are now satisfied, that there is nothing mystical in the words Funds and Stocks, and that, so far from meaning a place where a great quantity of money is kept, they are not the name of any place at all, nor of any thing which has a corporeal existence, and are the mere denominations, or names, of the several classes, or parcels, of Debt, which the government owes to individuals: in short, as we have now, let us hope, arrived at a complete knowledge of the nature and origin of the Funds and the Stocks and the National Debt, which, as was before said, are, in fact, all one and the same thing, it is time that we proceed to enquire into their progress, and to see how that progress is connected with the increase of the Bank Notes and with the stoppage of the payment of those notes in gold and silver. To do justice, however, to this copious and interesting theme, especially when coupled

with what it will be necessary to say as to the schemes for *arresting* the progress of the Debt, will demand a separate Letter.

In the mean while,

I am, with perfect sincerity,

Your Friend,

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Thursday, 6 Sept. 1810.*

P. S. There is, this day, a long LETTER in the MORNING CHRONICLE, upon the subject of the BULLION COMMITTEE'S REPORT. It is manifestly the declaration of the OUT party; and it *hints* at projects, which, when they come to be more fully explained, will make the fund-holders shake in their shoes. We shall have, before parliament meets, other projects from the INS, which, of course, will be as nearly opposite as possible to those of the OUTS. Between them they will, we shall see, make a pretty hand of it. It is my intention not to suffer these publications to break in upon our discussion; but, when that is closed, to answer whatever may seem to demand an answer, in them, or in any other (upon the same subject) that may, in the meanwhile, have made their appearance.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SWEDEN.—We have, for some time past, been informed of the sitting of the Diet in Sweden, for the purpose of choosing a CROWN PRINCE, or Heir Apparent to the Throne of that kingdom, a choice of the more importance both to Sweden and to Europe, as the present king cannot, from his age, be expected to live many years.—That choice is now made; and the person chosen is GENERAL BERNADOTTE, so famed in the wars and conquests of Napoleon, by whom he was, sometime ago, created PRINCE OF PONTE CORVO, a spot where he had gained a great and memorable victory.—It will be seen, from the authentic article, inserted below, that the election was by a *voice unanimous*; and, that the present king himself, in a set speech, evidently prepared for the occasion, strongly recommended that choice to the Diet, upon the double ground of the distinguished merits of the man and of his power to protect the kingdom and make the people happy.—One would have thought, that an event of such importance, in every point of view; an event of such uncom-

mon interest and such mighty consequence; an event, which must *infallibly* have great and visible effect in deciding the fate of several countries: one would have thought, that such an event, in which England is beyond all comparison more interested than she is, or ever can be, in the fate of Hindostan, and of all her colonies put together; one would have thought, that such an event, and coming upon us unexpected too, would have brought back to something like common sense; would, for a few days at least, have stunned into sober thought, even the mad heads of our ministerial writers.—Not so, however, but far the contrary; those heads appearing to have been, by this event, rendered more mad than ever.—It is truly painful to me to quote the words of the MORNING POST and the COURIER of the 3d instant; because I am aware, that by so doing I shall cause those words to be read in foreign countries, when it must be the wish of every man, who has any even the slightest regard for the character of England, to keep these publications from the eyes of the world. But, on the other hand, it is absolutely necessary to expose such publications to our own countrymen, who, on this as well as upon every other occasion, are, by these writers, attempted to be misled, deceived, and abused. To answer this purpose, to accomplish this wicked object, nothing is left untried: misrepresentation and direct falsehood, in all the shapes that they can assume, and, when neither nor both appear sufficient, then recourse is had, by way of addition, to all possible endeavours at totally blinding the reason by exciting the most violent of passions, and, in these endeavours no degree of scurrility is spared.—Is my description over-charged? Does it go beyond the truth? Let the reader judge; and let the world pronounce upon the character of the English ministerial prints, when they have patiently read (if patience be not impossible in such a case) the following article from the MORNING POST.—“General Bernadotte has been elected Crown Prince of Sweden. This has obviously been the effect of the deepest and most infamous intrigue. The Arch Tyrant was in the first instance disposed to support the pretensions of the King of Denmark; but having ascertained that there was an understanding upon the subject between his Danish Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, he suddenly withdrew

" his patronage, changed his system, and,
 " instead of the King of Denmark, put
 " forward his General, Bernadotte, as the
 " most proper person to succeed to the
 " throne of Sweden. This *infamous sate-*
 " *lite* of the *common tyrant* of the Conti-
 " nent, has in consequence of the *baleful*
 " *influence* thus exercised, carried his elec-
 " tion; but can it be possible that the
 " once noble and proudly independent
 " Swedes will permit so *base* and *unprin-*
 " *cipled* an *upstart* to ascend the throne
 " formerly occupied by the great and il-
 " lustrious Gustavus Vasa, and the other
 " heroes who have so gloriously and legi-
 " timately filled the throne of Sweden?
 " If so, then, indeed, will the Swedish na-
 " tion prove itself unworthy of any senti-
 " ment of compassion or respect, and be
 " justly consigned to the contempt and
 " execration of mankind. But, notwith-
 " standing the temporary success of this
 " artful expedient of the Corsican to pro-
 " mote his own ambitious and *infamous*
 " *views*, it is scarce to be imagined that
 " the noble and intrepid Swedes, who
 " look with reverence to the valiant and
 " patriotic deeds of their ancestors, can
 " submit to such a degradation as to yield
 " obedience to a *miscreant* who has raised
 " himself from obscurity by his devotion
 " only to the most *infamous* and *detestable*
 " *tyrant* that ever cursed the earth. Our
 " high opinion of the hardy and spi-
 " rited character of the Swedes, induces
 " us most fondly to hope that a more
 " worthy line of conduct will, in the
 " present crisis of their fate, be pursued
 " by them. Though some of the Nobles
 " have been cajoled by arts, or seduced by
 " bribery, the people, we trust, will not
 " submit to the horrible and insufferable
 " degradation of having their legitimate
 " race of Sovereigns entirely set aside,
 " and replaced by the most *base upstart*
 " *dynasty* that ever disgraced the meanest
 " and most abject nations of the universe.
 " Besides, it is so evidently the interest of
 " Russia to prevent Sweden from falling
 " into such a state of degradation, that
 " abject as the Emperor ALEXANDER seems
 " to have become, it is hardly possible for
 " him not to rouse from his disgraceful
 " torpor, now that his enemy, who has de-
 " ceived him so long, is approaching his
 " very threshold. If he be not wholly
 " besotted by the artifices of the *subtle ty-*
 " *rant*, or terrified by his menaces, he will
 " at once shake off the *degrading yoke*,
 " and bid defiance to the *perfidious Corsi-*

" can. The fate of Spain and Holland is
 " now before the Russians and the Swedes,
 " and presents an awful and lamentable
 " warning to both. The infatuated ALEX-
 " ANDER may learn from the treatment
 " which the Royal Family of Spain suffer-
 " ed, after all the sacrifices which had
 " been made to BUONAPARTE, what trea-
 " chery he has to expect from so *rile* and
 " *perfidious* a *tyrant*; while this new proof
 " of the unprincipled ambition of the Cor-
 " sican may be hoped to operate alike for-
 " cibly on Sweden and Russia, and con-
 " vince them that THEIR ONLY SECU-
 " RITY IS IN A SINCERE AND CLOSE
 " ALLIANCE WITH GREAT BRI-
 " TAIN, UNDER WHOSE PROTECT-
 " ING WINGS THEY ARE SURE TO
 " EXPERIENCE A PROMPT AND
 " EFFECTUAL SHELTER."—Now,
 reader, first look at the *language* of this
 article; look at the terms and the epithets,
 which I have distinguished by *italic* *cha-*
acters, and say, if, as an Englishman, you do
 not feel shame, that such language as this,
 such abuse as this, such self-degrading
 abuse, should appear in an English print.
 This print is, too, called "the Morning
 Post and Fashionable World:" a pretty
 specimen, truly, of the *taste* of those who
 are called *people of fashion* in England!—
 Is there any man of sense, who does not
 perceive, that every article of this; every
 such publication that appears in this coun-
 try, must do the country harm, if it has
 any effect at all? The way to have writ-
 ten, upon such an occasion, having the au-
 thor's sentiments (if, indeed, a madman
 can be said to have any sentiments); the
 way to have proceeded, in such a case,
 was, to show, by *fair statement* and *reason*,
 that it was a great degradation for the
 Swedes to submit to Bernadotte, and that
 his becoming their king would be injurious
 to them. To have shown this, to have
 proved this, *might* have done good; but, to
 heap upon Bernadotte and his master loads
 of sheer abuse, could not possibly do any
 good, and *might* do harm. Put all these furio-
 us phrases together: the infamous in-
 triguer, the Arch tyrant, the infamous sate-
 lite, the base upstart, the subtle, unprin-
 ciple, vile, perfidious, base, detestable, infa-
 mous miscreant: put them all together, and
 what do they weigh with any man, who
 reads for the sake of obtaining informa-
 tion; for the sake of acquiring the means
 of forming a right judgment upon poli-
 tical occurrences? With such a man they
 weigh not as a feather; nor is it possible

for them to answer any other purpose, than that of feeding the passions, of gratifying the vindictive appetite, of those who live but to hate and to injure, and who would fain kill with curses those whom their stilettos cannot reach; no other purpose than this, and the one other purpose of flattering, by imitation, the taste of the rabble in high life as well as in low, and, if possible, of keeping that rabble a rabble still; diverting their minds from the objects, on which they ought to be fixed, namely, the *causes* and the *consequences* of this great event; of filling their mouths with imprecations upon Napoleon, instead of pointing out for their timely reflection, what new dangers may, from this event, arise to their country.—This, however, is what I shall endeavour to do, after I have made some remarks on what this shamefully abusive writer says about the conduct of the Swedes, upon this occasion. The Swedes are flattered with lofty descriptions of the noble conduct of their fore-fathers, and great hope is expressed that they will not now submit to what is called the horrible and insufferable degradation of having the race of their sovereigns changed; but, if they should so submit, they are plainly told, that they will be unworthy of respect or compassion, and will be justly consigned to the execration of mankind. Verily, there is nothing original in this, for it has been said of every nation that the French have subdued, from the year 1793 to the present day. It is quite useless, however, to abuse the Swedes; and I dare say, that, if the Swedes were to hear this abuse, they would not find it very difficult to discover that it arose from causes, very different indeed from that of a regard for either their honour or their happiness. Indeed this pretended anxiety for the welfare of the Swedes has in it something full as shameful perhaps even as the abuse which has been just noticed.—This writer acknowledges, that “some of the *Nobles* have been cajoled by arts, or seduced by bribery” upon this occasion. Well, then, this has not been, it seems, a *Jacobinical* revolution. Here are a king and his nobles making over the government to a “subtle, unprincipled, vile, “perfidious, base, detestable, infamous, “upstart miscreant.” Had this thing been done by *the people*, we should have heard them execrated at a rate not to be calculated; but, it having been done by a *king* and his *nobles*, we hear *not* execrations

against them; and, what is more, the poor people are to be *execrated to all eternity*, unless they *refuse to submit* to the choice of the Diet; that is to say, unless they *openly resist the government*, or commit what is sometimes called “*high treason*,” and for the commission of which men are hanged by the neck, till they are dead. Surely these writers are the most impudent of all mankind! or, rather, they are mad. They must be mad to suppose, that the Swedes would not laugh them to scorn, if they could read their threats of execration.—This event in Sweden has caused but little to be said by way of commentary in any of our public prints; and, the reason is, that the case was too palpable to admit of being disguised or disfigured. In most other cases: in every other case, perhaps, there has been some room for disguising; some room for efforts to make the people of England believe, that the people of the country in question *hated* the French and Buonaparté and the Revolutionary Principle. Somehow or other this hatred was, in every case, neutralized in practice, and so effectually as for us to be able to discover scarcely any symptoms of it amongst any part of the people. Still, however, we were to believe, and, being very complaisant, we did believe, that the people in Italy, Naples, Piedmont, Switzerland, Venice, Austria, Poland, Prussia, Hanover, Hamburgh, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and Holland, all, all to a man, hated, detested, abhorred, and abominated Frenchmen, French principles, and, above all, the French Emperor; and, if we dared (which very few of us ever did) to question the truth of the fact, to ask for proof of it, and humbly to observe, that we saw no *signs* of any such spirit of abhorrence, we were sharply told, to look at the *military force*, by the means of which Buonaparté smothered the spirit of discontent. We sometimes ventured to ask how it happened, that our writers were able to perceive the said spirit, if it was so completely smothered; but, as to press these gentlemen in an argument was pretty sure to bring upon us the charge of jacobinism and of enmity to “social order “and our holy religion,” as GOVERNOR ARIS’s friends and defenders used to call it, there was, of course, no venturing far in this way; and, so the assertion triumphed; men were told that they were to believe, and they did believe, that all the people in all the countries, subdued, or taken possession of, by the French,

abominated the French in degree and manner aforesaid; and that the natural effects of such abomination were prevented solely by the *immense military force*, which Napoleon kept in those countries respectively; which was a standing answer to every doubt that was founded upon the circumstance of no commotions ever taking place, no signs of discontent appearing in those countries. But, the affair in Sweden is singularly unfortunate in this respect; for, not only is there *not a French soldier in Sweden*, but, it is *not in the power of Napoleon to send a French soldier thither*, without the good-will and consent of the Swedes themselves, any more than it is in his power to send a military force to England; and, indeed, the latter is *more easy* than the former. This election of the Prince of Ponte Corvo, therefore, as successor to the throne of Sweden, completely sets at defiance the only reason that used to be assigned for nations quietly submitting to the French. Here is, in this case, no power to over-awe or influence: here is, indeed, to say the truth, *no submission*: it is, if the intelligence given us be correct, the choice, the free choice, of the Swedish nation to have Bernadotte for their king. — What, then, can have been the *cause*, and what will be the *consequences*, of this choice? As to the former, those who are acquainted with the history of Sweden and who have observed the way in which the people of that country were deprived of their ancient rights and liberties, will not be at all surprised at what has now taken place. But, without going back, at present, to seek for remote causes, we must, I think, be pretty well convinced, that the immediate cause is, *a desire of change in the people*, under the persuasion, that *any change must be for the better*, or, at least, could not be for the worse. It is true, that the king and the nobles, and not "*the jacobins*," as they are called, (that is to say, *all those who do not live upon the taxes*) appear to have been the actors in making over the government to Bernadotte; but, it is impossible to believe, that the people were greatly averse from it; nay, it is impossible to believe, that the people did not wish for it, or, at least, for some change that should deliver them from their present set of rulers. If this should be denied, then are those who deny it in a worse situation than before; for, if *the people*, the great body of the people of Sweden, were averse from the change,

then have the king and the nobles treated them like slaves; *then* have the king and the nobles sold them like a drove of cattle; *then* did this people live under a despotism, of which it must, even by the *tax-enters themselves*, be acknowledged that no earthly change could be for the worse.

—The truth is, however, as we shall, I believe, find, by-and-by, that the change has arisen, as in most other cases of the kind, from a *mutual and cordial hatred* existing between the people and their rulers. Long, very long, have the people of Sweden been complaining of abuses and calling for reform, and they have complained and called in vain. But, things appear to have, at last, reached that state which would no longer admit of refusal on the part of the rulers without exposing them to be overthrown by the people; and, *rather than yield to the demands of the people, they have delivered up the Crown and the Country to the Emperor of France*. This is not the first instance of the sort by many: the scene has been exhibited in almost every part of Europe: it is not the first, but I pray to God Almighty that it *may be the last*! — This, for the present, may suffice as to the *cause* of the change in Sweden; and now for a few words as to its *consequences*, none of which, according to the wise writers above quoted, appear to have even the most distant bearing upon *us*. These wise men can see danger to Russia, danger to Denmark, danger to Prussia; they are alarmed for Finland and Bothnia and Courland and Holstein and Schleswick and Poland and Norway; their wild brains seem to run backward and forward over all the rest of the world to seek for subjects of alarm; but never do they discover any alarm for England. They are mad, but their madness will produce mischief; for, it will, as far as it has effect, turn the eyes of the people from the *only thing*, belonging to this affair of Sweden, that calls for the attention of the people of England. — "*Bernadotte*," says the *Courier* of the 3d instant, "once on Swedish ground, we shall soon hear of some pretence for removing the old King. If death do not release him, he will be advised to abdicate. The cares of Royalty will be too much for him; and retirement and quiet will be *earnestly and affectionately* recommended. *Let the King of Denmark and the Emperor Alexander look now to the selves*. Schleswick and Hol-

"stein will soon change masters, and "Finland, won by Russian blood, will be "restored by French menaces or intrigues. And the cession of part of "Austrian Poland to France, and the "wresting Warsaw from the King of "Saxony, will produce another kingdom, "which will be given probably to some "other French General, who will hang "upon the Russian frontier, and keep the "Russian Emperor in constant awe, apprehension, and dependence."—What a kind, what an anxious, solicitude for the safety and honour of Russia and Denmark! Measures of precaution are here as "earnestly and affectionately recommended" to them as it is said that Napoleon will recommend retirement to the king of Sweden! Oh! what a strange mixture of madness and hypocrisy!—Why not warn the king of England to "look to himself?" Is it not evident, that England is very deeply interested in this event? Nay, must we not begin from the moment we are assured that the event has taken place to the extent mentioned; must we not from that moment begin to take measures in consequence? We are, though the madmen above quoted seem to forget it, or, rather, never to have known it, at peace and in amity with Sweden; we have a treaty with her to that effect; no small part of our foreign trade is now carried on through that channel; and, in short, it is to Sweden that we owe, in a great measure, the power we yet possess of entering the Baltic Sea. Such being the case, one might have expected to hear a word or two upon the subject of the consequences to England which this event was likely to produce; but, of these consequences not one word have we heard.—Napoleon, in his address to the Dutch Deputies, quoted in my last Number, at page 272, said, that, from "that moment, "all the changes that took place in Europe "should have for their first motive the destruction of the tyrannical system of the "English Government;" that is to say, the destruction of our maritime power, as now exercised; the destruction of our maritime supremacy. And, does not this event in Sweden prove, that that was no empty and unmeaning threat? Time was when the statesmen of England were alarmed at the possession of *Dunkirk* by France. What would they have said, if they had been told, that France would have possession of Sweden and Denmark, in addition to the whole of Flanders and

Holland? Would they, like the madmen of our ministerial prints, have contented themselves with calling upon Russia and Denmark to look to themselves?—Every arrangement, every measure, of Napoleon now points, much more directly than ever, to the subjugation of this country, which is, indeed, an object that no man in his senses can suppose that he ever, for a moment, loses sight of; and, in the prosecuting of this great object how is it possible for him to have gained a more important acquisition of means, than he has now, gained in Sweden? What is the precise strength of the Swedish navy I do not know. It is, perhaps, all together, little short of thirty ships of the line, or force equal to thirty such ships. But that is of little comparative importance: there are, upon the spot, *all the resources*; all the means of making ships, of forming seamen, and of sending forth a mighty navy. To hear the madmen above-quoted; to hear their wretched balderdash commentaries upon the event in Sweden, who would imagine, that it was from Sweden and from the territories that will now, even according to these madmen, inevitably belong to her; who would imagine, that it was thence that we draw, and must still draw, if from any place, the half, at least, of our means of constructing and fitting out our navy? Talk of the "*infatuated*" Alexander, indeed! He may, for aught I know, and for aught I, or any other friend to the freedom and happiness of the world, care, be infatuated; but, what is his infatuation, compared with that of those Englishmen, who can see no danger to their own country in an event which has placed Sweden in the hands of Napoleon? They must, as the author of my motto emphatically expresses it, *hate truth*, and resolve to be cheated.

"Hear the just Law, the Judgment of the Skies:
"He that hates Truth, shall be the Dupe of Lies:
"And he that will be cheated to the last,
"Delusion strong as Hell shall bind him fast."

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I shall, for the present, dismiss this subject, with an observation or two upon the hint thrown out at the close of the passage above quoted from the Morning Post. Indeed it is more than a hint: it is a very distinct recommendation to Russia and Denmark to form a close alliance with England for the purpose of resisting their new neighbour. Mad again. What! is not the work going on fast enough without more coalitions? Is this madman afraid, that Napo-

leon will not *soon enough* find out grounds for a quarrel with these two governments? Or, is he afraid, that, unless we have *new subsidies* to pay, we shall be *over-loaded with gold and silver*?—Reader, look, now, well at this event. Do not deceive yourself, and let not these mad writers mislead you. Consider what a change this event makes in the affairs of Europe, and of England in particular; and, then your mind will be duly prepared for the final struggle, which must come, unless something should happen very little short of a miracle.

CARRACCAS.—The Revolution, which has taken place in these colonies of Spain, has, for some time past, been a very interesting object; but, previous to making any observations upon it, it was desirable to wait, in order to see the real character of it. Now, however, when the Junta, or Regency, or whatever else they may call the rulers of Old Spain, assembled at Cadiz, have declared the Carraccas in a *state of vigorous blockade*, it is time to make an observation or two upon the subject, were it only for the purpose of pointing it out to the attention of my readers.—What has taken place in the Carraccas is, to all intents and purposes, a *revolution*; a total change of rulers, and not only of rulers, but of *form of government*.—I have not time now, nor would this be the proper occasion if I had, to give a full account of the measures adopted by the people in those colonies; but, we may observe, that they declared themselves *independent of the rulers of Old Spain*, upon the ground that they could receive no protection from those rulers; whereupon these latter have declared their countries in a *state of blockade*!—We are placed in a singular situation by this measure; for, as the reader will remember, we have had here, *Deputies* from the Carraccas, who are said to have been well received by our government, and who were sent away with every mark of approbation, and even with promises of friendship, if not of support. But, the dilemma, in which our government appears to be, will be best explained by one of their friends before quoted:—
 “The recent revolution in the Carraccas has called forth energetic measures from the Regency, which, in the present state of Old Spain, may be of doubtful policy. The Regency have issued a Royal Order, proclaiming the Carraccas in a state of rigorous blockade, and declaring all

“merchant vessels that shall attempt to enter; or sail from the ports of that Settlement, liable to seizure and confiscation. This is a *bold resolution*, and big with very important results. The Settlement must now either submit and return to ancient allegiance, or raise the standard of independence, and set the present Government of Spain at defiance. We do not imagine that either the Regency or the author of the Revolution in the Carraccas, are disposed to push matters to extremities. On the contrary, we believe that the Deputies from that Colony, who were lately in this country, have solicited the mediation of the British Government, and that such concessions will be made to the Colonies as will prevent any serious rupture between them and the mother country. One of the points which the Marquis WELLESLEY, while in Spain, pressed upon the attention of the Supreme Junta was, “that the same act of the Junta, by which the Regency shall be appointed, and the Cortes called, shall contain the principal articles of *redress of grievances, correction of abuses, and relief of exactions in Spain and the Indies*, and also the heads of such concessions to the Colonies, as shall fully secure to them a *due share in the Representative Body*, of the Spanish Empire.” With such concessions as were then suggested by the Noble Marquis, we have reason to hope, the friends of independence, in the Colonies, will be satisfied; nor will the Regency, if they duly appreciate the present situation of their country, feel no reluctance to grant. The seasonable interposition of England, in harmonizing these jarring interests, while it affords a new proof of our honour and good faith, will also operate as a new tie to strengthen the attachment and the confidence which already so happily subsists between the two countries.”—So, so! Here, we are told, is the Marquis Wellesley, recommending, *pressing*, upon the attention of the Junta, the necessity of a “*redress of grievances, and a correction of abuses, in Spain and the Indies!*” Aye, and what is more than even that; he is pressing upon them the necessity of *giving*, even to the people in the Colonies (and of course to the people at home) “a *due share in the REPRESENTATIVE BODY!*” Oh, happy Spain and the Indies! Well, and was the Marquis’s recommendation; was the Marquis’s *pressing* recommendation, af-

tended to ? This is what our mad friend does not tell us ; but, it is, for the present, at least, quite sufficient for us to know, that the Marquis Wellesley did actually press the government of Spain to give even the people in the colonies a *fair representation* in the Cortes, or Parliament, of Spain ; and that he also pressed them to effect a *redress of grievances* and a *correction of abuses* !—Whether the madman says this from *any authority*, or whether it proceed wholly from himself, it is impossible for us to know ; but, it has actually appeared in a print devoted to the government, and, as such it is worthy of putting upon record.——With respect to the proposed *accommodation* between the government of Old Spain and the people of the Carraccas, I look upon it as being very unlikely to take place. The Régency is shut out of the main land of Spain ; and no one can tell the day, when they will be obliged to quit the Isle of Leon. It is, indeed, *possible* that they may not be obliged to quit it, and that they may recover the government of the kingdom ! but, the people of the Carraccas will judge for themselves. Indeed I imagine, that all the colonies of Spain will become independent. The spirit of revolution is not laid yet : so far from it, that it appears to be but beginning to take a *grand range*. The darkness of prejudice and the light of reason are like the darkness and light of the natural world : they may succeed one another by turns ; but, for them to exist together is impossible ; and, when one casts one's eye over the colonies of Spain, and, indeed, over the whole of South America, observing especially its neighbourhood with North America and considering what a race it is who there reside ; when one takes this view of the matter, and reflects in addition, that the interest of Napoleon points out, imperiously calls for, the independence of all those countries, and the unchaining of all the commerce of the world ; when one takes this view of the matter, this little squabble between the Carraccas and the Junta at Cadiz drops out of sight, as unworthy of occupying the mind of any rational man for a moment : and, as to the dreams, that we frequently hear, about our securing possessions in South America as a *counterpoise to Napoleon's possessions in Europe*, they are such as might be expected from madmen, and are surely, not capable of imposing upon any person in his senses.

PORTUGAL. — In my last, at page 286, I brought down the detail of occurrences in the Portuguese war to as late a date as I then was enabled. I shall now resume it ; and, if it should be found to contain nothing that is interesting *now*, the reader may be well assured, that a time will come, when every word of it will be of interest to every Englishman, who cares a straw about the fate of his country.—The Ministerial papers, published since last Saturday, state, that there is every reason to hope that the deliverance of Portugal will be speedy ;—that the desertions from the French army not only increase, but that the French soldiers now begin to come over in great numbers ;—that such was the situation of the French on the 18th of August, that it was impossible that they must not soon fall back for want of provisions ;—that Romana's army was in motion at that time, and it was hourly expected to receive particulars of a battle fought between him and the French ;—that the people in Lisbon were in high spirits and full of confidence, and that their paper money was scarcely at twenty eight per cent discount ;—that the last accounts from our army in Portugal represented it as being in excellent spirits and was well prepared for any event that might occur ;—that my lord Talavera still adhered to a wise system which is calculated to baffle all the designs of the enemy ;—that, on the side of Spain, the French are fleeing from the Patriots in every direction, and that in a short space of time, it is confidently hoped, that that Liberty which had taken its departure from the banks of the Rhine and the Danube will make her abode upon the banks of the Tagus and the Guadalquivir ;—that my lord Talavera was still at Celerico on the 18th of last month, and that the enemy had made no sign of an intention to attack him ;—that the whole of our army were in good health and spirits, and fully prepared for a battle ;—that lord Talavera had sent home to our Ministers, an intercepted letter from Buonaparté to Massena, from the nature of which letter it was evident that it was an answer to one praying for a reinforcement of at least 40,000 men ;—that in this letter of Napoleon, he tells Massena that it is impossible for him to send him such reinforcement, and that if he is beaten by the English, which

is not unlikely, he must get off as well as he can;—that it was in consequence of this intercepted letter that reinforcements were lately sent from England and from Cadiz to join lord Talavera in Portugal.—Such is our intelligence of the last week, given by all the Ministerial prints, and especially by the Morning Post. Every thing does, indeed, if these prints speak truth (and it is possible that they do) wear a promising appearance in Portugal; and, indeed, if the desertion from the enemy continues but another month, it does not seem possible, that he can keep the field; for if we take from his side all the men who are said to have deserted and put them to our side, we shall find, that, even now our army must be the most numerous, without any reinforcements from Cadiz or England. With all humility be it spoken, but really, I should suppose it unwise, in such a state of things, to send such reinforcements; because, as we have seen, our General has it under *Napoleon's own hand*, that he has it not in his power to send Massena any reinforcements, and, of course, the desertion must, in a very short time, make our army the most numerous, to say not a word about the hunger and the sickness, the plague and the famine, in the French camp.—Yet, amidst all these flattering circumstances, the MORNING CHRONICLE seems to be alarmed for the safety of our army! And, indeed, he does not seem to look upon any part of our prospect as being fair. At least, so I should suppose from the language of his paper of the 6th instant, where he says:—"Is it only by the last dispatches that Ministers were made acquainted with this discovery of the actual design of Massena; or with the certain knowledge that he had met with no impediment to his progress, have they sanctioned the misrepresentations that have gone forth; and lulled the nation into the dangerous confidence that, our most valuable army was not likely to be exposed to a battle in which a victory could bring only renown to the warriors, without benefit to their country? No man believes that if Massena can bring *his whole army* to bear on our gallant HANDFUL OF MEN compared with his host, that he is likely to suffer a defeat so signal as to make it impossible for him to renew the combat. With his immense body of cavalry this supposition would be insane—because

"Lord Wellington could not follow up a victory by pursuing the enemy into the plain. All therefore that can be expected from this impending conflict is—that the survivors may be able to retire to their ships with eclat."—What! "our gallant HANDFUL of men!" HANDFUL! Stop a little, Mr. Perry, if you please. "Take me along with you," as my Lord Peter says. There is a time for all things, and, of course, a time for jesting; but, we are not to be jested out of our Portuguese army. You may, perhaps, think nothing of an army of SIXTY THOUSAND FIGHTING MEN; but, I do, and so do most others, I believe. You may call our sixty thousand men a *handful*; but, upon reflection, you will, I think, find, that they are a pretty good bellyful for us. This I know, at least, that they are quite enough to satisfy me, and especially when I hear of the starvation and dreadful mortality amongst the French, and of the numerous, the endless, desertions from them. Why, by this time, we may naturally conclude, from the accounts we have had, that nearly half the French army have died from hunger or sickness, or have deserted. Our army must have been greatly augmented by these desertions, and yet Mr. Perry calls them "a handful of men." Handful as they are, there are sixty thousand of them paid by the people of this country, and, therefore, let us hope, that we shall hear no more about *handfuls*.

"GOVERNOR ARIS!"—Keep your eyes upon this subject, people of all England! Watch well what passes. Honour the Governor with your unceasing attention. You know him; you remember him; and I do beseech you to keep your eye steadily fixed upon what now passes with regard to him.—Mark well the paragraphs that you see in the newspapers upon the subject of the escape of ROBERTS and HARPER (who have *not been heard of*), and upon every thing relating to this matter.—I have not now room for the three publications that have been already made upon the subject; but, I will, hereafter, collect them all; and, in the mean time, I say unto you *watch!*

BARON KOLLI.—The Morning Post of the 3rd instant says, "We again most positively assert, that there is no truth in the report that Baron Kolli has *turned to this country*."—There is some-

thing very mysterious about this **BARON KOLLI**. It is strange, that nobody knows any thing of the **FAMILY** of this man, who has been stated to have been the bearer of a letter written by the king of England. A person ought to be pretty well known, before he be so entrusted; and though the Baron did not succeed, and appears to have made a most miserable hand of the business, he was, as it appears, entrusted with a good deal. But, in all other cases, it has come to light *who the person really was*; and why not in this case? Why not let us know the name of this worthy gentleman, to whose zeal, at least, the cause of our ally, the most Catholic King, is so much indebted?

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
7th September, 1810.

CORN.

Sir;—Though the fact so long stated by you and since confirmed by the Report of the Bullion Committee is, I think, now unquestionable, that the absence of specie is chiefly owing to the issues of Paper not convertible into coin; yet, if the matter be fully examined, I think it will appear, that the want of due encouragement to our domestic agriculture, which compels us to pay ten or twelve millions every year to foreign farmers for bread, has a tendency to increase the export of Bullion, and to produce other evils of a nature still more serious.—I most heartily wish I could draw your attention to this part of the subject. Can you point out to me, and to the country, the principle on which it is, that in every thing relating to agriculture, we pursue a course the reverse of that which we adopt in respect to manufactures and commerce? In the latter case, we exclude almost entirely the foreigner from the supply of the home market, and we allow free export to our surplus produce. On this principle we exclude the sugars from the Brazils; we tax the timber from the Baltic and the States of America; and we increase the duties on foreign freight. The wisdom of these measures has been proved by the experience of many ages, and the skill of our manufacturers and merchants, in consequence of this encouragement, has become unrivalled. Yet, in respect to agriculture, we adopt an entirely opposite policy. All our encouragement is given to the farmers of France and America; on

them we are content to lavish the capital which ought to be employed on our own lands, and for two or three months in every year, we rely on them to supply us with food.—Is it, that in this enlightened active country, overflowing with capital and industry, we have not the means of providing sustenance for ourselves? The idea is disgraceful to our national character, and at variance with every principle of common sense. Give to our domestic husbandry and the business of the country only the same encouragement that is given to the trade of Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, &c.—I mean, exclude the foreigner from supplying our markets, and allow our surplus free export, and in four years we shall become in the trade of grain an exporting country for ever; and the supply at home, even in bad years, when the export might lessen, would become secure. The prices in the markets would be less fluctuating, regulating as to wheat perhaps between 70s. and 80s. the quarter. • Our population would increase, and the strength, riches, comfort and prosperity of the country would be augmented.—Should it be asked, where is the land required for the increased supply? I would refer to Sir John Sinclair, and all writers on agriculture; who prove, that many millions of acres are now lying waste, capable of producing grain which in the character of commons do not even to the poor who occupy them, produce now 4s. per acre. • The public at large having a deep interest in the cultivation of these wastes, the parliamentary fees on all enclosure bills, should, under direction of the Speaker and a Committee of the House of Commons, be paid by the Treasury. Were this regulation adopted, the two or three million additional acres required to supply us fully at home would soon be brought into cultivation, and the gradual exclusion of the foreigner would make husbandry a more steady and profitable employment for our capital and industry.—Through the powerful encouragement given to the business of the towns, we now fabricate for exportation more than all the markets in the world to which we have access can consume. In two years after Madeira was occupied by our troops, goods were sent there for sale, more than could be consumed in ten years. A Rio de Janeiro, La Plata, Cadiz, Lisbon and every other port to which we have access, the fact is the same, Agents and supercargoes for the manufacturing districts are sent

in endless succession in order to facilitate the sale of these surplus productions; and our merchants are driven into the wildest and most hazardous speculations, in order to relieve themselves from the pressure of this useless redundancy, the forced returns for which do not repay the labour of production. In consequence of which, a large proportion of the exporters become bankrupt. At the same moment we have within our own ring-fence a market for articles of imperious necessity, crying aloud for supply to the extent of ten and fifteen millions a year, to which we turn a deaf ear, and suffer foreigners to supply it, enrich themselves and disgrace us, in order that we may still further deluge the world with exported goods, against the reception of which every power in Europe sets its face. May it not be added, too, that in procuring food, if we can purchase it from the growers at home, we can give in exchange either gold or paper, or it may more properly be said we pay nothing for it. The gold or paper only changes hands, and as labourers in husbandry sustain themselves, the value of their produce is clear national profit drawn out of the bowels of the earth. Whereas, when we buy of French farmers, a great deal of bullion it has been proved must go out to pay them; and while so much resistance continues on the Continent to the introduction of our manufactures, it is not easy to see how the specie can return to us.—If we reflect on the animal and moral character of labourers employed in husbandry, and compare it with the condition of those in the enervating and unwholesome occupations of towns, arguments still more important will present themselves, and the most cursory observer, will, I think, agree with me, that the distinction and comparative discouragement which has so long prevailed to the injury of our domestic agriculture, ought to be removed. The same system of policy which in manufactures and commerce has advanced us to pre-eminence absolutely unrivalled, should be extended to the far more important pursuits of the English farmer. With a view to this, the export of corn should be declared free up to 80s. per quarter for wheat; and after one year a small duty should be laid on foreign grain. The sum of which, and the scale of prices at which it may attach, should be gradually raised till the increase of our home produce, the duty might operate as an ex-

clusion up to 120s. per quarter, prior to which time our farmers should have the exclusive supply of the home market; and if the fees on bills of enclosure were paid by the public, we should soon have at home in average years a large excess to export, and in the worst of seasons a full supply for home consumption, with prices more stationary, and an exemption from the cruel and mortifying situation of being compelled to supplicate France and America for food to eat. I am, Sir, Your most obedient servant,

JACOB SMITHSON.

Bath, August 24th, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SWEDEN.—21 Aug. 1810. *Election of Bernadotte to be Crown Prince.*

OREBRO, Aug. 21.—The important object for which the Diet was convoked, has this day been happily accomplished by the nomination of a Crown Prince. His Serene Highness the Prince of Ponte Corvo, who has been chosen to fill that exalted situation, was proposed by his Majesty, and unanimously elected; so perfect was the harmony which has prevailed on this occasion, that not more than half an hour was occupied in the deliberations. Immediately after the decision, Count Morner was directed to proceed to Paris to announce the event to the Emperor and the Prince. His Highness had sent hither his own portrait, with that of his Princess and son, accompanied with letters containing assurances of the interest he took in the welfare of this kingdom, and pointing out the means by which he hoped to ameliorate its situation. Among these may be enumerated the re-purchase of the estates of Pomerania, which were given to French officers during the late war; a voluntary loan of 8,000,000 of franks, at an interest of four per cent., which interest is to be appropriated to national purposes, and the security and extension of our commerce.

STOCKHOLM, Aug. 20.—The following is the Speech, in which his Majesty, on the 18th instant, proposed to the Diet the Prince of Ponte Corvo, as a proper person to be chosen Crown Prince of Sweden:—"At a period when, after a long Session the last Diet separated, the fairest prospect of peace opened for Sweden; after a long series of severe misfortunes, lasting tranquillity seemed to have been

obtained for this kingdom. Three Treaties of Peace had secured the dominion which remained at the end of a destructive war, and a generous Prince placed near the throne promised powerfully to support the constitution formed by the States of the Empire, and every thing promised to well-disposed Swedish citizens certain indemnification for past misfortunes. His Royal Majesty fondly shared in the pleasing hope in which his faithful subjects indulged on this head, when one of these unexpected blows, with which Providence at times destroys the hopes of men, annihilated ours. The Crown Prince Charles Augustus was no more, and his death shrouded the future destinies of Sweden in a dreadful gloom. His Royal Majesty, with a mind deeply affected by a loss, universally so severely felt, yet mindful of his royal duty, contemplated the state of public affairs, and felt thoroughly convinced, that for the preservation of the independence of the Swedish Empire, it became indispensably necessary to secure, without the least delay, the succession to the throne, which appeared to him the only means of preserving the tranquillity of the Empire, by a firm and wise Government, founded on the fundamental laws of the constitution of our country. Deeply impressed with those sentiments, his Majesty perceived with pleasure that the voice of his people, equally aware of the necessity speedily to choose a successor to the Swedish throne, loudly and unanimously declared in favour of the Prince of Ponte Corvo. Brilliant exploits have illustrated his name as a warrior, at the same time that eminent talents mark him one of the most skilful statesmen of our age. Universally admired for the probity of his character and the mildness of his temper, he found opportunities even in the midst of the misfortunes of war, to shew his attachment to the Swedish nation, by the kind and friendly manner in which he treated the Swedish officers and soldiers whom the chance of war subjected to his power. All these circumstances and considerations could not but fix his Majesty's attention and determine his resolution, when the question was, to propose a successor to the Swedish throne.—Yet his Royal Majesty has not failed to take on this important question the sense of the States of the Empire, and of the Secret Committee of the Council of State, a large majority of the former, and the unanimous opinions of the latter perfectly coincided with his Majesty's sentiments on this point.—His Royal Majesty

thinks that by confiding the future destinies of Sweden to the Prince of Ponte Corvo, his well-earned military fame, while on the one side it secured the independence of the State, will on the other hand render it superfluous for him to engage in fresh wars; that his strong mind, tutored by long experience, will maintain national tranquillity and order, and secure to our faithful subjects a long and undisturbed enjoyment of the blessings of Peace, and lastly, that his Son will remove in future times that uncertainty of succession to the throne which some late lamentable events have rendered still more important to this country.—From all these considerations his Royal Majesty feels obliged to propose to the assembled states of the Empire, his Serene Highness John Baptist Julian Bernadotte,* Prince of Ponte Corvo, as Crown Prince of Sweden, and his Royal Majesty's successor to the Swedish throne. His Royal Majesty must however, expressly add the reservation, that should the said Prince be chosen, by the States of the empire, successor to the Swedish throne, he must, pursuant to the fundamental laws of their kingdom, before he arrives on Swedish ground, adopt the tenets of the pure evangelical creed, and also sign a similar assurance, as the states of the empire formed for the late Crown Prince. His Royal Majesty has now performed the duty prescribed to him by the Constitution of the realm, and now expects the resolution of the states. May the choice which they are about to make, secure the glory and prosperity of our beloved country, and thus fulfil the most earnest wish which his Royal Majesty can ever entertain.—

“CHARLES.”

PORTUGAL.—*Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.*—Signed at Rio de Janeiro, the 19th of February, 1810.—(Continued from p. 256.)

.....XVI. But during the interval between the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, and the promulgation of the above mentioned tariff, should any goods or merchandizes the produce or manufacture of the dominions of his Britannic Majesty arrive in the ports of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, it is stipulated, that they shall be admitted for consumption on paying the above mentioned duties of fifteen per cent. according to the value set

on them by the tariff now actually established, should they be goods or merchandize which are comprised or valued in that tariff, and if they should not be comprised or valued in that tariff (as also if any British goods or merchandizes should hereafter arrive in the ports of the Portuguese dominions without having been specifically valued and rated in the new tariff or pauta, which is to be made in consequence of the stipulations of the preceding Article of the present Treaty) they shall be equally admitted on paying the same duties of fifteen per cent. *ad valorem*, according to the invoices of the said goods and merchandizes, which shall be duly presented and sworn to by the parties importing the same. And in case that any suspicion of fraud or unfair practices should arise, the invoices shall be examined, and the real value of the goods or merchandizes ascertained by a reference to an equal number of British and Portuguese merchants of known integrity and honour; and in case of a difference of opinion amongst them, followed by an equality of votes upon the subject, they shall then nominate another merchant, likewise of known integrity and honour, to whom the matter shall be ultimately referred, and whose decision thereon shall be final, and without appeal. And in case the invoice should appear to have been fair and correct, the goods and merchandizes specified in it, shall be admitted on paying the duties abovementioned of fifteen per cent. and the expences, if any, of the examination of the invoice shall be delayed by the party who called its fairness and correctness into question. But if the invoice shall be found to be fraudulent and unfair, then the goods and merchandizes shall be brought up by the officers of the customs on the account of the Portuguese Government, according to the value specified in the invoice with an addition of ten per cent. to the sum so paid for them by the officers of the customs, the Portuguese Government engaging for the payment of the goods so valued and purchased by the officers of the customs within the space of fifteen days, and the expences, if any, of the examination of the fraudulent invoice, shall be paid by the party who presented it as just and fair.—XVII. It is agreed and covenanted, that articles of military and naval stores brought into the ports of his Royal High-

ness the Prince Regent of Portugal, which the Portuguese Government may be desirous of taking for its own use, shall be paid for without delay at the prices appointed by the proprietors, who shall not be compelled to sell such articles on any other terms. And it is further stipulated, that if the Portuguese Government shall take into its own care and custody any cargo, or part of a cargo, with a view to purchase, or otherwise, the said Portuguese Government shall be responsible for any damage or injury that such cargo, or part of a cargo, may receive while in the care and custody of the Officers of the said Portuguese Government.—XVIII. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal is pleased to grant to the subjects of Great Britain the privilege of being Assignantes for the duties to be paid in the Custom Houses of his Royal Highness's dominions, on the same terms, and on giving the same security as are required from the subjects of Portugal.—And it is on the other hand stipulated and agreed, that the subjects of the Crown of Portugal shall receive, as far as it may be just or legal, the same favour in the Custom Houses of Great Britain as is shewn to the natural subjects of his Britannic Majesty.—XIX. His Britannic Majesty does on his part and in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, promise and engage that all goods, merchandizes and articles whatsoever, of the produce, manufacture, industry, or invention of the dominions or subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, shall be received and admitted into all and singular the ports and dominions of his Britannic Majesty, on paying generally and only the same duties that are paid upon similar articles by the subjects of the most favoured nation. And it is expressly declared, that if any reduction of duties should take place exclusively in favour of British goods and merchandizes imported into the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, an equivalent reduction shall take place on Portuguese goods and merchandizes imported into his Britannic Majesty's dominions, and *vice versa*, the articles upon which such equivalent reduction is to take place, being settled by previous concert and agreement.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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" How shall I speak thee, or thy power address,
 " Thou God of our Idolatry, the Press ?
 " By thee Religion, Liberty, and Laws,
 " Exert their influence, and advance their cause ;
 " By thee worse plagues than Pharaoh's land befel,
 " Diffus'd make Earth the vestibule of Hell ;
 " Thou fountain, at which drink the Good and Wise ;
 " Thou ever-bubbling spring of endless Lies ;
 " Luke Eden's dread probationary tree,
 " Knowledge of Good and Evil is from thee."

COWPER.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER III.

Danger of exciting popular discontents against country paper-money makers—Description of the National Debt—Progress of the Debt—The different denominations of it of no consequence—Cost of the Anti-jacobin war—Progress of the National Expences—Progress of the Revenue or Taxes—The effect of taxation—Taxes cause poverty and misery in a country—Not like rents—Increase of Revenue no proof of national prosperity—What are the signs of national prosperity—Increase of the poor rates in England—Cost of the Tax-Gatherers sufficient to support 92,500 families.

Gentlemen,

A London print, which is what is called a ministerial newspaper, and which I, in the discharge of my duty as a public writer, am compelled to read, but which, for the sake of your morals, I hope none of you ever see, has most harshly spoken of that part of our paper money, which is issued by the Bankers, whose shops are in the country. The writer of this print has described that paper, namely, the country bank notes, as "*destructive assignats*;" and, in another of his publications, he calls them "*rile rags*;" and then again, "*dirty rags*." These hard words, besides that

they are unbecoming in sober discussion, can do no good, and may do a great deal of harm, if they have any effect at all upon the minds of the people; and, therefore, we will make a remark or two upon their tendency, before we proceed with the topic mentioned at the close of the last letter.

Assignats was the name given to the French revolutionary paper-money, the distresses occasioned by which are fresh in the recollection of most people; and, to give the same name to our country-bank notes was, therefore, to proclaim, as far as this writer was able to proclaim, that these notes, *being more than one half of all our circulating medium*, were as bad, if not worse, than the paper-money of France, which produced so much individual misery to so many millions of people. Not that this was betraying any secret to the world; for, it is beyond all comprehension foolish to suppose, that all the world, particularly our sharp-sighted enemy, are not fully acquainted with our situation in this respect, more especially now that the Bullion Report is abroad; but, what I find fault of, is, that this description of country-bank notes, as contradistinguished from the London bank-notes, has a tendency to excite popular hatred, and, in cases that may happen, popular violence, against that part of our paper-money makers, called country-bankers; than which nothing can be much more unjust in itself, or be more likely to lead to universal confusion, the experience of the world having proved, that commotion, when once on foot, is seldom limited to the accomplishment of its original object; and, we may venture to affirm, that nothing was

ever better calculated to render popular commotion violent, and to push it beyond its natural bounds, than the hatred and revenge, which, it would seem to be the object of the print above mentioned to excite in the minds of the people.

The country paper-money makers are not, as we shall soon see, any more to blame than are the paper-money makers in town. Paper-money making is a trade, or calling, perfectly innocent in itself, and the tradesmen may be very moral and even very liberal men. Amongst them, as amongst men of other trades, there are, doubtless, sharpers and even rogues; and, the trade itself may be one that exposes men to the temptation of becoming roguish; but, it does not follow, that *all* the paper-money makers, or, that the paper-money makers *in general*, are men of dishonest views. It is, therefore, not only illiberal, but unjust in the extreme, to condemn the whole of the trade in a lump, to call their wares "*destructive as-signals, vile rags, dirty rags,*" and the like, whence it is, of course, intended that it should be understood, that all the issuers of them ought to be regarded as pests of society and treated accordingly; when the truth is, as we shall presently see, the fault is not in individuals, but in the system, out of which the swarm of paper-money makers have grown as naturally and as innocently as certain well-known little animals are engendered by, and live upon, an impoverished and sickly carcass.

Having thus endeavoured to put you upon your guard against the tendency of this very unjust representation of our country bankers and their money, an endeavour, which, it appeared to me, ought not to be delayed, we will now proceed with our subject, and, as was proposed, at the close of the last Letter, inquire into the progress of the Funds and Stocks; or, in more proper terms, into the INCREASE OF THE NATIONAL DEBT.

We have before seen what is the nature of this debt; we have also seen how it began: we by-and-by have to show the effects of it; but, what we have to do, at present, is to inquire into, and ascertain, how it has gone on increasing, and what is now its amount. We shall next inquire into the schemes for lessening the Debt; and, then we shall distinguish what is called redeemed from unredeemed debt; but, first of all, let us leave all other views of it aside, and con-

fine our attention merely to the sums borrowed. We have before seen, that the money has been borrowed in various ways, or under various denominations. In some cases the money borrowed was to yield the lender 3 per centum, that is to say 3 pounds interest, yearly, for every hundred pounds of principal. In some cases the lender was to receive 4 per centum; in some cases 5 per centum; and in some cases more. Hence come the denomination of 3 per cents and 4 per cents, and so forth. But, to the people, who have to pay the interest, these distinctions are of no consequence at all, any more than it would be to either of us, whether our bakers' bills were made out upon brown paper or upon white. We shall see afterwards what we have to pay yearly in the shape of interest, which is the thing that touches us home; but, let us first see what the principal is, and how it has gone on increasing; bearing in mind, that, as was shown in the foregoing letter, page 292, the borrowing, and, of course, the Debt, began in the year 1692, in the reign of William the Third, and that, the loan made in that year amounted to one million of pounds.

When QUEEN ANNE, who succeeded William, came to the throne, which was in the year 1701, the Debt was£.16,394,702

When GEORGE I came to the throne, in 1714, it was 54,145,363

When GEORGE II came to the throne, in 1727, it was 52,092,235

When GEORGE III came to the throne, in 1760, it was 146,682,844

After the AMERICAN WAR, in 1784, it was 257,213,043

At the latter END OF THE LAST WAR; that is to say, the first war against the French Revolutionists, and which, for the sake of having a distinctive appellation, we will call the ANTI-JACOBIN WAR: at the end of that war, in 1801, the Debt was 579,931,447

At the PRESENT TIME; or, rather, in January last... 811,398,082

That is to say, eight hundred and eleven

millions, eight hundred and ninety eight thousand, and eighty two; and these in pounds, in English pounds, too! There are, in the accounts, laid before parliament (from which the last mentioned sum is taken) some *skillings* and *pence* and even **FARTHING**s, in addition; but though these accountants have been so nice, we will not mind a few furthings. Part of this Debt is what is called *funded*, and a part *unfunded*; part is called Irish Debt, part Emperor of Germany's Debt, and another part the Prince Regent of Portugal's. But, *interest upon the whole of it is payable in England*; and that is all that we have to look after; it being of no consequence to us what the thing is called, so that we have to pay for it. So that we are taxed to pay the interest of it, what matters it to us what names the several parts of it may go by? I hope, that there is not, at this day, a man amongst you, who is to be amused with empty sounds: I hope, that your minds are not now-a-days, after all that you have seen, to be led away from the object before them by any repetition of mere names. So long as we are taxed to pay the interest upon the Debt, that man must be exceedingly weak, who is to be made to believe, that it is of any consequence to any of us by what name that debt is called*.

Such, then, has been the progress of the National Debt; and it is well worthy of our attention, that it has increased in an increasing proportion. It is now nearly six times as great as it was when the present king came to the throne; and, which ought to be well attended to, more than two thirds of the whole of the Debt has been contracted in carrying on, against the French, that war, which, at its commencement, was to succeed by means of *ruining the finances of France*. When the ANTI-JACOBIN War began, in 1793, the Debt was, at the utmost, 257,213,043*l*. It is now 811,898,000*l*. Such has, thus far, been the financial effect; such has been the effect as to money-matters, of the war against the Jacobins. How many times were we told, that it required but *one* more campaign; *one* more; only *one* more rigorous campaign, to put an end to the war; to destroy, to annihilate, for ever, the resources of France. Alas! those resources have

* There is, besides the above, the **INDIA DEBT**; but of that we will speak another time.

not been destroyed. They have increased in a fearful degree; while we have accumulated hundreds of millions of Debt in the attempt. How many writers have flattered us, from time to time, with the hope, nay, the certainty (if we would but persevere) of triumphing over the French by the means of our riches! To how many of these deceivers have we been so foolish as to listen! It is this credulity, which has led to the present state of things; and, unless we shake it off at once, and resolve to look our Gingers in the face, we shall, I greatly fear, experience that it to which our deceivers told us would be experienced by our enemy. First, it is well known, grew into debt, with the nation in consequence of his promise, that he plans to pay-off the National Debt; and the same Pitt, who had that 1,600,000*l* outlay, let it pay down, 600,000*l* after having, for twenty years, had the full power of managing all the resources of the nation; after having, for nearly the whole of that time, had the support of three fourths, if not more, of the Members of the House of Commons; after having, of course, adopted whatever measures he thought proper, during the whole of that time. He found the Debt two hundred and fifty odd millions, and he left it six hundred and fifty odd. This was what was done for England by that Pitt, whose own *private debts* the *people* had to pay, besides the expense of a monument to his memory! This is what every man in England should bear constantly in mind.

Having now seen how the National Debt has increased, let us next see how the EXPENSES of the Nation have increased; and, then take a look at the increase of the TAXES; for, in order to be able to form a correct opinion upon the main points, touched upon by the Bullion Committee, we must have a full view, not only of the Debt but of the Expenses and the Taxes of the nation.

When QUEEN ANNE came to the throne, in 1701, the whole Expenses of the year, including the interest on the National Debt, amounted to£.5,610,007 Peace.

When GEORGE I. came to the throne, in 1714, and just after

Queen Anne had been at war eleven years	6,633,581 Peace.
When GEORGE II. came to the throne, in 1727,	5,441,218 Peace.
When GEORGE III. came to the throne, in 1760	24,156,940 War.
After the END OF THE AMERICAN WAR, and at the beginning of PITT'S Administration, in 1784	21,657,609 Peace.
At the latter End of the last, or ANTI-JACOBIN WAR, in 1801,	61,278,018 War.
For the last year, that is, the year 1809,	£82,027,288 5 1¼ War.

Now, without any thing more than this, let me ask any of you, to whom I address this letter, whether you think it possible for the thing to go on in this way for any great length of time?—If the subject did not present so many considerations to make us serious, it would be quite impossible to refrain from laughing at the scrupulousness that could put *five shillings and a penny three farthings* at the end of a sum of millions that it almost makes one's head swim but to think of. Laughable, however, as we may think it, those who have such accounts made out, think it no laughing matter. It is, on the contrary, looked upon by them, perhaps, as no very unimportant part of the system. Upon looking at the above progress of the Expenditure, it is impossible to avoid being struck with the increase, *during the present reign*. The year 1760 was a time of war as well as the present; but, as we see, a year of war then, cost only 24 millions; whereas a year of war now costs 82 millions. We see, too, that a year of war now costs 20 millions more than a year of war cost only ten years ago. What, then, will be the cost if this war should continue many years longer, and if, as appearances threaten, the enemy should take such measures, and adopt such a change in his mode of hostility, as to add greatly to the expensiveness of our defence? This is a very material consideration; and, though it will hereafter be taken up, still I could not refrain from just touching upon it in this place. Am I told, that *our money is*

depreciated, or fallen off in value; and that the increase in our Expences is more *nominal* than real; that the increase is in name; merely in the figures, and not in the thing; for that a pound is not worth any thing like what a pound was worth when the king came to the throne? Am I told this? If I am, I say, that we are not yet come to the proper place for discussing matters of this sort; that we shall come to it all in good time; but, that, in the meanwhile, I may hope to hear no more abuse of our doctrines, from those, at least, who, in this way, would reconcile our minds to the enormous increase in the Nation's yearly Expences.

Having now taken a view of the increase of the *Debt*, and also of the yearly *Expences* of the nation, let us now see how the *Revenue*, or *Income*, or, more properly speaking, the *TAXES*; that is to say, the money received from the people, in the course of the year, by the several sorts of Tax-gatherers; let us now see how the amount of these has gone on increasing.

When QUEEN ANNE came to the throne, in 1701, the yearly amount of the taxes was	£4,212,353
When GEORGE I. came to the throne, in 1714, it was	6,762,643
When GEORGE II. came to the throne, in 1727, it was	6,522,540
When GEORGE III. came to the throne, in 1760, it was	8,744,682
After the AMERICAN war, in 1784, it was	15,300,921
At the Close of the Anti-Jacobin war, in 1801, it was	36,728,971
For the last year, that is 1809, it was	70,240,226

It is quite useless to offer any comments upon this. The figures speak too plainly for themselves to receive any assistance from words. As to the *correctness* of these statements, there may, perhaps, be found some little inaccuracies in the copying of the figures, and in adding some of the sums together; but, these must be very immaterial; and, indeed, none of the questions, which we have to discuss, can possibly be affected by any little error of this sort. I say this in order to bar any cavil that may, possibly, be attempted to be raised out of circumstances, such as I have here mentioned.

Thus, then, we have pretty fairly before us, a view of the increase of the *Debts*, the *Expences*, and the *Taxes*, of the nation; and a view it is quite sufficient to impress with serious thoughts every man, whose regard for his country is not confined to mere professions. There are persons, I know, who laugh at this. *They may have reason to laugh; but we have not.* The pretence is, that taxes *return again* to those who pay them. Return again! In what manner do they return? Can any of you perceive the taxes that you pay coming back again to you? All the interested persons who have written upon taxation, have endeavoured to persuade the people, that, to load them with taxes does them no harm at all, though this is in direct opposition to the language of every speech that the King makes to the Parliament, during every war; for, in every such Speech, he expresses his deep *sorrow*, that he is compelled to lay new burdens upon his people.

The writers here alluded to, the greater part of whom live, or have a design to live, upon the taxes, always appear to consider the nation as being *rich and prosperous* in proportion to the *quantity of taxes* that is raised upon it; never seeming to take into their views of riches and prosperity the *ease and comfort* of the people who pay the taxes. The notion of these persons seems to be, that, as there always will be more food raised and more goods made in the country than is sufficient for those, who own and who till the soil, and who labour in other ways, that the surplus, or super-abundance, ought to fall to *their* share; or, at least, that it ought to be *taken away in taxes*, which produce a luxurious way of living, and luxury gives *employment* to the people; that is to say, that it sets them to work *to earn their own money back again.* This is a mighty favour to be sure.

The tendency of taxation is; to create a class of persons, who do not labour. to take from those who do labour the produce of that labour, and to give it to those who do not labour. The produce taken away is, in this case, *totally destroyed*; but, if it were expended, or consumed, amongst those who labour, it would produce something in its stead. There would be more, or better cloth; more, or better, houses; and these would be more generally distributed; while the

growth of vice, which idleness always engenders and fosters, would be prevented.

If, by the gripe of taxation, every grain of the surplus produce of a country be taken from the lowest class of those who labour; they will have the means of *bare existence* left. Of course, their clothing and their dwellings will become miserable, their food bad, or in stinted quantity; that surplus produce which should go to the making of an addition to their meal, and to the creating of things for their use, will be *annihilated* by those who do nothing but eat. Suppose, for instance, a community to consist of a farmer, four cottagers, a taylor, a shoemaker, a smith, a carpenter, and a mason, and that the land produces enough food for them all and no more. Suppose this little community to be seized with a design to imitate their betters, and to keep a sinecure placeman, giving him the tenth of their produce which they formerly gave to their shoemaker. The consequence would be, that poor CRISPIN would die, and they would go bare-footed, with the consolation of reflecting that they had brought themselves into this state from the silly vanity of keeping an idle man. But, suppose the land to yield enough food for all ten of them, and enough for two persons besides. They have this, then, besides what is absolutely necessary to supply their wants. They can spare one of their men from the field, and have, besides, food enough to keep him in some other situation. Now, which is best, to make him a second carpenter, who, in return for his food, would give them additional and permanent convenience and comfort in their dwellings; or to make him a sinecure placeman or a singer, in either of which places he would be an annihilator of corn, at the same time, that, in case of emergency, he would not be half so able to defend the community. Suppose two of the cultivators became sinecure placemen, then you kill the carpenter or some one else, or what is more likely, all the labouring part of the community, that is to say, all but the sinecure placemen, live more miserably, in dress, in dwellings, and in food. This reasoning applied to *tens*, applies equally well to *millions*, the causes and effects being, in the latter case, only a little more difficult to trace.

Such is the way in which *taxes* operate;

the distinction between which operation and the operation of *taxes* being this, that, in the latter case, you receive something of which you have the particular enjoyment, for what you give; and, in the former case you receive nothing. It is by no means to be understood, that there should be no persons to live without what is generally called Labour. Physicians, Persons, Lawyers, and others of the higher callings in life, do, in fact, labour; and it is right that there should be persons of great estate, and without any profession at all; but, then, you will find, that these persons *do not live upon the earnings of others*: they all of them give something in return for what they receive. Those of the learned professions give *the use of their talents and skill*; and the landlord gives *the use of his land or his houses*.

Nor ought we to look upon all taxes as so much of the fruit of our labour lost, or taken away without cause. Taxes are necessary in every community; and the man, whether he be stevedman, soldier, or sailor, who is in the service of the community, gives his services in return for that portion of the taxes which he receives. We are not talking against *taxes in general*; nor, indeed, will we stop here to inquire, whether *our taxes*, at their present amount, be necessary; or, *whether, by other means, they might, in great part, at least, have been avoided*. These are questions, which, for the present, we will wholly pass over, our object being to come at a correct opinion with regard to the effect of heavy taxation upon the people who have to support it, reserving for another opportunity our remarks and opinions as to the necessity of such taxation in our particular case.

By national *prosperity* the writers above alluded to mean something very different indeed from that which you and I, who have no desire to live upon the taxes, should call national prosperity. They look upon it, or, at least, they would have us look upon it as being demonstrated in the increase of the number of chariots and of fine dressed people in and about the purlieus of the court; whereas, reflection will not fail to teach us, that this is a demonstration of the increase of the taxes, and nothing more. National prosperity shows itself in very different ways: in the plentiful meal, the comfortable dwelling, the decent furniture and dress, the healthy and happy countenances, and

the good morals, of *the labouring classes of the people*. These are the ways in which national prosperity shows itself; and, whatever is not attended with these signs, is not national prosperity. Need I ask you, then, if heavy taxation be calculated to produce these effects? Have our labourers a plentiful meal of food fit for man? Do they taste meat once in a *day*? Are they decently clothed? Have they the means of obtaining firing? Are they and their children healthy and happy? I put these questions to you, Gentlemen, who have the means of knowing the facts, and who must, I am afraid, answer them all in the negative.

But, why need we here leave any thing to conjecture, when we have the undeniable proof before us, in the accounts, laid before Parliament, of the amount of the *Poor Rates*, at two different periods, and, of course, at two different stages in our taxation, namely, in the year 1784, and in the year 1803? At the former period, the taxes of the year, as we have seen above, amounted to £13,300,921; and then the Poor Rates amounted to £2,105,023. At the latter period, the taxes of the year (as will be seen from the Official Statement in Register, Vol. IV, page 1471) amounted to £14,931,747; and the Poor Rates had then risen to £5,240,506. What most truly, then, amount to at this day, when the year's taxes amounts to upwards of 70 millions of pounds?

Here, then, we have a pretty good proof, that *taxation and pauperism* go hand in hand. We here see what was produced by the ANTIJACOBIN WAR. The taxes continued nearly the same from 1784 to 1793, the year in which Pitt began that war; so that, by the ANTIJACOBIN War alone the poor rates were augmented, in nominal amount, from £2,105,023 to £5,240,506; at which we shall not be surprized, if we apply to this case the principle above illustrated in the supposed community of ten men, where it is shown, that, by taking the produce of labour from the proprietors of it, and giving it to those, who do not labour and who do not give the proprietors of such produce any thing in return, *poverty*, or, at least, a less degree of ease and enjoyment, must be the consequence.

The poor-rates alone now are equal in amount to the whole of the national ex-

penditure, including the interest of the Debt, when the late king came to the throne; and, the charges of *managing* the taxes; that is to say, the wages, salaries, or allowances, to the *Tax-gatherers* of various descriptions; the bare charge which we pay on this account amounts to very little short of as much as the whole of the taxes amounted to when the late king was crowned.

This charge; that is to say, *what we pay to the Tax-gatherers*, in one shape or another, is stated, in the account laid before Parliament for the last year, at £.2,886,201, a sum equal to a year's wages of 92,500 labourers at *twelve shillings a week*, which may, I suppose, be looked upon as the average wages of labourers, take all the kingdom through. Is this *no evil*? Are we to be persuaded, that, to take the means of supporting 92,500 families, consisting, upon the usual computation (5 to a family), of 461,000 souls; that to take away the means of supporting all these, and giving those means to support others, whose business it is to *tax* the rest, instead of adding to the stock of the community by their labour; are we to be persuaded, that this is *no evil*; and that, too, though we see the poor rates grown from 2 millions to 5 millions in the space of 10 years? Are we to be persuaded to believe this? Verily, if we are, it is a great shame for us to pretend to laugh at the Mahomedans.

Having now taken a view of the *progress* of the National Debt together with that of the National *Expenses* and *Taxes*; and having (by stepping a little aside for a moment) seen something of their effect upon National *prosperity*, we will, in the next Letter, agreeably to the intention before expressed, inquire into the schemes for *arresting* this fearful progress; or, as they are generally denominated, plans for *paying off*, or *reducing*, the National Debt; a subject of very great importance, because, as we must now be satisfied, the *bank-notes* have *increased with the Debt*, and, of course, the reducing of the Debt would, if it were accomplished, tend to the reduction of the quantity of bank-notes, by the excess of which it is, as the Bullion Committee have declared, that the gold coin has been driven from circulation.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your faithful Friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday, °.

11th Sept. 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SWEDEN.—There is little, at present, to be added, upon this subject, to what was said, in my last, ending at page 307. I cannot, however, refrain from endeavouring to reinforce what I before said, relative to the idea, started in the Morning Post, of an *alliance* between Russia, Denmark, and England. The writer of that print (See page 300) calls upon the two former powers, and says, that "their only *security* is in a sincere and close alliance with Great Britain, under whose *protecting wings* they are *sure* to experience a *prompt and effectual shelter*."—The thing is too wild; it is too mad; paradoxical as it may seem, it is too ridiculous to laugh at. Really it is hardly to be believed, that any man should be found so devoid of all sense of shame as to put this upon paper, and to send it forth to the public, while the fate of Holland, Prussia, Austria, Naples, Piedmont, and even of Russia itself, is fresh in the recollection, nay, right before the eyes of that public, and which public, too, have paid so dearly for what has been going on. It is hardly to be believed, that any man should be found so devoid of shame. Louis XVIII, the Stadtholder, the two kings of Spain, the Prince and Queen of Portugal, the king of Sardinia, the Pope: with the fate of all these before him, does this shameless writer put forth his invitation with as much confidence as if they were all restored to their former power. This is, indeed, shameful in the extreme; and, surely, never could be tolerated by any set of persons in the world, who did not desire to have truth disguised from them.—An alliance with England, too, always includes *subsidies*; and, does the nation really think, that this is a time for it to pay subsidies, when, even men who may be supposed to have very little mercy upon the public purse, acknowledge, that we must have *retrenchments*? I do not know, that it is necessary to send subsidies either in gold or silver; but I know, that they must be sent in *money's worth*; that whatever is so sent is so much taken from the enjoyment of the people in this country; and, that, while each subsidy must add to the Debt of the Nation, it must add to the burden of taxes, the hardships of the people, and the quantity of bank notes. Let us hope, therefore, that the notion of an alliance with Russia and Denmark, under the present circumstances, is confined to the heads of

this very mad writer for our "fashionable world;" though, mind, I by no means pledge myself that such is the case, being of opinion that there are others pretty nearly as foolish as he is mad; nor should I at all wonder if such people were even to believe, in good earnest, that it would be an easy matter for us to gain the *cordial friendship* of the *Danes*!—This same writer and his fellow labourers are now endeavouring, through the instrumentality of General Sarrazin, to persuade this insulted and patient public, that Napoleon has sent Bernadotte to Sweden, and made him the successor to the throne of that kingdom, in order to get him out of the way; in order to get rid of a rival! What shall we be told next? What will General Sarrazin and the *Morning Post* tell us next? The notion hitherto has been, that Napoleon had *other ways* of getting rid of those whom he wished to get rid of. How shameful are these falsehoods. What a disgrace are they to the nation. And, what a mischievous thing is the press, when, as is pointed out in my motto, it is employed for such purposes.—The main tendency, and, most likely, the main object, of all such publications, is, to deceive the nation; to keep its eyes shut to its real situation; to persuade it, that, though the event which has taken place seems fearful, still that there is a set off in the situation, or circumstances, of our great enemy; and, that, after all, Bernadotte is likely, when he gets into Sweden, *not to be the friend of Napoleon*. Such is, to all appearance, the view with which these publications are sent forth to the world; and, I am very far indeed from underrating the effect of them; for, unless we suppose, that the corrupt part of the press of this country has produced great effect upon the minds of the people; has kept them in darkness: unless we suppose this, it is impossible to account for that infatuation, which has led to the dangers, with which we are more and more closely beset, and even in the midst of which many still seem to be as insensible as ever.—In the public prints of only a few days ago, it was stated, from the French papers, that, on the Emperor's birth day, two ships of war, of eighty guns, were launched; one at Toulon and the other at Antwerp. No notice was taken of this fact: it was too trifling a thing to be even referred to by our wise and loyal writers, who seem to think it much more useful and more becoming,

to detail the "*secrets*" brought to England by a train of impostors, whose design, at the very best, is to prey upon English credulity. —Two ships of eighty guns is no mean addition to a navy. Such a place of ship-building as Antwerp there is not in all Europe, all the timber being so close at hand. At the peace of Amiens there was at Antwerp no more of an arsenal than there now is at Hungerford Stairs. If, then, 20 ships have already been built at Antwerp, what will be done there in future?—In short, it is impossible to look at the means, which our enemy has of forming a navy, without feeling alarm for the safety of the country, and especially when we see such continual attempts, such a settled system, for keeping the nation in blindness with regard to its danger.

IRELAND.—One would suppose, that, in a state of things like the present, we should hear nothing, from those especially who are loud in their cries against *Napoleon*; from such persons, we might hope to hear nothing, tending to add fuel to the flames which have so long been burning in Ireland. Yet, as we shall see, from an article, which I am now about to insert with the hope of defeating its evil effects, that, by some of the persons of this description, every effort seems to be making, not only to keep alive the heart-burnings in the "*sister country*," but to aggravate them and render them incurable.—The distresses, which Ireland has been enduring for some time past, and which have, of late, greatly increased, have given rise to meetings, in different places, to consider of what means ought to be adopted in such an emergency; and, it having, in many, or, in some, at least, of those meetings, been determined, that the Union has been the cause of the miseries of Ireland, it has, as a natural consequence, been also determined by those meetings, to petition the Parliament for a repeal of the act of Union.—Now, whether the gentlemen, who have come to these determinations, be correct either in their facts or their reasonings, it is very certain that they have a right to meet and deliberate upon such subjects; they have a right to express their opinions upon them; they have a right to publish those opinions to the world; and, they have a right to submit them to the Parliament or the King, in the shape of a petition; or, if they have not such right,

is it not a shame for us to talk about *rights* at all; for, what is this more than the right of *crying out when you think yourself hurt, and praying most humbly not to be hurt any longer!*—Yet, this is a right, which, according to the notions of some of our loyalty-professing news-paper writers, is too much for the Irish to enjoy; and, accordingly, one of these worthies, falls on upon them with charges of faction and sedition and treason. He says: “The *mass* of those who support the Petitions *are persons who entertain principles that are equally hostile to the true interests of both Countries.* There are unfortunately, both in Great Britain and Ireland, many persons who eagerly seize every opportunity that presents itself of *embarrassing the Government*, at a moment when the pressure of public danger ought to call forth the exertions of every individual to secure the general safety. We have seen many men, we regret to say, who boast of their attachment to their country, yet who have for years exerted all their faculties to depress the spirits and damp the energies of their Countrymen—who upon all occasions decry the successes obtained by our arms, while they are equally ready to magnify those of the enemy; whose predictions are always of the most gloomy nature, who fasten with delight upon any thing that has the appearance of a public calamity; in a word, men who, under the pretext and cloak of patriotism, are in effect doing every thing in their power to serve the cause of our inveterate enemy. The unfortunate commercial embarrassments which have recently occurred afforded too favourable an opportunity to be neglected; accordingly it has been studiously represented in Ireland, that those embarrassments have arisen entirely from the Union, and that therefore that measure ought to be repealed, although it is one upon which, in the opinion of every rational and dispassionate man, not only the interests, but even the permanent safety of the two countries depend. Nobody can feel more sincerely for the sufferings of those manufacturers in Dublin and other parts of Ireland, who are out of employment, than we do; but surely the way to relieve those sufferings is not to attribute them to a wrong cause, and to endeavour first to aggravate the discontent arising from temporary distress, and then to convert it to the ser-

vice of some political or party purpose. “The extraordinary and unprecedented situation of Europe, owing to the capricious but relentless tyranny of the man who unfortunately rules over the greater part of it—the violent, and in many instances successful, efforts that he has made to force commerce out of its natural channels—the almost total annihilation of Commercial Capital and Credit on the Continent of Europe—the hostile regulations of the American Government—and the eagerness of speculation, by which the markets of South America were so greatly over-stocked, surely afford grounds enough to account for the recent commercial embarrassments both in Great Britain and Ireland, without recurring to the Union, a measure with which they can, by no possibility, have any connection. It might as well have been asserted by those persons in Scotland, who were partakers in the general distress in 1720, that their misfortune was occasioned by the Union between England and Scotland, which happened twelve years before. Or it might as truly now be said, that the failures in the City of London in 1810, were to be attributed to the Union between Great Britain and Ireland in 1800. We trust, however, that the good sense of the people of Ireland will see through the attempts that are made to deceive them, and that the unremitting exertions of the Irish Government will be successful in effectually relieving this temporary embarrassment.”—Now, as to the point at issue, namely, whether the Union has, or has not, been the cause of the manifold miseries which, as this writer is obliged to allow, exist in Ireland, what does he say to prove, or to make any one believe, the negative of the proposition? Numerous bodies in Ireland, consisting of intelligent and independent men, have declared that the Union is the cause of their country’s misery. And, what does this bold reproacher say to shew that that opinion is not well founded? Not a single fact, or a single argument, does he produce. He says, that “it has been studiously represented in Ireland, that its embarrassments have arisen entirely from the Union, although it is a measure, upon which, in the opinion of every rational man, the interests and the very safety of the country depend.” Thou madman! This is thy way of arguing, is it? This is thy way of proving to “the

"fashionable world" that what is going forward in Ireland is wicked, and that those who support it are leagued in hostility towards both countries? And, it is by this sort of *arguing*, is it, that you and your wise counsellors hope to answer all the able and eloquent representations of the Irish Petitioners? No: you do not hope to do this; but, you entertain the hope of being, by such means as these, able to expose them to the hatred, or to the suspicion, at least, of the people of England, who, it must be confessed, have always been but *too ready* to become the dupes of such artifices, instead of rejecting with scorn, or, at least, never believing but upon clear proof, any thing to the prejudice of their fellow-subjects in Ireland.—This assailant of the Irish Petitioners tells us, that the way to relieve the sufferings of the people of that country "is, *surely*, not to attribute them to a *wrong cause*." Very true, and, therefore, the Irish Petitioners attribute them to a *right cause*. At least, so they say, and so I shall believe, till the contrary be *shown*; and this their assailant has not attempted to do, except in a way that tends to confirm, instead of to shake, the opinions of the Petitioners. He tells us, that the miseries of Ireland do not arise from the *Union*, but, from *Napoleon's sway upon the continent of Europe* and the events growing out of it. Now, this *may* be true enough, and, in part, it *is*, I believe, true; but, then, what was the cause, and what is the cause, of Napoleon's having that sway? This is the question; and, if the Irish believe, that the Union has contributed to the creating of Napoleon's power, which, in divers ways it may, then, even upon the assertion of this writer, they are right in complaining of the effects of the Union.—But, the ground, upon which this writer goes is wholly false. The miseries of Ireland are not of a *mercantile* nature; if they were they would be *temporary*; and, if they had been of this sort, would the continent of America now be peopled with the sons and daughters of Ireland? Ireland's, if I may be allowed the expression, is a disease of the mind, or, rather, of the heart; and, whatever *may* be the way to cure her, that which is pursued by this writer and his fellow-labourers certainly is *not* the way; but, on the contrary, if any thing can make the matter worse; if any thing can add to the poignancy of that heart-corroding disease, it is the language of reproach and of accusation, which, unsus-

ported by any thing to prove the justice of it, they scruple not, upon all occasions, to assume.—We are here told, that this is "a moment when the pressure of public danger ought to call forth the exertions of every individual to secure the general safety." And, what are the means that he employs to favour this effect? Why, the accusing of a great part of the people, and of the most intelligent and active of the people of Ireland, of a desire to *embarrass the government*; to *depress the spirit of the nation*; and, in a word, "to serve the cause of our inveterate enemy." These are the means that he employs for calling forth the zealous exertions of every individual to secure the general safety.—But, here again we are presented with nothing new. It is the stale practice of seventeen years. It is, indeed, the practice pursued by all such persons in all times of our history; though never so much as of late, and never with consequences so visibly fatal.—One might, however, have hoped to see this practice, in the present circumstances, discontinued. It has been openly declared in Parliament, that there is a *French Party* in Ireland; not a few contemptible persons attached to the French; not merely a little *faction*; but a *Party*; and, upon that ground, an *Act* was passed, and is still kept in existence. And, the writer, who now thus reproaches the Irish Petitioners, has, very lately, said, that Ireland is so worked with *French conspiracies*, that an army is necessary there, though none be necessary in England. One might have hoped, then, that, under such circumstances, and especially when we see Napoleon drawing his maritime means around us, and when all the world must know, that Ireland is our vulnerable point; under such circumstances, with such a crowd of powerful motives for conciliation, one might have hoped to see every English writer carefully abstain from imputations like those which I have cited above, and which are manifestly calculated, if not intended, to cut off the possibility of all conciliation; than which it is not in my power to form an idea of any thing more odious or more wicked.

PORTUGAL.—I had something further to say upon the affairs of Ireland, which is more dear to us than all the world besides, but, perceiving an attempt, in the Morning Post of this day, to deprive us, to rob us, to steal away slyly, our army in Portugal, I could not refrain from employ-

ing the small space I have left, in crying "*stop thief*."—The attempt is as follows:—
 "The British army now in Portugal amounts to 28,000 fighting men, all in excellent health and spirits. Of these 21,000 are under the immediate command of lord Wellington, including gen. Hill's division. The remainder are at Tomar, under general Leith, with the exception of one regiment at Lisbon. Further reinforcements will soon go out from this country. The 79th and 91st have already left Cadiz for Portugal; two more regiments are to follow; and another corps is daily expected from North America; so that in a short time our force in Portugal will be very formidable. Still, however, it will be far outnumbered by that of the enemy, as appears by Massena's Proclamation, which asserts that he has under his orders 110,000 men. Thus, we need not say, will be an inrefragable authority in the eyes of the factious writers among us, who have so often stated Massena's army did not exceed 35,000 men, and that of that number, no less than 25,000 were sick. Massena's own assertion will also prove the correctness of our information, when, from other sources of intelligence, we estimated the enemy's force at 85,000 men, independent of large reinforcements, which were then pouring into Spain.—We believe the latest official advices from our army in Portugal are of the 19th ult. The French had then commenced the siege of Almeida, and lord Wellington was concentrating his forces, among other objects, with a view of compelling the French to keep in a collected body, and thus increase their difficulties as to supplies. The last private letters from our army are of the 20th. They state that lord Wellington had removed his headquarters to Alverca, and that our out-posts extended to within eight or ten miles of Pombal."—Here we catch him in the fact. What, then, do you sink our Portuguese army of 30 thousand fighting men and the 20 thousand Portuguese Militia and the 20 thousand men under Romana and others who were co-operating with our army of 60 thousand men and 20 thousand Militia in Portugal? Do you mean to sink all these, and all the numerous deserters, too, from the French army? All the hundreds and thousands of Poles and Swiss and Germans and Italians and even French, who, we were told, over and over again, had deserted?—N^o; it was

no "*faction* writer," it was your mad and "*loyal*" self, who said, and who swore, that Massena's army was wasting away with sickness and want. It was yourself who said this, and who reproached the Morning Chronicle for expressing its disbelief of your assertions. You have, for weeks past, filled your columns with accounts of the wasted state of the French army, and with whatever appeared most likely to cause the public to believe, that ours was the army of superior power. Did you not tell us, that Massena was *retreating*? Did you not tell us, that lord Talavera possessed, under Napoleon's own hand, a declaration that it was out of the power of the latter to send assistance to the former, and even that Napoleon expected lord Talavera to beat Massena? And, do you now call out against "the factious writers," who would fain make the world believe, that Massena's army is weak and sickly?—So, so! You now tell us, that, after all, our army "will be far outnumbered by the enemy." So the Morning Chronicle said, and you abused him for it, and for the conclusions that he drew therefrom; and, now you are abusing him, and any one else, who shall say, that our army is not outnumbered.—It is this be not madness, it is something a great deal worse.—But, the worst of all is, the attempt to steal off our Portuguese army of 30 thousand men; that 30 thousand men, whom we, the people of this country are paying. Oh, no: you shall not! *We have an army of 60 THOUSAND FIGHTING MEN in Portugal*, and the existence of that army, if no one else will maintain it, shall be maintained to the last by

• W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
 11th September, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.—Signed at Rio de Janeiro, the 19th of February, 1810.—(Concluded from p. 320.)

..... It is understood, that any such reduction so granted by either party to the other, shall not be granted afterwards (except upon the same terms and for the same compensation) in favour of any other state or nation what-

soever. And this declaration is to be considered as reciprocal on the part of the two high contracting parties.—XX. But as there are some articles of the growth and produce of Brazil, which are excluded from the markets and home consumption of the British dominions, such as Sugar, Coffee, and other articles similar to the produce of the British Colonies, his Britannic Majesty, willing to favour and protect (as much as possible) the Commerce of the subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, consents, and permits, that the said articles, as well as all other the growth and produce of Brazil, and all other parts of the Portuguese dominions, may be received and warehoused in all the ports of his dominions, which shall be by law appointed to be warehousing ports for those articles, for the purpose of re-exportation, under due regulation, exempted from the greater duties with which they would be charged were they destined for consumption within the British dominions, and liable only to the reduced duties and expences on warehousing and re-exportation.—XXI. In like manner, notwithstanding the general privilege of admission thus granted in the fifteenth article of the present treaty by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in favour of all goods and merchandizes, the produce and manufacture of the British dominions; his Royal Highness reserves to himself the right of imposing heavy, and even prohibitory duties on all articles known by the name of British East Indian goods and West Indian produce, such as sugar and coffee, which cannot be admitted for consumption in the Portuguese dominions, by reason of the same principle of colonial policy, which prevents the free admission into the British dominions of corresponding articles of Brazilian produce. But his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal consents that all the ports of his dominions, where there are or may be Custom Houses, shall be free ports for the reception and admission of all articles whatsoever, the produce or manufacture of the British dominions, not destined for the consumption of the place, at which they may be received or admitted, but for re-exportation, either for other ports of the dominions of Portugal, or for those of other states. And the articles thus received and admitted (subject to due regulations) shall be exempted from the duties, with which they

would be charged if destined for the consumption of the place at which they be landed or warehoused, and liable only to the same expences that may be paid by articles of Brazilian produce received and warehoused for re-exportation in the ports of his Britannic Majesty's dominions.—XXII. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in order to facilitate and encourage the legitimate commerce, not only of the subjects of Great Britain, but also of those of Portugal, with other states adjacent to his own dominions, and with a view also to augment and secure that part of his own revenue which is derived from the collection of warehousing duties upon merchandize, is pleased to declare the port of Saint Catharines to be a free port, according to the terms mentioned in the preceding article of the present treaty.—XXIII. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal being desirous to place the system of commerce announced by the present Treaty, upon the most extensive basis, is pleased to take the opportunity afforded by it, of publishing the determination pre-conceived in his Royal Highness's mind of rendering Goa a free port, and of permitting the free toleration of all Religious Sects whatever in that City and in its Dependencies.—XXIV. All trade with the Portuguese possessions situated upon the Eastern Coast of the Continent of Africa (in articles not included in the exclusive contracts possessed by the Crown of Portugal) which may have been formerly allowed to the subjects of Great Britain, is confirmed and secured to them now, and for ever, in the same manner as the trade which has hitherto been permitted to Portuguese subjects in the ports and seas of Asia confirmed and secured to them by virtue of the Sixth Article of the present Treaty.—XXV. But in order to give due effect to that system of perfect reciprocity which the two High Contracting Parties are willing to establish as the basis of their mutual relations, his Britannic Majesty consents to waive the right of creating factories or incorporated bodies of British Merchants, under any name or description whatsoever, within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal; provided, however, that this concession in favour of the wishes of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal shall not deprive the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, residing within the dominions of Portugal, of the full en-

joyment as individuals engaged in commerce, of any of those rights and privileges which they did or might possess as members of incorporated commercial bodies; and also that the commerce and trade carried on by British subjects shall not be restricted, annoyed, or otherwise affected by any commercial company whatever, possessing exclusive privileges and favours within the dominions of Portugal. And his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal does also engage, that he will not consent nor permit that any other nation or state shall possess factories or incorporated bodies of merchants within his dominions, so long as British factories shall not be established therein.—

XXVI. The two High Contracting Parties agree, that they will forthwith proceed to the revision of all other former Treaties subsisting between the two Crowns, for the purpose of ascertaining what stipulations contained in them are in the present state of affairs proper to be continued or renewed. It is agreed and declared, that the stipulations contained in former Treaties concerning the admission of the wines of Portugal on the one hand, and the woollen cloths of Great Britain on the other, shall at present remain unaltered. In the same manner it is agreed, that the favour, privileges, and immunities granted by either Contracting Party to the subjects of the other, whether by Treaty, Decree, or Alvara, shall remain unaltered, except the power granted by former Treaties, of carrying in the ships of either country goods and merchandizes of any description whatever, the property of the enemies of the other country, which power is now mutually and publicly renounced and abrogated.—XXVII. The reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation, declared and announced by the present Treaty, shall be considered to extend to all goods and merchandizes whatsoever, except those articles the property of the enemies of either power, or contraband of war.—

XXVIII. Under the name of contraband or prohibited articles shall be comprehended not only arms, cannon, harquebusses, mortars, petards, bombs, grenades, saucisses, carcasses, carriages for cannon, musket rests, bandoliers, gunpowder, match, saltpetre, ball, pikes, swords, head pieces, helmets, cuirasses, halberds, javelins, holsters, belts, horses, and their harness, but generally all other articles that may have been specified as contraband in any former Treaties concluded by Great Britain

or by Portugal with other powers. But goods which have not been wrought into the form of warlike instruments, or which cannot become such, shall not be reputed contraband; much less such as have been already wrought and made up for other purposes; all which shall be deemed not contraband, and may be freely carried by the subjects of both Sovereigns even to places belonging to an enemy, excepting only such places as are besieged, blockaded, or invested by sea or land.—

XXIX. In case any ships or vessels of war, or merchantmen, should be shipwrecked on the coasts of either of the High Contracting Parties; all such parts of the said ships or vessels, or of the furniture and appurtenances thereof, as also of goods and merchandizes as shall be saved, or the produce thereof, shall be faithfully restored upon the same being claimed by the proprietors or their factors duly authorised, paying only the expences incurred in the preservation thereof, according to the rate of salvage settled on both sides (saving at the same time the rights and customs of each nation, the abolition or modification of which shall, however, be treated upon in the cases where they shall be contrary to the stipulations of the present article;) and the High Contracting Parties will mutually interpose their authority, that such of their subjects as shall take advantage of any such misfortune, may be severely punished.—XXX.

And, for the greater security and liberty of commerce and navigation, it is further agreed, that both his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, shall not only refuse to receive any pirates or sea-rovers whatsoever into any of their havens, ports, cities, or towns, or permit any of their subjects, citizens, or inhabitants, on either part, to receive or protect them in their ports, to harbour them in their houses, or to assist them in any manner whatsoever; but further, that they shall cause all such pirates and sea-rovers, and all persons who shall receive, conceal, or assist them, to be brought to condign punishment, for a terror and example to others. And all their ships, with the goods or merchandizes taken by them, and brought into the ports belonging to either of the High Contracting Parties, shall be seized as far as they can be discovered, and shall be restored to the owners, or the factors duly authorised or deputed by them in writing, proper evidence being first given to prove the

property, even in case such effects should have passed into other hands by sale, if it be ascertained that the buyers knew or might have known that they had been piratically taken.—XXXI. For the future security of commerce and friendship between the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to the end that their mutual good understanding may be preserved from all interruption and disturbance, it is concluded and agreed, that if at any time there should arise any disagreement, breach of friendship, or rupture between the crowns of the high contracting parties, which God forbid, (which rupture shall not be deemed to exist until the recalling or sending home of the respective Ambassadors and Ministers) the subjects of each of the two parties residing in the dominions of the other, shall have the privilege of remaining and continuing their trade therein, without any manner of interruption, so long as they behave peaceably, and commit no offence against the laws and ordinances; and in case their conduct should render them suspected, and the respective governments should be obliged to order them to remove, the term of twelve months shall be allowed them for that purpose, in order that they may retire with their effects and property, whether entrusted to individuals, or to the state. At the same time it is to be understood that this favour is not to be extended to those who shall act in any manner contrary to the established laws.—XXXII. It is agreed and stipulated by the High Contracting Parties, that the present Treaty shall be unlimited in point of duration, that the obligations and conditions expressed or implied in it shall be perpetual and immutable; and they shall not be changed or affected in any manner in case his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, his heirs or successors, should again establish the seat of the Portuguese Monarchy within the European dominions of that Crown.—XXXIII. But the two high contracting parties do reserve to themselves the right of jointly examining and revising the several Articles of this Treaty at the expiration of 15 years, counted in the first instance from the date of the exchange of the Ratification thereof, and of then proposing, discussing, and making such amendments or additions, as the real interests of their respective subjects may seem to require. It

being understood that any stipulation which at the period of revision of the Treaty shall be objected to by either of the high contracting parties, shall be considered as suspended in its operation until the discussion concerning that stipulation shall be terminated, due notice being previously given to the other contracting party of the intended suspension of such stipulation, for the purpose of avoiding mutual inconvenience.—XXXIV. The several stipulations and conditions of the present Treaty shall begin to have effect from the date of his Britannic Majesty's Ratification thereof; and the mutual exchange of Ratification shall take place in the city of London within the space of four months, or sooner if possible, to be computed from the day of the signature of the present Treaty.

In Witness whereof, We the Undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of his Britannic Majesty and of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in virtue of our respective full powers, have signed the present Treaty with our hands, and have caused the seals of our arms to be set thereto.

Done in the city of Rio de Janeiro, on the nineteenth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ten.

(L. S.)

STRANFORD,

(L. S.)

CONDE DE LINHARES.

AMERICA.—*Massachusetts Legislature: Extract from the Answer of the House of Representatives to the Governor's Speech: June 11. (Concluded from p. 192.)*

..... This House ardently desires, that this state of things may be changed. And although expectation is almost destroyed, yet we cannot forbear to hope that these nations will return to a sense of justice and of duty, that they will give to this country a free enjoyment of those blessings which are her rights, and of which in a moment of lawless oppression, she has been unjustly deprived. In any event, we feel confident that under the auspices of those whom the people have selected as the depositories of their power, cemented by union and harmony, and with the benignant interposition of that providence which has heretofore been "the stability of our times, and the strength of our salvation," the destinies of this republic will rise superior to existing difficulties,

and be more firmly fixed in the affections of our citizens, and the respect of mankind."

Washington, June 11.—Don Louis de Onís, minister plenipotentiary of his Christian Majesty, Ferdinand VII. has sent the following circular officially, to the Consuls and Vice-Consuls in the different ports of the United States:—

"Under date of the 27th of April last, I am informed by the intendant of Havannah, that our king Ferdinand VII. and in his name the Regency of the kingdom, has been pleased, under the existing circumstances, to grant to neutrals and allies, admittance into the ports of Havannah, Cuba, Trinidad, and Matangas, with such articles as are stipulated in the commercial arrangement of free trade of 1778, on condition, that the proceeds of importation shall be exported in the fruits or produce of the island; causing by these means, and the same terms, an extension of the trade to the inhabitants of that island, and all the permitted ports thereof. But to prevent any contraband trade, or importation of French produce or manufactures, it will be required that such shipments should be accompanied by his Majesty's consul's certificate, in their respective ports of clearance, without which documents no vessels will be admitted an entry. I communicate this to you, in order to publish the same to such individuals or merchants within your consulate, whom it may concern, that in no instance they may allege ignorance, requesting you to give me timely notice after the execution of the same. I pray God, &c.

(Signed!) LOUIS DE ONÍS."

CARACCAS.—Royal Order of Blockade.

The following Royal Order, dated the 31st ult. and transmitted through the usual channel to the Consulate, has been published:—

"The Council of Regency no sooner received the unexpected and disagreeable intelligence of the events that have occurred in the Caraccas, the natives whereof, instigated no doubt by some intriguers and factious persons, have committed the indignity of declaring themselves independent of the mother country, and created a Junta of government which exercises the pretended independent authority, than his Majesty determined upon taking the most active and efficacious measures to attack an evil so scandalous both in its origin

and progress. But in order to proceed with that mature deliberation and circumspection, which a matter of such importance demands, his Majesty thought it proper to advise thereon with the Supreme Council of Spain and the Indies. This has accordingly been done, and such measures have consequently been adopted, as his Majesty entertains no doubt will accomplish the object in view; more particularly as, according to subsequent accounts, neither the Capital and Province of Maracabo, that of Coro, nor even the interior of Caraccas itself, have taken part in so criminal a proceeding; but on the contrary, that they have not only recognized the Council of Regency, but also, animated with the best spirit in favour of the people of the mother country, have taken the most efficacious measures to oppose the absurd idea of the Caraccas declaring themselves independent, without the means of maintaining their independence. His Majesty has, nevertheless, deemed it indispensable to declare, as he hereby declares, the Province of the Caraccas to be in a state of rigorous blockade; ordering that no vessels shall enter the ports thereof, under pain of being detained by the cruizers and vessels of his Majesty, and forbidding all Commandants and Chiefs civil or military of any of the provinces or dominions of his Majesty, to authorize vessels to proceed to La Guaiara, or to grant permits or licences to any vessel bound thereto, or to any port or creek of the said Province; and further, commanding that all vessels sailing therefrom whithersoever bound, shall be seized, detained, and confiscated; and in order to carry this measure into effect, his Majesty is forwarding a sufficient naval force to prevent any vessel from entering or departing from the ports of the said Province.

—His Majesty also directs that all the Commandants and Chiefs of the Provinces contiguous to the said Province, do obstruct the introduction therein of any description of provisions, arms, or stores, and likewise the exportation of the productions of its soil or industry; and that they exert themselves to cut off all communication with the inhabitants of the said Province. —This royal resolution does not extend to such Provinces of that Captain-generalship as, declining to follow the pernicious example of that of the Caraccas, have manifested their constant fidelity, by renouncing the project of rebellion, which has solely originated in the unbounded

ambition of some of the inhabitants, and the blind credulity of the rest, in suffering themselves to be hurried away by the inflamed passions of their fellow-countrymen. His Majesty has taken the proper means for the complete extirpation of these evils, and chastising the authors thereof with all the rigour which the rights of sovereignty authorise him to exercise, if they do not previously make a voluntary submission; in which case his Majesty grants them a general pardon.—His Majesty orders that these dispositions be circulated in his dominions for the purpose of being carried into effect, and also in foreign parts, that they may conform themselves to the measures adopted for the blockade of the above mentioned coasts; and by order of his Majesty I transmit the same to your Honour for your information," &c.

SICILY.—*Official Note of the Council of Regency of the Kingdoms of Spain and the Indies, to the Chevalier Robertone, Charge d'Affaires of his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies. Dated Cadix, July 19, 1810.*

The Council of Regency of the kingdoms of Spain and the Indies, to whom I have communicated the Note which I had the honour of receiving from you, under date of the 6th inst. feels the greatest concern, that an affair, (the nature of which never should have produced any effect contrary to the good opinion and unalterable attachment which the august Queen of the Two Sicilies most justly possesses to the good cause, to the great sacrifices she made in its support, and to the known firmness of her character and principles) could ever give rise to the slightest motive in some members of the British Parliament, for entertaining any doubts of the continuation of the system, to which the Court of the Two Sicilies has invariably adhered.—A small degree of reflection, as to the authenticity of the supposed letter written by Napoleon to the Queen of the Two Sicilies, will necessarily shew, that even in case of its being authentic, it is very improbable that he ever should have entrusted any one with a copy for the sake of having it published, and still less that it should fall into the hands of a woman writing to her husband or lover in Spain. Besides, how is it possible that Napoleon

should have made use of the language contained in this letter in addressing himself to a Queen, whose principles are entirely opposed to his, and whose hatred to his person could not have been manifested in a stronger manner, since he usurped the French throne, a throne stained with the blood of so many illustrious victims, among whom was her Majesty's own sister?—The Council of Regency have looked upon this letter as spurious from the very first moment it came to their knowledge through the Badajoz Diary, and the circumstance of its not having been permitted to appear in the Gazette of Government proves the truth of this.—Could his Majesty (the Council of Regency) have imagined that such a production could have been productive of the least alteration towards the Court of the Two Sicilies in the British Parliament, or in the minds of the British Ministry, he would have ordered the publication of some Paper demonstrating the slender foundation of the letter in question, and would moreover have adopted other measures, which he might have thought proper, to discredit it. His Majesty is, however, fully convinced, that the English Cabinet is too well informed, and possesses too much sagacity, to be misled by so improbable a letter, or that it could occasion the least alteration in the opinion hitherto entertained of the inviolable principles of the Court of the Two Sicilies. Your mind ought, therefore, to be perfectly at ease as to this point.—Those who, under the supposed restriction of the press, argue that from the very circumstance of this letter being printed in Spain, it must be genuine, are but ill-informed of the actual state of the Peninsula in this respect. True it is, that the liberty of the press is not authorised by law, nor expressly permitted by Government; but, notwithstanding this, there exists an equivalent toleration; particularly the Diary of Badajoz, which, being printed under no authority, uses much liberty in every thing it writes.—On the other hand, no original can be traced to which recourse might be had; and whatever the letter of Madame Beuret Cellerier may be, such as it is, it cannot be noticed, and still less the copy included of the supposed letter to Napoleon, this lady not being known.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"But, Gentlemen, there are men, who entertain very different opinions of the Liberty of the Press; that this Liberty is to be all on one side. In Russia, Gentlemen, there is great Liberty of the Press, provided you publish nothing but praise on the good Empress."—ERSKINE'S Defence of PAINE, 1792.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER IV.

Schemes for paying off the National Debt—Former Sinking Funds—Origin of Pitt's Grand Sinking Fund—Changes made by Pitt's sway in the state of this country—Grand Sinking Fund Act—Purposes of it—The Commissioners and their manner of proceeding—How they would buy up Grizzle Greenhorn's share of the Debt—What redemption means—Commissioners step into Grizzle's shoes—We still are taxed for the interest—Evils of the Grand Sinking Fund—What would be really redeeming—American mode of Redeeming—Statement of the increase of the interest on the Debt—Clause in Pitt's Grand Sinking Fund Act for ceasing to pay interest, in 1808, upon Stock bought up.

Gentlemen,

Our next business is to inform ourselves correctly with respect to the Schemes, which, at different times, have been on foot for PAYING OFF THE NATIONAL DEBT, and about which *paying off* we have, all our lives long, heard so much.

We have seen how the Debt has gone on increasing from its first existence to the present day; we have seen how the Expences of the nation and the Taxes of the nation have gone on increasing with the debt; we have also seen that the increase of the Bank-Notes has kept pace with the rest, till those notes have, at last, *driven the gold coin out of circulation*. This last is the evil, for which the Bullion Committee have endeavoured to find out a remedy, and such a remedy they appear to think

that they have found, in an Act of Parliament which they propose to be passed for causing the Bank Company to pay their promissory notes in gold and silver in two years' time. One of our principal objects, in this discussion, is, to enable ourselves to form a correct opinion as to the *practicability of this remedy*, even at the end of two years; and, as we have, from what has already been shown, good reason to believe, that the quantity of bank notes, the excess of which has driven the gold out of circulation, cannot be lessened unless the Debt be also diminished, it is necessary for us to ascertain what has been done or attempted, and what is likely to be done, in the way of causing such diminution.

From very early stages of the Debt; indeed, almost from the very beginning of it, there were measures proposed for *paying it off*, the idea of an everlasting Debt, and an everlasting mortgage upon the nation's means, being at first, something too frightful for our upright and sensible ancestors to bear. Propositions, and even provisions, were at different times accordingly made for paying off parts of the Debt, and some comparatively small sums were, in the early stages of the progress, actually paid off; the Debt became less, and less interest was, of course, paid upon it. Still, however, as *new wars* came on, new sums were borrowed; and, as lending money to the government was found to be a profitable trade; as so many persons of influence found their advantage in the loaning transactions, the money was always easily enough raised. But, yet there continued to be a talk of *paying off* the Debt; and, in time, a part of the yearly taxes were set aside for that purpose, which part of the taxes so set aside was called a SINKING FUND.

• These being words, which, as belonging to our present subject, are of vast importance, it is necessary for us to have a clear notion of their meaning. The word *fund*, as was before observed in Letter II, page

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201, means a quantity of money put together for any purpose; and, in the instance before us, the word *Sinking* appears to have been prefixed to the word Fund in order to characterize, or describe, the particular purpose, or use, of the taxes so set apart; namely, to the purpose of *sinking*, or *reducing*, or *diminishing*, or *lessening*, the Debt. So that the *Sinking Fund*, of which we have all heard so much, and of which most of us have known so little, means, in other words, in words better to be understood, a *Lessening Fund*, and whether the thing has, in its operation, hitherto, answered to its name, we shall by-and-by see, if, indeed, we have not seen enough to satisfy us upon this point in the increase of the Debt, as exhibited in the foregoing Letter.

The amount of taxes thus set apart, or, to use the words with which we must now grow familiar, the *Sinking Funds*, which were, time after time, established, were in many cases, applied to other purposes than that for which they were destined, or intended. Indeed, they seem, for many years, to have been very little better than purses made up at one time and spent again at another, without answering any rational purpose at all; and, accordingly, the nation does not appear to have paid any great attention to them, or to have considered them as of any consequence, until the year 1786, when the present GRAND SINKING FUND was established by PITT, who, but a little while before, had been made Prime Minister, and whose system has continued to this day.

Gentlemen, we are now entering upon a part of our subject, which not only demands an uncommon portion of your attention, but, into the discussion of which you will, I hope, carry such a spirit of impartiality as shall subdue all the prejudices of party and dissipate all the mists of ignorance which have therefrom arisen. It is, even yet, impossible to mention the name of PITT, without exciting feelings that struggle hard against reason, and that, in some minds, overcome it. During his administration, the nation was divided into two parties, so hostile to each other, that both were easily made subservient to his views; and, it is, with every man who really loves his country, matter of deep regret, that the same, or nearly the same, divisions continue to the present day.

It is not for me, who at one time, really

looked upon PITT as the greatest minister that England ever saw, to reproach others, who may still be as ignorant of the truth as I was then, for their attachment to his memory, for their high opinion of the schemes of his inventing, and for their blind adoration of those schemes; but when they have, as I have, taken a fair and full view of all his measures; when they have compared his deeds with his professions, his performances with his promises; when they have seen, that he added threefold to our Taxes and our Expenditure, and that, notwithstanding this, the power and the territory of France were extended in proportion to the sacrifices he called upon us to make for what he called resisting her; when they see, that that standard of national misery, the poor-rates, rose, during his sway, in almost a triple degree; when they see, that the war at the outset of which he relied, in no small degree, for success upon the *destruction of French assignats*, did, at the end of four years, cause the stoppage of gold and silver payments at the Bank of England, and that its prolongation has led to a state of things, in which a public print, devoted to the government, has described the largest class of *English bank-notes* as "*destructive assignats*;" when they see this, and when they see, that, the National Debt, which he himself called "*the best ally of France*;" when they see, that that Debt, which he found at 200 millions and odd, he left at 600 millions and odd, while France, during his wars against her, had exchanged her assignats for gold, and had extended her territory and her sway to a degree which made that nation, whose power our forefathers despised, an object of continual dread to England; when the former partisans of PITT see this, as they must, aye, and feel it too, will they still persist in asserting the wisdom of his plans; and, above all, will they, when they see the Debt tripling in amount under his hands, still persist in asserting the efficacy of his *Sinking Fund*, and, upon that bare assertion, reject all inquiry into either the nature or the effect of that celebrated scheme?

Let us hope, that, in a country boasting of the thoughtfulness of its people, there can be but very few persons so besotted as this; and, indeed, it is due to the country to say, that there do not appear to be any such left, excepting amongst those who live upon the taxes, and whose perverse-

ness arises not from their want of information. But, be this as it may, I am satisfied that you, my Friends and Neighbours, who like me, have no interests separate from those of our country, will not, whatever may have been your prejudices heretofore, wilfully shut your eyes against the truth; and that you will accompany me in this inquiry with that great attention, which, as I before observed, the subject demands.

Pitt's *Sinking Fund* was begun in the year 1786, by an Act of Parliament (being Chapter XXXI of the 26th year of the reign of George III) entitled "*An Act for vesting certain sums in Commissioners, at the end of every Quarter of a Year, to be by them applied to the Reduction of the National Debt.*" In virtue of this Act, a certain part of the taxes was, in each year, to be paid to certain persons, named in the Act, as Commissioners for managing the concern; and, these taxes together with the accumulations upon them, have been, as formerly, called a *Sinking Fund*.

It is no matter what was the *amount* of the sum, or sums, of money, thus to be set apart out of the taxes, and to introduce particulars of that sort would only embarrass our view. Suffice it to know, that certain sums of money, being a part of the taxes, were set apart, and that, with this money, together with its growing interest, the Commissioners, appointed by the Sinking-Fund-Act, were, at stated periods, and with certain limitations in their powers, to *redeem* the Debt as fast as they could, the word *redeem* having now come into fashion instead of the word *pay off*. It is of no consequence what were the periods, what were the days of the week or the times of the moon, when this work of redemption was to be performed. The *effect* is what we have to look after; but, in order to have a clear view of even that, we must see the *manner* of doing the thing, the manner of redeeming or paying off the Debt; for, without that, we shall be continually exposed to be bewildered and deceived; and, indeed, we shall be quite unable to form any thing like a clear notion of what the Sinking Fund really is.

The Commissioners, with the money thus put under their care and management, were to *purchase up stock* from indi-

viduals, which stock would then become *the property of the nation*. But, stay. We must go gently on here, or we lose ourselves in a moment. We must, indeed, not proceed a step further, till we have gone back to Letter II, at pages 293, 294, 295, and have taken another look, and refreshed our memories as to what STOCK means. Having done so, and read on to the end of the first paragraph in page 296, we may proceed by repeating, that the Commissioners were to go to work with the money lodged in their hands, out of the taxes, and *purchase up Stock*. We have seen, in the pages just referred to, *how Stock is made*; we have seen how Muckworm lent his money to the government; we have seen how he got *his name written in a book* in return for his money; we have seen that Stock is nothing that can be seen, heard, smelled, or touched; we have seen that it signifies the *right of receiving interest* upon money lent to the government, which money has been long ago expended; we have seen the operation by which Muckworm became possessed of stock; and, lastly, we have seen our neighbour, FARMER GREENHORN, purchase two thousand pounds worth of Muckworm's stock, which the former bequeathed to his poor daughter GRIZZLE.

Now, then, observe, the whole of the Stock, of which the National Debt is made up, is exactly the same sort of thing as this two thousand pounds worth of Stock, belonging to Grizzle Greenhorn. There is a *book*, in which a list of the names of all those persons is written, who have, like Grizzle, a right to draw interest from the government out of the taxes; against each name in this list is placed the amount of the sum for which the person has a right to draw interest. Some have a right to draw interest for more and some for less. And these sums make up what is called the National Debt. Of course, the Sinking Fund Commissioners, in order to pay-off the National Debt, or any part of it, must *purchase up Stock from individuals*; or, in other words, *pay them off their share of the Debt*. If, for instance, Grizzle Greenhorn has a mind to have her two thousand pounds to lay out upon land, or to do any thing else with, she sells her stock, and, if it so happen, she may sell it to the Commissioners; and thus, as they pay her for it with the nation's money, it is said, that, by this

transaction, they have *redeemed* (by which I should mean *paid off*) two thousand pounds of the National Debt. Grizzle, who was the creditor, has got her money again; she has no longer any right to draw interest for it; and, of course, you would think, that these two thousand pounds worth of debt were paid off; and that the nation, that we the people, had no longer any interest to pay upon it; you would naturally think, that we were no longer *taxed to pay the interest upon this part of the Debt*.

Greatly, however, would you be deceived; cruelly deceived, if you did think so; for, notwithstanding the Commissioners have *redeemed* these two thousand pounds, we have still to pay the interest of them every year; *we are still taxed for the money wherewith to pay this interest, just in the same way as if the two thousand pounds worth of Debt had not been redeemed at all, but still belonged to Grizzle Greenhorn*. 'This is an odd way of redeeming; an odd way of *paying off*: do you not think it is, Neighbours? We have before seen, that the National Debt is a *mortgage* upon the taxes. It is constantly called so in conversation, and in writings upon the subject. But, should not either of you, who happened to have a mortgage upon your land or house, think it strange if, after you had *redeemed* a part of the mortgage, you had still to pay interest upon the part redeemed as well as upon the part unredeemed? TO REDEEM, as applied to money engagements, means to *discharge, to set free* by payment. 'This is the meaning of the word *redeem*, as applied to such matters. It sometimes means to *rescue* or to *ransom*, from captivity, from forfeiture, or from peril of any sort, by paying a price. But, in every sense, in which this word is used, it always implies the *setting free* of the object on which it operates; and, when applied to a mortgage, a bond, a note of hand, or a Debt of any sort, it implies the *paying of it off*. Now, then, can the two thousand pounds *worth of Debt*, purchased from Grizzle Greenhorn, by our Sinking-Fund Commissioners, be said to be redeemed by us, if we are *still taxed to pay the interest upon it*, and, of course, if it be not discharged, and not set free?

Nothing, at first sight, appears more plausible, nothing more reasonable, nothing more clear, than the mode above-

described, of redeeming the Debt by purchasing from the several individuals, who, like Grizzle Greenhorn, own the Stock or the Debt, their respective shares thereof. And, the operation is as simple as any thing can be. For, the Sinking-Fund Commissioners, having, for instance, received two thousand pounds from the Taxgatherers, in virtue of the Sinking-Fund Act, go and purchase Grizzle's stock; they give her the two thousand pounds; her right to draw interest from us ceases; her share of the Stock or Debt is redeemed or paid off; *and her name is crossed out of the Book*. Ah; but, alas! *the names of our Sinking-Fund Commissioners are written in the Book instead of hers*! Aye; we have to pay the interest of the two thousand pounds to *them* instead of to her; and, our taxes on account of this which is called the *redeemed* part of the Debt, are just as great as they were before this curious work of redemption began.

"Well, then," you will say, "what does this thing mean; and what can it have been intended for?" Why, to speak candidly of the matter, though the thing was an invention of PITT, under whose sway so much mischief came upon this nation, I believe, that the thing was well meant. I believe that it was intended to free the nation from its Debt. But, I am satisfied, that it has been productive of no small part of the evils, which England and which Europe have experienced since its invention; for, by giving people renewed confidence in the solidity of the Funds or Stocks, it rendered government borrowing more easy; and, of course, it took from the Minister that check to the making of wars and the paying of foreign armies, for the want of which check the Expences and Taxes and Debt of the country have been so fearfully augmented, to say nothing, at present, about the dreadful changes which those wars have made in our affairs both at home and abroad.

To produce such effects was, however, certainly not the *intention* of the scheme. The intention was, that the Sinking-Fund Commissioners should, with the money put into their hands out of the taxes, purchase up Stock, or parts of the Debt, belonging to individuals; that the parts, so purchased up, *should not cease to exist*; that they should be written in the Great Book under the name of the Commissioners; that the Commissioners should receive the

interest upon them, instead of its being received by individuals as before; that this interest, as fast as it came into the hands of the Commissioners, should, like the money paid to them annually out of the taxes, be laid out in purchasing up more stock from individuals; and that the thing should go on thus, till the *last* of the Stock, or Debt, got into the hands of Commissioners; when, of course, the government might burn the Great Book, and the National Debt would be paid off.

This scheme was very pretty upon paper; it made a fine figure in the newspapers and pamphlets of the day; and looked quite solemn when embodied into an Act of Parliament. There was, to be sure, when people looked into the matter more closely, something rather whimsical in the idea of a nation's *paying interest to itself*; something very whimsical in a nation's *GETTING MONEY by paying itself interest upon its own Stock*. Many persons thought so, at the time, and some said so; but the formidable tables of figures made out by court calculators, and the flowery and bold speeches of PITT, soon put all such persons out of countenance, and reduced them to silence; or exposed them to the charge of faction and disaffection and disloyalty. The country, infatuated with its "Heaven-born Minister," became deaf to the dictates of common sense; and, with as much fondness as the mother hangs over her smiling babe, it cherished and fostered the fatal delusion.

As the execution of the Sinking-Fund Act proceeded, more and more of the Stock, or parts of the Debt, became of course entered in the Great Book in the names of the Commissioners. Hence arose a new denomination in our national money accounts; namely, the *redeemed* debt; that is, the parts of the debt, as aforesaid purchased up by the Commissioners, was now called the "*redeemed* debt;" a phrase which contains a contradiction in itself. But, still it was unavoidable; for, it was not *paid off*; it was *bought up*, but we had still, and *have* still, to *pay interest upon it*; and, therefore, it could not be said to be *paid off*; for, it would be folly too gross to pretend that we had paid off a debt or a mortgage, for which we were still paying interest. If, indeed, the parts of the debt, which were purchased up by the Commissioners, had been, at once, done away, and we had *ceased to pay interest upon them*,

then those parts would have been *really redeemed*. If, for instance, Grizzle Greenhorn's two thousand pounds worth of Stock had been crossed out of the Great Book, and had not been inserted in it again under any other name, that two thousand pounds worth of the debt would have been redeemed in reality. This is the way in which the Sinking Fund of the American States operates. They raise yearly a certain sum in taxes; with that sum they purchase up part of their debt; and then that part of the debt *ceases to exist* in any shape whatever. The next year they raise a like sum in taxes, and again purchase up parcels of the debt. And, thus they proceed, having every succeeding year, *less and less interest to pay upon their debt*. This is *real* redemption: this is *real* paying off. But, the way in which we proceed bears no resemblance to it; nor has any thing in common with it, except it be the *name*.

Let us, before we proceed any further, take a view of the *increase of the interest that we have to pay upon the debt*. We have seen in Letter III, page 324, how the debt itself has gone on increasing. But, we have not yet taken a look at the increase of the INTEREST; though this is very material, and, indeed, it is the only thing, belonging to the debt, worthy of our attention. The statement of the amount of the debt itself is of no practical use, except as it serves to illustrate, to render more clear, the part of the subject upon which we now are. For as we have seen, the Debt is nothing more than a right possessed by certain persons, called *Stock-Holders*, to draw interest from the nation; or, in other words, to take annually, or quarterly, part of the taxes raised upon the people at large. Let us, therefore, take a look at the progress of this interest.

When QUEEN ANNE came to the throne, in 1701,	
the annual interest on the National Debt was	£.1,310,942
When GEORGE I. came to the throne, in 1714	3,351,358
When GEORGE II. came to the throne, in 1727	2,217,551
When GEORGE III. came to the throne, in 1760	4,840,821
After the AMERICAN WAR, in 1784, and just before the making of Pitt's Sinking Fund	9,669,635

At the latter end of the
ANTI-JACOBIN WAR, in
1801 21,778,018
For the LAST YEAR, that is
1809 32,870,608

There are included in this sum "*charges for management*," and, as we have before seen, there is some of the Debt (small portions) called the loans, or debts, of the *Emperor of Germany*, and of the *Prince Regent of Portugal*, which, it is possible, they may repay us; but, this is, as it is called in the account laid before Parliament, during the last session, the "Total charge on account of Debt, payable in Great Britain." And, let me ask any sensible man, what consequence it can be to us, what the Debt is called; what consequence by what name the different sorts of it may go, so that the interest upon it still goes on increasing, and so that we have to pay the whole of that interest out of the taxes?

When PITT's Sinking Fund was established, there was a time fixed, when the interest should *begin to be diminished*. I mean, a time was fixed, when the people should no longer pay taxes to defray the interest upon the Stock, or parts of the Debt, which should *after that time be purchased up by the Commissioners*. The time so fixed was 1808, *two years ago*. The year was not named in the Act; but, it was known to a certainty; because this ceasing to pay interest was to begin, when the interest upon the Stock, or parts of the Debt, bought up, together with the sums paid to the Commissioners out of the taxes, should amount to a certain sum (four millions annually); and, as the sums to be paid to them were fixed, it was a mere question of arithmetic when the paying of interest would cease, agreeably to the terms of the Act; as expressed in the XXth clause, as follows: "And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that whenever the whole sum annually receivable by the said Commissioners, including as well the quarterly sum of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds herein before directed to be issued from the Exchequer, as the several Annuities and Dividends of Stock to be placed to the Account of the said Commissioners in the Books of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, by virtue of this Act, shall amount in the whole to FOUR MILLIONS ANNUALLY, the Divi-

dends due on such Part of the Principal or Capital Stock as shall *thenceforth* be paid off by the said Commissioners, and the Monies payable on such Annuities for Lives or Years as may *afterwards* cease and determine, SHALL NO LONGER BE ISSUED AT THE RECEIPT OF HIS MAJESTY'S EXCHEQUER, but shall be CONSIDERED AS REDEEMED by Parliament, and shall remain to be disposed of as Parliament shall direct." In *what way* it might have been supposed, that Parliament, in its wisdom, would *dispose* of these parcels of *redeemed debt*, I shall not, for my part presume to hazard a conjecture; but, as was before observed, it was easy (the sums being given) to ascertain the time, when the provision in this clause would begin to operate; and, that time was, the year 1808.

There was another Act, passed seven years later, (1792), allotting more of the taxes to the same purpose (Chapter 52 of the 32nd year of this king's reign); and still the same provision was made; namely, that, when the produce of the Sinking Fund should amount to 4 millions annually, *all the Stock, or parts of the Debt, that should be purchased up by the Commissioners after that time, SHOULD NO LONGER HAVE INTEREST PAID UPON IT OUT OF THE TAXES*; but that *these parts* of the Debt should (mark the words!) "*be considered AS REDEEMED*." And so they would. They really, in *that case*, would have been redeemed; but the word *redeemed* is now applied, even in the Accounts laid before Parliament, to those parts of the Debt, bought up by the Commissioners, the dividend, or interest, on which parts, IS STILL ISSUED AT THE EXCHEQUER; that is to say, *is still paid out of the taxes*! And all this goes on amongst "*the thinking*" people of England!

But, what was done, in the long-expected year 1808? What was done, when the year of promise came? This is the most interesting part of this most curious history; but, as to bring to a close the whole of the discussion, relating to the Sinking Fund, would extend this letter to double its present length, I think it better to make the remaining part of it the subject of another Letter, beseeching you, in the meanwhile, to make up, by your patience in the perusal, for whatever want

of clearness may be discovered in the writer.

I remain, Gentlemen,
Your faithful friend,
WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,
September 14, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.—Some little while ago, there was published in the London news-papers, an edict, or decree, of the Emperor of France, relating to THE PRESS, according to which decree, the number of Provincial Newspapers was limited to one in each Province, or Department; and, all these country papers, as well, I believe, as those in Paris, were, according to this decree, to be subjected to the *previous inspection* of the Prefect of the Police, who is a sort of *hired Justice of Peace, or Police Magistrate*, appointed by, and *removable at the will of, the government*. Nothing, according to this decree, was to be published, *unless it had the approbation of this person*. This is what has been called an Imprimatur.—The Morning Post news-paper, in speaking of this, and in holding it up to the observation of its readers, after calling Buonaparté “a base, “vile, upstart, tyrannical, insolent miscreant “and monster;” after having addressed this to the “*fashionable World*” of England, for whose amusement and instruction this polite paper is published; after this, and a great deal more abuse of the same sort, the Morning Post asks, “how such a decree “would be relished in England.”—To which I, for my part, answer, that it would not be relished at all by me; but, that prudence will restrain me from bestowing any hard names upon the author of it, or upon the motives whence it proceeded, when I recollect that a law, or regulation, of nearly the same amount, exists, or did lately exist, in the *East Indies*; or, to adopt the “*fashionable World’s*” phrase, in “*Our Eastern Empire*.” I recollect sending out some books, under the care of a friend, in the year 1802 (I think it was) to be sold at Calcutta. An advertisement of them was prepared for the news-paper at that place and actually inserted; but, two of them being of a *political* nature, the person who inspected the press, crossed them out, thereby, of course, *preventing them from being advertised*. And what works, reader, do you think these might be? No other than *Lord Grenville’s Speech*

on the Convention with the Northern Powers; and Mr. Windham’s Speech on the Peace of Amiens! I remember this; and, remembering it, I have not the face to bestow hard names; to call “*tyrant and monster* “and *miscreant*,” the ruler, who, in another country, has made a similar regulation.—Such a regulation might, for ought I can pretend to say, be *necessary* in the East Indies. It might, as according with our colonial system, be *very proper*. And, there may possibly be persons able to discover reasons why such a regulation is not equally proper in France. To such persons I leave the drawing of the distinction. But, again I say, that, while I remember the fact that I have stated, I shall not presume to bestow the names of “*tyrant, monster, and miscreant*,” upon him who has adopted such a regulation in any part of the world.—But, after all, what harm has this decree done to the Press in France? In what way has it abridged its liberty? It can now say what it pleases *on one side*; it can say what it pleases *in praise of the government* without any fear of prosecution, or even of reproof; if there were any blunders, any ruinous projects, to applaud, it might *applaud them* freely; it may *attack the opponents of the government*, though I am not sure that the Police Magistrates in France would not have too much sense of decency to permit, in such cases, the use of language which would disgrace the lips of poisoners, and which must inevitably tend to defeat its own purpose. The French press may *do this now*; and, unless it was foolishly belied, this was all that it could *safely* do before. The French press has still all the liberty described in the words of my motto, the author of which motto was, at the memorable time to which it refers us, stigmatized almost as a *traitor*, because he, in the way of his profession, took upon him the legal defence of the use which his client had made of the press.—I certainly should not like to be subjected to a law, or rule, like that said now to exist in France; nor should I be, in the smallest degree, reconciled to it by being told, that the French press is still as free as any other press upon the continent of Europe; because nothing will ever satisfy me short of the liberty of writing and publishing whatever I can prove to be true, subject to the payment of *damages*, perhaps, for any *real injury*, that I may do by *maliciously* publishing even truth respecting private persons and respecting

matters in which the *public* can have no interest. I am not *decidedly* of opinion, that, even in such cases, the publication of *truth* should subject the party to any sort of punishment. To publish *truth maliciously* is, like all private scandal, a *moral offence*; but, I am not decided, that it ought to be, in any way, punishable by law; because such law, explain it how you will, is still a *law against truth*.—In the proceedings upon the trial of JOHN PETER ZWINGER, in the State of New York, while that State was under the crown of England, is contained in my view of the matter, the true doctrine of the liberty of the press. His advocate, a Mr. Hamilton from Philadelphia, contended, that to be punishable in any way, the thing published must be *false*; and, upon this ground ZWINGER, to the great honour of the State, was acquitted. In most of the American States the other principle has been acted upon, and, in many cases, most shamefully stretched; but, in the State of New York, the spirit of freedom, as to the press, has always been alive; and, since I left America, an Act of that State, has, I hear, been passed, expressly declaring, that, in *all* cases of libel, the *truth* shall be given in evidence, and, if established, shall be admitted as a complete *justification*; which, indeed, seems nothing more than to say, that the law shall not set its face against *truth*.—Nothing will ever satisfy me short of this, and, therefore, I stood in no need of having read MILTON's famous argument against an Imprimatur, to make me dislike a regulation, such as that now adopted in France. But, still, I say, that to live under this regulation is far preferable to that of living under a system of "*liberty* of the press," such as that described in my motto, where the "*liberty*" is all on "*one side*;" and, bad as the regulation in question is, in many respects, it is not half so mischievous nor half so *degrading* to the nation and to those who use the press in particular, as would be a thing called the "*liberty* of the press," but, in fact, a *mode of deceiving* by the press, such as one may easily suppose possible to exist in a country like France. —Suppose, for instance, Napoleon were to die, and the government were again to assume a sort of mixty-maxty form under the name of Republic, or, no matter what; and that a set of *mercenary, mean, malignant* men were to get hold of the reins of government; such men, possessing no-

thing but what they had plundered from the public, having no weight either of family or of character, conscious that they must be despised by all men of talents and hated by all the rest of the nation for their oppressions, seeing the necessity of stifling the voice of free discussion, and yet too cowardly to make an open and avowed attack upon the press; such men, under the hypocritical pretence of suffering a free press; would, in all likelihood, take off Napoleon's Imprimatur, would repeal his decree, but would take care, by the means of chicane, to stifle, or, at least, nearly stifle, every part of the press, not devoted to themselves.—Therefore, though I very much disapprove of Napoleon's decree, and never wish to live under the operation of such a decree, I can conceive a state of things infinitely worse; infinitely more hostile to TRUTH, and, of course, more hostile to public virtue, to all virtue, to all honour, to every good feeling of the heart, and, of course, to the *freedom and happiness of the people at large*.

DESERTIONS FROM THE ARMIES.—

There have, as the reader must have seen, been constant endeavours made of late, to excite a belief, that the armies of Napoleon, serving in Spain and Portugal, have been greatly *wasted by desertion*; and, indeed, that the armies are become *greatly disaffected towards him*. Would it were so! But, there is great mischief in encouraging the belief, if the fact be *untrue*; because, in such case, that belief must end in disappointment, and every disappointment is productive of a want of confidence in future. To encourage the entertaining of hopes that have no foundation, in whatever way this may be done, whether by falshood in words, or in effect, comes under the moralist's definition of *lying* or *criminal falshood*, one of the consequences of which always is, to destroy, or to weaken, future confidence.—In consequence of some statements made in one of our principal daily prints, THE TIMES, and one of our prints which is certainly conducted with the greatest degree of ability as well as of candour; in consequence of some statements made in this print, relative to the prospect of affairs in Spain and Portugal, into which statements were introduced some remarks respecting the alledged *great desertions* from, and disaffection in, the French armies, and also relative to the comparative *valour* of the soldiers of the

two nations; in consequence of these statements, the MONITEUR, of a date not many days after, put forth the commentary which will be found inserted, together with the statement of THE TIMES, immediately after this Summary.—Here the reader will hear both sides; and, if he divests his mind of all *desire to be duped*, of all the “*fashionable world's*” polite taste for deception, he will very easily, as he proceeds, brush aside the exaggeration and falshood, and cull out the truth, without any assistance from me, or from any one else.—A remark or two, however, I must offer upon what the print of the “*fashionable world*” has said upon the subject.—In the first place, with a degree of ridiculousness hardly to be supposed possible, it ascribes this long commentary to Napoleon's *own pen*, and, not seeming to think that its readers will not doubt the fact, it goes on in its remarks accordingly, actually appearing to look upon itself as engaged in a literary controversy with him, who, unfortunately, is the ruler of all Europe, these islands excepted! To conceit themselves the equals of kings and emperors has, in all ages, I believe, been amongst the most prominent and most certain symptoms of the unhappy malady of madmen.—Having, thus without the least ceremony, got into a personal dispute with Napoleon, this editor, whose time is devoted to the entertainment and instruction of “the *fashionable world*,” sets on upon his work of *answering* Napoleon with calling him all manner of bad names; and having decked him out as “a *vile, base, savage, loathsome, cruel, infamous, upstart tyrant*,” he answers the assertions, which he ascribes to him, by telling him, that “he is a *liar*.”—Such is the language of the instructor of our “*fashionable world*; upon which language we will stop here and make a remark or two.—Some character in some play that I have read, exclaims: “Oh! “for a *curse to kill with!*” Whatever one may think of the *charity* or the *manliness* of this wish, there is certainly some *sense* in it. It is not *nonsense*. And, if the Morning Post could *kill*, or even *wound*; if it could *destroy* or *enfeeble*, our great and mortal enemy by its abuse, and if that abuse, like the *stink-pots* used of old, were efficacious in proportion to its quantity, we might wish this editor success, though we declined, even with such an end in view, to participate in his labours. But, when we reflect, that it is impossible that

this abuse should do any harm to Napoleon; that it should do any good to our cause; that it may do that cause much and lasting injury; and, which is a consideration that ought to have peculiar weight, that it may tend to *render worse the lot of our unfortunate countrymen, who are captives in France*, where shall we find words to express our reprobation of this abuse?—This writer and his fellow-labourers take as an admitted fact, that *Napoleon reads their productions*. Either they believe what they say, or they do not. If the latter, I need not characterize them: and, if the former, can they suppose that their writings must not tend to irritate him against every thing that is English; especially when they, at the same time, charge him with being under the domination of passion, and addicted to every species of vindictiveness and barbarity?—Let those of “the *fashionable world*,” who have kindred and friends in the power of Napoleon, reflect a little, then, upon the possible consequences of being the patrons and patronesses of this self-degrading and mischievous abuse.—To return to the controversy with the MONITEUR, the point upon which our editor for the polite world gives the French print the “*lie direct*,” is, the *enlistment of English captive soldiers into the armies of France*. The *Moniteur*, as will be seen by a reference to the close of the article taken from it, asserts, that some thousands of our men, who were prisoners of war in France, have actually enlisted into the French Army. To *disprove* this the “*fashionable world's*” print calls the *Moniteur* “a *liar*,” as (the reader will see) the *Moniteur* had called the *Courier*.—But, though there is little difference here in point of language, there is a good deal, I am afraid, in point of fact; for, the assertion of the *Courier* appears to have been wholly false; totally destitute of truth; a pure invention; while, there is but too much reason to fear, that the “*lie*” has been given to the *Moniteur*, with, at least, *no certainty* of its having asserted a *falshood*; and even with *some reason* to suppose that its assertion was *true*. For, in the month of November last, there was published in the *Morning Chronicle*, a letter from a Gentleman just returned from France, the author of which letter was said to be known to the editor, the veracity of which letter the editor answered for, and which letter contained the following passage:—

"They treat our prisoners with uncommon cruelty; thumb-screwed, a chain round their necks and bodies, conducted from brigade to brigade; nothing but bread, no wine, no beer, no meat, oftentimes without straw, and put into dungeons full of water! chained often with galley slaves or other criminals. This severity has forced many to enter into their service; 600 already clothed and armed, passed through Meaux for Bayonne. They swore to me they would desert; above 30 had. I am sure, poor fellows, they entered into the service with no other view than running away; but, alas! I fear they will never succeed."—At the time when this letter was published, I did not, I must confess, believe the statement. I thought, that Mr. PERRY had been imposed upon by some person, whose sufferings and ill-treatment in France had greatly exasperated him against the government of that country. But, upon hearing since *who the writer of the letter was*, a gentleman whose word, as to a fact that *came under his own eyes*, one cannot doubt, I have altered my opinion; and am afraid that what the Moniteur asserts upon this subject is but too true.—Here, then, is fresh reason for us to be upon our guard against deception; against those, who, if they were hired to deceive the people, could not labour to that end with more industry and perseverance; and, I am sorry to say, with much more success. The taste for falshood (and for such absurd and gross falshood!) is, I hope, declining. There does appear to be a growing desire in the public to hear the truth. Imposture is getting out of vogue. Men are no longer a prey to false alarm, and false exultation, which, operating upon them by turns, for so many years, had, at last, almost wholly changed the character of the English people. I hope yet to see the day when HYPOCRISY, IMPOSTURE, and CORRUPTION will be completely scouted and put down; and, when I see that, I shall fear neither the pens nor the swords of Frenchmen, though backed by all the nations of the earth.

PORTUGAL.—It was my intention to have offered some remarks upon the *Proclamation* of Lord Talavera, which, if possible, will be inserted in the present Number; and upon other matters connected with the war in Portugal, especially upon the *Order*, relating to officers *sending home news* from the army. But, want

of room obliges me to postpone these remarks, as well as many others, till my next.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
Sept. 14th 1810.

EXTRACTS

FROM THE

FRENCH MONITEUR.

Copied from the TIMES news-paper of the 8th instant; and relating to the comparative VALOUR of the FRENCH and ENGLISH; and also to the DESERTIONS, and ENLISTMENTS OF PRISONERS on both sides.

The Times, Aug. 3.—"In relation to the charge against Lord Wellington, 'that the cries of the inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo are heard in his camp, but that his ears are shut against them,' we shall only say, that if his Lordship has, in this instance, as is stated in the Moniteur, imitated the conduct of General Moore, in refusing to march to Madrid, he has acted most wisely, and has therein frustrated the arts of his opponents; for it is now ascertained, beyond doubt, that all the endeavours which were used to draw the deceased Commander to the Spanish capital, resulted from the plots of a traitor, conspiring, along with the enemies of his country, the ruin of the British army, which had been sent to its assistance; but the want of parallelism in the two cases is, first, that General Moore was not, as is falsely stated in the Moniteur, within sight or hearing of Madrid when it surrendered, but at the distance of many days march; and further, that Madrid never made any defence, as did Ciudad Rodrigo; and, lastly, that however it might be the design of Massena to draw the British Commander into an engagement, which it was prudent in the latter to decline, we have never yet heard that the insidious machinations of treachery were employed for that purpose. Had the brave Herasti, (1) in imitation of Morla, entered into a compromise with the enemy, to urge Lord Wellington to come to relieve the town, while it was secretly stipulated to surrender it, and to fall upon our forces (2), the cases of Madrid and Ciudad Rodrigo would have been, in this respect, at least similar. As the matter stands at present, they are dissimilar in every respect what-

soever. It was never yet stated, that twenty-four thousand English must necessarily defeat seventy thousand Frenchmen, or that one English soldier was at least equal to four French grenadiers; but this we may say, in conformity to the opinion, though not in the words of General Stuart, "that a British army when properly commanded, has no occasion to dread meeting a French one of one-third greater number (3); for we have defeated and put to flight Buonaparté's best troops, in this proportion, wherever we have met them again, and again, in Egypt, in Italy, and at Corunna."

Moniteur.—(1) This Irish officer, whom the most superstitious, nay, we may say, the only intolerant government now existing in Europe, formerly compelled to serve against you, because you, who call yourselves so liberal and so wise a nation, insist, that several millions of your countrymen should think as you do, and abjure the religion of their fathers, under pain of exclusion from public office and military rank—the brave Herasti, incessantly shews the letters he had from Lord Wellington, encouraging him to prolong the defence, and promising that he should be relieved. He loudly complains of you. But it is not the Spaniards of Ciudad Rodrigo alone that complain of you. The following is the language of those at Cadiz:—"The English," say they, "have in this instance done as they always do. They have let Ciudad Rodrigo be taken, as they let Madrid and Seville! At the appearance of danger they take themselves off! when it is of importance to succour us, and to save the effusion of blood, they run away! they are here only to stir up war and disorder among us; and to encourage us to shed our blood without risking a drop of their own.—" General Morla is not a traitor. Had General Moore been either with Blake at Espinosa, or with the army of Estremadura at Burgos, or with that of Castanos at Tudela; if, a fortnight after the opening of the campaign, when the Spanish armies of the first line were beaten, Moore had, instead of remaining at Salamanca, advanced to the Somo-Sierra, and in that position, rallied the Spanish troops, he must without doubt have ultimately given way, because the English are not a match for the French by land; but he would, at least, have acted a frank and honourable part in the game which he had to play.

Instead of this, he allowed the Spaniards to be beaten in their first line, suffered Madrid to be taken, and ended with disgracefully re-imbarking, in the very heat of the contest, and when there still existed a Spanish army. Why, also, did he retreat upon Corunna, and not upon Lisbon? It was because the English were fully sensible that the war in Spain was finished: and, in fact, it would have been then finished, had not the war with Austria called off the attention of the head of the French government to another point. Thus, it was not the English, and the handful of Spanish chiefs to whom they distributed their gold for the maintenance of brigandage in Spain, that prevented the war from being finished before the spring of 1809; it was the diversion on the Continent, and undoubtedly a diversion of between 5 and 600,000 men was of some weight in the balance of affairs.—(2). How, fall upon your forces? How come you to talk of snares and ambuscades? That victorious army which was to have done such great things, you feared, you say, lest it should have been drawn towards Ciudad Rodrigo in order to fall upon it! If you could not relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, why did you leave there 7,000 unfortunate Spaniards? If you could not attack the French army at the moment when it was harrassed with the fatigues and details of a siege, how did you expect to be able to sustain its attack, when the fortress being reduced, and all our means collected, that same army should advance to meet you? What! you have no more than 24,000 men? After so many proclamations, so many expectations, and so many boasts, we thought you had at least sent 60,000 into the field. The defence of Lisbon was at least worthy of such an effort. You say, you have only 24,000 against 70,000 French; but have you not, besides, that redoubtable Portuguese army, commanded by English officers, and which you have represented as amounting to 30,000 men? Have you not also Romana's army, which, by your account, is equally formidable? Have you not in the rear that Portuguese Militia, which you tell us is animated with such ardour? If you have only 24,000, why have you no more? The Walcheren fever was surely cured. A number of your soldiers perished; but the survivors ought to have been by this time again fit for service. Why do not you send them to the assistance of your beloved allies? Do

you think there can be an occasion when they will have greater need of auxiliaries? So, all the efforts of that British Empire, which wishes to pass for being so colossal, and which is so ambitious, reduce themselves to the mere employment of 24,000 men in an interest which is so dear to it? This is very nearly the contingent which Wirtemberg would furnish, in a general contest, for the aid of her allies. In a word, either you can furnish more than 24,000, and if so, why do not you furnish more? Or you cannot; and in that case why do you, in a contest which you cannot maintain, cause so much blood to be shed, and make a whole population the victims of your ambition?—(3). Here is an assertion which will make every man in Europe shrug up his shoulders; ask the Austrian army, which fought in conjunction with the English army under the walls of Dunkirk? Ask the Russian officers, who to their misfortune fought along with the English at the famous landing at the Helder, in Holland? Ask them whether the English can beat the French with inferior numbers. Those officers smile with pity when they hear talk of the English troops, and, in general, they even refuse them the name of an army. Indeed, if this were the age of the battle of the thirty, we should not much fear to pitch 25,000 French against 40,000 English.—But where did you put to flight the French troops? In Egypt, do you say, Italy, and Corunna?—In the conflicts in Egypt, General Lanusse, with only six battalions, broke the ranks of your 16,000 men; you were always three to one. But has it not been said that the English reconquered Egypt? The Grand Vizier, with 70,000 Ottomans, their squadron upon the coasts, their partisans in the country, all these united against 25,000 French, made very nearly a force of 100,000 against 25,000; and yet, had Kleber or Dessaix been in Egypt at the head of the French, the Grand Vizier would have been beaten, your army would have been driven into the lake of Aboukir, as it was the year before, and neither Turks nor English would have succeeded in reconquering that country.—The English, then, were only auxiliaries. When they were before Alexandria, the Turks were at Cairo, and the Ottoman troops formed the principal army. The French capitulated; but, what is unprecedented, they brought back with them their arms, artillery, baggage, and horses: you were overjoyed in getting

the whole carried back to France. Nevertheless, we must say that the French army was under the direction of a weak man.—In Italy? Italy will be greatly astonished to hear that a French army has been routed by the English. At Maida, you say. Must we speak of that petty affair? So it seems, if we attend to the language of the proceedings of Parliament, which amuses itself in returning thanks for a skirmish. You had on that occasion between 5 and 6,000 men intrenched under the cover of the fire of your ships. The French General attacked you with three pieces of cannon, 4 French battalions, a Swiss battalion, and a Polish battalion. You were at least one third more in number than the French. If the latter did not succeed at the moment in compelling you to reembark, they did so a few days after. But at Maida, also, you were only auxiliaries. All Calabria was in insurrection, 20,000 armed peasants had surrounded the French division, and cut off its communications. But such is the vanity of the English, that their allies, the Spaniards, Turks, and Sicilians, are nothing when boasting is the only thing to be done; they are every thing when danger is to be faced. Thus it appears, that at Maida the English were no more than auxiliaries.—At Corunna? And when did you beat the French at Corunna? and how did you beat them? They did not even attack you. It was the next day that they were to attack you. Our advanced guard only, which was engaged with you, did you some mischief; night came on, and you reembarked. Instead of our advanced guard, had the whole French army boldly attacked you, you would have been ruined.—Where, then, did you ever beat the French? At Talavera? But there you had, in the first place, 25,000 English, nor were you by yourselves. There, again, you were only auxiliaries. You had with you 40,000 Spaniards; you had, therefore, in that quarter 70,000 men, while the French had no more than 26,000. You had another Spanish corps which was advancing by La Mancha; so that you had more than 80,000 men operating against the French army. This is known to every body; but the truth is shamefully disguised in the English Journals, where the greatest absurdities find insertion. Even in the Parliamentary proceedings you will find it stated that they beat the French? But if they beat the French, why did they not march on to Madrid,

that city which they represent as so discontented and so ripe for revolt?

The Times, Aug. 11.—(In an article entitled "Continental Commerce.") "Bonaparté knows the enemy he has to deal with; he knows that this government, from a sense of honour and rectitude, will not do injury to other nations for the sake of defeating his purposes."

Moniteur.—Not they, indeed! for proof, look to the massacre at Copenhagen: the robbery of the two Spanish frigates without a declaration of war; the impressing of the American sailors; the detention of the Turkish vessels, &c. &c. &c. These are incontestible proofs of the strict rectitude of the English Government!

The Times, Aug. 17.—"America will be annoyed by this change of measures, for she cannot, in the present state of her relations with France, avail herself of the benefit which might otherwise result from it by freighting vessels to the Continent; and as the British markets are, as we all know, overstocked with colonial produce, those of France and Holland will be filled before America hears the tidings."

Moniteur.—This is what experience will prove. We are pleased to see the English confess at last, that their magazines are overloaded with colonial produce. They might add, also, that those magazines, overflowing with the colonial produce, are the guarantee of the Bank notes that circulate in England. It would without doubt, be very convenient for them to give them outlets for all those vast quantities of sugars, coffee, and cottons, and thus arrest the depreciation and fall of their assignats, by giving them a value which they are losing every day.

Courier.—"The French Decree, allowing the importation of East India goods and colonial produce, continues to occupy the public attention."

Moniteur.—The great eagerness you shew to collect all reports on this subject, sufficiently confirms what we before knew, of the effect which the Continental system produces among you, and of the embarrassment which it introduces into your domestic affairs.

Sun.—"The *Moniteur* of the 8th contains the Decree, which we have already laid before our readers, permitting the importation of certain articles into France."

Moniteur. *This is a lie*. There is no decree on that subject, neither in the *Moniteur* of the 8th, nor in any other number of this journal.

Letter from Portugal. "We have for the first time excellent information, and it is believed it comes to us from officers of rank in the French army."

Moniteur.—If you are so well informed, why then did you expose the division of General Craufurd, which the Duc d'Elchingen had nearly taken, and which he partly destroyed? Really we should not be much surprised if you were to tell us that your General, Wellington, has some supernatural power of defending himself! The anxiety of the people of England for the fate of their army must be somewhat considerable, when the ministerial party diverts their attention, and inspires them with confidence by such extraordinary tales! At one time they say that a superior Officer of the Etat Major of Prince d'Essling has deserted; that he has even arrived in London with all the secrets of his army; and at another time they announce that a Colonel, and three superior Officers, also deserted into Cadiz: *thus they make the French army to desert en masse*. This would be a very convenient mode of defeating the French; and, indeed, nothing less than a miracle like this can give the conduct of the English Minister any chance of success, or shelter the English army from disgrace. *A great number of deserters, natives of England and of Scotland, enter the French service in the auxiliary corps*; but, if the French desert so fast, how does it happen that of the twenty or thirty thousand unfortunate men whom you coop up in your prison-ships, you cannot prevail on any to desert, even when you offer them handfuls of gold? If the French are inclined to desertion, how happens it that the unfortunate men confined and tormented in the hulks, at Cadiz, and tempted daily by your offers, uniformly reject them, and, by cutting their cables, run a thousand dangers in the hope of obtaining their liberty as a reward for their courage. Few Frenchmen are to be seen in the auxiliary corps of the English army. *The Irish regiments at present in the French service have no fewer than 3,000 Englishmen or Scotchmen, which they recruited from the different depths of prisoners*. In this number we do not include the Irish prisoners who have entered the service of France. They are Catholics, and a just indignation animates them against the intolerant Government which oppresses their country. The animosity which subsists between the English and Irish is such, that it was found necessary to remove 1,800 English or

Scotchmen, who had been enlisted into the Irish regiments, from the different depots of prisoners of war, because they were daily fighting with each other. *It will be pretty difficult for the English to shew such a number of Frenchmen carrying arms against their country; we say Frenchmen, because France having a number of battalions, composed of many thousand deserters, Germans, Prussians, &c. it is not extraordinary that from such foreign battalions there should be some desertions. But Europe knows that Frenchmen do not desert; neither forced marches, nor the most severe privations, nor the most trying danger, ever made French soldiers desert. With regard to the information, that there might be some French Officers belonging to the French Etai Major who corresponded with the enemy, its falsity is proved by the very movements of the enemy; and we can only reject the assertion with pity. All that the English have printed upon Walcheren, Antwerp, upon the campaign of General Moore, upon Talavera—in short, their actual conduct shews that they have known nothing, and that they know nothing.—In another place the Moniteur says, “In the space of three months there have been 80 deserters from the army of Portugal, and almost all of them are Englishmen, who were admitted into the Hanoverian legion.” As to Captains and Lieutenant-Colonels deserting, it is unnecessary to remark on the absurdity of such an assertion.”*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SICILY.—*Official Note of the Council of Regency of the Kingdoms of Spain and the Indies, to the Chevalier Robertson, Charge d’Affaires of his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies. Dated Cadix, July 19.—(Concluded from p. 352.)*

Hence we are to conclude, that it is the mere fabrication of some Frenchman to ridicule the supposed author, and by no means intended to lessen the good opinion entertained of the august Queen of the Two Sicilies, whose noble firmness in sustaining the dignity and decorum of her elevated station ought to have served as a pattern and example to many others, who seem to have degenerated from their high origin, and from every thing which, till now, formed the good reputation of Sovereigns.—Finally, supposing, even for a moment, that Napoleon, ever mindful of his fallacious

and insidious suggestions, which have always been the main spring of his policy, should have come to the resolution of writing the letter, his Majesty is convinced that such an attempt, far from being prejudicial to the high esteem so deservedly gained by the Queen of the Two Sicilies, through her great strength of character, and the inflexibility of her principles, ought to throw still brighter light on those great qualities which adorn her, and tend to humiliate the false pride and absurd pretensions of the perturbator of Europe.—This I have the honour to state in answer to your note, in compliance with the commands of the Council of Regency of Spain and the Indies, &c. I seize with pleasure this opportunity of reiterating to you, Sir, my true esteem and consideration. God preserve you many years, &c. EUSEBIO DE BARDAXI Y AZARA.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Washington, July 25.*—We are informed that, on June 24, the United States brig Vixen, Lieut. Trippe, carrying 14 guns, on her way to New Orleans, under orders from our Government, near the Bahamas, was, in a wanton and unprovoked manner, fired into by the British sloop of war the Moselle, Captain Boyce, rating 20 guns, 32 pounders. A 32 pound shot carried away the main-boom of the Vixen, within a short distance of Colonel Poindexter, a Member of Congress, who, with his family, had taken passage on board on his return from Congress; and a splinter from the boom wounded slightly Mr. Rodney, son of the Attorney-General of the United States, who likewise was on his way to New Orleans.

The subjoined extract of a letter from a Gentleman of great respectability on board the Vixen, to his friend in this city, will give a detail of circumstances; and on the conduct of Lieutenant Trippe, we will forbear to make a comment, because, in our war with Tripoli, this Officer signalized himself; but more especially as we are informed that he has been ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to repair immediately to Washington, for the purpose of an inquiry into his conduct, in not returning the fire of the Moselle.

“On the 24th inst. (June) an occurrence took place, which was equally unpleasant and unexpected. The character of the affair, however, corresponds with the treat-

ment which we have so often received from the British naval Commanders on former occasions. The Moselle, a 20 gun brig, carrying 32 pounders, was lying at anchor under the Stirrup Roy, near the Bahama bank. The Vixen approached her under full sail, with her pendant and ensign hoisted. The Commander of the Moselle hoisted French colours, and exhibited several private signals. Captain Trippe, on perceiving a boat, which he supposed wished to speak his vessel, hauled up and received the officer, who requested him to go down to the British vessel. With this request Captain Trippe declined a compliance, furnishing the officer, at the same time, with the name of the vessel, and her destination. Captain Boyce, who commands the Moselle, fired a shot at us as we passed, which Captain Trippe considered as an intimation that he wished to speak with us. Several musket balls were fired from the boat into the vessel; and at the very moment the British Officer was politely received on board the Vixen, and before he had taken a memorandum of the reply, which was given by Captain Trippe to the message which was delivered, Captain Boyce fired a round shot, which came over the quarter-deck, and penetrated the main boom of the Vixen. Captain Trippe immediately discharged the British Officer and prepared for action. The British brig slipped her cable, and got under way, menacing an attack on our vessel. So soon as she approached within a proper distance, Captain Trippe dispatched a boat, with his First Lieutenant, to demand of the British Officer an explanation of his conduct; who sent his Lieutenant on board the Vixen, with various apologies, which were not understood in a satisfactory manner; and Captain Trippe addressed a note to Captain Boyce, requiring a written statement of the reason which had induced him to fire two shots at his vessel. Captain Boyce returned for answer, that he recognized with pleasure, the existing amity between the two countries, and was extremely sorry for having fired at us—that the reasons which induced him to fire were, that he could not at the time distinguish our colours, and saw no preparations for taking in sail; that he had been informed that two French privateers were fitting out in the United States, and supposed we might probably be one of them. He also pledged his honour, that his shot was not

aimed at our vessel. The explanation was deemed by Captain Trippe sufficient to prevent any further conflict; and we instantly made sail, and proceeded on our course. The injury which we sustained was trifling. Mr. Rodney's son was struck by a splinter from the boom, which occasioned his mouth to bleed a short time—no other person was touched.

"The conduct of Captain Trippe, in this affair, was highly honourable to himself, to the American navy, and to his country. The Vixen was prepared for action with the greatest promptitude and order, and the explanation demanded in a manner which left no doubt as to his determination to vindicate the honour of the national flag, or perish in the attempt. The official assurances of Captain Boyce could not be questioned in an official form, but I feel the most perfect convictions that he knew the Vixen to be an American man of war—that he fired the second shot directly at the vessel, with the view of provoking a return of the fire, and thereby furnishing him with an excuse for going into action with a vessel of inferior metal, and then shift the responsibility from himself, by declaring that his shot was fired through mistake, and without any intention of injuring the vessel. I was on deck, and saw the gun on the fore-castle of the Moselle levelled directly at the Vixen, and was not more than three feet from the place where the shot struck the boom. The insolence of this transaction is not more remarkable than the meanness displayed by the British Commander, in forging excuses for his conduct."

SPANISH COLONIES.—*Dispatch, extracted from the Spanish Papers, received from Cadiz.—It appears to have been sent to Brig. General Inyard, governor of one of the colonies taken from the enemy.*

Downing-Street, June 29, 1810.

Sir; Your dispatch, with its inclosures, has been received and laid before the King.—I am commanded by his Majesty, to express his approbation of your conduct in sending your aide-de-camp, Capt. Kelly, to this country, with the intelligence of the events which have recently occurred in the province of Venezuela.—I think it of the utmost importance, that Capt. Kelly should return with as little delay as possible to Curaçoa; and that you should be apprized of the line of con-

duct which, under the circumstances stated in your letter, it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should pursue in his name.—The great object which his Majesty has had in view from the first moment when intelligence was received in the country of the glorious resistance of the Spanish nation against the tyranny and usurpation of France, was to assist by every means in his power this great effort of a brave, loyal, and high-spirited people; and to secure, if possible, the independence of the Spanish monarchy in all parts of the world.—As long as the Spanish nation persevere in their resistance to their invaders, and as any reasonable hope can be entertained of ultimate success to their cause in Spain, his Majesty feels it to be his duty, according to every obligation of justice and good faith, to discourage any proceeding which may have the effect of separating the Spanish Provinces in America from the parent state in Europe; the integrity of the Spanish Monarchy upon principles of justice and true policy being not less the object of his Majesty than of all loyal and patriotic Spaniards.—If, however, contrary to his Majesty's most anxious wishes, and, as he still continues to think, well-founded expectations, the Spanish dominions in Europe shall be doomed to submit to the yoke of the common enemy, either in consequence of actual force or of any compromise which may leave to them only the semblance of independence, an event which his Majesty, relying on the tried energy and patriotism of the Spanish people, can in no degree consider as probable; his Majesty will feel himself bound by the same principles which have influenced his conduct for the last two years in the cause of the Spanish nation, to afford every assistance to the provinces in America which may render them independent of French Spain, may afford a place of refuge to those Spaniards who in disdaining to submit to their oppressor may look to America as to their natural asylum, and may preserve the remains of the monarchy for their unfortunate Sovereign, if it should ever be his lot under such circumstances to recover his liberty. His Majesty, in thus explicitly declaring the motives and principles of his conduct, disclaims every view of territory or acquisition for himself.—His Ma-

jesty observes with satisfaction from the papers which have been transmitted to him, that the proceedings in the Caraccas appear in a great measure to have originated in a belief, that in consequence of the progress of the French armies in the South of Spain, and the dissolution of the Supreme Junta, the cause of the parent State had become desperate. He trusts, therefore, that as soon as the actual state of things shall have been correctly known in that quarter, the general acknowledgment throughout Spain of the Regency, and the unremitted exertions of the Spaniards in defence of their country under that authority, the inhabitants of the Caraccas will be induced to return to their connection with Spain, as an integral part of the Spanish Monarchy.—His Majesty is led more particularly to entertain this expectation from the consideration, that the Regency now established at Cadiz appears to have adopted the same wise and generous principles with respect to the provinces in America as were previously adopted by the Supreme Junta, in establishing the connection between every part of the Spanish Monarchy upon the most liberal footing, in regarding the American Provinces as integral parts of the Empire, and in admitting them in consequence to a place in the Cortes of the kingdom.—His Majesty feels confident that the same generous and enlightened policy which has dictated these measures, will induce the Government of Spain to regulate the intercourse of the American provinces with other parts of the world upon such a basis as will contribute to their growing prosperity, and at the same time augment all the advantages which the parent state may justly expect to derive from them.—His Majesty trusts, that this exposition of his sentiments will enable you, without difficulty, to regulate your conduct in any intercourse you may find it necessary to have with the contiguous Spanish provinces in South America. And as his Majesty has directed that a Copy of his Letter should be communicated to the Government of Spain, he can have no objection to your making any use of the avowal of these his sentiments which circumstances may appear to you to require.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 12.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1810. [Price 1s.

"I would inculcate one truth with peculiar earnestness; namely, that a REVOLUTION is not the necessary consequence of a NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY."—PURSUITS OF LITERATURE.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER V.

Digression respecting the use of bank-notes as a political support to the government—Mr. Addington's notion of convincing Buonaparté by the means of a tax—Answer of the Moniteur—Advice given to Mr. Addington in the Register in 1803—Passage quoted from a government news-paper describing bank-notes as necessary to the existence of the government—Same doctrine promulgated by Mr. Paine in his Rights of Man—How different is this from what the world has been told—Effect of it to encourage the enemy—Resume the subject of the Sinking Fund—No interest taken off in 1808—Addington's Act of 1802—George Rose quoted to prove that it was clearly held forth to the nation that taxes would be repealed in consequence of the Sinking Fund—P. S. Sir John Sinclair's Pamphlet.

Gentlemen,

Before we resume the discussion, relating to Pitt's Grand Sinking Fund, which want of room obliged us to break off, at the close of the last letter, I think it may be useful to submit to you here an observation or two, calculated to obviate any unfounded apprehensions that might otherwise be excited by the apparently inevitable fate of the paper-money; and this I deem the more necessary, as publications are daily appearing, from the pens of ignorant or interested persons, the evident tendency, and, indeed, object, of which is, to persuade the public, that the existence of the government; that the existence of law and order; that the safety

to persons and property; nay, that the continuance of the very breath in our nostrils, depend upon the credit of the Bank Notes.

The author, from whose writings I have taken my motto to this present Number of my work, was, you see, of a very different opinion; and, I have quoted his sentiment upon the subject, because his work is well known to be of what is called the ANTI-JACOBIN kind, that is to say, a work the tendency of which is to prevent men like you from having any thing to say or to do, any more than your horses, in the affairs of government. This writer, who, however, might mean well, and who is certainly a very clever man, so far from supposing that the existence of the government depended upon the credit of bank notes, is, you see, fixed in his opinion, an opinion that he wishes "to inculcate with "peculiar earnestness," that a REVOLUTION, thereby meaning a change in the form of government, is not the necessary consequence, even of a National Bankruptcy; that is to say, not only a total discredit of all the paper-money and especially the Bank of England Notes, but also an utter inability to pay, in any way whatever, the interest upon the National Debt, or any part of it.

This is my opinion also, as it always has been since I turned my attention to the subject. At the beginning of the present war, MR. ADDINGTON, who was then the Prime Minister, told the House of Commons, that one of his principal objects in laying on the Property Tax and other war taxes, was, "to convince Buonaparté, that "it was hopeless for him to contend with "our finances." To which the MONITEUR, or French government-newspaper, replied: "Pay your bank notes in gold and silver, and then we will believe you, without your "going to war."*

* Register, Vol. III. page 948. June, 1803.

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Whether the Minister made good his promise; whether he has convinced Buonaparté, it was "hopeless for him to contend" with our finances," you, Gentlemen, are as likely to be able to judge as any body that I know. I, for my part, blamed the Minister for holding out such a *motive* for his taxing measures. I said to him: The true way of convincing your enemy, that this war upon your finances will be useless, is to state explicitly to the world, that you are not at all afraid of the consequences of what is called a national bankruptcy; for, while you endeavour to make people believe, that such an event *cannot possibly happen*, they will certainly think that you regard it, if it should happen, as *irretrievable ruin and destruction*; and, therefore, as you never can quite overcome their apprehensions, the best way is to be silent upon the subject, or to set the terrific bug-bear at defiance. To Buonaparté's exultation at our approaching bankruptcy the answer is always ready: France has been a bankrupt; France has not paid her paper-money in specie; yet France is not the weaker for that; France is, in spite of her ruined finances, in spite of the long pamphlets of Sir Francis D'Ivernois and Mr. Rose, in spite of the longer speeches of Lord Mornington, Lord Auckland and Mr. Pitt, in spite of the innumerable columns of figures which these noblemen and gentlemen have drawn up in battle array against her; in spite of all this, France is yet powerful, yea, much more powerful than she was before she experienced what is called a national bankruptcy. What ground, therefore, have the French to rejoice at our finances being about to undergo a similar operation?

Such were my sentiments and my reasoning upon this subject, seven years ago; a time, when to pronounce the word *depreciation*, as applied to bank-notes, was sure to expose a man to charges very little short of *treason*, which charges were made by those very persons, who have now declared the greater half of our bank notes to be "*destructive assignats*," and who have called them "*rile and dirty rags*." My opinion was, and it still is, that the total destruction of the paper-money would not cause any change injurious to this kingdom; and, indeed, I should have a most hearty contempt for the constitution and for the whole form and composition of our government, if I thought that their existence depended

upon the credit of bank-notes. There are, however, those who think just the reverse; and these are, too, writers, who appear to be entirely devoted to the government; one of whom goes so far as to say, that the government has *no other trustworthy support* than that which it derives from the bank-notes. "The human mind," says he, "is sensible only of the present good, or evil, and has too little thought to anticipate consequences, and if it was not for the immediate personal interest of a very large and informed part of the community in the National Debt, patronage and paper currency, GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE NO EXISTENCE, standing insulated on the pure basis of duty, and remote national and respective good. The conduct of Sweden, America, Ireland, and the Jacobins of England, in their partiality for France, exemplify a want of sense to execute the maxims of ERICURUS. The paper currency of Bank Notes (there should be no Country Banks) offers to Government a most *destructible support*, because IT MAKES THE DAILY BREAD OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL DEPEND SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE SAFETY OF GOVERNMENT, whereas money, which may be hoarded, separates the individual from the public safety. In the present revolutionary state of the world, I think our paper currency a most *invaluable mean of salvation*, and the man who would propose the payment of Bank Notes in specie at any period, to separate individual property from public safety, might as well propose the burning of the Navy to protect the commerce of the world."*

Gentlemen, do you remember the writings of PAINE? Do you remember the *Rights of Man*; for the writing of which the author was prosecuted by the then Attorney General who is now the Lord Chancellor? Do you remember the *Rights of Man*, the author of which was prosecuted, and, being absent, was outlawed; the publishers of which were prosecuted all over the kingdom; the circulating of which was forbidden by Proclamation; and, to counteract the principles of which ASSOCIATIONS were formed of the rich and the powerful? Well, it was in this

* MORNING Post news-paper: 14th Sept. 1810.

very work, that the doctrine here laid down, by this government writer, was first started. PAINE said, that *the existence of the government depended upon the existence of the bank-notes*; and that, the question was not, *how long the British government would stand*; but, *how long the Funding System would last*. PAINE's mode of reasoning was, if I am correct in my recollection, as nearly as possible like that of this government writer. He laid it down as an admitted fact, that the people (owing to causes that he stated) must be *wholly indifferent about the fate of the government*; but, that, as so many of them were, either by holding *Stocks* or *bank-notes*, interested in the fate of the government, they would, *while the Stocks and bank-notes lasted*, continue to support the government, whatever might be their *feelings* towards it. But, that, when, from whatever cause, the Funding System should fail, not a soul would be found to lift a finger, or, even to express a wish in favour of the existence of the government.

Just the same, or rather more, is now said by this government writer; a writer one half of whose pages are filled with invectives against those whom he calls the friends of the Emperor of France. But, how is it possible for any thing to be written more agreeable to the Emperor Napoleon than what this writer has put forth? Until now the world has been told that we entertained a *real love for our government*; that we were attached to our constitution because it afforded such fine *protection* to our *persons* and our *property*; that we loved the constitution, because it insured to us the enjoyment of *liberty*, and defended us against every species of *oppression*; that we had made numerous sacrifices, and that we were ready to make as many more, nay, even "to spend our *last shilling* and shed the *last drop of our blood*," for the sake of these *liberties* and in defence of a *king*, whom we so *dearly loved*, and in gratitude for the blessings enjoyed during whose reign, we held a Jubilee. Until NOW, this is what the world has been told. But NOW it is told, by this loyalty-professing writer, that the only motive whence we support the government at all, is, to preserve the value of the Bank-notes that we hold; that, if it was not for the immediate personal interest of so many people in the *National Debt*, and for *patronage* and *paper currency*, the Government could have no

existence; that we support the government because without its existence, the bank-notes would fall, and because, by the number of bank-notes, we are thus made to depend upon the safety of Government *for our daily bread*; and that, therefore, the man who would propose the payment of bank-notes in gold and silver *at any period*, might as well propose *the burning of the Navy*, or, in other words, the giving up of the country to France.

What, Gentlemen! are we never, then, to see gold and silver again? Every Minister; every Member of Parliament; every one of those, who endeavoured to palliate the measure of protecting the Bank Company from paying their notes in Gold and Silver; every one of them "*lamented the necessity*," as they called it, of the measure. But, NOW, behold, we are told that it was a *good thing*; and not only a good thing, but that *the government could not exist without it*! Gentlemen, we call ourselves a "*thinking people*;" but, believe me, that this is what would not have been said to any other civilized people upon earth.

We might here easily show how encouraging a prospect doctrines of this sort hold out to our enemy, and how strong an inducement to use all those means, whether in the way of attack or of menace, which are likely to destroy the credit of the paper-money, that being, if these doctrines be sound, the sure and certain way of destroying our government. But, another opportunity will offer for observations upon these matters; and, it is now time that we return to our inquiry into the SINKING FUND.

In the last Letter, at page 364, having stated the provisions, made in the Acts of 1786 and 1792, for the nation's *ceasing to pay interest* upon the Stock that should be redeemed, or bought up by the Commissioners, after the year 1808; or, in other words, the nation's *ceasing to pay taxes* on account of the Stock, or part of the Debt, which should be bought up after that time: having stated these provisions, we were proceeding to inquire: *What was done in the long-expected year, 1808? What was done when the year of promise came?*

Why, my Neighbours, not *at all* was done: just nothing at all in the

way provided for. The nation ceased to pay no *dividends of interest*; and, of course, this work of redemption caused *none of its taxes to be taken off*. "Well," say you, "but, is it possible, that, after such a solemn proceeding; after the *express and positive* declaration in two Acts of Parliament, that the dividends of interest *should cease* to be paid in 1808; is it possible, that, after that, all the dividends did continue to be paid, *just the same as if those Acts had never been passed?*" O, yes! It is not only possible to be so, but it *is* so. All the dividends have continued to be paid; and are paid to this day. The above-mentioned provisions, in the Acts of 1786 and 1792 were *repealed*. The Parliament undid what it had before done. It did away the provisions, which it had made in 1786 and 1792. It passed another Act, which said that those provisions should not be carried into effect; or, in other words, that which was *law* before was no longer *law*.

This new Act was passed in the month of June, 1802, ADDINGTON, the successor and the friend of PITT, being then Minister. This Act (which is Chapter 71 of the 42nd year of the reign of George III.) is entitled "An Act to amend and **RENDER MORE EFFECTUAL** two Acts passed in the twenty sixth and thirty second years of the reign of his present Majesty, for the reduction of the National Debt." This Act which was to render those two Acts *more effectual*, sets out by stating, that the said two Acts had been by experience found "to be attended with *most beneficial consequences* to the *public credit* of the country;" and having made that declaration, it sets to work, and repeals the two provisions above-mentioned; and, of course, when the year 1808 came; when the year of expectation arrived, no *dividends* ceased to be paid, and *interest* upon the whole of the Debt was still paid, and is still paid to this day.

Gentlemen, it is hardly to be believed, that any men, who, like PITT and his associates and supporters, had invented and caused to be passed, the two first mentioned Acts, could propose the last-mentioned Act, that is to say, the Act of 1802. Not only, however, did they propose it, but the ANTIJACOBIN writers laughed in our faces and called us fools, if not le-

vellers and jacobins, if we ventured to express any doubt at all of the wisdom and justice of any of these successive measures; and, these writers stontly denied, *that it ever was intended to take off any of the taxes in 1808*; and, of course, they maintained, that we, who felt disappointment, in this respect, were fools for our pains, and, indeed, they expressed themselves thus, that we "were *nature's fools*," and not the fools of the Minister.

Never, surely, were any portion of mankind treated with such barefaced contempt as the people of England were, at the time referred to, by the venal writers of newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and reviews, who, seeing the people terrified out of their senses, by alternate alarms from within and without, seemed to think that he was the best man, who could show the greatest degree of scorn for their understanding and character. Had not this been their persuasion, would they have dared to tell us, that *none but fools ever expected the Sinking Fund to produce a repeal of Taxes*, when it must still remain in the memory of every man, who was then at all conversant in political matters, that the *repeal of taxes*; the *lessening of the taxes*; the making of their *burthens less*, was the promise held forth to the people by the supporters of PITT; nay, when it is notorious, that PITT owed the establishment of his tremendous power to the opinion which the people entertained, that he had discovered, and would put in practice, the means of *reducing the load of their Taxes*? This, as the great end of his schemes, was so much talked of; it is so well known, that this was so distinctly stated in the speeches in parliament, and so many times repeated, that I am almost ashamed to trouble you with any proof of the fact; yet, considering that the point is of great importance, I will put the matter beyond all dispute by a reference to a work on the increase of the *Resources* of the kingdom, published in 1799, under the name of GEORGE ROSE, who was then a Secretary of the Treasury, and who is now Treasurer of the Navy and a Privy Counsellor, and who, in the execution of the work about to be cited, was, doubtless, assisted by PITT himself. Indeed, this must have been the case; or, at least, it must be believed, that nothing, upon such a subject, and under the name of his official Secretary, would be published without PITT's previous approbation. In this work, which is entitled,

"A Brief Examination into the Increase of the Revenue, Commerce and Manufactures of Great Britain, from 1792 to 1799;" in this work the hopeful effects of the Sinking Funds of 1786 and 1792 are pointed out, and the writer says: "By the operation of these sinking funds, without any further intervention of Parliament, the one existing before the war, will attain its *maximum* (4,000,000*l.* a year) most probably, in 1808, in no case later than February 1811. As the *dividends* due on such parts of the old debt as shall be paid off after the sinking fund shall have attained its *maximum*, and the annuities which shall afterwards fall in, will be at the disposal of Parliament, the period of **REPEALING TAXES** annually, to an amount equal thereto, cannot be delayed more than nine, ten, or eleven years."

Need I ask you, Gentlemen, whether you have heard of any *repealing of taxes*? Whether you have felt your load of *taxation lightened*? Whether you pay *less taxes*, than you paid when this placeman wrote his book in 1799? No: These questions I need not put to you; nor need I ask you what are your feelings towards those, who fed you with hopes of a diminution of your burdens; nor need I, perhaps, say one more word upon the subject of the *Sinking Fund*, not to have seen through which by this time would argue a much greater want of discernment than I am disposed to attribute to any part of my countrymen, and especially to you, whose discerning faculties have, as to matters of this sort, been, of late, pretty well sharpened by experience. Nevertheless, with the hope of leaving no possibility of bewildering any body in future, with regard to the nature or effect of the *Sinking Fund*, I shall add some additional remarks; but, as these remarks will open to us quite new views of the matter, and will extend to some length, I shall postpone them to my next; and I remain, in the mean while,

Your faithful friend,
WM. CORBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,
September 17, 1810.

P. S. A pamphlet, entitled, "OBSERVATIONS ON THE REPORT OF THE BULLION COMMITTEE," has just been published by SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, who is, it seems, a member of Parliament, and who is said to have been recently made a *Privy Coun-*

sellor. So much of such gross ignorance, in so short a compass, I do not recollect to have met with in the course of my reading, except perhaps, in the Morning Post news-paper or in the British Critic Review. Such a publication would be wholly unworthy of serious notice, were it not pretty evidently the vehicle of the sentiments and views of others. For this reason, some of its prominent absurdities will be noticed, when I come to that part of my subject, to which they more particularly belong. In the mean time, in order to furnish the means of judging of this writer's depth of understanding, take the following specimen, from a former work of his, and compare his theory with the practice now before our eyes. "The PUBLIC DEBTS of a nation, not only attract riches from abroad, with a species of magnetic influence, but they also retain money at home, which otherwise would be exported, and which, if sent to other countries, might possibly be attended with pernicious consequences to the State, whose wealth was carried out of it. If France, for example, maintained its wars by borrowing money, and England raised all its within the year, the necessary consequence would be that all the loose and unemployed money of England, would naturally be transmitted to France, where it would be placed out to advantage." This is quite sufficient. The next time that SIR JOHN thinks of writing upon matters of this sort, he will do well to go, previously, and take a lesson of MRS. DE YONGE. She will be able to tell him for a certainty, whether National Debts have a tendency to keep money at home, to prevent it from being exported, and to bring money from abroad. She will also be able to give him a lesson upon depreciation, in a way, which, perhaps, will make the thing comprehensible even to him.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"On Thursday a Court-martial commenced at Bexhill, for the trial of two privates of the 2nd battalion of the ROYAL GERMAN LEGION, who deserted a few days ago, and took from the beach a large boat for the purpose of going out to the enemy. They were apprehended by a boatman off Dover. THE TIMES NEWSPAPER, Monday, 17 Sept. 1810.

ROYAL GERMAN LEGION.—Look at the Motto, English reader! Look at the Motto! "A cat," they say, "may look at a king;" and, surely we may look at the Deserters from "the ROYAL GERMAN LE-

"GION," whom we pay.—What! desert! Soldiers of the *Royal German Legion* desert? Can this be true? And desert with a view of *going over to the enemy* too? Seize a boat, and actually put out to sea, in order to go over and join "the *vile, base, infamous miscreant usurper*," as the *Morning Post* so eloquently calls Buonaparté? Attempt to go over to join him; to join the very enemy for the express purpose of *defending us against whom they were brought into this country*? What! in such haste to get to him, that they could not wait for chances to take them near to him, or to take him near to them? What eagerness there must have been in these men of the *Royal German Legion* to join the enemy of England!—But, upon reflection, this, surely, cannot be true. The *Times News-paper* must have been deceived. It must be a *Libel* upon the *Royal German Legion*. What! these *Royal Legion Soldiers*, "whose loyalty to their sovereign" induced them to leave Hanover when the French approached it, and to enter since into corps for the defence of that sovereign's dominions here, desert; and desert, too, with an intention of going over to the hated Napoleon? Oh! it never can be; and the *Times news-paper*, which must have been imposed upon by some ill-disposed person, will, I dare say, lose no time in thanking me for giving it this timely hint to make that sort of retraction, which* is vulgarly, and most emphatically, called, *drawing in the horns*.—If, however, the fact should prove true; if such court-martial, and for such a purpose, should be now sitting, let us hope, that *its proceedings will be made known to us*. It is a case which has not before occurred. Deserters enough, from amongst our English and Scotch and Irish soldiers, we have heard of: plenty of deserters from the service: thousands upon thousands of deserters ~~from the service~~, as the accounts laid before Parliament will tell; but, this is the first, and the very first instance that we have heard of, wherein deserters from our army, at home, have made attempts to *get over to the enemy*.—If a disposition like this exist; and if it exist in so strong a degree as to induce ~~men~~ put off to sea in an open boat, what must be the consequence, if the same men were in the field, and, perhaps, within musket-shot of the enemy's out-posts, which is very frequently the case?—But, there is a still more weighty consideration belonging to this fact, if a

fact it be; and, that is, the *example*; and who shall say, how far that may extend? Deserting to *France* is something quite *new* in our army: the *idea* is new: and, an idea it is that may, possibly, prove of extreme danger to the country. Men's minds soon grow familiar with any thing that favours their views. This notion of deserting to the French coast by *twos* may be *improved upon*, if not, at once, most decidedly reprobated, and effectual measures adopted for preventing men from attempting to act upon it. Let the reader only consider, for a moment, what must be the natural and inevitable consequence of even the bare fact of two soldiers in the English army, two of "*our defenders*," making an attempt to *desert from England to France*. Let him consider what must be the effect of this upon the minds of our own soldiers, upon the minds of our enemies, and upon the minds of all other nations.—Viewing the thing in this light, I cannot help repeating an expression of my hope, that the *proceedings of this court-martial* may be made known to the public at large.—Either *invasion* is thought within the compass of *probability*, or it is not: if the latter, it is pretty clear that there is no great necessity for any troops at all to be stationed upon our coasts: if the former, it is not, I think, less clear, that we ought to sift to the bottom this attempt to go over to the enemy, made by soldiers appointed to defend that coast.—We are told, and we appear to believe, that we are the most "*thinking people*" upon earth. We should do well to *think* a little upon this matter, before it be too late; for, as the saying is, "*thoughts are free*" at any rate.—I, for my part, shall keep my eye upon the transaction; and, I shall expect from the *Times news-paper*, either an explicit *drawing in of the horns*, or, a full account of the *proceedings and result of the Court-martial*.

BRAZILS.—Either this Number, or the next, will contain "*The TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP and ALLIANCE*" between our king and the Prince Regent of Portugal, concluded at Rio de Janeiro, in February last, several parts of which treaty call for a little observation; but for the present, at least, I shall confine myself to what presents itself to me, as to the 3d and the 6th articles, the former of which relates to the possession of the *Crown of Portugal*, and the latter to the *building of English ships of war in the BRAZILS*.—As to this pro-

vision for permission for us to build ships of war, the Article says, that the Prince Regent, in *gratitude* for the benefits he has received from the Royal Navy of England, "is pleased to *grant* to his Britannic Majesty the privilege of causing *timber* for the purpose of *building ships of war* to be purchased and cut down in *the woods, forests, and chases of Brazil* (excepting in *Royal Forests*, which are appointed for the use of the *Portuguese navy*), together with permission to cause *ships of war to be built*, equipped, or *paired within the ports and harbours of that Empire*, a previous application and notice being made in each instance (for *form's sake*) to the Court of Portugal, which shall immediately appoint an officer of the royal navy to assist and attend upon these occasions. And it is expressly declared and promised that these privileges shall not be granted to any other nation or state whatsoever." Let us first look back a little, which may be of great use. — The worth of this privilege; the practicability of doing any of the things of the kind contemplated, was discussed by me, at the time of the "PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION," and under that head, in Volumes XII and XIII of the Register, where I took all possible pains to prevent the effect of those *delusions*, the consequences of which have recently been felt. The newspapers of the day teemed with *triumphant exultations* at the prospect of opening a trade with the Brazils, of which they gave a picture too flattering, alas! for many to resist; and thousands, even thousands of families, are now plunged into ruin for having rejected my advice. — In commenting upon an article describing the *speculations to the Brazils*, I said: "There needs no assurance, on the part of this writer, to convince me, that the event has produced great satisfaction amongst the inhabitants of Finsbury Square and Thames Street; nor have I the least doubt that the Brazils will soon become a grand out-let for the produce, or fruits, of the industry of the people of England, having, indeed, shewn in my former Number, that this would be the case. But I see, in this, nothing to give me satisfaction, and nothing that ought to give satisfaction to any man, who has the good of England at heart."* Again, in another part of my

work, I said: "Already, we are told, that a hundred thousand pounds, taken out of the taxes of England, has been sent off, in specie, to the Brazils, to assist her most faithful majesty. And this, after all, is the result of that 'glorious event,' which was to produce so much good to England! When will this commercial and colonising rage cease to beggar and enslave us? Never, till the CORRUPTIONS, which are found to be so conveniently carried on through the medium of commercial and colonial associations, are banished by a wholesome change."† — Over and over again did I exhort my countrymen not to be deceived by the representations in the Morning Post and the other bragging newspapers. I exhorted them not to suffer any one to persuade them to send their property to the BRAZILS. I assured them, and I proved to them, that the adventure must be attended with ruin. My advice, grounded upon a thorough knowledge of the subject, was scouted, and not without imputations upon my "loyalty;" and the advice of presumptuous ignorance, joined to hypocritical zeal for the royal cause, was followed. The adventurers, and those who trusted them, now feel the consequences: consequences the just reward of their credulity; or, rather, of their perverseness in preferring falsehood to truth. — At the time, to which we are now referring, a great bustle was made about the capacity of the BRAZILS for building ships of war, and supplying our West-India islands with lumber; and, one of our flattering writers, whose object was to console us for the driving of the family of Braganza out of Europe, asserted that there was already cut down TIMBER sufficient for twenty ships of the line, whereupon I made the following remarks, the whole of which are, at this time, peculiarly applicable. "Timber for twenty sail of the line! What was it cut down for? And who cut it down? The event, which has now taken place, could not have been anticipated in the Brazils; and if it had, whence were to come the hands to cut down the timber? The whole of the population does not surpass half a million of souls, scattered over an immense territory. The Europeans do not work, and the African slaves are employed in raising them provisions and in

* Register, Vol. XII. p. 2, January 2nd, 1808.

† Register, *ibid.* p. 175. January 30, 1808.

working the mines. It would require, I should think, one half of the working population to be employed for a whole year to cut down and rough-hew timber sufficient for twenty ships of the line, supposing a sufficiency of the various sorts of timber to be found in the country, which, I am convinced, is not the case. And, if one half of the working population were employed in this way, is it not evident, that one half of the people must cease to eat; or, that one half of the mines must cease to be worked? This assertion, therefore, respecting the timber cut down in the Brazils is not less weak than untrue. Still, however, it is, as to both these qualities, far surpassed by the assertion respecting the capability of the Brazils to supply our West Indian colonies "with provisions, lumber, and every article of necessity." c This writer will say, that it is unfair, if I suppose him to include amongst articles of necessity, the clothing and hardware requisite in the West Indies; and, therefore, I will suppose him to mean only the wood necessary for buildings and for cooperage, and the food necessary for the people to live upon. First, as to the wood, the inhabited part of the Brazils is at a distance from the centre of our West India colonies, five times as great as that which divides these colonies from the centre ports of the United States of America, or from Nova Scotia; so that, supposing there to be a spare population in the Brazils, sufficient for the preparation of the several sorts of lumber; supposing there to be a sufficiency of saw-mills and of other conveniences under the scorching suns of the Brazils; and supposing there to be iron and shipwrights in abundance, in that country, the lumber must arrive in the West Indies at an expence which would soon cause the plantations to be deserted, English sugar necessarily being quite unable to bear a moment's competition with that raised by the colonists of other nations. But, supposing all this to be overbalanced by the advantage of getting the lumber from a country other than the American States. Yet, what good is this grand event to us, in this respect? We have another of our own, Nova Scotia, covered with all sorts of wood, from the pine to the hazel, and we have, nevertheless, found, that it is impossible thence to draw the lumber necessary for our West India colonies. The reason is, that we have not there a sufficiency of population to prepare the lumber for the West Indies, and we never

shall have, as long as the banks of the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomack, the Ohio, and the Mississippi invite to the til-ling of a climate more genial." Who does not, upon reading this, see that the 6th Article of the Treaty before us can never have any practical effect. What! Are we to go to the Brazils for timber to build ships with, when we have Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and Canada, all covered with timber of every sort and size, and abounding in most convenient places for harbours and docks? For what, I should be glad to know, are we to do this?—Timber! Aye, there is plenty, a great abundance, of timber, without trenching upon "the Royal FORESTS," good God! Ch; yes! There is a vast superabundance of timber; but, whence are to come the Iron, the Cordage, all the means of making Arsenals; and, if all these were found, whence are to come the workmen?—Yet shall we be told: nay, do not laugh, reader; for, as sure as you will be reading this article of mine, the readers of the "fashionable World" will be told, and, I dare say, they will believe, that this 6th Article of the Brazil Treaty will amply make up to us, for the acquisitions which France is making in that mine of naval stores, the shores of the Baltic. And thus another delusion will get afloat, and will be sucked in with full as much confidence as the last.—Besides, reader, suppose it PRACTICABLE for us to build ships and to establish arsenals in the Brazils, have those who cry the thing up, reflected upon the consequences of so doing? If you remove the arsenals of England from England, what do you do much short of annihilating the power of England? You take from her her most precious possession; and, is it to be believed, that Navies built and manned almost on the other side of this globe, would remain long in the service of this island? It was quite practicable for us to build ships in our fine colonies, now the American States; but, we took very good care not to do it; we took very good care not to send our most valuable artizans to settle out of the kingdom, in order to build navies to eclipse our native navy; we never have, I believe, yet had a Royal arsenal even in the sister Island; and, therefore, I should like very much to know, whose genius it was that conceived the brilliant idea of sending Iron and Cordage to be wrought up with the timber of the Brazils; to send out English artizans

to work them up; and, to tax the people of England for money to be spent in ship-building at a distance equal to more than one half, I believe, of the space that is between us and the directly opposite side of the world.—Alas! this is not the way that the Emperor Napoleon goes to work. He looks out for arsenals *nearer home*. He goes to Sweden and Norway, whence we get our Iron and our Timber, and he takes, by due degrees, possession of every channel, through which we draw our naval stores. He makes arsenals on the banks of the Scheldt, and the news, under the head of Antwerp of this very day, tells us, that “the two ships of the line that were launched this year from this harbour, have made room for the *Hymen* and the *Momarch*, of 110 guns, which are now on the stocks.” Each of which ships will, I am satisfied, be built and sent to sea at a less expence than we could build and fit out a gun-boat in the Brazils.—So much for the “*privilege*” secured to us by the 6th Article of the Treaty before us; so much for what the “fashionable world’s” print speaks of as “an important advantage, conceded to this country, of purchasing and cutting down timber in the FORESTS of Brazil, for building ships of war, and for building, equipping, or repairing ships of war within the *Brazilian Ports* and *Harbours*”—Brazilian Ports! Brazilian harbours! But, the “FORESTS of Brazil” amuse one the most. The FORESTS! Like the New Forest, I suppose; or the Forest of Bere; or Wolmer Forest; or Holt Forest? “Oh, no! a great deal finer and larger than any of these, and better set with wood.” Aye, I’ll warrant you; but, reader, let me, who have seen a great deal of this sort of “Forest” land, assure you, that the spot that was covered, by the carcasses of my two heifers, last night, in the Forest of Bere, is worth more, in any view with which an estimate can be made, than any million or ten million of acres of the “Forests” of Brazil; and this, whatever foolish Englishman shall try the experiment will, when it is too late, find to be true; and, therefore, I would anxiously caution my credulous countrymen in general, against this new delusion, which I trust will be reserved for the exclusive benefit of the “fashionable world,” to whose adventures, in this way, I most heartily wish success.—The 3d article of the Treaty is as follows: “The seat of the Portuguese Monarchy being established in Brazil, his Britan-

nic Majesty promises in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, never to acknowledge, as King of Portugal, any Prince other than the heir and representative of the Royal House of Braganza; and his Majesty also engages to renew and maintain with the Regency (which his Royal Highness may establish in Portugal) the relations of friendship which have so long united the Crowns of Great Britain and Portugal.”—There is very little to be said upon this. The King promises, for himself and his heirs and successors, “NEVER to acknowledge, as king” (or sovereign, I suppose) “of Portugal,” any body but the heir of the House of Braganza; that is to say, any body but the Prince Regent and his successors. I have only to add, that this promise is made “IN THE NAME OF THE MOST HOLY AND UNDIVIDED TRINITY.”—This being the case, it is, I think, high time that we begin to inquire what sort of a state this same Portugal is now in; whence we shall, perhaps, be able to form something like an estimate of the probable cost of adhering to this promise, made with a degree of solemnity and piety, so truly characteristic.

PORTUGAL.—In my last Number, at page 371, I was so pressed for room, that I could not resume my remarks upon the war in Portugal, which had been, in the former Number, page 342, brought down to about the 20th of August, at which time the enemy had, it was said, begun the siege of the fortress of ALMEIDA, but with every prospect of not soon succeeding in reducing it.—But, I will, before I presume to offer any remarks upon these matters myself, go back, and state what, through the channel of the Morning Post, the “fashionable world” have sucked in like mother’s-milk, since the time here referred to.—They have been told, that in Spain, not fewer than 1,500 deserters from the French army entered into our service about the 21st of August, on the side of Gibraltar;—that on the side of Madrid there is “a farmer, a fine dashing young fellow,” at the head of about 1,500 men, who sometimes “dashes into the very gates of Madrid, and intercepts the French dispatches;”—that, when followed the farmer and his men (adopting the practice of partridges) disperse to meet again at the rallying point;—that Lord Talavera frankly says, that if he is blessed with health and a continuance of

good spirits, he has no fear for the result of the expected general action ; — that Marshal Beresford has transmitted to the council of regency an eagle taken from the Swiss battalion lately made prisoners of war ; — that (for the sake, we may suppose, of shewing what valour it required to take this eagle from the Swiss) a body of Swiss troops to the number of 500, deserted to the British army, on the 29th of August with all their arms and accoutrements ; — that Lord Talavera's proclamation denouncing punishment against those Portuguese who may favour the French, and that his general orders respecting those officers who send home news from his army, and who are called by this writer traitors to their country, must be read with *satisfaction* and make us *happy* ; — that, turning again to the side of Spain the Junta at Cadiz had heard what the governor of Madrid had said in a *whisper* at his table ; — that king Joseph had narrowly escaped being murdered, that his goods were all packing up at Madrid, that he had escaped from the play-house on foot, that general Morla was put in a state of arrest because he said he thought the game was up, that *poor Joseph* had reached almost the end of his cares of royalty, that he was about to quit Madrid, that his brother had sent for him home to France, that there was a general pack up at Madrid, that the sale of provisions at the palace at Madrid, had actually commenced, and that this intelligence all came from a source "of unquestionable authenticity," namely that of a Spanish officer, who had "entered the service of Joseph, in order that he might have an opportunity of coming over to us ;" — that, (turning now back again to Portugal) the French army shews an *awful respect* for the gallantry of Lord Talavera, whose caution, vigilance, judgment, and sagacity, have out-witted Massena ; — that the opposition in England do not rejoice in the present prospect of things, which sheds such additional lustre on our military "fame ;" — that the ministers, their adherents, and every good subject, heartily exult in the present posture of things, both in Spain and Portugal, a posture of things which justifies the promises, which derides the threats, which defeats the projects, and which confounds the ambition of Buonaparté, and to true British hearts such prospects and events must ever be matter of proud exultation, however they may disappoint the expectations of

Buonaparté's admirers, and frustrate the views of an ambitious faction ; — that the people in Portugal vie with each other in zeal for the good cause ; — that the desertions from the French army continue ; — that 70 men came over lately in one day and some of these were Frenchmen ; — that our army is getting ready for a general engagement, and that, though a bloody, it will doubtless be a glorious day for Britain, as the armies are nearly equal in force ; — that the soldiers of the French army are very much *discontented*, in consequence of being obliged to cut the corn and to thrash and grind it (whether with their teeth or not, is not mentioned) ; — that Lord Talavera, tells our government, in his last dispatches that Massena is in such *distress for provisions*, that he was obliged to send one half of his army back into Spain ; — that the royal academy of Lisbon has proposed the following question : "What will be the most proper mode of erecting, in Portugal, a monument of eternal gratitude, that may preserve to posterity an indelible testimony of British generosity, which, by the most costly sacrifices, has liberally bestowed all the means of saving our country, and maintaining its independence. Essays on the subject are to be received till the end of December." — This was what had been stated in these prints up to the 16th of this month. On the 17th, the "fashionable world" were told, that Almeida had fallen ! — Yes, that Almeida had fallen, that Mr. Cox, the English Colonel, who commanded in it, was safe, that the event was produced by treachery. But on the 18th, out comes the truth ; or, at least, a part of the truth, in the following words ; before we insert which, however, let us ask, how it comes to pass, that these dispatches of my Lord Talavera, have not been published. Why should these dispatches more than other dispatches, be kept from the eye of the public ? — "Dispatches were received this morning from Lord Wellington, by which it appears that the enemy opened his fire upon Almeida on the night of the 25th, ult. and obtained possession of the place on the night of the 27th. — Some prisoners taken on the 28th report, that the magazines of the Fort blew up on the night of the 25th ; that on the 27th the Governor proposed to surrender the place on condition that the garrison and inhabitants might join Lord Wellington's army, but this was refused,

"and the fire was renewed. The Governor held out *while his ammunition lasted*, and surrendered at two a. m. of the 28th. Offers had been made to the garrison to take them into the French service, *but they all rejected the offer with indignation, and preferred being sent prisoners to France.*—The weather had interrupted Lord Wellington's telegraphic communication with Almeida on the 26th and great part of the 27th, so that he had *no opportunity of knowing its situation* after the explosion of the magazine. — Lord Wellington, has again moved his infantry to the Valley of Mondego, keeping a division on Guarda. His cavalry outposts at Alverca, Head-quarters at Celorico. On the 25th some skirmishes took place between the piquets: Captain Lygon of the 16th, was wounded. A piquet of the Royal Dragoons made a gallant and successful charge upon the body of the enemy, and made some prisoners. — Regnier has made no material movement. Sixty of his cavalry had been cut off by a corps of the 13th Light Dragoons, and a troop of the 4th Portuguese Dragoons under Captain White, and the whole were made prisoners, except the Commanding Officer and one man who were killed. This has been a very creditable affair to the allied cavalry. — In the North, a French corps advanced on the 20th to Alcanezas, but on the approach of General Silveira, from Braganza, they *immediately retreated.* Lord Wellington's dispatch is dated Celorico, the 29th ult. — Since writing the above we hear that 500 men were *blown up* when the magazine of Almeida exploded. The Governor, Cox, is *among the wounded.* — Thus, you see, reader, every thing favourable, that they told us was false. Mr. Cox, it appears, is, *not safe*; the event was not produced by treachery; the resistance made, was of no duration worth speaking of; and, reader, do you not blush, to reflect that they are your countrymen, who, after what you have read above, attempt to make an apology for the surrender of this fortress, which apology they ground upon assertions about *hazy weather* and *want of ammunition*? — These same writers, even at the very time that they are communicating this event to the public, put forth a string of new falsehoods. They assert that the fall of this fortress can have *no influence* on the fortunes of the campaign; that the spirit

of resistance to the French daily spreads wider and burns fiercer; and that, in short, our prospects in that part of the world are *brighter than ever.* — Here I should quit the subject of the war in Portugal for the present, were I not called upon for a word or two by way of answer to the Morning Chronicle, which print, contrary to its general character for correctness, had stated previous to my number of the 8th instant, that we had but a *handful* of men in Portugal, upon which I made a remark (at page 312) which the Morning Chronicle has since construed into a sneer. I did not *sneer*; but, if I had, I am sure Mr. Perry will now excuse the sneer, when he has attentively examined the following document, (doubtless authentic) taken from the *COURIER*, ministerial news-paper of the 17th instant.

24 Regiments of Portuguese Infantry, of 1,550 men each ...	37,000
12 of Cavalry, 594 each	7,128
6 Battalions of Chasseurs, of 628 men each	3,768
The Loyal Lusitanian Legion ...	2,267
4 Regiments of Artillery, of 1,200 men each	4,800
4 ditto ditto, 1,148 men each ...	4,592
<hr/>	
Portuguese Regulars	59,755
48 Regiments of Portuguese Militia, at 1,101 men each	52,848
<hr/>	
English Army	112,603
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Total	142,603

What, then! Where is now the man; I would fain see the man, with a wig or in his own hair; I would fain see the man, who would attempt, after this, to take from me any part of my army of SIXTY THOUSAND FIGHTING MEN. Here are, as the reader will see, 142 thousand men; and, surely this is not a "*handful*," Mr. Perry. It is a number far greater than it has ever been pretended Massena had. Well, then, may we make sure of final success, seeing, too, that Massena's army is daily and hourly wasting with *hunger, sickness, and desertion*, a fact which is stated in every packet of letters that arrives. Observe, too, that this statement does not include *Romana's* army, which, from the last accounts, appears to be 20 thousand more, which would make the whole amount to 162 thousand men; with

which force, if the French are not driven out of Portugal and Spain, there is nothing left for it but to betake ourselves to the Morning Post artillery, namely, the artillery of execrations.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
September 18th, 1810.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—*Proclamation of the DUKE OF DALMATIA (Marshal Soult), relative to the punishment of those Spaniards who oppose the French, without being in an army.*—*Seville, May 9, 1810.*

Don Blas de Aranza, Counsellor of State of his Catholic Majesty, Royal Commissary, Prefect of this Province, &c. His Excellency the Marshal of the Empire, Duke of Dalmatia, has transmitted to me the following orders, dated the 7th inst.:—The state of the South of Spain imperiously requires that vigorous measures should be adopted to encourage respectable people, and destroy those factious bands who endeavour to excite in this unhappy kingdom all the horrors of civil war: it is therefore become necessary, in consequence of this state of affairs, to rigidly enforce the following orders:—**I.** In every place where a civic guard is not organized, and where it is consequently necessary to station Imperial troops to maintain peace and prevent disorders, the pay of the said troops, during the time they may remain in such cantonments, is to be discharged by the inhabitants, who are moreover bound to supply them with the usual articles of subsistence.—**II.** Whatever may be the nature of any crime committed in a district, the inhabitants shall be obliged to pay the value of the stolen property; and in addition thereto, an extraordinary war contribution shall be imposed on them.—**III.** All districts that organize a civic guard, or volunteer companies, for the purpose of protecting the public establishments, maintaining tranquillity, and repressing robbery, shall be exempt from this burthen and penalty.—**IV.** All the inhabitants of a district are responsible in a mass for the safety and preservation of the public funds, as well as the royal treasure; should it, therefore, happen that the districts suffer this property to be carried off by robbers, they shall be immediately amerced in a sum triple the value of the stolen property. The same penalty

shall be inflicted on persons who allow themselves to be robbed, and they shall moreover be liable to the regulations contained in the 1st article.—**V.** Districts that furnish assistance to the bands of robbers, whether in men, horses, beasts of burthen, provisions or forage, or which suffer them to be carried off, shall be obliged to pay into the Royal Treasury three times the value of the articles so supplied, and shall be brought before a tribunal to be tried by the laws against such persons as give assistance in any way to robbers, and against the families of those who attach themselves to such bands.—**VI.** No species of indemnity will be received for the pains and penalties contained in the foregoing articles, unless the inhabitants shall prove that they resisted, and that they were obliged to yield to a superiority of force, which must in all such cases exceed half the population.—**VII.** Should it happen that a district is surprised by a considerable number of robbers, and that its force is not sufficient to repel them, the magistrates are enjoined to adopt all possible means of making it known to the troops in the neighbouring districts, who, so soon as they are apprized of it, are to march without delay to the assistance of the districts that are attacked; but should there be the least neglect on any side in this respect, those guilty of it shall be punished.—**VIII.** The Magistrates of every district are personally responsible for strangers travelling therein, and those residing in it. It is their duty to arrest all persons travelling without a regular passport; those who shall not make known their means of living; persons whose conduct becomes suspicious from making seditious proposals, exciting the inhabitants to join the insurgents, distributing proclamations or false intelligence contrary to the Government of his most Catholic Majesty the King, Don Joseph Napoleon, or maintaining an understanding with the rebels. The persons arrested shall be conducted by the Magistrates to the principal town in the provincial district, and brought before the respective Tribunals, by which they shall be immediately brought to trial.—**IX.** There is no other Spanish army than that of the King Don Joseph Napoleon. Therefore all collections of persons in the provinces, whatever be their number or whoever be their leader, shall be considered only as so many gangs of robbers, whose sole object is plunder and murder. *Every one belonging to these gangs, who is*

taken with arms in his hands, shall be immediately tried by the military Prevot and shot, and his body exposed on the highway.—X. Every individual who shall arrest a murderer or robber who is convicted of being such, shall receive a reward of 100 francs; which shall be increased in proportion to the consequence of the person arrested.—These are the measures which appear to me the most effectual for re-establishing order. They cannot be considered as too severe, when it is known that the weight of them is intended to fall upon criminals, who have hitherto defied the ordinary laws. The object I have in view will be partially obtained, if the respectable classes of the community, animated by greater confidence, will henceforth display more energy, and by so doing render themselves more worthy of the approbation of his Most Catholic Majesty. (Signed)

The Marshal Duke of DALMATIA.

That every one may become acquainted with this, and no one pretend ignorance of it, I have ordered it to be published, in obedience to his Majesty's orders communicated by his Excellency the Duke of Dalmatia. (Signed)

BLAS DE ARANZA.

*Retaliatory Proclamation, issued at Cádiz,
15th Aug. 1810.*

The Council of Regency of the kingdoms of Spain and the Indies, governing these States in the name of their King Ferdinand VII, a prisoner, feeling the utmost horror and indignation on reading a kind of Decree signed at Seville on the 9th May of the present year, by a lunatic, calling himself the Duke of Dalmatia, and published by a degenerate Spaniard of the name of Blas de Aranza, would have forthwith adopted measures against a proceeding offensive to the brave defenders of their religion, their king, and their country, if they could have conceived that the articles of this sanguinary decree were intended to be put in force: but, as experience has not left the least doubt on this point, the Council of Regency feels itself under the necessity of departing from the bounds of that sober conduct, inspired till this moment by their own noble sentiments and those of the magnanimous nation that has placed them at its head, whose dignity it considers to have been grossly insulted; and considering how improperly the epithets of robbers and murderers are applied, by which the

said Duke of Dalmatia, and the French Marshals, and Generals, attempt to justify the unexampled horrors which they commit in countries they have unjustly attacked, and the denaturalization of the small number of Spanish wretches, who by assisting such robbers, flatter themselves they shall be able to complete their perfidious plan of usurpation, by means revolting to humanity, have ordered that the following articles be observed and put in execution.—I. They renew the declaration of the Central Junta on the 20th of March in last year; to wit, that every inhabitant of Spain, capable of bearing arms, is a soldier of his country, because, in consequence of the measures already taken, every Spaniard is obliged to take up arms against the brigands who infest the Peninsula, and join the armies, the flying corps, the detachments, or Guerrillas, acting together or separately, or composing the corps of reserve or garrisons.—II. If on the arrival of the national troops in any district, they shall find there a body, calling itself the Civic Guard, appointed by the Usurper Joseph, the commanders of battalions and other superior officers of such guard shall be immediately taken before the next justices; and in case the national troops have been fired on, the chief or chiefs who ordered it shall be brought before a council of war, and upon conviction shall be punished according to the magnitude of their offence.—III. The Corregidores, Alcades, Justices, &c. of districts who through fear of the French shall refuse to facilitate supplies of provisions or assistance to the national troops, shall be punished, as well as the inhabitants for any charges substantiated against them.—IV. The Justices of districts, and the officers commanding corps or parties, are ordered to arrest every passenger who shall be found bearing the orders of the intrusive government, or who shall represent himself as authorised by such government to make requisitions of provisions or any other articles; he shall be conducted to the next post occupied by the national troops to be there tried and punished.—V. For every Spaniard proved to have been murdered in obedience to the before-mentioned Decree of the Duke of Dalmatia, the first three Frenchmen taken in arms, shall be hanged without fail.—VI. For every house that shall be burned without any other object in view than the execution of that system of devastation proposed by those calling themselves Marshals, Generals, and Chiefs of the

gangs of the tyrant Napoleon, the three first persons taken belonging to the French army shall be hanged, and as many for every one, whatever be his age or condition, who will have perished in the flames, or in consequence of the fire.—VII. Considering that he is the true robber and murderer who kills and plunders from habit, the Council of Regency declares, that so long as the Duke of Dalmatia does not withdraw his sanguinary decree, and does not alter the conduct he has observed in Spain, he shall be personally considered as unworthy of the protection of the law of nations, and be treated like a robber, if he should happen to be taken by any of our troops.—VIII. Although no Marshal of France ever took upon him to publish so atrocious a decree as that of General Soult, calling himself the Duke of Dalmatia, seeing, notwithstanding that all or the greater part of Napoleon's satellites, including therein the Usurper Joseph, as well as the infamous Spaniards who surround him, persist in giving no other names to the Spanish troops than those of insurgents and robbers, the Council of Regency declares that until these offensive names be changed, the French armies in Spain shall be considered in no other light than robbers or assassins, and shall be called by no other name whenever it is necessary to mention them.—IX. This order shall be communicated to the Commander of the National troops, to the Captains General of provinces, to the Governors of fortresses, and all those at the head of corps, moveable columns, detachments, and the leaders of Guerillas. It shall be communicated by these to the enemy's Generals to whom they are opposed; endeavours shall be made to circulate it among the French soldiers, that they may judge with their own eyes, of the measures we are compelled to adopt by the inconsiderate rashness of a madman.—X. The present order shall be, moreover, printed in French and Spanish, and circulated every where, as well within as without the kingdom, that every one may become acquainted with, and that all Europe may shudder at the horrible conduct of these enemies of the human race; and that all the powers, the allies, or rather the slaves of France, already too unfortunate in having their children, their relations, and their friends in the French armies, may see the inevitable fate prepared for them by the cruelty of a monster, who having been disappointed in his plans of conquest, makes a last effort; persuading himself without

doubt, that by these means he will find no difficulty in subjecting a nation, which never ceases to shew the superlative contempt with which it regards such threats, and whose greatness of soul encreases so wonderfully in its reverses, that the Tyrant of France should in future be convinced, that all his forces and those of his allies are far from being sufficient to subdue a people, who have sworn to defend their rights, and to maintain them with equal perseverance and bravery.—*His Majesty has ordered me to communicate this Royal Order to you, that it may be published, circulated, and afterwards carried into execution.* (Signed)

EUSEBIO DE BARDAXI and *f* ZARA.

BRAZILS.—*Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.—Signed at Rio de Janeiro, the 19th of February, 1810.*

In the Name of the most Holy and Undivided Trinity.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, being impressed with a sense of the advantage which the two Crowns have derived from the perfect harmony and friendship which have subsisted between them during four centuries, in a manner equally honourable to the good faith, moderation, and justice of both parties, and recognizing the important and happy effects which their mutual alliance has produced at the present crisis, during which his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal (firmly attached to the cause of Great Britain, as well by his own principles as by the example of his august ancestors,) has continually received from his Britannic Majesty the most generous and disinterested support and succour, both in Portugal and his other dominions, have determined, for the benefit of their respective states and subjects to form a solemn treaty of friendship and alliance: for which purpose his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, have named for their respective Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries, to wit, his Britannic Majesty the most Illustrious and most Excellent Lord Percy Clinton Sydney, Lord Viscount and Baron of Strangford, one of his Majesty's most Honourable

Privy Council, Knight of the Military Order of the Bath, Grand Cross of the Portuguese Order of the Tower and Sword, and his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Portugal; and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, the most Illustrious and most Excellent Lord Don Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, Count of Linhares, Lord of Payalvo, Commander of the Order of Christ, Grand Cross of the Order of Saint Bento, and of the Order of the Tower and Sword, one of his Royal Highness's Council of State, and his Principal Secretary of State for the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War; who, after having duly exchanged their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles: Article I. There shall be a perpetual firm and unalterable friendship, defensive alliance, and strict and inviolable union, between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors, on the one part, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, his heirs and successors on the other part; as also between and amongst their respective kingdoms, dominions, provinces, countries, and subjects, so that the high contracting parties shall constantly employ as well their utmost attention as all these means which Almighty Providence has put in their power, for preserving the public tranquillity and security, for maintaining their common interests and for their mutual defence and guarantee against every hostile attack, the whole in conformity to the treaties already subsisting between the high contracting parties; the stipulations of which, so far as the points of alliance and friendship are concerned, shall remain in entire force and vigour, and shall be deemed to be renewed by the present treaty in their fullest interpretation and extent.—II. In consequence of the engagement contracted by the preceding article, the two High Contracting Parties shall always act in concert for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, and in case that either of them should be threatened with a hostile attack by any power whatever, the other shall employ its most earnest and effectual good offices, either for preventing hostilities, or for procuring just and complete satisfaction to the injured party.—III. In conformity with this declaration, his Britannic Majesty agrees to renew and confirm, and does hereby renew and confirm, to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, the engagement contained in the sixth Article of the Con-

vention signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries in London on the twenty-second day of October, 1807, which Article is hereunto subjoined, with the omission only of the words "previously to his departure for Brazil," which words immediately followed the words "which his Royal Highness may establish in Portugal."—"The seat of the Portuguese Monarchy being established in Brazil, his Britannic Majesty promises in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, never to acknowledge as King of Portugal any Prince other than the heir and legitimate representative of the Royal House of Braganza; and his Majesty also engages to renew and maintain with the Regency (which his Royal Highness may establish in Portugal) the relations of friendship which have so long united the Crowns of Great Britain and Portugal."—And the two High Contracting Parties do also renew and confirm the additional articles relating to the Island of Madeira, signed in London on the 16th day of March, 1803, and engage faithfully to execute such of them as remain to be executed.—IV. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal renews and confirms to his Britannic Majesty the engagement which has been made in his royal name, to make good all and several the losses and defalcations of property sustained by the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, in consequence of the various measures which the Court of Portugal was unwillingly obliged to take in the month of November, 1807. And this article is to be carried into full effect as soon as possible after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.—V. It is agreed, that in case it should appear that any losses or injuries in point of property have been sustained either by the Portuguese Government, or by the subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in consequence of the state of public affairs at the time of the amicable occupation of Goa by the troops of his Britannic Majesty; the said losses and injuries shall be duly investigated, and that upon due proof thereof they shall be made good by the British Government.—VI. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, preserving a grateful remembrance of the service and assistance which his Crown and family have received from the Royal Navy of England, being convinced that it has been by the powerful exertions of that navy in support of the rights and independence of Europe, that the most effectual barrier has hitherto

been opposed to the ambition and injustice of other states ; and desiring to give a proof of confidence and perfect friendship to his true and ancient ally the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, is pleased to grant to his Britannic Majesty the privilege of causing timber for the purpose of building ships of war to be purchased and cut down in the woods, forests, and chases of Brazil (excepting in the Royal Forests, which are appointed for the use of the Portuguese navy,) together with permission to cause ships of war to be built, equipped, or repaired within the ports and harbours of that Empire, a previous application and notice being made in each instance (for form's sake) to the Court of Portugal, which shall immediately appoint an officer of the royal navy to assist and attend upon these occasions. And it is expressly declared and promised that these privileges shall not be granted to any other nation or state whatsoever.—VII. It is stipulated and agreed by the present Treaty, that if at any time a squadron or number of ships of war should be sent by either of the high contracting parties for the succour and assistance of the other, the party receiving the succour and assistance shall, at its own proper charge and expence, furnish the said squadron or ships of war (so long as they may be actually employed for its benefit, protection, or service), with the articles of fresh beef, vegetables, and fuel, in the same proportion in which those articles are usually supplied to its own ships of war, by the party so granting the succour and assistance. And this agreement is declared to be reciprocally binding on each of the high contracting parties.—VIII. Whereas it is stipulated by former Treaties between Great Britain and Portugal, that in times of peace the ships of war of the former power, that may be admitted at any one time into any port belonging to the other, shall not exceed the number of six, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, confiding in the faith and permanency of his alliance with his Britannic Majesty, is pleased to abrogate and annul this restriction altogether, and to declare, that henceforward any number of ships whatever, belonging to his Britannic Majesty, may be admitted at one time into any port belonging to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal. And it is further

stipulated that this privilege shall not be granted to any other nation or state whatever, whether in return for any other equivalent, or in virtue of any subsequent treaty or agreement, it being solely founded upon the principles of the unexampled amity and confidence which have during so many ages subsisted between the Crowns of Great Britain and Portugal. And it is further agreed and stipulated, that transports, *bona fide* such, and actually employed on the service of either of the high contracting parties, shall be treated within the ports of the other on the same footing as if they were ships of war.—His Britannic Majesty does also agree on his part to permit any number of ships belonging to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, to be admitted at one time into any port of his Britannic Majesty's dominions, and there to receive succour and assistance if necessary, and be otherwise treated as the ships of the most favoured nation ; this engagement being also reciprocal between the two high contracting parties.—IX. The Inquisition or Tribunal of the Holy Office not having been hitherto established or recognized in Brazil, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, guided by an enlightened and liberal policy, takes the opportunity afforded by the present Treaty to declare spontaneously in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, that the Inquisition shall not hereafter be established in the South American dominions of the Crown of Portugal.—And his Britannic Majesty, in consequence of this declaration on the part of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, does on his part engage and declare that the fifth article of the Treaty of 1654, in virtue of which certain exemptions from the authority of the Inquisition are exclusively granted to British subjects, shall be considered as null and having no effect in the South American dominions of the Crown of Portugal. And his Britannic Majesty consents that this abrogation of the fifth article of the Treaty of 1654, shall also extend to Portugal upon the abolition of the Inquisition in that country, by the command of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and generally to all other parts of his Royal Highness's dominions where he may hereafter abolish that tribunal.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"It is not altogether improbable, that, when the nation becomes heartily sick of its Debts, and is cruelly oppressed by them, some daring projector may arise with a *novel scheme for their discharge*, and, as public credit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, the least touch will destroy it, and in this manner it will die of its Doctor. But, it is more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the necessary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even, perhaps, of victories and conquests."—HUME on Public Credit.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY

LETTER VI.

Saying that a man writes from a prison is not a satisfactory reputation of his arguments—Proceed with the subject of the Sinking Fund—Alleged grounds of Addington's Act in 1802—The time when it was to begin to yield us relief, to wit, 4½ years—Mr. Brand's answer to an argument of mine—He denies that interest is paid upon the redeemed stock—Acts of Parliament and Public Accounts say the contrary—Examination of the Example stated by Mr. Brand—Great error in regarding things as alike which are essentially dissimilar in their properties—Consequence of this error shown in the supposed case of Thrifty—Grand fallacy in supposing that what we pay to support the Sinking Fund, would otherwise be of no use to us—Conclusion of the subject of the Sinking Fund—P. S. Mr. Randall Jackson's speech at the Bank Company's House, in Threadneedle Street.

Gentlemen,

It was naturally to be expected, that those venal men, who for want of industry to "labour with their hands the thing that is good," and from a desire to live upon the labour of others, have chosen the occupation of writing, instead of obeying the voice of nature, which bade use the brush and not the pen, to blacken shoes and not paper; it was naturally to be expected that those venal men, who gain their livelihood by serving the corrupt and by deceiving the weak, and

the number of whom, in this Town, is, unfortunately, but too great; it was naturally to be expected that this description of men would feel alarmed at the progress of these Letters, which, by making honest and useful truths so familiar to the minds of the people, threatened literary venality with destruction. Accordingly these instruments of Corruption have shewn their anger and resentment against me; but, the only answer they have offered to me is this: "that I discharge my gun from a stone-battery;" meaning that I write from a prison; therein giving the public a specimen of their wit as well as of their *manliness*. This is always the way; it is the constant practice of those, who, while they are, from whatever motive, impelled to oppose a writer, want either the materials or the ability to shew that he is wrong; and, Gentlemen, you may lay it down as a maxim, that when any publication is answered by abuse, and especially personal abuse, the author of such publication is right, or, at least, that his abusers want the ability to shew that he is wrong. Facts and reasoning, if erroneous, always admit of refutation; but, if correct, no one can refute them; and, if erroneous, to refute may still require some ability; whereas, to abuse the person from whom they have proceeded, is within the power of every one, a gift not denied to any creature capable of uttering articulate sounds or of making marks upon paper. The great cause, however, of abuse in such cases, is the weight of the truths, against which such abuse is opposed: for it is here as in common verbal disputes, he, who has the truth clearly on his side, is always seen to be in good temper, while his opponent scarcely ever fails to discover impatience and anger, and, in but too many cases, to give way to personal invective and false accusation; and, be you well assured, Gentlemen, that even the venal men, above-described, answer me by saying that

I write from a prison, only because they have no other answer to give.

Leaving them in the full possession and unenvied enjoyment of all the advantage and of all the honour which such a mode of answering can give, let us proceed with our inquiry into the effects of the SINKING FUND, just casting our eye back first, and refreshing our memory as to the foregone facts; namely, that the Sinking-Fund Acts of 1791, which provided for the cutting off some part of the interest upon the Debt in 1808; that these provisions, which led the poor nation to hope for a taking off of part of its taxes in 1808; that these provisions, which, as we have seen, were held forth to the believing people of England, in the pamphlet of GEORGE ROSE, as the sure and undoubted pledge for the taking off of taxes in 1808, or thereabouts; that these provisions, in order to begin to taste the benefit of which, the people were to pay a million a year of additional taxes for twenty-two years; that these provisions; yes, we must bear in mind, that these provisions, after the people had gone on hoping for sixteen years out of the twenty-two: that these provisions, were, by ADDINGTON'S Act of 1802, repealed, done away, made of no more effect than if they never had been enacted by the Parliament.

"Well," you will say, "but upon what ground was this measure adopted? What end was it proposed to answer?" Oh! why it was to pay off the Debt, new as well as old (for, by this time, the Debt, contracted since the existence of the Sinking Fund, was become greater than the one contracted before;) it was to pay off the Debt, new as well as old, sooner than they would have been paid off, if this new Act had not been passed. And, it was said, in support of the measure, that it would be better for us (good God, what a "thinking" people we are!) not to have any of our taxes taken off in 1803; but to go on paying interest upon the whole of the Debt, as before, till our Sinking-Fund Commissioners had bought up the whole of the Stock, and that, then (Oh, then!) then, my boys, huzza! For, then we should be completely out of Debt.

"Thinking people" of England, when do you think that that was to arrive? When do you think that it was supposed that our Commissioners would have bought

up the whole of the Stock existing when the new Act was passed? When do you think that the day, the happy day, the new day of promise was to come? When do you think we were, according to this Act for rendering the Sinking Fund "MORE EFFECTUAL;" when, aye when do you think, that we were, according to this improved plan, to begin to feel the effects of it, in the lessening of our taxes? How many years do you think we were to wait; how many years to keep paying additional taxes for the purpose of paying off the Debt, before we began to taste of any redemption of Taxes in consequence of it? Only FORTY FIVE! Forty five years only had we to wait; and now we have only THIRTY NINE to wait, and to pay taxes all the time, over and above the interest upon the Debt; only thirty nine years before we shall cease to pay interest upon the whole of the Debt existing in 1802; about five eighths of the Debt now existing. We have been waiting ever since the year 1786; we have been waiting for twenty four years; we have been paying taxes all that time, over and above the interest of the Debt; we have, for twenty four years, been paying taxes for the purpose of paying off the Debt; and now, at the end of these twenty four years, those of us who are alive have the consolation to reflect, that we have only thirty nine years more to wait and to pay these Sinking Fund taxes, before we shall begin to taste the fruit of all this patience and all these sacrifices, and that, at the blessed time here-mentioned, some of our taxes will be taken off; unless another Act should be passed, between this time and that, for rendering the last made Act "MORE EFFECTUAL."

Gentlemen, need I say more? Certainly it is not necessary; but, there are still some views to take of this matter, which having taken, we may defy all the world to puzzle us upon this subject again.

We have seen, that we still pay interest upon the whole of the Debt; we have seen, in Letter IV. p. 362, that, since the Sinking Fund was established, the interest we pay has increased from nine millions and upwards to thirty-two millions and upwards; and, we humbly think, at least I do, that so long as I am compelled to pay interest for a Debt, it is no matter to whom,

or under *what name*, I pay it. This is so obvious a truth, and there is something so consummately ridiculous in the idea of a nation's *getting money* by paying interest to *itself* upon its *own stock*, that the mind of every rational man naturally rejects it. It is, really, something little short of madness to suppose, that a nation can *increase its wealth*; increase its *means of paying others*; that it can do this by *paying interest to itself*. When time is taken to reflect, no rational man will attempt to maintain a proposition so shockingly absurd. I put the thing in this way in an Article, published by me in 1804,* and I requested the late REV. JOHN BRAND, who had written a great deal upon the subject, to look at the Article, and to tell me what sort of answer he could find to this part of it. He did so, and the following was his answer :

"I have looked at your observations on the Sinking Fund; and the following is my answer to your great argument; namely, "that the Debt said to be redeemed is an imaginary discharge, "because INTEREST *thereon* continues to "be paid."—If the interest *does* continue to be paid, the conclusion is just; and this is the fundamental principle of much of what you have said.—It is reduced, therefore, to a question of fact, and I should say the interest does not continue to be paid, the same tax continues to be levied, it is paid also away, but it is paid for another purpose: it is yearly applied to the paying of more principal; no part of it is applied to the payment of interest.—Take an example in a private concern, A has on his estate a mortgage of £.70,000 at 3 per cent. which he has the liberty to pay off as he pleases. He determines to diminish his expenditure by £.1,000 a year, at the end of the year he pays the interest £.2,100, and part of the principal £.1,000, his payment that year is £.3,100, and this sum he continues to pay annually till the debt is annihilated; it is now reduced to £.69,000; at the end of the second year there will be due for interest £.2,070, being 30 less than the year before; when, therefore, the second payment of £.3,100 is made, it will consist of two parts, £.1,030 for principal, and £.2,070 for interest.—The interest of the £.1,000 paid off the

"first year does not continue to be paid "in the second, and the £.30 interest of "the part of the capital redeemed or paid "off is now applied to the payment of more "capital.—Such mortgager at the end "of the year has actually paid off "£.1,000, of year two £.2,030, and of "year three £.3,060 18s. And that he "continues to pay annually the same sum "on account of debt, that is, on account "of principal and interest jointly, does "not in the least affect this conclusion."

Now, in the first place, you see, Mr. BRAND takes up "a new position," as most combatants do, when they are afraid to meet their antagonist. He is obliged to say, that we DO NOT continue to pay interest upon the part of the Debt, which is bought up, or, as it is called, redeemed. Aye! but, what say the Acts of Parliament? They say, that interest is continued to be paid thereon: they say, that, when any Stock, or parts of the Debt, are bought up, or redeemed, by the Commissioners, "the dividends thereon shall be received by the said Commissioners," or by the Bank on their account. And, what is the language of the Accounts, laid before Parliament? Why, in the account of the nation's Expenditure of last year, there is the following item: "INTEREST on "Debt of Great Britain REDEEMED, "£.443,519." So that, either the Acts of Parliament and the Public Accounts make use of misnomers, or, I was right in calling it interest. Besides, how completely does this denial of Mr. BRAND dissipate all our fine dreams about the gains of the Sinking Fund? Is it not the commonly received opinion, that we gain money by this fund? Are we not continually told, by the venal writers of the day, about what the Fund yields? Were we not told by them, less than six weeks ago, that this Fund had produced such and such sums? And, what is meant by a Fund's yielding and producing, if you cast the notion of interest aside? In what other way is it to yield? In what other way can it produce an addition to its amount? Yet, on the other hand, it is impossible to adhere to this notion of interest, without falling into the gross absurdity, before mentioned, of supposing that the nation can get money; that it can increase its means of paying others, by paying interest to itself, by becoming the lender of money to itself, by becoming its own creditor; an absurdity, which, as we have seen, Mr. BRAND dared

* REGISTER, Vol. V. page 491.

not risk his reputation in attempting to support.

We now come to Mr. BRAND's "example in a private concern." And here, Gentlemen, suffer me once more, and in a more pressing manner than before, to solicit your attention; because we have now before us the ground work of all the sad delusion, which has so long existed, and which does still exist, upon this subject.

It is a natural propensity of the mind of man to assimilate things, which he wishes to understand, with things which he does understand. Hence the application of the terms *mortgage*, *redemption*, and others, to the Debt of the Nation. But, in this work of assimilation, or *bringing things to a resemblance for the purposes of illustration*, we ought to take the greatest care, not to make use of violence, not to regard as *alike*, things which are *essentially different in their properties*; for, if we do this, error must be the result, and, I think, you will find, that this has been done by all those, who have reasoned like Mr. BRAND; that is to say, *the whole* of those writers and speakers, who have held forth the Sinking Fund as likely to produce relief to the country.

We know, we daily see, that *private persons* pay off *encumbrances upon their estates*; and, we know very well and very familiarly, how fast the money of private persons increases by being permitted to lie at *compound interest*. This very common portion of knowledge appears to have been quite enough for our Financiers, who had, therefore, nothing to do but to look into *interest tables*, where they would not fail to find, that a million a year set apart, in 1786, would, at compound interest, pay off the then existing Debt, in the space of *sixty years* from that time. They ask no more. This quite satisfies them. They have no doubts upon the subject; and, accordingly, they set apart the million a year; that is to say, they make a law for applying, as we have seen, a million a year of taxes, raised upon the nation, to the paying off the nation's Debts. But, where is the real *similarity* between this proceeding, and the proceeding of the *individual* as supposed by Mr. Brand, Mr. M^r Arthur, Mr. Pitt and others; for they have all made use of the same sort of illustration? Where is the *similarity* in the cases?

Mr. BRAND's individual, to whom, for the sake of clearness, we will give the name of THRIFTY, *diminishes his expenditure* by a thousand a year; that is, he, instead of spending it upon beer, wine, bread, beef, and servants, pays it annually to GOLDHAIR, who has the mortgage upon his estate. Now, this you will clearly see, is to be a thousand a year SAVED by THRIFTY; and, besides this, he resolves to pay to GOLDHAIR (who has the mortgage on the estate, mind) as much more every year as will make each payment equal to what he formerly paid on account of the interest of the whole debt. This is an odd sort of way to do the thing, but it is THRIFTY's humour, and there can be no doubt, that, in time, he will, thus, pay off his mortgage. But, again, I ask, what *similarity* there is in the case of THRIFTY and the case of a NATION?

THRIFTY, we are told, "*determines to diminish his expenditure.*" Can a NATION do this? THRIFTY knows to a *certainly* what his income and what his expenditure will be; the former is *fixed*, and over the latter he has *complete controul*. Is this the case with a NATION? Prudent THRIFTY does not, and, indeed, *the supposition will not let him* contract a debt with SILVERLOCKS, while he is clearing off with GOLDHAIR. Is this the case with a NATION? But suppose, for argument's sake, that, as to all these, there is a perfect similarity; still is there a point of dissimilarity, which nothing can remove. THRIFTY, we are told, SAVES a thousand pounds a year. *How* does the saving arise? Why, he has less beer, wine, bread, beef, and servants than he had before. His saving, then, is made from the brewer, the wine-merchant, the baker, the butcher, and the footmen; or, rather, it is made from *the public*; it is made from *the nation*; it is made from *a third party*. But where is the NATION to find a *third party* from whom to make its saving?

But, what we are now going to view is the GRAND FALLACY. In this case of THRIFTY it is supposed, that he makes retrenchments from *useless* expences; that "*he determines to diminish his expences by a thousand a year,*" and that, what he WASTED before, what HE GOT NOTHING BY THE USE OF BEFORE, he now applies to the paying off of his mortgage. This is very rational, and very efficient it would be; but, is this the

case with A NATION? Would the money, which is collected from the people *in taxes*, for the purpose of supporting the Sinking Fund, be *wasted*, if not collected from them? Would it be *squandered away* by the several individuals who pay it, in the same manner that THRIFTY's thousand a year is supposed to have been wasted, before he began the work of redemption? Would it, in short, be of *no advantage* to them, if it were not taken away to be given to the Sinking Fund? Oh, yes! And it would produce a compound interest, too, in the hands of individuals, as well as in the hands of the Sinking-Fund Commissioners. What has the nation *gained*, then, by paying millions to Commissioners, instead of keeping those millions in their own hands? SINCE THE YEAR 1786, THE NATION HAS PAID UPWARDS OF 160 MILLIONS INTO THE HANDS OF THE SINKING-FUND COMMISSIONERS; that is to say, so much money has been *collected from the people in taxes* for the purpose of redeeming Debt; and, if this sum had been left in the people's hands, would it have been of *no use to them*? Would it not, at any rate, have *helped* to prevent the Debt, *since that time*, from being AUGMENTED IN THE SUM OF 600 MILLIONS.

Let us give the thing one more turn, and then, it is, I think, hard, if we may not safely quit it for ever.

THRIFTY is supposed to take his thousand a year out of what he before *wasted*; out of his *superfluities*. But, does our Sinking-Fund money; do the taxes that we pay towards the Sinking Fund, come out of our *superfluities*? And, why suppose that THRIFTY *wasted* any money before? Why suppose that *he had any money to waste*? Is THRIFTY's being *in debt*, and having his *estate encumbered*; are these reasons sufficient for concluding, that he had it in his power to "*determine to diminish his expences*?" Are they not rather reasons sufficient for concluding, that he was in circumstances of distress? Yes; and if, when we have come to that rational conclusion, we suppose him persuaded to believe, that he will get out of debt by *borrowing from SILVERLOCKS all the money that he pays off with GOLDHAIR*, and loading his estate with a new mortgage, *with the addition of the cost of bonds and fees*, then we shall have before our eyes "*an example in a private concern*," pretty well calcu-

lated to illustrate the celebrated scheme, which we have now been discussing, and of which I now flatter myself that a single word more need never be uttered to any man of sound understanding.

I am,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,

September 20, 1810.

P. S.—FRIDAY, 21st SEPT.—I have just seen, in the public Prints, a report of a Speech, said to have been delivered yesterday at The Bank Company's House, in Threadneedle Street, by MR. RANDALL JACKSON. I shall not, as I said before, suffer any publications of the day to interrupt the course of my discussion. In my next LETTER, which will open the way to that memorable transaction, the *Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank of England*, I shall, in all likelihood, have occasion to notice Mr. Jackson's Speech, not so much on its own account, as because it appears to have been highly applauded by the people at the head of the Bank Company, for whom, perhaps, MR. JACKSON, who, it seems, is a *lawyer*, made it in the way of his profession. One word, however, I must beg leave to add upon the part of this Gentleman's speech, in which, as the reporter says, he alluded *to me*, as one who had exulted at the appearance of the Bullion Report, because that Report, coming from such *high authority*, had put the *stamp of correctness on my opinions*. Never did I say this; never did I think this. Never did I look upon the Bullion Committee as a *high authority*; and, meanly indeed should I think of myself, if I thought any thing, that they could say or do, capable of adding the smallest weight to my opinions. No: what I exulted at was, that my principles and doctrines, as to paper-money, had, at last, produced *practical effect*, a proof of which was contained in the Bullion Report; and that, it was now more likely than before, that such measures would, in time, be adopted, as would be likely to secure the country from the natural consequences of that overwhelming CORRUPTION, and that want of love for the Constitution, which I regarded as the fruit of the Paper-money System, and which, years ago, I proved, as I think, to have proceeded, in great part, from that *poisonous and all-degrading root*. This was the cause of my exulta-

tion. I looked upon the Bullion Report as tending to this great object; and, as I prefer the accomplishment of this object, as I look upon the happiness and honour of my country as of far greater value to me than any other worldly possession, I said, and I still say, that the Bullion Report has given me more pleasure than I should derive from being made the owner of the whole of Hampshire. As for any idea of a *party* nature, I shall, I am sure, be believed when I say, that I did not care one straw to what party the Committee belonged. If I had a wish as to party it certainly would be, that *no change of ministry* should take place; for, (without prejudice to the OUTS, who, I think, would do the thing full as well with a little more time) I am quite satisfied that the present men will do it as neatly and as quickly as any reasonable man can expect.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MORNING POST TURNED TURK.—On Wednesday last, the 19th instant, the "*fashionable World's*" news-paper contained the following passage:—"The Foreign intelligence, given in another part of our Paper, will be found not unimportant. There seems no doubt of the fact of the Russians having completely failed, and most severely suffered in their repeated attempts against Schumla; and we are happy to find that the Turks are at length aroused to that degree of enthusiasm which formerly marked the Mussulman character, and rendered the followers of Mahomet the terror of Europe; they are making the most extraordinary exertions to carry on the war against the Russians, and certainly not without a fair and reasonable prospect of success."—I have, more than once, given it as my opinion, that the HYPOCRITES would, if it answered, or they thought it answered their purpose, not have the smallest scruple to applaud, or even join, His most SATANIC MAJESTY, were he, in his proper person, to come, according to their own notions of him, horned and hooved and tailed, and stinking of fire and brimstone. To give this opinion seriously seems to be sporting with one's veracity; but, is it going much too far, when we hear this writer seriously declaring; putting into print; promulgating to the world; that he is happy to find, that the Turks are now animated with the same spirit, which formerly rendered the fol-

lowers of Mahomet the terror of Europe, and that their recent exertions against a Christian sovereign have been successful? When we have this before our eyes; when we see this published in the metropolis of England; when we see this addressed to "the fashionable World" in England; when this is the case, can we go too far, can even imagination overstep the bounds, in a conjecture as to the lengths to which the HYPOCRITES would go in their search for friends and associates?—But, reader, our great business, in the present state of things, where so many venal writers are, in perfect security to themselves, employing their pens for the sole purpose of deceiving us, of leading us on from one falshood to another, till, when we see the gulph yawning before us, it is too late to stop; in such a state of things, it is our great business to detect and expose them, and thus to render their efforts of no avail. This declaration of the writer, on whom we have now seized, is bad enough in itself; in itself it is sufficiently indecent, quite a sufficient insult to the public understanding and sense of propriety; but, not more than half its odiousness is seen, till we look to the same writer's paper of the 3d instant, where, in speaking of the Prince de Ponte Corvo's (General Bernadotte's) election to the heirship to the Swedish Crown, he affects to be alarmed for the safety and honour of Russia, and expresses his earnest hope, that this event in Sweden will "convince the Emperor Alexander, that his only security is in a sincere and close alliance with Great Britain, under whose protecting wings he is sure to experience a prompt and effectual shelter."—When this was published, when it stood by itself, one was struck with its assurance, with the unparalleled effrontery, that could have enabled a man, with eyes to look round the world, to put it upon paper. But, what shall we say to it now? Where shall we now find words to characterize this passage, when put side by side with the one which is above quoted, and in which the writer is happy to find, that this same Emperor Alexander, whom he was inviting to take shelter under the protecting wings of Great Britain, has been beaten by the Turks?—How disgraceful, both to the head and the heart of its authors, its promoters, and encouragers, is a publication like this!—And, must it not, if it ever reach foreign countries, do the character,

and even the cause, of this country, a great deal of harm? I do not suppose, that a paper like the *Morning Post*, which seldom contains any thing calculated to inform or instruct, is sent much abroad, where people want real information; but, it is not to be doubted that the agents of foreign princes, will take care to inform them of what is said in a print like this, upon matters, wherein they are deeply interested; and, if the two passages above quoted, should find their way to the Emperor Alexander, accompanied with an account of the *Morning Post*, is it to be supposed, that they will produce in his mind sentiments favourable to England; is it to be supposed, that they will have a tendency to detach him from his ally Napoleon, and convince him of the propriety of seeking for safety under the "*protecting wings*" of Great Britain?—Let the public think of this; but, indeed, it requires very little thinking to convince them, that such publications must be a source of great mischief to the country, and that they have been one great cause of that hatred against us, of which we, unfortunately, see but too many proofs, in almost every part of the continent of Europe, and which we, resolved not to look at home for the cause of evil, have ascribed wholly to the calumnies and intrigues of the French.

HOLLAND.—Just in the same spirit does this same print, of only yesterday, speak of the conduct of the Dutch, who, it seems, are taking the oath of allegiance to Napoleon, and whom this writer speaks of thus:—"Of the Dutch little can now be expected beyond what is dictated by the partizans and emissaries of the Tyrant of the Continent. Of the complete prostration of all patriotic spirit in Holland, after so long a series of oppression and humiliation, what other proof could have been looked for than the degrading ceremony of the once spirited and high-minded Dutch taking the oath of allegiance, even as military men, to Bonaparté, the scourge and curse of their country, and, as far as he can entrap and subdue them, the oppressor and the scourge of every other nation in the world."—This is after the old fashion. The moment any nation, no matter from what cause, whether from its natural weakness, the fault of its former rulers, or from its own wishes; the moment any nation, no matter from what cause, be-

comes subject to France, that moment do these heroes of the quill, in London, assail them with every epithet and every term expressive of contempt; that moment they become degraded, prostrated, degenerate, and every thing that is vile. —Now, to say nothing of the injustice of this, is it not manifestly impolitic? Such nation, supposing it to be in a state of forced subjection (which, by-the-bye, these writers always suppose) feels its degradation quite enough without being reminded of it by us; and, he has spent his time in the world to very little profit, who does not see, that to reproach men with what they feel to be a degradation is the sure way to reconcile them, if any thing can, to the party, by whom they have been degraded, and who holds them in subjection; while, on the other hand, it is as sure to excite in their breasts hatred implacable against their reproacher, and, at the same time, an eager desire to see him reduced to the same situation with themselves. —If this be the invariable course of the feelings of mankind, in such cases, what must be the tendency of these reproaches, uttered by our writers against the Dutch, a people whom of all others common sense calls upon us not to exasperate against us, and especially when, by so doing, we cannot point out any counterbalancing good? We see, that Napoleon is making every species of preparation for sending forth the force of Holland against this country; not a mail arrives without something to convince us that this is the case; and, every man in the kingdom, is, I believe, now satisfied, that the time cannot be very distant, when the whole force of that country will be put into movement for our annoyance. Yet, unless he has the people of Holland with him, and especially, unless he has the military and naval officers heartily in his cause, that force, great as it may be numerically, will be but half efficient. What, then, let me ask you, reader; what, but mere spite; what, but senseless spite; what, but a complete predominance of the meanest of passion, in the meanest of men, could induce any one, in this country, at such a time, to point the finger of scorn at the military and naval officers of Holland, seeing that it is, as I dare say the reader will perceive, almost impossible, that, if such a publication has any effect at all, that effect must not be to make these officers exert all their energies in a war against England?—Besides,

what sort of prospect does this conduct of ours, as far as the language of these prints is considered to be the language of the nation; what sort of prospect does this conduct hold out to those nations, who, with us, are still combatting against Napoleon, as the Dutch were a few years ago? Is it not saying to those nations, that, if their exertions should prove, at last, unavailing, they, too, will be held up by us as proper objects of scorn and derision? And, is this the way to induce them to continue the struggle, at all hazards, 'till it is out of their power to fire another shot? Am I answered by being told, that these reproaches are bestowed upon those nations only, who *willingly* submit to Napoleon? This distinction is good: this is a good answer: but, then, what does it do? Why, as applied to Holland, it completely knocks down; it lays in the dust; it utterly annihilates, all that these same prints said, only about a month back, respecting the feelings of the Dutch towards Napoleon, who, we were then told (see page 274) were "*made to thank him*;" while they "*felt for his government hatred, loathing, and disgust*," which, we were told, "*was notorious*."—What, reader, I put it to your good sense; what is the world to think; what can the world think of this shameful blowing hot and cold with the same mouth? It is hard, that the whole of a good and just people should suffer for the follies, the madness (to give it no worse name) of a few newspaper writers; but, I am, perfectly convinced, that, in various ways, it has done, and will, if persevered in, do, great injury to this country, both at home and abroad.

SWEDEN.—Under the head of Stockholm of the date of August 29, our public prints, of the 18th instant, give us the following Article.—“That two couriers arrived here on the 12th inst. from Paris, is not correct; but on the preceding day a traveller from that capital, and on the following day, a Gentleman of the King's Household: neither one or the other brought any dispatches from the Prince of Ponte Corvo, nor his portrait. As to the statement that the Prince had offered considerable advantages to the kingdom in case of his being elected successor to the Swedish throne, the *thinking part* of the public will be best able to judge of its truth, when they are assured that the Emperor Napoleon, refraining from any kind of in-

terference, left the choice of a Crown Prince, without the least influence or compulsion, to the King and States; that the eminent qualities and endowments of the Prince of Ponte Corvo, universally acknowledged, and not loose rumours of advantageous offers, determined the States of the Realm to grant to the said Prince the succession of the throne; and lastly, that it would be perfectly inconsistent with the exalted character of that Prince to promise advantages to the Swedish trade which perhaps it might not be in his power to procure.”—Now, to say the truth, I do not believe one word of this assertion as to the non-interference of the Emperor Napoleon, at whose special request, or, rather, at whose command, the choice, I have no doubt was made. But, the article is material as it pretty clearly shows, that there is none of that resistance to him in Sweden, for which we were led to hope. The thing has been done, you see, as quietly as the choosing of a “*representative*” for GARTON or OLD SARUM. No opposition; nor, *as far as we hear*, any other of the accompaniments of such an event; though, it is by no means improbable, that there may have been, some of those silent accompaniments, which, out of respect for candidates as well as constituents, both in Sweden, and England, shall here be nameless.—The Emperor of Russia, too, and the King of Denmark, who, we were told, were highly offended at the choice, and were even preparing for war against France, on account of it, are, we are now told, contending for the honour of having the new Crown Prince pass through their territories in his way to those, over which he is, apparently, destined to rule. “Invitations,” says the COURIER, of yesterday, 20th instant, “have been sent to Bernadotte, both by the Emperor of Russia and the King of Denmark to do them the honour to pass through their territories on his way to Stockholm. The route is a little circuitous, no doubt, but the direct road from Stralsund might expose the Crown Prince to some perils which he has no taste for encountering. Alexander and the King of Denmark must feel great pleasure forsooth in doing the honours of their Capitals to the future King of Sweden. In his election they may read their fate. Buonaparté seemed to support the King of Denmark, and something was said in his favour in the French official journal to mask the real intention, and to give the election

"of a French General something of the appearance of a spontaneous act of the Swedish States. It would not have been consistent with Buonaparté's policy to have permitted Denmark and Sweden, by associating under one foreign crown, to form an empire, which, by its magnitude, might have assumed a higher tone of independence than he is willing to allow to any Continental State; and it would also have been yielding too much influence to Russia, to whom Denmark has been but a satellite moving within the sphere of her attraction. *The object of Buonaparté*, as the present direction of his policy shows, is to throw back Russia northward, if not in territory, yet in influence, and perhaps in both. *This has for many years been a favourite project with the French politicians*, and Buonaparté's offensive and defensive treaty with Austria, cemented by the family connection, has so far strengthened his ability to accomplish it, that he will now exercise less delicacy in taking the preliminary measures."—Reader, I must beg you to cast your eye upon the parts, which I have here marked with *Italics*; and, even at the risk of wearying you, I must beg you, once more, to observe the means that are in continual use, by these venal writers, to deceive the people; to amuse them with imaginary facts, with idle tales and suggestions, and thereby to divert their attention from the dangers brought upon the country. "*The object*," we are here told, of Buonaparté, in putting one of his favourite generals upon the throne of Sweden, is what? Why "*to throw back Russia northward*;" and this, we are told, "*has, for many years, been a favourite project with French politicians*."—Here is nothing new, then; nothing extraordinary; nothing that might not have been expected; and, above all, nothing in the least degree dangerous to England, all the danger being to Russia and Denmark, who, in Bernadotte's election, "*may read their fate*." The Swedish navy, with, perhaps, from 15 to 20 thousand seamen, the iron mines of Sweden, the timber of Norway, the key of the Baltic; all these, put into the hands of France, present no dangers, that the *Courier* appears to discover, except to Russia and Denmark.—And, this; aye, even *this*, is published amongst the "*thinking people*" of England!

PORTUGAL.—In another part of this

Number, will be found what the government has published, from Lord Talavera, relative to the fall of the fortress of ALMEIDA, upon which subject some remarks were made in my last, at page 404. Following his lordship's account of that event will be found, if I have room, the French account of the beginning, the progress, and the result of the siege.—The Noble Viscount is very short and pithy in his account. "*The Enemy*," says he, "*opened their fire upon Almeida late on Saturday night or early on Sunday morning, the 20th instant*, and I am concerned to add that they obtained possession of the place in the course of the night of the 27th. I have no intelligence, upon which I can rely, of the cause of its surrender. An explosion had been heard at our advanced posts, and I observed on Monday that the steeple of the church was destroyed, and many houses of the town unroofed. I had a telegraphic communication with the Governor, but, unfortunately, the weather did not allow of our using it on Sunday, or during a great part of Monday, and when the weather cleared on that day, it was obvious that the Governor was in communication with the enemy."—Brevity almost equal to that of the Spartans.

But, the reader, by referring to the paper, published by the government, will find, that it is only an "EXTRACT" of the Viscount's dispatch, whence he will, of course, conclude, that there was something in the rest of the dispatch, which it was not advisable to make known, just yet, to the people of England.—Viscount Talavera observes, that he has "*no intelligence*, upon which he can rely, of the cause of the surrender." But, upon this cause, MASSENA is very clear; for he tells us, that, *at five in the morning of the 26th of August*, he had 65 pieces of ordnance throwing balls and shells against the works and into the town; and that, *at seven at night*, one of the principal powder magazines blew up with a dreadful explosion; and, my lord Talavera says, that he could perceive (when the weather became clear,) that the steeple of the Church was destroyed and many of the houses in the town unroofed. Here alone seems to have been a pretty sufficient "*cause*" for the surrender.—Thus, then, was the taking of this fortress, of the strength of which our venal writers told us so much, the work of two days, after the enemy's batteries were opened!—The government have given

us no account of the *garrison*; no account of the *number of men* that it contained; and, it is very odd, very odd indeed, that no account of this is contained in *MASSENA's* dispatch, or, at least, in the *translations of it, published in London*.—I am well aware, that it might be, and, in all probability must be, out of the power of the Noble Viscount to give any detailed account of killed and wounded; but, he must have known the *total amount* of the garrison, and also of what *particular corps and officers* it consisted, the reason for not communicating which, we are, of course, to suppose of a very cogent nature; but,

bad news travels apace, and especially across the Channel, we shall, most likely, have the account but too soon for our feelings.—‘The fall of this fortress,’ with so *short* (for I do not say *feeble*) a resistance, ought to be, though I will not say, and I can hardly say that I have foundation for hope, that it will be, a lesson to the people of this country, not again to confide in the flattering prospects held forth by the venal, or ignorant, men, who conduct some of our public prints, and who, as the public must recollect, told us, that ALMEIDA was a place of *great strength*, that it had a garrison of *several thousands of men*, and that it was *amply supplied with provisions, arms, ammunition*, and all the means of making a *long defence*; and, they branded with the denomination of “*admirers of Buonaparté*” all those writers, such as the ‘conductor of the Morning Chronicle, who ventured to express their doubts, of the correctness of this statement, thereby insinuating, that such doubting writers were *enemies of their country*. Who, as things now stand, was the greatest enemy of their country? Let Mr. Cox, the unfortunate gentleman, who was Governor of Almeida, answer this question.—“No,” the honest English reader exclaims, “I will answer it for him! He is in the enemy’s hospitals; and he shall not be ca-
lumniated at home, while, perhaps, the breath is leaving his body!” And this answer is, that *those flattering accounts were, as to their most essential points, wholly false*. There is no man, who has any such thing as sentiment about him, who will not feel the injurious conclusion that those accounts were calculated to produce with regard to this unfortunate gentleman, whose bodily sufferings, great as they may be, can be *nothing compared* to those which his mind must undergo, when he is informed of the impression produced in England

by the representations of the strength of the fortress which he lost at the end of two days.—Yet, while this most mischievous effect is staring us in the face, are these same writers again at work in exactly the same way, doing, apparently, all in their power for the purpose of *injuring the character of the army itself*, and especially of *its commander*, whose every act they, in words, admire and applaud. They are now telling the public, that the fall of ALMEIDA has not made the situation of our army *any worse* than it was before that fall. But, let us have their own words; for they are well worthy of present attention, and of being referred to in future.—The ‘Public’ (ah! poor public!) says: the Morning Post of the 20th instant, “have now before them the official *dispatches* “both of Lord Wellington and Marshal “Massena” (an “*Extract*,” it should have said, of the former) “with regard to the “fall of Almeida, and the respective po-
“sitions and determinations of the two
“hostile armies, in consequence of that
“event. Much stress has been laid upon
“the disadvantages resulting from the
“premature surrender of Almeida, even
“by those who long since contemplated
“its fall as a circumstance not at all af-
“fecting the final issue of the campaign.
“For unforeseen accidents they had made
“no provision, but even when these are
“taken into account, there will be no room
“for any serious apprehension. We
“again venture to repeat, that *as to the is-
“sue of a general engagement, Massena is
“nearly in the same circumstances in which
“he was placed before the surrender of Al-
“meida*. In making this assertion how-
“ever we are well aware of what the
““Talent” Journals assert, viz. that the
“magnitude and rapidity of the effort
“to reduce Almeida were a proof
“of the resolution and of the means
“of a decisive operation against the Bri-
“tish troops.—We must request the “Ta-
“lent” will have the *patience to wait for
“the fulfilment of their PATRIOTIC pro-
“phecy*, and, that, until then, they will al-
“low us to indulge in a very different
“prospect of affairs. On perusing the
“late dispatches from Lord Wellington
“and the official report of Massena, rela-
“tive to the siege of Almeida and the
“other operations of the French in the
“Peninsula, our Readers will perceive the
“accuracy of our details upon these
“points before any of the official accounts
“had been published; while even the

"enemy's own account (vide our last "page) proves how little he has to boast "of on this occasion."—Upon the assurance of this writer in desiring his readers to observe, that his former statements, relative to this fortress, were *accurate*, I will make no remark; but the two passages distinguished by *italics*, are worthy of remark, and, indeed, of the severest reprobation.—In the FIRST, we are told, that "as to the issue of a general "engagement, Massena is *nearly in the "same circumstances*, in which he was "placed *before the surrender of Almeida*." Now, if this be so, why was the garrison of Almeida; why were several thousands of men: why were the town and the people, exposed to the consequence of resistance? *Why*, if the thing was of so little consequence, were so many Englishmen exposed to the chance of being killed in that fortress, or, of being sent to augment the number of our unhappy countrymen who are captives in France, and who are, as this same writer tells us, suffering every species of hardship and indignity? Am I told, that Lord Talavera *thought* the place would hold out longer? Oh! then, he was *wrong*, was he? And his *error* it was that cost us so dear? It was his *error* that sent so many of our countrymen into French prisons?—These, alas! are the "friends" of the Noble Viscount! Never had man such solid reason for exclaiming: "save me from my friend!" But, such must be the fate of every one, who has venal men for his eulogists; it being a truth from which there is hardly an exception in an age, that venality and stupidity are inseparable companions, for which there is this very excellent reason, that talent is able to maintain a man without venality, and stupidity is not.—Mischievous as is the tendency of this passage, however; injurious as it is to the army, and, of course, to the country, it is far less so, than the SECOND, that I have pointed out to the reader, and which assumes, that the "TALENTS," that is to say, all the party of the late Ministry, *are impatient to hear of the destructive operation of the French against our army*. That some of that party may deserve this at the hands of the mercenary, mean, and malignant men, who propagate this, I do not deny; but, assuredly, if any thing has a more powerful tendency than all other things put together to cause the subversion of the government it is this. These mercenary, mean, and ma-

lignant men will insist that there are enemies to the country amongst the people themselves; they will insist upon it, that a whole party (nearly equal in numbers to that of the ministry) *wish our army to be destroyed*; they will insist upon it *that the country is thus full of traitors*. This is the picture of England, which *they* hold up to the world; and, it must be confessed, that, if the picture be false, the fault is not theirs.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
September 21st, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

BRAZILS.—*Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between his Britannic Majesty and the Prince Regent of Portugal.*—(Cont. from p. 416.)

..... X. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, being fully convinced of the injustice and impolicy of the slave trade, and of the great disadvantages which arise from the necessity of introducing and continually renewing a foreign and factitious population for the purpose of labour and industry within his South American dominions, has resolved to co-operate with his Britannic Majesty in the cause of humanity and justice, by adopting the most efficacious means for bringing about a gradual abolition of the slave trade throughout the whole of his dominions. And actuated by this principle his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal engages that his subjects shall not be permitted to carry on the slave trade on any part of the coast of Africa, not actually belonging to his Royal Highness's dominions, in which that trade has been discontinued and abandoned by the powers and states of Europe, which formerly traded there, reserving however to his own subjects the right of purchasing and trading in slaves within the African dominions of the Crown of Portugal. It is, however, to be distinctly understood, that the stipulations of the present article are not to be considered as invalidating or otherwise affecting the rights of the Crown of Portugal to the territories of Cabinda and Molembo (which rights have formerly been questioned by the Government of France), nor as limiting or restraining the commerce of Ajuda and other ports in Africa (situated upon the coast commonly called in the Portuguese language the Costa da Mina), belonging to or claimed by the Crown of

Portugal; his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal being resolved not to resign nor forego his just and legitimate pretensions thereto, nor the rights of his subjects to trade with those places, exactly in the same manner as they have hitherto done.—XI. The mutual exchange of ratifications of the present Treaty shall take place in the city of London within the space of four months, or sooner if possible, to be computed from the day of the signature thereof.—In witness whereof we the Undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of his Britannic Majesty and of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in virtue of our respective full powers, have signed the present Treaty with our hands, and have caused the seals of our arms to be set thereto.—Done in the city of Rio de Janeiro, on the 19th day of February, in the year of our Lord 1810.

(L. S.) STRANGFORD.

(L. S.) CONDE DE LINHARES.

PORTUGAL.—Address of General Massena to the Portuguese Nation.

The following Address from Massena, intended to be generally circulated among the native troops under the orders of the British Commander, has been received from Lisbon:—

"Inhabitants of Portugal; His Majesty the Emperor of the French has put under my orders an army of 110,000 men to take possession of this kingdom, and to expel the English, your pretended friends. I say pretended friends, because in no one instance have they proved your benefactors. Against you his Majesty the Emperor has no animosity. On the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote your happiness, and the first step to secure it is to dismiss from the country those locusts who consume your property, blast your harvests, and palsy your efforts. Believe me, in opposing the Emperor you oppose your true friend; a friend who has it in his power to render you the happiest people in the world. Were it not for the insidious counsels of England you might now have enjoyed peace and tranquillity, and have been put in possession of that happiness. You have blindly rejected offers calculated only to promote your benefit, and have accepted proposals which will long be the curse of Portugal.—His Majesty has commissioned me to conjure you to awake to your true interests; to awake to those prospects which, with your con-

sent, may be quickly realized; to awake so as to distinguish between friends and enemies. The King of England is actuated by selfish and narrow purposes; the Emperor of the French is governed by the principles of universal philanthropy.—'Tis true, the English have put arms into your hands, arms which you know not how to use. I will instruct you. They are to be the instruments of annihilation to your foes. Who those foes are I have already shewn you. Use them as you ought, and they will become your salvation. Use them as you ought not, and they will prove your destruction.—Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British General expect to oppose any barrier to the victorious legions of the Emperor? Already a force is collected sufficient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the moment that mercy and generosity offer. As friends you may respect us, and be respected in return; as foes you must dread us, and in the conflict must be subdued. The choice is your own, either to meet the horrors of a bloody war, and to see your country desolated, your villages in flames, and your cities plundered, or to accept an honourable and happy peace, which will obtain for you every blessing that by resistance you would resign for ever.

"MASSENA, Prince of Essling,
and Commander in Chief.

"*Ciudad Rodrigo August 14.*"

PORTUGAL.—General Orders relating to the News sent from the Army by Officers.

"Head-quarters, Lagesa, Aug. 16.

"GENERAL ORDERS.

"His Excellency Marshal Beresford, Commander in Chief of the Army, directs, that the following Orders of Marshal General Lord Wellington be inserted in their Orders.

"Adj. Gen.'s Office, Celerico, Aug. 10.

Order of the Day.

"No. 1.—Extract of a letter from Vice Admiral Berkeley, dated Lisbon, Aug. 6.

"No. 2.—The Commander in Chief makes publicly known to the army the following extract from a letter, from Vice Admiral Berkeley, and from two other letters enclosed therein.

"No. 3.—I cannot but conceive it is my duty to send you the copy of a letter from the Vice-Consul in Oporto to the Commander of his Majesty's cutter Dart, inclosing extracts from two letters. I shall

not make any comment whatever on their contents, but only observe that they have thrown the whole ship into such a state of fear and consternation, that I was officially required to send thither some ships for the removal of the inhabitants.

"Colonel Trant will be able to ascertain who was the writer of the said letters through the merchant named in that of the Vice-Consul.

"No. 4.—Copy of a Letter from John Alvey, Esq. his Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul in Oporto, to Lieut. Crowe, commanding his Britannic Majesty's cutter Dart.

Oporto, Aug. 1, 1810.

"Sir ;—After having paid my respects to you this morning, I must now beg leave to transmit to you the inclosed extract from an English Officer of rank, to Mr. J. Tindale, a respectable merchant of this place, whereby you will perceive the critical situation in which we find ourselves ; and I, therefore, request in my own name, as well as in that of all the English merchants of this place, that you will take into consideration, the necessity of having a sufficient force off this Bar, (if it be consistent with the general tenor of your orders) to protect all the English ships which can be got ready for setting sail, as well as all the English subjects who, on account of the imminent danger, may be under the necessity of embarking without the least delay. I yesterday received a letter from the Commissary General in Lisbon, of the 28th of last month, wherein he informs me, that the gun brig Growler had set sail from thence for this city, but she has not yet made her appearance. We are in the utmost consternation, and unanimously entreat your assistance.—I have, &c. JOHN ALVEY, Consul."

"To Lieut. Crowe, commanding his Majesty's cutter Dart."

"No. 5.—Extract from the letter referred to in the preceding one, dated Peinhancos, July 28, 1810 :—

"We are here at present ; the Guards, and the division which was commanded by Gen. Cameron, composed of the 24th, 42d, and 61st regiments, have arrived in Jaupajo and Gouvea. Lord Wellington's head-quarters will be this evening in Celerico, but it is said that General Cotton still remains in Guarda. I have seen some officers of the staff, who told me that the force commanded by Massena, including Regnier's division, amounts in the whole to 105,000 men, 40 regiments whereof are

'cavalry: 86,000 men are marching against our rear ; you will hardly suppose that lord Wellington means to oppose such a force ; we must retreat, and occasionally quit the country.'

"No. 6.—Dated Truxillo, 28 leagues from Oporto, July 29, 1810.

"It is said we are to retreat as far as Manrila, 4 leagues from Coimbra, where we are to make our first stand. I know that engineers have been detached to undermine the bridge, in order to blow it up. 24,000 rations of biscuit are to be sent there this evening. Various are the conjectures formed here, but all agree in the opinion that it would be madness to think of engaging in the hopeless contest with Massena's army, and I really suppose, until our whole force shall have formed a junction, we are not to make any resistance or defence. The horse artillery and heavy horse marched this morning for Celerico, to protect the retreat of our rear guard."

"No. 7.—The Commander in Chief will not make any enquiry to ascertain the author of letters which excited so much fear and consternation in a place where it is most to be wished none should exist. He has frequently lamented the ignorance displayed in opinions announced in letters from the army, and the indiscretion with which the like letters are published. It is impossible that many officers of the army can possess a sufficient knowledge of facts to be able to form a correct opinion of the probable events of the campaign, and yet their opinions, although erroneous, when once published, cannot but produce mischievous results. The Commander in Chief, therefore, requests that the officers, on account of their own reputation, will refrain from giving opinions upon matters, with regard to which they cannot possibly possess the necessary knowledge for giving it with correctness ; and if they chance to communicate to their correspondents facts which relate to the position of the army, its strength, the formation of its magazines, preparations for cutting down or blowing up bridges, &c. they will at least tell their correspondents not to publish their letters in newspapers, unless it be certain that the publication thereof cannot prove injurious to the army and the public service.—(Signed)—CHARLES STEWART, Brigadier and Adjutant General."

"Although the Marshal hopes that the letters in question are not written by any

officers employed in the Portuguese army, yet he thinks it right to express his earnest wish, that all the officers may bear in mind the observations made by his Excellency Marshal General Lord Wellington, and also hopes, that not only all the large towns of this kingdom, but also smaller places, will not suffer themselves to be thrown into confusion and intimidated by similar relations of Portuguese officers. — (Signed)—“MOZENHO, Adjutant-General.”

Proclamation of Lord Viscount Talarera, respecting those Portuguese, who may favour the French.

“The time which has elapsed during which the enemy has remained on the frontiers of Portugal, must have proved to the Portuguese nation what they have to expect from the French. The inhabitants of some villages have remained in them, confiding in the promises of the enemy, and hoping that, by treating the enemies of their country well, they might conciliate and mollify them, and inspire them with humane sentiments; that their property would be respected, their females preserved from brutal violation, and their lives secured.

“Vain hopes! The inhabitants of these submissive places have suffered all the evils which a cruel enemy could inflict; their property has been plundered, their habitations burnt, their women atrociously violated, and those whose age and sex did not provoke the brutal violence of the soldiers have fallen victims to the imprudent confidence which they placed in promises made only to be broken.—The Portuguese must now see that no other means remain to avoid the evils with which they are threatened but a determined and vigorous resistance, and a firm resolution to obstruct as much as possible the advance of the enemy into the interior of the kingdom, by removing out of his reach all such things as may contribute to his subsistence or facilitate his progress. These are the only and most certain means to prevent the evils with which the country is threatened. The army under my command will protect as large a portion of the country as is possible; but it is obvious that the people alone can deliver themselves by a vigorous resistance, and preserve their goods by removing them out of the reach of the enemy. The duties, therefore, that bind me to his Royal Highness the Prince

Regent of Portugal, and to the Portuguese nation, oblige me to make use of the power and authority with which I am furnished, to compel the careless and indolent to make the necessary efforts to preserve themselves from the dangers which threaten them, and to save their country. In conformity with this, I make known and declare, that all magistrates and persons in authority who shall remain in the villages or towns, after having received orders from the military officer to remove from them, and all persons, of whatever class they may be, who shall maintain the least communication with, or aid and assist in any manner the enemy, shall be considered as traitors to the state, and tried, and punished as such an enormous crime requires. WELLINGTON.”

Head Quarters, 4th Aug. 1810.

PORTUGAL.—*Extract of Dispatches from Lord Viscount Talarera, relating to the Fall of Almeida.—Dated OBERICO, 29th Aug. 1810.—Published in London, 19th September 1810.*

The enemy opened their fire upon Almeida late on Saturday night or early on Sunday morning, the 26th instant, and I am concerned to add, that they obtained possession of the place in the course of the night of the 27th. I have no intelligence upon which I can rely, of the cause of its surrender. An explosion had been heard at our advanced post, and I observed on Monday that the steeple of the church was destroyed, and many houses of the town unroofed. I had a telegraphic communication with the Governor, but unfortunately the weather did not allow of our using it on Sunday, or during a great part of Monday, and when the weather cleared on that day it was obvious that the Governor was in communication with the enemy.—After I was certain of the fall of the place, I moved the infantry of the army again into the valley of the Mondego, keeping a division upon Guarda, and the outposts of the cavalry at Alverca. The enemy attacked our piquets twice yesterday in the morning but feebly, and they were repulsed; in the afternoon, however, they obliged Sir Stapleton Cotton to draw in his posts to this side of Fraxedas. Captain Lygon, of the 16th Light Dragoons, was wounded in the morning, and two men of the Royal Dragoons were wounded in the afternoon.—A picquet of the regiment made a gallant and successful charge

upon a party of the enemy's infantry and cavalry, and took some prisoners.—The second corps under General Regnier has made no movement of any importance since I had the honour of addressing your lordship last. A patrol, however, belonging to this corps fell in with a squadron of Dragoons, consisting of one troop of the 13th British, and one troop of the 4th Portuguese, belonging to Lieutenant-General Hill's corps, under the command of Captain White of the 13th, and the whole of them were taken, with the exception of the captain and one man, who, I since understand, have been killed. I enclose he copy of Brigadier-General Fane's report to Lieutenant-General Hill of this affair, which it appears was highly creditable to Captain White, and the allied troops engaged.—No movement has been made, and nothing of any importance has occurred in Estremadura since I addressed your lordship last.—In the north, the enemy moved a small body of infantry and cavalry on the 20th to Alcanenas; but General Silveira moved towards them from Braganza, and they immediately retired.

Escallos de Cima, August 22, 1810.

SIR;—I have the honour to report to you, that the troops of the 13th Light Dragoons, and one of the 4th Portuguese Dragoons, forming the squadron under the command of Captain White, of the 15th at Ladoera, this morning fell in with a patrol of the enemy's Dragoons, consisting of one captain, two subalterns, and about sixty men. Captain White fortunately succeeded in coming up with them, when he immediately charged and overturned them; and the result has been, the capture of two lieutenants, three sergeants, six corporals, one trumpeter, and fifty privates, and about fifty horses. The Captain was also a prisoner, but escaped during the bustle on foot—I am happy to say, this has been performed without the loss of a man on our side. Six of the enemy are wounded. Captain White expresses his obligation to Major Vigoreux, of the 38th regiment, who was a volunteer with him, and to the Alferes Pedro Raymundo di Oliviera, commanding the Portuguese troop (which he states to have done its duty extremely well, and to have shewn much gallantry;) and also to Lieutenant Turner, of the 13th Light Dragoons, to whose activity and courage he reports himself to be indebted for several of his prisoners, I trust the whole will be

considered to have merited the approbation of the Commander in Chief. I have the honour to be, &c. H. FANE.

Lieutenant-General Hill.

PORTUGAL.—*French Account of the Siege and Fall of Almeida.*—PARIS, 11th Sept.

SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.—The Prince of Essling caused the trenches to be opened before Almeida on the night of the 15th of August; a false attack directed against the north of the town had drawn the attention of the besieged to that quarter. Two thousand workmen took advantage of that circumstance, to dig the first parallel to a depth of three feet, along a line of more than 500 toises, in spite of the difficulties arising from the rocky nature of the ground, and the necessity of every instant covering themselves by gabions.—Between the 18th and the 19th, though the fire of the enemy was very brisk, and the obstacles which the rocks presented to the enlargement of the trenches appeared insurmountable, the parallel was finished, and the rocks blown up by the petard.—Between the 20th and 25th, eleven batteries were erected. During the night of the 24th, the second parallel was opened in the rock, at less than 150 toises from the place. The terrible fire of the fortress did not permit us to maintain it during the day; but on the following night the miners finished deepening and enlarging the trenches with the petard. The mounting and supplying of the batteries were also finished the same night.—On the 26th, at five in the morning, eleven batteries, mounted with 65 pieces of cannon, opened their fire on the fortress, which returned it with vigour; but at four in the afternoon their fire slackened; at seven, one of our bombs exploded the principal powder magazine of the place; the explosion was terrible. At the departure of the courier, the fire of our batteries was redoubled with activity.

To the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.

"SIR—In my last dispatch, I had the honour to acquaint you that on the 20th the fortress of Almeida returned our fire till 4 in the afternoon; that then it ceased entirely; that at seven a considerable explosion took place in the fortress; and that the conflagration was kept up during the night by our bombs and howitzers. This state of things determined me to summon

the Governor to surrender, yesterday morning. He sent me some officers to ask a cessation of hostilities. I made known to them the terms of capitulation which I should offer. Several hours of the day were employed in negotiation, which did not produce the success which I desired. I therefore ordered our fire to recommence at eight in the evening, and three hours after the Governor of the place signed a capitulation, of which I have the honour to send you a copy, together with that of my summons. Almeida is thus in the possession of his Majesty the Emperor and King. We entered it this morning at nine o'clock. The garrison are prisoners of war, and shall be conducted to France. We have found on the batteries of the place, 98 pieces of cannon and 17 requiring repairs, 300,000 rations of biscuit, 100,000 rations of salted meat, and a great quantity of other provisions. —I think it my duty to say something to your Highness of the disposition of the garrison. The Marquis d'Alorna, a General of Division, a Portuguese, and several other general or superior Officers of his nation, employed in the French army, approached the fortress while the negotiation was going forward. They were recognized, from the walls, by a great number of their countrymen, who loudly expressed their satisfaction at being freed from the yoke of the English; which was much increased, when they learned that the Emperor had attached to his service, and in their several ranks, the Portuguese officers who were in France; and that far from having reduced them to the state of humiliation which the English make them feel at present, he had admitted them to the honour of fighting at his side, in his great campaigns. —The horrors committed by the English are deplorable; they cut down the corn, destroy mills, houses, and make a desert of that unfortunate country which they were invited to defend. They thus violate the law of nations and of war. This nation is accustomed to respect nothing; its interest for the moment is its only law. —It is the division of Loison, of the corps of the Duke of Elchingen, which has carried on the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida. The two other divisions of that corps, the three divisions of the 2d corps, and the three divisions of the corps of the Duke of Abrantes, have not yet fired a mus-

quet. The Duke of Abrantes is at Ledesma; General Regnier, commanding the 2d corps, is at Zarza Mayor. The soldiers are in good health, the army is well provisioned, and burning with desire to teach the English that which we have already taught the division of Crawford. The Emperor may rely on the bravery and dispositions of the army, as well as on my zeal and respectful devotion. I have the honour, &c. **MASSENA, Marshal, Fort Conception, Prince of Essling, Aug. 23, 1810.** Commander in Chief of the Army of Portugal.

Copy of Summons to the English Governor of Almeida.

Camp before Almeida, Aug. 27, 1810.

"M Governor,—The town of Almeida is in flames; all my besieging artillery is battering it, and the English army cannot come to your relief. Surrender, then, to the generosity of the armies of his Majesty the Emperor and King: I offer you honourable terms. To induce you to accept them, consider what took place at Ciudad Rodrigo, the deplorable state in which that town now is, and the misfortunes, which are reserved for Almeida, if you prolong an useless defence.

"Receive, M. Governor, the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed)

"MASSENA."

Capitulation granted in the name of his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, &c. &c. by the Marshal Prince of Essling, Commander in Chief of the Army of Portugal, to M. the English General Cox, Governor of Almeida, for the surrender of that Place to the troops of his Majesty.

Art. I. The garrison shall be prisoners of war, with the honours of war; that is to say, they shall march out with their arms, which they shall deposit on the glacis of the place. The militia shall return to their homes, after having deposited their arms; the garrison are not to serve during the present war against France or her allies.

II. The officers of every description, and the soldiers, shall retain, the former their swords and the latter their baggage only.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 14.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1810. [Price 1s.

"REAL MONEY can hardly ever multiply too much in any country, because it will always, as IT increases, be the certain sign of the increase of TRADE, of which it is the measure, and consequently of the soundness and vigour of the whole body. But this PAPER MONEY may, and does increase, without any increase of Trade; nay often when Trade greatly declines, FOR IT IS NOT THE MEASURE OF THE TRADE OF ITS NATION, BUT OF THE NECESSITY OF ITS GOVERNMENT; and it is absurd, and must be ruinous, that the same cause which naturally exhausts the wealth of a Nation should likewise be the only productive cause of money."—BURKE.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER VII.

Review of the ground over which we have passed in the foregoing Letters—Opening the way into the history of the Bank's stoppage in 1797—Vague notion about the increase of bank-notes being a sign of an increase of Trade and Wealth and Prosperity—This notion examined—Mr. Randle Jackson's speech, inveighing against those who have recommended that he and his partners shall be compelled to pay their promissory notes in two years—His notion that an increase of bank-notes naturally arises from an increase of Trade—Abuse heaped upon those who wish the Bank to pay its notes—Such persons called Riflers and accused of wishing to destroy the Credit of Old England—An increase of promissory notes is a proof of an increase of Debt—Five ways in which bank-notes get out into circulation—Absurdity of supposing that an increase of promises-to-pay are a sign of an increase of the means of paying—N. B. An Account of the distresses arising from the failure of the Banks at Salisbury and Shaftsbury.

Gentlemen,

In the foregoing Letter, we closed the discussion relative to the *Sinking Fund*; and that brought us to a point, to a sort of stage, or resting place, on our way, from which point it will be advantageous for us to take a brief review of the ground over which we have passed; for, when

the design of the writer is to serve the cause of *truth*, and especially when the truths, he wishes to make apparent, have been industriously enveloped in darkness; in such a case, every other quality in writing ought to yield to that of *clearness*.

It was stated, at the out-set of our Inquiries, that the *Chief Object* of them was, to ascertain, or, at least, to enable ourselves to form a decided opinion, "*Whether it be possible, without a total destruction of all the paper-money, to restore Gold and Silver to circulation amongst us.*" In pursuit of this object, it became necessary for us to make some preliminary inquiries as to the cause of the Gold and Silver having gone out of circulation.

The cause, the *immediate cause*, that is to say the cause which came close before the effect, was the *increase of the paper-money*. This cause was evident to every one; but, then, it became us to inquire what had been the *cause of that increase*; otherwise our inquiries would have been as useless as would be those of a farmer, who, upon finding a score of his sheep dead, should content himself with ascertaining that they had been killed with a knife, without making any inquiry as to the person by whom the destructive instrument had been used. Common sense, therefore, dictated to us to inquire into the cause, or causes, of the increase of the paper-money; and, in order to come at a clear understanding with respect to these causes, we were obliged to go back to the inauspicious origin of the paper-money system, that fatal system, whence arose the National Debt, that Debt which even PITT himself, the great abettor of the system, called "*the best ally of France.*"

During this retrospect, we have seen, that the Bank of England is merely a Company of traders, whose charter arose out

of a loan which they made to the government, and that, at its institution, it never entered into the mind of man, that these traders were ever to be protected by law from paying, in the king's coin, their *promissory notes*, as they have been from February 1797 to the present day. We have seen, in proceeding to inquire into the cause of this *non-payment*, or *stoppage*, on the part of the Bank, in 1797, that the Bank-notes have gone on *increasing in quantity*, and that these notes, of which, for more than half a century, there were none under 20 pounds, appeared, in the war of 1755, in the shape of 15 pounds and 10 pounds; and, during PITT's war against the French revolution, which war he carried on, in part at least, for the avowed purpose of *destroying the finances of France*, we have seen that they appeared in the shape, first, of 5 pounds, and, at last, in the shape of 2 pounds and 1 pound. We have, in order the better to understand the history of the Bank Stoppage in 1797, and the better to estimate its consequences, taken a view of the *Funds and Stocks* and *National Debt*; we have seen how they arose; we have described their nature; we have traced them in their dreadful progress; we have seen how the National Debt has gone on increasing, from the reign of William the Third to the present day; we have seen how exactly the increase of the National *Expenditure* and the *Taxes* and the *Poor Rates* have kept pace with the increase of the Debt; and, in the three last Letters, we have seen an ample developement, a clear exposé, of the schemes for "*redeeming*," or "*paying off*," that Debt, and we have seen, that, during the operation of those schemes of redemption, the Debt has gone on increasing, and, that the *interest* we pay upon the Debt, has, since the Grand Scheme of PITT has been in force, been augmented from 9 millions a year to 32 millions a year.

This is what we have seen and what we have done. And having now, to use the sportsman's language, made good our ground, we may begin to move forwards towards the interesting history of the stoppage of gold and silver payments at the Bank of England, in 1797.

Our first step, in opening the way into this history, must be to obtain a clear notion, with regard to the manner, in which bank notes are issued, or put out into cir-

ulation among the people; or, rather, with regard to the *immediate causes* of putting them out. For, unless we have a clear understanding upon this point, we shall have but a confused idea of the *more distant causes* of their increase.

There is, apparently, a vague, or indistinct, notion, floating in the minds of some men, that the increase of the bank notes is an indication, or sign, of an increase of TRADE, of WEALTH, and of PROSPERITY, which, as you must have perceived, are, by such persons, always jumbled and confounded together, for want of proper attention to the facts and principles, which we have stated and laid down in Letter III, from page 329 to page 333. But, we must not suffer ourselves to fall into this confusion; and, indeed, does not common sense reject the notion, that an increase of *promissory notes*, which necessarily argues the want of the means of the person, issuing them, to pay in specie; does not common sense, does not the plain understanding of every plain man, reject, with scorn, the notion, that such an increase is a sign of increasing *wealth* and *prosperity* in the person, or body, or community, by whom the issue is made? Why does our neighbour NEEDY give a note of hand in payment of his rent, or of his tailor's bill? Why, because he has not the money in his pocket or his drawer. And, are we to be made to believe, that the circumstance of his not having money to pay what he owes is a proof of his *wealth* and *prosperity*? We have been persuaded to believe many things; but, I think, that, at this day, we shall not be persuaded to believe this. At the time of the *numerous bankruptcies*, in 1793, just after PITT's war broke out, PITT asserted, that they were a sign of *national prosperity*, and was almost *huzzaed* for the assertion; but, we have had time now to experience, time to *feel*, the worth of PITT's assertions, predictions, plans, and measures; and, with the benefit of this lesson, we shall not, now, be so easily persuaded, that *bankruptcy* is a sign of prosperity; though, it must, I think, be allowed, that it is full as true a sign of prosperity as that which has now been discovered in the *increase of promissory notes*, which increase is, and must be, always an infallible sign of a want, in a greater or less degree, of the means to make payment in money.

As to the *increase of Trade*, that, indeed,

will demand; as we shall hereafter more fully see, a certain increase of circulating medium, or money, as must be evident to every man, who reflects, but for one moment, upon the subject; because, where there are ten purchases of a pound each to be made (supposing them to be made in the same space of time) twice as much money will be wanted as where there are only five purchases of a pound each to be made. But, the increase of *trade*, that is to say, the increase of purchases and sales, or, in other words, *the increase of MONEY'S-WORTH things*, though it is a very solid reason for the increase of money, is no reason at all for the increase of *promissory notes*, and especially of promissory notes which will not bring money in exchange for them. The man, who is in a great way of trade, gives more promissory notes than a man in a small way; but, he has proportionate means, and, at any rate, does not give notes without possessing the value of them in goods, or property, of some kind, in *money's-worth things*; and, of course, his notes are *convertible into money*; but, is this the case with the notes of the Bank? Is this the case with the notes of any of our Banks? Such a man stands in need of no law to protect him against the demands of the holder of his notes; but, there is a law to protect the Bank of England against the demand of any holder of its notes, who may wish to have guineas in exchange for those notes. And, can the increase of such notes be regarded as a sign of the increase of trade?

Yet this is a favourite fallacy with those, who either do not understand the matter, or who, while they do understand it, wish to deceive the world, and the people of this country in particular. This same fallacy was put forth with great assurance, at the House of the Bank in Threadneedle Street, London, no longer ago than last Friday, by the Gentleman, a Mr. RANDLE JACKSON, mentioned in the Postscript to the last Letter, page 426, in a speech, the whole of which, (together with the speech of the GOVERNOR OF THE BANK and of a Mr. PAYN, a Country Banker), as reported in the Morning Chronicle, of Saturday last, I insert in another part of this Number, and which I beg leave to recommend to your attentive perusal.

Mr. JACKSON, who is, it would seem, a

proprietor of Bank Stock; that is to say, one of the Bank Company; that is to say, one of the persons in whose name the Bank notes are issued; that is to say, one of the persons, who put forth the promissory notes of the Bank; that is to say, one of the persons who derive a profit, who get rich, from the putting out of those notes; Mr. JACKSON most loudly inveighs against the Bullion Committee, and, indeed, pretty roundly abuses them; pretty roundly abuses a Committee of the House of Commons, for having recommended to the House to pass a law *to oblige him and his partners to pay their notes agreeably to promise*; and, this he does, you will observe, at the very time that he is railing against the revolutionists of France for their *levelling principles*, and insinuating, that there are such levellers now at work in England; all which may be very natural in Mr. JACKSON; for, who that is protected by law from the payment of his promissory notes, would wish that law to be repealed, and its place supplied by a law to compel him to pay? It may be very natural for a gentleman, so situated, to abuse the Committee; but, it would be very foolish in the people; very foolish in the holders of his notes; very foolish in *his creditors*, to join in such abuse. Upon this part of his speech, however, we shall find a more suitable place for extending our remarks, and also for noticing what he said about the vast increase of Country Banks, without seeming to perceive, that that increase has been owing solely to the law which protected, and still protects, the Bank of England against the Gold and Silver demands of its creditors. Upon these parts of his speech, and upon his assertions respecting a debt said to be due to the Bank *from the public*; upon his statement of the causes of the Bank stoppage; upon the *wonderful unanimity* of all the speakers at this Meeting of the partners of the Bank Company, in declaring, that there would be NO GOOD *in their paying of their promissory notes in Gold and Silver*; upon all these topics, and upon some others, brought forward at the Bank Company's Meeting, we shall find, hereafter, a more suitable opportunity for making and applying our remarks, which, indeed, belong to other parts of our subject, and, therefore, we will, at present, confine ourselves to the only topic, introduced into these speeches, which belong to the part of our subject now im-

mediately before us; namely, the notion, that the increase of bank notes naturally arises from an increase of trade.

Since, however, I have digressed so far, I take the liberty to continue on a little further for the purpose of noticing a paragraph, in a news-paper of this very morning (Monday, 24th Sept.) which imitates Mr. JACKSON in abusing those, who are desirous of seeing the Bank Company once more pay their promissory notes in Gold and Silver. "We are happy," says this writer, "to find, that the opinion we have more than once expressed upon this subject is sanctioned by the first authorities in the Country, and that the mischievous idea of throwing open the Bank immediately to be rifled by the engrossers and exporters of guineas, is universally reprobated. Sir John Sinclair has taken up the pen upon the subject, and most ably does he treat it. Neither the authority of the Committee, nor the clamours of those who wish to destroy the public credit of Old England have been sufficient to intimidate that highly informed and much respected Gentleman from coming forward to vindicate truth and dispel a most mischievous delusion." What, Gentlemen! is a recommendation to pass a law to oblige the Bank Company to begin to pay its promissory notes in gold and silver, at the end of two years; is this to be called "throwing open" the Bank to be "rifled?" Are you and all of us, who hold bank notes, to be denominated "riflers," or robbers, because we may wish to be paid the amount of those notes in gold and silver? Is a desire to see the Bank pay its promissory notes upon demand, agreeably to the words written in them, and to see the king's coin once more come back into circulation amongst us; is this desire to be attributed to a "wish to destroy the public credit of Old England?" Gentlemen, this language shews two things: first, that those who use it entertain a most hearty contempt for the people of England; and, second, that their cause is so very bad, that they dare not even attempt to offer in support of it any thing bearing the shape of an argument.

Leaving the Bank Company to the support of these railers, let us now, with the calmness and candour which belong to the cause of truth, return to our inquiry, whether the increase of the bank notes has arisen

from an increase of trade, and, if not, what has been the real cause, or causes, of that increase of bank notes which has driven the gold and silver out of circulation.

We have seen, that a real increase of trade means, an increase in purchases and sales, or, in other words, an increase in commodities, or things, which are really worth money. Consequently an increase of trade will naturally demand an increase of money; but, what it demands is an increase of real money, seeing that the increase of the trade itself is no other than an increase of money's worth things; and, that the increase of its demand will not be for paper, or for notes not convertible into money. Precisely the contrary; and, in private concerns, we every day see, that it is the falling off of a man's real trade, it is the lessening of his quantity of money's worth things, that induces him to have recourse to the issue of paper, paper which he cannot turn into money. In a word, it is DEBT that makes a man give promissory notes. An increase of trade, always implying an increase of money's worth things, brings, of itself, an increase of real money, unless that money be, by some unnatural cause, withheld from circulation. It is just the same with a nation, whose increase of money's worth things will bring to it an exactly proportionate increase of real money, if that money be not kept back, or driven out again, by some unnatural cause; but, DEBT, and the attendants upon debt, lead to the issuing of bank notes, or, to paper of some sort or other, or, to a something, no matter what it be, which has not a real value in itself. Real money is the representative of MONEY'S WORTH THINGS: promissory notes are the representatives of DEBT; and, this we shall clearly see, as we proceed in examining into the way, or, rather, the divers ways, in which bank notes get out into circulation amongst the people.

The bank notes have in them nothing of a mystical nature. They are the joint work of a paper-maker; an engraver, a printer, and the person who puts his name, in writing, at the bottom of them. Being thus brought to perfection, they are delivered at the Bank Company's House, or Shop, first, to any persons, to whom the Company may owe money, for work done to their buildings, or to others for

keeping their books, or for paper, or for printing, or, in short, for any services performed for them. A SECOND way, in which the notes get out, is through what is called *discounting*; that is to say, loans of bank notes made to private persons, for which the borrower leaves in possession of the Company a note of hand or bill of exchange, that is to say, an engagement to pay back again as much as he receives together with interest for the time, or, rather, the interest is deducted when the loan is made. A THIRD way, in which the notes get out, is through the advances, or loans, which the Bank makes to the Government, by way of anticipation upon the taxes, before they come in. A FOURTH way is through the payment of the interest of Exchequer Bills, or Navy Bills, which are a sort of promissory notes, given by the government, and upon which the Bank sometimes pays the interest, and, at other times, discounts them, or purchases them of the holders at the current price; but, in every case, a fresh parcel of bank notes, get, through the means of these bills, into circulation. A FIFTH way, in which the notes get out, is through the payment of the *dividends or the interest, of the Stock, or National Debt*, which dividends are paid quarterly; and, as we have before seen, the amount is *three times as great* as it was at the beginning of PITT's war against the Jacobins of France, which we have called the ANTI-JACOBIN WAR.

Now, without enumerating any more of the ways, in which bank-notes get into circulation, is it not as clear as the Sun at noon-day, that they are always the *representatives of DEBT*? Is it not a fact that no one can deny, that the increase of them proceeds from the *increase of Debt*, and not from the *increase of trade*? Away, then, with the nonsense of those dreamers, who would persuade us, that an issue of *promissory notes* proceeds from an increase of *money's worth things*! Away with the idle talk about an increase of things of real value calling for an increase of *paper promises*! Away, away, with the confused, the childish notion, that an *increase of the means of paying* produces an increase of *promises to pay*! As well might any one tell you, that the increase of the paper of the Salisbury and Shaftesbury banks, arose from the *increase of the means of paying their debts*, an assertion, which, with

the present scenes before your eyes,* might be a little more impudent, but not a whit more contrary to truth than the assertion above noticed, and, I trust, completely refuted.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,

24th September, 1810.

* The scenes at SALISBURY, on account of the failure of the Banks at that city and at Shaftesbury, have been truly distressing. At Salisbury in particular, where the greatest part of the sufferers were, the poor people were, in many cases, without victuals or drink for some time, and many persons, in a respectable way of life, were for many days together, obliged to sit down to dine upon little more than bread, no meat being to be purchased with the only sort of money (if a debased paper ought, for a moment, to go by that name) which was, generally speaking, in possession of the people. Many persons, in the lower ranks of life, who had gathered together a few pounds, the fruit of long labour and anxious care, of frugality, and of forbearance from enjoyment; the fruit, in short, of an exercise of all the domestic virtues, and destined to be the provision, as the saying is, "against a rainy day," that is, to be the source of comfort in sickness or in old age; many persons of this description, the heart ache of one of whom ought to give us more pain than to see fifty thousand Public Robbers swinging from so many gibbets; many persons of this description; many of these very best of the people, saw their little all vanish in a moment, and themselves reduced to the same state with the improvident, the careless, the lazy, the spendthrift, the drunkard, and the glutton, looking back upon a life of labour and of care, and looking forward to the misery and disgrace of a workhouse! To describe the scene, when the Meetings of Creditors took place, at Salisbury, would be impossible. The Council Chamber of the city (for no other place, except the Cathedral, would have contained a twentieth part of them), was surrounded with such multitudes, and so eager were they, in pressing forward, that some were in danger of their lives; and the constables, from necessity, perhaps, laid their staves about the heads of many of those who came to demand their due, particularly,

as I am informed, on the 7th of this month. What a scene was this! Here, PITT, if he had still been alive, might have seen a specimen of the fruits of his system! The holders of the notes, were, I understand, each of them compelled to be at the expence of an *affidavit*, and obliged also, to attend in person, or by an *attorney*, at the Meeting of Creditors, and also for the receipt of the dividends whenever any shall take place. It is easy, therefore, to conceive *what portion of payment* will ever fall to the lot of hundreds of poor men and women, living at a distance from Salisbury, and scattered about in country places, where a news-paper is hardly ever seen. One of the banks was called the *Salisbury and Shaftesbury bank* and part of the notes are dated at one place, and part at the other. Those notes, which were dated at the latter place, were to be proved at meetings to be held there; so that, many of the poor fellows, who had brought their notes to Salisbury, were told, that *they must carry them to Shaftesbury, a place at forty miles distance!* The holder of each note, was, I understand, compelled, in order to have a claim to any dividend, to swear that he had given the full value of the note; so that, *one man could not demand payment of the note of any other man*; and, people could not sell the notes for any thing below their nominal value. It is evident, that, under circumstances like these, a great portion of the poor people who hold any of these notes, will lose the whole amount of them. I have two men, for instance, who had the misfortune to be of this number, James Gullingham and William Hurckett, the former of whom had a five pound note, and the latter a one pound note, both issued under the names of Bowles, Ogden, and Wyndham, and both which notes I have now lying upon the table before me. These men are at twenty-eight miles distance from Salisbury; to present the notes at the Meeting would have required three days absence from home in the midst of harvest, besides their expences at Salisbury and upon the road, which, without the expence of the affidavit, would have amounted to more than the one pound note of Hurckett, to say nothing about the expences attending the receipt of the dividends. Indeed, upon the circumstances being related to me, I was quite satisfied that any attempt of poor Gullingham to recover his debt from Messrs. Bowles, Ogden, and Wyndham,

even supposing them to pay 20 shillings in the pound, would be a losing concern, and that the best way was for me to take the debt off their hands. I intend to send the pretty little bits of paper down to them, with a request, that they will paste them upon two little boards, and hang them up in their cottages, not only by way of ornament, but as a lesson to their neighbours and their children. I dare say, that there are many considerate masters who will act in like manner; but, it must be manifest to every one, that hundreds of poor families will suffer, and very severely suffer, from this one failure. What, then, must be the consequence, if *these failures should become general*; and, does it not become every one, who wishes to see the peace and independence of the country preserved, to use his utmost endeavours to convince the public of the necessity of measures to restore to circulation the gold and silver coin, and thereby to prevent, if possible, those dreadful convulsions, in which the issue of a paper currency, not convertible into specie, have but too frequently, not to say invariably, ended?

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

IRELAND.—In the present Number I have not room for all that I could wish to say upon the subject of the seemingly-desired repeal of the Union, the petition and other papers, relative to which, I intend to insert in my next. Indeed, I was so desirous to treat this matter fully, and, as far as my abilities go, in a manner worthy of the regard and respect which I feel towards the gallant and generous people, to whom it relates, that I should have postponed all notice of it till I had been able to do it agreeably to my wishes; but, an article in the MORNING POST newspaper of yesterday has induced me to depart from that intention.—The writer says: “We have given, in another part of our Paper, an account of the proceeding of the Freemen, and Freeholders of Dublin, at the Aggregate Meeting, on Tuesday last, when a Petition for a Repeal of the Legislative Union was agreed to. The substance of this Petition is correctly stated, upon which we cannot help observing that the grounds set forth, if calmly and dispassionately considered, are far from warranting an application for a repeal of the Union. It is true that the expendi-

"ture and the debt of Ireland have greatly increased within the last ten years, so have the expenditure and debt of Great Britain; and it would be just as fair to attribute the one to the Union as the other. We are engaged in a war unprecedented in its nature, and we have no alternative but that of unconditional submission to a ferocious tyrant, or the most determined resistance. That that resistance can only be made at an enormous expence, and by the most painful sacrifices, must be obvious to every man, who will reason dispassionately. The trade of Ireland has suffered, but surely no one who looks at the state of the Continent, and contemplates the extraordinary and violent measures which BUONAPARTE has adopted to ruin the trade of this Empire, will be at a loss to account for a temporary commercial embarrassment. It is notorious that the trade of Ireland did greatly increase after the Union, nothing, therefore, but party prejudice could attribute the stagnation under which it is at present stated to labour, to that measure.—With regard to the inattention of Irish Landlords, and the drain occasioned by absentees, and a foreign National Debt, these are evils which would have existed without a Union, and which did exist before it. For considerably more than half a century the people of Ireland have complained of the perpetual drain occasioned by absentees. That the foreign National Debt would have existed to as great, or, perhaps, a greater extent, if the Union had not taken place, is obvious, because Ireland must have borrowed money, if she had remained separate, and from the want of capital in Ireland, the loans must have been effected in England."—Now, in the first place, I wish the public to observe the unfairness of this writer, and the use which he makes of that press. He gives, he says, "an account" of the proceedings in Dublin, and he gives the "substance of the petition." He crams into two fifths of one single column of his paper, that which, in the broader columns and smaller print of the Times, occupies upwards of three whole columns.—This is a pretty good specimen of the fairness of this print, which is the constant advocate of the government; and, it is a pretty good presumptive proof of the goodness of the cause of the Petitioners, or, at least, of this writer's conviction of the goodness of that cause; for,

had he not been persuaded, that a publication of the full report, in the same way in which it was published in the Times; had he not been persuaded, that this would have operated in favour of the Petitioners' cause, he would not have filled his paper with more of those shameful fabrications, called "*intercepted correspondence in Spain*," and with more of the not much less shameful falsehoods from Cadiz; he would not have filled up his paper with this vile trash, scouted now, one would suppose, even by the poor feeble-minded creatures who still read his paper; he would not have put in stuff like this, to the exclusion of matter so deeply interesting as the proceedings at Dublin.—But, though he suppressed all that part of this interesting matter, which he did not garble and misrepresent, he found room, as we see, for a commentary; upon which commentary we will now make a few remarks.—The People of Ireland complain, that their *National Debt has been greatly increased* since the Union; and what answer does this writer give to that? Why, that the *Debt of Great Britain has also greatly increased*; and, that it would be as fair to attribute the one to the Union as the other.—Now, without stopping to show how the Debt of England may press lighter than that of Ireland, let us, for argument's sake, grant what is here assumed, and allow, that the increase of the debt of the one country may as well be attributed to the Union as the increase of the Debt of the other. What then? Is the lot of Ireland the better, because England's lot is bad, or because the lot of England is the same, or worse? And, as to the cause of the increase, are we to conclude, that the Union has not tended to cause an increase in the Irish Debt, because an increase has also taken place in the English Debt since the Union? This cause, we are told, is the war, in which we are engaged, "*a war unprecedented in its nature*." But, no attempt is made to shew that this war would have existed at all, and especially that it would have been conducted as it has been, if the Union had not taken place; if the Union had not put a hundred members into the English parliament. Something should have been said to convince us, that, without the Union, the parliament would have given its approbation to the Expedition to the Scheldt, and to the campaigns in Spain and Portugal.—We are next told, that our enemy is a ferocious tyrant, and that we have no

alternative but that of determined resistance or *unconditional submission*. What, then (to digress a little) is it come to this, at last? Are all our prospects of "indemnity for the past and security for the future" vanished? And, are we spending all these hundreds of millions of taxes and contracting all these hundreds of millions of debt without any other hope than that of *avoiding the necessity of unconditional submission*? Is this the relative situation, in which England now stands to France? Is this acknowledgment now made by those writers, who do nothing but praise the ministers, and who have praised *every act* of the ministers from 1793 to the present day?—But, to return: we are next told, that this resistance is "only to be made at an *enormous expence* and by the *most painful sacrifices*;" and, 'we are further told, that this "*must be obvious to any man who will reason dispassionately.*"—This is all assertion; and assertion which I *deny*, being decidedly of opinion, that the whole of the savings proposed by Mr. WARDLE might be made, not only *without weakening* our means of resistance, but that such savings would add, in an astonishing degree, to the *strengthening* of those means. Let the plan of national defence, proposed by my venerable friend, and faithful friend of his country, MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, be adopted, and we should soon see, that our expences would be lessened, and that, too, in a degree that the country can scarcely conceive. It is not mere *taxation*, not mere *expenditure*: that ever did, or ever will, defend, or provide for the defence of, a country, in the hour of real danger, and none but poor narrow-minded men ever supposed that it would. The hour of real danger is, with us, at hand. It may come to-morrow; and, therefore, it is time to bethink ourselves of the means of a sure and certain defence; and this defence, so far from being found in the source, whence the Morning Post expects it to come, will assuredly find therein one of its greatest obstacles. —It was only on the 13th of last month, that this same writer, in speaking of measures of defence, said: "IRELAND, indeed, demands an army. Worried and distracted as she is, by *French conspiracies and machinations*, ministers need not be told, that there alone is Great Britain *vulnerable*." Well then, it is not, it seems, merely for defence; not merely for the purpose of resisting "*the ferocious tyrant*," that, according to this same

writer, these "*enormous expences*" are wanted. Ireland, according to him, "*demand*s an army," and this he proclaims to the enemy. Ireland demands an army for the purpose of opposing "*French conspiracies and machinations*," which doubtless must be of great force in that unhappy country, though as far, as I have heard, no *proof* has ever been publicly given of their existence. But, grant that there are "*French conspiracies and machinations*" in Ireland; grant that there is a *French party* in Ireland, as was distinctly stated in parliament in 1807, when the law was passed for confining the people, in certain cases, to their houses and huts, from sunset to sun-rise, and for empowering the magistrates, in similar cases, to enter their dwellings at any hour of the night to see if they were at home; grant that there are "*French conspiracies and machinations*," and even a *French party* in Ireland," is it not the more necessary to listen patiently to the petitions of the people, when they state what they deem to be grievances, and especially when they very fully explain what they look upon as the causes of the prevailing discontents. An army *may*, for aught I know, be necessary to guard the interior of Ireland. It is a fact that I would fain not believe to be true; but, if it be true, I am very sure, that every thing ought to be tried to *retain the attachment* of all the loyal part of the people, and, if possible, to *gain over* the disloyal. "*French conspiracies and machinations*" can exist only because there are some, at least, of the Irish people discontented with their rulers; and, as these discontents cost us "*the expence of an army*," it is, surely, worth while to endeavour to remove them; and, that they are not to be removed by abusing Irish *Petitions* and Irish *Petitioners*, is, I think, a proposition, which admits not of dispute.—As to the TRADE of Ireland, this writer acknowledges that "*it has suffered*;" "*but*," says he, "*surely, no one, who looks at the state of the Continent, and contemplates the extraordinary and violent measures, which BUONAPARTE has adopted to ruin the trade of this empire, will be at a loss to account for a temporary commercial embarrassment.*" No?—What? Is it true, then, that BUONAPARTE's violent measures have injured our trade? Is it true, then, that our famous *Orders in Council* have not had the effect of saving that trade? Is it true, really true, that BUONAPARTE has had more wit than our Board of Trade and Plantations? And,

do I live to hear the government-defending papers set up a pitiful, whining cry, against the *violent* measures of the enemy, and of an enemy, too, whom they *daily* call a *base, vile, degraded, infamous, upstart miscreant and monster*? Do I live to hear this heroic, this defying, writer, whimpering and whining about this enemy's *violent* measures? Just as if *mild and gentle* measures were to be expected from an enemy, and especially from an enemy like Buonaparté.—But, how long is it *since the fact was discovered*? How long is it since the Morning Post and the rest of the writers of that description, discovered that the measures of Buonaparté have produced an *injury to our trade*? The reader will, I am sure, bear in mind, that *exactly the contrary* has been, almost up to this very day, asserted by these same writers, who have affected to *laugh* at his measures; and, which is still closer to the point, every one must recollect, that, during the last session of parliament, the minister boasted over and over again, boasted and flung the fact in the teeth of his opponents, that our trade, up to that hour, had not only gone on increasing, but increasing at a rate more rapid than during any former period. Nay, has not SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, another champion of the government, in a passage quoted but yesterday by the writer of this very Morning Post, stated that the trade of *Great Britain* has been augmented nearly one half, or, at least, far beyond one third since the Union with Ireland; and do not the advocates of the Bank of England justify the excessive issue of their notes upon an alledged *increase of trade*? And, after all this; nay, *side by side with this*, are the Irish to be told, that they can be at *no loss* to account for their commercial embarrassment, when they look at “the violent measures of the ferocious tyrant of the Continent?” Are the Irish to be told this, at the same time that they hear our Minister and his advocates declaring, that the *trade of England* has not been injured by the measures of the “ferocious tyrant?” The Irish, supposing the Irish to have ears, would naturally hear all the last winter's boasting about *our* increase of trade. I do not say that they would naturally read MR. PERCEVAL's and GEORGE ROSS's speeches; but they would naturally hear of the flourishing trade, in the description of which those speeches abounded. And the Irish, supposing the

Irish to be capable, not of reasoning; which, in the opinion of some folks, might, perhaps, be going too far; but, the Irish, supposing the Irish to possess the capacity of putting *two ideas* together, would, upon hearing of these boastings, naturally conclude, that Ireland being now *united* with England, the trade of the former, if all had been right, would have been in an increasing and flourishing way, as well as the trade of the latter. But, they are now told, by the writer before us, that they are to be at *no loss at all* to account for the suffering in *their* trade; though, in another page of the very same paper (paper of yesterday, Monday, September 24,) he tells the people of England that *their* trade has most wonderfully increased, and is now more flourishing than ever. On the left hand page of the paper, the people of Ireland are told, that their trade “*has suffered*,” to be sure; but, that they will readily put up with that, when they consider that it is the natural consequence of the war, in which we are engaged for our existence as a nation; and, on the right hand side of the paper, the people of England are told, that *the quantity of bank notes has increased*, to be sure; but that they will readily put up with that, when they consider that it is the natural consequence of the *astonishing prosperity of their trade*. And yet has this same writer the assurance to point out *the people of other countries* as objects of our contempt and scorn, on account of their credulity, or of the oratorical insults which they tamely endure!—It is said, by this writer, that the Union has not increased the number of *absentees*, that it has not rendered Ireland more like a *colony* than it was before. This, like all the rest, is more *assertion*. But, without going into particular facts, is it not next to impossible; nay, is it not quite impossible, that this assertion can be true? It is notorious, that during every winter, thousands of persons are brought to England in consequence of the business to be done in parliament. All private bills, relating to Ireland, all road and canal and enclosure bills, must now be passed here. All contested elections must now be settled here. What crowds of applicants, appellants, witnesses, attorneys, and agents of all sorts; must these things alone bring to England from Ireland; and what immense sums of money must these cause to pass from that country to this? And were there none but the members of the two Houses of

Parliament, will any one say, that their residence in England for the far greater part of the year, and, some of them, all the year, must not operate as a great drain upon Ireland? Yet, it is not the absence of the *members themselves* so much as the absence of others, to which the absence of the principal persons in the kingdom gives rise. Absence, through this example, becomes a *fashion*: not to reside in England for the winter, is to be out of the "fashionable world." It argues either a *want of breeding* or a *want of means*, to avoid the imputation of which the last shilling of many a family is spent in England, when the income of such family, if expended in Ireland, whence it is drawn, would give not only a respectable competence, but a sufficiency of superabundance to preserve that best cement of society, *the respect and gratitude of the poor towards the rich*. How are these to exist, when those who cultivate the land, when those from whose toil the landlord derives his means, never behold his face, much less taste of his bounty or receive encouragement from his condescension; how are respect and gratitude towards the owners of the land to exist amidst the apparent scorn, or, at least, the visible disregard of the principals; and the exactions, the extortions, the arrogance and the contumeliousness of agents and factors, to whom the tenantry of an Absentee are delivered over, in order to secure his *purse*, and, at the same time, to spare his *feelings*? When we are talking of "*French parties*" and of "*French conspiracies and machinations*," in Ireland, ought we not to turn our thoughts this way, and consider how great a portion of the evil may have proceeded from this source? Who are those, that are best able to keep the people right? Whose *duty* is it? Those who enjoy the riches of the country; those who live upon the fruit of that land which the people till. HUME, in speaking of the effects of a system of Stocks and Funds, points out its hostility to the *peace and freedom* of a country, on account of the destruction which it occasions of the *intercourse between the rich and the poor*. "These are men," says he, meaning the Stock-holders, "who can enjoy their revenue in any part of the globe in which they choose to reside, who will naturally bury themselves in the capital, or in great cities, and who will sink into the lethargy of a stupid and pampered luxury, without spirit, ambition, or enjoyment.....By these

"means the several ranks of men, which form a kind of independent magistracy in a state, instituted by the hand of nature, are entirely lost; and every man in authority derives his influence from the mission alone of the sovereign. No expedient remains for preventing or suppressing insurrections, but mercenary armies."—Such was this great man's opinion as to the effect of Absentees created by the means of Funds and Stocks: how exactly it applies to the case of Irish Absentees, any one may easily guess, but none but Irishmen can feel.

PORTUGAL, SICILY, the ARMAMENTS IN THE SCHELDT, and other subjects, on which I meant to submit some remarks to my readers, must be deferred till my next.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
September 25, 1810.

BANK SHOP MEETING, relative to the Bullion Report.—21 Sept. 1810.—Taken from the Morning Chronicle of the 22d Sept.

Yesterday there was a numerous meeting of the Bank Proprietors at their house in Threadneedle-street. About one o'clock the Chairmen of the Court of Directors proposed that the dividend upon their profits should be 10 per cent. Upon this proposition being put,

MR. RANDLE JACKSON presented himself to the attention of the Court, and advertising to a recent publication, (the Report of the Bullion Committee of the House of Commons) which he observed the Chairman could not officially notice, the Learned Gentleman spoke to the following effect—When, said he, the character of any individual or body of men is publicly attacked, it becomes a duty to take the first opportunity of vindicating that character; and although I am as unwilling as any man to step out of the line of my professional pursuits, yet I feel too strongly how much I owe to this institution, to the interest of the public, and to my own interest, to overlook the animadversions contained in the Report to which I have alluded. That Report appears to me to contain in effect very serious charges against the validity of our stock, and our public stock. I wish it to be understood, that I do not mean to speak disrespectfully of the Committee, nor to attribute their Report to the influence of party motives;

but I must observe that that Report is clearly and avowedly inconsistent with the evidence taken before that Committee. This inconsistency is, indeed, so glaring and so material, that I could not wish for any more complete vindication of this institution than the universal publicity of that evidence. The fallacies contained in the Report are of such a nature that it is in my mind of considerable consequence to guard against or remove as soon as possible the impressions they are calculated to produce. Among those fallacies, the first that strikes me is the assumption as a fact, that Bank notes are below par, because 105*l.* would not buy gold enough to make 100 guineas. The fact is, that the market price of bullion has risen considerably above the mint price, I believe about sixteen per cent. But let it be recollected that 105*l.* in notes would buy as much of gold as 100 guineas, if the gold were not preferred for the criminal purpose of melting it. For every legitimate purpose the one were quite as efficient as the other, and how was the disposition of men to violate the laws, to act disloyally, to risk their liberty and character, to be provided against, or how could that disposition operate in any fair consideration of the subject? Mr. Merle, Mr. Goldsmid, and other gentlemen of high character and intelligence, stated in their evidence before the Committee, that there was no difference between the value of Bank notes and coin. Those gentlemen alleged, that they neither felt nor perceived such a difference in any of their extensive and various transactions. In fact, they declared that they would as soon take Bank notes as cash in payment; and why not, when Bank notes were as acceptable as cash in any payment whatever to be made, either for corn or goods of any description. Yet the Report of the Committee to whom this declaration was made by such high authority, before whom the depreciation of Bank notes was broadly and positively contradicted throughout the whole of the evidence, thought proper to express quite a different opinion. It is not surprising, then, that a certain celebrated writer (Mr. Cobbett) should have taken advantage of the publication of such a Report—that he should have declared that it made him rejoice as much, as if he were appointed Lord of Hampshire. I do not mean to complain of, or to accuse this eminent writer for such a declaration. No, such a feeling of gratulation was quite natural,

upon finding a favourite proposition adopted and recommended by so high an authority as that of a Committee of the House of Commons.

The next fallacy with which I have to charge the Report is, the allegation that this institution has issued an excess of paper, to which excess the Committee attribute the advance that has taken place in the necessities of life and other commodities. Is it possible, I would ask, that the Committee can seriously mean to impress upon the lower orders of the people, that the advanced price which they pay for provisions is owing to the conduct of this institution? But what do the Committee mean by an excess of issue? I am prepared to shew, that the issue of our paper was comparatively more, considering all circumstances, previous to the Act of Restriction, than it has been since that period.—It is, in fact, clearly deducible from the evidence, as well as from notorious circumstances, and from admissions, even in some parts of the Report, that your issue has been rather parsimonious than excessive. In the year 1797, when the restriction took place, your issue was at about 11 millions, but it was reduced to that amount in consequence of the alarm which then prevailed. Previous to that alarm your issue was generally about 14 millions. That issue, including the 1*l.* and 2*l.* notes, without which society must have stood still, has for some years averaged about 20 millions. Thus the increase of your issue has not exceeded 6 millions, and how can that with any colour of fairness be pronounced an excess, considering the progressive increase of our commerce, and also the increase of country Bank paper?—It is known that the increase of our commerce from the year 1805 to 1809, was no less than 15 millions, and I believe I do not over-rate, when I state the increase of our commerce since the year 1797, at 50 millions.—I am not in possession of any memoranda at present to justify this estimate, but the increase of our commerce is undeniable, and it is equally undeniable that the increased issue of your paper has been trifling, compared to that increase of commerce.—Now as to the Country Banks, it appears that since the year 1797, when their number was at about two or three hundred, they have increased to between 7 and 800, and that their issue amounts to no less than 30 millions—yet no charge of excess was applied by the Committee

to this issue—no, that seemed to have been lost sight of, and the whole of the sin was confined to this institution, for making an increase of six millions in its issue within a period of thirteen years of prodigiously increasing commerce; this increase of issue too having been made in the discount of commercial bills, secured by valid *bona fide* mercantile property. But the cause of the increased issue escaped the notice of the Committee. The commercial accommodation which the Bank afforded by that issue, was overlooked by the Committee. This I complain of as a sin of omission against this institution, but I am more disposed to complain of the sin of commission against you, in imputing to you the rise that has taken place in the price of provisions. But here, as in other points, the Report is inconsistent with itself—for while it attributes, to you, whose increased issue has been, as I have shewn, only six millions, it states in another part that your circulation is chiefly confined to London and its vicinity, and consequently your paper cannot be the cause which affects the country markets. This must surely proceed from the paper of the Country Banks. The fault alleged by the Committee must belong to that, and not to yours. In making this observation, I beg it to be distinctly understood that I do not mean to speak in disparagement of the Country Banks. No, my opinion with regard to these institutions perfectly corresponds with that of the justly respected Baronet who is now no more, and who so properly pronounced them of great utility to commerce, and of peculiar utility in a country requiring a large circulating medium.—Another fallacy in the Report refers to the balance of commerce, which is in no degree attributable to this institution. The suggestion in the Report upon this point is indeed negated by the acknowledgment of the Reporters as to the moderation and self-denial of the Bank in its issues. It would, in fact, be quite preposterous to maintain, that an issue of 20 millions of paper could have the effect ascribed to it upon the commerce, the provisions, and the general currency of the country. Undoubtedly, the price of provisions must be affected by the mass of our circulating medium, but the same effect would be produced whether that circulating medium were in specie or paper. But in the eager preference which the Committee express for the circulation of the former, and their urgent desire that

you should pay cash for your notes, there is an omission on their part, which I think betrays a want of candour. In no part of their Report do they notice that out of the 20 millions of notes which we have in circulation, the public owe us 18 millions—so that the public hold a security in their own hands for no less than 9-10ths of our whole issue. This is a fact of importance, which applies to no other monied or mercantile institution in the country. From this fact, indeed, we are entitled to say, that if the public think Bank issues; an evil, they may annihilate them in 24 hours. If they wish to dissolve this institution, let them pay us the 18 millions they owe us, and we will make up the remaining two millions by subscription among ourselves within an hour, so as immediately to discharge all our notes.—But there are other and important advantages derived by the public from the Bank, which the Report has declined to notice. We actually pay to the public at present 210,000*l.* per annum in consideration of existing circumstances—that is, by lending 3 millions gratuitously until a peace is concluded, and by an abatement of interest to the amount of 60,000*l.* upon a former loan. This, however, is not the only grant we have made to the public. You agreed with Mr. Pitt upon the renewal of our charter, to lend 3 millions to the public for 6 years gratuitously, and afterwards at an interest of 5 per cent. This interest was afterwards by an agreement with lord Grenville, with whom your bargain was opened, reduced to 3 per cent. which produced the abatement of 60,000*l.* which I have mentioned. Again, your bargain was opened with the present Administration; but let us hope that the Report upon which I am speaking, may not be the forerunner of another opinion. Your grants to the public are already sufficiently ample—are as much as justice could allow, or liberality could accept. For independently of the sum of 210,000*l.* which I have stated, you have agreed to abate your claim for the management of the public debt, to the amount of 70,000*l.* per annum, besides relinquishing the advantage you derived from the unclaimed dividends. Thus are the public considerable participators with you in the profits of your concern, and of course the amount of the dividends to the Proprietors is proportionally reduced. Yet these facts are not mentioned, are not at all alluded to in the Report, and I be-

lieve they are but very partially known to the country.—Notwithstanding the liberal participation of our profits, which, as I have detailed, the public enjoy, it appears from the Report, that a suggestion had been thrown out to the Committee to seize upon our surplus profits. What, to seize upon the profits arising from the legal and honourable exertion of our trade! upon that which was the result of labour and hazard, conducted upon the same just principles, and standing upon the same fair footing as other merchants! The very idea was extraordinary, and it was almost equally extraordinary that the Committee, instead of merely expressing their disapprobation, did not reject it with all that marked abhorrence and indignation which such an iniquitous proposition was calculated to excite in virtuous minds. Upon recollection, I think a similar proposition was made by Marat, in the National Convention. I remember that his proposition referred to the property of the Merchants of Marseilles and Bourdeaux, and he had many supporters. Yes, that factious demagogue and his coadjutors, having succeeded in prostrating the aristocracy of rank and birth, wished also to break down the aristocracy of wealth; the public necessity being their pretence, but universal revolution their object; supply being their profession, but equality their principle.—I come now to the conclusion of the Report, and from a view of all the circumstances, a most extraordinary conclusion I cannot hesitate to pronounce it. The Committee recommend that you should be compelled by a Legislative Act to pay your notes in specie in two years. What a variety of mischievous consequences would flow from the adoption of such a recommendation! It has been often observed, that sufficient for the day is the evil thereof, but that adage is totally inapplicable to a case of this nature. Precautions cannot be too early taken to guard against a great public calamity. We cannot too soon enter our protest against the recommendation I have mentioned. There is no man who has the honour to know and the opportunity to appreciate your Hon. Board, but must concur in the compliment pronounced upon your conduct by the Report. I am the more glad of this compliment, because it proceeds from a quarter evidently hostile to your interests, and indifferent to your feelings. If they were not so hostile and indifferent, why, in the name of com-

mon justice and common sense, should they demand that which in plain English is nothing less than this, that whatever may be the price of bullion, you shall be obliged to buy it, in order to pay in specie at a fixed period? What an encouragement would thus be held out to imposition by pointing at you as those who must submit to imposture—who must buy bullion upon any terms? Can any proposition be imagined more unjust and ungenerous, and if acted upon, more injurious to the commercial world? In the name then of justice and generosity, in the name of all orders and professions interested in sustaining the monied and mercantile interest of the country, I enter my protest against this extraordinary proposition.—In examining the justice and generosity of such a proposition, let it be considered by whom, and for what purpose you were exhausted of your bullion in 1797. The public interest was placed in a state of the utmost peril, and for the public safety and accommodation you lent your bullion. Without entering into any question as to the propriety of the conduct you then adopted, without considering your disposition or your duty to submit to the utmost sacrifices in your power, when fighting for our liberties and our homes, I believe I may say, that if it were not for the sacrifices you made in 1797, our army must have starved in Flanders. You besides made advances to enable Government to subsidize our allies. It is not now necessary to inquire into the policy of these subsidies. It is undeniable, that the circumstances of the times and the sacrifices you made for the public safety, produced the inconveniences you then suffered. Yet your wish was, under all disadvantages, to continue the issue of your specie. No less than 29 times in 1795 and 1796, your Honourable Board of Directors remonstrated with Mr. Pitt against the project of restriction. Here I must observe in passing, that it would perhaps have been as well if your Honourable Board had convened the Proprietors, had consulted your constituents instead of repeating your remonstrances to Mr. Pitt, and had taken their opinion before you had concluded with him. To the public, however, you advanced your money, and had you not conceded to the proposition of Mr. Pitt, the Government could not have gone on; and was it now for that public to say to you, "you have exhausted yourself of bullion to sustain us

in the day of need, and yet we will now compel you to buy bullion at any price, in order to give it in exchange for your notes, or even for the notes which we have borrowed from you?" But what would be the consequences of obliging you to comply with such a requisition? The first effect of appointing the payment at a fixed period would be to encourage speculators to hoard the coin, in order to make the Bank pay through the nose for it. But the moment you were ordered to pay, you must prepare by limiting your issues, by confining your discounts, and what a convulsion would that occasion in the commercial world? Those who remember the circumstances which occurred in 1797, arising out of your resolution to limit your discounts, must be aware of the effect of such a measure upon the mercantile body; must be able to foresee the calamity the advice of the Committee would produce, were it possible that it ever could be acted upon by an intelligent House of Commons.—From some parts of the Report of this Committee, one would really be inclined to suppose that it was drawn up by persons not at all in the habit of considering commercial operations, particularly with regard to exchanges, and the appointment of a fixed period for the payment of bullion. Why not leave this question as to the resumption of cash payments to the discretion of the Directors, as all the mercantile witnesses so strongly recommended to the Committee; and why doubt the proper exercise of that discretion, which even the Committee itself applauded? It is a fact easily capable of proof, that the compulsive resumption of cash payments would be much more fatal to the interest of the Commercial World, than to that of the Bank Proprietors. In the event of such a compulsive measure, the Bank would naturally, in its own defence, forbear to issue notes, to pay which they must buy bullion at an advanced price. Judge, then, of the consequences. From what happened through the reduction of discounts in 1797, what must be apprehended from any such attempt in the present augmented state of our commerce? Even the Committee deprecate any recurrence to such a measure of limited discounts. On the contrary, they recommend coinage to the Bank without any consideration of the means by which that coinage is to be sustained. They recommend coinage to an institution, the character of which their

Report is running down. They recommend coinage to an institution, while a prospect is held out of seizing upon its surplus profits.—I do not mean to deny that it is a solecism that the Bank should not pay its promissory notes, but still, considering the cause and all the circumstances of the case, I would leave the time of payment to be settled by slow progression and deliberate caution. I would confide in the discretion of that honourable Board to whose character and conduct even the Report, which would deprive them of discretion, bears the most complete testimony.—The Committee states, that it is necessary for the recovery of our credit upon the Continent, as well as at home, to resume cash payments at the Bank, and that such resumption would serve to cure the evil of exchange; but does any thinking man, acquainted with the subject, imagine, that if cash payments were resumed at the Bank, these payments could continue for any time.—In fact, all the gold would vanish in a week after its issue. Then we should be under the necessity of soon restoring the restriction again, and I would ask you, as merchants, whether it would not be better to make no pledge than to make one you must break—whether it would not be better to decline making a promise which you cannot perform? Such must be the consequence of the rate of bullion, and the state of commercial exchange, which I contend is not affected, as the Report alleges, by the restriction of the Bank; but as the mercantile witnesses stated before the Committee, by the nature of our commerce, by the balance of exports and imports. For what effect could gold sent to the Continent have upon the rate of exchange any more than any other article of merchandize of equal value? But as a proof that the rate of exchange has not been affected by the state of the Bank, it is only necessary to state this fact, that the exchange with Hamburgh is the same now that it was in the year 1797.—But when the Committee determined so earnestly to recommend the resumption of cash payments, and a compulsive measure upon this institution, it would have been but becoming in them to recommend, as a preliminary step, the repayment to the Bank of the 18 millions due from the public, and also the restoration of the £210,000 derived from the Bank in consequence of the supposed advantages resulting from the non-payment of cash.

This was a line of proceeding which at least common justice should have urged the Committee to propose.—The Learned Gentleman concluded a very impressive speech, in the course of which he was repeatedly cheered, and particularly on his deprecating the proposition of the Committee, to resume cash payment in two years, by exhorting the Directors to continue to pursue that same firm, upright and undeviating course which it appeared by the evidence had distinguished their conduct, unawed by power, and unmoved by faction; to continue the same liberal advances to the mercantile interest, and to continue the same cautious principle by which it appeared they had been governed. Thus, by identifying themselves with the best interests, with the truth and with the honour of the public, they would be sure of public support; or at all events, be enabled, as they had done, to convince those who would inquire into their affairs, that they well deserved that support.

Mr. PEARSE, the Governor of the Bank of England, next rose, and commenced a short speech by assuring that Honourable Court that in the evidence which he gave before the Bullion Committee, he had been influenced by no sinister motives whatever, whether of a political or a private nature. In a question of such vast importance and general interest, he trusted that he knew his duty too well, both to that Court and the public, to be induced by any considerations to give a partial or fallacious statement of whatever was his knowledge, or of the impressions that knowledge had produced in his own mind; for the Directors, he would take it upon him to say, that they would, as they were bound, pay uniform and anxious attention to those measures which might result from the Report of that Committee, and here he could not help expressing a hope, that the public in reading and investigating that Report, would give more attention to, and lay greater stress upon, the evidence laid before that Committee, than, he was sorry to say, the Reporters themselves seem to have done (*hear! hear.*) It was to be regretted, that a Report avowedly founded upon that evidence was not more conformable to it. He therefore threw out this as a caution to the public, not to suffer themselves to be implicitly guided by that Report, without duly weighing the nature of the testi-

mony laid before the Committee. From the able speech they had just heard, it would be unnecessary for him to detain them by any observations upon points which had been already so satisfactorily dwelt upon. He, however, concurred so entirely in the opinions of the last speaker, respecting the issue of the Bank Paper, that instead of agreeing with those who professed to think that that issue had been excessive, that he, on the contrary, thought it just matter of surprise, that considering all circumstances, it could have been so moderate as it had been. The increase of issue, instead of being so extravagant, as some have represented, was not in proportion to the exigencies of the times. The issue of paper for this year, independent of the one pound notes and two pound notes, was very little more than fourteen millions, a sum to which it was well known, that their paper issue, with the same exception, amounted a short period before the year 1797. In the course of the year 1795, this paper issue amounted to fourteen millions, and it was at present very little more. There never could be an excessive issue of paper, as long as the Directors took care that there should be an exact proportion observed between the necessities of the public and that issue; that object the laudable caution of the Directors would uniformly support, by resorting to those means within themselves, and refusing to discount what did not appear to be valid mercantile paper. Their disposition to accommodate the public would necessarily, for the sake both of the public and themselves, be regulated by this very proper caution; and indeed, as the manner in which their notes were issued, depended so much upon the extent of the applications made for discounts, in order to make good their deficiency, it of course followed that this was of itself such a control on the issue, as that it could never amount to an excess. With respect to the rate of exchange, he could not agree with those who thought that it depended on the price of bullion; his opinion was, that the rate of exchange was rather affected by the state of commerce, and that as the circumstances of commerce did happen to be more or less favourable, so in proportion was the rate of exchange more or less advantageous; and he repeated it as his opinion, that the issue of their paper did not in proportion to its quantity operate in raising the price of

bullion, or in materially affecting the state of the exchanges. He regretted that he was unable adequately to express his own sentiments, and those of the Gentlemen in the Direction, for the very handsome manner in which the Gentleman who spoke last, had done justice to the motives which had actuated their conduct. He had no doubt, that the Directors would, by adhering to the same line of conduct, to the same prudence and firmness, secure a continuance of that support which the public had hitherto given them. In answering all demands made upon them for discounts, they would never lose sight of the public interest by looking not merely to the solidity of the paper, but endeavouring, as far as it might be possible, to be certain that the paper is to be issued for commercial purposes. He concluded by thanking the Court for their attention (*Hear! Hear.*)

MR. PAYN, of Bath and Wells, Banker, when the question was about to be put, rose to make one or two observations. He applauded in his heart the greater portion of the sentiments so ably and eloquently urged by the Gentleman who first spoke, but as it was admitted that the present circulating medium of the country had fallen into depreciation, if the cause of that depreciation be not what the Report of the Bullion Committee alleges it to be, he thought it was desirable to ascertain to what other source this acknowledged effect was to be traced. In the corn countries of England the paper money of country bankers most abounded. He admitted that the issue of their notes by many country bankers had been very indiscreet. He was himself a country banker, and he had with many others in the same business endeavoured, as far as he could, to restrict the issue of the smaller notes. He thought that the issue of all notes under a certain amount should be confined to the Bank of England solely; but he had known persons after suffering losses in other trades, take up

that of a country banker, and proceed to issue small notes, though at the time, he, Mr. Payn, could not with safety to himself give them any accommodation. It was known to be the practice of corn-factors and other dealers, to consider in their demand for their respective commodities, the nature of the medium in which they were to be paid; and he has known the practice to have prevailed of making very considerable abatements in the articles offered for sale, in proportion to their opinion of the security of the medium in which they were to be paid for those articles. The farmer sold his grain to the corn-factor, the corn-factor sells again to the bread-baker, the baker may be paid in a very different manner, he receiving his payment in the existing smaller currency of that part of the country. He wished he was able to follow this through all its consequences. He hoped, however, that others more capable would consider it. He professed himself an advocate for the honour of that body to which he belonged, the country bankers, and said that he knew many of them to be as anxious as he himself was, to confine the small currency to Bank of England Notes, as the only effectual way to check the abuses, which must otherwise endanger the system of country banks. It was, however, impossible that the circulation of the country should not at all be affected by a weighty foreign expenditure; it must necessarily have its consequences, the sending out our specie in large quantities to support large armies on the Continent. He had, however, great doubts that the putting guineas into circulation would be attended with the good consequences which it had been pretended would result from it. He did not think it would put a stop to the hoarding, and should ever the silver be issued to its full extent, he did not think it would remain long in circulation.

The motion fixing the next Quarterly Payment of the Dividend was then put and carried, and soon after the Meeting was adjourned.

"That provisions and labour should become dear by the increase of *trade and money*, is, in many respects, an inconvenience; but an inconvenience that is unavoidable, and the effect of that *public wealth and prosperity* which are the end of all our wishes. It is compensated by the advantages which we reap from the possession of those PRECIOUS METALS, and the weight which they give the nation in all foreign wars and negotiations; but there appears no reason for increasing that inconvenience by a counterfeit money, which foreigners will not accept of in any payment, and which any great disorder in the state will reduce to nothing."—HUME.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER VIII.

Further observations respecting the fallacious notion that paper money is the consequence of an increase of Trade and of National Prosperity—Sir John Sinclair's idea about Roads and Canals—Exemplification in the instances of France and the American States—Destruction of the paper money in both those countries, the dawn of National Prosperity—Our own history shows the influence of a National Debt in producing bank-notes—Our Bank was the offspring of the Debt—The Bank was necessary in order to pay the interest of the Debt—Boldness of Mr. Jackson and Sir John Sinclair in asserting that paper money is necessary to Trade, and is a mine of National Prosperity—What would Hume have said if he had been told that Scotland would produce a man to assert what Sir John Sinclair has asserted?—The "LO HERE!" and the "LO THERE!"—The real cause of the increase of the bank-notes—That increase shown to have kept pace with the increase of the Debt—Conclusion of this part of our subject.

Gentlemen,

In the foregoing Letter we opened the way towards the history of the Stoppage of Gold and Silver, or, *Real-money payments*, at the Bank of England, in the year 1797, by showing the divers ways, in which bank notes get out into circulation, or, in other words, the divers motives for mak-

ing those notes; and by clearly showing also, in reasoning upon general principles, that it is *Debt* and not *Wealth*, that generates promissory notes, of whatever sort they may be, or by whomsoever issued. So fond, however, have we been upon this subject, and such great pains, for so long a time, have been taken to make us believe; that the increase of the paper-currency proceeds from an increase of *Trade*, or of something *favourable* to us, that I should not be perfectly satisfied with myself, were I to hasten forward, without first submitting to you all the observations that have occurred to me upon this part of our subject.

When those, who, from whatever motive, have written in favour of the Paper System, have had to account for the vast increase in the quantity of the bank notes, they have always had recourse to our "*increasing trade*" and "*wealth*" and "*prosperity*" and "*improvement*;" and they have, like SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, bid us look at the increase of turnpike-roads and canals and harbours and new enclosures. Now, this reference to roads, canals, harbours, and enclosures is singularly unhappy; for, the Emperor Napoleon, in his annual speeches, to his Corps Legislatif, or Parliament, tells them of new roads and canals, compared to which ours are not worth naming, while we know pretty well that he has, during this war even, made a harbour and an arsenal and a fleet too, where there was before no semblance of maritime means, to get at which fleet, or, rather, to attempt to get at it, has cost us all the lives and all the millions of taxes expended in the Walcheren Expedition; and, while we see, that, as to *agricultural improvements*, France is able to let us have bread. Therefore, as this is the case in France, and as these same writers assure us, that the people of France are in a state of extreme misery, methinks that new canals

and roads and harbours and agricultural improvements should not, by these writers, at any rate, be cited as proofs of national prosperity.

But, what have these exertions of genius and industry; these efforts of the bodily or mental faculties of a people; what have these to do with *paper-money*? There is no *paper-money* in France. Yet the French make roads and canals and harbours and agricultural improvements. There is no *paper-money*, by which we always mean, *paper not convertible into gold or silver at the will of the holder*; there is no paper of this kind in the AMERICAN STATES; yet, it is pretty notorious, that there are improvements going on in those States, some of which are truly astonishing, and one instance in particular, I cannot help giving you, just as I found it published in the London news-papers of the 11th of last month.* Having seen and admired this

* It is now a little more than five years, since a number of German families, styling themselves "THE HARMONY SOCIETY," went to the United States, with the view of forming a distinct settlement. They soon planted themselves in the wilderness of BUTLER COUNTY, in the north-western corner of PENNSYLVANIA. The following account of the origin and progress of their settlement is copied from the Mirror, a paper published in the neighbourhood of this frugal, industrious and thriving people.—The Association of Harmony had its origin in Germany upwards of 20 years ago, and feeling themselves much oppressed, on account of their religion, they concluded to seek a country where they could exercise their religion without hindrance or oppression. They chose the United States of America.—In the year 1804, in December, about 20 families arrived in Zelinople, in the neighbourhood of which, Mr. George Rapp, with some others, bought about 4,700 acres of land, and during that fall built nine log houses.—In the year 1805, in the spring, the society consisted of about 50 families: they laid out the town of Harmony on their own land, and in that spring built twelve log houses 24 feet by 18, built a large barn, cleared 25 acres round the town, and 151 acres for corn and 50 acres for potatoes; a grist mill was built this year, the race 3-8ths of a mile long, and 15 acres cleared for meadow, the other ground sowed with wheat and rye; in the

wonderful, and, perhaps, unparalleled, instance of prosperity and happiness proceeding from the united exertions of genius and industry; and, being at the same time, aware, that something approaching towards, it must necessarily be going on in other parts of the country, you have only to know, that there is no such thing as a *paper-money* in any part of that country; for, then your conclusion must be, that a paper-money is not necessary to create, or to aid the operations of, genius and industry; and, history, at once to inform and console you, affords you these further facts, that, both in France and America, there has been a paper-money; that, in both countries, that money has met with its *total destruction*; and that, since such destruction, both countries have flourished much more than they did while that money was in existence.

What have the partizans of the Paper-

fall and winter, 30 houses more were built.—In the year 1806 an inn was built, two stories high, 42 feet by 32 feet, and some other houses; 300 acres cleared for corn, 58 acres for meadow; an oil mill was built, and a tannery, a blue dyer's shop, and a frame barn 100 feet long.—In the year 1807, 360 acres were cleared for grain and a meadow, a brick store house built, a saw-mill and beer-brewery erected, and four acres of vines planted; in this year the society sold 500 bushels of grain and 3,000 gallons of whiskey, manufactured by themselves of their own produce.—In the year 1808, a considerable quantity of ground cleared, a meeting house built of brick, 70 feet long and 55 feet wide, another brick house built, some other buildings and stables for cattle, potash, soap-boiler and candle-drawer shops erected, a frame barn of 80 feet long built. Of the produce of this year was sold 2,000 bushels of grain, and 1400 bushels were distilled.—In the year 1809, a fulling mill was built, which does a great deal of business for the country, also a hemp-mill, an oil-mill, a grist-mill, a brick warehouse 46 feet by 36, and another brick building of the same dimensions, one of which has a cellar completely arched under the whole, for the purpose of a wine cellar. A considerable quantity of land cleared this year. The produce of this year was 6,000 bushels of Indian corn, 4,500 bushels of wheat, 5,000 bushels of oats, 10,000 bushels of

System to offer in answer to this? Will any one of them venture to look these facts in the face? I do not believe they will. They will, I should suppose, rather choose to confine themselves to a dull re-assertion of their former assertions, interspersed, may be, with a seasoning of abuse upon those, by whom their ignorance, or insincerity, is detected and exposed. But, without resorting to the instances furnished in foreign countries, have we not, in the history of our own finances, quite a sufficient proof, that paper-money, or, indeed, *bank notes of any sort*, are not the representatives of any thing but *Debt*? In every country, of which we have any knowledge, a *government Debt* has been accompanied with *bank notes*, or *payments in paper*, of some sort or other, no matter under what name. The *Debt*, in England, did, as we have seen (Letter II. p. 292), begin in the year 1692; and there appeared, at first, no intention to pay either

potatoes, 4,000lbs. of hemp and flax, 100 bushels of barley brewed into beer, and 50 gallons of sweet oil, made from the white poppy. Of the produce of this year will be sold, 3,000 bushels of corn, 1,000 bushels of potatoes, 1,000 bushels of wheat; 1,200 bushels of rye will be distilled.—In the year 1810 will be erected a barn 90 feet long, a school house 50 feet by 44 wide, a grist-mill with three pair of stones, one of which will be burrs, and some small brick houses for families.—The society now consists of 780 persons, comprising 140 families; they have now 1,600 acres of land cleared, 203 acres whereof are in meadow, and possess at present 6,000 acres of land.—There are different tradesmen members of this society, who work for the country as well as the society, to wit: Twelve shoemakers, six taylors, twelve weavers, three wheelwrights, five coopers, six blacksmiths, two nail smiths, three rope-makers, three blue dyers, ten carpenters, four cabinet-makers, two saddlers, two waggon-makers, twelve masons, two potters, one soap-boiler, a doctor and apothecary, but neither *parson* nor *lawyer*, and in a short time a hatter and a tin-plate worker is expected.—During the last year the shoe-makers alone worked for the country to the amount of 112 dollars, and 8 cents, the coopers to the amount of 207 dollars, the saddlers to the amount of 739 dollars, 54 cents, the tannery 675 dollars, the blacksmiths 180 dollars.

the interest or the principal in any thing but the usual gold and silver coin of the country. People lent their guineas and crown pieces, and there was not the smallest notion of their being repaid in any thing but guineas and crown pieces. But, it was soon found, that, to pay the interest of its *Debt*, the government needed something other than gold and silver; which, indeed, any one might have foreseen, because the *Debt* itself necessarily arose from the *want of gold and silver* within the reach of the government. It was, therefore, supreme folly to suppose, that the government, who had borrowed people's guineas from want, would long have guineas enough to carry on wars and to pay those people too. Accordingly, in only *two years* after the *Debt* began, the *Bank* was established; the Bank made notes; these notes, as far as they went, supplied the place of real money; and, very soon, by giving all possible countenance and support to the Bank, the government got great part of the interest of its *Debt* paid in bank notes. Thus were the bank notes, from the very outset, as, indeed, *all promissory notes* must be, the *representatives of Debt*, and not of *wealth*, of *prosperity*, or of *trade*; and, if this was the case, at a time when these notes were *convertible into gold and silver*, shall we now look upon them in a better light?

In spite, however, of the voice of history and of reason, and even in spite of common sense, there are (as in the instances of MR. RANDLE JACKSON and SIR JOHN SINCLAIR) men to be found, so ignorant or so hardy as to hold up bank notes, promissory notes, and promissory notes, too, *not convertible into real-money*; there are men to be found to hold up this *paper-money*, which, as we have clearly shewn, is always issued in consequence of *Debt*, in consequence of a *want of real-money*, and which paper-money is, as BURKE (See the Motto to Letter VII. page 449) well describes it, “*not the measure of the trade of its nation, but of the necessities of its government*,” there are men to be found, who, like MR JACKSON, insist that an increase of paper-money is called for by an increase of *trade*; and, who, like the holder BARONET, scruple not to assert, that “*the abundance of circulation*” [speaking of bank notes not convertible into gold and silver] “*is the great source of our opulence and strength*, and a *MINE of national prosperity*,” yea, who have

the boldness to call promissory notes, which are issued only because the issuers are not able to pay in money, a *mine* of national prosperity; and, who are hardy enough to make this assertion at the very moment when they themselves are declaring, that it would be *ruinous* to attempt to force the issuers of such notes to pay them in money when presented.

HUME, as will be seen from that passage of his Essay on Money, from which I have taken my motto, observes, that there is an *inconvenience* in the increase of *real* money, which, as was shown in the last Letter, is naturally produced by an increase of trade; and he calls bank-notes (though, observe, convertible into gold and silver, as they were in his time), *counterfeit* money. What, then, would he have said of our present bank-notes; what would he have said of bank-notes not convertible into gold and silver; and what would he have said, if he had been told, that Scotland would produce a man, who would tell the people of Great Britain, and in print too, that such bank-notes are a *mine* of *National Prosperity*?

We have now, I think, said quite enough to convince any man, whose faculties enable him to distinguish falsehood from truth, that the notion of an increase of trade demanding an increase of paper-money, is one of the most gross delusions, that either ignorance or an intention to deceive ever attempted to practise upon mankind. We have, in short, clearly shown, that the increase of bank notes, and of promissory notes of every description, are produced by *Debt*, are the offspring and *representatives* of *Debt*, and that *real* money, and *real* money only, is the representative of *property*, or *wealth*, or things of *real* value, and, of course, that an increase of *trade*, which is only another term for an increase of *money's-worth* things, demands, and if there be no unnatural cause to prevent it, will, of itself, *bring into circulation*, an increase of *real* money.

To acknowledge this truth would, however, have been so manifestly injurious to the Paper Money System, that it is not surprising that the partizans of that system (which is but another name for those who have profited, and do still profit, from it) should have taken uncommon pains to avoid the acknowledgment, and even to maintain, with their utmost ability, any opinion of a

contrary tendency. Hence all the absurdities, that we find in the various speeches and pamphlets, uttered and written upon the subject, and in which the increase of the bank-notes, and now of the paper-money, have been, at different times, attributed to almost every cause but the real one. At one time it was the enterprize in commerce; at another, the enterprize in roads and canals; at another, the "*presure* of the war," which was, as a distant cause, true; at another, it was a "*temporary* alarm;" at another, it was *speculations* abroad; at another it was the "*influx* of wealth;" at another, it was *Jacobinism*; and now, there are three causes, an *increase* of *trade*, the *embarrassment* to *trade* occasioned by Napoleon's commercial warfare against us, and the *exportation* of *gold*! These last-mentioned causes, which any one may hear from, perhaps, the three first persons whom he meets in Threadneedle Street, do, to be sure, most admirably *accord* with each other. But, it is the lot of falsehood to contradict itself.

In the meanwhile, however, very great is the mischief, which arises from this misguiding of the public mind. The people, while amused with this "*Lo here!* and *Lo there!*" see not that which they ought to see; they see not the *real* cause of the increase of the paper-money, the *real* cause of the *gold* and *silver* having gone out of *circulation*; and, of course, they use no endeavours, they express no wish to see adopted any measures, calculated to remove that cause, and to relieve their country from this, the most formidable of all the dangers with which it is threatened.

That this *real* cause is no other, than the *increase* of the *Debt*, contracted by the government, cannot, I think, be doubted by any one, who has gone patiently through the foregoing Letters, and who must have seen, that, *as the Debt increased, the bank notes became of greater amount in the whole*, and of sums smaller and smaller, till, at last, they came down to a *single pound*. At first, and for half a century, there were no bank notes for a sum less than *twenty pounds*. When the Debt got to about 70 millions, there were *fifteen pound* notes made; before it reached 150 millions, there were *ten pound* notes made; before it reached 300 millions, there were *five pound* notes made; and before it had reached 500 millions, there were *two pound* notes and *one pound* notes made. Since it reached

500 millions, there have been, in some parts of the country, notes made to represent silver coins, and the SILVER-TOKENS, issued from the Bank of England, the *intrinsic* value of which is *less* than the *nominal*, have been circulated over the country, while the gold coin, of every value, has almost wholly disappeared, is notoriously exported, and while English guineas, not one of which is seen by hardly any man in England, in the course of a month, make part of the *common current coin* on the continent of Europe, in the *American States*, and more especially in *France*; aye, in that very country, which PITT and his associates told us, over and over again, was in "*the very gulph of bankruptcy*," and which we were, year after year, induced to believe would be totally ruined by the fall of that paper-money, the place of which has been, in a great part, supplied by our guineas!

Thus, then, we have seen, both from reason and experience, that it is *Debt* which produces bank-notes, and paper-promises of every sort; and, having seen the manner in which these paper-promises get out amongst us, and how their increase has kept pace with the increase of our *Debt*, we shall, in the next Letter, proceed to trace this increase to that grand and memorable effect, the Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank of England, in 1797.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your sincere friend,

WM. CORBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,

27th September, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

GLoucestershire Election. — In the present state of things, it may, by some persons, be thought a very absurd use of one's time to make remarks as to what is passing, or has passed, during one of those disgraceful and disgusting scenes, which occur during the *cavass* for an *Election*. But, there are some circumstances, attending the contest in Gloucestershire, of which I think it right to take particular notice, which notice may, *hereafter*, be found useful, though it have little or no practical effect for the present; and; at any rate, let me take care to be clearly understood upon one point, namely, that, as to the *candidates*, as to which of them is chosen, I care no more, and I think my readers need care no more, than they

need care about whether the miserable wretches in the Pillory, yesterday, were pelted with dead cats or with dead dogs. — It would seem, that Gloucestershire has, for nearly, if not quite, half a century, been sometimes represented by members nominated by one great family, and sometimes by members nominated by another great family; and, that these families, in order to save trouble and expence, or, as they call it, "to prevent the *PEACE of the country from being disturbed*," have, for the last forty or fifty years, acted upon a principle of *compromise*; and, having divided the people into two opposite parties, the *Orange* and the *Blue*, one family taking one of these colours and the other family taking the other colour, they have *divided the representation between them*; so that, in fact, the people have had *no choice at all*. It had been so in Essex, for as long a time, I believe, till MR. MONTAGU BURGOYNE, at the last election, gave the people an opportunity of *voting*, and laid the foundation for better things in future. In that county the *Whigs*, as they called themselves, and as they still call themselves, put up one member, and the *Tories*, as their opponents call them, put up the other; so that, between them, they took care, that there should be *no election at all*; and thus was the county of Essex, as RALPH says of England, "*crucified between two thieves*."

— Nay, even the people of *Westminster*, who have recently discovered so much discernment, as well as of public-spirit and public virtue, and who have set an example worthy of being imitated by every body of electors in the kingdom; even the electors of *Westminster* were, for many years, the sport of the *two factions*, in the like manner that the freeholders of Essex were. MR. Fox was nominated by the Whig Aristocracy, some one else was nominated by the Minister of the day, and an election for Westminster occasioned not half so much bustle and excited not half so much interest as the choosing of an Evening Lecturer for any of the fashionable churches. — Such has been the case in Gloucestershire, where the people, in consequence of the *compromise*, had no voice at all, in reality, and the whole of their right of election was rendered nugatory by an amicable arrangement between two or three families, whom the *law* does not encourage to interfere in elections at all. — The present vacancy arose from the death of the EARL

"have no objection, and expressed my readiness to attend—but beyond this I never went, as I was both surprised and hurt to find, that in announcing this Meeting to the public, my name was associated with persons, the violence of whose politics I could not but disprove. In consequence of this, I disclaimed any further interference, and declined attending the Meeting. This is the only instance in which I am aware, that my name has ever been joined with that of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT; and I am quite sure, that I have never adopted his political creed. Had the misrepresentations of which I complain, been confined to a narrow circle, I might possibly have thought, that silent contempt would have been all that was due to them: but as I know that the friends of the other Candidates have industriously propagated these reports through every corner of the County, I think I should not do justice to myself, were I to omit to give this public contradiction to their assertions. I have the honour to be, with great respect, Gentlemen, your very faithful and devoted humble servant, BERKELEY WILLIAM GUISE. *Higgin Court, Aug. 20, 1810.*"

—It is very clear, that this gentleman knew full well, that he was not to be elected, if elected at all, by the free voice of the people of Gloucestershire. It is, from his language, very clear, that he knew he was speaking to a faction, and not to the people. To be elected was his object; he knew that the mass of the people had not the votes, and therefore he addressed himself to a faction, who wish still to make tools, miserable, degraded tools, of the people.

—That this candidate has no knowledge whatever of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT cannot be true, unless, which is not altogether impossible, he be as ignorant as a stock or a stone of what is passing even in the metropolis of England. But, he means personal knowledge, perhaps, and there we may easily believe him; for, I think, the odds are, that SIR FRANCIS BURDETT never heard of him, and did not know, that there was such a man in the world, till he saw his name in the account of the Gloucestershire Meeting, which account it is about ten to one that he never read. As to the MEETING, however, that sir B. WILLIAM GUISE was invited to attend, his memory fails him a little; for, in the advertisement, of which he speaks, his name had not the honour of being as-

sociated with that of Sir Francis Burdett, nor was he invited to any meeting, at which Sir Francis Burdett was present. So that, this was a mere device; the story about the Meeting, as far as related to Sir Francis Burdett, was a mere invention for the purpose of disclaiming SIR FRANCIS, after the manner of the Whig heroes of Tuesday, the 10th of April, 1810, who, when they saw, that an army had succeeded in taking SIR FRANCIS to the Tower, began, like PETER, "to curse and to swear they knew not the man," and, at the same time to "rally round his Majesty's government," the members of which, only about six days before, they had actually called "the Demon of England." Yes, they rallied round those, whom they had declared to be the scourge and the curse of the country. They hated the ministers; but they hated SIR FRANCIS more; for, they regarded the former as only keeping the good things from them for a time, while they saw that the latter would annihilate that which was the main object of their pursuit, namely, the pensions and sinecures.—This Gloucestershire Candidate may not want, for himself, at least, any place or pension; but, he wants to be elected, and he, doubtless, sees, that he cannot be elected without the help of the faction, and the faction do want the places and the pensions, and they want nothing else.—This Candidate has not thought proper to assign any reason for thus disclaiming all connection with SIR FRANCIS BURDETT; and, it is rather a novel proceeding for one gentleman to print and circulate a paper, declaring to the world that he has no knowledge of, or connection with, a certain other gentleman. Leaving good-breeding aside, however, as a thing not to be looked for in such a case, why should this Candidate be so anxious to disclaim all acquaintance-ship or connection with SIR FRANCIS, who may defy him and the whole of the Whig faction, or of both factions, to point to any one thing, injurious to either the safety, the honour, or the happiness of England, and to say that he has had any hand in it. The people are daily told of the perilous state of their country: well, let those who have had the management of affairs, and those who have rallied round them; let these take the blame to themselves, for SIR FRANCIS BURDETT has had nothing to do with the matter; but, on the contrary, has constantly foreboded that these evils would come upon the country, if the persons

in power persevered in their measures. "But," we are then told, "there is no blame at all." Why, truly, that *may* be; but, then, the misfortune is, that the two sets, both the *INS* and the *RALLIES*, have been guilty of a sad departure from the truth; for, as the public must well remember, each of them, in their turn, have accused the other of the grossest of *ignorance and mismanagement*; of almost every folly and every vice that can be named; and, can they, then, be angry with us, if we, with Sir Francis Burdett, should *believe them both*?—The case of Sir Francis Burdett and the Parties stands thus. They are making war and doing divers other things and leaving divers things undone. Sir Francis is of opinion that these things are wrong, and that, if persevered in, great mischief will arise to the country; that the enemy will become dangerously powerful; that our internal resources will fail; that the burdens of taxation will be intolerably grievous: these are his opinions, and he states them to the Parties. The Parties cry out: "*violent! revolutionary! dangerous!*" and the venal prints cry: "*Jacobin!*" from the 1st of January to the 31st of December. Neither the Parties nor the venal prints ever *answer* him, or attempt to answer him. They abuse him and spread abroad insinuations against him; in which work they *all* unite. In this way the thing goes on for years; 'till, at last, his fears and predictions, or some of them, at least, seem likely to be verified. And what do the Parties *now* do? Why, abuse him more than ever; and, at a moment when they are abusing each other without mercy, one of them appearing to fault a little in executing a measure against him, the other party rallies round them; and thus hostility to him produces between them a cordial union.—This our Gloucestershire Candidate has had wit enough to perceive; and, knowing well, that his election did not depend upon the free voice of the people at large, but upon the influence of the Parties, he lost no time in giving them a pledge of his being as hostile to Sir Francis as the greatest sinecure holder of them all. — As if there were not sufficient to disgust us, in what we have already seen, relative to this Candidate, he must refer us to the *patriotism* of HIS FAMILY, as if to make us believe, that *political honesty, public spirit, and love of liberty*, ran in the blood of the Guises. It is a good maxim, never to

stir the ashes of ones forefathers; but, this maxim SIR B. WILLIAM GUISE and his friends seem to have wholly disregarded. He himself talked of his *Education*; of the *political principles* which he inherited from his ancestors; and a Mr. DE VISMÉ, by whom he was strongly recommended to the county, said: "Sir William Guise, whose fortune was ample, whose independent principles were so well known, and whose ancient family had so long been characterized as the genuine and zealous friends of the Whig Interest, and the present happy Constitution, AS ESTABLISHED AT THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION. They might rest assured, that such a character as this would never betray the trust reposed in him. In a contest like the present, themselves, their families, and future generations, were deeply interested; and, he had no doubt, that success would finally crown their exertions in this truly laudable and patriotic cause."—To hear men brag of their families, when they have nothing else to brag of, always disgusts one; and, besides the desire, that I should naturally have felt, to make an observation or two upon this boast about the *ancient family* of the Candidate, it ran in my head, I had a sort of dream-like recollection, that I had had printed, in my PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, something strongly illustrative of the *patriotism* of the GUISES OF GLOUCESTERSHIRE; and, upon referring to that work, under the date of a few years after "*the Glorious Revolution*," as Mr. DE VISMÉ calls it, I found the following passage from RALPH, that historian so renowned for his fidelity.—"SIR JOHN GUISE" (Member for Gloucestershire at the Revolution, in 1688) "who was one of the first of the English gentry that had joined the Prince of Orange, had, as a consideration, begged of his highness, THE WEEDING OF THE FOREST OF DEAN, or in other words, the fall of all the hazel, and other trees, not coming under the denomination of timber; but his majesty being afterwards informed, that what he had given for £ 7,000 was worth upwards of £ 20,000, reduced his grant to his intention."—In the course of a debate in the House of Commons, on the 9th of December 1693, relative to certain sums of money, issued for Secret Service, and paid to Members of Parliament. SIR JOHN GUISE said, "I am charged with 400*l.* for Secret Service. I thank the gentlemen of the Committee for putting me down. This

"is not very much for the service I have done. As for the Forest of Dean, &c. it is but *part* of what the King promised me."—See PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. V. page 809.—There is more very curious matter about this SIR JOHN GUISE, from whom, if he was the ancestor of the present Candidate, some very patriotic blood would naturally flow. Well might such a man call the Revolution "*glorious*." Such *weedings* as he had would make any such man think the event glorious which put the wedding into his hands.—Mr. DE VISMÉ talked, too, of the *ample fortune* of this Candidate, and, I dare say, he has an ample fortune; but, if he derives that fortune from SIR JOHN GUISE, it is pretty clear, that he owes some part of it, at least, to the *people of England*, to whom the Forest of Dean belonged. *Seven thousand pounds* in 1690 was equal to *thirty thousand* at this day; and, we have, in such a case, a right to reckon the *interest* from that time to this; because, if that money had remained in the hands of the nation, it would have yielded interest, and even *compound interest*.—Indeed (and it is right that the people should be reminded thereof) it was the making of grants to persons, who favoured the Revolution, which was one of the great causes of the *National Debt*, which, as the reader will bear in mind, was begun in 1692, the very year before the above mentioned debate about secret service money took place in the House of Commons. The WHIGS, who had brought over the Prince of Orange, thought that they never could be sufficiently paid for their *patriotism*; but, as *taxing* was not so easy a matter in those days, they invented Loans and Stocks, by which means they burthened that generation with the interest, leaving future generations to discharge the principal. To the WHIGS we owe the *National Debt*; PITT told us that this Debt was the *best ally of France*; and whether it is likely to produce any effects to merit the application of the word "*glorious*," I will leave those to judge, who are not quite blind to what is now passing, and will quit the subject with this one remark, that *one single farthing was never added to that Debt by a vote of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT*.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
September 28th, 1810.

P. S. The Petition for a REPEAL OF THE UNION will be found in another part of this

Number.—I have no room for any remarks upon it, or upon the papers relative to the war in Portugal, which seems, in the mean-while, to be drawing on towards a very natural termination.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

IRELAND.—*Petition to the Parliament, for a Repeal of the Union, approved of at a Meeting, held at the Royal Exchange, Dublin, 18th Sept. 1810.—Moved by Mr. HUTTON, and seconded by Mr. O'CONNELL.*

That your Petitioners feeling, as they have ever felt, the warmest attachment to British connection, and (from a conviction of their excellence) to the principles of the British Constitution, in support of which they have shed their blood and exhausted their treasure, and anxious only that those sacrifices shall not have been made in vain, most humbly present themselves before this Honourable House, beseeching it, as the constitutional guardian of the British Empire, to take into its most serious consideration the consequences resulting from that Legislative Union which, in the year 1800, was enacted between Great Britain and Ireland. And your Petitioners the more earnestly beseech this Honourable House now to enter on this investigation, because it was an increase of the great, solid, and extensive benefits, which "were promised to this country, and an immense addition and consolidation of interest, and affection" to the Empire at large—a measure which was to counteract the restless machinations of an inveterate enemy, to calm all dissensions, to allay all animosities, and dissipate all jealousies, which was to communicate to the Sister Kingdom "the state of the Capital and industry of England," and give to her "a full participation of the Commerce and Constitution of Great Britain."—Your Petitioners consequently entreat the Honourable House, to enquire whether that measure, which has now been put to the decisive test of experience, has in any degree fulfilled, or whether it is calculated to fulfil the sanguine expectations of its advocates; and whether its repeal has not been indispensably necessary for the accomplishment of those very ends for which its enactment was made a pretext.—That your Petitioners humbly conceive a revival and repeal of the Legislative Union between

Great Britain and Ireland irresistibly called for by the following amongst other considerations:—Because, from the earliest establishment of English dominion in this country, to the year 1782, a resident Parliament was by the British Kings deemed necessary, and alone competent to understand its wants, to encourage its resources, and promote its interest.—Because the Government of England while it could control the proceedings of the Irish Legislature, never proposed or recommended to the consideration of either a Legislative Union between the two countries; but that when compelled to renounce that control, and, finally, to declare the Parliament of Ireland independent, the Minister of England never ceased to plot its extinction; and, consequently that the real motive for a union was not the mutual benefits of the countries, but the trouble and difficulty of managing an independent Parliament, and the desire of procuring an increase of influence in that of Great Britain. Because the moment seized on by the British Minister for the accomplishment of his views was that least fitted for a calm discussion and fair investigation of the merits of any serious and impartial political question; and because, even under such unfavourable circumstances, the means employed to effect it were most corrupt and iniquitous.—Because the Parliament of Ireland “being delegated to make laws, not Legislators,” could not transfer their legislative authority without the express sanction and approbation of their constituents; and that a decided majority of the constitutional body was hostile to the measure, is evident from their petitions against it, and from the fact that the Minister, even after his defeat, feared to appeal to the sense of the People, by a dissolution of the then refractory Parliament.—And your Petitioners submit, that so decided was the opinion of the Irish people respecting the incompetency of the Irish Parliament to enact the measure of Union, and so strong their abhorrence of that measure, and their conviction that they could not, in the language of the immortal and constitutional Locke, be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorised to make them—“that an appeal to Heaven must in all probability have been the inevitable consequence, but for the preconcerted horrors of the preceding rebellion.”—Because the rapid improve-

ment of Ireland, under an independent Parliament, together with the annexed statement, must demonstrate that the interests of the country were much better understood, and its resources better managed by an Irish than an Imperial Parliament.—During the seven years war from 1793 to 1800, the National Debt, under an Irish Parliament, increased but Twenty Millions.—During seven years war from 1803 to 1810, the National Debt, under an Imperial Parliament, has increased Forty Millions.—During the year 1798, a year of foreign invasion and domestic rebellion, the expenditure of Ireland, under an Irish Parliament, was but Four Millions.—During the year 1809, a year in which the army were so employed, as to leave Ireland under no apprehension of either invasion or rebellion, her expenditure by an Imperial Parliament was Ten Millions Five Hundred Thousand Pounds.—The debt of Ireland, in 1793, was to the debt of Great Britain as one to one hundred, and is now as one to seven, and since the Union has increased in proportion to the debt of Great Britain as one, to two; whereas had the relative resources of the two countries been justly estimated at the enactment of that measure, the proportion should have been as two to seventeen.—And your Petitioners cannot but conceive this statement the more irresistibly conclusive in favour of a repeal of the Union, inasmuch as the warmest advocates of that measure ever maintained the avowed and notorious corruption of the Irish Parliament as the strongest argument against its enactment. Your Petitioners therefore submit to the good sense of this Honourable House, whether a still more economical management of Irish resources, and a still more enlarged understanding of Irish interests, are not to be expected from a reformed Legislature, such as must exist in Ireland on a repeal of the Union, all the Irish objectionable boroughs being now extinct by purchase.—Because the Imperial Parliament is composed of Members, five-sixths of whom have never visited Ireland or acquired any personal knowledge of the genius and character of its inhabitants—of their wants and grievances; because one-sixth of even the Irish Representatives are neither natives of that country, nor have ever set foot on Irish ground; and because, by consequence, the affairs of Ireland are neglected and mismanaged, or her interests disregarded.—Because the

promises officially announced to this country by the British Minister, as the grounds upon which he ventured to propose the Union, and which, though not inserted among its articles, were considered by the Irish people as equally binding, were forgotten by him, disowned by his successors, and disregarded by the Imperial Parliament.—Because the dangers and distresses of Ireland have ever taken their chief rise from the following, among other evils; from the inattention of its landlords to the welfare and comforts of their tenantry: from the foreign expenditure of the country, caused by its absentees, and its foreign national debt; from its consequent want of capital, trade, and tranquillity—because all these sources of poverty and discontent have been and ever must be increased and multiplied by a Legislative Union between the two countries—and because upon a removal or an alleviation of these evils, and upon a fulfilment of the promises made to the nation, depend the safety of Ireland—its future attachment to the Crown of Great Britain, and the ultimate security of the empire.—That your Petitioners, in conclusion, beg to state to this Honourable House, that having from 1782 to 1800 experienced the beneficial effects resulting from a resident and independent Parliament, and having now for ten years felt the operative influence of British Legislation, are impelled, from the recollection of the past, and sad experience of the present, to express their conviction to this Honourable House, that the very serious distresses of the Irish people, and the dangers to which the country is consequently exposed, are principally to be attributed to the want of a resident Legislature, as your Petitioners, in expressing this conviction, are confident, that if admitted to the bar of the House of Commons, they shall be able to prove, to its full satisfaction, that such is the real source of the national distress, and that to the repeal of the Legislative Union can the people of this country look as the only efficient means of obtaining it present relief, of procuring it future prosperity, and securing its permanent connection with Great Britain.

PORTUGAL.—*Capitulation of Almeida.*—
(Concluded from p. 448.)

III. The inhabitants shall enjoy their property, and shall not be disturbed for their opinions.

IV. The military stores and artillery shall remain at the disposal of the French army, and shall be given up to the Commandant of artillery.

V. The magazines, chests, &c. shall be given up to French Commissaries appointed for that effect.

VI. The plans and memoirs of the fortress shall be given up to the Commandant of Engineers of the French army.

VII. The sick of the English and Portuguese army shall be taken care of and maintained at the expence of the French army, and on their recovery shall follow the destination of the garrison. (Signed)

MASSENA, Prince of Essling, &c.

WM COX, Governor of Almeida.

Camp before Almeida, Aug. 27.

List of Stores found in the Fortress of Almeida:—20 bushels of flour, 300,000 rations of biscuits, 600 fanegas of corn, 700 of rye, 2,000 of Turkey corn, 500 quintals of rice, 400 arrobas of salt provisions, 12 quintals of salt provisions in barrels, 34 tons of wine, at 700 bottles each, 2 pipes of brandy, about 700 bottles, 20 pipes of vinegar, 50 fanegas of beans, 2,000 fanegas of barley, 300 fanegas of bran, 3,000 quintals of straw, 5,000 quintals of wood, and about 1,000 coverlids.

PORTUGAL.—*Siege of Almeida.*—Prince of ESSLING's Report of it, dated Fort Coception, Aug. 30, 1810, also his Letter to the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram.

The fortress of Almeida is very strong, and in part founded on a rock; it has a very good wall with bastions and casemates; built of granite, covered by half-moons, with very large trenches, and a counterscarp; preceded, in short, by a very good covered way. In general the fortifications are well adapted to the site of the place, and it commands the environs. It had in the centre an ancient and large square castle, flanked by towers of very strong masonry, and bomb proof. The enemy kept his powder there, with part of his magazines.—After the fortress had been minutely reconnoitred, the point of attack was fixed on to be the bastion of San Pedro, which was flanked by rather small half-moons, and which was most insulated from the general defence. Besides, it was not half lined with artillery, and the ground was the most favourable for our approaches, and also for the erection of batteries.—On the 15th, in the evening, the trenches were opened. From

this first night, the greater part of our communications was established, and also the whole line of the first parallel. By day, we were covered almost through the whole line, or at least masked by gabions; but in many places we found rock, which it became necessary to blow up by mines, and thus to dig the trenches in the very granite. From the fourth night the artillery was able to commence its labours, in advance of the first parallel, and at once establish its eleven batteries, where it found the same difficulties. Every where these obstacles were overcome by great efforts, by a continual devotion, and by an activity without example. At the same time we were employed in the rear in digging new communications, which, combined with the natural covered ways, stretched beyond 500 toises of the parallel: This work was nearly completed; nevertheless the artillery were obliged to conduct across the fields the pieces of cannon, with their ammunition. All these operations were executed within a very short distance of the place, without much loss on our side, the angle within reach of a large line of fortification.—On the 26th, in the morning, our fire commenced from eleven batteries. They had for the most part the object of enfilading and battering the ramparts, while three of them were to batter in breach and destroy the bastion of San Pedro with its collateral half-moon, to an extent of from 150 to 160 toises. Our fire by its converging direction, acquired some superiority over that of the enemy, who, however, opposed to us a considerable number of pieces. During the day, our batteries *en ricochet* had already dismounted a number of cannon, and injured the traverses and the parapets, while our direct fire destroyed the embrasures, and our bombs injured the interior of the works. Some powder depots exploded in Almeida, and several houses were burnt. Towards the evening the fortress ceased its fire, our bombs were then more particularly directed against the town. About eight in the evening one of our bombs fell into the castle upon a *caisson* which they were filling before the gates of the general magazine, set it on fire, and the fire was communicated to 150,000 lb. weight of gunpowder. It was the eruption of a volcano. It was believed that the whole place had exploded; it was followed by a violent fire, which extended itself and lasted during the night. A great quantity of

rubbish fell upon our trenches, which already reached to the foot of the glacis, and terminated the second parallel.—At break of day, on the 27th, I repaired to the trenches, and the ravage caused by the explosion might then be judged of. The castle, the cathedral, and all the neighbouring habitations had disappeared. I immediately ordered the firing to cease, and summoned the English Governor, Mr. William Cox, sending to him the annexed capitulation by my first Aide-de-camp. During the parleys, which lasted a considerable time, the Marquis of Alorna approached the ramparts. As soon as the soldiers recognized that former commander in chief of the Portuguese troops, and one of the most estimable men in their country, they testified the enthusiasm which his presence inspired by the loudest acclamations. The Governor, notwithstanding, prolonged the negotiation with a view to gain time; and in the end refused to sign the capitulation, the terms of which I refused to alter. I then ordered the fire to be resumed with more vigour than ever; and a few hours after, in the middle of the night, a copy of the capitulation which had been left with the English General was brought to me, with his signature.—The garrison, consisting of 5,000 Portuguese troops, went out with the honours of war, and after depositing their arms on the glacis remained prisoners of war, as well as the English General whom Lord Wellington had sent to them, along with only two other officers of his nation. We have found in the place a great quantity of provisions, 6 stand of colours, and 115 pieces of cannon, among which is a small train of mountain artillery, which will be very useful to us in our expedition.—The corps of engineers and the artillery have made a happy application of the most scientific principles of war and siege, and of all the means of attack, to supply our want of necessary articles, and to concentrate our efforts upon one single point which must necessarily be destroyed. Generals Lazowski and Eblé, Commanders of the Engineers and the Artillery, distinguished themselves by their great talents: they were well seconded by their officers and soldiers. I have no less occasion to praise the courage, the perseverance, and indefatigable activity of the troops of the line. Generals, officers, and soldiers, all have deserved the greatest commendation, all have displayed the same devotion of which

they had given proofs in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

To his Highness the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram, Major-general.

My Lord,—By the terms of capitulation for the surrender of Almeida, the Portuguese Militia were to return to their homes. However, I caused it to be made known to them, that we would retain those who chose to enter the service of his Majesty the Emperor and King. Twelve hundred men offered themselves of their own accord, and I have formed them into a corps of pioneers, of which one half will be employed in filling up the trenches, and dismantling the town, and the other half in repairing the road from Almeida to Pinhel.—With regard to the 24th Portuguese regiment of the line, I have adopted a measure, which appears to me calculated to promote the good of his Majesty's service. I have kept it here instead of sending it to France, and I mean to assign it officers from those of their nation who are attached to the army of Portugal. I shall thus turn to good account the good dispositions recognized in this regiment, its hatred of the English, and the zeal of the Portuguese officers who have been sent to me. I have placed, at the disposal of the Commandant of Artillery, 112 Portuguese cannoniers who have offered their services; and I have also retained 60 horsemen who have testified the same wish. I shall always, however, take care to keep an eye on these troops, and not to place them in posts which are at all important. It will be very agreeable for me to learn, from your highness, that these different arrangements meet his Majesty's approbation—I have the honour to be, &c.—MASSENA. *Fort of Conception, Aug. 30, 1810.*

BULLION REPORT.

Extracted from a French Paper published in THE TIMES of 21st Sept. 1810.

"A general rise of all prices, a rise in the market price of gold and a fall of the foreign Exchanges, will be the effect of an excessive quantity of circulating medium in a country which has adopted a currency not exportable to other countries, or not convertible at will into a coin which is exportable."—*Report of Bullion Committee, page 8.*

Note.—It will excite laughter on the

continent to perceive that the Bank of London could indulge an erroneous opinion on a question of such an elementary nature.

England has a paper-money; for a Bank-note, which cannot be exchanged at pleasure, and at all times, for gold, is in reality paper-money. It is sufficient to cast one's eyes over the different States of Europe, to be able to judge of the effects of paper-money. The effect of it is, to cause gold to be sought after, and wholly to disappear.—Money is only the representative sign of a certain portion of income; no state requires more than a certain quantity; and when that quantity is exceeded, the sign is depreciated in proportion to its issue.—In France, we had assignats. These were for some time at par, because they were receivable in payment for the purchase of national domains, the sales of which were carried on with great activity. During the time that the assignats supported their value they did not obtain this credit, because the pledge was solid, and equal to the quantity of assignats issued; but because the sale of national domains was organised, and a great deal of them were sold, which gave proportionate employment to the assignats: but when the issues were augmented, the depreciation became progressive. Their depreciation did not arise from this, that the pledge was no longer equal in value to the quantity of assignats issued; but simply to the rapidity of the sales, which bore no longer a proportion to the quantity issued. The assignat was then depreciated in proportion to the augmentation of the numerical quantity, in such a way, that when several thousand millions were issued, they no longer had a greater value than as many hundreds of millions which represented the income of France for one year.—In Austria, it has been observed, that the value of their paper money was exactly in proportion to the quantity issued; so that when they had exceeded 300 millions of florins, which were the amount necessary for the circulation of Austria, what was issued beyond that sum suffered a proportionate loss. Thus, when they had 600 millions of paper in circulation, the paper was at a discount of 50 per cent. When there were 900 millions, it was at a discount of 100 per cent., and successively in the same progression. The value of the objects which it represented remained still the same.—The same observation may be made as to Russia.—

England is at the commencement of the depreciation of her paper currency. The observation applies also to her. In proportion as her paper money is augmented, its value decreases; it now loses 15 and 20 per cent. of its value; and if the Bank continue to issue paper money, that is, if it continue its discounts, it is evident that the paper must soon be at a loss of 100 per cent.

"According to the best judgment your Committee has been enabled to form, no sufficient remedy for the present, or security for the future, can be pointed out, except the repeal of the law, which suspends the cash payments of the Bank of England."—*Report of Bullion Committee, p. 31.*

Note. The Committee reasons justly. All men who have reflected on the subject think, with it, that a Bank-note ought never to be paper-money, that is, paper which you are obliged to take; that it ought not to remain a Bank-note, but when it can be exchanged at pleasure for money; that the act of parliament which made it unnecessary for the Bank to pay in specie, created a paper-money; and that the remedy is to render it convertible for cash.—But has this Committee well reflected on what will happen when Bank-notes are exchanged, at sight, for money? The notes which are depreciating will come to be exchanged. They have not calculated, that the mass of notes being diminished by a third, which will go to be exchanged for money, supposing the treasure of the Bank sufficient to pay this third, the Bank itself will be paralyzed, and unable to discount for a long time. But what will be the fate of the commerce of England, if it ceases to enjoy the assistance of Bank discounts? The Bank, even at present, discounts more than it wishes, because it is pressed by the wants of commerce; because commerce has an immense quantity of goods, for which it has no market. The encumbered state of the English warehouses obliges the merchant to apply to the Bank for discounts. If the Bank continues to give discounts on Bills of Exchange for this property, instead of diminishing its paper in circulation, it must augment it. If it does not augment it, one half of the merchants must stop payment, and will only be able to pay their creditors with hogsheds of sugar, with coffee, India goods, &c. In the embarrassed state of her commerce with the Continent, England having no other relief

but the Bank discounts, the very day when the Bank shall be obliged to pay in specie, the pressure of the Berlin and Milan Decrees will be felt in all its force.

EXTRACT

From a French paper, entitled The JOURNAL DE L'EMPIRE; translated for, and, in London, first published in, the TIMES of the 25th September. To which is subjoined the Commentary, or ANSWER of the Courier Newspaper of the 25th of Sept.

ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

ENGLAND—England cannot have more than 300 millions of revenue: she has, however, 4500 millions; but 300 millions represent her actual wealth, and 1,200 millions the revenue of her monopoly; whence it results, that when England is ever so little cramped in her commerce, the exchange becomes unfavourable to her; she can no longer support herself, and she requires a paper money. Paper money is a natural and indispensable consequence of the situation of a nation, which, like England, has created a factitious revenue. England pays 600 millions of interest for debt; that is twice her real and reasonable revenue.

FRANCE—France has 800 millions of revenue in time of peace. This is only two thirds of what she can raise in time of war. By adding 30 centimes to her rates of imports, her revenue is raised to 1200 millions. This revenue is wholly derived from her own territory. She has 50 millions of debt, that is to say, one-sixteenth of her ordinary income. It is obvious from this, that France has not, and ought not to have a paper money. France may be considered as a rich farmer, who finds every thing on his farm. She has no need of commerce, but as an agent for selling her productions. Germany, Italy, are open to her speculations; and even England is happy to receive, when she chooses to send, the surplus of her produce. The Bank discounts twice as much as the *Caisse d'escompte* discounted in 1780. It has 120 millions of notes in circulation. These are true bank notes, convertible into specie at pleasure, and not forced. The coinage of France is the best in Europe. Money is there abundant, and the rate of interest is from 4 to 5 per cent. Her manufactures

are in such a state of prosperity, that they supply not only her own consumption, but that of Italy and Germany. The manufactures of France never before prospered so much.

ANALYSIS OF THE COMMERCIAL SITUATION OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

ENGLAND—As the power of England rests upon her commerce, that commerce consists in the circulation of the produce of the New World. We have proved that four-fifths of her revenue arose from brokerage; it is the coffee, therefore, the sugar, the indigo, the dye-woods, the muslins of India, which constitute her fortune; all her prosperity consists in drawing these productions from both the Indies, and in promoting their introduction into Europe.

FRANCE—France has an interest wholly continental; her revenue arises from the produce of her fields, of her vines, her olives, her tobacco, her fabrics of silk and linen; and from the cottons of her southern provinces. Like the Continent, she has an interest in rejecting the merchandize of the Indies, and in profiting by the bounty of Nature, which has placed within the Old Continent, what may enable it to dispense with the New. Thus, the shackles which she has thrown upon English brokerage are such, that the consumption of sugar, of coffee, and colonial produce, has within three years decreased one half in Europe. The discoveries which she has made enable her even to replace the productions of the Continent. The sugar from grapes is sold cheaper than the cane-sugar ever was, even at the period of greatest communication with the Colonies. The cottons of Naples and of Rome are superior to those of America. The kermes, the woad, and the madder, thanks to the aids of Chemistry, compensate for the want of colonial dyes. Already soda is made every where. When the New World was discovered, the arts of chemistry were in their infancy.—The Continental system has produced a real or prodigious revolution. It will oppose an insurmountable obstacle to the brokerage of England; and in proportion as the Continental powers feel, and they have felt it for a long time, that it is their interest to tax the importation of colonial produce, they will have sugar, coffee, cotton and indigo, from the Continent

itself. This result is not chimerical. The actual prosperity of France, the aid which she derives from the arts to procure that which she wants, from that, this revolution has advanced 5-6ths of its course. It has been silently working, it will burst forth; and at a general Continental peace, England will be astonished at the progress of the arts of chemistry in Europe, of the naturalization of the culture of the plants of America on the Continent, and the repugnance of the Continent to give her its gold, and impoverish itself when it finds an equivalent within itself. These are the great causes of the diminution of English commerce; these effects will be more efficacious than the Decrees of Milan and Berlin. Let these Decrees continue in force a few years longer, and they will make themselves be felt a century after they have been revoked.

ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

ENGLAND—The alliance of England has caused the ruin of the Powers who have courted it; witness the Stadtholder of Holland, the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, and the other princes who have given themselves up to it. England is in her internal policy intolerant: a population of more than 6 millions of Christians cannot profess their religion; cannot hold employments in the state, or in the army without renouncing their faith. England oppresses the nations, with whom she unites, because she carries her oppression so far as not to leave them the free exercise of their religion. Such are the effects of the English Administration. Ireland cannot be guarded without a considerable army.—Tranquillity cannot be maintained in London, without an armed force. Even in London English troops have been seen to fire upon the people—old men, women, children—to enforce the respect due to the law. It was not only the bayonet that was employed—it was cannon, and trains of artillery which were brought to London, to make the government respected. The King of England durst not go abroad in London unattended; he has, ten times, been very near being assassinated: he will take care not to go among a crowd—it is probable that he would not do so with impunity.
(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 16.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1810. [Price 1s.

"The consternation was general through the whole kingdom. Thousands of families were utterly ruined, and reduced from opulence to beggary. Despair seemed to have seized upon the country, in which so many suicides were never before heard of."—HISTORY OF THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER IX.

This Letter a Digression from the regular line of the Discussion—Death of Abraham Goldsmidt the great Jew Money-Dealer—Effect of it described, as to the Funds—He and Sir Francis Daring called the Pillars of the City—The Corporation of London thought nothing of—Perilous state of the country if such be the Pillars of its credit—Goldsmidt's character—His charities—His princely entertainments—His transactions with Sir John Peter at the Exchequer Bill Office—The motive for the act of self-murder—A hint at the reasons why this Jew has been so praised and why benevolent Jew Characters have been introduced into some of our modern stage plays—The cause of Goldsmidt's committing the act—History of the loan-transaction—What Omnium and Discount is—Progress of the fall of the price of Stocks—News-paper Puffs to keep them up—What must be the state of the country if such trifling causes produce discredit—"Capital, Credit, and Confidence"—What security have we that things will not become worse?—The effect upon the minds of our enemies—Can it be supposed that people will purchase Stock, or hold Stock, if the fabric be so frail?—May not Napoleon cause a combination against the Funds?—Of the remedy or expedient talked of—The Loan-Makers have no claim to compensation for any loss they may sustain—The famous and immortal Loyalty Loan in the days of Pitt—This case different from that of the present Loan-Makers—Conclusion of the Digression.

Gentlemen,
The death of ABRAHAM GOLDSMIDT, the

rich Jew, mentioned in Letter I, page 259, and who is said to have shot himself on Friday last, the 28th of September; this death, is, in the history and progress of the Paper-Money System, an incident of some importance, and, at this time, worthy of our particular attention; because, the circumstances connected with it afford, perhaps, a more striking and satisfactory illustration, than any other that can be imagined, of the *loan-making transactions*. In inquiries, which are of an intricate nature, it is always advantageous to be able to combine *practice* with principle; and, we shall, I think, find, in the circumstances just alluded to, such a development, such a practical exemplification, of some of the principles which we have laid down, as could scarcely have been derived from any other source. The present Letter will, indeed, turn us a little aside from the direct line of our pursuit, and may be considered as a *Digression*; but, it will not tend to *confuse* us, and the matter of it will be found of great use to us, during the rest of our inquiry.

The news-papers, and particularly those which praise the government unceasingly, have stated, that, when the intelligence of this man's death reached the city of London (he having shot himself at his house, or, rather palace of the village of MORDEN in Surrey) all was confusion and consternation. They tell us, that "The Stock Exchange, Capel-court, and even the Royal Exchange, were crowded, all persons eagerly making inquiries about this event, and forgetting almost every thing else.—Little or no business was done. We question whether peace or war suddenly made ever created such a bustle &c." We are told, that "Words would be inadequate to express the surprise, the alarm and the dismay that were visible &c." We are further told, that, the moment the intelligence reached the

* COURIER News-paper, 28th Sept.

† Id. Ibid.

City of London, "the Funds felt the effect, and three per cent. Stock fell from "66½ to 63½*;" that is to say, hundreds of millions of this sort of property instantly lost in value about 3 pounds in every hundred. We are told, in another place, that "the Ministers sent off a Messenger, with the melancholy tidings, to "the King and to the Prince of Wales†."

And all this for the death of a Jew merchant! The king and the heir apparent to be informed of it by a royal Messenger! And, is it really true, that this man's having shot himself made the citizens of London forget almost every thing else? Is it really true, that such an event put business nearly at a stand? Is it really true, that it produced an effect equal to *peace* or *war* suddenly made? And is it true; is there truth in the shameful fact, that a Jew Merchant's shooting himself produced *alarm* and *dismay* in the capital of England, which is also called, and not very improperly, perhaps, the emporium of the world?

If all this be true, it is high time that we become acquainted with the reasons why such a person was thought of so much consequence, and that we consider well the tendency of a system, that could make his life, or his death, an object of national importance. One of the public prints presents us with the following disconsolate reflection: "The mutability of human affairs has been strongly evinced during the last few weeks. SIR FRANCIS BARRING and MR. A. GOLDSMIDT, who were considered as the *PILLARS OF THE CITY*, are both dead within that time. The effects their deaths have had on the funds of the country will best bespeak the support they gave them while they lived‡." What! The pillars of the City of London! The Corporation of that famous City, the Mayor, Aldermen, Sheriffs, Common Counsellors, and the Liverymen; all these; the whole of this admirably constituted body, to which, upon so many occasions, the people of the kingdom have been indebted for the preservation of their liberties; the whole of this body sinks out of sight, and all the Companies of industrious and ingenious Tradesmen along with it; they all become no-

thing, at the mention of the names of a couple of dealers in funds and paper-money! With eyes very different indeed do I view the parties; and, though I desire not the death of either, and am as sorry as you, my neighbours, to hear of the untimely death of any man, I have not the smallest hesitation in saying, that I look upon the life of SIR FRANCIS BARRING, or that of GOLDSMIDT, as being of no more, if so much, value to England, as that of any one of your apprentices, or ploughboys; and, I have no doubt, that, before we arrive at the close of this series of letters, you will see good reason for believing, that my opinion is founded in a just estimate of the nature and tendency of the professions of these several parties.

But, are these writers aware of the import of their words, when they tell us, that the two persons above-mentioned were the *PILLARS of the city*; that they gave support to the *Funds of the country*; and that their deaths have occasioned those *Funds to fall*? Are these writers aware of the tendency of such declarations? Do they consider what it is that they are saying, what it is they are proclaiming to the people and to the world? If they do, and if they expect to be believed, their intention must be to destroy all confidence in the Funds and Stocks; for, what man in his senses can possibly confide in that which leans for support upon the life of individuals, and of individuals, too, who, from the perils of their very calling, are liable to be driven to commit acts of suicide? In some cases, we are compelled to leave our property dependent upon the life of individuals; but, no man with his intellects perfect ever does this from choice; and, if these writers should make the public in general believe, or, if the public, from any other cause, should believe, that the Funds stand in need of the support of individuals, it is a pretty clear case, that the price of them must fall very low, before many people will be inclined to dispose of their solid property in order to purchase Stock. They must come down to almost nothing, and the purchase must be a sort of gambling; for, no man will lay out his money, in Stock, as men hitherto have done, if it should become matter of general belief, that the Funds are, in any degree, dependent upon the lives, and, of course, upon the will, of individuals.

* TIMES News-paper, 29th Sept.

† COURIER News-paper, 29th Sept.

‡ TIMES News-paper, 29th Sept.

We will now see (for it is very curious) what has been said as to the cause of GOLDSMIDT's putting an end to his life; and, that will let us into matter essentially belonging to our subject. But, before we proceed any further, I think myself called upon to make a few remarks upon what has, in some of our newspapers, been said about the *character* of this man; for, though I have no desire to say any harm of him, or to cause people to believe harm of him, I think it wrong; I think it very unjust towards my readers; I think it an act of treason to the morals of my country, to stand by, with pen in hand, and to see spread abroad amongst the people such *unqualified praises* of a man, who has terminated his existence by *suicide*, and especially when I do not believe those praises to be *founded in truth*.

We are told of his *acts of charity*; his *subscriptions to charitable undertakings*; his *name*, we are told, was always seen foremost upon such occasions. But, why tell us of this again, if every individual act has been carefully *printed and published* before? There are cases, in which a man's acts of charity may get out to the world in spite of him; but, he is very unlucky when his name is *printed* upon every trifling occasion, which has been the case with this man's charities. Besides, what has he given, put it all together? Not, perhaps, the odd shillings and pence upon the enormous sums that he has gained by his dealings with the government; and, is any man so blind as not to perceive, that motives very different indeed from those of charity might dictate his gifts? A man, acquiring such immense wealth, must see, that something was necessary to keep the public from *grudging*; and, though I do not take upon me to say, that GOLDSMIDT's donations proceeded from this motive, I cannot help thinking that they frequently did, when I recollect how many paragraphs, stating the nature and amount of his charities, I have, at different times, read in the news-papers.

"Who builds a Church to God, and not to fame,
"Will ne'er inscribe the marble with his name."

One of his eulogists says: "he had done
"so many kind and generous actions—his
"benevolence was so *enlarged*—his public
"and private character was so *princely*,
"embracing *men of all persuasions*—he was
"so *unostentatious* in his habits, and so
"mild and cheerful in his manners;—in
"short, a man more truly amiable in all

"the relations of life *never existed*. He was
"incessantly employed in acts of *friendship*;
"and though like every man of extensive
"dealings, he had to encounter the bitterness
"of opposition and envy, we never
"heard even from his most active rivals,
"any other than the most favourable testimony
"to his virtues. He died in the
"53rd year of his age.—We understand
"that that which preyed most acutely on
"his feelings, and wrung from him many
"an agonizing exclamation, was the manner
"in which he had been treated by some
"persons who had been under the greatest obligations
"to him. He had, for years, been
"a man the most looked up to in the
"monied market—his command of money
"had been immense—his credit unbounded.
"This was a proud situation; but
"elevated as he was, it inspired him with
"nothing like *hauteur or insolence*—He was
"still the same affable man, increasing in
"kindness, if possible, with his increasing
"wealth*." The much greater part of
"this has not, I am satisfied, a particle of
"truth in it. Never was any thing more
"ostentatious than the acts of *benevolence*, as
"they are called, of this man, who, as I observed
"years ago, merely tossed back to the miserable
"part of us, in the shape of alms, the fractions
"of the pence, upon the immense sums of money
"that he got by his traffic in loans and bills
"and funds. The public, if it has any memory
"at all, must remember the accounts that were
"given of his *entertainments*, at which even
"princes were present; and at which, probably,
"as much was consumed in an evening as would
"have maintained the whole village of Morden
"for a year. Of these entertainments the most
"pompous accounts were published, in all the
"news-papers of the day; and, from the manner
"of the publication, there can be but little doubt
"of its having been *paid for*. As to his
"having shewn his hospitality to men of
"all *persuasions*, that is precisely what a man
"does, who is more intent upon *securing the*
"*favour of men in power*, than upon cultivating
"real friendship; and, indeed, I have, for my
"part, very little doubt, that the cost of the
"entertainments of GOLDSMIDT was always
"put down amongst the necessary out-goings
"of his trade.

Thus far, however, what I have stated may be called matter of *opinion*. What I am now going to state is matter of *fact*,

and of fact, too, that the people of England should have been made fully acquainted with long ago. I allude to this man's transaction with SIR JOHN PETER in the funding of Exchequer Bills, and which transaction is related in a Report, made by a COMMITTEE of the House of Commons, which was ordered to be printed on the 14th of May last, and which will be found at page 193 of the Appendix to Vol. XVII of the Parliamentary Debates. And here, Gentlemen, we shall have a view of something of no small interest to us as belonging to the Inquiries, in which we are engaged.

In Letter VII, at page 457, mention was made of *Exchequer Bills*; and they were described as one sort of the promissory notes, issued by the government in payment of persons, to whom they owe money. They are like other promissory notes, with this difference, that they bear an interest of so much upon each hundred pounds every day, the rate of which interest varies according to circumstances. In short, an EXCHEQUER BILL, which derives its name from the place whence it issues, is like a bank-note, not convertible into money at the will of the holder, except that the bank-note does not bear interest, and the Exchequer Bill does. You will easily perceive, that these Exchequer Bills, while out, form a part of the National Debt. They belong to what is called the *unfunded debt*; and, they are sometimes paid off and taken up, as a private person pays off and takes up his notes of hand. But, sometimes, the government, like the private person, finds it inconvenient to pay off these bills; and, in such cases, it funds them; that is to say, it makes an advantageous offer to the holders of them to exchange them for Stock; and, when this is done, the amount of such Exchequer Bills is, of course, added to the great mass of the permanent National Debt; which, as you will perceive, is a way of borrowing money that occasions much less talk and noise than would be occasioned by a new loan. The loan, this year, was for 14 millions; but, then, there were Exchequer Bills funded to the amount of 8 millions, so that the addition to the permanent or funded Debt, has in fact, in this one year, been 22 millions.

I have just said, that, when the government finds it inconvenient to pay off and take up Exchequer Bills, it makes an ad-

vantageous offer to the holders of them, by which these holders are induced to give them up, and to take Funds or Stock, in lieu of them. The Bills are brought by the holders to a certain place, called the Exchequer Bill Office, where they are received, and where the voucher is given which procures the holder stock in exchange for them. Upon these occasions, there is generally a great struggle of the Bill-holders to get first into the office; because, when the quantity of Bills to be funded have been presented and received, all the rest must, for the present, at any rate, still remain with the holders; and, as there is an advantage in getting them funded, it is evident enough, that there must always be an anxious rivalry in pursuit of that object.

Upon an occasion of this sort, in the month of March last, ABRAHAM GOLDSMIDT attended, amongst others, with a view of getting into the Exchequer Bill office; and, being unable to get in at the common door, so early as some others, he went to a passage leading to another part of the office, where he met SIR JOHN PETER, one of the Paymasters, or persons who conduct the business of the office. "To this person, he delivered his pocket-book, containing Exchequer Bills to the amount of 350,000 pounds, and then went away. SIR JOHN PETER carried in the book and the bills; and, in consequence of this, GOLDSMIDT's bills were funded; while the bills of other persons, who had attended from the earliest hour, and had got in amongst the very first, and whose bills were actually received, had their bills returned without being funded." It appears also, from the Report, that, upon a previous day, this GOLDSMIDT, with a few others, had found out and used the means of getting into the Office before the door was opened to the public. The Committee state, that the same Paymaster, SIR JOHN PETER, according to an arrangement previously made, did, on the first day of funding, before the doors were open to the public, take into the office with him, MR. GOLDSMIDT, MR. SUTTON, and MR. GILLMAN, as appears from the evidence of Mr. Gillman and Mr. Sutton. The other Paymaster in attendance, MR. PLANTA, says, that he found those gentlemen in the Board Room upon his arrival at the office; that he knew it to be a great impropriety; that he expressed indignation at the proceeding, and ordered

"the doors to be immediately thrown open to the public. The names, however, of the gentlemen so introduced stand amongst the very first on the books of that day." The Committee reprobate these proceedings, as partial, unjust, and foul; and recommend means for preventing the like in future.

Now, Gentlemen, this is quite enough to enable you to judge of the real character of GOLDSMIDT, who is so extolled by our courtly news-writers, who have, doubtless, their reasons for what they do; you will, from these facts alone, facts which cannot be denied, be able to judge, whether this man is deserving of the character, which, with so much industry, is given him; whether he was that kind, benevolent, disinterested, generous, and noble-minded man, which he has been represented to be; or, whether, with all his outward shew of liberality and generosity, he was, as to his essential practices, still a money-loving, a money-amassing Jew, and nothing more; and if any additional proof of this were wanting, what need we but the simple fact of his having killed himself, *because he was losing a part of his immense wealth*; a truly Jew-like motive for the commission of an act at which human nature shudders? Gentlemen, how much more to be respected and to be pitied are hundreds and thousands of your industrious and honest neighbours, who had their *all* snatched from them in a moment, and who, after a life of labour and of abstinence, saw themselves deprived of the means of buying a dinner; and that, too, observe, without any fault of theirs, without any greedy speculation, any desire on their part to gain by over-reaching their neighbours, or to possess any thing which was not the fair fruit of their labour? What value are we to set upon the princely feasts of a man, who could creep in at a back door to get the preference in funding Exchequer Bills? What value are we to set upon friendship, such as he would, doubtless, entertain for such men as SIR JOHN PETER? And, as to his *charities*; as to what he used to give to the miserable part of our countrymen, under the name of charities, it is very probable, that the whole of what he bestowed in this way, in the course of his life, did not amount to half so much as the sum that he gained in consequence of his proceeding above-noticed with SIR JOHN PETER.

Gentlemen, the reasons why he has been so much praised by many of our news-writers would amuse you, and it would also entertain you to learn the real cause of the fine benevolent Jewish characters, which are to be found in some of our modern plays, if, indeed, a feeling of shame for your country did not overpower your propensity to laugh at these offerings of literary venality at the shrine of Mammon. But, having now bestowed quite as much time as it merited in remarks upon the character of the departed Jew, but which remarks were demanded by truth, we will now proceed to those matters, connected with his death, which are of much greater consequence to us, and a clear understanding of which will be found to be greatly useful in the course of the remainder of our inquiries. Indeed, these matters not only relate to our subject, but they are strongly illustrative of some of the most important parts of it.

The cause of GOLDSMIDT's committing the act of self-murder is stated as follows: "The cause of this rash act it is not difficult to assign:—Mr. Goldsmidt was a joint contractor for the late loan of 14 millions with the House of Sir Francis Baring, and taking the largest probable range that he had dealt amongst his friends one half of the sum allotted to him, the loss sustained by the remainder, at the rate of 65*l.* per thousand, which was the price of Thursday, was more than any individual fortune could be expected to sustain. Ever since the decline of *Omni*um from par, Mr. Goldsmidt's spirits were progressively drooping; but when it reached 5 and 6 per cent. discount, without the probability of recovering, the unfortunate gentleman appeared evidently restless in his disposition, and disordered in his mind; and, as we have reason to believe, not finding that cheerful assistance amongst his monied friends which he had experienced in happier times, he was unable to bear up against the pressure of his misfortunes; and hence was driven to terminate a life which till then had never been chequered by misfortune. The moment intelligence of the distressing event reached the city, which was about the period of the opening of the Stock Exchange, the Funds suddenly felt the effects, and the Three per cent. Stock fell in a few minutes from 66½ to

quired a great extent of *territory*, her acquisitions in point of *strength* did not surpass ours, which consisted of an immense mass of CAPITAL, CREDIT, and CONFIDENCE, the changes upon which words were rung over and over again, till the speech became full as enlivening and instructive as a peal of the three bells of Botley Church. But, what becomes of these fine things, if the scribbling of a news-paper writer, or of a pamphleteer, or, if the sudden death of a Jew, is capable of so materially affecting them? What, in that case, becomes of that Capital, Credit, and Confidence, which were to counterbalance all the acquisitions of France, and were to prove a never-failing defence to England? "True," said the adherents of PITT, who wished still to find something to say by way of apology for his ruinous measures; "true," said they, "France has made conquests; she has gained sea-ports; she has acquired and now quietly possesses, the means of rearing a navy; but, look at the immense CAPITAL of England; look at her CREDIT; look at the CONFIDENCE which she possesses; look at these pillars of national strength." It was not easy to see, however long one looked, that these things were pillars of national strength; but, if they were; if they were the pillars, upon which this nation was to depend, what are we to think of our situation, when we are told, as we are in the above-cited publications, and, indeed, as we are told every day, that the Funds, which are said to be the barometer of national CREDIT, can be, nay *have been*, and still *are*, lowered in their value by such trifling things as the erroneous opinion of a writer on politics, or the death of a Merchant or a Jew? If what we have been told about the importance of CREDIT be true; if it be our defence against the enemy, what must our situation be, if what we are now told be true, namely, that this CREDIT has been shaken by such contemptible means? PITT and his associates told us, that CAPITAL, CREDIT, and CONFIDENCE, which is using three words instead of one, merely for the sake of the *sound*; they told us, that these were the *pillars* of the nation; and, as we have seen above, our newspapers now tell us, that SIR FRANCIS BARING and GOLDSMIDT were the *pillars* of our CREDIT; so, that, at last, we come to this comfortable conclusion: that the defence and preservation of the country depended upon SIR FRANCIS BARING and GOLDSMIDT,

one of whom has *died* and the other *shot himself* within the last three weeks! And this is the effect, is it, of the PITT system of what is called Public Credit?

If what we are now told *be true*, what security have we, that things will *stop* where they are? What reason have we to conclude, or to suppose, that the same causes will not continue to operate, 'till the whole of the Funds are annihilated; that is to say, until nobody will give any thing at all for any sort of the Stock? We are told, that the fall, which has already taken place, has, in part, been the consequence of combinations of individuals, which must mean, combinations *not to purchase*; and, who is to *put an end* to such combinations? Who is to prevent the force of them from *increasing*? Then, again, we are told, that the fall has partly been produced by *jobbers*, *intent upon their own interests*; and, who, let me ask, is to alter the nature of these jobbers; who can say, or even guess, when these interested jobbers will be pleased to desist from their selfish and mischievous practices? If the causes of the fall be such as have been stated to the public, in the above-cited and other publications, who will pretend to say when, or where, the fall will stop? And, I should be very glad to hear any reason, why, if those alledged causes be founded in truth, the Funds should not continue to fall, 'till they are not worth owning; 'till it is not worth GRIZZLE GREENHORN's while to have her name written in the Great Book.

We here see, that these boasted friends of their country; these men of such high flying loyalty; these writers who accuse of *Jacobinism* all those who cannot believe, and who will not say, that the Paper-money is as good, if not better, than Gold and Silver; we here see, that these boasted friends of their country, who, apparently, would eat Buonaparté raw, if they could get at him; we here see these outrageously loyal writers proclaiming to that same Buonaparté what must delight him more than almost any thing that he could hear, namely, that such is the state of our public credit, such the state of our pecuniary resources, such the confidence in our Funds, such the confidence in the security of our government bonds, that this confidence is shaken by a combination of jobbers or the death of a Jew. How much abuse has been, at various

times, heaped upon those, who have expressed their doubts as to the durability of the Paper-Money system! Nay, the Bullion Committee themselves have been very grossly abused for their Report upon the subject, by which Report, their opponents say, they have *injured the credit* of the country. They are charged with having *injured the credit of this country*, because they have recommended, that the Bank of England should *pay its notes in Gold and Silver*. What, then, are those men doing, who now assert, that a *combination of individuals*; that the *tricks of interested jobbers*; that the *erroneous opinions of political writers*: what are the men doing, who assert, that these things are capable of causing the government securities to fall in value; and, who scruple not to tell us, that the men, who were the *pillars of the Public Funds*, are *dead*? What are these writers doing; and how will they now be able to hold up their heads and complain of the endeavours of others to destroy what they call public credit, which, if it admit of destruction by the means of the pen, must assuredly fall for ever under the pens of these writers.

If what these writers say be true; if the stocks are to be lowered in value by combinations of individuals, by the errors of writers, by the reports of committees, or by the death of a Jew; if this be true, can it be thought, that people will long be disposed to become proprietors of stock? Can it be thought, that they will, like our neighbour GREENHORN, put their money in the Funds? Can it be expected, that fathers and mothers will make provision for their children, or their grand-children, by purchasing stock, liable to be lowered in value by such causes? Nay, can it be expected, that any man in his senses, who is now the owner of stock, will not dispose of it as soon as possible, and at almost any rate? For, is it possible to regard as safe property; is it possible to regard as any property at all, a thing the value of which may be lowered ten per cent, in the space of ten days, and, of course, which may be lowered to almost nothing; is it possible to regard as any *property* at all, a thing the value of which may be thus reduced by the combinations of individuals, the trickery of jobbers, the errors of political writers, or the death of a Jew, or of any other individual or number of individuals? Is it possible to regard such a thing as *property*? Common sense says, *no*; and

yet the statement of these causes, a *statement*, which, if it have any effect at all, must tend to the discredit, and, indeed, to the destruction, of the Funds; this statement comes from the pens of those, who cry out *Jacobin* against every man, who ventures, in however modest a way, to express his doubts of the solidity of the Funding System.

These writers, in their eagerness to abuse those, to whom they impute the fall of the Funds, seem to have overlooked the conclusions that would naturally be drawn from their premises, else they would have perceived what a dangerous thing it was to declare to our powerful and sharp-sighted enemy that a combination of individuals was capable of shaking our Funds. That enemy is, by these same writers, represented as being all-powerful by his intrigues in other countries; and, is it too much to suppose, that it might be possible for him to find the means of forming combinations against the Funds in England? If combinations of individuals can pull down the value of our Government securities, is it to be believed, that our enemy will not be disposed, and that he will not endeavour, to form such combinations? And, if we are asked, where he will find individuals so base, have not these writers pointed them out to him; or, at least, have they not told him, in terms that admit not of misunderstanding, that there are such individuals in England, in London, and now actually at work; and that these individuals have caused the Funds to fall, have caused the Government securities to lose part of their value? Let these writers, therefore, confess that these statements of theirs have proceeded from error; or, at any rate, that they are *untrue*; or let them, for ever hold their tongue as to complaints against those, who entertain doubts of the solidity of the paper-money system.

Here, Gentlemen, I should have concluded this already-too-long Letter; but, an article, which I find in the public prints of this morning (Tuesday, 2nd October) induces me to add some observations upon the subject of the *remedy* or *expedient*, which has been more than hinted at. The article, alluded to, is as follows: "The state of the Funds was a little improved yesterday; and as no bad consequences beyond those of the first shock had arisen from Mr. Gold-

"smidt's death, it is hoped that things will soon be restored to their former level. The result of the conferences of the leading Loan-holders, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Lords of the Treasury, on Saturday, has not yet been made known. Mr. Goldsmidt's house continues to discharge, without reserve or hesitation, all the demands made on it. The account at the Stock Exchange was not settled nor declared yesterday, in consequence of the attendance of Mr. Nathan Solomons, Mr. Goldsmidt's Broker, at the funeral, which took place, according to the Jewish rites, about noon yesterday. His body was placed by the side of that of his brother Benjamin. Yesterday morning early Mr. Perceval came to town from his house at Ealing, and soon after sent off letters to the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank, Mr. Whish, the Chairman of the Commissioners of Excise, the Treasurer of the Ordnance, and a number of other official Gentlemen; they all attended Mr. Perceval, and he was with them during the whole of the day."

These conferences will not, I trust, as some persons appear to suppose, lead to any application of the public money, that is to say, of the taxes, to the assisting, as it is called, of these Loan-holders. The Loan-holders, or Loan-makers, have never been known to return to the people any part of the immense profits, which they, from time to time, have made upon their loaning transactions. We see, from one of the above-quoted passages, that Sir FRANCIS BARING has gained enough to lay out half a million of money in freehold estates. Great part of this was, it is reasonable to suppose, gained by the many loans to government, in which he has been, at different times, concerned. Well, then, if these profits, these immense gains, be considered as fairly belonging to him, or his heirs and successors; and, if we view the not less immense gains of GOLDSMIDT in the same light; if the gains be theirs, ought not the loss to be theirs also? Upon any other principle, what a sort of bargain would a government loan be? A bargain where all the chance of gain would be on one side, and all the chance of loss on the other. If the loan-maker gained, well; but, if he lost, the people must make good his loss. Is this the way that dealings take place between man and man? Is there any one of you, Gentlemen, who

would sell a load of wheat to a miller, leaving him the chance of gaining by it, and, if he happened to lose by it, would give him back again the amount of his loss? Oh, no! You would keep the whole of the price of your wheat, and leave the miller to console himself in counting his gains upon other occasions.

But, if, contrary to my wish and expectation, "*relief*," as it is called, were to be given to these persons, in *what way* could it be done? The loan is made and ratified in virtue of an ACT OF PARLIAMENT. There can be no alteration made in the bargain; there can be no change in the terms of payment; there can be no abatement in the demands of the government, without another ACT OF PARLIAMENT, previously passed. Those who made the loan must pay the 14 millions into the King's Exchequer, let what will be their loss upon the transaction, unless, indeed, the whole of their property, *real and personal*, be insufficient for the purpose; and, in that case, the people have a right to expect, that the government will take care to hold back from the loan-makers, or to recover from them, so much of the new Stock as will not leave the loan-makers a farthing in the people's debt.

During PITT's Anti-jacobin War, which, as you will bear in mind, was to succeed by producing the destruction of the paper-money in France; during that war, which was to diminish the power of France, and to restore the Bourbons by the means of ruin to the French finances; during that famous war, which was to plunge, and which, as PITT told us, did plunge, France "*into the very gulph of Bankruptcy*," during that renowned war, there was what was called a "LOYALTY LOAN." People were *invited*, in the name of *loyalty*, to come forward and lend their money to the government, for the purpose of carrying on the Anti-jacobin war with vigour; and, at the same time, no very unintelligible hints were given, in some of the public prints, that those who had it in their power to lend, and did not lend, upon this occasion, were deficient in point of *loyalty*, an imputation not very pleasant at any time, and, at the time to which we are referring, *singularly inconvenient*. The LOYALTY LOAN was accomplished; but, owing to some cause or other, it did not prove to be a *profitable concern* for the lenders; and, as

in the case of the present loan, as far as it has gone, the loan fell to a discount, and a loss was sustained upon it. Such loss, one might have expected, would have been not only contentedly, but gladly, sustained, as a sacrifice upon the altar of loyalty; and this, it was said by PITT, would have been the case, but that he and his associates in the ministry, did not think it wise to suffer loyalty so *disinterested* to experience any loss. An act, therefore, was passed for making good to the lenders whatever they would otherwise have lost by their ardent affection for their king and country, and loyalty was thus prevented from costing them any thing.

The case, however, of these loyal and devoted persons was somewhat different from that of the makers of the present loan. The Loyalty-loan men had never *gained* any thing by loan-making. They had not got their half-million's worths of freeholds and their palace-like mansions. They had made a *bargain*, and they ought, in my opinion, to have been held to that bargain; because, if there had been a *gain* instead of a loss, they would have put that gain in their pocket, and would, doubtless, have looked upon it as doubly blessed, being the profits of trade and of loyalty too; and further, because, they had put their names down upon a list, which was to hold them forth to the world as men ready to make *sacrifices* for their king and country, in contradistinction to those, whose names were not put upon the list. But, still, though nothing, in my opinion, can ever fully reconcile to principles of justice, the compensating of these people for their losses by that loan, there is great difference between that case and the case of the present loan-makers or holders, who have no claim whatever to any compensation at all, or to any relief, or to the adoption of any measure, that shall cost the people one single shilling. If they lose by this loan, they have gained by other loans. If they cannot pay without the sale of their goods and chattles, why should not their goods and chattles be sold, as well as the goods and chattles of those, who out of pure loyalty, have set up papers for the purpose of writing me down, and whose names I have never once mentioned, on whose papers I have never set my eyes, and who have killed themselves in their foolish attempts to wound me? Why should not the loan-makers, if they can-

not make good their bargain, have their goods and chattles sold as well as these loyalty writers? I am, however, reasoning here, against an unfounded surmise; for, it appears from the above quoted publications, that the family of BARING is very rich and in perfect credit, and that the concerns of GOLDSMIDT are in a flourishing way, seeing that his house is able to meet all the demands upon it, of every sort, without the least delay or hesitation. This being the case, there can be *no need of any interference on the part of the government*, who will, doubtless see, that the bargain is fulfilled agreeably to the terms.

I have now done with this accidental occurrence, the notice of which, so much at length, forms a Digression from the regular line of our progress, but which, as we shall see by-and-by, will have afforded us practical knowledge, of great use in our future inquiries.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
2nd October, 1810.

THE SUMMARY OF POLITICS

I have no room for. I will endeavour to find more room in my next; for, indeed, there are so many important matters to notice, that nothing but a desire to communicate my thoughts fully upon the above subject, and to put a stop, *in time*, to the deluge of delusion, that was pouring forth, could have induced me to defer the observations, which, I wished to offer on the aspect of affairs both at home and abroad.

PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.

EXTRACTS from the French Newspaper, the MONITEUR, entitled, THE CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN. To which is added the ANSWER of the COURIER, English ministerial newspaper, of 28th Sept. 1810.

FIRST PERIOD.—General Moore, with 25,000 good troops, did nothing in November, 1808, for the Spaniards. Spain, however, had then 300,000 men under arms, and all her troops of the line. The French head-quarters were at Vittoria. Bilboa was occupied by the Spanish army of Galicia, more than 80,000 strong; the

army of Estremadura, in number 30,000, occupied Burgos; 90,000 men, commanded by Castanõ, occupied Tudela, independently of the armies which occupied the pass of Somosierra and the Guadiana, without speaking of Catalonia.—General Moore had arrived at Salamanca since the month of September, and remained there during the whole of November, an idle spectator of the destruction of the Spanish armies of the first line, at the battles of Espinosa, Burgos, and Tudela. The French army advanced upon Valladolid and Aranda; he remains undisturbed, permits the Somosierra to be forced, and Madrid to be taken, without moving a step. Eight days after he knew that Madrid was taken, that the Spanish armies were destroyed and driven back on Andalusia, he put himself in motion from Salamanca, and advanced to menace the corps of the Duke of Dalmatia; but soon perceiving the snare into which he had fallen, the remains of his army shamefully embarked at Corunna, after abandoning their artillery, stores, and hospitals. It appeared as if he had only come into Spain to witness the destruction of the Spanish armies of the first and second line. If General Moore had marched either to Espinosa to support Blake, or to Burgos to support the army of Estremadura, or to Tudela to support Castanos, conqueror or conquered, he would have done his duty of friend and ally. If afterwards he had advanced upon Somosierra, or Guadiana, he would have covered Madrid,* given time to organise the defence of that capital, he would have rallied the remains of the Spanish armies, and whether successful or not, he would have tried his fortune with honour; the insurgents must have felt grateful to the English, and would not have been well founded in their complaints. But there is a fatality attached to the English armies; they are good for nothing to their allies. General Moore was not more useful to the Spanish cause, which was then decided for ever, than he had been to the cause of Sweden, when he saw the isles of Aland, Sweabourgh, and all Finland, taken under his eyes. He had been present at the ruin of the Swedish armies; he came to Spain, to be present at the ruin of the Spanish armies; thus will posterity speak of this great expedition.

SECOND PERIOD.—The war of the 5th coalition was lighted up on the Continent. The moment appeared favourable to push

the affairs of Spain with activity. The French Cabinet felt this so strongly, that it had the boldness to engage in this war, without drawing a single man from the army of Spain. The Imperial guards were the only troops withdrawn. By this the hopes of the English were deceived; but if ever there was a moment when they might have hoped to regain the superiority in Spain, it was this.—Lord Wellington marched from Lisbon. The Duke of Dalmatia, who was at Oporto, perceived the impossibility of struggling with 16,000 troops against 24,000 English, against the Portuguese insurrection, and against the scattered bands of the Spanish insurrection; for the French armies, without direction in Spain, remained insulated, and either did not profit by the advantages which their experience and discipline might have secured, or did not assist each other, but remained inactive. Portugal was evacuated without a battle. Europe then expected that England would present herself with honour, and in an imposing attitude upon the continental theatre; that 50,000 men from England would join Lord Wellington's army, and form an army of more than 60,000 men, which it was supposed that England could place under arms; a force, which added to the remains of the Spanish and Portuguese insurgents, and supported by the gold of Mexico and Peru, would have constituted an imposing mass of force. The English, faithful to their system, sent no reinforcements to Lord Wellington. That General, after enterprises lightly taken up, without calculation, and in the most perfect ignorance of the force of his enemy, escaped, by a miracle, entire destruction, after the battle of Talavera; but he lost his hospitals, and returned to Lisbon to recruit his army. During this period, 30,000 other English troops came to perish in the marshes of Walcheren. Thus, in the second period of the Spanish war, the English have constantly studied to avoid what could endanger themselves, and to do only that which was necessary to stir up the people, and foment civil war. If they exposed themselves to danger for a moment, it proceeded from folly, and a shameful ignorance of continental war. Shortly after, Seville and Andalusia were taken from the Spaniards, and that Junta, the dear ally of the King of England, was driven within the fortifications of Cadiz, without this terrible General Wellington having made a single movement to assist them, or made

a diversion in favour of Seville, the last hope of the insurrection.

THIRD PERIOD.—The Continent being restored to peace at Vienna, all men of sense and friends to humanity expected, that since England had not known how to profit by the war of the fifth coalition, and had calculated so ill as to send 30,000 men to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, instead of employing them to drive the French from Spain, she would feel it her true interest to retire from this theatre, and no longer render herself guilty of the blood she has caused to flow, and of the horrors which were there committed; and that she would attempt to preserve, by some negotiation, the integrity of Spain, which was of great advantage to her. Unfortunately Lord Wellesley had, in the mean time, been called to the Ministry. This man, ignorant of the affairs of Europe, only judging of them by the principles of policy which he had put in practice in India and towards Nabobs, induced the King of England to engage to acknowledge and support the insurgents; to do that which General Moore had not been able to do in the period of the strength and force of the insurrection, and that which Lord Wellington had not been able to accomplish at the time when the French armies were in Vienna and Hungary. It was believed at least that England would make great efforts; and that supported by the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, she would profit by the embarrassment which these two sieges gave the French, to give them battle: it turned out otherwise. The English army was only weakly reinforced; and, instead of deeds, they rested satisfied with boasting and bravado. Ciudad Rodrigo was invested; Romana, and the Spanish colonels, flew from the centre of Estremadura, with tears in their eyes, threw themselves at his feet, and conjured him to relieve the brave garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, where 8,000 chosen troops were shut up.—Lord Wellington, who had promised every thing, when these troops were placed in the fortress, retracted when it was necessary to come to deeds; and when pressed, he produced in full Council a letter from the King of England, which forbade him hazarding any thing. Ciudad Rodrigo was taken: 8,000 chosen troops were made prisoners. Upon this news, the English gave assurances that it should not be the same with Almeida, and persuaded the Portuguese to shut themselves up

in the place. "But of what use will it be," said the Portuguese, "to shut ourselves up in Almeida? If you will not give battle, blow up the fortress. If you mean to relieve it, why did you not give us the example at Ciudad Rodrigo?" "The cases are different," replied Lord Wellington: "I had orders to the contrary for Spain; I have them not for Portugal. Besides, I could not engage in the plains of Ciudad Rodrigo with a cavalry five times more numerous and better able to manœuvre than mine: but Almeida is a country full of rocks. When the place is besieged, and when the French are fatigued with the siege, I will relieve it." The garrison was shut up in the fortress. General Craufurd, by the most foolish of manœuvres, caused the regiments of his division to be cut up. The trenches were opened; the English from their camps beheld the fire. The Portuguese required Lord Wellington to keep his promise, and to relieve their countrymen. "I can, do nothing," replied he; "my orders are to the contrary." A few days after Almeida was taken.—It is related that a Portuguese General said on that occasion to Lord Wellington—"If you could not defend us, why excite us to resistance, and to cover our unfortunate country with blood and ruins. If you are in force, give battle; if you are too weak, retire, and leave us to make arrangements with the conqueror." By way of answer, Lord Wellington sounded a retreat; with a barbarity unknown among civilized nations, he ordered the mills, the farms, the houses, to be destroyed, the fields to be burnt up, and that a vast desert should separate the English from the French army. This conduct is atrocious, and without example in modern annals. The Turks and Tartars alone act thus.—If the European powers had adopted these principles, every thing would be devastated on the Continent; the provinces of Prussia, of Austria, would be deserts; every thing there would have been given up to flames and devastation. How is a general to be excused, who, in a friendly country; of which he declares himself protector, and which to him should be as sacred as his own, not being able to preserve, burns, ravages, and destroys it? It is thus that in India the English have caused myriads of Hindoos to perish, have despoiled by treachery the Indian princes, have destroyed them by poison, &c. Behold what constitutes

the difference between France and England.—In the provinces where the French are masters, the fortunes, the property of individuals, the stores of the merchant remain with their proprietors. They only make war on the sovereign. The shops, the fairs, the markets are open as in profound peace. If England had the same influence as France on the Continent, she would confiscate the merchandize and property of individuals, she would go back to the earliest times of barbarism; would make the population slaves; would drag after her families, and would chain them together in her hulks.—When France shall be mistress of the Sea, her laws will partake of the generosity of her character. The liberality of her principles on sea will be the same as on land. Traders will not be made prisoners; if unarmed, every ship will be protected by its flag.—We conclude, then, that in their first Expedition the English might have been useful to the Spaniards; but were not, from their incapacity and egotism: that in the second Expedition, they behaved as if they did not know with whom they had to do, and abandoned their allies without pity, when they saw the serious struggle in which they were engaged; that in the third, they pursued the same error, only doing what they could to promote the belief of libels and calumnies distilling poison upon the Peninsula, and fanning the flames of discord and civil war: in short, that they have no respect for the law of nations; that with them nothing is sacred; and that if they were as powerful as they are weak by land, if they had a shadow of the power of France, the Continent would wear the chains which they have imposed upon the unhappy Hindoos. The law of nations and the liberality of the Continental code are due to France; the barbarism of the maritime code is owing to the influence of England on the seas.

ANSWER OF THE COURIER.

We have extracted a most precious article from the *Moniteur*, upon the conduct of the English in Spain and Portugal. The boastfulness, the abusive hatred of the English, and the mean maliciousness that pervade it, proclaim, beyond a doubt, *Buonaparté* as the author of it. It is divided into three Epochs. Upon the first Epoch we shall say nothing, except that if by the retreat of General Moore from Spain, the Spanish cause was decided for ever, how

comes it that Buonaparté is now at the end of two years from that time, as far from effecting the subjugation of Spain as he was when he first sent his troops into the country? The second Epoch embraces the interval between the commencement and conclusion of the last war between Austria and France—The escape of Lord Wellington after the battle of Talavera from entire destruction, is represented as miraculous; the miracle, however, could easily be explained by his Generals—After seeing 40,000 of their troops beat by half the number of British, they had no taste nor inclination for coming in contact with them again, and Lord Wellington remained in Spain for some time after the battle, in the presence of the enemy superior in numbers, who might have attacked him whenever they chose, and he retreated deliberately and unmolested into Portugal. The third Epoch commences with the peace of Vienna, when "our true interest would have been," says Buonaparté, "to retire from that theatre, and not to render ourselves guilty of the blood which we caused to be shed." We! as if we and not he were answerable for all the enormities committed by himself and his troops in his infamous invasion of Spain! But it is hinted that we might by negotiation have preserved the integrity of Spain.—The integrity of Spain under its legitimate Sovereign! He cannot mean that—for let us recollect what answer he returned when we refused to enter into any negotiation that should not include Spain. This hint, however, has been thrown out on purpose to induce the Spaniards to believe that we might have preserved the integrity of their country. That the treaty between this Country and Spain was negotiated under the Ministry of Mr. Canning, and not the Marquis Wellesley, as he asserts, is a circumstance scarcely worth noticing, unless it be to shew how eager he is to distort facts, in order to shew his hatred of all the Wellesley family, particularly Lord Wellington. It is laughable to see what spleen he discovers against his Lordship, what conversations he invents between him and Portuguese Officers, in order to have it supposed that the Portuguese are dissatisfied with him. But the laying waste the country between our army and the French excites the anger of Buonaparté almost to madness. It is atrocious—it is unexampled—it is the act of a Turk and a Tartar. It is making the country a desert. Mas-

sena first advanced this charge, and Buonaparté repeats it—Massena! It is amusing to hear this man, the most unfeeling of Buonaparté's Chiefs, talk of humanity and the laws of nations and of war. It is, however, evident that if he only affects to feel for the Portuguese, he feels sensibly enough for his own troops, who in the time of harvest find a desert, the fruits of the field having been destroyed, *not by the British, but by the inhabitants themselves*; thus preferring poverty to slavery, and flying from their habitations, *appalled by the approach of those humane observers of the laws of war and of nations*—the bands of Massena.—The article concludes with some assertions which will be instantly acknowledged as truisms—One is, that “wherever France is predominant, noble and generous sentiments govern, and that her troops never violate the property of individuals!!”—another is, that “when France shall be Mistress of the Sea, the generosity of her character will be felt, for the liberality of her maritime principles will be the same as her principles upon land.”—We have not the least doubt of it.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

EXTRACT

From a French paper, entitled The JOURNAL DE L'EMPIRE; translated for, and, in London, first published in, the TIMES of the 25th September. To which is subjoined the Commentary, or ANSWER of the Courier Newspaper of the 25th of Sept.

ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.—(Concluded from p. 512.)

—In order to have sailors, they are pressed, they are carried off in the public streets without law, and like savages. In these expeditions men are beaten, they are killed; every where authority acts with violence. The English Government then has all the characteristics of tyranny and oppression; it employs the bayonet and the cannon to keep in obedience one of the principal divisions of its empire, and to restrain its capital; it shackles six millions of its citizens in the exercise of their religion.

FRANCE.—All the powers allied to France are aggrandized; all the countries united with it receive fraternal treatment; toleration, there, is entire and absolute; within the circumference of the Louvre is

the Chapel of St. Thomas, where Protestants officiate: the emperor appoints and pays the Bishops and Clergy, the Presidents of the Consistory, and the Ministers organize the seminaries and the schools of Geneva and Montauban. Civil authority has no right to restrain the conscience; this is the principle of the French monarchy. No troops are necessary in the united countries. Piedmont, Tuscany, Genoa, had not 1500 troops when the Emperor was at Vienna. There were only 1200 men in garrison at Paris. The conscription was levied, taxes were exactly paid, and every thing was tranquil. At no time has an armed force been employed since the close of the revolution; and the Emperor promenades in the midst of the crowd which covers the Carousel, or in the park of St. Cloud in his chariot and four, at slow pace, with the Empress, and a single page, and amidst 150,000 spectators surrounding his carriage, and blessing the father of the country. Opinion is all powerful in France, from the lowest class to the highest: all listen to reason, and march when the trumpet sounds. The conscription is regulated like the taxes; it is levied without commotion, without disorder; the Magistrates of the people preside over the whole, there is nothing of violence or tumult to be seen.

ANSWER

Given to the above by our COURIER Newspaper.

One of the French Papers has favoured the world with an analysis of the financial, commercial, and political situation of England and of France. We wonder for the meridian of whose mind, or what country it could have been destined; certainly not for *this country*, where its fallacies and falsehoods will be detected by the *nearest* understanding—certainly not for France, where the people must *laugh*, if they are not more disposed to indulge a feeling of *indignation*, at the barefaced imposition. Hardly, we should think, could the author suppose that his analysis could deceive the continent, smarting, as it does, under the restrictions imposed by Buonaparté.—To enter into any *serious* review, or *reply* to such a statement would be *absurd*. We shall content ourselves with merely drawing the attention of our readers to *some* of the most prominent LIES:—“Money is so abundant in France, that the rate of interest is from

4 to 5 per cent!—The manufactures of France never prospered so much.”—

English commerce has diminished one-third!! Let the Milan and Berlin decrees continue in force a few years longer,” (what! has not Buonaparte declared them repealed from the 1st November?) “and they will be felt a century after they have been revoked,” (Yes! in France!) —“Tranquillity cannot be maintained in London without an armed force! The King of England durst not go abroad unattended! He has ten times been near assassinated! he will take care not to go among the crowd; he could not do it with impunity!?” —“All the countries united with France receive fraternal treatment.” (Holland, for instance, and Spain when she was allied with France). —“The Emperor promenades, in the midst of a crowd in a chariot and four, at slow pace, with a single page!!!” —“Opinion is all powerful in France; all listen to reason, and march when the trumpet sounds.” (The voice of reason is spoken through the trumpet). —“The conscription is levied without commotion.” (Opinion, so all powerful in France, is of course in favour of the conscription.)

AMERICA —*Dispatch from the Honourable David Erskine to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Washington, 3d of December, 1808.*

Sir;—The Government and Congress have been quite at a loss how to act in the present extraordinary and embarrassing situation of their public affairs, and they have not yet determined upon the measures which they mean to pursue; but I think that I may venture to assure you, that the course of conduct recommended by the Committee of the House of Representatives, to which was referred the documents mentioned in the President's Message to Congress, will, in substance at least, be adopted for the present, with certain amendments, so as to give some time previous to its going into operation.—It is not, however, denied by those even who have introduced this measure, that it is only of a temporary nature, and that the United States may be driven to adopt a more decided course of conduct against the Belligerents before the present Congress closes, or at any rate soon after the

meeting of the new Legislature, in consequence of the feelings and sentiments of the Eastern division of the United States, which has almost universally expressed a disapprobation of the continuance of the Embargo, and has begun to shew symptoms of a determination not to endure it much longer.—The Government and party in power, unequivocally express their resolution not to remove the Embargo, except by substituting war measures against the Belligerents, unless either or both should relax their restrictions upon neutral commerce.—Upon this subject some important communications have been made to me by Mr. Madison, and several of the Members of this Government, which I will accordingly lay before you, as I confidently believe they were delivered from an unfeigned desire that they might produce the effect of leading, if possible, to some adjustment of their differences with Great Britain, so as to enable the Government and the nation to extricate themselves from the present very distressing dilemma in which they are involved.—Mr. Madison expressed his firm conviction, that when the documents referred to in the President's Message should be seen by his Majesty's Government, and the correspondences between their Minister in France with the French Minister, respecting the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, should be deliberately considered; particularly the strong remonstrance of Mr. Armstrong to the French Government, of the 12th November, 1807, that it would be acknowledged, that the United States had exerted all the efforts which remonstrances could have been supposed to be capable of producing; and that in failure of any effect from them in persuading the French Government to withdraw their unjust restrictions upon neutral commerce, recourse might have been had by the United States to measures of more activity and decision against France; but that in the mean time Great Britain had issued her Orders in Council, before it was known whether the United States would acquiesce in the aggressions of France, and thereby rendered it impossible to distinguish between the conduct of the two Belligerents, who had equally committed aggressions against the United States.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 17.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1810.

[Price 1s.

"Massena affects to be horror-struck at the ravages we have committed (in Portugal) in cutting down the corn, destroying the mills, and making a desert of the country. This part of his letter pleases us most. He knows, that it is not the English that have done, or could have done, this, without the consent of the Portuguese. This part of his letter pleases us, because it shows the disposition and spirit of the people of Portugal; their unconquerable hatred to the French, their unanimous determination to resist him, with all their might and with all their strength. Blighted be the corn (exclaim the gallant and loyal Portuguese) and blasted the grass, wherever the hoof of Frenchman treads! May the earth yield him neither food nor water! And, may his unburied bones bleach the ground he would have reduced beneath his yoke."—COURIER, a London News-paper, 19th Sept. 1810.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGAL.—Look at the motto, English reader; look at the motto! and, when you have so done, and have taken a little time to call to your recollection what I have, week after week, stated to you, in the way of repeating the assertions of these prints, relative to the happy prospect of affairs in Portugal and Spain. When you have taken time for this, and have particularly called to mind, what has been said about the love of the Portuguese for us, and their animosity against the French. When you have taken time for this, you may as well take a look at the following account of THE CONSPIRACY in Lisbon, the capital of Portugal, which, it appears, has lately been detected, and of which as little has been said, as was said about a late conspiracy amongst the journeymen printers, to obtain a rise in their wages; nay, much less has been said about it, especially in the MORNING POST news-paper, which told us, a little while ago, that the People of Portugal had advertised for a plan of a monument, to render eternal the memory of the gratitude of the Portuguese nation towards us for having defended them against their invaders and secured the independence of their country.—The account I am now about to insert is taken from the same public print, whence my motto is taken; and the editor of which seems not to have any sense of shame in giving a statement of facts so directly in the teeth of all his former assertions upon the subject. He introduces his account thus:—"We have inserted some particulars relative to the detestable conspiracy lately discovered at Lisbon. It was confined to the higher orders—the hearts of the people being sound and unanimous against the French. The object of the conspiracy

"was to massacre the British, and to deliver up the capital to the enemy. That the experience of the French yoke, that subjection to French requisitions, French conscriptions, and French pillage, should have produced so little effect, as to leave one man in any rank of life, in any country, desirous of being exposed a second time to such evils, excites in us an equal degree of astonishment and disgust!—May SIGNAL VENGEANCE be inflicted upon the Conspirators! Perhaps the most signal that could be inflicted would be to send them where they might enjoy, in the fullest measure, the blessings of Buonaparte's government."—Such is the preface. Then comes the account in the shape of Letters from Lisbon, dated on the 15th of September, at 6 o'clock in the evening. "A plot of a most sanguinary nature has just been found out. Above 160 most respectable inhabitants have been apprehended, among them the Marquis Abrantes. On the 29th of this month a general massacre of the British was to have taken place. The conspiracy extends throughout the country; at Tomar, Coimbra, and other towns in the interior, depots of arms have been found. In consequence of the number of prisoners confined, I have just learnt from good authority, that the Regency expect a rescue, and which was to have taken place or may take place this night. It was arranged in this manner:—This day the Cathedral, it being the anniversary of the expulsion of the French from Lisbon, turned out a grand procession of Priests, &c. This evening they are to go round again. About 600 of the rebels were to be clothed in British uniforms, and which have this day been found; the Priests were to be fired on, in order to make the populace ima-

"gine that it was by the British soldiers ;
 "others were to cut off as many of us as
 "they could find, and others to release the
 "prisoners confined at a small insulated
 "fort near Belem. In order to be on our
 "guard, officers are ordered up to the
 "castle, where our men are quartered from
 "their billets in town. The business of
 "the rescue must either take place to-
 "night or to-morrow, as those prisoners
 "are to be embarked for *Brazil on Monday*.
 "It is a most vile conspiracy; a Portuguese
 "lady, married to a French General,
 "made the happy discovery."—Among
 "the persons taken up at Lisbon, as con-
 "cerned in this Conspiracy, are the fol-
 "lowing :—

"Mr. RATSON, a French merchant and
 "Member of the Board of Trade.

"VANDELLI, a principal house of trade,
 "and Member of the same Board;

"SAMFRAYO, a nobleman.

"Judge MARCARENHA.

"CAMBIASO, employed formerly by a
 "late defaulter who lived in his house.

"DUFURCO, a Frenchman.

"MORDANT, an English merchant.

"Marchioness D'ALVITO.

"JEROME ESTAVES and son, of the Po-
 "lice Office.

"Dr. ALMEIDA, a Physician in the first
 "practice.

"BRENCAMP, a merchant much re-
 "spected.

"PELLIGRINI, a painter not long since
 "in London.

"MORELI, ESTAVES, JOSEPH SALDANA,
 "&c. &c.

"Lord W. has taken up the line of po-
 "sitions he probably all along intended,
 "after the fall of Almeida, and hunger
 "will, I fancy, keep the French from ad-
 "vancing. *Several great and rich*, but
 "suspected men, have been taken up as
 "partizans to the enemy. It is said they
 "are to be sent to the Brazils: *some mer-
 "chants figure away in the throng.*"—

Another Letter says:—"Treachery, I am
 "happy to say, does not pervade the
 "lower classes either in or out of Lisbon.
 "I have lately returned from a northern
 "tour, and I find that the people every
 "where are well disposed. Their hatred
 "of the French and love of the English is
 "confirmed."—Another Letter says:—
 "The British army, not including the
 "Portuguese, now amounts to about 35,000
 "men, without the late arrivals. Further
 "reinforcements are expected in our har-
 "bour daily, so as to increase it to 40,000,

"and then we need fear little. The
 "French force directly opposed to ours
 "does not exceed so far as we can learn
 "about 50,000."—Another Letter says :
 "—We are informed that Regnier, with
 "a considerable force, has crossed the
 "Tagus, near Alcantara, to proceed to
 "the southward. His motions are watch-
 "ed by the brigade under General Hill,
 "and the Spanish army under Marquis
 "Romana. The head-quarters have been
 "removed to Gouvea, but the cavalry
 "under General Cotton still remains at
 "Celorico.—The Portuguese army under
 "Marshal Beresford, has recovered from
 "the impression made by the fall of Almeida.
 "They, as well as the British troops, are in
 "high health and spirits; while the French
 "are compelled to suffer every deprivati-
 "on, and in every respect are in a mi-
 "serable condition."—Another Letter
 "says :—"This city, since Monday, has
 "put me in mind of the French Revolution.
 "Domiciliary visits—persons of the first
 "property, character, &c. to the amount
 "of 100 to 200, have been taken from their
 "beds, during the night, and lodged in va-
 "rious prisons;—no access—no communica-
 "tion even with child or wife. This day all
 "are ordered to be put on board ships now
 "preparing, to be transported, they say, to
 "Cape de Verd. All is conjecture; for
 "numbers are persons of age, long stand-
 "ing, or natives—men of character, pro-
 "perty, &c.; in short, there is no canaille.
 "No examination of any has taken place;
 "6,000*l.* money down, has been offered for
 "one to stay here and stand trial. On my
 "life, this is fact," &c. &c.—Another
 "says :—"The Plot. The mystery of the
 "foregoing arrests has been explained to
 "us through other channels, as follows :
 "—Lord Wellington had intercepted a
 "correspondence carrying on between
 "the enemy and a party in Portugal ini-
 "mical to the English, in consequence of
 "which about 200 persons (*principally no-
 "bility and persons in the higher classes*) had
 "been arrested in Lisbon, and embarked on
 "ship-board. It is also understood that a
 "quantity of concealed arms have been
 "found. Report states that their plan was,
 "to cause Lisbon to be set on fire in several
 "places at once, and in the confusion to
 "massacre all the English and their
 "friends, at the same moment that Mas-
 "sena was to make a general attack on
 "Lord Wellington's army. Besides those
 "arrested in Lisbon, there had been a
 "number taken up in the interior."

Another Letter says:—"The plot included the blowing up of all the powder in the English magazines, and taking possession of the works in the rear of the British army, with the view of placing Lord Wellington between two fires, and depriving him of the means of defence. The explosion of the magazine at Almeida is said to have been a part of this plot."—Now, if all this be true, what are we to think of such persons as the writers of the *MORNING POST* and the *COURIER*, who have, from the commencement of the campaign, so grossly abused the *MORNING CHRONICLE* and every other writer or publication, expressing a doubt as to the disposition of the people of Portugal? The *Morning Chronicle* has been accused of publishing intelligence, sent to it by "*traitors*," because that intelligence expressed a fear as to the result of the campaign in Portugal; and this appellation of *traitor* was, it will be remembered, given to officers of our own army by the writer of the *Morning Post*. No wonder, then, that officers, or other persons, in Portugal, are shy as to what they write, and that the proprietors of papers here are shy as to what they publish. Men do not, under any circumstances, like to be called *traitors*; and, especially, men who are *abroad*, and under *military law*. Hence it is, that this plot, or conspiracy, has burst upon us, all at once, when the great body of the people in England must have supposed, that the Portuguese were all devotion to our cause, and all animated with unconquerable hatred towards the French. It was no longer ago than about the 8th of August, that the *Morning Post* told its readers of the fashionable world, that "there was no ground for any *apprehensions* as to the result of the campaign on the frontiers of Portugal; that we ought still to "*cling fondly*" to the hope, that the cause of Spain and Portugal was not desperate; that independently of the natural strength of Portugal, there are various fortified places, which are adequately garrisoned, must be regularly besieged, among which are Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, St. Julien, and Caceras; that besides we have complete military possession of the country; that all its resources are at our disposal; that the people are hearty in their cause, and strenuous in their exertions; that we have again a large fleet, and the whole sea-coast is within our controul; and that under

"such, and all these circumstances, it would be *dastardly* to despair of the fate of Portugal."—After this, were we to expect, that a plot for the massacre of the English army was hatching in Lisbon, and that it would extend all through the country? We are a "*thinking people*," we are told; but, surely, we were not to think of such a thing as this? When these notions relative to the fidelity and love of the Portuguese were spreading about, when these were daily published in London, it would have been almost as much as a man's *life* was worth to say that he doubted of that fidelity and love. And, yet, out comes a conspiracy upon us, all at once, while these assertions were believed all over the country.—But, there was something still more decisive as to this point in what we were told was the copy of a Letter from General (I beg his pardon, *Marshal*) Beresford to His Excellency Don P. Forjaz, dated Lagioa, 7th of August, 1810, which, as we were told, settled the point, with regard to the disposition and conduct of the Portuguese, and part of which was given us in these words:—"It gives me much pleasure to inform your Excellency of the EXCELLENT DISPOSITIONS OF ALL CLASSES OF PEOPLE, shewing every where the utmost zeal and loyalty in defence of their country, and the MOST DECIDED DETESTATION OF THE COMMON ENEMY, who justly deserves it, by his unwarrantable conduct, and by the acts of violence and excesses of every description, which he daily commits. In all places, the people rather leave their homes, than submit to the necessity of affording the enemy any kind of assistance, and thus evince a most ardent love of their country."—People of England! "*Thinking-people*" of England! Do look at this and think a little about it; if, indeed, you do not think that the *thinking season* is passed. One cannot remark upon this. One can only just put it upon paper again, and leave it to be contrasted with the facts that are come out since, and that are now published by these same prints only because they cannot be disguised any longer; for, if they could, they certainly would not have been published now.—In the Register of the 22nd of last month, page 442, will be found the Lord Viscount Talavera's Order to his Army, relative to Officers writing intelligence from the army, which intelligence got into *news-papers*, and did

great "*mischief*." The Morning Post, in speaking of this order, made, on the 13th of September, the following observations :—"We are *happy* to see that Lord Wellington has not left unnoticed the letters of "*Officers of Rank*," or rather of "*RANK TRAITORS* to their country, who "have been continually propagating *reports and fancies most injurious to the common cause*. We have often noticed the "evil tendency of these letters, as published in the *Opposition Papers*, and we "have now only to remind our Readers "that so far back as the middle of July "last, these Journals represented on the "faith of such letters that the British "army was in full retreat from Portugal, "and that the inhabitants of Oporto were "shipping off themselves and their property with the utmost precipitation. "Such are the *desperate arts*, to which *faction* will have recourse, and in which it "is so seriously to be lamented that any "real British Officer, of *any* rank, could so "far *disgrace himself* as to become involved."—After this, it was not to be expected, that we should have much intelligence from the army in Portugal, or, indeed, from any part of Portugal, where, of course, military law is predominant. When officers of our army saw themselves held forth as *traitors* for having conveyed home *bad news* to their friends and correspondents, it was quite natural to expect, that those officers would send no more news home to their friends. Hence it is that this plot has burst upon us all at once; and, seeing what we have seen, is there a man in his senses, who can believe that we now know the *worst* that has happened? What officer, or what other man, with a denunciation, like that above-quoted, hanging over his head, will venture to put into a letter his thoughts upon the state of affairs in Portugal, if those thoughts are contrary to what is wished at home? And how, in such a state of things, is it possible, that we should, through the means of the press, come at the truth? It is impossible; and, with respect to *Portugal*, as well as with respect to *Spain* and *Sicily*, we must expect no truth through the means of the press. We shall never hear of the existence of danger, 'till the disaster has actually taken place. There is no power on earth can prevent us from knowing what *events* say: they speak in a voice that will be heard; and from one, we may guess at another; from the past we may guess at the future, provided we

keep our guess to ourselves; for, as LAGO says, even slaves are free to *think*, and, surely, then, this freedom will not be denied to the free and thinking people of England?—It has been a rule with me not to make *any assertion*, respecting the war in Portugal, good or bad; and, even to refrain from giving *any opinion* as to any event, or as to the result, of that war. I have merely stated what the ministerial news-papers have said, and have pointed out the *conclusions* to be drawn, supposing the premises to be *true*.—This is the mode I shall pursue, with regard to the plot, *said* to have been discovered at Lisbon; for, I, by no means, take upon me to assert, that there has been any plot at all discovered. But, if there has been a plot discovered, and, if what I have above extracted from the Courier news-paper be true, there are some remarks, which, though, perhaps, they are too obvious not to have presented themselves to the reader, I cannot refrain from making.—But, we should first hear the MORNING POST of today (Thursday 4th Oct. ;) for, without that we shall have but half our matter before us.—One would have expected, that the writer of this print, who had so reproached and abused, who had calumniated, in the grossest manner, all those, who discovered signs of *doubting* as to the disposition of the Portuguese, and who had, in more than one instance, insinuated that Lord GRENVILLE and Lord GREY wished the destruction of the English army in Portugal, because they had given it as their opinion, that the people of Portugal were not disposed to defend their own country against the French; one would have expected, that even this writer would, upon an occasion like this, when he himself was recording the verification of the fears, the opinions and the predictions of those, whom he had so foully calumniated, and at whose predictions he had affected to laugh, as being little better than the dreams of ideots; one would have expected, that even this writer, upon an occasion such as this, would, from an impulse of shame, too strong for human nature, though blunted and hardened by *venality*, to resist, have acknowledged his error, and begged pardon of those, upon whom he had emptied the depository of his filth. This is what one would have expected, even from a writer like this; but, as if to afford full justification to all that has been said of writers of his description, he has, by his conduct upon this occasion, given us com-

plete proof, that, where *venality* has gotten possession, there is no room for *shame*. Having suppressed, as far as he was able, the intelligence from Lisbon, relating to the conspiracy, he publishes the following observations:—"It is *consolatory* to reflect that the late conspiracy was smothered, and its authors seized, without the slightest difficulty, confusion, or alarm; and their resources are now employed for the defence of their country, instead of being applied to the aid of its invaders. Considerable *surprise* has been expressed that there should be a French party, or a French interest of any moment, among the Portuguese; and, we have no doubt, that some of the *patriotic* writers will regard it as a proof that the people, so far from being universally sanguine, are not unanimous in the cause in which we are engaged with them; that, on the contrary, they regard the French as their friends, and are prepared to welcome and support them. In answer to these remarks, we have to observe, first, that it is not surprising that Napoleon should find worshippers, and the French ready instruments for the extension of their domination in other countries, when even here, even in Britain, the boasted land of freedom; and even among the pure patriots, the foremost advocates of liberty, there are found open and professed vindicators of every part of the conduct of "the great man and the great nation." Can Mr. COBBETT be astonished that there are men like him at Lisbon? And if he dares to hold up to Britons the excellencies of Buonaparte's character and government, can he be surprised, that among people so far behind us in freedom, intelligence, and every thing essential to the happiness of a nation, similar preachers should exert themselves with better hopes of success? The known arts of the French, the intrigues of their partizans, and the corrupt and restless spirit they leave in every place where they have once had a footing, will make it easy for persons of general observation to perceive that this remnant of French interest was preserved at Lisbon ever since the Convention of Cintra, escaping notice by its quietness and secrecy, till conceiving the favourable moment for executing its treacherous designs at hand, it began to put itself in motion; and its first acts led directly to its discovery and destruction. We know not whether we should altogether commend

"the moderation, with which the individuals arrested have been disposed of; but it is certainly an indication of the perfect security of the Government, as well as of the loyalty of the people, that such an offence could have been passed over without the necessity of sacrificing a single life, either for the purpose of terrifying the treason of the disloyal, or gratifying the vengeance of the attacked."

—First, as to what is here said of myself, you, reader, have the pages of the Register in your possession; my writings do not need to be extracted into other works, like those of this writer, in order to be preserved. You have the several volumes of the Register before you; and, if you find, in the course of all those volumes, one single instance of praise, either of the character or the government of the Emperor Napoleon; if you find one single instance of my speaking of "the great man" and the great nation;" if you find one single instance of my attributing excellence to Napoleon's character or government; if you find one single instance of my having said any thing, which can, by any means whatever, be twisted into such a meaning, I will be content to be put upon a level with the worst defender and eulogist of despotic sway, even the writer of the Morning Post, who is the instructor of our fashionable world. — I have, indeed, said, that Napoleon was powerful, or, at least, that I feared he was; and I have ventured, sometimes, so far as to say, that I greatly questioned the truth of the accounts of his death, which we have, from time to time, received, through the channel of the Morning Post. I confess, too, that I have refrained from saying certain things against him, and have even presumed to give it as my opinion, that to call him, as our "fashionable World" does, "an infamous intriguer, an arch tyrant, an infamous villain, a base upstart, a subtle, unprincipled, vile, perfidious, base, detestable, infamous miscreant and murderer;" I have presumed to give it as my opinion, that to call the Emperor Napoleon by these names cannot tend to the diminution of his power, either by land or by sea; cannot make Mr. Perceval and Sir Vicary Gibbs any more a match for him than they are now; and, besides, I know, that it is unlawful to make use of these words towards the "sovereign of France" (as he was called upon Mr. Peltier's trial), unless the law has changed since that time. I have

this refrained too, from being of opinion, that *hard names* do the man on whom they are heaped no harm; but, on the contrary, that if they are heaped upon him, for any length of time, they do him great good, and completely defeat both their object and their author, as has been experienced by several unfortunate speculators in print, who have set up papers with the avowed resolution of demolishing me, who, after choking their readers with falsehoods too flagrant and filth too foul even for Public Robbers and would-be-public-robbers to swallow, and who, for their sins, shall STILL BE NAMELESS*. Being of this opinion, and having this example before me, I have refrained from attempting to demolish Napoleon with hard words, and have used my humble endeavours to persuade my countrymen, that, to resist his mighty power, great exertions both of *valour* and of *public-spirit* were necessary, and, above all things, a *reform of abuses*, and a *complete demolition of CORRUPTION*. Then, again, to restrain me from using hard names towards the Emperor Napoleon (even if I could forget the speeches of the *Judge* and the *Attorney General* upon Mr. Peltier's trial) what need I more than the recollection, that he is now married into the family of our long-time "August Ally" the Emperor of Austria, whose son-in-law he now is? When I see that part of our National Debt consists of money lent to the Emperor of Austria; when I see that we, the people of England, are paying interest upon this Debt annually; and, when I consider all that we have been called upon to do for that Emperor, can I think of calling his son-in-law "an infamous villain, a base upstart, "a subtle, unprincipled, vile, perfidious, "base, detestable, infamous miscreant and "murderer?" Can I think of thus recalling the son-in-law of our August Ally, an ally for whose defence we have expended so many many millions?—Having disposed of this miserable attempt at a diversion, let us now examine this article in the regular order, in which it lies before us.—The *consolation*, which this writer draws from the smothering of the conspiracy is of a very curious sort; namely, that the *resources* of the conspirators will now be employed in the defence of their country, upon which one need say no more, than this, that, according to this

notion, a conspiracy is a good thing, especially in time of war and with an enemy upon the frontier; and, as, the more formidable the conspiracy the more ample its resources will necessarily be, it would be, of course, a great source of strength to have one half of the country engaged in such conspiracy.—We are next told, and with some *anger*, that "considerable *surprize* has been expressed that there "should be a *French party* amongst the "Portuguese, *ready to welcome the French "as friends.*" And, if what this writer told us before, if what he has been telling the "fashionable world" for months past, and if what he told them that Marshal Beresford had said; if this, or any part of it, if only a ten thousandth part of it was *believed*, was it not natural that people should be *surprized* at hearing of the discovery of a French party in Portugal, consisting of so large a portion of the well-informed part of the people? No: it seems, that we were *not* to be surprized at this. We were not to be surprized at it at all; and this same writer, who told us, over and over again, that the Portuguese were *unanimous* in their hatred of the French, and, who accused of *rank treason* those who doubted of it; this same writer now tells us, that "it is *not surprizing* that "Napoleon should find worshippers," even worshippers, in Portugal.—We have, by this writer and his fellow-labourers, been abused, in every form of words, because we sometimes appeared to fear, that Napoleon was not so *universally* hated as they said he was. They told us, that he was so hated, in Holland and in all the countries, annexed to France, or under her sway, that revolt might be expected. We have been, within this fortnight, told, that he is afraid to move about unguarded, such is the hatred of him in France. Within the same space of time, we have been told, that his Marshals detest him; that they have been conspiring against him; and, though last not least, that Massena himself was about to be recalled upon suspicion. All this has been told us, within this fortnight, by this Morning Post writer, who now is not ashamed to say, in plain terms, that "it is *not surprizing* that Napoleon should find wor- "shippers in Portugal."—As to the cause of this, we are told, that the "Portuguese are less *intelligent* than we are; "that it is not surprizing that, amongst "such people, the preachers in favour of "France should meet with success; that the

* "Better be damnd than not be nam'd at all."

"known arts of the French, and the intrigues of their partizans, and the restless spirit they leave in every place where they have once had a footing, will make it very easy for persons of general observation to perceive, that this remnant of French interest was preserved in Lisbon."—Well, then, if it was so easy to perceive this, why did you not perceive it? And, if you did perceive it, why did you not tell your readers so? At any rate, why did you tell them the exact contrary? And, still worse, why did you abuse, and represent as rank traitors, all those who expressed their fears as to the disposition of the Portuguese? Yes; it was very easy to perceive, that there was a remnant of French interest in Portugal. The fact was not only perceived, but it was stated, and several times stated, in the Morning Chronicle; but, you denied the statement, and, according to your usual practice, for want of fact or argument, you abused the writer, and represented him as wishing for that of the existence of which he expressed his fears. This was your dealing towards him: and, those who abetted you by the countenance they gave your paper, have, in their present disappointment and mortification their just reward.—But, who are the persons, in Portugal, on whom French arts, intrigues, and this French preaching have had so much effect? Who are the persons; what is the description of them, who were so unintelligent as to be seduced by the French partizans, and led away by the spirit, which the French leave behind them, in every place, where they have once had a footing? Who are they? Not the "mob;" not the "rabble;" not the "swinish multitude." No: but "people of property; PERSONS OF AGE, LONG-STANDING, MEN OF PROPERTY." This is what we are told; and, amongst the persons, who are particularly named, there is an English merchant, two members of the Board of Trade, an eminent physician, an eminent painter, two noblemen, a marchioness, and a judge. These, it seems, are, according to this writer, unintelligent persons, easily led astray by the arts and intrigues of French preachers!—Now, you will please to observe, reader, that I do not say, that the account of the conspiracy, which I have inserted above is true; I do not say, that there has been any conspiracy at all; but, if there has been a conspiracy, and if the above account of it be true, the Portuguese are paying but a very poor compliment to our cause; for it appears from this account, that the French have their friends

amongst the people of property, the eminent men of the learned professions, the gentry and nobility, while our friends are amongst the "swinish multitude," as the same description of persons are, by the Anti-Jacobins, called in this country. So that we appear to be reduced to this dilemma: either to allow that the common people have, at least, as much sense and virtue as the people of property, the great merchants, the learned men, the gentry and nobility; or that the French have on their side a great many of those persons who have most sense and most virtue. Upon which dilemma we will leave the writer of the Morning Post, and his readers of the "fashionable world" suspended, while we digress into an observation or two of a somewhat more general nature.—We have seen, that, in Spain, and in Sweden the country, as far as it could be delivered up, has been delivered up by the nobility and the great and rich. That this has been the case in almost every country of Europe, is a fact pretty well known. I know of no instance, in which the common people have surrendered their country. To what, then, is this to be ascribed? I will not attempt to answer that question; but, I am quite sure, that, if we insist (as we, doubtless, shall), that to surrender a country to Napoleon is an act of folly or of baseness, we must, at the same time acknowledge, that the nobility and the rich, in the countries so surrendered to Napoleon, have been more foolish or more base than the common people; and, when we have made this acknowledgement, I think we shall not again patiently hear the people of England called a "swinish multitude," and represented as unfit to be suffered to open their lips upon any subject connected with public affairs.—I had occasion to observe, in speaking of the state of Holland, in the present volume, page 236, that there was, and long had been, a moral principle at work in favour of the views of Napoleon, "who ought to be considered not so much the leader of an army as the agent of that principle;" and, have we not now another proof of this prevailing principle? We are told, indeed, that the "hearts of the people in Portugal are sound;" but, who, I pray, were to have used the five thousand stand of arms? Who were to have "massacred the British army?" Two hundred of the nobility and great merchants could not have done this, though aided by a judge and a marchioness. Oh, no! The story is false altogether, or there must have been a large body of men

concerned in the plot, or expected to be ready to aid in the execution of it. It is quite impossible, that a mere *band* of conspirators could have provided deposits of arms and ammunition to such an extent as to be able, as we are told, to place Lord Talavera's army *between two fires*.—As to what is said to have been done to the *persons arrested*, it would, perhaps, be improper, with our present information, to say much. At any rate, I shall, agreeably to my usual practice, relative to the Portuguese War, offer *no opinion*. We are told, that they were seized in their beds, and thrown into prison, without being suffered to hold any communication with child or wife; that they were going to be transported instantly; and that, on the part of one particular person, 6,000 pounds had been offered for him to be *permitted to have a trial!*—And, upon this; yea, upon this it is, that the writer in the *Morning Post*, who instructs our "fashionable world" observes, that he "knows not whether "he should altogether commend the *moderation*, with which the prisoners have "been disposed of!" This is the sentiment of an English journalist, who publishes his work in the capital of England, and whose paper bears the title of "the "fashionable world!" But, he says, that, whatever he may think, in other respects, of the punishment (*transportation without trial*, if what he says in another part of his paper be true;) whatever he may think of the *moderation* of this punishment; and though he may not be able to commend such moderation, he is quite sure, that it is "an indication of the *perfect security* of "the government, as well as of the *loyalty* of "the people." And, thus, I think, the thing is wound up in a most complete manner.—Let us now look, a little, before we close this article, at the situation of our army, and at its prospects.—There slips out, as it were by accident, in the above relation of the conspiracy, the statement, that "the Portuguese army, under "Marshal Beresford, recovered from the "impression made by the fall of Almeida." What, then, there was, it seems, an *impression* made upon these gentlemen by the fall of Almeida! What *sort* of an impression we are not even now told, and we never before heard of any impression at all. As, however, they are recovered from this impression, it would seem, that the impression was not a very pleasant one; which, to say the truth, is not very wonderful, if, as our news-papers informed us, there were several hundreds of men

blown up in the garrison, and if all these were, as now it appears was the case, *Portuguese*.—We are told, now, that our army consists of 35,000 British soldiers, and that, when all the reinforcements arrive, there will be 40,000. We have, in our pay, 30,000 Portuguese soldiers, which together make SEVENTY THOUSAND. We are also told, in these last accounts, that MASSENA can bring only 50,000 men to face us in the field; so, that we have, if these statements be true, 15,000 men, at least, more than he, to bring into the field. How it happens that viscount Talavera did, under such circumstances, suffer the French to besiege, and take Almeida, I cannot pretend to say; neither am I able to judge of the noble viscount's reasons for retreating with so decided a superiority of numbers. These are matters, which those who have obliged us by the above statements, will, in time, doubtless, be able to explain very much to the satisfaction of their readers.—He must have been a very inattentive observer, who has failed to remark, that, when any untoward event, like that of the conspiracy in Portugal, takes place, there is seldom, if ever wanting, some piece of extraordinary good news to counterbalance it. It constantly happened thus in the good old anti-jacobin times of PITT. Accordingly, along with the account of the conspiracy in Portugal, there came forth news of a battle in Portugal, in which battle, MASSENA had been completely defeated. This news was brought up from Portsmouth, and said to have been got from on board the American sloop of war, the *Hornet*, which had just come from Havre-de-grace. Whether this news be true, is more than I can pretend to say. Were I to judge from the past, I should conclude that it was false; because, I have always perceived, that such news, did, in the end, prove to have been published for the purpose of withdrawing the public attention from the bad news with which it came out. It is, however, *possible*, that it may prove true; and, if the above account of numbers be correct, there can, I should hope, be but very little doubt, that when a battle does take place, the victory will be on our side, seeing that, according to all the accounts which have been given as to superiority of numbers, we add health, plenty, fidelity, and the highest spirits; while the army of MASSENA has long been in a starving condition, and sickness and desertion have been daily thinning his ranks.

JEFFERY.—The following documents will show, that this poor man is alive; and when the reader has gone through them, I have a remark or two to make upon the subject.

"OFFICE OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
"CONSUL.—I, Andrew Allen, jun. his
"Britannic Majesty's Consul for the
"States of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut,
"do hereby certify, that William Stephenson, Esq. is a Magistrate for the county of Suffolk, in the State of Massachusetts, and that Robert Jeffery made oath before him in my presence.—Given under my hand and seal of office, at Boston, in the State of Massachusetts, this 14th day of July, in the year of our Lord, 1810. W. S. SKINNER, Pro Consul.

"BOSTON, SUFFOLK.—*United States of America, Commonwealth of Massachusetts.*
"On this 14th day of July, in the year of our Lord 1810, before me Wm. Stevenson, Esq. a Justice of the Peace for the County of Suffolk, by legal authority, appointed and sworn, and dwelling in Boston aforesaid, personally appeared Robert Jeffery, and made oath, that the affidavit hereunto annexed contains the truth and nothing but the truth.—In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed my seal of office, the day and year above written.—Wm. Stevenson Just. Peace.

"At Wenham, County of Essex, State of Massachusetts, in the United States of America, the 17th of June, 1810, personally appeared Robert Jeffery, blacksmith, who, being interrogated and examined, declares as follows, viz. :
"—That he is twenty-one years of age; was born at Polparo, in the county of Cornwall, Great Britain. That in the summer of 1807, he shipped himself at Polparo aforesaid on board the privateer schooner Lord Nelson, of Plymouth.—That the schooner, about eight days afterwards, put into Falmouth, where he was impressed by an officer belonging to and carried on board of his Britannic Majesty's brig Recruit of 18 guns, commanded by ——— Lake, and appointed Armourer's Mate, and soon afterwards sailed in the Recruit, for the West Indies, where she cruised for about three months. The brig's water-running short, the crew were allowanced; and this Declarant being very thirsty, and unable to obtain a sufficiency to quench

"his thirst, one Saturday evening went to the beer-cask, and drew off about two quarts of beer into a bucket, drank about three fourths of it, and left the remainder in the bucket, one of the crew was present when this took place, and informed Captain Lake of it, who next day asked this Declarant if it was he who tapped the beer, to which he replied in the affirmative, and Capt. Lake ordered the Serjeant of Marines to put him on the black list.—That he continued to do his duty as usual, and nothing else particularly occurred until the Sunday following, Captain Lake called him aft, and said to him (Sombrero Island being then in sight)—'Jeffery, do you see that island; do you know that I am going to land you on it?' To which he replied in the negative. Shortly afterwards, Captain Lake ordered the boat to be lowered down; the Second Lieutenant, a Midshipman, and four men, to land him on Sombrero Island.—That this Declarant wished to take his clothes with him, but Captain Lake denied him them, or any thing else, except what he then had upon him, and when the boat landed him, the rocks cut his feet, upon which the Lieutenant begged one of the men in the boat to spare him a pair of shoes, which he did, and gave him a knife; the Lieutenant and Midshipman each gave him a handkerchief, and left him on the Island of Sombrero aforesaid, the Lieutenant having previously recommended him to keep a look out for vessels passing.—That Sombrero is a desolate island, without any inhabitant thereon, or sustenance of any kind to support life, and he remained on it nine days without any food, save about a dozen limpets that he picked off the rocks; his drink was sometimes salt-water, at other times rain water, which he found in crevices of the rocks after a fall of rain.—That he saw several vessels pass, and attempted to hail them, but without effect, for they were too distant to hear or see him, until the schooner Adams, of Marblehead, John Dennis, Master, came to his assistance, took him off, and landed him at Marblehead in the county of Essex, aforesaid."

his
ROBERT X JEFFERY.
mark

"The above Declaration and Examination taken by and in presence of

"J. RAMSEY."

Thus, then, thanks to SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, we have got the glad tidings of this poor fellow's safety.—Look at his narrative, reader. *English* reader, look at the narrative of this English sailor; this sailor of the *Royal Navy of England*! Look at it, and then tell me what your feelings are upon reflecting, that this narrative will be read all over the world! The *crime* of this poor young man, then only *eighteen years of age*, was the taking of two quarts of beer out of a barrel, at a time when he was stinted as to water! Such was the *crime*, that doomed him to death the most horrible that imagination can conceive, and from which death he was preserved by the mere accidental assistance of a humane foreigner.—“‘The rock cut his feet,” he says! His clothes were refused him. This tallies with the evidence, which will be seen in the Register, Vol. XVII, page 400 and onwards. “‘The rock cut his feet;” and, one of the witnesses said, that, when the boat rowed off, he *cried*, but *said nothing*! This, indeed, when it was laid before the Honourable House, was enough to make the hair of the members stand on end.—JEFFERY was an *impressed* man, too. In short, every circumstance tends to heighten the horror which every good man will feel at this deed, committed, observe, not by one of the “*rabble*,” not by one of the “*mob*,” not by one of the “*swinish multitude*,” not by “a *jacobin* or a *leveller*,” but by “an *Honourable Captain* Warwick Lake,” by the son of a *Lord*, whose family have a large pension, paid by the people. I do not mean to say, that any of the rest of the family have any share in this act; but, what I do wish is, that it should be clearly understood, that the act was not committed by one of those, whom our fashionable writers call *jacobins*.—We are not informed, whether JEFFERY is about to return to England. I hope, however, that he will receive such assurances of *protection* and *compensation* as shall induce him to come without delay; for, I am of opinion, as, I think, the reader must be, that it is of great importance, that all possible pains should be taken to show, that the act of Lake has the disapprobation of the whole government, King, Lords, and Commons. The thing is now become known to all the world, and it will be, it must be, an object of particular attention in the *Navy*, not a sailor in which will fail to fix his eyes upon it and to bear it in his mind. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the conduct of the govern-

ment, upon this occasion, should be such as to convince every one, that it not only abhors the act committed, but that it is anxious to make the suffering party every amends in its power to make, and that it is resolved to use its utmost endeavours to prevent such tyrannical acts in future. This, in my opinion, is absolutely necessary not only to the character of the government, but to the maritime service.—The inquiries about JEFFERY have been made, in consequence of an Address of the House of Commons to the King, upon motion of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT. A Message will, I suppose, communicate to the House the result of the proceedings consequent upon that Address, and, perhaps, will announce, that measures have been taken for the bringing of JEFFERY to England, and affording him *protection* and *compensation*. In the course of the proceedings, some occasion will, doubtless, be found, for marking the cruel act with the reprobation of both king and parliament; for, this would have more effect, perhaps, than any other measure.—It will be recollected, that, when SIR FRANCIS BURDETT first mentioned the thing, in the House, he said, having just pointed it out to the attention of the ministers, he should do no more at present, hoping that they would, themselves, take the matter up; but that, if they did not, in the course of a few days, he would. I forget their answer, nor is it of much consequence. They did not bring the matter forward, and SIR FRANCIS narrowly escaped being sent to the Tower himself, before he could do it. By a postponement of the discussion, relative to him, he, luckily, had time to bring on the discussion, and to carry his motion for an Address to the King, in favour of JEFFERY, just two days before the order was issued by the House for committing him to the Tower.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT has suggested many things to the House; but, unless in this one instance, his advice has been rejected. Let us hope, however, that the happy effect of having followed his advice, in this case, will be an inducement for the House to follow it in future.—At any rate, let it be clearly understood, that the discovery of JEFFERY, and the opportunity thereby offered to the government of doing the poor fellow justice, and of convincing the world, and especially the sailors of the fleets, that the government of England will spare no pains to come at truth and to do justice where the well-being of the sailors is concerned; let it be clearly understood, that,

of all this good, SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, who was lately committed to the Tower, is the author.

ROYAL GERMAN LEGION.—In my Register of the 19th of September, p. 894, I inserted the following paragraph, from the TIMES news-paper of Monday, the 17th of that month.—“On Thursday a Court-martial commenced at Bexhill, for the trial of two privates of the 2nd battalion of the ROYAL GERMAN LEGION, who *deserted* a few days ago, and *took from the beach a large boat for the purpose of going out to the enemy.* They were apprehended by a boatman off Dover.”—After having made some remarks upon this, without taking upon me to say that it was *true*, I called upon the TIMES either to *contradict* it, or to give to the public *some further and fuller account of it*, and especially of the result of the *court-martial*, said to be then assembled for the trial of the men. The TIMES has done neither; and, which is well worthy of remark, no other paper *has ventured even to mention the matter.* Yet, methinks, the matter was of consequence, *equal*, at least, to the letters of GENERAL SARRAZIN. These troops are here for *our defence*; they are here for the *defence of England*; they are here (for Judge Grose told me so) for the purpose of assisting to defend England against a foreign enemy, who has set at naught every thing for the sake of attacking us; and, therefore, it, surely, is of consequence to us to be informed, whether it be really true, that two of these our defenders, did desert, and not only desert, but *take a large boat from the beach for the purpose of going out to the enemy*; aye, for the purpose of going out to that enemy, against whom they were brought here to defend us. It is, surely, of consequence for us to know, whether this fact be true, and what the Court-martial have done to these two Royal German Legion soldiers, who were brought here for our defence. The “boatman,” too, should, I think, be an object of our gratitude; for, if, to save the life of a common citizen, was, amongst the Romans, deemed worthy of a civic crown, what is due to that Englishman, who, *single-handed*, apprehended *two of the foreign defenders of England*, who were going out to the enemy?—But, surely, this is all a romance! It never can be true! Yet, if it be not, I am sure, that it is very mischievous to have published it, and I trust, still, that the TIMES will give us either the confirmation, or the re-

traction, as soon as possible.—*Going out to the enemy*, is, as I observed, in the article above referred to, something quite new in cases of desertion from our army. That the fact will reach France there can be no doubt; for, we see the TIMES news-paper frequently quoted by the Moniteur; and, if the fact remain uncontradicted, I leave the reader to guess at the conclusions that the enemy will draw from it.

“THE BRUNSWICKERS.”—In the COURIER of TUESDAY last, the 2nd instant, the following paragraph appeared:—“We are sorry to understand that some disturbances have taken place between our troops and the Duke of Brunswick’s corps, in the Isle of Wight, in which some shots were exchanged. We have not heard that any lives were lost.” There this matter drops, as far as the COURIER is concerned. “Sorry to understand.” That is all. Shots exchanged in a barrack yard and in barrack rooms! And no more than this said about the matter? Yet, not another word has the COURIER said of it from first to last!—The MORNING CHRONICLE of Wednesday, published the following article upon the subject, and I, without vouching for the truth of it, without giving it as mine, without knowing and without saying that there is any truth in it, shall first insert it, and then offer a few of those observations, which occur to me, and which, I think likely to be useful.—“We have received the following interesting Letter from the Isle of Wight:—*Newport, Isle of Wight, Oct. 1.*—I hasten to inform you of a dreadful commotion among the troops at the Dépôt, which took place about eight o’clock last evening, which, for some time, caused a considerable alarm, as all were *panic struck* within the garrison. The BRUNSWICKERS, a part of a FOREIGN CORPS here, had been, during the day of Sunday, *guilty of several irregularities*, one of the East India recruits being wounded in an affray. But a party being intoxicated, in the evening, entered the canteen, and *demolished every thing* that came in their way, and did the same in a second room; they then SANG SOME NATIONAL SONGS, and rushed out in a body, and went to their quarters, and brought out THEIR RIFLES, with FOUR ROUNDS OF BALL CARTRIDGE, and fired up and down every division at random. One report mentions 150 balls having been fired—ano-

“ther account makes them but 105. One man, I am sorry to say, was KILLED, another was shot so badly in the arm, that it has been AMPUTATED—another THROUGH THE BODY, but whether dead or not, is not known.—We trust an Inquest will be held, and an account given, a satisfactory one we hope, why these men were entrusted with four rounds of ball cartridge each.—The drums at length BEAT TO ARMS, and the garrison was ordered to ground arms, which was at length done, after some little hesitation on the part of the foreigners.—The coach from Cowes to Newport was passing at the time, and the lives of the passengers were endangered. A woman was addressing a child in a serjeant’s quarters, and a ball absolutely passed between the woman and child without injury.”

—Not a word has been said of this in the MORNING POST. Not a single word from first to last. Yet, reader, look at it. Consider the matter well. Think of the consequences. If you are one of “the most thinking people in the world,” think of this.—The story may, for aught I know, be wholly false: I am in my prison, and cannot know what has happened in the Isle of Wight. But, though in a prison, in London, my country, and Hampshire in particular, is far more dear to me than any other spot of earth in the world, and I cannot help feeling anxious for its safety and its honour.—Is it not right, that those, who have the means in their hands, should let us know, whether this account be true or false? What! The Brunswickers, in singing their national songs, rush out with their rifles and four rounds of ball cartridges, and wound and kill people! And, is this to be looked upon, by our public writers, as a matter of too little moment to merit a corner in their papers, while they have room for accounts taken out of the *Hornet*, of battles in Portugal, in which Massena was completely defeated?—In every way, in which this matter can be viewed, it is one of the greatest importance; inferior, in that respect, to nothing but the alledged desertion and attempt to go out to the enemy, above-noticed for the second time.—What does it indicate? What conclusions will the enemy draw from it? What will be its effect upon the feelings of our native army? What will be the feelings arising from it amongst the people at large?—If it be false, wholly or in part, and especially the part relating to the national songs and the shooting and

killing, justice to the Brunswickers demands a retraction, or an explanation; for, in giving an account of their conduct, we should, if possible, be more careful to be correct, than in speaking of the conduct of our own army, a rule which I, for my part, have always strictly observed. The policy of bringing them here; the motive for the introduction of them; the use which they are calculated to be of; these are all matters, with which we have, in this case, nothing to do: these are matters, very proper, perhaps, to be discussed in parliament, or elsewhere; but, they are matters, which should be kept carefully separate from the conduct of the men, against whom, in a case like the present, no attempt should be made to excite, or take advantage of, any thing like national prejudice.—But, on the other hand, if what is stated, in the above article, taken from a print, certainly in the first rank of respectability; if what is stated in that article be true, either wholly, or in part, the people of England ought to be fully informed of it; and, if they are not, they will be most shamefully betrayed by the press.—“An Inquest!” The writer says, he “trusts” that an inquest will be held. He trusts! what! has he any doubt of it then?—Yet, it is now Friday, and the Morning Chronicle says not another word about the matter.—What can be the reason of this? There is a post daily from the Isle of Wight to London; and how comes it, that we hear nothing more about the matter? Has there ever been a thing of this sort amongst our own troops, without our seeing the newspapers half full of it? The Times, so punctual in giving us French news, and in detailing to us all the affrays in the vicinity of Madrid, says not one word of the affray in the Isle of Wight. The Morning Post, so punctual, so exact, in its accounts of the disaffection in Massena’s army, and of the desertions of the Poles and Swiss and Germans, who go over from the French to the Spaniards and Portuguese, says not one word of the two soldiers of the Royal German Legion, above-mentioned, who are said to have been apprehended by the boatman off Dover.—Strange taste! These writers seem to have a disorder in their eyes precisely the contrary of near-sightedness. They can see what is going on in the neighbourhood of Buonaparté’s palaces; they can penetrate into “the secrets of his cabinet,” and they actually are filling their columns with accounts of what has passed, and is passing, there;

they are so intimately acquainted with what is going forward in his armies, particularly, that they tell us even of what is said in *whispers* at the tables of the officers; but, they cannot see what is passing at Dover and the Isle of Wight; of which, as far as they are concerned, the people of England are kept wholly ignorant, as completely in the dark as if they lived in Siberia.—Let us hope, however, that MR. PERRY will not thus treat *his* readers. He used not to act thus. His paper has long borne the reputation of having something like public justice running through its columns. Let us hope, that we are not, at last, to lump this print along with the Morning Post and the Courier.—What I wish for is, to see the *truth* made known to the public; the truth, and the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I am sure, that the making of it known is due to the people of England; and, I repeat, that if it is not made known to them, they will be most shamefully betrayed by the press; by that press, about which such a boasting is made; that press which is called “the *pulladium of free men*.”—It is not many days ago, that the Morning Post pointed out to us Napoleon’s decrees relative to the press, and asked us JACOBINS, *how we should like* such a decree to be in force in England. I, for my part (taking the word *Jacobin* to mean a man who neither has nor wishes to have any part of the *taxes to eat*) answered for myself, that I should not like such a decree at all; but, really, if, no matter from what motive, the people are not to be informed, through the means of the press, of facts like those above stated; if, from whatever cause, such facts are kept out of the public prints; if this be the case generally, or partially, I am of opinion, that, as far as it is the case, a press under laws like the decrees of Napoleon is quite as good, if not better; because in the latter case, there is no talk about “*liberty of the press*,” there is no such pretence; it is notorious that there is no such thing, and, therefore, nobody is deceived by it.—But, come; let us hope, that for shame’s sake, for very shame’s sake, that we shall see, full accounts published of the transactions above-mentioned. Ah! Well may you attempt to hide your heads! But, writhe as long as you please! Writhe, and grind your teeth! Curse ’till you are hoarse! You shall hear of these things; you shall be posted up to the contempt of the whole civilized world, until you publish a fair,

true, and full account of these transactions. The statement of the facts, true or false, did not originate with me. It was amongst yourselves that it had its origin. It is you, who have told the world, and our enemy amongst the rest, of the *desertion from the Royal German Legion*, and of the *national songs and the shootings and killings of the Brunswickers*: it is you, who have told the world of this: upon you I call, either to state fully what *has been done to the guilty persons*, or, to *retract your statements*; and call upon you I will, ’till you answer to the call, or till your pretensions to impartiality shall make even Russian printers turn up the nose.

FRENCH ARMAMENTS.—Let us now (for it is high time) take a look at what is passing across the Channel, at the mouth of the Scheldt, and within a few hours sail of England.—I will not say what is doing there; but I will tell my readers what the Morning Post, of the 29th of September, says upon the subject.—“The *Idas* armed cutter arrived at Deal on Thursday from our fleet off Flushing. She brought with her a Prussian Captain and a French Gentleman, whom she picked up at sea on Tuesday in an open boat, in which they had effected their escape. They report, that the fleet in Flushing is now completely equipped and ready for sea, excepting a deficiency of sailors. None of the men of war have more than a hundred *seamen*, so that, were there nothing else to deter them, it is hardly possible that they can venture to put to sea. The deficiency of the crews is supplied by *soldiers*, but probably with a view to defence more than any thing else. Great exertions and incessant labours have been bestowed by the enemy to repair the works in the island of Walcheren, which is now in a good state of defence, to repel any new attempt that may be made against it by this country. They are not, however, free from apprehensions for their safety, in case of a serious attack. The fleet under Sir Edward Pellew made its appearance a few days since off the Duerloo Channel—a circumstance which excited no small degree of alarm for the safety of their new fleet, and filled the inhabitants with terror.”—What, “filled the inhabitants with terror!” Were they not, then, glad to see an English fleet? Were they not anxious to be again “under the protecting wings” of England? This must be a slip of the pen.

If I had said this, it would have been produced against me as a proof of my "*admiration*" of the French Emperor.—We will not stop to compare this account of the Island of Walcheren being in a good state of defence, with what was said, last winter, about the difficulty of restoring it to the state, in which we found it; but hasten on to what we are here told about the *fleet* at Flushing, which, in another part, we are told, consists of *thirteen ships* of the line, besides frigates and smaller vessels of war. This fleet, we are told, is now *completely equipped*; and, I believe, that, from the mast-head of the men of war, the *mouth of the Thames is easily seen*!—It is very well worth the while of "the most *thinking* people in the world" to *think* a little of this; and, when the Morning Post is lulling the "*fashionable world*" with the notion, that this fleet cannot *venture to sea* with only a hundred sailors on board of each ship of the line, it becomes a "*thinking people*" to consider, what use sailors are put to, and what sort of "*a sea*" it is that this French fleet would have to cross.—The truth is, and it is a truth I should be happy to find myself able to impress deeply upon the minds of my readers, that in an attempt (for, let us hope, that it will never succeed) to invade England from the opposite coast, there can be but little to do in those matters, for which *sailors* are most wanted. In *all ships* a very considerable portion of the hands are not worthy of being called sailors. Perhaps, in few cases, there are more than one-third part of the crew, employed about things which might be done, though not quite so quickly, by *landsmen*. A hundred *sailors* appear to me to be quite sufficient for bringing a first rate ship of war across from the Scheldt to England, if the ship be well filled with *landsmen*, which, as we are told in the above paragraph, is the case with respect to the fleet at Flushing. Indeed, what are the ships wanted for but to contain and bring over *landsmen*? And, yet the wise writer of the Morning Post, imagines that the *soldiers* have been on board of this fleet "*for defence more than for any thing else*!" Why, with what does he suppose that Napoleon means to invade England, or attempt to invade it? With what, if not with *soldiers*?—I am afraid, that there is no good reason to suppose, that Napoleon will want for sailors. All the sailors of Holland must

be in existence, somewhere or other; and, we may be assured, that they will not want for encouragement to come forward into service. It *may* be very *unjust* to take the interest of the Dutch National Debt and give it to seamen, instead of paying it to the creditors. This is a point, that I will not meddle with now; but, I am sure that such an act would greatly *please the seamen*, and would, in a very short time, man a greater fleet than is now ready for sea.—Holland is naturally a maritime country. The people live amongst and upon the waters. They are all sailors from their infancy. Is it possible, that such a people, under a government capable of drawing forth and putting in motion, every particle of means that the country affords, should not speedily attain to maritime greatness? The destruction of the commerce of Holland and the capture of her colonies, to accomplish which we have spent so much of our means, are favourable, in the highest degree, to the views of Napoleon; for, from these causes, many thousands of seamen, of all descriptions, will, for the sake of bread, be induced to enter his service; and, when I heard of the capture of AMBOYNA, my instantaneous observation was, that it was another blow struck for our enemy; though our news-writers in general congratulated the country upon it, and particularly as it would tend to make the Dutch repent of their connection with France. It may; but, that repentance will be unavailing, and we may be sure, that the capture will make them *hate us* more than they did before, and make them, if any such motive was necessary, still more docile in the hands of Napoleon. In short, it appears to me, that exclusive of all other resources, he will easily find seamen in Holland for a fleet of forty or fifty ships of the line.

—It does not, however, seem to me reasonable, that any attempt at invasion will be actually made for some time. The means are merely collecting. The ships are building. The line is drawing round us. And, until that line is completed, I do not believe, that any serious attempt will be made.—This work of preparation will not, however, in all human probability, be slow. There is a talk of war between France and Russia. Perhaps this may take place; but I think it much more likely, that Russia will be glad to save herself by giving up so much in the Baltic as shall satisfy Napoleon; that is to say, as shall

effectually deprive us of all sorts of naval stores from the grand magazine in the North.—The Morning Chronicle, of to-day, says:—"In proportion to the augmentation of the enemy's strength, *is the indifference with which these hostile preparations appear to be regarded here.*"

—Nothing ever was more true than this; and, as to the effect, produced *here*, by these truly terrible preparations, it is, as the Morning Chronicle observes, *less and less*, as the strength of the enemy augments. This is as bad a symptom, if not worse, than any we have ever witnessed. We have wondered at the apathy of other countries, subdued by France; but, I much question, if any country ever discovered *more apathy*, than this country now does, with respect either to its domestic or foreign concerns.—The time, however, is not, in all probability, far distant, when it must begin to think, if it ever does; for, though invasion will not, as I believe, be seriously attempted for some time, the *threats of invasion will*. There is now a fleet at the mouth of the Scheldt for that purpose; a purpose that will not place our persons in danger, to be sure; but, which will not fail to be answered as to the *paper-money system*. The paper-money system of France was assailed with *forged assignats*: ours will be assailed with threats of invasion; and, it will, in the course of my next Letter, be shewn, that threats of invasion are the most formidable assailants of that system, which, indeed, all Europe knows long ago, and our enemy better than any body else.

—But, the grand preparations for invasion, for the subjugation of England, will keep steadily on. They will be affected by nothing that I am able to foresee. "*Peace!*" No: why should peace put a stop to them? On the contrary, my opinion is, that they would be advanced by peace. But, when we talk of peace, do we think about the terms? are we ready to evacuate Spain, Portugal, Sicily, Malta, and all the colonies, taken from the French, Dutch, and Spaniards? That no peace would be made, of which such an evacuation was not a preliminary, is pretty certain; and, I would not engage, that the return of the Danish fleet and of the Spanish frigates, taken before the war, would not be another condition. Are we prepared to yield upon terms like these? No; very well, then, let us not talk of peace. We shall never see another Peace of Amiens; and, indeed, Buonaparté told

us that we should not.—It is sometimes said, that such and such things will happen, *when a peace takes place*, just as if we were in a situation like that in which we were during any of the wars previous to PITT's Anti-jacobin war; just as if no material change had taken place in Europe; just as if the Bourbons were still ruling in France; just as if the Stadtholder was ruling in Holland; just as if there had been no change in Spain and in Portugal; and just as if guineas were still ready to meet the paper at the Bank of England. The people at Whitehall see the same buildings there that were there twenty years ago; and they appear to think, that all the world has remained equally unchanged.

—It has been once or twice observed, in the Morning Chronicle, that our keeping of armies out of England, as in Portugal, Spain, Sicily, Malta, and elsewhere, is precisely what Napoleon must wish for, because it leaves *England defenceless*. As my opinion is, that England must depend for defence upon the *people of England*, I do not care much about the mere *absence* of the regular army; but, I do care about the *expence*; and, in this way, I do not, for my part, see how we could possibly do any thing more agreeable to Napoleon than to send armies to Spain and Portugal, and above all to *Sicily*. I can conceive, that if Spain and Portugal, or either of them, could be kept out of the hands of Napoleon, we should be safer, especially *with regard to Ireland*; but, I am utterly unable to form to myself any notion of an advantage, of any sort, to be derived to us, from a *defence of Sicily*, or the *preservation of Malta*. The whole of our trade, if it were *all profit*, would not be worth one half of the amount of the expence of keeping up the garrison of Malta. The possession of that place may annoy France and Naples a little; but, as to its forming any diversion in favour of England, the idea really appears to me to be strangely absurd.—The truth is, that we are acting upon the old system, when every thing else in the world is new. The PITT system is still in full vigour. That "great statesman now no more" has a very worthy and faithful follower in Mr. Perceval, who might be succeeded by Sir Vicary Gibbs (and perhaps will) without any one being able to perceive the smallest difference. We have lost ally after ally, each of whom has, in his turn, become our enemy; and still we go on in just the same way as before. At the out-

set of the Anti-jacobin war, we could raise up myriads against France; we cannot now make a man stir, except at our heels; and still we talk as big as ever, and we go on with armaments and expeditions as pompously as ever. We deplore the fate of Holland and Sweden and Naples and Switzerland and Prussia and Genoa and Piedmont and Austria; but, what is the use of this, when we have not the power to render the smallest assistance to any one of them? What is the use of our deploring the fate of Holland and of giving such a frightful picture of its situation, if we cannot do any thing to better that situation? We talk of the power, which riches and commerce give, and we boast of our riches and commerce. Why, then, do we not shew our power; why do we not give some proof of it; why do we not exert it, in behalf of the dethroned or degraded sovereigns, formerly our allies? This boasting places us in a dilemma too obvious to be pointed out.—What wisdom dictates to us is this: to look at home; to leave the continent to its fate; to leave it to undergo that revolution which we have it not in our power to prevent, or even to retard for any considerable time; to leave the continent to be new-modelled in the way that its new master may choose; to look well into our means of preserving ourselves; to make a fair estimate of those means; to diminish our expenditure; to put our force, naval as well as military, upon a footing that we can *permanently* bear; to reform all abuses and 'tear up CORRUPTION by the roots; and, to conciliate, to quiet, to gain over, to fix on our side, the discontented part of the *Irish people*; to destroy the *French Party*, which we are told exists in that unhappy country, but to destroy it, not by force of arms; not by the cord and the sword, but by the force of reason and of kindness. These are, in my opinion, the things which wisdom dictates to us; and, if we listen to her voice, though we must still look with anxiety at the dreadful power of our enemy, we need not look at it with fear; though this war may last till those who are now children shall be men, they may arrive at man's estate and still see their country free.

LUCIEN BUONAPARTE.—Far-famed as we are for our cullibility, the world will

hardly expect us to discover an eagerness to embrace one of the family of Buonaparte, merely because he is said to have left Italy to avoid the resentment of his Brother. Yet, if we are to believe the *Courier* news-paper of this evening (Friday) this species of huggery is likely to take place. We are there told, in *positive* terms, that **LUCIEN** will not only be permitted, but invited, to come to *this country*; that there will be no coldness, no suspicion, on our part; that he will be most cordially received; that there is no ground whatever for suspecting him of any contrivance with his brother to injure us; that we ought not to believe him to be a cheat; that he has proved himself to be a very good sort of a man; and that we ought to *honour* him for his conduct! Aye, *honour* him! Honour a Buonaparte, the whole family of whom this same writer has, a thousand times, represented as a nest of the vilest vermin that ever crawled the earth. — We are told a sort of canting story about **LUCIEN** having run away *rather than be divorced from his wife*, a story which, it is very likely, will be believed here, because it is pretty clear that it would be believed in no other country upon earth. — As to the story about his refusal to let his daughter marry our friend, *His Most Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII.*, if it be contended that this argues in favour of Lucien's virtue and understanding, it will not, I think, be cited as a *compliment to us*, who are spending millions with the avowed object of giving a great kingdom to a man, to whom, if this story be true, our new friend Lucien would not consent to give his daughter. — The writer of the *Courier* says, that, for his part, he "views this step of Lucien as *very honourable to this country*." And, why? Because "to all Europe he denounces *his brother* (who abuses us) as a *liar* and *calumniator*." This is the reason why his coming to our dominions is *honourable to us*! It is honourable to us to have a man take refuge amongst us, who denounces *his brother* as a *liar* and *calumniator*! — I break off for want of room —

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
October 5, 1810.

The XTH LETTER to my Salisbury Friends in the next Number.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"They" (the French Revolutionists) "forget that, IN ENGLAND, not one shilling of Paper Money of any description is received but of choice; that the whole has had its origin in cash, actually deposited; and that it is convertible, at pleasure, in an instant, and without the smallest loss, into cash again. Our Paper is of value in commerce, because in law it is of none. It is powerful on Change, because in Westminster-hall it is impotent. In payment of a debt of twenty shillings a creditor may refuse all the paper of the bank of England. Nor is there among us a single public security, of any quality or nature whatsoever, that is enforced by authority. In fact it might be easily shewn, that our paper wealth, instead of lessening the real coin, has a tendency to increase it; instead of being a substitute for money, it only facilitates its entry, its exit, and its circulation; that it is the symbol of prosperity, and not the badge of distress. Never was a scarcity of cash, and an exuberance of paper, a subject of complaint in this nation."—BURKE. Reflections on the French Revolution. Written and published in 1790.

"But, whatever momentary relief, or aid, the Minister and the Bank might expect from this low contrivance of FIVE POUND NOTES, it will increase the inability of the Bank to pay the Higher Notes, and hasten the destruction of all; for, even the small taxes that used to be paid in money, will now be paid in those notes, and the Bank will soon find itself with scarcely any other money than what the hair-powder-guinea-tax brings in."—PAINE'S Decline and Fall of the English System of Finance. Written and published in March, 1796.

"When the situation of the Bank of England was under the consideration of the two Houses of Parliament, in the year 1797, it was my opinion, and that of many others, that the extent, to which the Paper-Currency had been carried, was the first and principal, though not the sole cause, of the many difficulties, to which that Corporate Body was then, and had, of late years, from time to time, been exposed, in supplying the cash, necessary for the commerce of the kingdom."—CHARLES JENKINSON, EARL OF LIVERPOOL, Letter to The King; published in 1805.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER X.

Horrid Passage from the Morning Post news-paper—Such are the writers by whom the paper-money system and its patrons are supported—Such are the Answers that are given to these Letters—Bank Paper asserted to be the only sort of currency calculated to exert the energies of an Island—Proceed in tracing the increase of Debt and Notes to that grand effect, the Bank Stoppage—Table shewing the annual increase of the Debt and Interest from 1793 to 1797—Increase in the number and amount of payments at the Bank demanded small notes—Hence came the five pound notes—Burke's picture of the English Bank Paper—Paine's prediction—Lord Liverpool the historian of Paine's prophecy.

Gentlemen,

In returning to our subject, we must bear in mind, that, in Letter VIII. (which

closed in page 489) and in the foregoing Letter, we saw clearly, that bank-notes, as well as all other promissory-notes, ought to be considered as *representatives of debt*, while *real money* ought to be considered as the representative of *property*, or things of *real value*. At the close of Letter VIII, we saw how the increase in the quantity of bank-notes had *kept pace with the increase of the National Debt*; and we proposed, when we should resume the subject, to trace this joint increase to that grand and memorable effect, THE STOPPAGE OF GOLD AND SILVER PAYMENTS AT THE BANK OF ENGLAND, in 1797.

But, before we enter upon this interesting matter, will you give me leave again to give you a specimen of the way, in which my Letters are answered by the venal writers in London? To do this will not be without its utility, both now and hereafter. It will be useful to shew you what sort of writers those are, who are opposed to me; and, though it may not be so useful to posterity, it will, nevertheless, be of some use, and will be very curious, for our children to see what manner of men those were, who wrote in favour of the Paper-money System. The passage I am about to lay before you was published in a news-paper, printed for the use of "The Fashionable World," under the date of the

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6th of this month, and its words are these.
 "To the People of the United Kingdom.—
 "The detestable characters *exposed lately*
in the pillory, may be considered the *real*
representatives of the Corsican Tyrant and
his Ministers, who boast of the monstrous
vice which excites such horrors in every
British bosom, and who, fearful of your
valour, are exerting every artifice to
subvert your empire, betray your virtue,
and extirpate your people. COBBETT,
 "the oracle of the Jacobins, *abuses the*
British Papers for speaking ill of such in-
fernal monsters, whose detestable prac-
tices must annihilate every virtuous
principle from the human breast; and
he tells the British People, in effect, that
if they are to be robbed by taxes and oppress-
ed by power, it is of no consequence whe-
ther they are conquered by a French Vere
street gang, or governed by a virtuous Bri-
tish Sovereign and his respectable Ministers.
 "Such is the profound reasoning of an
 "apostate low-minded scribe, who is impelled
 "by a *savage passion of revenge* for Mi-
 "nisterial deserved contempt, and by *foolish*
 "and *base* hopes of conciliation with the
 "Corsican Monster, who often rewards, but
 "never has been known to forgive. He
 "publishes weekly an *infernal Register*,
 "to excite *mutiny in the army and the fleet*,
 "to seduce the *loyalty of British subjects*, to
 "confound the good sense of the yeomanry
 "by low cunning and artful sophistry, and
 "above all, to destroy *Public Credit* and
 "Bank Paper, as the best bond of individual
 "and public security, and the only medium of
 "currency to suit and exert the energies of an
 "insular and commercial people. Such a
 "man, whom reading and writing made a
 "corporal, but whom sense and reason will
 "never make a politician or an honest
 "patriot, may be the proper oracle of a
 "Vere-street gang of regal French ruffians,
 "but his councils of liberty, economy,
 "and reform, must be regarded as the
 "treacherous delusions of a French spy,
 "when offered to a free, virtuous and
 "happy nation."*

Such, Gentlemen, is the language of my
 opposers. Such is the sort of men, who
 dislike me. Such are the answers that are
 given to my statements and my reasoning
 upon a sober and most important subject
 of political economy. The abuse here
 heaped upon a person, whom our Com-

mander in Portugal, in his public dis-
 patches, recognizes as an "Emperor," and
 who, in our courts of justice, has been re-
 cognized as "Sovereign of France," to say
 nothing of our negotiations and treaties
 with him; the abuse here heaped upon Na-
 poleon, who is not only called a monster,
 but is distinctly charged with "boasting
 "of the monstrous vice," for being guilty
 of which several infamous wretches have
 lately stood in the pillory in London, can,
 surely, not meet with the approbation of
 any man upon earth; for, one would fain
 hope, that there is not another man like
 this writer. Yet is it a serious considera-
 tion for the country, that such an accusa-
 tion should be thus boldly put forth in
 our public news-papers, and in a news-
 paper, too, which, from its uniform praises
 of the men at present in power, is called
 a ministerial news-paper, and is, in gene-
 ral, looked upon as a sort of half-official
 print. As far as concerns this particular
 article, every man in England will be
 ready to acquit the ministers; and, in-
 deed, every one will readily believe that
 it must meet with their sincere reprobation.
 But, this may not be the opinion
 abroad; and, I leave you to guess what
 an impression such a publication is calcu-
 lated to give the world of our national cha-
 racter.

There is one declaration here, about
 the paper-money, that I wish you to
 bear in mind; namely, that "bank-paper
 "is the best bond of individual and public
 "security, and the only medium of currency
 "to suit and exert the energies of an insular
 "and commercial people." So that, accord-
 ing to this writer, the return of gold and
 silver would be no good at all, and we
 ought, indeed, to desire to get rid of it, if
 we had any, though, upon the trial of Dr
 YONGE (of which we shall see more by-
 and-by), both the Attorney General and
 the Judge so decidedly declared the ex-
 portation of the coin to be a most mischie-
 vious practice; and though this writer him-
 self, little more than two months ago,
 congratulated his readers upon the pros-
 pect of seeing bank paper destroyed,
 which paper he called, in his print of the
 19th of July, "destructive assignats," and
 afterwards, "wile, dirty rags;" aye, that
 very paper, which he now asserts to be
 "the best bond of individual and public
 "security, and the only medium of currency
 "to suit and exert the energies of an insu-
 lar and commercial people."

* Morning Post, Saturday, October 6,
 1810.

Let us now leave our opponents; let us leave the paper-money system and its patrons to receive all the *support* that writings like the above can give, while we proceed in tracing the increase of the National Debt and that of the Bank notes to that grand and memorable effect, *the stoppage of gold and silver payments at the Bank of England, in 1797*, from which time our *paper-money* began, because it was then that the bank notes ceased to be convertible into coin, and have remained in that state to this day.

We have already seen, that, at the beginning of PITT's war with the Republicans of France, in 1793, our National Debt amounted to about 250 millions, because it did not increase during the peace preceding that war. Its amount, at the close of the American war, was 257 mil-

lions (See Letter III. page 324), and the annual interest paid upon it was 9 millions and about a half. The debt, and, of course, the interest along with it, decreased a little before the beginning of PITT's war against the Jacobins of France; so that, when that war was begun, both Debt and Interest were somewhat less, than at the conclusion of the American war. We will, however, take them at what they were at the last-mentioned period; and, in order the more clearly to shew the progress of the cause of the great increase of bank notes, and, finally, of the Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank, we will state the annual increase of the Debt and Interest, from the beginning of the war to the year 1797, when the Stoppage took place, which statement is not only very curious, but is of singularly great importance.

	DEBT. £.	INTEREST. £.
Before the Anti-Jacobin war began (in 1793), the amount was.....	257,213,043	9,669,435
In that same year was added	6,250,000	252,812
Amount at the end of 1793.....	263,463,043	9,922,247
In the year 1794 was added.....	15,676,525	773,324
Amount at the end of 1794.....	279,139,567	10,695,571
In the year 1795 was added	25,609,897	1,227,415
Amount at the end of 1795.....	304,749,464	11,922,986
In the year 1796 was added.....	41,303,699	1,850,373
Amount at the end of 1796.....	346,053,163	13,773,359
In the year 1797 was added.....	67,087,668	3,241,790
Amount at the end of 1797.....	413,140,831	17,015,149

Thus, then, we see, that the first four years and a half of PITT's war with the Jacobins, or Republicans of France, nearly doubled the Debt and the Interest, or (which is the same thing to the people), the *annual charge on account of Debt*, which, together with interest, includes management and Sinking fund allowance. Four years and a half of the Anti-Jacobin war nearly doubled these; and, according to the principles we have before laid down, in Letters VII and VIII, the bank notes would necessarily increase in the same proportion as the Debt and Interest increased; because, every quarter of a year, the *dividends* to be paid at the Bank, became greater and greater.

Before the Anti-Jacobin war began, the *dividends of a year*, amounted, as we see

above, to 9,669,435*l*. To obviate all pettifoggery cavil here, let me state, that this sum was not *wholly* dividends, or interest; but consisted, partly, of "*charges for management*," paid to the bank of England; and also of charges on "*account of the Sinking Fund*." But, as was observed before, this is of no consequence to the people, who pay the taxes, out of which the *whole* sum comes; and, I only make the distinction to avoid a cavilling charge of misrepresentation, or error. When, therefore, we speak of the amount of the *Interest* of the National Debt, let it be understood, that we include these charges; and that, by the word *Interest* is meant the *annual charge on account of the Debt*.

To resume, then; before the Anti-Jacobin war began; the dividends, or interest,

of one year amounted, as we have seen, to 9,669,435 pounds; and, before the nation got to the end of the fifth year of that war, a year's dividends, or interest, amounted to 17,015,149 pounds; not much short of double. The Bank therefore, having nearly twice as much to pay yearly in interest of the Debt; having, to speak in round numbers, 17 millions to pay, under this head, where it had but 9 millions to pay before the beginning of PITT's Anti-Jacobin War; having twice as much to issue on this great score as it had previous to the war, was, of course, compelled to increase the quantity of its *paper promises*, or the quantity of its *Gold and Silver coin*; because, as we have before seen (Letter VII, page 453), an increase in the number and amount of payments must necessarily demand an increase of the money, or medium, in which those payments are made; and, why this increase, at the Bank of England, would take place in *paper promises*, and not in *Gold and Silver coin*, we have seen in Letters VII, and VIII, where it was shown that an increase of Debt must produce an increase of paper-promises, or notes, when once a paper-system has begun.

"That the experience of the times, of which we are now speaking, perfectly corresponded with the principles here stated, we shall now see by adverting a little to the manner, in which the payments of interest at the Bank were formerly made."

It has before been observed, that, when the National Debt first began, the whole of the interest was paid in Gold and Silver, there being then no such thing as bank-notes, and *no such thing as a Bank*, in this country. It has also been observed, that, very shortly after the Debt came into existence, it produced its natural offspring, *a Bank*, which issued its *promissory notes*, and in which promissory notes the interest of the Debt was, in part, at least, paid. At first, it appears, that the Bank paid an interest upon its notes, or bills; but, this was soon left off; and, from that time, the bank notes, or bills, became part of the circulating medium of the country.

When the Stock owners, or Public Creditors, as they are sometimes called, went to the Bank to receive their dividends, or interest, they might have either bank notes, or Gold and Silver, according to their choice. Some persons chose the

coin, and some the paper. But, as the Debt increased, and, of course, the amount of the dividends, or interest, it was evident, from what has already been said, that the Bank would possess a less and less quantity of Gold and Silver in proportion to the quantity of its paper. And, further, the payments of interest having, as we have seen above, become nearly double in amount to what they were in 1793, previous to the Anti-Jacobin war, it is natural to suppose, that there would be double the number of Stock-holders, and, of course, *double the number of payments to make*. Therefore, as, at every payment, the receiver had his choice of paper or Gold and Silver coin, there were double the number of chances against the Bank; and, at any rate, as there were, as yet, no bank notes of an amount less than TEN POUNDS, there must necessarily be, upon every payment, an issue of Gold and Silver from the Bank, to the amount of every demand, or part of a demand, *falling short of ten pounds*.

This the Bank could bear before the Anti-Jacobin war; but, when that war had nearly doubled the Debt, the Interest, and the number of the payments, on account of Interest; when this increase had taken place, the Bank found it necessary, not only to augment the general quantity of its notes; it found it necessary not only to add to the total amount of its notes; that is to say, to put out a greater sum in notes, than it had out before the Anti-Jacobin war; but, it also found it necessary to put out some notes of a *lower amount* than it already had, in order to pay the parts of ten pounds, which we have just mentioned.

Hence came the FIVE POUND NOTES. And, you will perceive, Gentlemen, that causes precisely similar had formerly produced the FIFTEEN POUND NOTES and the TEN POUND Notes; namely, an increase of the National Debt, and, of course, an increase of the dividends, or interest; these being always paid at the Bank, after the establishment of the Bank Company.

Here let us stop for a little and look back at the MOTTO, or, rather, MOTTOs, to this Letter.

In the FIRST, the passage from BURKE, we have a picture of English Bank Paper

previous to the war; aye, to that very war, which that very picture and others in the same publication greatly tended to produce, and were, without, I believe, any bad motive, *intended* to produce. Look well at that picture, gentlemen. Look at the triumphant contrast there exhibited between the money of England and that of France, which latter country had then a paper-money. And, when you have viewed that picture in all its parts; when you have fully examined the contrast; then turn your eyes to what is *now* exhibited to the world: then see what English Bank Paper now is, and what in this regard, is the state of France, where all the paper-money has, long ago, been destroyed, and where there is no currency but that of Gold and Silver coin, part of which coin consists of English Guineas, those guineas the absence of which all men of sense and of public-spirit so sorely lament, and the practicability of causing the return of which is, as you will bear in mind, the chief object of our inquiries.

In the SECOND motto, the passage from PAINE, (the mortal antagonist of Burke as to every thing else) we have an opinion as to the consequences of the Bank having made 5 pound notes. We have a prediction as to the *inability* which it will produce in the Bank *to pay its higher notes*. This prediction was, it appears, written in March, 1796, and it was published in England in, or about, the month of June of that year; which was, as we shall see by and by, only about *nine months* before the *stoppage of gold and silver payments at the Bank* actually took place.

In the THIRD motto, the passage from the late LORD LIVERPOOL, we have the opinion, not only of the writer: himself, who, upon such a matter, is no very mean authority, but, as he asserts, of *many others* (doubtless, persons of distinction, as to rank, at least); we have an opinion, thus sanctioned, that the *increase of the paper-currency* was the *first and principal* cause of the Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank; and which opinion perfectly corresponds with that of PAINE, there being this distinction in the merits of the two writers, that Lord Liverpool only recorded what PAINE had foretold: the former was the historian, the latter the prophet; and, it is not a little curious, that Lord Liverpool, a clerk in whose office had written

under a feigned name, a sham life of PAINE, should become the recorder of the truth of PAINE's predictions, and that too in "*a Letter to the King*," in whose name the very work containing the predictions had been prosecuted as A LIBEL.

Here are three writers, all of whom of great understanding and experience, and the two former of abilities scarcely ever surpassed in any age or country, all opposed to each other, as to every other question; each one hating the other two, and each two hating the other one; yet all agreeing, as harmoniously as their bones would now agree, if they happened to be tumbled together; all agreeing as to these principles respecting paper-money.

Having now traced the increase of the Debt down to the putting forth of the 5 pound bank notes, we will rest here, and resume the subject in our next.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,
8th October, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"Newport (Isle of Wight,) Oct. 5th, 1810.—I hasten to inform you, that, since my last, a Coroner's Inquest has been held at the Barracks, on the body of the unfortunate man who was killed on Sunday evening. And the Coroner's verdict was *Wilful Murder* against persons *unknown*. The deceased, it appears, was *not in the least concerned in the affray*, but was quietly going into his barracks, as the fatal ball struck him in the neck. It does not appear that the guard were called upon to assist in quelling the disturbance; but that 150 ball cartridges were fired, is beyond a doubt. Since this unfortunate business, the four ball cartridges have been taken away from each individual, a very necessary precaution, for it cannot be good policy surely, for *privates who may intoxicate themselves at the canteen at their pleasure*, to have such things in their own power. This quarrel had began as long ago as Wednesday preceding the Sunday evening that this unfortunate event took place. The FOREIGNERS are now sent into the country to the outposts, where the inhabitants do not feel themselves very secure. For, if, being under the immediate eye of the commanding officer could not restrain their excesses, the result may be feared, when at a distance of eight or nine miles from head quarters, near cot-

"tagers who cannot know their wants, not understanding their language."—*MORNING CHRONICLE*, 8TH OCTOBER, 1810.

THE BRUNSWICKERS.—Look at the motto, English reader! Look at the motto! And also look back at the article in my last, at page 566, where the subject was first mentioned.—Yes, look at the motto, English reader, and especially the latter part of the motto; and, then, recollect what we were told by Sir Vicary Gibbs.—Another time, I will contrast the account of this transaction with Sir VICARY GIBBS'S assertions respecting the *exemplary behaviour* of the GERMAN SOLDIERS, and his appeal to the *inhabitants in the neighbourhood of their quarters* for the truth of those assertions. This I will do another time, when I have more room than I shall have to-day. At present, I shall make some remarks upon what is here laid before us.—It seems, then, and, if this account be true (for which, mind, I do not vouch) it is a fact, that these *foreigners*, these *Germans*, these *Brunswickers*, these *German Soldiers*, have **KILLED A MAN**; it seems that they have actually put an end to a man's life; actually murdered him, if this account be true, and, if it be not true, why is not the fact contradicted?—We are told also, that there were 150 ball cartridges actually fired. How came these men to have ball cartridges to the amount of 4 rounds a man? Is it the custom in our army, to leave 4 rounds, or even 1 round of ball cartridges in the hands of the soldiers? Is there any regiment in our service who ever had ball cartridges left in their hands, except when in actual service before the enemy, or employed to quell riots? I should like to have an answer to these questions, and that, too, as soon as possible. I have known something of English regiments, for many years, and I know that ball cartridges were things which were never put into the hands of the men, even upon guard, except under very particular circumstances, and that, in such cases, they were taken from the men the moment that particular duty was over, and counted back into the store with as much exactness as if they had been so many dollars, and, indeed, with much more exactness. The customs of the army must have changed very much, or the leaving of ball-cartridges in the hands of soldiers off duty, must be something *very singular*; and, at any rate, considering how fatal are the consequences, which may arise, and

which, if the above account be true, have arisen, from leaving these mortal weapons in the hands of soldiers, and especially of these Brunswickers and other foreigners, I trust, that an inquiry will be made into the matter.—It is not many months since the attention of the whole of this metropolis was turned to an inquiry, as to who was the murderer of a man, killed near the Tower. That was, however, a deed of much less atrocity than the present. The soldiers, who fired, upon that occasion, were *out on duty*, and, they had been very much galled and annoyed by some of the people. Still, there was a very general feeling of horror at the deed. It became matter of discussion in the Parliament. It was felt through the country. What, then! shall this infinitely worse deed, in the Isle of Wight, pass without notice?—Reader, English Reader! Know, and bear in mind, that this deed has been only once slightly alluded to by the *Courier* news-paper; and that, from first to last, it has not been so much as alluded to by the *Morning Post*; both of which papers are nearly half filled with those famous fabrications, called *intercepted letters*; both of which are continually telling us of the brutal conduct of soldiers to the people of some other countries; both of which are incessantly telling the abused public of the conduct of the foreign soldiers in the army of the Emperor of France.—What! are we told, that "*the inhabitants do not feel themselves very secure*," in consequence of having these German Brunswicker Soldiers sent into their neighbourhood? *The inhabitants do not feel themselves very secure!*—Now, if this be true (of which, of course, I can know nothing;) if this be true, what must the final consequence be? What must this lead to? If these people are wanted in England, it must be in case of *invasion*; and, if the inhabitants do not feel themselves very secure with these people near them now, how would they feel then?—The answer to these questions will suggest itself to every man; and I do most earnestly hope, that, when parliament meets, a full inquiry will be made into this matter; and, indeed, into the whole of the question relating to these Germans and Brunswickers; for, there is no foretelling how great consequences may proceed from an event like that above-mentioned; and, when those consequences come upon us, it is too late to exclaim: "Who would have thought it!"—If I

were animated by a desire of vengeance; if I were anxious to see *my* opinions verified, and to receive the unanimous applause of the country for my unavailing exertions; were this my wish, I should hold my tongue upon subjects of this sort; I should let the thing go on; I should do nothing to check its progress; I should carefully abstain from every thing that would be likely to put the German Soldiers and their friends upon their guard. And, I am not sure that I should not do this; I am by no means certain that I should not listen to my resentment, were I not impelled to speak by a still stronger feeling; were not my love for my country greater than my hatred of my enemies. I am not pretending to any extraordinary portion of patriotism. I love my country for the same reasons that other men do, whose means of happiness are inseparable from the country, and who have, besides, a proper sense of national honour, and feel their own honour wounded, when that of their country receives a blow.—I have always feared, and as far as I dared, have expressed my fears, of evils such as are now beginning to develope themselves; and, as I am seriously impressed with the opinion, that these evils are likely to *lead to others of a much greater magnitude*, I wish to see speedily taken such measures as shall prevent that dreaded consequence.—I again repeat, that I do not state any of the above facts as *true*. I give them as I find them in one of our great public prints; and, what I have said upon them is said with that reservation. And, again I say, that I have not seen either this article, or the former article upon the same subject, contradicted, or even noticed, by either of the ministerial prints; yet, if this story were false, it would be very necessary to contradict it; for, if it remain uncontradicted, the country, the world, and especially our *enemy*, who well knows how to estimate a fact of this sort, will assuredly believe it to be true.—Another reason for contradicting it, if false, is, that, if it remain uncontradicted, it may produce a feeling in our *native* army that may be attended with very fatal consequences; and, indeed, if true, it might, in this last mentioned respect, be rendered less mischievous by some explanation, some *official statement*, given of it. As it now is, it is calculated to produce the worst possible effect; and, therefore, I hope, that something will be done in the way either

of contradiction or explanation, and too, as soon as possible.

ROYAL GERMAN LEGION.—In my Register of the 19th of September I inserted the following article.—“On Thursday a Court-Martial commenced at Bexhill, for the trial of two privates of the 2nd battalion of the Royal German Legion, who deserted a few days ago, and took from the beach a large boat for the purpose of going out to the enemy. They were apprehended by a boatman off Dover.” *Times Newspaper*, Monday, 17th Sept. 1810.—Upon this I made some observations, to which I beg leave to refer the reader, page 394. In my last Number, at page 565, I made some further observations upon the subject, and expressed my surprise that the *Times* newspaper, from which the article had been taken, had not either contradicted it, or told its readers what had been done to the offenders. It had, however, escaped my notice, that this information had been given by the *Times*, on *Thursday* last, the day before I wrote my article, last referred to.—It was given in these words: “The two privates of the 2nd battalion of the ROYAL GERMAN LEGION who were lately tried by a Court Martial for having DESERTED in July last, WITH A VIEW OF GOING OVER TO THE ENEMY, have been found guilty of the charge; and sentenced to transportation for life.”—Well, then, if this statement be true; if this statement be true; if this statement be true, English reader, here we see it proved, that two of these GERMAN LEGION, these ROYAL GERMAN LEGION SOLDIERS did actually desert, and not only desert, but desert with a view of GOING OVER TO THE ENEMY!—This, as I observed before, is, by no means, the first desertions we have heard of in our army. Unfortunately those desertions are, by the accounts laid before parliament some time ago, proved to have been but too frequent. But, I repeat, that this is the first, the first instance that we have, or, at least, that I have heard of, wherein soldiers, in England, have deserted, with a view of “going over to the enemy.” No such attempt as this has ever been made, thank God, by the soldiers of our native army, who, I trust, will not imbibe this dangerous, this disgraceful, this miscreant-like infection. Our native soldiers have deserted sometimes, and very bad that is. It is a breach

of oath as well as of honour. But, they have never attempted to go over to the enemy as it is here distinctly asserted these Royal German Legion soldiers have. Going over to the enemy is *treason*; and, thank God, none of our native army have attempted the commission of such an offence.—What effect this *example* may have there is no telling. It is impossible to say how such an *example* may work; what thoughts it may put into the head of bold and adventurous men in our army; but, I trust, that there are very few of our native soldiers, who are so base as not to hold these miscreants in detestation, and who, of course, would not shun the act with a double degree of care, because it has been committed by them, and because to commit it would be to follow their disgraceful example.—As to the *punishment*, said to have been inflicted upon these traitorous miscreants, it is of little consequence, in my eyes, what becomes of them, so that they are not suffered to live in this kingdom; so that they are out of the kingdom, we need not care one straw what becomes of them. I do not, for my part, wish their sorry lives to be taken away. Let them live; but let them not live here; let them not live in my country.—Many people are asking what country the traitorous miscreants are to be transported to? But, for my part, I care not a farthing what country it is, so that it is to no country where they can betray us; where they can sell us; where they can again perjure themselves and attempt to go over to the enemy.—I wish the reader and the public, and, if I thought they would take my advice, I would recommend, to the ministers, to consider well of this matter. The worst effect, that can be produced by the attempt of these betraying miscreants, is, in the way of *example* to our own army. Great mischief may be done by it in the way of *encouraging the enemy*, who, as I said before, will not fail to note down the fact and to draw his conclusions accordingly, in which conclusions it would be foolish for us to suppose, that he would be very erroneous, seeing how right he has been in his reasonings with regard to other countries. But, still, as I am, and always have been, convinced, that we have nothing to fear so long as we ourselves remain sound, so am I convinced, that the greatest danger to be apprehended from this attempt of the Germans to go over to the enemy, is the *example* it may give to our native army, in which, if there should

be discontented men, there may be some amongst them found so bold and so wicked as to carry into execution what has now been merely attempted by these Germans; and, if our native soldiers were to venture upon the undertaking, it is to be feared, that one boat-man would not be able to bring back two of them.—This is the light, in which this attempt of the Germans appears to me most formidable; for, if, which God forbid, any number of our native troops were to make such an attempt, there is no guessing at the consequences.—For these reasons every means that can be made use of, ought to be made use of, to excite a horror of this offence, and to deter others from contemplating the commission of it. The name of the guilty persons should, in my opinion, be made known to the whole army. This will, most likely, be done, in the promulgation of the sentence of the court-martial by authority from the Horse Guards, accompanied with the king's decision with regard to it; and, in addition to this, every man, who has the conducting of a public print, ought to lend a hand to the government in exciting and fixing, in the public mind, a horror of the deed of these base, cowardly, and ungrateful miscreants.—Now, mind, all this is said hypothetically; it is said conditionally; it applies to two Germans only upon the presumption of what is asserted in the Times being true. If that account be false, all that I have said has no application; but, then, if it be false, the falsehood should be contradicted without loss of time.—Once more, English reader, let me press upon you a consideration of the conduct of the COURIER and MORNING POST news-papers, which, from first to last, have never published one single word upon this subject. Let me press this upon your attention. I beg you to reflect on what it indicates. I beg you to consider what can have been the cause of this silence. I beg you to consider what can have prevailed upon the conductors of these prints to keep so guarded a silence upon so very interesting a matter; a matter, in which the very existence of no small part of the people of England may possibly become involved. I beg to press this upon you. The times we live in are full of danger. They require all the energy, which the most ardent public-spirit can give. Those who have the controul of any part of the press, ought to regard it as a trust in their hands for the country's benefit; and, by those who

suppress a knowledge of acts like that above-noticed, that country is betrayed, and the traitor is not the less criminal because the law is insufficient for reaching his crime.

PORTUGAL.—In my last, at page 560, I noticed the report, which, on Friday last was in circulation, relative to a victory gained by Lord Talavera over Massena, which report was said (in the Morning Post) to have come directly from France by the American Envoy, Mr. Armstrong. This report was, the next day, proved to be false; and my only motive for mentioning it here, is, that the reader may view this instance; that he may bear in mind this attempt to deceive, to cajole, to cheat, the abused public. It was well known, that the falshood could not live for more than 24 hours; but, 24 hours was something. The falshood gave time for the invention of another; and that other would, of course, and has been, succeeded by another and another and another; and all this in the short space of 5 days.—The Dispatches, published in another part of this Number, will speak for themselves. They will shew what sort of a state things were in at Almeida, and what was the cause of the speedy surrender. But, what I wish the reader to pay particular attention to is, what General (I mean *Marshal*) Beresford says about the *traitors* in that fortress. Let us, in order to avoid a charge of *libel* against our friends, the Portuguese, take the Marshal's own words:—"With whatever regret it was we witnessed the unexpected fall of that place, uninformed as we then were of the cause, I think the circumstance related in the Governor's letter of the unfortunate loss of his entire ammunition, and the injury sustained by the town and works, and loss to the garrison by the effects of the explosion, will prove sufficiently the impracticability of a protracted defence; and I regret to say the conduct of the Lieutenant-Governor (Tenente Rey) Francisco B. da Costa e Almeida, and of Major commanding the Artillery, *Fornato Joze Barreros*, increased the difficulties occasioned by the explosion. The former had until the commencement of the enemy's fire acted with much zeal and propriety, but on that commencing *shut himself up in bomb-proofs*; and after the explosion, from personal fear and to avoid any further firing, took advantage of the consternation and confusion

"which must be ever attendant in such a case, to counteract the Governor's attempt to hold out at least some short time longer. The Major of Artillery, it appears, had acted well during the siege, but after the explosion appears to have added treachery to cowardice, and to gain favour with the enemy, communicated to him the real state of the garrison, and that it had no ammunition whatever left, which caused Marshal Massena to refuse the terms demanded by the Governor."—

I do not think that any remarks upon this are necessary. The commentary will, in all likelihood, be a very plain-speaking one, and will not be long, perhaps, before it reaches even the dull ears of the readers of the Morning Post; for, if it come as I think it will, it will be heard.—So, then, here is treason at LISBON and at ALMEIDA; here is treason in the Capital and treason on the Frontier; treason in the neighbourhood of the enemy and treason at the point of embarkation. And, is it come to this? Is this the result of all that we have been told about the fidelity of our allies and their zeal in our cause? Is it come to this, after those, who doubted of the disposition of the Portuguese have been called *admirers* of Buonaparté and *rank traitors* to England? Would it not, reader, have been full as well, if the advice of the Morning Chronicle had been taken as to abuse the writer for giving that advice?—I beg the reader to look now at the situation of Portugal, and of our army in it. I beg him, then to look back at what I have, from time to time, extracted from the MORNING POST and the COURIER upon the subject; and, when he has so done, to consider, whether, if he be one of those persons, who contribute towards the existence of those prints, the denunciation of Cowper does not apply to him.

"Hear the just Law, the Judgment of the Skies:
"He that hates Truth, shall be the Dupe of Lies:
"And he that will be cheated to the last,
"Delusion strong as Hell shall bind him fast."

COWPER.

We need not expect, that those, who have deceived the credulous people hitherto, will discontinue their deceptions, because events, not to be disguised, have now detected and exposed them. This operation they have undergone before; and they are, without a blush, ready to undergo it again. If they had any sense of shame; if that feeling had any thing to do with their nature, or, if it had not been completely worn out of them by the con-

timual rubbings of CORRUPTION, they would not be fit for their calling. They will persevere; but, if what I hear of their success be true, their perseverance will, at no very distant day, be attended with an effect very honourable to the public.—I shall offer no conjectures of mine, relative to Viscount Talavera and his army. These writers say, that every thing promises fairly.—“Our accounts (says the Morning Post of yesterday) by the last conveyance are indeed of THE MOST ENCOURAGING DESCRIPTION. They state as follows:—Lord Wellington was accompanied in his late movements by nearly the whole population of the country, who destroyed such part of their property as they were unable to remove; so that Massena, by advancing in an exhausted country, must add to the embarrassments he previously laboured under from the insufficiency of his supplies. Marshal Beresford had, on the 22d ult. arrived at Serra de Besteiros, at the Northern extremity of the Alcoba Mountains, and by means of the divisions of Generals Traut and Spencer, formed a junction with Lord Wellington, who, in addition to the advantage of a strong mountainous position, has concentrated his forces, brought the Portuguese army within the range of his operations, and drawn nearer to his main resources, while the enemy gets further from his supplies, is compelled to divide his forces, and is exposed to excursions from the Estrella and Alcoba Mountains.”—Thus, on Monday last, the accounts of nearly the whole population accompanying Lord Talavera and destroying all that part of their property, which they could not remove, were of the most encouraging description. To day the accounts (same print) go a little further. Another battle is conjured up; another victory.—“It was very generally reported in the course of the evening, that an account had been received of a battle having been fought on the Mondego, in which the enemy were defeated with the loss of 10,000 men, while that of the British did not amount, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to more than 4,000;—it was added that Lord Wellington himself was slightly wounded. That a battle has taken place, ere this, we see little or no reason to doubt; but of the result, we repeat, no official advice had arrived at a late hour last night. At the date of the accounts received by the Tonnant, the hostile armies were within five leagues

of each other; Massena’s force was said to amount to between 70 and 80,000; that of Lord Wellington to between 50 and 60,000. Their respective positions, as described in our Paper of yesterday, were such, that a speedy and desperate battle appeared inevitable, with the result of which it is probable we shall be made acquainted before our next Paper goes to press.”—This assertion about the general report is wholly false. No such report was abroad last evening; and the sole intention of the falsehood is to amuse the very foolish part of this print’s very foolish readers for one half-day.—The world never before saw, and never thought of, such an use of the press as it is now put to in England.—Is it not shameful; is it not scandalous; is it not to the last degree degrading to us, that such publications meet with support? Our country has suffered much from many causes; but, my sincere belief is, that, of all these causes, the most powerful has been the shameless prostitution of the press.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
October 9, 1810.

IRELAND.

Extract from the Dublin Evening Herald, of 28 Sept. relative to the conduct of some of the PROTESTANT YEOMANRY, in opposition to the Catholics.

Sir,—I have read with pleasure the account of the Meeting held in your city, for the purpose of taking into consideration the propriety of petitioning Parliament for the repeal of the Union, (an act which has produced the most ruinous consequences to Ireland) in which the various religious sects joined hand in hand, and all party distinction seemed lost in the more worthy feeling of endeavouring to alleviate the distresses of their countrymen. Very different, indeed, is the spirit which seems to actuate many who wear the insignia of loyalty in this part of the country, who exult in the diabolical work of sowing the seeds of discord among their brethren, as the following plain narrative will shew.—On the 12th inst. Major Wallace attended at Banford green, the seat of Robt. Jaffray Nicholson, esq. for the purpose of inspecting various corps of yeomen, viz. Warrington Cavalry, commanded by John Lushington Reilly, esq.

Bann Infantry, commanded by Robert Jaffray Nicholson, esq. and the Scarvagh Infantry, commanded by Wm. E. Reilly, esq.—The Scarvagh Infantry (whose Captain not attending) were commanded by Lieut. Shegog, arrived on the ground first; shortly after the Bann Infantry made their appearance, and immediately shewed by their hesitating manner, and loud murmurs, that they were dissatisfied. On being questioned as to the cause of their dissatisfaction, they declared, they would not be inspected along with the Scarvagh Infantry, because there were six Roman Catholics belonging to that corps. Their Captain harangued them, and deprecated in strong language the fomenting of religious animosities; he ended by saying, he had come to a resolution, "that any one of them who refused to be inspected with the Scarvagh infantry, might lay down their arms;" immediately the whole threw down their muskets, and the greater part their belts; the whole of the Scarvagh Infantry, with the exception of the six Catholics, seeing what the others had done, ran over to them huzzaing; the Warrington Cavalry, as if seized with a similar mania, galloped from their Officers and joined the other two corps, while the six Catholics, left to themselves and fearful of unpleasant consequences from the intolerant spirit of their fellow soldiers, retired from the field in which their presence had caused so much confusion.—John Lushington Reilly, esq. in a strong and energetic speech to his corps, declared, "he had been in Germany, Holland, &c. in a number of engagements, and never before knew British subjects refuse to obey their officers; that he had seen Protestant and Catholic fight side by side, and nobly mingle their blood in the field of honour; that he had never seen any difference made on account of religious profession, nor ever heard of it until he witnessed it in this unhappy country, and concluded by saying, that men who would conduct themselves as they had done, he could have nothing farther to do with," on which they dismounted and laid down their arms, and dispersed in the utmost confusion.—Alas! Sir, are these the glorious defenders of their Country? are these the men to whom we are to look for succour in the hour of danger? and at a time which so loudly calls for unanimity, and the extinction of every religious prejudice—at a time when the great Tyrant is exerting his energies to endeavour

to overwhelm us, and when (which God avert) we do not know the hour that we shall be called upon to encounter him, for our very existence, on our own shores—when every arm capable of wielding a sword is required for our country's defence, that the torch of religious discord should be again enkindled, and the intolerance of religious persecution persisted in against a numerous, loyal, peaceable, brave, and unoffending people, argues not more wickedness, than stultified blindness.—I am, Sir, yours, &c. BENEVOLE.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Dispatches from Lord Viscount Talavera, respecting the fall of Almeida. Published by the Government in London. 6th Oct. 1810.*

A dispatch, of which the following is a copy, was received, on the 4th instant, at the Earl of Liverpool's Office, addressed to his Lordship by Lieutenant-General Viscount Wellington. K. B. dated Gouvea, 5th September, 1810.

GOUVEA, SEPT. 5, 1810.

My Lord;—I inclose a letter from Colonel Cox, late Governor of Almeida, to Marshal Beresford, containing a copy of the capitulation of Almeida, and an account of the circumstances which occasioned the early surrender of that place.—It was impossible to expect that Colonel Cox should continue the defence of the place after the unfortunate occurrence which he mentions; and I am happy to add, that all the accounts which I have received from officers and soldiers of the militia, who have come into the interior under the capitulation, concur in applauding the conduct of the Governor throughout the siege, and in the unfortunate situation in which he was placed towards its close. It is certain that till the explosion of the magazine of the place, the garrison had sustained but little loss, and were in the highest spirits, and, encouraged by the example of the Governor, and the confidence they had in him, were determined to hold out till the last moment.—I have the honour to inclose the copy of a letter, which I received from Marshal Beresford, in which he inclosed the letter from Colonel Cox; to which I have to add, that the two officers mentioned in that letter, the Tenente del Rey, and the Major of the Artillery, have entered the service of France, and that the latter has been promoted to the rank of

colonel. I am also informed that when sent out by the Governor into the enemy's lines to negotiate the capitulation; and after he had informed the enemy of the unfortunate situation of the garrison, he did not return to the place when hostilities recommenced; but continued in the enemy's lines. I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLINGTON.

Extract of a Letter from Marshal Beresford to Viscount Wellington, dated Moinento da Serra, 4th September, 1810.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a letter I have received from Colonel Cox, late Governor of Almeida, and a copy of the capitulation of that place.—With whatever regret it was witnessed the unexpected fall of that place, uninformed as we then were of the cause, I think the circumstance related in the Governor's letter of the unfortunate loss of his entire ammunition, and the injury sustained by the town and works, and loss to the garrison by the effects of the explosion, will prove sufficiently the impracticability of a protracted defence; and I regret to say the conduct of the Lieutenant Governor (Tenente Rey) Francisco Bernardo da Costa e Almeida, and of Major, commanding the Artillery, Fortunato Joze Barveros, increased the difficulties occasioned by the explosion. The former had until the commencement of the enemy's fire acted with much zeal and propriety, but on that commencing shut himself up in bomb-proofs; and after the explosion, from personal fear and to avoid any further firing, took advantage of the consternation and confusion which must be ever attendant in such a case, to counteract the Governor's attempt to hold out at least some short time longer. The Major of Artillery, it appears, had acted well during the siege, but after the explosion appears to have added treachery to cowardice, and to gain favour with the enemy, communicated to him the real state of the garrison, and that it had no ammunition whatever left, which caused Marshal Massena to refuse the terms demanded by the Governor.—Until the unfortunate accident of the explosion of the magazine, the garrison appears to have been in the highest spirits, and in the best possible disposition and resolution to defend the town, and which they unanimously state their Governor's conduct inspired them with, as every officer and man gives the highest applause to his unre-

mitting zeal and activity, encouraging all by his own example.—Your Lordship will see that it was of very little consequence what capitulation the garrison had got, as it is obvious the enemy would not have observed it, were it was his interest to break it, and which will be witnessed by his having detained by force, and contrary to the terms of the capitulation, seven officers and two hundred men from each of the three regiments of militia that were in the garrison, and this with the object of forming them into a pioneer corps.—The officers and soldiers of the militia regiments, to a man, continued to refuse to enter voluntarily into the service of the enemy, and the seven officers and two hundred men of each regiment were detained forcibly. Such are the circumstances which have come to my knowledge of the conduct of the garrison of Almeida, and which I think it necessary to communicate to your Lordship.

Aldea del Obispo, Aug. 30, 1810.

Sir;—The painful task has fallen to my lot of acquainting your Excellency, that I was reduced to the necessity of surrendering the fortress of Almeida, which I had the honour to command, on the 27th instant, at ten o'clock at night, in consequence of the unfortunate explosion of the great magazine of powder in the Castle, and the small magazines contiguous to it, by which dreadful accident I was deprived of the whole of my artillery and musket ammunition, with the exception of a few made-up cartridges which remained in some of the expence magazines on the ramparts, and thirty-nine barrels of powder which were deposited in the laboratory. — Upwards of half of the detachment of artillery, and a great number of infantry soldiers, besides several of the inhabitants, were destroyed by the effect of this terrible explosion. Many of the guns were dismounted upon the ramparts, the works were materially injured, and a general dismay spread amongst the troops and inhabitants of the place.—In this distressing situation I received a letter from the Commander in Chief of the French army of Portugal, proposing to me that I should surrender the place to the French army under his command upon honourable terms, which, he said, he was ready to grant; I answered, that I wished to know the terms which he proposed; upon which the Articles, of which I have the honour to send your Excellency a copy,

were transmitted to me, and which, after using every effort in my power to obtain more favourable terms, I accepted, with an exception in favour of the militia regiments. I hope my conduct on this trying occasion will meet your Excellency's approbation, and that I shall remain justified by the circumstances in the eyes of my country.—The *Prince of Essling* has been good enough to allow me to return to England on my parole, accompanied by Major Hewitt and Captain Foley, of the 91th regiment, and we are now on our way to France, to embark from thence for a British port. I have the honour to be, &c.

W. Cox.

SWEDEN.—*Act of Election of the Prince of Ponte Corvo (Gen. Bernadotte) to be Crown Prince. Dated at Stockholm. Sept. 1, 1810.*

We, the undersigned, States-General of the kingdom of Sweden, Counts, Barons, Bishops, Representatives of the Nobility, Clergy, Burghers, and Peasants, assembled in the Extraordinary Diet at Orebro, make known, that his Royal Highness Prince Charles Augustus of Schleswig Holstein Augustenburg, elected Prince Royal of Sweden, of the Goths and Vandals, being deceased without heirs male, and judging that it is our duty to prevent and to avert the danger to the independence and tranquillity of the kingdom, as well as to the rights and privileges of its inhabitants, which might result from a vacancy of the throne, and a consequent election: exercising, at the same time, the power which is reserved to us by the ninety-fourth Article of the Constitution of the 6th of June, 1809, of electing in such case a new dynasty;—for these reasons, and considering that the High and Mighty Prince and Lord Jean Baptiste Jule Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, is endowed with virtues and qualities which give us the well-founded hope of enjoying under the reign of that Prince, a good administration and prosperity, the fruits of a legal, energetic, and beneficent Government: We, the States-General of Sweden, upon the proposition of our august king now reigning, under condition that the said Prince and Lord the Prince of Ponte Corvo, have before his arrival on the Swedish territory embraced the Evangelical Lutheran Religion, and signed the conditions drawn up by us, have voluntarily elected by free and unanimous

suffrage, for ourselves and our descendants, the High and Mighty Prince Jean Baptiste Jule Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, to the dignity of Prince Royal of Sweden, to reign in Sweden and its dependencies after the decease of our present august Sovereign (whose days may the Almighty prolong!) to be crowned King of Sweden, and receive the oath of fidelity; in short, to govern the kingdom according to the literal sense of the Constitution of the 6th of June, 1809, and of the other laws in force, as well fundamental as general and special, the whole conformable to the answers which his Royal Highness shall now give, and afterwards at his accession to the throne. We also confer on the legitimate male descendants of his Royal Highness, the right of filling the throne of Sweden, in the order and manner which are literally prescribed in the law of succession which we have established.—We, the States-General of Sweden, have, in consequence, confirmed the present Act of Election, by the signature of our names, and affixing our seals.—Done at Orebro, this 21st of August, in the year of the Christian Era 1810.

AMERICA.—*Dispatch from the Honourable David Erskine to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Washington, 3d of December, 1808. (Continued from p. 514.)*

He went also into all the arguments upon that subject, which are detailed in his correspondences with the American Ministers in London and Paris, as published in the documents referred to in the President's Message; but which I do not now repeat, as my object is merely to inform you of the result of his observations, which was, that as the world must be convinced that America had in vain taken all the means in her power to obtain from Great Britain and France a just attention to her rights as a neutral Power, by representations and remonstrances, that she would be fully justified in having recourse to hostilities with either Belligerent, and that she only hesitated to do so, from the difficulty of contending with both; but that she must be driven even to endeavour to maintain her rights against the two greatest Powers in the world, unless either of them should relax their restrictions upon neutral commerce, in which case the United States would at once side with that Power against the other which might continue its aggressions.—Mr. Madison

observed to me, that it must be evident that the United States would enter upon measures of hostility with great reluctance, as he acknowledged that they are not at all prepared for war, much less with a Power so irresistibly strong as Great Britain, and that nothing would be thought to be too great a sacrifice to the preservation of peace, except their independence and their honour. He said, he did not believe that any Americans would be found willing to submit to (what he termed) the encroachments upon the liberty of the rights of the United States, by the Belligerents, and therefore the alternatives were Embargo or War. He confessed that the people of this country were beginning to think the former alternative too passive, and would, perhaps, soon prefer the latter, as even less injurious to the interests, and more congenial with the spirit of a free people.—He declared to me, that every opinion on which he ascertained respecting the best interests of his country, led him to wish that a good understanding should take place between Great Britain and the United States, and that he thought that the obvious advantages which would thereby result to both countries were a sufficient pledge of the sincerity of his sentiments.—The reasons which induce me to believe that the views and determinations of this Government, as described to me by Mr. Madison, are their real sentiments, and that they will pursue the course of conduct which they have marked out, arise from a mature consideration of the actual state of the affairs of this country, the particular situation of the Government and ruling party, and from certain private but important communications which have been made to me by some of the Members of the Administration, who are sincerely desirous of a conciliation with Great Britain.—It is evident from every thing which has lately taken place in this country, that the people at large are desirous of having the Embargo removed; but it is also to be collected from the result of the elections throughout the United States, that the present ruling party have a decided majority of the people with them; and as they have pledged themselves not to repeal it, while the restrictions upon their neutral rights continue in force, by both Belligerents, without substituting war measures, and as they themselves acknowledge that the ultimate and only effectual mode of resisting such warfare, if

persisted in, is war,' and 'that a permanent suspension of commerce would not properly be resistance, but submission;'' I cannot therefore conceive that it would be possible for them to retract their declarations; and indeed they would not have the power of continuing the Embargo more than six months, and of course, therefore, they must substitute war measures when it should be withdrawn, unless they were to abandon all the principles they have laid down, and to change all the resolutions which they have so unequivocally expressed.—It is true that they might possibly do so, if they found themselves pressed by the number and strength of their opponents, or by a change in the opinions of their majority amongst the people; but it is plain from the decision in the House of Representatives in Congress, upon the resolutions proposed by the Committee appointed to consider the subject of their foreign relations, which were carried by a majority of eighty-four to twenty-one, that they have not lost any ground in the present Congress; and the result of the elections for Members of Congress proves, that although they have lost some votes in the Eastern States, that they will have a great majority out of the whole number of the next Congress.—For these reasons I conclude that the Government party could carry along with them the support of the people in the measures which they might resolve to take; and I have already explained, why I believe they will adopt the course of conduct which I have described in the foregoing part of this dispatch, arising out of the state of the country and their own particular situation, and I will therefore proceed to explain my private reasons for feeling confirmed in their opinions, and will have the honour of laying before you some important communications which were made to me by some of the Members of this Government, unofficially, but with a desire that they might produce a favourable effect towards a conciliation with Great Britain. I beg leave to refer you to my next number, in which they are detailed.—I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient humble servant,

D. M. ERSKINE.

Dispatch from the Hon. David Erskine to Mr. Sec. Canning, dated Washington, 4th Dec. 1808.

Sir;—In the course of several private

interviews which I had with Mr. Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, and with Mr. Smith, the Secretary of the Navy, I have collected from them that their sentiments coincide with those of Mr. Madison, which I have detailed at some length in the preceding number of my dispatches, respecting the proper course of conduct which ought to be pursued by the United States, in their present situation, although they had differed as to the propriety of laying on the Embargo, as a measure of defence, and had thought that it would be better to have resorted to measures of a more decided nature at first, but that now they had no other means left but to continue it for a short time longer; and then in the event of no change taking place in the conduct of the Belligerents towards the United States, to endeavour to assert their rights against both Powers; but that if either should relax in their aggressions, they said they would vote for taking part with that one against the other which should continue its aggressions.—Mr. Gallatin remarked to me, that the resolutions which were proposed by the Committee of Foreign Relations in their report to the House of Representatives, and which had already passed in the Committee of the whole House, and would perhaps soon pass into a law, seemed to him to remove two very important grounds of difference with Great Britain, viz. the Non-important Act, as applicable to her alone, and the President's Proclamation, whereby the ships of Great Britain were excluded from the ports of the United States, while those of France were permitted to enter; but now, by the Non-intercourse law, both Powers were placed on the same footing. He did not pretend to say that this measure had been taken from any motives of concession to Great Britain; but, as in fact those consequences followed, he conceived they might be considered as removing the two great obstacles to a conciliation. This he wished might be the case, as he intimated to me that such steps were about to be taken by Congress upon another very important subject of the differences between the two countries, as might have a further effect in leading to a favourable adjustment of them. He informed me, that a law was about to be proposed by Congress, and which he believed would pass, to interdict all American vessels from receiving on board any foreign seamen, under heavy penalties or forfeitures, and that already

the ships of war of the United States had been ordered not to receive any, and to discharge such as were at that time on board. This subject is also alluded to by Mr. Giles, the Senator, in his speech, who is high in the confidence of the Government, and, it is said, is to be Mr. Madison's Secretary of State. Mr. Gallatin also said, that he knew that it was intended by the United States to abandon the attempt to carry on a trade with the colonies of the Belligerents in time of war which was not allowed in time of peace, and to trust to the being permitted by the French to carry on such trade in peace so as to entitle them to a continuance of it in time of war.—In this manner, he observed, all the points of difference between Great Britain and the United States might be smoothed away (~~was~~ his expression), and that the United States would be willing to put the intercourse with Great Britain upon a perfect footing of reciprocity, and would either consent to the arrangement that the ships of both nations should pay the same duties reciprocally, or place each other simply upon the footing of the most favoured nation.—I have no doubt that these communications were made with a sincere desire that they might produce the effect of conciliation, because it is well known that Mr. Gallatin has long thought that the restrictive and jealous system of non-important laws, extra duties, and other modes of checking a free trade with Great Britain, have been erroneous, and highly injurious to the interests of America. He informed me, distinctly, that he had always entertained that opinion, and that he had uniformly endeavoured to persuade the President to place the conduct of Great Britain and France towards the United States in a fair light before the public. He seemed to check himself at the moment he was speaking upon that subject, and I could not get him to express himself more distinctly; but I could clearly collect from his manner, and from some slight insinuations, that he thought the President had acted with partiality towards France: for he turned the conversation immediately upon the character of Mr. Madison, and said that he could not be accused of having such a bias towards France; and remarked that Mr. Madison was known to be an admirer of the British constitution, to be generally well disposed towards the nation, and to be entirely free from any enmity to its general prosperity.

He appealed to me, whether I had not observed that he frequently spoke with approbation of its institutions, its energy and spirit, and that, he was thoroughly well versed in its history, literature, and arts.—These observations he made at that time for the purpose of contrasting the sentiments of Mr. Madison with those of the President, as he knew that I must have observed that Mr. Jefferson never spoke with approbation of any thing that was British, and always took up French topics in his conversation, and always praised the people and country of France, and never lost an opportunity of shewing his dislike to Great Britain.—At the close of my interview with Mr. Gallatin, he said, in a familiar way, “You see, Sir, we could settle a treaty in my private room in two hours, which might perhaps be found to be as lasting as if it was bound up in all the formalities of a regular system; and might be found as reciprocally useful as a treaty consisting of twenty-four articles, in which the intricate points of intercourse might be in vain attempted to be reconciled to the opposite, and perhaps, jealous views of self-interest of the respective countries.”—I have taken the liberty of detailing to you the substance of this unofficial conversation with Mr. Gallatin, in order to explain to you the grounds upon which I have formed my opinion that the Members of the present Government, who are expected will belong also to the next, would be desirous of settling the differences of the United States with Great Britain, to enable them to extricate the country and themselves from the difficulties in which they are involved; for it is now, I believe, determined that Mr. Gallatin will accept his present office under Mr. Madison, which was at one time doubted. The character of Mr. Gallatin must be well known to you to be held in the greatest respect in this country for his unrivalled talents as a Financier and as a Statesman. There cannot, I think, be any reasonable doubt entertained that he is heartily opposed to French aggrandizement, and to the usurpations of Buonaparté. He was an enthusiast in favour of the French revolution, in the early period of it, but has long since abandoned the favourable opinions he had entertained respecting it, and has viewed the progress of France towards universal dominion with jealousy and re-

gret. How far the good-will of this Government and Country towards Great Britain may be worth, in the estimation of his Majesty's Government, the sacrifice of the Orders in Council, and of the impression which they might be expected to make on France, it would be presumptuous in me to venture to calculate; but I am thoroughly persuaded, that at that price it might be obtained—I have endeavoured, by the most strict and diligent enquiries into the views and strength of the federal party, to ascertain to what extent they would be willing and able to resist the measures of the party in power, and how far they could carry the opinions of this country along with them in their attempts to remove the Embargo, without recurring to hostilities against both Great Britain and France.—Upon a mature consideration of this subject I am persuaded, that great as the desire is which generally prevails for the removal of the Embargo, that the Federalists would not venture to recommend that it should be withdrawn, without proposing some measures of greater energy as a substitute. Some have indeed hinted at the propriety of at once declaring war against France; but few, however, of those who have been most clamorous against the Embargo, have yet offered their opinions, as to what course ought to be pursued, although all have declared against the submission to the restrictions upon their neutral rights.—When the small number of those who have pointed out the propriety of going to war with France alone, is considered, even of the Federal party, I cannot believe that such a measure would succeed.—All the leaders of the Democratic party in Congress and out of it declare that they only propose the continuance of the Embargo for a short time; and that if the voice of the people at large is for more active resistance, that they should be willing and ready to put forth the strength of the country for that purpose. These declarations are to be found in the speeches, some printed copies of which I have sent herewith; you will find, however, that in some of them a great stress is still laid upon the effects to be expected from the Embargo in coercing the Belligerents, particularly Great Britain, to relax in her restrictions, from the distress and inconvenience which is likely to be procured by the want of the produce of this country,

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"A FRENCH OFFICER ON THE STAFF, and HIGH IN THE CONFIDENCE OF Sir JOHN STUART, is reported to have been detected in a correspondence with MERAT. It is said that he made regular communications of the force, positions, and purposes of the army in Sicily, and afforded such intelligence as might have been fatal to our interests in that Island, had not the activity and gallantry of our cruisers more than counteracted his treason. He has, we hear, been ordered home for trial. We are ever willing to admire and reward merit, without suffering our estimation of it to be narrowed by consideration as to the country which gave the possessor birth, but we have, at the same time, had too frequent occasion to lament that indigenous talent has been left to pine unregarded, while foreigners of less deserving have been obtruded into situations to betray us."—MORNING POST, News-Paper, 6th October, 1810.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

FOREIGNERS ON THE STAFF.—Look at the Motto, English reader! Look at the Motto! And, when you have looked attentively at it, it will be quite unnecessary for me to remind you of what I have so often said upon the subject; or to point out to you, that, upon a recent memorable occasion, I expressly complained of Foreign Officers being employed on the Staff; that is to say, being entrusted with the command of parts of the army, or being so situated as to be able to betray us to the enemy. This observation of mine was called a *fresh calumny*; but that appellation did not mar the truth of what I said, nor will it at all tend to prevent consequences, such as are above-described and related, and of which we have not, I fear, yet seen but a small part.—All the Daily News-Papers have published the above article as far down as the word "*Trium*;" but the corollary I find only in the Morning Post, which corollary contains an *opinion*, from which I dissent.—The writer says, that "he is ever willing to admire and reward merit, without suffering his estimation of it to be narrowed by considerations as to the country which gave the possessor birth."—This, at first sight, appears to be a sentiment, dictated by liberality and justice, and to contain nothing more than what they demand; though one cannot help, even here, to notice how widely it differs from the general practice of this writer, who abuses, without mercy, all those who do not join him in asserting that the "*Corsican Monster*" is a "*fool*" as well as a "*miscreant*."—But, there is a fallacy in this sentiment, or, rather in the mode of stating the case, bearing, as it does, allusion to the fact before recorded. Who ever objected to a man on account of his birth merely? Who but a fool

or a knave, or, perhaps, both at once, ever rested his objections to foreigners upon this ground? Who ever objected to a man's being employed in army or navy, or in any department of the state, merely because he happened to be born out of the kingdom? I have a son, for instance, who was born in Pennsylvania; and, though God forbid he should ever be exposed to the like, would it not be the height of folly as well as of injustice to reject him as a servant of the public, merely because he drew his first breath in the American States?—It is a fallacy to argue as if any of us, who dislike the employment of foreigners in our army, founded that dislike upon the mere circumstance of place of birth. Our dislike has a very different foundation. It is founded in reason and experience. It is, indeed, founded in human nature.—It is not because a man has been born in another country, but because he has lived there; because he has been brought up and educated there; because his prejudices are on that side; because his kindred are there; because there is the grave of his fathers, there are the objects of his early and dearest attachments; because there, in nine cases out of ten, are his wife and children; and because there is his patrimony, and all his real property, if he has any, for none can he hold here, I believe, except by virtue of special act of parliament.—These are the reasons, why we object to the employing of Foreigners in our army, and especially to the placing of them in situations of profit and trust; and these, doubtless, were the reasons for the exclusion of them, which was so carefully provided for in that great Constitution Law, the ACT OF SETTLEMENT. This Act was passed in the 12th year of the reign of William III, at a time when it was foreseen, that the PRINCESS ANNE, who was afterwards the famous Queen of England, would

have no children. It provided for the succession of the present family, in that case; and, it laid down the *limitations and conditions*, upon which the crown should go to that family. It is entitled "An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown, and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject." One of the clauses in this Act is as follows: "That, after the said limitation shall take effect as aforesaid, no person born out of the kingdoms of *England, Scotland, or Ireland*, or dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized, or made a denizen, except such as are born of *English* parents), shall be capable to be of the Privy Council, or a Member of either House of Parliament, or to enjoy any office, or place of trust, either *civil or military*, or to have any grants of lands, tenements, or hereditaments from the crown; to himself, or to any others in trust for him."—This was the Act of Parliament, by which the people of this kingdom, settled the crown upon the present family; and this Act is, except inasmuch as it has been suspended by the acts permitting the king to hire, or enlist, certain corps of foreigners, still in full force, as I trust it always will be.—You see how careful our ancestors were to guard against the putting of power into the hands of foreigners, who are here excluded from *offices and places of trust, either civil or military*, even after they may have been naturalized by special acts of parliament. But, those, who made this law, did not proceed upon the notion of birth. Their objection was not grounded upon that circumstance; for, if the party were of *English parents* he might become capable of office or trust, upon this supposition, doubtless, that, being of *English parents*, his attachments would be *English* and not *foreign*.—Goldsmith has a verse, in which he says, that a man's "*last, best country, ever is at home.*" This is a feeling belonging to our nature. It is what nothing living can shake off; and, to suppose that a man has divested himself of it, is to suppose him to have divested himself of his nature, leaving out of the question all the ties of early friendship and love and scenes of delight, and the ties of more advanced age, those of wife, children, and property.—And, to weigh against all these, what are the *motives*, which we can fairly suppose to actuate a foreigner? *Attachment to his former sovereign*, whom he still regards as such; and a *desire to inflict vengeance* on those in his

own country, from whom he has suffered injury, and, perhaps, expulsion. These motives, especially the latter, will, doubtless, have great weight, in some minds. But, I believe, it will still be found, that these are of inferior weight to the motives on the other side. I am by no means disposed to under-rate the power of a vindictive feeling towards domestic oppressors; for, we have, of late years, seen instances enough of the effect of that power, which, indeed, has exhibited itself in the cordial reception of the French in so many states upon the continent. But, with time, and especially with the increasing *improbability* of obtaining vengeance, this stimulus becomes weak; and, in the mean while, the immediate object of the hostile feeling has ceased to exist, or has changed places; the oppressor, where oppression is still going on, is not the same. All is changed but the nature of man, which still bids him love the name and fame of his native country.—There are, indeed, men, who are said to retain all their love for their native country, while they fight most bloodily for others; and the *Swiss* are cited as a complete instance; for, they are said to be *home-sick* once in a time, while it is notorious, that they were *hired out in whole regiments* to foreign states, by whom it sometimes happened, that they were brought into the field to *fight against one another*. But, if governments were not to be defended without such means as these, and which, in my view of things, are as disgraceful to human nature as any thing that can be conceived; if the governments of the continent were not to be kept up without such means, we may certainly be allowed to feel, on that account, the less regret for their fall.—As to this case of the *Swiss*, however, it was not *against their own country, or its government*, that they were hired to fight. Their governments took care to keep at *peace* in order that the youth of the country might be let out to carry on the work of *war* elsewhere. In fact, the *Swiss* were hired as guards to those governments, which thought it safer to trust to foreigners than to natives; and the use that they were finally put to by the old government of France clearly shewed for what they were intended, at the same time that it shewed the folly of the intention; it shewed, that, while the people were in a quiet state, a handful of *Swiss* were sufficient to keep hundreds of thousands of the people in awe, but that when the latter were once roused, the *Swiss*

were "as the dew-drops upon the lion's mane."—As to what this writer of the *Morning Post* says about the preference given to foreign officers, in our military service, there may be some grounds for the remark, for aught I know. He tells us that native talents are neglected, while inferior talent in foreign officers is patronized and cherished. If this be true, it is very well worthy of reprobation; but, I do not know that it is; and, even if I did know it to be the case, I should think much less of it, than I think of the general objection. This complaint cannot, I should think, be grounded to any very great extent. The question of mere preference is, at any rate, one of very little consequence, compared with the general question; of no more consequence, indeed, than the well-being of an individual is when compared to the safety of a nation.—As to the particular person, who is said to have acted the part of a traitor, upon this occasion, we are not told his name, which, however, we ought to be told; for, if there be more Frenchmen than one on the staff in Sicily, the imputation may, by some persons, at least, alight upon the wrong man, an injury to which no one ought to remain exposed for an hour. It was the duty, therefore, of those, with whom this statement originated, to ascertain the facts correctly, before they attempted to communicate them to the public.—But, I must again observe, that the fact itself is, comparatively, of small importance. It signifies little (except as towards the individual) who the alledged traitor is, or whether there be any truth in the story or not. The thing worthy of our attention is the principle, and to that we should keep our attention steadily fixed.—I am not a little pleased to see, that the *Morning Post*, in communicating this intelligence to the public, should have had the courage to express itself even in the way it has done. Perhaps, indeed, the alledged traitor being a Frenchman may have had some weight with the editor; though, I dare say, the reader will think with me, that a French traitor is no worse for us than a German traitor; and, the public will bear in mind, that the *Morning Post* has not yet said one single word about the two men, who have, in the other prints, been said to have deserted from the ROYAL GERMAN LEGION, with a view of going over to the enemy.* Not one word has the *Morning Post* said of this, though the two traitorous miscreants are said to have been tried and sentenced to

be transported for life; but, this same writer seizes hold (very properly, if true), of the story about a French traitor, just as if Sicily were of more importance to us than ENGLAND!—Now, as in all former cases of this kind, I beg to be clearly understood not as stating the facts of the motto myself; but, as giving it merely as a publication, which I find in the newspapers; and, the effect of my thus noticing it will be, I hope, to cause it to be contradicted, if not true, and if true, to assist in the causing of measures to be adopted, which shall be likely to prevent such treasons in future; for, as to their consequences, where is the man able to calculate them? The army in Sicily might, from such a cause, have been captured or cut to pieces; or, at the very least, defeated; and, if treason of the same description, and under circumstances of pressing danger, were to find its way into the army in England or Ireland, need I point out to the reader how fatal the consequences may prove?—Nor is it the existence only of such treasons that may be productive of injury; for, the belief of their existence may be nearly as mischievous. The enemy is gathering his forces together at all those points, whence he is most likely to be able to annoy us. Invasion, if not attempted, will be threatened. And, it is, I think, very evident, that a belief of the existence of such treasons amongst the many foreigners in our pay, must tend to embolden the enemy, while, in an equal degree, it tends to dispirit our own people.—For this reason along with others; but for this reason in particular, I should like to see an official examination into all these matters, and a report made upon them and published, that the people may know exactly what is true and what is not. Justice to the Foreigners, too, requires something of this sort; for, be men who or what they may, they ought not to lie under false imputations.

THE BRUNSWICKERS.—I have, upon this subject, nothing to add to what was said in my last, at page 587 and onwards, and only insert the title to the article for the purpose of introducing the following complaint of the *Morning Chronicle* of the 10th instant, which has arisen, I should suppose, from what was said by me at page 569:—"Mr. Cobbett accuses the *Morning Chronicle* of not procuring more particulars of the scandalous riot in the Isle of Wight, in which some foreign troops

"were guilty of a gross and brutal outrage. It does not seem, upon any occasion, to occur to Mr. Cobbett, *that it is full as much his duty as it is ours, to exert himself to procure information upon such topics—as well as to copy, and animadvert upon that which is collected by others.* We must depend, in a great degree, upon the voluntary contributions of Readers in different parts of the world—who, by seeing that our columns are ever open to information in the cause of humanity, and active in the prosecution of justice, whatever crimes are committed, may be disposed to communicate and verify to us what may pass under their eye worthy of publication. But *we should deserve to be where Mr. Cobbett is, if we were to act upon every anonymous narrative that is sent to us.* In the case of this military outrage, we readily published what came to us authenticated, and we stated the result on Monday."—Now, without noticing the passionate part of this paragraph any further than by most sincerely congratulating MR. PERRY upon his late escape from being placed where I now am, and by reminding him, that

"Stone Walls do not a prison make,

"Nor Iron Bars a cage,"

and that freedom's seat is in the mind, I must beg leave to give it as my decided persuasion, that it is *no part of my duty to procure intelligence*, and that *it is his duty to procure intelligence*, and full and correct intelligence upon a subject of such vital importance. I pretend not to give intelligence. It is no part of my understood engagement with my readers; and it is a part of his understood engagement with his readers. It is my duty to copy and to animadvert upon what *is published by others*; and, I am not without hopes, that it is a duty, the performance of which has done, is doing, and will yet do the country no little good.—I must say, too, that the desertion of two of the GERMAN LEGION MEN, with an alledged view of *going over to the enemy*, did appear to me a thing worthy of a distinguished place in the Morning Chronicle; yet, I have not observed a word about the matter in that paper. I repeat, that such silence is treason to the cause of truth; it is to betray the country; as far as the press can betray it.—It is every way bad. It is unjust towards the Germans themselves, who, if not guilty, ought to be cleared of the blame. There is nothing so dangerous to

the reputation of any man, or set of men, as a sort of smothered accusation.—The MORNING CHRONICLE may be angry with me; but I must say, that "TO SHEW THE VERY AGE AND BODY OF THE TIME, ITS FORM AND PRESSURE;" I must say, that, to do this, the account of the desertion of two GERMAN LEGION MEN, with a view of *going over to the enemy*, was full as necessary as the account of the everlastingly recurring ride, in Windsor Park.—Nor, observe, did the Editor of the Morning Chronicle offer to his readers, any, even the slightest, comment upon the affair in the Isle of Wight. Not thus, when any thing happens where *the ministers can be blamed*; where a chance presents itself of driving a wedge against them. Upon these occasions he is keen enough; but, as to the Brunswickers and their alledged shootings, he could see clearly enough, that one of the parties could not cast any blame upon the other, without taking some to themselves.—Thus, as in all other cases, where this print does what is wrong, its conduct can be traced to *party*. Few publications of the kind have more merit, generally speaking. The Gentleman, under whose controul it is, has a great deal of knowledge and of talent. But, the trammels of faction bind him sometimes, and sometimes draw him aside; and thus it will be with all those who give themselves up to the influence of faction.—It is well worthy of remark, that all our news-papers are ready enough to record, with the greatest minuteness, every affray that takes place amongst our *native troops*, one instance of which is now before me in a paragraph which has appeared in *every daily paper in London*.—"Tuesday last a desperate affray took place in Gloucester, between a detachment of volunteers from a regiment of *Irish Militia*, who were on their route for the depot at the Isle of Wight, and a body of *trowmen* and others. The dispute originated at the Swan Inn, Westgate-street, where a party of the soldiers were quartered, in which some trowmen who were present interfered; and this led to an assemblage in the streets of the partizans on each side, when a conflict took place, which threatened the most alarming consequences. On the first appearance of disturbance, however, the Magistrates and civil power interposed their authority; and being aided by the personal exertions of Colonel Morgan and the officers of the district Staff, together with

" a detachment of Captain Morris's troop
 " of cavalry (fortunately at that time on
 " duty,) and the permanent Staff of the
 " Eastern Local Militia, who were under
 " arms, and paraded the streets during the
 " greater part of the night, the rioters
 " were dispersed. The Irishmen resumed
 " their march next morning, without mo-
 " lestation. At the City Sessions, on
 " Friday, *the thanks of the Magistrates were*
 " *expressed to the military*, for the laudable
 " zeal and alacrity with which they con-
 " tributed their assistance on the above
 " occasion."——It is very proper to give
 these accounts. Such publications not
 only tend to prevent a repetition of sim-
 ilar acts, but, they give the nation an
 idea of the state in which it is from the
 military establishments in the country.
 In short, these are important facts, re-
 lating to public matters, and it is right
 to state them at as early a time as possi-
 ble.——But why are the affrays in the
Isle of Wight to pass unnoticed? Why
 are the poor *Irish* to be selected out for
 exposure? Why are their acts of mis-
 conduct to be blazoned forth by the
 MORNING POST and COURIER, while these
 prints carefully guard their columns against
 the admission of a single word about
 the alleged shootings of the BRUNSWICK-
 ERS, and even about the two ROYAL GER-
 MAN LEGION MEN, who deserted, as it is
 alleged, with a view of going over to the
 enemy? Blame the *Irish*, too, with all
 my heart; but, at any rate, treat them,
 good heroes of the press, no worse than
 the foreigners. Expose the *Irish*, but ex-
 pose the others too, especially when what
 is said of the former is nothing, compared
 with what is alleged against the latter.
 ——It is curious enough, that these gen-
 tlemen could all get intelligence of what
 was doing by the *Irish*, who were going
 to the *Isle of Wight*; but could get at
 nothing *that was passing* in the Island itself.
 ——Surely this shameful partiality must
 have its proper effect in time!

JEFFERY.—This affair will not rest
 yet, it seems. The following letter is well
 worthy of public attention. Nay, it *must*
have attention paid to it. It contains as-
 sertions so directly tending to excite sus-
 picions, that the matter cannot now be
 suffered to rest, where it is.——The letter,
 it will be perceived, is from the mother of
 JEFFERY, who, in consequence of a subse-
 quent marriage, has since changed her
 name to COADE; and, it appears, that the

Letter was written by her, in consequence
 of her having seen, in the news-papers,
 the certificates and affidavit, published in
 the Register of the 6th instant, at page
 561. Mrs. COADE's letter, from a copy
 of it which I find in the PLYMOUTH CHRO-
 NICLE of the 9th instant, appears to have
 been addressed to a Mr. CARRINGTON of
 Plymouth Dock, and to have been dated
 on the 4th instant. As published in the
 London News-papers, the letter is as fol-
 lows. I copy from the COURIER of the
 9th instant.——"SIR—I take the liberty
 " to intrude on your time, emboldened by
 " the interest you have taken in the fate
 " of my unfortunate son. I observe a
 " copy of your letter to me, and also of
 " my answer to you, in the public papers,
 " which has been the means of producing
 " another official document respecting the
 " pretended existence of my unhappy
 " child. Of course, you and the country
 " will be now satisfied, that, from such in-
 " formation there can be no doubt of his
 " existence. I have now no doubt myself
 " but that some one has been examined,
 " as therein stated; but I am persuaded
 " that the Officers of our Government
 " (who in this transaction appear to have
 " done their duty) have been imposed on
 " by that ***. The story is plausible, and
 " calculated to give weight to the testi-
 " mony: for myself, I believe it is col-
 " lected from the evidence given on Lake's
 " trial, and the subsequent examinations
 " of my boy's shipmates, &c. There is
 " one thing that forcibly strikes me that
 " it is a fabrication—that is, the signature
 " to the Affidavit is a cross. This I wish
 " you to bear in your mind; and if you
 " think proper to make my letter public,
 " I have no objection; (that the country
 " may judge whether the official document
 " be true or false) I have neither the
 " means nor opportunity of so doing—My
 " son could write not only his name, but
 " a tolerable hand for a labouring youth,
 " and understood the first rudiments of
 " arithmetic, sufficient for his employ-
 " ment, and kept the daily journal of his
 " work done in the shop. While there
 " remains a doubt of his existence, why
 " not have got a letter for me from him?
 " Why not have pressed him so to do; or
 " to let me hear some circumstance of his
 " family or of his neighbours, something
 " ever so trivial, not public? Or tell me
 " how a letter might be conveyed to him,
 " to convince me he really exists? Suppose
 " that Nature for a moment could forget its

" functions, and my agonized feelings were
" at rest, interest would still be a power-
" ful monitor, and say that it would be
" necessary to prove his existence for my
" temporal good. My present husband
" put my poor boy's life on the premises
" we now inhabit, purchased the ground,
" on which he built a dwelling-house and
" work shop, and holds his lease on the
" dropping of three lives—so that when
" the other two drop, it would be neces-
" sary to prove the existence of my son,
" or render the lease to the Lord of the
" Manor.

" I beg your pardon for this long intru-
" sion; and shall only add, that the signa-
" ture convinces me the story is fabri-
" cated by — and his emissaries, and at-
" tested by unprincipled hirelings, like
" himself. My only hope is that those
" who from universal philanthropy have
" interested themselves in my unhappy
" boy's behalf, and the nation's character,
" will yet prove his fate beyond a doubt.
" —I remain, Sir, your obliged humble
" Servant.—(*Signed*) HONOR COADE."

Poor Mrs. COADE's letter has suffered a good deal from the sort of *Imprimatur*, which the London prints have exercised. The reader can see, that there are some parts left out; but, in the copy, which I find in the Plymouth paper, there are several passages, that are omitted here; and, even the Plymouth Editor has thought it necessary to leave out two lines, the place of which he has supplied by stars!—This fact is curious. It is well worthy of remark, and of being remembered. Well worthy of being remembered, of being told to the world, of being put upon record; and, then, perhaps, it will have full as good an effect as the publishing of the whole of Mrs. COADE's letter would have had.—But, now, as to the matter of the letter as far as the London press has had the courage to publish it. The supposition of Mrs. COADE is, that her son has been represented by some impostor, and this supposition she grounds, 1. upon the fact of her real son's having learned to write well enough to keep the shop-book; and 2. upon that of her having got no intelligence directly from her son.—It must be confessed, that these facts, admitting them to be true, must have great weight. It is only about three years since JEFFERY left home, and, therefore, it is not to be credited, that he could have forgotten how to write. There are (I have known such) instances of persons, having, for the want of practice for a great

number of years, lost the knowledge of letters and writing. Jeffery, however, was so young, and it was so short a time since he can be proved to have been in the habit of writing, that there does not appear to be any probability of his putting a ✕ instead of his name; that is to say, if what Mrs. COADE says about his ability to write, and his habit of writing be true.—It is, too, very strange, that JEFFERY, upon making himself known in America, should not have written to his mother. It is very odd, indeed, that he should never have written to her during the whole time that he had been in America, from the Summer of 1807 to the Summer of 1810. He must be satisfied, that his poor mother would be in great anxiety about him; and, he must have known, that to let her know where he was would not expose him to any danger. This omission on his part is not, taken alone, enough to warrant a conclusion against the authenticity of the affidavit; but, it must have a good deal of weight, when taken together with other circumstances.—Besides, leaving parent and kindred out of the question, is it not something wonderful, that JEFFERY, being once safe in America, did not think of making application to the government at home for justice against Lake? To be sure, his being an ignorant man (supposing that to be the fact) might operate against his making such application; but, he is in a country of intelligent people; and in the State of Massachusetts he would not wait for good advice; and his story was so extraordinary; there was something so very horrible in it, that it is impossible it should not have attracted attention and excited an uncommon degree of interest. Yet, all this time; all these three years, not a word did our government ever hear from, or about, JEFFERY.—Well, but, at last, JEFFERY comes forth and makes an affidavit. What brings him forth? What made him go to the Justice of the peace to make the affidavit? What induced him to do this? Did he go voluntarily to make this oath and pay a shilling for making it merely for the sake of relieving Lake from all anxiety, and thus perform an act of Christian charity, such as never was before heard of in the world? Did he really go of his own accord to perform this act? If he did, he must, at any rate, have done it in consequence of what he had read in, or from, the English newspapers, and those papers must have reached him

pretty quickly too. If he did it in consequence of what he had read in the English news-papers, or from those news-papers, he must, of course, have been apprized of the great interest, which his fate had excited in England. He must have been apprized, that he had become the subject of *Debates in Parliament* and of *An Address to the King*; and, being apprized of that, his *modesty* must have been as miraculous as his *charity*, if he did not feel anxious to return to England; and, yet, he has not appeared, though the affidavit bearing his name, or, rather, his *cross*, was, from the date of it, made on the 17th of June; that is, nearly *four months ago*.—If we, on the other hand, suppose, that JEFFERY was sought after and brought forth, as Achilles was by Ulysses, he would not have gone to swear, in all likelihood, without being *well paid* for it; for, as to our Consul, or Pro-consul, he had no more power over him than any cat in Massachusetts; and, JEFFERY, who is said to have been there nearly three years, would have imbibed enough of the manners and feelings of the country, to make him laugh at any airs of dignity that any body whatever might choose to give themselves. In short, it is impossible to believe, that JEFFERY would go to make the Affidavit, without being *very well paid* for it. And, *who* was to pay him? Was it the *Consul*, in consequence of orders received from our Foreign Secretary? Was this the channel of application? If it was, how comes it, that the Consul took no steps to send JEFFERY home; or, at least, to satisfy the world that he was alive, by prevailing on him to write to his mother? How comes it that this same Consul took no steps to get the man to England? This was the thing that was wanted. Is it to be supposed, that *ten* or a *dozen pounds*, would have been thrown away in getting this man home? Are we so economical as this? Oh, no! We should hardly have grudged this sum for such a purpose. And, yet JEFFERY has not, it seems, got home to his mother in the space of nearly four months from the time of his making the Affidavit.—In looking again at the documents in page 561, they have some, to me, unaccountable singularities about them. The first, which is a certificate of the Consul, that WILLIAM STEPHENSON is a justice of the Peace, begins, "I, ANDREW "ALLEN, Junr. His Britannic Majesty's "Consul, &c. &c." And it ends with "W. S. SKINNER, Pro-Consul." How

came Mr. ALLEN not to put his name to a document that began with his name? —Next comes the certificate of Mr. STEPHENSON; and he says, what? Why, that ROBERT JEFFERY personally appeared before him and swore, *what did he swear?* Why, that a *declaration*, which he had before made, was true. This declaration is signed with a *cross*, and, at the bottom of it, there are these words: "The above "*Declaration and Examination taken by* "and in presence of, J. RAMSEY." But, there is nobody to tell us who this J. RAMSEY is, or what he is; and, for aught we know to the contrary, he may be some worthless hireling, or, indeed, may be a mere man of straw. It is very odd, that Mr. ANDREW ALLEN did not think it worth while to order his Pro Consul to let us know who this Mr. J. RAMSEY was. It would, perhaps, be too much to expect, that the Consul himself should put his great name to such a paper; but, surely, he might have commanded his Pro Consul to honour it with his signature. At present, we know not, who this Mr. J. RAMSEY is; and, of course, as far as his certificate goes, these papers are worth just as much as one of the columns of the Morning Post would be.—On the 9th of August last it was, that we first heard of this affidavit of JEFFERY. On that day, the Morning Post news-paper told the public, that "Mr. JACKSON," (our Minister in America) "had transmitted a deposition, "made by JEFFERY; that Mr. Jackson's "inquiries were, of course, made in consequence of *official directions* from home; "and that the result was *completely satisfactory* as to the *existence* of JEFFERY." —Now, if this had been true, how comes it, that we see Mr. JACKSON to have nothing at all to do with these Pro-Consular papers? Here is (see page 561) no document from Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson signs nothing. Is it likely, that documents, taken and transmitted in consequence of an order of the king, founded upon an *Address of the House of Commons*, would have been taken with so little care? It is very strange if it be so. One would have expected to see an Affidavit made before one of the *Judges* of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and countersigned by our Minister. This would not have been too much, in a case where the life of a British seaman was in question and the honour of the British nation at stake. —Besides, *who* is it that *puts forth* these documents now? From *whom* do they

come? From *what office* of the state are they sent to the press? *What printer* was it who received them in their *manuscript* form? These questions have not before been put, that I know of; but, it is time, not only that they were put, but *answered*. Again, therefore, let us ask, *who* was the person, that sent these papers to the press? This is not the way, in which the government promulgates its documents. The government causes publication to be made in a paper called THE GAZETTE, whence its publications get into other papers. And, why, then, are we to believe, in the *authenticity* of these documents, which come in a shape so questionable, and against the truth of which such weighty circumstances are opposed?—Opposed to all these reasons for discrediting the Boston documents what have we? One single circumstance; to wit, *the name of the vessel and that of the Master*, who, in the declaration, is said to have saved JEFFERY; and, I allow, that it may reasonably be said, that it is incredible, that, if the thing had not been true, the declaration should have stated, that the declarant was taken off the rock by “the schooner, *John Adams*, of *Marblehead*, *John Dennis*, “*Master*, who landed him at *Marblehead*.” These names expose falshood to great danger; but, it is to be observed, that the making use of names was *not a matter of choice*; it was absolutely necessary to give the name of the Vessel and the Master to obtain the smallest chance of belief. This was indispensable; and, if we suppose imposition in one case, we may in the other; if we suppose that a false JEFFERY was brought forward by some unknown hand, it is very easy to conceive that JOHN DENNIS, Master, might be prevailed upon to aid in the charitable deed.—However, there are some things, which may be done. JOHN DENNIS, Master, must be *alive*. He must not be *dead*; at least he must not have been dead in June last, when the Declaration of JEFFERY is said to have been made. We will have him a *live man* at that time, or, away goes the whole story at once. And, we will not only have the Master’s Affidavit; but, that of *some of the crew*. Nay, it must be shewn us, that the Master mentioned the *matter*, when he landed JEFFERY at *Marblehead* in 1807.—But, now one thinks of it, is it to be believed, that he could have landed a man at *Marblehead* (close by Boston) under such circumstances, without the thing’s making a noise all

through the Commonwealth and all through the whole of North America? It is *possible*, but, really, it appears to me scarcely possible.—It was said, that *some one* had seen, in an *American News-paper*, an account of JEFFERY’S safe arrival in the United States. Nobody ever attempted to say *what* paper it was; and, yet, one would have thought, that, in such a case, care would have been taken to note down particulars. Such a fact, if it got into *one* paper, would have run through the American Continent like wildfire. It was a fact just such as suited the purpose, too, at the time when it is said JEFFERY was landed, which was just about the time, that CAPTAIN BARRON’S frigate was attacked by our people, and when every thing, that could be said, was said, against our naval service. It is, therefore, something not only wonderful, but miraculous, if JEFFERY was landed at that time, and the fact was kept from the world.—In short, such is the state of the matter now, that nothing but JEFFERY’S arrival in England, and the affidavits of his relations and neighbours as to the identity of his person, will ever satisfy the public that he is alive, or that he did not perish upon the Rock of Sombbrero. Nothing but this either will, or ought to satisfy the public upon this point. Mrs. COADE, who, I understand, is in very penurious, and even distressed circumstances, may possibly be prevailed upon to discontinue her complaints. She may be prevailed upon; I do not say, that she will be prevailed upon, to write and publish another letter, saying that she has now heard from her son. I hope, that she is not capable of being prevailed upon to publish any thing which is not true; but, it is *possible*, and the truth, in this case, demands every thing to be done, that can be done, to prevent smothering.—The report of what has been done, will, of course, be laid before the House of Commons. Then the Boston documents, if they really have been sent to the government, will be produced, and, in all likelihood, Mrs. COADE will be brought forward to give testimony as to her son’s being able to write; and, it will be inquired into *why* JEFFERY, if he really was found in New England, as the papers state, was not brought to England. Whether, the expence to the nation was the obstacle, or what was the obstacle.—There will, doubtless, be many subjects of great importance brought forward during the next session of parliament;

but, for my part, I must say, that I can foresee no one equal to this in point either of immediate interest or of probable future consequences.—The cruel act of Lake, the horrid treatment of this English Sailor; the deed, not to be described, is known to the world, and it must, long before this time, have been a subject of conversation and of deep consideration with every ship's crew in the navy.—It was very much talked of in the navy, before SIR FRANCIS BURDETT brought it out in the House of Commons. I remember hearing it talked of at Portsmouth, in December last, before the court-martial was held upon Lake. So that, had it not been made a matter of discussion in the House of Commons, it would still have been known in the navy, where it might, and where it naturally would, have produced great discontent, which, perhaps, would finally have broken out under the appearance of some other cause.—Through the zeal and public-spirit of Sir Francis, the Government has had a fair opportunity of completely eradicating any evil impression, that the sailors may have imbibed from the knowledge of the treatment of their unfortunate mate; and, I hope, that this opportunity will be made the best use of. I hope, that there will not remain the smallest doubt, that it is the sincere wish of the Government, not only to do justice as to the past; but to prevent the like in future. I must, however, again observe, and I hope it will never be forgotten, that, for the opportunity of doing this, the government is indebted to SIR FRANCIS BURDETT; that every one, who, immediately or remotely, will derive benefit, of any sort, from the inquiry, will have to thank SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, who made his motion for an Address to the King upon this subject, *only two days before he himself was committed a prisoner to the Tower.*

SWEDEN.—The situation of Sweden is an object of great interest to all Europe, and especially to us, who *must* be so greatly affected by that country's being placed quietly at the disposition of the Emperor of France.—As much pains as possible appears to be taken by those regular deceivers of the people, the MORNING POST and the COURIER, to cause it to be believed, that the possession (for it will be that in fact) of Sweden by Napoleon, will be of little or no consequence to US. The "*Lo here,*" and the "*Lo there,*" is incessantly resorted to, by these writers, when speak-

ing of SWEDEN. All possible efforts are made use of to draw our attention from what we ought to attend to; that is to say, from the consequences, which, in all human probability, will arise to US from this great and extraordinary event.—The reason why these efforts are made is plain enough. If the people were to see the thing in its true light at once, the effect upon their minds would be great. They would see the danger to their country, and, of course, to themselves, from the event. They would, then, as men generally do in such cases, begin to inquire, *whence* that danger had arisen. They would find the immediate cause to be *the irresistible power of France.* But, they would not stop there; for, recollecting that England was *once* as powerful as France; that England had *once* the power of preventing France from tyrannizing over the smaller states of Europe; that England had *once* the power of punishing France if she attempted any such acts of aggrandizement; recollecting this, the people of England would be very apt to ask, how it has happened, that England does not possess this power *now*; how she came to *lose* this power; *since* when she lost it; what was the *cause* of her losing it, and *who* are the persons who have managed her affairs, who have had the command of her resources, since the time when she possessed this power.—These would be ugly questions. To answer them would not be a very pleasant task. Therefore all manner of endeavours are used to prevent the questions from being put; the most effectual way of doing which is supposed to be, the persuading of the people, that the event, that the transfer of the Crown of Sweden and power of Sweden to France is of *no consequence* to US, and, of course, is not worth our notice.—I have before exhibited to the public, and put upon record, some of these endeavours; but, I have now before me some others, which must not remain unnoticed. The first that I shall submit to my readers is from the COURIER news-paper of the 28th of last month. I shall then insert a passage from the MORNING POST news-paper, upon the same subject; and, I think, that, upon reflecting duly on the matter, the reader must be convinced, that these publications are amongst the most mischievous as well as the most foolish that ever appeared.—The first is as follows:—"*It was reported this morning that the King of Sweden is no more.—It is a*

something quite new for sovereigns, who are at peace and amity with us, to be called, in our public prints, *traitors* and *assassins*. This I believe quite new. Lord GEORGE GORDON was put into this prison for a libel on the late good *Queen of France*. A printer was prosecuted for a libel upon the good Emperor or good Empress of Russia. And, it is fresh in every one's memory, that MR. PELTIER (whose trial I shall notice more at large one of these days) was tried, and was convicted without the Jury's going out of court, and without scarcely a moment's hesitation, for having made a publication against BUONAPARTE, when First Consul of France.—How it happens, then, that the Morning Post and the Courier venture to call the present king of Sweden a *traitor* and an *assassin* I should be very glad to know. It may be said, as to Napoleon, that we are at war with him; and therefore, may say of him just what we please; but, without examining into this doctrine, we may observe, that it cannot apply to the case before us, as we are not at war with the present king of Sweden; though, it must be confessed, that if such publications go on, it is impossible that war should not take place. The king of Sweden must have his feelings as well as other men; he cannot fail to be informed of these attacks upon him; he has seen how our law seizes hold of the assailants of other sovereigns; and, if he sees himself thus attacked with impunity to the assailants, it is, I should suppose, next to impossible for him to refrain from using the only means, which, in such a case, he has of shewing his resentment.—It may be said, that these publications can do no harm, because Sweden will do every thing she can do to injure us, the moment that the new Crown Prince arrives in the country.—This latter may be; but, may not these terrible accusations against the king of Sweden make him hasten hostile measures against us? May they not add some little matter to the injuries, which BERNADOTTE is supposed to have in store for us? May they not cause the ruin of some few merchants and their families? And, one thing is quite certain, that they can do no good. It is possible that they may do no harm but that of disgracing the English press in the eyes of other nations; but, it is impossible that they should, in any way whatever, do any good; except, indeed, in the way above-mentioned, that is to say, in clearing the *Jacobins* of the

charge of having plotted the assassination of GUSTAVUS, and placing that charge upon the head of a *Royal Duke*, who is now become a king.—But, let us now see a little of what is said about the consequences of Bernadotte's election.—We are told, by these writers, that they will be fatal to Sweden. "Now be—gin HER miseries!" exclaims the COURIER. "Her connection with this country, where her principal commercial market lies, will be at the mercy of HER enemy." He does not perceive, or affects not to perceive, that WE shall share in the injury; and that, in some degree, at any rate, OUR miseries are beginning; and that if the connection of Sweden with England will now be at the mercy of France, so will the connection of England with Sweden. Strange perversity! This writer can see that Sweden will feel an injury, but he cannot see any injury that we shall receive from the same cause.—It is very true, that England is the principal commercial market of Sweden; but, then what we get from Sweden is of use to us, and, indeed, is indispensable to us. From Sweden and the rest of the Baltic we get our naval stores and part of our bread-corn; and, if this source is stopped up, as to the former at least, must it not injure us full as much as it will injure Sweden? Yet these flaming writers can see no injury likely to arise to us. It is all injury to Sweden, and, which is not a little singular, they keep saying this all the while that they are menacing Russia with the restoration, which BERNADOTTE will, as they say, compel her to make of the dominions, which she took from Sweden!—They rail against BERNADOTTE, call him a *plunderer*, a *swindler*, a *base satellite* of Napoleon. They tell the Swedes that their miseries are beginning, and that they merit these miseries for their cowardice. Then, in the very same article (it is inserted above) they turn short round to the Emperor of Russia, whom they accuse of the "iniquitous attack" in which Finland was taken from the Swedes, and tell him, that he "is about to be justly punished" for that "iniquitous attack;" and, observe, this act of justice is to be performed by the "plunderer and swindler," BERNADOTTE; this act of justice is to be inflicted upon the enemy of Sweden, for an offence committed against Sweden; this act is to make Sweden triumph over her long-settled enemy; and

this act is to be the dawn of Sweden's *miseries*!—Verily, there is something too low, too despicable, in the inconsistencies of these writers for me to trouble myself with. Yet, it is necessary thus to exhibit them to the public. It is necessary thus to post them up. It is necessary to prove to the unobserving what sort of writers these are, and what degree of credit is due to their assertions and opinions.—Now, then, in taking leave of Sweden, for the present, and in considering what must be the natural consequences of our enemy having possession of that country, let us bestow another moment upon what seriously concerns us; namely, how it came to pass, that we had no power to prevent this event. We hear, and especially from the writers above quoted, continual boastings about the *greatness* of our country. The magnitude of our *force* and our *resources* is incessantly held forth to us. Now, then, if these are as great as formerly, how comes it to pass, that we had not, as we *formerly* should have had, the power of preventing this great evil? Our connection with Sweden is stated to have been very intimate. The sea lies between us and Sweden and also between France and Sweden; but, *we command the seas*, and the French dare not shew their face upon the seas. What, then, can have been the *cause* of the French getting this predominance in Sweden? What can have been the *cause* of our inability to prevent that predominance? Our *taxes*, they say, are greater than ever. This has been asserted most *triumphantly* within these few days. But, then, adding to a nation's *taxes* does not, it would seem, add to its power? at least, it does not appear to have had that effect with regard to the sort of power, which can be brought to bear upon foreign nations. Our *army* is more numerous than ever, and so is our navy. Yet France gets quiet possession of Sweden, and there is not, that I hear of, any one who supposes, that we have the means of interrupting her there in the smallest degree.—If, at the time when PITT became minister, any one had foretold what has now happened with regard to Sweden, what would have been said to him? He would have been considered, and, perhaps, treated, as a *madman*. And, if he had foretold it during the Anti-Jacobin war, he would have been considered as a *traitor*, and, if the law would not have reached him, the hue and cry of the Anti-Jacobins would. Now, however, the

thing takes place almost as a matter of course; it surprizes nobody; and, the Anti-Jacobin writers, instead of reprobating predictions of the like elsewhere, turn sooth-sayers themselves, and foretell the fall of Denmark, Prussia, and Russia; that is to say, the fall of the *governments* of those countries; just as if the prediction would do Napoleon any harm!—One of them says: "What, then, we would again ask, can be the chances of Alexander against Buonaparté and his more disciplined legions, if his efforts have thus failed against an enemy so *immeasurably inferior in every respect*? The trial, to all appearance, is fast approaching. He will have in his immediate frontier two of Buonaparté's most active and skilful generals, erected into Sovereigns, and it is not difficult to conjecture with what views they are thus raised into Sovereignty and Power, to beard him almost in his capital. The views of Buonaparté in the North are daily developing, and we may soon see those very powers who *treacherously undermined and subverted the kingdom of Poland, now compelled not only to give up their respective portions of the spoil*, but contribute their efforts in assisting the common usurper to re-establish that, in consolidation of his power, which they had vainly imagined would have confirmed their own."—For once here is a little truth; but, really, these writers mar the work of their own hands. Their object manifestly is to assault BUONAPARTE; but, if we are to believe what they say in the above paragraphs, he is a man employed in *going about to do good*. A little while ago, he was, they said, about to perform an act of *justice* in favour of Sweden; and now, they tell us, he is about to *compel those to give up their spoil*, who gained it by *treachery*.—It is, however, very true, I believe, that he has the designs here imputed to him; and, that he is now actually taking measures for getting possession of the *land* of Denmark upon the principle that he has a right to do it, *as being necessary to prevent it from falling into the hands of England*; at which, I think, we shall be obliged to rest satisfied with biting the lip.—Thus, at any rate, under whatever pretence, we see the enemy gathering his forces round us; we see ourselves shut from port after port, pushed off from point after point; and yet, we do not see any prospect of a *change in that system*, which

has prevailed during these many years of increasing French power. It is a practice, founded on reason, and it is the practice of the world, that, when any system, or rule of conduct, is found to be accompanied with mischief, to examine that system, and to change what is defective in it, or do it away altogether. This is what we, in despite of reason and of the universal practice of mankind, never appear to think of; and, indeed, all those, who propose any change, as the means of saving the country, are represented as *enemies* of the country; are called Jacobins and Levellers and traitors, and are loaded with the most foul and horrid abuse.—Where this is to end no one can tell, or even guess; and all that any one, devoid of power, can do is to endeavour to awaken the people to a sense of their danger, leaving the rest to themselves.

HOLLAND.—There is nothing *new*, of any importance, that has happened in Holland; but I think a remark or two due to some articles, which have, within these few days, appeared in the Morning Post, which, on the 28th of September, contained the following:—"The letters from Rotterdam inform us that *domiciliary visits* had commenced throughout Holland; and that in one of these visitations, a French Officer had been killed by the *indignant and infuriated inhabitants*.—The same letters state, "that Buonaparté had declared his intention *to wipe away two-thirds of the National Debt of Holland*; and of course that only *one third will remain on interest*."—We should not be surprised to find the *unprincipled Tyrant actually having recourse even to so atrocious a breach of national faith*; and which, while it would ruin thousands personally interested in the funds, would not in the remotest degree benefit the people at large, whose taxes, instead of being honestly paid to the national creditor, would be transferred to the coffers of Buonaparté, in aid of his general system of tyranny and oppression throughout the Continent."—As to the *domiciliary visits*, they mean neither more nor less than a *house visit*; what is here stated is, in plain language, that the French Tax Officers, or *Excise Officers*, had begun to *search peoples' houses* for smuggled goods; which, though very bad, and a most disgraceful thing, could be very little worse than a similar search, made

by Dutch Excise or Taxing Officers. So that the Dutch peoples' houses are searched, what signifies it who they are searched by?—There appears to be some mistake about the *National Debt*. Two thirds of the National Debt are, it seems, to be wiped away; that is to say, only one third part of the money, which was formerly paid in interest upon the Debt, will now be paid in interest upon the Debt; and, of course, the public creditors, as they are called, the GRIZZLE GREEN-HORNS of Holland, will never hereafter receive any more than *six and eight pence in the pound*; and, in all likelihood, they will not receive this long.—I shall not stop to inquire, whether this be what the Morning Post calls it, an *atrocious breach of national faith*; but, I am very certain it will enable Napoleon to fit out ships in Holland with more ease than he would have done, had he not adopted this measure; and that is the thing which concerns us.—

What he has thus taken from those who had, as they imagined, money in the funds, he will have to give to Admirals and Captains, who, let us say what we like, will be highly delighted with the change, and will not attempt to discover any thing like injustice in it.—Nor will the measure be objected to by the people at large, who, at any rate, will not have the two thirds of the interest to pay in interest. They will see a fleet, or an army, or something for their money, and will like that better than to see it laid out in paying the interest upon a debt. The money is, indeed, I dare say, transferred to the coffers of Buonaparté; but, it will not remain there; it will be laid out upon soldiers and sailors, who are a much more powerful sort of friends than public creditors are. It is very true also, that the money will be applied in aid of his general system of conquest, and, as far as I know, oppression. But, he must give the money to somebody; it must be given to soldiers and sailors; and, it is pretty clear, that they will not complain.—There seems to be prevailing in England, a very odd notion about Holland, and the rest of the states subdued by France. It seems to be thought, that the *interests and opinions of merchants* are every thing in those countries. This is a very gross error. Napoleon's system tends to the annihilation of these interests, and they are intended to be annihilated. The *age of commerce*, he has said, shall cease, and the *age of arms* and of agriculture return.—The Times of yes-

terday (the 11th instant) has an article proceeding from this vulgar error.—“Accounts were yesterday received from Holland of a cast more gloomy than any that have come from it since its annexation to France. The vigilance and severities of the French have completely destroyed the little portion of clandestine commerce that was carried on. Fresh contributions were talked of; and it was even reported that all the circulating specie was to be called in, and its place supplied by an emission of Assignats, or SOME OTHER DENOMINATION OF PAPER CURRENCY. One of the letters says, we grumble, but dare not complain. The French General at the head of affairs governs us with a rod of iron. While we contemplate the miseries of surrounding nations, misfortunes keep crowding on us. Yesterday two fresh houses suspended their payments; and when our commercial distresses will terminate, no man can say.”—Bless me! What! is the circulating coin going to have its place supplied by an emission of paper! And do the Dutch look upon this as a gloomy prospect? Oh! silly, silly Dutchmen! I think, really, that the editor of the TIMES, who appears to feel a good deal of compassion for the dear good discontented Dutch (from whom we took AMBOYNA the other day), should send them over a copy of SIR JOHN SINCLAIR’S pamphlet, where they will see, that an abundant circulation of paper-money “is the great source of opulence and strength, and a mine of national prosperity.” Another of our “loyal” writers will inform them that “guineas are an expensive and useless encumbrance to commerce.” MR. JACKSON will tell them, that a plentiful issue of paper is the very life and soul of trade. The Morning Post will tell them, that “bank paper is the best bond of individual and public security, and the only medium of currency to suit and exert the energies of a commercial people;” and the same print will tell them, “that now-a-days bank paper is a miraculous mean of preserving the public and individual happiness.” When the Dutch have read all this, how they will stare!—Now, it is, I think, carrying our compassion a little too far to melt away as the editor of the TIMES does here, at the idea of the poor Dutch losing their coin and getting assignats, or some other denomination of paper currency in its stead. With what he has constantly before his eyes, this is, I think, carrying of compassion a little too far; and, though

the ridiculousness of the thing may escape him, he may be assured, that it will not escape any Dutchman who may happen to read his paper.—The Dutch can no longer carry on “any portion of clandestine commerce.” Well, and what then? Are we allowed to carry on any portion of clandestine commerce? Are not people in England punished, and most severely too, for attempting such a thing? And, if we are told that the Dutch are ruled with a rod of iron, because they cannot longer carry on any portion of clandestine commerce, what inferences must it be intended that we should draw from it? Clandestine means secret, underhand, unfair; and, when applied to commerce, it comes up to our idea of smuggling. Well, then, are we to be told, that the Dutch are not any longer suffered to smuggle; and, is this to be represented as a hardship; and are we to be told, immediately after, that the Dutch are ruled with a rod of iron? I, for my part, have no objection to see our writers lay on upon Buonaparté and his government; but, I wish them to take care how they strike, and not to give back-handed blows.—The next sign, that I shall notice of the miseries of Holland, is, that “two fresh Houses have suspended their payments.”—Can this writer have been in earnest? I hardly think it. If he was, such another instance of the proneness of men to see the moat in the brother’s eye, I do not believe to have been often seen.—The Dutch we are told, “grumble, but dare not complain;” by which, I suppose, is meant, that they growl and snarl and curse in secret, or to their relations and confidential friends; but, that they dare not proclaim their thoughts to the public; that they dare not speak of the rod-of-iron men in the manner that honest indignation would call for and that truth would warrant; for the imposing of which restraint, if the fact be true, I hereby give free liberty to the Morning Post and the Courier to pour upon the heads of the rod-of-iron men the whole collection of their abuse down to the very dregs.

PORTUGAL.—There is nothing to be said upon this subject. My Lord Talavera seems to be very cautious, and his friend the Morning Post has, of late, very wisely followed his example.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
October 12, 1810.

FIVE POUNDS came to be issued; when rents, salaries, yearly wages, and almost all the taxes came to be paid in paper; when this became the case, and when, of course, every part of the people, except the very poorest, possessed, occasionally, bank notes, it was impossible, that men should not begin to think, that there was some difference between Gold and Silver and Bank-notes, and that they should not become more desirous to possess the former than the latter. In other words, it was impossible, that men should not begin to have some *suspicion* relative to the Bank notes; and, it is very clear, that the moment such suspicion arises, there is an end to any paper-money, which is convertible into Gold and Silver at the will of the bearer, who will, of course, lose not an instant in turning that of which he has a *suspicion* (however slight) into that of which it is impossible for any one to have a suspicion.

Thus it happened in 1797, as PAINE, in his pamphlet, published only the year before, had foretold, in the words of the first of my mottoes to this Letter. He there told his readers how the issuing of Five Pound notes would operate; he pointed out how this measure would keep real money from the Bank; and he asked what must be the consequence, if (as it *might any day happen*) the people should go to the Bank and demand cash for the notes. This did happen the very next year; and, as he foretold in another part of his pamphlet, those who went to present their notes *first came best off*. LORD LIVERPOOL, in the passage, which I have selected for my second motto to this Letter, had, when he wrote, *seen the thing happen*; he had seen the fulfilment of what MR. PAINE had foretold, and spoke, therefore, of the "*dangerous*" consequences of an excessive issue of paper, with the fact before his eyes. Experience, which, says the proverb, "*makes fools wise*," had taught his Lordship, in 1805, what he might have learnt from MR. PAINE in 1796. Nevertheless, the opinions of Lord Liverpool have some weight, and are worthy of attention with us in England; because, though his talents and mind were of a cast quite inferior to those of such men as HUME and PAINE and BURKE, and though there is nothing in what he has said, which I had not said, in the Register, years before, still as being a man of great experience in business, as having, during this whole reign

been a great favourite at court, and especially as having, upon this occasion, *addressed himself directly to The King*, his opinions, though of no consequence elsewhere, are worthy of some notice in this country, and may possibly, in some minds, tend to produce that conviction, which, in the same minds, a stupid and incorrigible prejudice would have prevented from being produced by all the powers of HUME or PAINE.

But, we must now return to the Bank, and see *how* it happened that the people went to demand money in payment of the notes in 1797. That it did happen we all know; but, there are not a few of the people forming the present population of the country, who have forgotten, or, who have never known, the true history of the *Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank of England*; yet, without a knowledge of this history, and a thorough knowledge of it too, we cannot possibly pursue our inquiries to a satisfactory result.

We have seen abundant arguments to prove, that paper-money, that promissory paper of every sort, is the offspring and representative of *Debt*; that a National or Public Debt never can fail to bring forth bank-notes, or paper promises of some sort or other; that, of course, as the Debt increases and its Interest increases, there will be, and must be, an increase of the paper, in which that interest is paid; and, in the last Letter, at page 581, we saw, in the Table of increase of the Debt and Interest from the beginning of the Anti-Jacobin War to the year 1797, we here saw, in practice, the cause of the making of the FIVE POUND bank notes. But, as we have since seen, that measure was not sufficient. We saw, at p. 584, that it was to *avoid paying in Gold and Silver* the sums, or parts of sums, from TEN to FIVE pounds, which must have induced the Bank to make and put out notes so low as FIVE POUNDS. If you look again at that Table, gentlemen, you will see how the increase went on; you will see, that it was *greater and greater every year*. In the year 1793, the addition to the annual Interest was (speaking in round numbers) only 250 thousand pounds; but, in the year 1797, the addition was, 3½ millions; that is to say, a third part of as much as the whole amount of the Interest previous to the Anti-Jacobin war. Thus did this war of PRY against the Republicans of France cost, in only one year,

nearly as much, in addition to Debt, as the cost of the whole of the American War, the extravagant expenditure of which had, till now, been proverbial.

There were, however, *other causes* at work, at the time of which we are now speaking; causes operating upon the paper system from without; causes which must be here fully stated; for, besides that a knowledge of them is essential to our inquiry, it is demanded by justice towards those who opposed the ruinous measures of PITT, and who foretold their consequences; and this demand is, in a peculiar manner, addressed to ME, who, from being so situated as to be unable to come at, or even suspect, the truth, while many circumstances conspired to make me take for truth that which was false, was not only one of the dupes of the system, but who, unintentionally, contributed according to the degree of my talents, towards the extension of the circle of duplicity.

Credit is a thing wholly dependent upon *opinion*. The word itself, indeed, has the same meaning as the word *belief*. As long as men *believe* in the riches of any individual, or any company, so long he or they possess all the advantages of riches. But, when once *suspicion* is excited, no matter from what cause, the *credit* is shaken; and, a very little matter oversets it. So long as the *belief* is *implicit*, the person, towards whom it exists, goes on, not only with all the appearances, but with all the advantages, of wealth; though, at the same time, he be insolvent. But, if his wealth be not *solid*; if he have merely the *appearance* of wealth; if he be unable to pay so much as he owes, or, in other words, if he be *insolvent*, which means neither more nor less than *unable to pay*. When an individual is in this situation, he is liable, at any moment, to have his insolvency exposed. Any accident, that excites alarm in the minds of his creditors, brings the whole upon him at once; and he who might otherwise have gone on for years, is stopped in an instant.

Thus it will happen to Companies of Traders as well as to individuals; and thus it did happen to the Bank Company, at the time we are speaking of, and at which time an *alarm of invasion* prevailed through the country.

From the very out-set of the war, the

inventors and supporters of it had been, from time to time, propagating *alarms* of various sorts, by the means of which alarms, whether they themselves believed in them or not, they were enabled to do things, which never had before been either known or heard of or dreamt of in England. The mode of reasoning with the people was this: You see, that, in France, the revolution has deprived the people of both *property and 'life*: there are those who wish to cause a revolution in England: the measures taken, or proposed, are absolutely necessary to prevent the accomplishment of this wish: therefore, you have your choice, either to submit quietly to these measures, whatever *portion* of your *liberty or property* they may take away, or let in upon you a revolution which will take away *all your property* and your *lives* into the bargain. There was no room for hesitation; and thus were the people determined, and with this view of the matter did they proceed, until the time above referred to, the ministers being, probably, full as much alarmed as the people, and certainly not with *less cause*.

At times, however, especially after the war had continued for three or four years, the effect of alarm seemed to grow very faint. Danger had been so often talked of, that, at last, it was grown familiar. In the year 1796, however, things began to wear a serious aspect. All the minister's predictions and promises had failed; his allies, to whom and for whose support so many millions had been paid by the people of this country, had all laid down their arms or had gone over to the side of France; the assignats in France had been annihilated without producing any of the fatal consequences which PITT had so confidently anticipated, and upon which, indeed, he had relied for success; and, a negotiation for peace, opened at the instance of England, had produced nothing but a convincing proof of the high pretensions of the enemy, and of his confidence in his cause and resources.

When the parliament met, therefore, in October 1796, the ministers and their adherents seem to have been full of real apprehension. They failed not to renew the signal of *alarm*, in which, indeed, they were kept in countenance by the enemy, who had openly declared his intention of invading the country. The subject was mentioned in the King's

speech, upon a part of which a motion was grounded, on the 18th of October, for the bringing in of bills for the raising men, with all possible speed, for the purpose of defending the country against invasion. In virtue of a resolution passed in consequence of this motion, three acts were passed with all possible rapidity, the first for providing an *augmentation for the militia* to be trained and exercised in a particular manner; the second for raising a certain number of men in the several counties of England and Scotland (there were two Acts), for the *service of the regular Army and the Navy*; and the third for raising a *provisional force of cavalry* to be embodied, in case of necessity, for the defence of these kingdoms;* which acts were finally passed on the 11th of November 1796. When this measure was under discussion, Mr. Fox, Mr. SHERIDAN, and others opposed it upon the ground of its not being necessary, and Mr. Fox, who called it a *requisition*, after the French manner, observed that, if it was necessary to our safety, it was the conduct of the ministers and of the last parliament who confided in them, which had brought us into that miserable situation, "a parliament," he said, "which had done more " to destroy every thing that is dear to us, " than in better days would have entered " into the mind of any Englishman to at- " tempt, or to conceive; a parliament by " whom the people had been drained so " much, and from whom they had had, so " little benefit; a parliament that had di- " minished the dearest rights of the people " so shamelessly and so wickedly; a par- " liament whose conduct it was that had " given rise to this measure." Mr. Fox added, that he did not believe that inva- sion would render any such measure ne- cessary; that the real resources of the country consisted in the people's attach- ment to the constitution, and that, there- fore, the proper measure to be adopted would be to allow them to possess the spirit of that constitution. The minister and his partizans contended, however, that there was real cause for alarm; and PITT said, that as to the constitution "it still " possessed that esteem and admiration of " the people, which would induce them to " defend it against the designs of *domestic " foes*, and the attempts of *their foreign " allies*;" thus, according to his usual practice, proceeding upon the assumption,

that there was a party in the country in *alliance*, as to wishes, at least, *with the enemy*.

While these measures were before par- liament, the venal part of the press was by no means inactive. Representations the most exaggerated were made use of in speaking of the temper and designs of the enemy, always insinuating that the op- ponents of the Minister were ready to join the enemy, or, at least, wished him success. The French were exhibited as being quite prepared; and, a descent was held forth as something almost too horrible to be thought of. This was use- ful for the purpose of making the Arming Acts go down; but, the alarmists did not seem to be aware of its cutting another way; and, least of all do they appear to have imagined, that it would set people to thinking of what effect *invasion* might pro- duce upon *bank-notes*.

In the mean while, the negotiations for peace were broken off by the month of December, which gave rise to new *alarm*. This was soon followed by the appearance of a French naval force, with troops on board, off the coast of Ireland; and, though its return back to France, without attempt- ing a descent, might, one would think, have tended to quiet people's fears, it was, on the contrary, made the ground work of a still more general and more vociferous alarm. There was now no bounds to the exaggerations of the venal prints. From the first week in January, (1797) to the third week in February, the people were kept in a state of irritation hardly to be conceived. Addresses to them, in all shapes and sizes, were published, calling upon them to *arm* and *come forth* at once, not waiting for the slow process of the Militia and Cavalry Acts. "Already," were they told, "the opposite coast was crowded " with hostile arms; forests of bayonets " glistened in the sun; *despair* and *horror* " were coming in the rear." It was next to impossible that this should not make people think of what was to become of them; make them reflect a little as to what they were *to do* in case of invasion; and, it required but very little reflection to convince them, that money, at all times useful, would, in such a case, be more useful than ever. Whence by a very nat- ural and easy transition, they would be led to contemplate the *possibility* of real money being *rather* better than paper. That's enough! There needs no more!

* 37 George III, Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Away, in an instant, they go to the Bank, where the written promises tell them the bearer shall be paid *on demand*.

This effect of the alarm, an effect of which neither PITT nor any of his adherents seem ever to have had the smallest suspicion, and, indeed, when MR. FOX cautioned them against it, they affected to laugh at what he said; this effect of the alarm, raised and kept up by the minister and the great Loaners and men of that description; this effect of the alarm began, it appears, to be sensibly felt, at the Bank of England, immediately after the appearance of the French fleet off the coast of Ireland; and, as it afterwards appeared, from official documents, the drain had become so great by the end of the third week in February, that the Directors saw the impossibility of going on, unless something could be done to put a stop, or, at least, greatly to check, the run upon them for cash. The people were, in short, now doing precisely what PAINE, only about ten or eleven months before, had advised them to do, and the consequence was precisely what he had predicted.

It was now extremely curious to hear the language of the *venal newspapers*, who had, for months before, been endeavouring to excite *alarm*, and who abused MR. FOX and his party, called them Jacobins, and, sometimes, traitors, because they said, that the alarm was *false*, and was invented for bad purposes. These very newspapers now took the other side. They not only themselves said, that the alarm was *groundless*; but they had the impudence, the unparalleled, the atrocious impudence, to *accuse the Jacobins*, as they called them, of *having excited the alarm*, for the purpose of *injuring public credit*!

This change of tone was begun on the 17th of February by those notoriously venal prints, those prints so far famed above all others in the annals of venality; the "TRUE BRITON" and the "SUN." The thing was begun in "An Address to JOHN BULL," in which the "*most thinking people*," who were still all in frying confusion to get on with the levies of additional militia, and parish men for the army and navy, and the provisional cavalry; the "*most thinking people*," while all hurry and bustle about this, were told by these shameless writers, who had almost called the people traitors for not making greater haste to

arm; the people were, by these same writers, now told, that alarm might be *pushed too far*; that, if so pushed, it might do us *an injury equal to invasion*; that every one must see, that *the French wished to ruin our credit*; that, of course, to shew an *eagerness to sell out of the funds* was to *favour the designs of the enemy*; that it was, besides, the greatest nonsense in the world for people to suppose that their property was *not safe in the Bank of England*; that no apprehension need be felt, and that the people who had money in the funds, might safely rely upon the *wooden walls of Old England*. Though, observe, the whole country was actually in movement, down to the very headles, in order to raise men for defence by *land*!

"The evidence of facts" was before the people's eyes. The alarm was not to be allayed by assertions like these. And, though the venal prints grew more and more positive in their assurances, that there was now no danger from invasion; though they (on the 21st of February) assured the people, that it was "an error to suppose, that the enemy was at our gates," and that "a panic might do infinite mischief to public credit," people still kept carrying their notes softly to Threadneedle-street; they kept on selling out of the Stocks: and, a report, on the day last-mentioned, of the appearance of a *French fleet, with Troops on board*, off BEACHY HEAD*, immediately followed by

*"PORTSMOUTH, Feb. 20.—An account reached this place, this morning "at half past ten, A. M. of several French transports, convoyed by armed vessels, having been seen off Beachy Head. The intelligence came by the signal posts, and Admiral Sir P. Parker immediately on receiving it, ordered two ships of the line and five frigates to slip their cables "and proceed to sea. This squadron is now out of sight, and all the other ships are getting in readiness.—The sensation that this made in the City may be easily conceived. It spread a *very general alarm*; but it was soon contradicted: "Letters, written as the post was setting out, stated that the alarm had been occasioned by a *mistaken signal*, and that "instead of a fleet of 300 French transports, "it was no more than a signal that 3 privateers had been discovered off Beachy Head.—Such, however, is the consequence of the state of alarm to which

the famous landing of TATE and his handful of raggamuffins in WALES,† appears to have given confidence in bank paper the finishing blow.

All, as appears from the documents, and as we shall by-and-by see, was consternation in Threadneedle-street. The diminution of the gold became greater and greater every day. In vain did the venal prints cry out against alarm. They had cried "*wolf*," till the people had believed them. They had called upon them to "stand forward in *defence of the constitution*," till they had convinced them it was time for every man to think a little about taking care of himself. In vain did these venal writers now call aloud against alarm; in vain did they say, (24 February) that the Beachy-head report "arose from a mistake in the signals; that the resources of the country were *undiminished*; that it was *degrading* to suppose that we had not a sufficient force to annihilate the enemy; that the panic was *shameful*, *unmanly*, *mean*, and *dastardly*;" In vain did they assert (24th February), that "invasion was more to be desired than *decided*;" in vain did they exclaim: "Let us, for God's sake, not give way to our fears so as to *injure public credit*." In vain did they (25th February) aver, "that the alarm was *groundless*; that they were sure no attack was *meditated*; and that they were convinced it *never would be*." In vain did they again exclaim; "for God's sake let not the gloomy despondency of a few men in the city give a fatal blow to public credit."

In vain were all these efforts: SUSPICION, to use PAINE's emphatical expression, was no longer ASLEEP. It was broad awake, and to stay its operations was impossible. To excite fears in the breasts

"Government has thrown the country by the cry of a threatened invasion."—MORNING CHRONICLE, 22 February 1797.

† "On Saturday the public mind received the shock of a new alarm. An express arrived from Lord Milford, informing the King's Ministers that a body of French troops, amounting to about 1200, had been landed at Fiskard out of the ships which we stated had approached the coast of Pembroke. Ministers took the earliest opportunity of announcing the fact to the Lord Mayor."—MORNING CHRONICLE: Monday, 26 February 1797.

of the people was a task to which the venal prints had been adequate; but to remove those fears, or to impede the progress of their effects upon the mind, was too much for any human power to accomplish. The run upon the Bank continued to increase, until the day last-mentioned, Saturday, the 25th of February, 1797, a day which will long be remembered, and which will be amongst the most memorable in the annals of England, as being the last (hitherto at least) on which the Bank of England was compelled, at the will of the bearer, to pay its promissory notes in gold and silver, agreeably to the tenor of those notes; until the evening of that day the run continued, but, on the next, though it was Sunday, an Order was issued from the PRIVY COUNCIL requiring the Directors of the Bank to forbear issuing any cash in payment, until the sense of Parliament could be taken upon the subject, which memorable instrument was in the following words, * to which I must beg of you, Gentlemen, to pay particular attention.

* At the Council Chamber, Whitehall,
Feb. 26, 1797.

By the LORDS of His MAJESTY'S
Most Honourable PRIVY COUNCIL.
Present,

The LORD CHANCELLOR	EARL SPENCER
LORD PRESIDENT	EARL of LIVERPOOL
DUKE of PORTLAND	LORD GRENVILLE
MARQUIS CORNWALLIS	

MR. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER.

Upon the representation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, stating that from the result of the information which he has received, and of the enquiries which it has been his duty to make respecting the effect of the unusual demands for specie, that have been made upon the metropolis, in consequence of ill-founded or exaggerated alarms in different parts of the country, it appears that unless some measure is immediately taken, there may be reason to apprehend a want of a sufficient supply of cash to answer the exigencies of the public service. It is the unanimous opinion of the Board, that it is indispensably necessary for the public service, that the Directors of the Bank of England should forbear issuing any cash in payment until the sense of Parliament can be taken on that subject, and the proper measures adopted thereupon, for maintaining the means of circulation, and supporting the public and commercial credit of the kingdom at this important conjuncture; and it is ordered, that a copy of this minute be transmitted to the Di-

We shall, by-and-by, see *whence* it was that "Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer" received his information, and *what sort of information* it was that he did receive; but, for the present, we will, in order to avoid making this Letter too long, content ourselves with seeing what the Bank Company did in consequence of this Order *not to pay their creditors*; this requisition *not to pay their promissory notes when presented*; this Order *to forbear issuing cash in payment*.

The run had been very great on the *Saturday*, and people would scarcely suspect, that the *Sunday*, especially by such a godly ministry as PITT's was, would have been spent in labour of any sort. It would, however, naturally give people time to *think* a little; it would afford them leisure to reflect on the consequences of being without a farthing of cash in case of invasion. According, on the *Monday* morning, they appear to have been quite prepared for furnishing themselves with real money, if it was to be had at the Bank. Let us, however, as to this fact, take the words of the venal writers themselves. "Yesterday morning," says the TRUE BRITON of *Tuesday*, the 28th of February, "a great run seemed to have been *meditated* upon the Bank, as A CROWD OF PEOPLE ASSEMBLED THERE AS SOON AS THE DOORS OPENED. This design was HAPPILY defeated by a Resolution of the Privy Council, transmitted to the Bank Directors on Sunday; and, in consequence, they had *Hand-bills ready for delivery*, a copy of which, with the Order of the Privy Council annexed, our readers will find, as an Advertisement in the front of our Paper."*

rectors of the Bank of England, and they are hereby required, on the grounds of the exigency of the case, to conform thereto until the sense of Parliament can be taken as aforesaid.

W. FAWKENER.

* *Bank of England, February 27, 1797.*

In consequence of an order of his Majesty's Privy Council notified to the Bank last night, Copy of which is hereunto annexed,—The Governor, Deputy Governor, and Directors of the Bank of England, think it their duty to inform the Proprietors of Bank Stock, as well as the Public at large, that the general concerns of the Bank are in the most affluent and prosperous situation, and such as to preclude every doubt as to the security of its notes.—The Directors mean

Such, Gentlemen, was the manner, in which the *Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank of England* took place; such was the manner of that event, which produced the evils, for which the Bullion Committee have proposed a remedy. Upon the Order of Council there is much to observe, before we proceed further; but, having laid before you a plain narrative of the event, it will be best to reserve those observations 'till my next, and, in the meanwhile, I remain,

Gentlemen,
Your sincere friend,
W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,
15th October, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"On Friday a Court Martial was held "on board the *Gladiator*, on *Antonio*, alias Antony MILLER, seaman, of the "Latona, for *mutinous and seditious conduct*, in endeavouring to make a *mutinous assembly*, and excite the *French* "in particular, as well as the *German troops* on board the *Latona*, to rise and "take possession of the said ship, and carry her to a port in France, and for concealing such mutinous design. He was "sentenced to receive 500 lashes. Rear "Admiral Hargood, President."—
PORTSMOUTH TELEGRAPH: 13th Oct. 1810.

FOREIGNERS IN OUR SERVICE.—Look at the motto, English reader; look at the motto! And, when you have duly considered it, I beg you to think a little, as you are one of "the most thinking people in "the world," how this might have ended, or what it might have led to, if this mutiny had not luckily been put a stop to in time.—*Antonio* is a foreign name, and the word *Miller*, should, I suppose, be *Müller*. But, this is of little consequence. It signifies not, whether this particular man was a *German*; for, it appears, that the people on board were chiefly *Foreigners*, and that a design existed, to some extent, at any rate, of carrying the ship into a port of France.—The charge against this

to continue their usual discounts for the accommodation of the Commercial Interest, paying the amount in Bank notes, and the Dividend Warrants will be paid in the same manner.

FRANCIS MARTIN, Secretary.

Antonio was, we see, not only mutinous and seditious conduct, in endeavouring to make a mutinous assembly and excite the *foreign troops* to carry the ship into France; but, also, for *concealing* such mutinous design. This would be downright nonsense, upon the supposition, that the design existed in no breast *but his own*; and, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose, that *some* others, at least, were concerned in it.—But, be this as it may, the crime is as *new* in our navy, as the crime, the other day attempted by two of the ROYAL GERMAN LEGION, of *going over to the enemy*, is *new* in our army. These crimes are quite *new* in our service. *Desertion* and *Mutiny* are not new: they, unhappily, have been, and are, but too frequent; but, attempting to *go over to the enemy*, and designing to *carry an English ship into a port of France*; these are *new*; these we now hear of for the first time; and, it will, I think, be allowed, that we ought to guard against the consequences.—As I observed with regard to the attempt of the two German Legion miscreants, the great danger lies in the *putting of such thoughts into the heads of our own soldiers*; but, the danger is much greater in the *navy* than in the *army*; and, there is nothing that I should be so much afraid of as the effect of an example like that contemplated on board of the *Latona*.—Once more, I must repeat, that this is the *first time* we have heard of such a thing. We have heard of it, observe, in a ship, which appears to have been nearly filled with *foreign troops*. Whether the like would, by the aid of *Antonio*, have taken place on board of a ship filled with *native troops*; or, whether *Antonio* would have attempted to put in execution such a design with *native troops* on board; these are questions that I leave to the reader; but, I again beg him to consider, that, out of our hundreds and even thousands of ships, we have never *before* heard, even in the height of the *grand mutiny*, of such a design as this.

GERMAN RECRUITS.—The Morning Post of this day has the following article.—“Saturday a riot took place in the—Prison at Porchester Castle, near Portsmouth: about 120 prisoners, consisting of GERMANS AND SWISS, volunteered into the *Sicilian Regiment*, and when they were sent into the prison to get their clothes, the *Frenchmen* refused to let them out, again, and threatened to kill them.

“The drum immediately beat to arms, when the *Worcester Militia*, and part of the *Northampton*, directly marched into the Castle; and, with the assistance of the *artillery and dragoons*, order was restored without any bloodshed. The prisoners amounted to above six thousand.”—The reader will make his own observations upon this. They do, indeed, suggest themselves plainly enough. All that I shall say upon the matter is, that we here, if this be true, see recruits raised for our service from amongst those, who have been in the service of our enemy, and who now volunteer for us, they being in a prison.—Those, who have caused these men to be enlisted, have, doubtless, satisfactory reasons for concluding, that they will be more faithful to us than they have been to their last employers.—The exasperation of the French prisoners is a circumstance well worthy of attention. It is characteristic of the armies of France at this time; and, I hope, that, on the part of our armies, it will, as often as the occasion may offer, be met by a similar spirit.—The men, whom we thus enlist, are, I suppose, to be sent to SICILY.—We shall see, all in good time, what will be the effect of it.

VICTORY OF BUSACO.—From what has all along been said in the Register (humbly stating what was asserted by the great givers of intelligence), the public will, doubtless, have anticipated nothing short of the victory, recorded in another part of this Number, in the form of an Official Dispatch of Lord Viscount Talavera, which is dated from Coimbra, 30th September, and upon the receipt of which, on Sunday last, the *Guns of the Park and the Tower* were, it seems, fired in token of national joy and exultation.—Before we proceed to make any remarks upon this Dispatch, let us see how the event was announced at first to the public. The Gentleman who brought it, landed it seems in Cornwall. The intelligence started, therefore, from TRURO, thus:—“Truro, Saturday, Oct. 13.—A GLORIOUS VICTORY!—His Majesty’s ship *Gleaner*, Lieut. Green, put into Portreath last evening from Lisbon, and landed Capt. Burgh, Aid-de-Camp of Lord Wellington, to whom Lord de Dunstanville immediately sent his chariot and four, in which Capt. Burgh reached Truro about eleven o’clock, and proceeded immediately in a post-chaise and four for Lon-

"don. The substance of the dispatches he brings is as follows:—On the 27th a general battle was fought between Massena (with Junot and the whole of the French army) and the allied British and Portuguese. The English fought *themselves*, and the Portuguese *behaved nobly*. The French were repulsed at all points, *with the loss of 2,000 killed, and 8,000 wounded and prisoners*; among the latter is a French General. The English lost about 500 killed, and the Portuguese about an equal number. Major Smith, of the 45th, was the only Field Officer killed. The battle was fought on the Mondego, about 130 miles north of Lisbon.—Another battle was expected; but after the specimen the Portuguese have given of their *devotion*, the fullest confidence is entertained of a second and a most decisive victory."—When the intelligence got to London, the *MORNING POST* put it forth under the head of "GLORIOUS VICTORY gained over the French army in Portugal."—But, glorious as this news is, what is it more than we had a right to expect? Nay, ought we not to wonder, after all that we have been told, (truly, without doubt,) ought we not to wonder, that the French were able to get so far as Busaco; that they were able to drag their famished, their wasted, their skeleton carcasses so far, Busaco being not an inch less than a *hundred and twenty miles*, by the roads, from Almeida to the spot, where we gained the Victory? Have we not been told, a hundred times over, that the French army was daily wasting away from famine, sickness and desertion? Have not the *Morning Post* and its coadjutors told us again and again and again, that Massena was unable to penetrate into Portugal? Have we not been told, that, from want of provisions and from other causes, he had been compelled to fall back into Spain? Have we not been told, that he had to bring his starving army over a country, whence all the people had fled, and in which every species of subsistence had been destroyed? Have we not been told, that the season of the year was come, when to enter Portugal would be certain destruction to the French? Have we not been told, that we had all the military means of the country completely in our power; that all the people were hearty in our cause; that they all hated the French mortally and cut their throats whenever they could lay hold of them; that we had strong fortress

after strong fortress, which the enemy would be compelled to besiege before he could get at us; and, that, finally, our army was *more numerous* than his, a statement of it (page 406 of this volume) having, by the ministerial news-papers, been carried to a total of 142,003 men, of which 89,755 men were regulars, and which did not include about 10,000 men since sent to join Lord Talavera? Have we not been told all this? If this was *true*, what ground was there for *surprise* at hearing of the Victory? And ought not our surprise, on the contrary, to be that the French have been able to get so far as Busaco; that they have been able to drag their carcasses thither; and, that, *as yet*, there is even a *part* of them unkilld or uncaptured?—In my Register, of the 6th instant, I observed, that, if what the ministerial prints had told us was *true*, we had every reason to expect a victory, whenever the armies should meet; because, according to those accounts, "not only had we a *superiority of numbers*, but we had on our side, health, plenty, fidelity, and the highest spirits; while the army of Massena had long been in a starving condition, and while sickness and desertion had been daily thinning his ranks." Why, therefore, should I, or my readers, or any part of the public feel *surprise* at the victory that has been gained? Why should the *MORNING POST* and *COURIER*, from whom I have got all my information about *superiority of numbers*, seem to be quite transported with joy that they have a *victory* to announce; when, if what they told us was true, to have been defeated must, on our part, have been the consequence of stupidity or cowardice scarcely to be equalled?—The *Morning Post* says, that the French army consisted of 70 thousand men, and that ours consisted of 50 thousand.—Against this attempt to rob me of part of my Portuguese army I protested, by way of anticipation, so long ago as the 28th of July, page 113, where I gave, from official documents, an account of the *number of fighting men*, that we, the people of England, were *paying* in Portugal, which, at the lowest, was to be 60 thousand. We have since had accounts of re-inforcements sent to Lord Talavera to the amount of not less, I am pretty certain, than 10 thousand men. This is notorious. These are facts, which nobody can deny. The numbers, as my readers have seen, have been carried a great deal higher by the *MORN-*

ING POST and the COURIER, who, as I have before stated, did in a very detailed statement carry them so high as 89,755 regulars, besides about 60 thousand militia. But let us suppose these gentlemen to be at liberty to make free with facts; suppose them to be privileged to say and unsay as often as they please; still that will not alter the fact, that we are *paying* for so many men in Portugal; and, I shall not, for my part, ever consider the number in the *field* less than the number that we *pay* for.—In this view of the matter, then, who can be *surprised* at the victory now gained over “Massena’s” ragged, starved, discontented, and debilitated *ruffians*,” as the Morning Post called them just before we heard of the fall of Almeida?—What I ask again is there to surprise us in the intelligence, except the fact, that Massena had been able to get the carcasses of his men so far as Busaco, and some of them *up a hill* too, where one would have supposed, the wind would blow them away?—Thus it is, reader, that these venal writers, these miserable tools, whose sole object is to flatter the wishes of those on whom they depend, and who never see beyond the day, nay, the moment, in which they put their silly lucubrations upon paper; thus it is, that they do mischief to any cause, or to any character, in favour of which they move their pens. They have proclaimed to the world facts, which, *if true*, put it completely out of the power of our general in Portugal to gain any victory over Massena that shall be worthy of the epithet *glorious*; and which would render defeat *infamy*. They have, if the nation and the world *believe* them, precluded the possibility of Lord Talavera’s gaining any honour in the campaign, and have amply furnished him with the chances of disgrace such as few men can possibly meet with. The enemy, has nothing to do but to recur to their previous statements to prove, that the affair at Busaco was *highly honourable to him, and deeply disgraceful to our general and our army*.—Such is the tendency of the *friendship of venal writers*, who, to speak without any exaggeration, are an evil little less than any restraint that plain undisguised despotism can impose.—But, though I, by no means, feel myself called upon to view the matter in any other light than that, in which it would remain by holding these writers to their words, I must confess, that I should experience some pain at leaving it there, to the mani-

fest prejudice of the character of our army.—Lord Talavera has never, that I know of, said, that *his numbers were superior* to those of the French; and, therefore, he ought not to be looked upon as having superior numbers; but, if the French were to assert, that he had superior numbers, who could blame them, seeing, that our own public prints, and those prints too who speak constantly in his praise, have made so many statements to cause it to be believed, that he has a superiority of numbers?—The Dispatch of Lord Talavera is, as to *numbers*, as silent as usual; so that we cannot tell over *what force* it was that he gained this victory. Yet this is very essential; because, the glory consists not in gaining a *victory*, unless the victory be gained over a superior force, or under disadvantageous circumstances.—I never can approve of this keeping of numbers out of sight. I have complained of it before; and I complain of it now, as being calculated to render the account of the victory less complete.—There are, I must confess, certain other points, upon which I could have wished his lordship to be more explicit; and especially as to the killed and wounded. He tells us, that the enemy left *two thousand men dead* upon the field of battle; but, he does not tell us how he got the *knowledge* of this fact. The Morning Post, indeed, says, that our people *buried* the 2,000 killed; and, I should not have been at all surprised, if he had said, that they *eat* them. Seriously I should not. There is *nothing*, yea, nothing, at which that print will stick. But, my Lord Talavera says nothing about the interment; nothing about the funeral part of the business. He only kills them. The undertaker’s job is left to the Morning Post.—I should like to have been told, however, *how* my Lord Talavera got the knowledge of the *killing* of the 2,000 men, unless they were buried by our people.—However, as he says *positively*, that he killed 2,000 men, we shall take it for granted that he did. But, then, as to the wounded, he does not name the number. He says that he understands that it was *immense*, after which there is room to admire the moderation of the Morning Post, which contents itself with fixing the number of wounded at 8,000 men of all ranks, thus making Massena’s total loss, upon this occasion, 10,000 men. There is nothing like round numbers.—Ten thousand men, killed and wounded, makes a

pretty bloody battle. After such carnage, it is not very often the case, that the defeated part is ready, *the next day, to renew the fight*, especially with an adversary, *who has suffered hardly any loss at all*; and, it is still less frequent, I believe, to find the victorious party "*withdrawing*" from the field of battle, and moving away from it to the extent of 30 or 40 miles.—The Morning Post says, that Lord Talavera "would not allow of a *pursuit*," though the enemy was "*completely routed*;" and that the reason of this was, that his Lordship was resolved not to be put out of his "*defensive positions*." Where, or from whom, the sapient editor obtained this information, he does not say; and, as to the Dispatch, though it says nothing about a *pursuit*, says more than enough to convince us, that Lord Talavera *had quitted his defensive position*.—There would, if one had time, be much more to say upon the subject; but, perhaps, it is as well to let it alone, 'till we have more copious details. The time to give an account of a campaign is, at the end of it; for, besides many other reasons against taking it in piece meal, it always greatly diminishes the pleasure of contemplating final success if we dwell much upon the several minor successes which lead to it; and, in this case, the final overthrow, the route, the destruction, or the capture, of Massena and his army, when it shall happen, will not afford nearly so much satisfaction, as it would have afforded, if we had never heard of the present victory.—When the campaign shall be over, and Portugal cleared of its *invaders*, we shall, without any danger of communicating intelligence to the enemy, be able, most likely, to come at the reasons, which induced Lord Talavera to lie quiet while the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was going on, and, as soon as it was over, to begin to retreat; which induced him to put a garrison of some thousands of men, with an abundance of ammunition and provisions, into Almeida, and, when he saw it besieged, not to march to its relief; which induced him to wait till Massena had taken Almeida, and then to begin his retreat; and finally, which induced him to withdraw from the Sierra de Busaco, after having beaten the enemy upon that spot. To us, who are here in England, all this and much more, in the campaign, seems very strange; but, it would be the height of presumption in us to attempt to become critics upon subjects of such magnitude.

Let us, therefore, postpone, as much as possible, the communication of our thoughts upon these military operations, until the victory shall have been won which is destined to put an end to the campaign.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
October 16, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Battle of Busaco.—Account published by the English Government, on the 14th Oct. 1810.*

A dispatch, of which the following is a copy, was received this day at the Earl of Liverpool's Office, addressed to his Lordship, from Lieut. General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. dated Coimbra, September 30, 1810.

My Lord;—While the enemy was advancing from Celerico and Francoso upon Vizeu, the different divisions of Militia and Ordenanza were employed upon their flanks and rear; and Colonel Trant, with his division, attacked the escort of the military chest and reserve artillery, near Trelja, on the 20th inst.—He took two officers and 100 prisoners; but the enemy collected a force from the front and rear, which obliged him to retire again across the Douro.—I understand that the enemy's communication with Almeida is completely cut off; and he possesses only the ground on which his army stands.—My dispatches of the 20th instant will have informed you of the measures which I had adopted, and which were in progress to collect the army in this neighbourhood, and if possible to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of this town.—On the 21st the enemy's advanced guard pushed on to St. Cambadao, at the junction of the rivers Criz and Dao; and Brigadier General Pack retired across the former, and joined Brigadier General Crawford at Mortagoa, having destroyed the bridges over those two rivers. The enemy's advanced guard crossed the Criz having repaired the bridge on the 23d, and the whole of the 6th corps was collected on the other side of the river; and I therefore withdrew the cavalry through the Sierra de Busaco, with the exception of three squadrons, as the ground was unfavourable for the operations of that arm.—On the 25th the whole of the 6th and of the 2nd corps crossed the Criz, in the

neighbourhood of St. Cambadao; and Brigadier General Crawford's division and Brigadier General Pack's brigade retired to the position which I had fixed upon for the army on the top of Sierra de Busaco. These troops were followed in this movement by the whole of the corps of Ney and Regnier, (the 6th and 2nd), but it was conducted by Brigadier General Crawford with great regularity, and the troops took their position without sustaining any loss of importance.—The 4th Portuguese Cacadores which had retired on the right of the other troops, and the piquets of the 3d division of infantry, which were posted at St. Antonio de Cantaro, under Major Smith of the 45th, were engaged with the advance of Regnier's corps in the afternoon, and the former shewed that steadiness and gallantry, which others of the Portuguese troops have since manifested.—The Sierra de Busaco is a high ridge which extends from the Mondego in a northerly direction about eight miles.—At the highest point of the ridge, about two miles from its termination, is the Convent and Garden of Busaco. The Sierra de Busaco is connected by a mountainous tract of country with the Sierra de Caramula, which extends in a north-easterly direction beyond Vizeu, and separates the valley of the Mondego from the valley of the Douro, on the left of the Mondego. Nearly in a line with the Sierra de Busaco, is another ridge of the same description, which is called the Sierra de Murcella, covered by the River Alva, and connected by other mountainous tracts with the Sierra d'Estrella.—All the roads to Coimbra from the eastward, lead over one or the other of these Sierras. They are very difficult for the passage of an army, the approach to the top of the ridge on both sides being mountainous. As the enemy's whole army was on the ridge of the Mondego, and as it was evident that he intended to force our position, Lieutenant General Hill crossed the river, by a short movement to his left, on the morning of the 26th, leaving Colonel le Cor with his Brigade on the Sierra de Marcella, to cover the right of the army; and Major General Fane with his division of Portuguese cavalry, and the 13th Light Dragoons in front of the Alva, to observe and check the movements of the enemy's cavalry on the Mondego. With this exception, the whole army was collected upon the Sierra de Busaco, with the British cavalry observing the plain in the rear of its left, and the road

leading from Mortagoa to Oporto, through the mountainous tract which connects the Sierra de Busaco with the Sierra de Caramula.—The 8th corps joined the enemy in our front on the 26th, but he did not make any serious attack on that day. The light troops on both sides were engaged throughout the line.—At six in the morning of the 27th, the enemy made two desperate attacks upon our position, the one on the right, the other on the left of the highest point of the Sierra. The attack upon the right, was made by two divisions of the 2d corps, on that part of the Sierra occupied by the 3d division of infantry. One division of French infantry arrived at the top of the ridge, when it was attacked in the most gallant manner by the 88th regiment, under the command of the Hon. Lieut.-Colonel Wallace: and the 45th regiment, under the command of the Hon. Lieut.-Colonel Meade, and by the 8th Portuguese regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, directed by Major-General Picton.—These three corps advanced with the bayonet, and drove the enemy's division from the advantageous ground which they had obtained. The other division of the 2d corps attacked further on the right, by the road leading by St. Antonio de Cantaro, also in front of Major-General Picton's division. This division was repulsed before it could reach the top of the ridge, by the 71th regiment, under the command of the Hon. Lieut.-Colonel French, and the brigade of Portuguese infantry, under the command of Colonel Champelmond, directed by Colonel Mackinnon; Major-General Leith also moved to his left, to the support of Major-General Picton, and aided in the defeat of the enemy on this post, by the 3d battalion Royals, the 1st battalion, and the 2d battalion 39th regiment.—In these attacks Major-Generals Leith and Picton, Colonels Mackinnon and Champelmond, of the Portuguese service, who was wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Meade, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton, of the 9th Portuguese regiment, Major Smith, of the 45th regiment, who was unfortunately killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, and Major Birmingham, of the 8th Portuguese regiment, distinguished themselves. Major-General Picton reports of the 9th and 21st Portuguese regiments, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sutton, and by Lieutenant Colonel de Aronjé Bacellar, and of the

Portuguese artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arentchild. I have also to mention in a particular manner the conduct of Capt. Dansey of the 88th regiment.

Major General Leith reports the good conduct of the Royals, 1st battalion 9th, and 2d battalion 38th regiment; and I beg to assure your Lordship, that I never witnessed a more gallant attack than that made by the 38th, 45th, and 8th Portuguese regiment, on the enemy's division which had reached the ridge of the Sierra.—On the left, the enemy attacked with three divisions of infantry of the 6th corps, that part of the Sierra occupied by the left division, commanded by Brigadier General Craufurd, and by the brigade of Portuguese infantry, commanded by Brigadier General Pack.—One division of infantry only made any progress towards the top of the hill, and they were immediately charged with the bayonet by Brig.-Gen. Craufurd with the 48th, 52d, and 95th regiments, and the 3d Portuguese Caçadores, and driven down with immense loss.—Brig.-Gen. Cleman's brigade of Portuguese infantry, which was in reserve, was moved up to support the right of Brig.-Gen. Craufurd's division, and a battalion of the 19th Portuguese regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Macbean, made a gallant and successful charge upon a body of another division of the enemy, which was endeavouring to penetrate in that quarter.—In this attack Brig.-Gen. Craufurd, Lieut.-Colonels Beckwith of the 95th and Barclay of the 52d, and the commanding officers of the regiments engaged, distinguished themselves.—Besides these attacks, the light troops of the two armies were engaged throughout the 27th, and the 4th Portuguese Caçadores, and the 1st and 16th regiments, directed by Brig.-Gen. Pack, and commanded by Lieut.-Col. de Rego Bonito, Lieut.-Col. Hill, and Major Armstrong, shewed great steadiness and gallantry.—The loss sustained by the enemy in his attack of the 27th has been enormous.

I understand that the General of Division Merle and Gen. Maucun are wounded, and Gen. Simon was taken prisoner by the 52d regiment, and 3 Colonels, 33 officers, and 250 men.—The enemy left 2,000 killed upon the field of battle, and I understand from the prisoners and deserters that the loss in wounded is immense.

The enemy did not renew his attack excepting by the fire of his light troops on the 28th, but he moved a large body of

infantry and cavalry from the left of his centre to the rear, from whence I saw his cavalry in march on the road which leads from Mortagoa over the mountains towards Oporto.—Having thought it probable that he would endeavour to turn our left by that road, I had directed Col. Trant with his division of Militia, to march to Sardao, with the intention that he should occupy those mountains, but unfortunately he was sent round by Oporto by the General Officer commanding in the North, in consequence of a small detachment of the enemy being in possession of St. Pedro de Sul; and, notwithstanding the efforts which he made to arrive in time, he did not reach Sardao till the 28th at night, after the enemy was in possession of the ground.—As it was probable that in the course of the night of the 28th the enemy would throw his whole army upon that road by which he could avoid the Sierra de Busaco, and reach Coimbra by the high road to Oporto, and thus the army would have been exposed to be cut off from that town, or to a general action on less favourable ground; and as I had reinforcements in my rear, I was induced to withdraw from the Sierra de Busaco. The enemy did break up in the mountains at eleven at night of the 28th, and he made the march expected. His advanced guard was at Avelans, in the road from Oporto to Coimbra, yesterday, and the whole army was seen in march through the mountains. That under my command, however, was already in the low country, between the Sierra de Busaco and the sea; and the whole of it, with the exception of the advanced guard, is this day on the left of the Mondego.—Although from the unfortunate circumstance of the delay of Col. Trant's arrival at Sardao, I am apprehensive that I shall not succeed in effecting the object which I had in view in passing the Mondego, and in occupying the Sierra de Busaco, I do not regret my having done so. This movement has afforded me a favourable opportunity of shewing the enemy the description of troops of which this army is composed; it has brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situation; and they have proved that the trouble which has been taken with them has not been thrown away; and that they are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops, in this interesting cause, which they afford the best

hopes of saving.—Throughout the contest upon the Sierra, and in all the previous marches, and in those which we have since made, the whole army has conducted themselves in the most regular manner. Accordingly all the operations have been carried with ease, the soldiers have suffered no privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the army is in the highest spirits.—I have received throughout the service the greatest assistance from the General and Staff Officers—Lieutenant General Sir Brent Spencer, has given me the assistance which his experience enables him to afford me, and I am particularly indebted to the Adjutant and the Quarter-Master-General, and the Officers of their departments, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst, and the Officers of my personal Staff, to Brigadier-General Howarth, and the Artillery, and particularly to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, Captain Chapman, and the Officers of the Royal Engineers—I must likewise mention Mr. Kennedy, and the Officers of the Commissariat, which department has been carried on most successfully.—I should not do justice to the service, or to my own feelings, if I did not take this opportunity of drawing your lordship's attention to the merits of Marshal Beresford. To him exclusively, under the Portuguese Government, is due the merit of having raised, formed, disciplined, and equipped the Portuguese army, which has now shown itself capable of engaging and defeating the enemy.—I have besides received from him, upon all occasions, all the assistance which his experience and abilities, and knowledge of this country, have qualified him to afford me.—The enemy has made no movement in Extramadura, or in the Northern Provinces, since I addressed your Lordship last.—My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 9th inst.—I inclose a return of the killed and wounded of the allied armies in the course of the 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th inst. I send this dispatch by my Aid-de-Camp, Captain Burgh, to whom I beg to refer your Lordship for any further details, and to recommend him to your Lordship's notice.—I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLINGTON.

Return of the Number of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. in the advance of the French Army towards the Position of Busaco, on the 25th and 26th of September, 1810.

General Staff, 1 captain, wounded.—14th Light Dragoons; 1 horse, killed; 1 serjeant, 2 rank and file, 4 horses, wounded; 3 rank and file, 7 horses, missing.—16th Light Dragoons; 2 horses, killed; 1 cornet, 4 horses, wounded; 4 rank and file, 3 horses missing.—1st Hussars King's German Legion; 2 horses, killed; 1 serjeant, 3 rank and file, 4 horses, wounded.—TOTAL—5 horses, killed; 1 captain, 1 cornet, 2 serjeants, 5 rank and file, 12 horses, wounded; 7 rank and file, 10 horses missing.

Names of Officers Wounded.

99th Foot, Captain Hoey, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General, severely.—16th Light Dragoons, Cornet Keating, slightly.

C. STEWART, Maj.-Gen. and Adj.-Gen.

Return of the Number of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. in the Action with the French Army, commanded by Marshal Massena (Prince of Esslingen) in the position of Busaco, on the 27th Sept. 1810.

Head-quarters, Coimbra, Sept. 30, 1810.

General Staff, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 3 captains, wounded.—British Horse Artillery, 2 rank and file wounded.—British Foot Artillery, 1 rank and file, killed; 1 serj. 4 rank and file, wounded.—German Foot Artillery, 3 rank and file, wounded.—3d Batt. 1st Foot, 2 rank and file, wounded.—2d Batt. 5th Foot, 1 rank and file, killed; 1 serj. 6 rank and file, wounded.—1st Batt. 7th Foot, 1 rank and file, killed; 1 lieutenant, 22 rank and file wounded.—1st Batt. 9th Foot. 5 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 serj., 17 rank and file wounded.—2d Batt. 24th Foot, 1 captain wounded.—2d Batt. 38th Foot, 1 serj., 4 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant and 17 rank and file wounded.—2d Batt. 42d Foot, 2 serj., 1 drummer, 3 rank and file wounded.—1st Batt. 43d Foot, 1 serj., 7 rank and file, wounded.—1st Batt. 45th Foot, 1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 serj., 24 rank and file, killed; 1 major, 3 lieutenants, 3 serj., 106 rank and file wounded; 12 rank and file, missing.—1st Batt. 50th Foot, 1 major wounded.—1st Batt. 52d Foot, 3 rank and file killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 10 rank and file wounded.—5th Batt. 60th Foot, 3 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 16 rank and file wounded; 5 rank and file missing.—74th Foot, 1 ensign, 6 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 serj. 20 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.—1st Batt. 79th Foot, 7 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 41 rank and file, wounded; 1 captain, 6 rank and file, missing.—2d Batt. 83d Foot, 1 lieutenant, 1 drummer, 3 rank and file, wounded.—1st Batt. 88th Foot, 1 lieutenant, 1 serj., 29 rank and file, killed; 2 majors, 3 captains, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 2 serj., 92 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—1st Batt. 95th Foot, 9 rank and file, killed; 4 serj., 1 drummer, 27 rank and file, wounded.—1st Batt. of the Line King's German Legion, 3 rank and file, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 serj., 4 rank and file, wounded.—De-

sachment 1st Light Do. 1 serj. killed; 1 serj. 10 rank and file, wounded; 1 serj. 2 rank and file, missing.—Ditto 2d ditto, 1 rank and file, killed; 1 lieut., 1 serj., 5 rank and file, wounded.—2d Batt. of the line Do. 1 serj., 2 rank and file, killed; 1 major, 6 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—5th Do. Do., 1 rank and file, killed; 1 serj. 8 rank and file, wounded.—7th Do. Do., 1 serj. 8 rank and file, wounded. TOTAL.—1 major, 1 captain, 2 lieuts., 1 ensign, 5 serjs. 97 rank and file, killed; 3 lieut.-colonels, 5 majors, 10 captains, 16 lieuts., 1 ensign, 21 serjs., 3 drummers, 434 rank and file, wounded; 1 captain, 1 serj., 29 rank and file, missing.

C. STEWART, Maj.-Gen. and Adj. Gen.

N. B. The officer and men returned missing are supposed to be prisoners of war.

TOTAL.—3 lieutenant-colonels, 6 majors, 12 captains, 13 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 27 serjeants, 3 drummers, 560 rank and file.

Names of Officers killed, wounded, &c.

KILLED.—45th Foot, 1st batt. major Smith, capt. Urquhart, lieut. Onseley.—74th Ditto, ensign Williams.—88th Ditto, 1st batt. lieut. H. Johnson.

WOUNDED.—52d Foot, lieut.-col. Barclay, slightly.—70th Ditto, lieut.-col. C. Campbell, ditto.—43d Ditto, capt. lord Fitzroy Somerset, ditto.—1st Foot Guards, capt. marquis of Tweedale, ditto.—1st Batt. capt. G. Preston, ditto.—7th Foot, 1st batt. lieut. Marr, ditto.—9th Ditto, lieut. Lindsay, severely.—24th Ditto, 2d batt. capt. Meacham, slightly.—38th Ditto, 2d batt. lieut. Miller, ditto.—45th Ditto, 2d batt. major Gwynn, severely; lieut. Harris, ditto, lieut. Tyler, ditto; lieut. Anderson, slightly.—50th Ditto, 1st batt. major Napier, severely.—52d Ditto, 1st batt. capt. Napier, slightly; lieut. Wood, ditto.—60th Ditto, 5th batt. lieut.-col. Williams, slightly; capt. Andrews, ditto; lieut. Jorie, severely; lieut. Eherstein, ditto; lieut. Frankeine, slightly.—74th Ditto, lieut. Cargill, severely.—79th Ditto, 1st batt. capt. Douglas, ditto.—83d Ditto, 2d batt. lieut. Colthurst, slightly.—88th Ditto, 1st batt. major Silver, severely (since dead): major McGregor, severely; capt. McDermott, ditto; capt. Daisey, slightly; capt. Bury, ditto; lieut. Fitzpatrick, severely; lieut. Nickle, ditto; ensign Leonard, ditto.—1st batt. King's German Legion, lieut. During, slightly.—2d Ditto, major Wurmb, ditto.—2d Light Ditto, lieut. Stolte, severely.

MISSING.—1st Batt. 79th Foot, capt. A. Cameron.

PORTUGUESE.

KILLED.—4 captains, 2 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 82 rank and file.

WOUNDED.—1 colonel, 1 major, 5 captains, 5 lieutenants, 13 ensigns, 9 serjeants, 478 rank and file.

MISSING.—2 serjeants, 18 rank and file.

TOTAL.—1 colonel, 1 major, 5 captains, 5 lieutenants, 15 ensigns, 12 serjeants, 1 drummer, 578 rank and file.

Names of Officers killed, wounded, &c.

KILLED.—1st Regiment, capt. Macintosh.—8th Ditto, capt. De Sousa.—16th Ditto, capt. Charles Fox, 66th Regiment.—21st Ditto, capt. Salisbury, 52d ditto; ensign Castro.—4th Cassadors, capt. Des Novas Franer.

WOUNDED.—7th Foot, major Prior, 39th Foot.—1st Ditto, ensigns Paulo and Souza.—8th Ditto, capt. Auzabio, lieut. Mattias, and ensign Rodriger.—8th Ditto, ensigns Pedro and Manuel.—9th Ditto, ensign Antonie.—16th Ditto, captain Joze and ensign Maria.—19th Ditto, lieut. Goldero.—21st Ditto, col. Champliman, capt. Burges, lieut. Machel, ensigns Montero, Alberti, and Botello.—3d Cassadores, ensigns Sedjurada and Chrizostimo.—4th Ditto, capt. Bernardo; lieutenants Quirroz and Vasconcellos; ensign Faliziano.—6th Ditto, capt. Houm.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation of Lord Talavera, relative to communications with the enemy.*—Aug. 1, 1810.

It having come to my knowledge that certain persons have been sent by the enemy into the interior of the kingdom, with letters and messages for different individuals, cities and towns, all such persons shall be arrested as criminals, and sent, with the letters with which they may be charged, to my head-quarters. Those who shall receive letters from the enemy's army and not apprehend the bearers of them, shall be considered as accomplices, and subjected to the most rigorous punishment.

FRANKFORT.—*Decree of the Grand Duke, relating to French Emigrants.*—June 17, 1810.

The French Government having made reiterated representations, that in the country of the Confederation bordering upon France, desiring all necessary measures should be taken to prevent the emigration of French subjects, who set out with their families, and that particularly no emigrants may be suffered to pass in and through the territories of this town, notwithstanding any foreign passports they may have, unless they can prove their emigration is expressly authorised by the Minister of Police at Paris; his Serene Highness has just approved of the under-mentioned measures. The police have just received general instructions to attentively watch (for the neglect of which they will be personally responsible) that the passage be absolutely shut to all French subjects, as well as to their wives and

children, who may present themselves there, without being furnished with the authority already stated; that on the contrary, without paying attention to any foreign passports whatever which they may be able to produce, they may be immediately arrested and sent to the Superior Commandant of this place, who will give the necessary orders for their being conveyed back to the place to which they belong.

COUNT DE BUEST.

FRANCE.—*Orders to the Directors of French Customs.*—2nd July, 1810.

Sir;—In my circular of the 20th of October last, I apprised you that according to a regulation of the Minister of the Interior, dated the 18th, vinegar being a description of wine, might under that denomination, be comprised among the productions of the soil permitted to be exported under the licences.—The proportional quantity of wine and brandy, that may be put on board the licensed vessels, having been since determined by the decree of the 14th February, his Excellency decided, on the 30th of June, that the intent of the said decree would not be fulfilled, if the vinegars were merely admitted in the room of wines, and that they can only form part of the surplus of the cargoes, as productions of the soil.—You will consequently, be pleased to give orders that one half at least of the cargoes of vessels provided with licenses, shall be composed of real wines and brandies, with out tolerating any substitution of liquors of the same species, but differing in quality.—I beg you will enforce this regulation, and assure me of your attention in this respect, by acknowledging the receipt of the present circular.

FRANCE.—*Decree about American Ships.*—5th July, 1810.

Thirty American vessels may import into France cottons, oils, fish, dying wood, salted fish; leather and furs. The same vessels may export wines, brandies, silks, linens, jewellery, furnitures, and other manufactured goods.—These vessels shall be obliged to sail from Charleston and New York, and must be furnished with an American newspaper of the day of their departure, as also a *Certificate d'origin* of the Colonial produce, signed by the French

Consul, accompanied by a passage or sentence in cyphers.—The Merchants who give orders for these Americans to come, must prove that they are in partnership with manufacturers of Paris, Rouen, or other cities," &c.

PRUSSIA.—*Notice respecting Commercial Confiscations.*—12th July, 1810.

The public are hereby informed, that the process of confiscation on all vessels seized in this department, is now in full execution on the roads of Swiner, and will be concluded in a few days, after which all goods and merchandizes condemned will be put up to sale to the best bidder.

FRANCE.—*Commercial Decree.*—Dated Antwerp, 7th July, 1810.

Napoleon, &c. We have decreed, and do decree as follows, by the advice of our Minister of State:—1. All Colonial produce and other goods, which by our decree of the 30th June last, were ordered to be confiscated, shall be subjected to a duty of 50 per cent. on their value. This value is to be settled according to the average price at Paris for fourteen days, as it appears in the price currents. The duty on Indigo and Campeche wood shall be estimated according to its present value.—2. The above and other articles shall be calculated upon the following basis:—Then follows a long list of articles of trade, to which the prices are affixed, for the purpose of ascertaining the duties, and of other articles make various exceptions. It is signed by Napoleon, and countersigned by the Duke of Bassano.

SICILY.—*Proclamation.*—Ferdinand IV. by the Grace of God, King of the two Sicilies, Jerusalem, &c. Infant of Spain, Duke of Parma, Placenza, Castis, &c. Grand Hereditary Prince of Tuscany, to our beloved and faithful people of Sicily.—10th July, 1810.

The ferocious enemy who threatens to invade this happy kingdom, and to bring amongst us desolation, shame, and death, is carrying on his preparations. His pride supports him, notwithstanding the want of confidence of the unfortunate victims of his despotism, whom he intends to employ on his rash expedition. (*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 21.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1810. [Price 1s.

"Every victim of injustice and cruelty" (speaking of the *French* government) "*bequeaths his revenge to his connections, to his friends, and to his relations: or (if all these should be involved in the same common fate with himself) every such execution raises detestation and abhorrence, even in the breast of ordinary spectators, and unites the public opinion against a Government, which exists only by the daily practice of robbery and murder. From this disgusting scene, let us turn our eyes to our own situation. THERE the contrast is striking in all its parts. HERE we see nothing of, the character and genius of arbitrary finance; none of the bold frauds of bankrupt power; none of the wild struggles and plunges of despotism in distress; no lopping off from the capital of debt; no suspension of interest; no robbery under the name of loan; no raising the value; no debasing the substance of the coin. HERE we behold public credit of every description rising under all the disadvantages of a general war; an ample revenue, flowing freely and copiously from the opulence of a contented people.*"—LORD MORNINGTON (now Marquis Wellesley). SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 21st January, 1794.

"The interest of the national funded debt is paid at the Bank in the same kind of paper in which the taxes are collected. When people find, as they will find, a reservedness among each other in giving gold and silver for bank notes, or the least preference for the former over the latter, they will go for payment to the Bank, where they have a right to go. They will do this as a measure of prudence, each one for himself, and the truth, or delusion, of the funding system will be then proved."—PAINÉ. DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF FINANCE. Published in 1796.

"The great object, however, is to open the Bank of England and to enable it to carry on its pecuniary transactions to the extent which its resources will admit of, on the solid principle of giving either cash or paper at the option of the applicant. *Until that is done, neither public or private credit, nor agriculture, nor commerce, nor manufactories, nor the income of the nation, can go on prosperously.*"—SIR JOHN SINCLAIR. LETTER, published in 1797.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XII.

The impression made upon the country by the Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank—Ridiculous situation of the ministers in complaining of False Alarms—The Jacobins now accused of exciting the False Alarm—Jacobins accused of causing the run upon the Bank—Foolishness of this accusation—Mr. Wilberforce answered by Mr. Fox—Now was the time for Mr. Pitt's adherents to leave him—They had been warned by Mr. Fox and others—King's Speech and language of the Minister at the opening of the Session during which the Stoppage took place—If the Minister's adherents had now quitted him it might have prevented the present dangers—Mr. Pitt's humiliation in the House of Commons—Questions put to him upon the subject of the Legal Tender, by Mr. Combe and Mr. Nicholls—His inability to determine on what measures he should propose.

Gentlemen,

Having, agreeably to the intention expressed, traced the increase of the Debt and of the bank-notes down to that grand and memorable effect, the *stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank of England*, our next object must naturally be to know what *impression* that event produced upon the nation, and what *measures* were adopted in consequence of it; in other words, to continue the history of the *stoppage* down to this time, when the evil of paper-money produced the forming of the Bullion Committee.

The impression made upon the nation in general was such as might have been expected, after all the *flattering accounts* which had been given of the national resources. The ORDER OF COUNCIL does, you will perceive, ascribe the event to "*ill-founded and exaggerated alarms, in different parts of the country.*" But, supposing this to have been the chief, and only cause, with what face could the ministers complain of these alarms; seeing that they themselves had done their utmost to excite them? They had not only proposed and carried through the Arming Bills, but they had been writing to the magistrates, in every part of the kingdom, calling upon them for internal preparations, "*while*" (Morning Chronicle, 22nd February 1797) "*Contractors had put*

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"every town into commotion by inquiries as to the number of *Ovens*, the quantity of grain, and the state of the Provisions." Nay, the preamble of the Arming Acts itself proclaimed, that the measures were become necessary, "in order to prevent, or repel, any attempt, which the enemies of the country might make to effect a descent upon the kingdom." After all this it was, that the Privy Council spoke, in a sort of complaining tone, of "ill-founded and exaggerated alarms"!

When the matter came before parliament, the Opposition did, certainly, not spare the Minister and his adherents, who had the confidence to hold the same tone as to the alarm, and whose opinion of the minds of the people was such, that they scrupled not to repeat the assertions of the venal prints, and to ascribe the injury (for they then acknowledged it to be an injury) which Public Credit had sustained to unfounded alarms, excited by the internal enemies of the country, which, in a conary sense, some members were malicious enough to believe. GENERAL WALPOLE (in the Debate of 1st March) made an admirable exposure of them in this way, to which no answer was given, but that they were not always to feel alarm, because they had once felt it; though the fact was, that they were proclaiming alarm, with all their might, 'till the Bank, as it afterwards appeared, represented to them secretly, that the alarm, if continued, would take away all their cash. Mr. SHERIDAN, in advertg to the speech of GENERAL WALPOLE, who had remarked upon Mr. WINDHAM's not having signed the Order of Council, said, "that he believed it proceeded from the reflections it contained against the alarmists," and he added, that "even amidst the wreck of public credit, it was impossible not to laugh at the juggling tricks and miserable shifts to which the ministers had recourse."

The venal part of the press, now that it was impossible any longer to disguise the state of the credit of the Bank, began a regular new attack upon the Jacobins, whom it had before reviled for endeavouring to check the alarm, and whom it now accused of causing the alarm. The notoriously venal prints before-mentioned (TRUE BAITON and SON), which had, to the last moment, abused the Jacobins for (as they said) propagating the false notion of the Bank not having gold to answer

their notes. These prints, never equalled in venality, I believe, by any prints in the world, the MORNING POST only excepted, now abused those same unfortunate Jacobins for not acknowledging the necessity of the Order in Council. They (3rd March, 1797) again accused the Jacobins of having caused "a distrust of the Bank," and of having formed a design to ruin the credit of the country, in which "they had so far succeeded, at least, as to persuade the people, in some parts of the country, that gold was preferable to Bank notes."

Gentlemen, pause here, for a moment, and contemplate the foolishness as well as the injustice of such observations as these. You will bear in mind, that the Jacobins, as they were called, were, by these same writers, constantly represented as men without learning, without sense, without property, and, of course, without influence. How, then, were they to have the power of producing such an effect upon the minds of the nation; and, upon the minds of those, too, who held the bank-notes and who owned the Stock? The Jacobins, as these venal prints had the impudence to call them, had not been able to persuade the people to check Mr. PITT in his ruinous career of war and expenditure; they had not been able to prevent any one of the measures of that Minister; they had not been able to persuade the people to do any one thing that they wished them to do, and, at the very time we are speaking of, they were out-voted in the parliament, four to one. Yet, to these same Jacobins was now ascribed that run upon the Bank, which produced the Order in Council; which produced an order, issued by the king's Privy Council, to encourage a Company of Merchants to refuse, illegally, to pay their promissory notes, when duly presented. The Jacobins, as they were still called, with a degree of impudence not to be adequately described; the Jacobins, who were represented as defeated and put down, and as being held in abhorrence by the people, were, nevertheless, at the same moment, represented as having such power over the mind of that same people, as to cause them to make a run upon the bank, which was called "stabbing the country in its vitals." Mr. FOX, in answer to Mr. WILBERFORCE, who (March 1, 1797) attributed "much of the public calamity to the conduct of the Opposition," and to the conduct of those who had "proceeded to lengths which the Oppo-

"sition would not *avow*;" in answer to this Mr. Fox said: "this reminds me of a scene in Ben Jonson, where it appears, that an Impostor had played his tricks very successfully for a long time upon his dupes, and, when he was detected, the dupes became very angry, not at the Impostor, but at those who had detected him."

Now was the time for those, who had been deluded into a support of Mr. Pitt's measures, to make a frank and manly acknowledgment of their error, and to join Mr. Fox in demanding a change of system. They had, when war was first contemplated, received the most solemn assurances, that the resources for *vigorous preparation* (at first preparation only was talked of) were *ample*, even from the *excess* of the revenue*; they had been, when, after the war had begun and had brought, at once, very disastrous effects as to pecuniary matters, told that those effects were *completely removed*, and that the revenue was in a *favourable state*; † they had been told, that the war could not be of long duration; they had been told, that the situation of France, in every respect, and especially in respect to her finances, was desperate beyond description; the French system had been repeatedly described to them as one that could not last above a few months, having in itself the seeds of inevitable destruction; they had been assured, that all the powers of Europe would join us against France; they had been told, that, if there were no other cause of ruin to our enemy, that enemy must be ruined by the loss of all his colonies (which we had taken), and

* "Gentlemen of the House of Commons. It is a great consolation to me to reflect, that you will find ample resources for effectually defraying the expence of *vigorous preparations*, from the excess of the actual revenue beyond the ordinary expenditure." — KING'S SPEECH, 13th Dec. 1792.

† "I feel too sensibly the repeated proofs which I have received of the affection of my subjects not to lament the necessity of any additional burthens. It is, however, a great consolation to me, to observe the favourable state of the Revenue, and the complete success of the measure which was last year adopted for removing the embarrassments affecting commercial credit." — KING'S SPEECH, 10th January 1794.

by the annihilation of his naval force, which seemed to have been nearly completed by the fourth year of the war; they had had, year after year, exhibited to them such pictures of the finances of France compared with those of England, as to make them believe that France must speedily become *bankrupt*, while England was (and partly in consequence of the war) becoming, every day, more and more rich, that her commerce was daily increasing, and that her *credit*, which was always firmly established, was now built upon a rock; they had, even in the King's Speech, made at the beginning of the session of which we are now speaking, and during which the stoppage took place, at the beginning of that very session they had been told, in the King's Speech, of the *SOLIDITY* of the pecuniary resources of the country*, while the Minister and his adherents echoed back the assertion. Upon this last occasion, which, Gentlemen, is worthy of particular attention, the time being only four months before the Bank stoppage actually took place; upon this occasion, Sir WILLIAM LOWTHER, who seconded the address, and who is now a Lord, I believe, said: "if we regarded our finances, they were *ABUNDANT* in the *EXTREME*, and such as were adequate to any emergency of the country." Lord MORPETH, son of the earl of Carlisle, who moved the address to the king in answer to his speech, said: "As to our internal situation, we have witnessed it, for some time past, with joy and exultation, and have reason to congratulate his Majesty and the people at large, upon our auspicious prospects in that respect." And Mr. PITT himself said, "As to our resources, they furnish, indeed, in a moment like the present, a subject of peculiar congratulation and well grounded confidence. Our resources remain as yet, untouched, and we shall be able to bring them into action with a degree of concert and effect, worthy of the character of the British

* "It is a great satisfaction to me to observe, that, notwithstanding the temporary embarrassments, which have been experienced, the state of the commerce, manufactures, and revenue of the country proves the real extent and *SOLIDITY* of our resources, and furnish you such means as must be equal to any exertions which the present crisis may require." — KING'S SPEECH, 6th October, 1796.

"nation, and of the cause in which they
"will be employed. These resources
"have in them, NOTHING HOLLOW
"OR DELUSIVE. They are the result
"of an accumulated capital, of gradually
"increasing commerce, of HIGH AND
"ESTABLISHED CREDIT; and they
"have been produced while we have been
"contending against a country, which
"exhibits, in every respect, *the reverse of*
"*this picture* *."

Such, Gentlemen, was the language of the Minister and his adherents at the beginning of that session, during which took place the memorable event, recorded in the foregoing Letter; and before you proceed any further, I beg you to look well at it. I beseech you to consider it well. If you do so, you never will be deluded again by any high-sounding assertions, let them come from what quarter they will. These, which I have just quoted, are memorable words. They are precious matter for history. They go a great way in enabling any one to judge of the character of Mr. PITT, as a *statesman*, and especially as a *political economist*. Gentlemen, there is no such thing as answering me here. No one can contradict me. What I have laid before you is indubitably true; and, as such, I am sure, it will have weight upon your minds, whatever your prejudices heretofore may have been.

The adherents of Mr. PITT had been told all that we have now taken a hasty review of; and, though they ought never to have believed it, having constantly been warned against the delusion by Mr. Fox, Mr. SHERIDAN, Mr. NICHOLLS, Mr. HOBHOUSE, Mr. GREY, Mr. TIERNEY, and others, but especially by the three former; though they ought not to have believed, and would not, had it not been for the blinding influence of the fears excited in their minds, have believed in those delusive assertions and predictions; still, if they did believe in them, they were not (if they looked upon the principle of the war as being *just and wise*) to be blamed for supporting the minister; but, when experience had undeceived them; when they saw the proof of their error; when clearly established facts told them that they were in the wrong course; when they had before their eyes, that which could not possibly

leave a doubt in any man's mind, that the system which they had so long supported was ruinous to their country; when they saw the Bank of England stop payment of its notes, and take shelter under an Order of the Privy Council, immediately followed by an *Act of Indemnification*, that is to say, an act to shelter the parties concerned from the penalties of the law; when the adherents of Mr. PITT saw this; when they beheld these effects, this mighty ruin, which that adherence had brought upon their country; when they beheld this, they ought to have withdrawn their support; and, if they had done this, though I am very far from saying, that they could have restored Gold and Silver payments at the Bank, and am still less inclined to say, that they would have put a stop to the workings of the French revolution, I am decidedly of opinion, that there was yet time to give such a turn to that revolution as to render it less violent in itself, less severe towards Europe in general, and infinitely less dangerous to this country, as we, in all likelihood, never should have seen an Emperor in France, and, of course, should not have had to dread, and to guard against, the effects of his ambition and his power. It must, I think, be now clear to all the world, that to Mr. PITT, supported by the great mercantile and monied bodies, BUONAPARTE owes his rise and his greatness; and, that, instead of being, as Mr. PITT once called him, "the child and the champion of Jacobinism," he may be truly called the child of Mr. PITT and the *paper-system*, that system, the effects of which we shall, every day, feel more and more; that system, of the evils of which almost every man seems now to be thoroughly convinced; that system, of which to prevent, or, at least, retard, the still greater evils, the Bullion Committee have proposed that *remedy*, into which we shall, by-and-by, have to examine.

Mr. PITT, who was, in the House of Commons, *boldness* personified; who never seemed to feel as men in general do upon being defeated in argument, or at being detected and exposed as to points of fact; who always appeared to increase in boldness in proportion as he was worsted in the contest, does, however, seem to have, for a while, at least, felt himself humbled upon this occasion, and to have been, as the vulgar saying is, completely *chop-fallen*; and, after what we have seen him (in the above-quoted passages) assert, only four

* See Parliamentary Debates, 6th Oct. 1796.

months before, well might he feel humbled; well might he feel afraid to open his mouth in the presence of those, who had so often told him that such would be the result of his system, and whom he had, as often, reproached with the want of love for their country, and even at whose opinions not only himself but his underlings had been accustomed to laugh. To come to the House of Commons, that scene of his long-enjoyed triumph; to come to that bench, whence he had so long been in the habit of dictating to all around him, and of dealing out his sarcasms upon all who dared question his infallibility; to come to the same bench, and thence to deliver a message from the king, (27th February, 1797) announcing the *Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank of England*; to do this, and to look Mr. Fox in the face, seemed to be too much even for Mr. PITT; to come down to the House, and say, that necessity had compelled him to issue an order of the King's Council to forbid, or to protect, the Bank of England from paying the just demands of its creditors, was more than he was able to do without faltering, and it is, perhaps, more than any other man upon earth, under similar circumstances, would have been able to do at all.

His confidence seems, for once, to have failed him; and, what is upon record as to the debate, clearly proves, that he did not know what to do; that he literally was at his wit's end. Having delivered the Message, and laid a copy of the Order of Council upon the table, he moved for the Message to be taken into consideration the next day, and, at the same time, gave notice of a motion for appointing a committee to inquire into the concerns of the Bank, an inquiry, he said, which "would greatly tend to confirm the solidity of the Bank capital." He also said, that he meant to declare by law, that "notes instead of cash would be taken by the public in payment of the sums due to them by the Bank." MR. ALDERMAN COMBE asked him, whether he meant "that bank notes were to be taken only by the receivers of the revenue, or, that they were to become a legal tender in all money transactions." He answered, that, "in the first instance, he meant only to propose, that they should be taken on the part of the public," leaving future measures to be decided upon, after the committee should have made their report. MR. COMBE asked him "whether it was

"his opinion, that this measure would be resorted to in the end." He answered, that "he had no opinion upon the subject." Mr. Fox asked him, "if he disclaimed the opinion." He replied, that "he said nothing about it at all."

Look at him, Gentlemen! See there the man, who had the management of the affairs of this country for twenty years, and during whose administration more persons were, I believe, promoted to the peerage, than during any century before. Look at him. See him, who, only four months before, had boasted that our "resources were untouched," and that there was "nothing hollow or delusive in our finances." Look at him now, not able to say; nay, not able to give an opinion, whether he shall propose Bank notes to be made a legal tender, or not! MR. NICHOLLS (of whose great understanding upon this subject we shall see many proofs by-and-by) "pressed him for an answer to the question which had been put to him, whether it was his intention that the notes of the Bank of England should be declared a legal tender from the Bank to the public creditor? If so, he was about to proclaim an act of insolvency. And, considering it in this light, he rebated his silence, as an instance of most atrocious arrogance. After animadverting, in the severest terms, on the confiding majorities in that House, who supported the Minister in every measure, however wild, and sanctioned every part of his conduct, however insolent, he concluded with repeating the question, whether or not bank notes were to be declared a legal tender to the public creditor." After the treatment, which this gentleman had frequently received at the hands of Mr. PITT and his adherents, it could surprise no body to see him give way, upon this occasion, to a degree of asperity, which, without taking these circumstances into view, might not have been fully justified by the conduct of Mr. PITT upon this particular occasion, who, in answer to Mr. NICHOLLS, said, that he was "perplexed by the observations and questions of the learned gentleman, who to an intricacy which it was impossible to unravel, added an exertion of voice much beyond what he was accustomed to, and an asperity of language which even exceeded that of the other honourable gentleman (Mr. SHERIDAN). He hoped that he would not persist in think-

"ing it atrocious arrogance in him, if he
 "did not attempt to answer what he con-
 "ceived it would be unpardonable arro-
 "gance in him to attempt to understand.
 "When a man obtruded his opinion,
 "with too much rashness or too much
 "positiveness, then he might be accused
 "of arrogance; but he did not perceive
 "that the man who altogether declined giv-
 "ing an opinion, could incur the imputa-
 "tion. But the learned gentleman seem-
 "ed to be as ignorant of the forms of the
 "House as of the common mode of busi-
 "ness. He might have known that
 "though it would be sometimes conve-
 "nient to ask and to communicate in-
 "formation by question and answer, that
 "no discussion can regularly take place,
 "except when a motion was before the
 "House."

This was a very poor evasion; but, in fact, he could give no answer to the question, unless he had been ready to make a full and fair acknowledgment of his *not knowing what to do*. Nothing could be plainer than the question; nothing more distinct; nothing more intelligible to any man, who understood the common meaning of the frightful words, **LEGAL TENDER**. But, how was an answer to be given? Even if the minister had made his mind up to go that length. Even if he had served his courage up to the contemplation of such a measure, how was he to find face to propose it *all at once*? To propose such a measure required time, even with such a man as Mr. Fitts. It, at any rate, required time for him to look round him in the House. It required time for him to discover how his adherents felt, and whether they were still to be depended upon. It also required time to break the matter to the public, and to afford an opportunity for the press, and for the minister's monied friends out of doors to exert their influence. It not only required time to see what *could* be done, but what *dared* to be attempted.

To obtain this time the scheme of a Committee of Inquiry was resorted to, the result of which inquiry and an account of the measures adopted we shall see in the next Letter. In the meanwhile, I am,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,
 October 18, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"A few days ago, five men belonging to the
 "KING'S GERMAN LEGION, stationed at
 "Bexhill, took a boat from the beach, in which
 "they proceeded to sea, and have not since
 "been heard of: it is supposed their intention
 "was to gain the enemy's coast."—*Times news-
 paper*, 16 Oct. 1810.

KING'S GERMAN LEGION.—Look at the motto, English reader! Look at the motto! And, when you have looked well at it, recollect, that these men are stationed upon the coast of Kent, just opposite the enemy's coast.—These *five* men, if this account be true, have had better luck than the *two* gentlemen of the same LEGION, who, the other day, were, as it was stated, going off over to the enemy, and who were caught, and brought back by a *single boatman* of Dover. Those two heroes had bad luck; but the *five* now before us, seem to have managed their affairs better.—The venal prints should, I think, be a little cautious how they draw conclusions against the French service from the circumstance of the *German* soldiers deserting from it; for, this is a mode of arguing that may prove very injurious to the reputation of *our service*.—The desertions of the Germans from Massena's army, under circumstances, where to desert must have been little more than taking a long walk, has been held forth as a proof of the disaffection of the enemy's army, and, at one time, nothing short of the total ruin of it was anticipated from that cause. What, then, must we naturally expect, that the French will say, when they hear of the Germans deserting from our army, with the desperate risk of being drowned in the undertaking?—It must, I should suppose, be about twenty to one, that a boat, taken off in the manner described in the motto, would never reach the coast of France. This the Royal German Legion men must know: and, I leave the reader to guess, then, at their *eagerness to get off*. That eagerness must be almost incredible, which I suspected, indeed, when I mentioned the attempt of the *two* men. I said, that, if two men of a corps had made so *desperate* an attempt to get away, it was reasonable to suppose, that there must be a very strong desire indeed to go over to the enemy, in those men, at least; and that it was very surprising if that desire should confine itself to their breasts.—I have dwelt enough upon the subject before, perhaps; but, as often as facts of this sort reach me,

I cannot forbear reminding my readers, that we never *till now* heard of soldiers deserting in this Island, with a view of going over to the enemy. These men, as well as our own native soldiers, have taken the oath of allegiance and fidelity, and, whatever may be the question of *real allegiance*, they are, towards this country, guilty of *treason* in attempting to go over to the enemy; or, if their crime be not treason; if they cannot be *punished* as traitors for this crime, it would be curious to ascertain *what footing they are upon* with us. In what sort of relationship they stand towards us?

—At the same time that these things are going on, we are informed, by the Morning Post of Wednesday last, that “a number of deserters from the French army are going to join the German Legion at BEXHILL.”—This is very good indeed. Gone to the very spot, whence the German Legion soldiers (or seven of them, at least) have deserted, or attempted to desert, and to go over to the enemy at the greatest risk of their lives!—There will be opportunities enough for my resuming this subject; I shall, therefore, only add, at present, that the MORNING POST and COURIER have not taken the smallest notice of the desertion of the *five* King's German Legion men; and yet, as the reader may have seen, the writers of these papers have the face to boast of enjoying THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, and that this liberty is a great blessing to the people of England. Indeed, this is one of the things, for the preservation of which they are continually calling upon us to spend our last shilling and to shed the last drop of our blood. This is one of the things, for the preservation of which they tell us, that we ought to think nothing of any sacrifice that may be demanded of us. This is one of the things, for the possession of which they tell us we ought to keep a Jubilee, and “to return humble and hearty thanks to the Almighty giver of good.” This is one of the things, for the enjoyment of which these pious, sincere and free gentlemen would have us prostrate ourselves in the dirt and adore the system of sway, under which we live.—All this is, however, on the part of these writers, quite natural. It belongs to the state of things in which we now are. It is not to be put a stop to by any effort that can be made by any man or body of men. It will last, probably, for some few years, ‘till events put an end to it; and, in the mean while, men of sense, while they see it going on, and while they

remark upon it, will rather smile, than be angry, at it, being quite sure as to what the final consequence will be, and that that consequence will come as soon as any reasonable man can desire it to come.

JEFFERY.—The TIMES news-paper of this day, contains the following letter. It is signed JOHN EVANS, and dated at Islington, 17th Oct. 1810.—“As every humane individual must be interested in the fate of poor Jeffery, the Seaman, I transmit you an extract from a letter shewn me by a friend this morning, which is dated Marblehead, United States, March 8, 1808. It was written by a Mr. Strawbridge, who had engaged thither, and is a person of the strictest veracity: it is addressed to a relative here in England; and speaking of the great kindness of the Americans to strangers, he specifies the following instance, which must relate to Jeffery, the Seaman, though no name be mentioned—A boy about sixteen was picked off an uninhabited island by a Marblehead vessel the week before last—had been put on shore there by a Captain of a man of war from Plymouth, for tapping a cask of liquor—had been nine days without food, was nearly dead, and no clothes! The Marblehead people collected money for a new suit of clothes. He is now quite well—has got work at nine shillings sterling a week. Board, washing, lodging, and mending. In short, I never thought there were such kind-hearted people in this world.—This extract, though short, may be deemed satisfactory as far as it goes, though there is probably a mistake respecting his age. The affidavit stated to be that of Jeffery, which lately appeared in your valuable paper, seemed to have set the public mind at rest; but a subsequent letter, said to be his mother's, has thrown it back again into a state of doubt. Your insertion, therefore, of this present communication, will no doubt be gratifying to every humane mind.”—Yes, it would be very gratifying to every one, if the thing were true; but, the whole of this account cannot be true. The letter of Mr. STRAWBRIDGE was, it is said, dated on the 8th of March, 1808, and it says, that the boy was “picked off an uninhabited island, by a Marblehead vessel, the week before last,” which must have been in the last week of February, in that year; whereas, Jeffery, as will be

seen from the evidence upon the trial (Register, Vol. XVII, page 401), was landed and left on Sombrero, on the 13th of December, 1807. Consequently, as he is said, by the declaration (see page 561) to have been 9 days upon the island, he must have been "picked off" on the 22nd of December, and not at the end of the month of February. This account, therefore, *cannot be true* in all its parts.—Besides, if MR. EVANS's friend possessed this letter upwards of two years ago, and had it in his possession ever since, how comes he to have kept it to himself all this while? There has been talk enough about the matter to have induced a "humane" man to make this letter public before now, or, at least, to have communicated its contents to the mother of Jeffery. The matter was first brought before parliament in February last; the Address to the King was moved and carried in April; and, when Mr. EVANS's friend saw, that the House of Commons had moved the king to send out in search of the unfortunate man, how comes it that this friend of Mr. Evans did not come forth with his letter?—These circumstances, besides the *certainty of one untruth*, make against the credibility of this new account, which, indeed, will weigh nothing at all; because, if it be true, there is in existence, *indubitable evidence* of that truth, and, *why not*, then, *bring us that evidence*.—In short, nothing but JEFFERY himself, coming in person to England, and the *identity of that person* certified upon the oaths of the mother and the most respectable of her neighbours. Nothing short of this will now do, in my opinion; and, I believe, the same opinion is entertained by almost every man, who has an opinion upon the subject.—To-day has also brought forth a letter upon the subject, in the MORNING CHRONICLE, which is curious, in many respects. It is as follows:—"LOOK, OCTOBER 12, 1810. "Having seen the Star of Monday last, "in which was a letter of the mother of "Jeffery, the seaman, to be sure of the "fact, I yesterday went to her (she lives "about two miles from my farm;) she "told me that the letter was from her, "and she shewed me several letters, to "her, one from Sir J—S—, a curious one, two from Mr. W. and one "from Mr. J—W—C—, but the "woman will not believe he is alive. "The trick of personating her son is "proved by his being able to write, and "to keep on a slate a daily account of

"jobs done in the smith's shop. I also "called on the Schoolmaster, Edward Rum- "dle, of Polperro, and he will, he said, make "oath any time of Jeffery being able to write "a good hand. He was always a dutiful "lad, and when the boat put off at the "fatal spot (Sombrero) he begged the "men, who belonged to Polperro, "not "to tell his mother what had happened to "him, and she reasons justly, by saying, "if he was alive he would have written to "her."—Now, I have seen a copy of this same letter; but my copy fills up the blanks of the names, and does not stop quite so soon as that of the Morning Chronicle. Mine goes on to say: "I hope SIR FRANCIS BURDETT will sift the matter yet "more, and I shall be glad that MR. COBBETT should know, that what is published from the STAR is truly from JEFFERY's mother. How much I wish these "advocates of truth to prevail against the "ruinous system, which threatens the "destruction of the country."—The Morning Chronicle thought, I suppose, that this latter part of the letter did not belong to the subject.—The letter is, however, authentic; that the reader may rely on; and, what is said of the Schoolmaster's evidence tends most strongly to confirm MRS. COADE's conjectures as to the trick of personating her son.—Against testimony like this, what is the weight of a letter, seen in the possession of a Mr. John Evans's friend, which letter bears a date of two years and a half ago, has not been made public till now, and contains one *known untruth*.—Again, I say, that nothing can now satisfy any man of sense, that JEFFERY is alive, unless he be produced at Polperro, and the identity of his person certified by his mother and her neighbours.—If I am asked, whether, if the authenticity of Mr. Evans's friend's letter be proved; whether, if it be proved, that MR. STRAWBRIDGE did write such a letter; if I am asked, whether, in this case, I shall believe, that JEFFERY was landed at Marblehead, I answer, *certainly not the sooner for such proof*; for, why should not such a story, though false, be propagated at Marblehead, and in the neighbourhood? Nay, *why should not a fellow be got to personate JEFFERY then?*—The reader will bear in mind, that after JEFFERY (See account of the trial of LAKE, Vol. XVII. page 396 and onwards) was put upon the Island, LAKE sailed for Barbadoes, whence, upon hearing the story, SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE sent him back

in search of the man. It appears, from the evidence, that he got back to the Island on the 11th of February, 1808, and found no traces of the man. Now, mark, it was *after they returned to Barbadoes this second time*, that SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE says (Vol. XVII. page 463) he *heard* of the circumstance being reported in an American news-paper, and of the man's arrival there, which *assured* him of the man's safety, and induced him to *let the business rest*, leaving, of course, LAKE in the command of his ship and men.—Where, then, is the difficulty of supposing, that a fellow really did personate JEFFERY at Marblehead; that, as such he was presented to the people; that, as such, money and clothes were collected for him; and that, as such, MR. STRAWBRIDGE heard of him, and gave an account of him to his friend, agreeably to MR. EVANS's letter.—I have had files of American news-papers, for many years back; and I have never seen in them an account of JEFFERY's deliverance. I have correspondents in America, who tell me, that they have never seen any such thing. If such a publication had been made, why has it not, long ago, been produced? Will any man believe, that, if it was to be found in any news-paper in America, LAKE would not have had it before now? An Advertisement, offering a dollar reward, would have got him fifty copies of the paper by this time. But, why need he go to America for this news-paper? There are files of the American news-papers kept at the NEW-ENGLAND COFFEE-HOUSE, or some other of the places, in London, where the Americans resort. Marblehead is near Boston. The paragraph would naturally appear in the Boston news-papers. Why not go and search a file of them? Why not go and get us this long-talked-of paragraph?—I must, however, confess, that the producing of an American paper, with the paragraph in it, would not go far towards making me believe JEFFERY to be alive. When I published a daily paper at Philadelphia, I was acquainted with a worthy old Quaker, named ROBERT VAREE, whose only failing was that of an insatiable curiosity, which led him to be eternally asking for news and especially news from England. It was my custom to pass every Saturday night and Sunday at another Quaker's about 12 miles from the city, and about a mile from Robert's house; and, upon a certain occasion, not having any English

news for him, a neighbour of mine, who was going out with me one Saturday evening, and who was also a friend of Robert, suggested the idea of making some for him. This he did in a paragraph, stating that the PRINCESS OF WALES had been brought to bed of three sons; that the assistants, in their hurry and anxiety, had so handed them about from one to the other, that, at last, neither of them could tell which was born first, and, of course, there might arise a disputed title to the Crown, whence might come strife and fightings and bloodshed without end.—The paragraph was printed in one copy of the news-paper, and then it was taken out, and the rest of the edition printed off with something else in the place of that paragraph. When ROBERT had read the paper, and was gone home, we put it in the fire, and left him to propagate its contents for miles and miles round the country, with an effect that will, I dare say, be, for years, remembered amongst the hospitable and good-humoured people of that part of Pennsylvania.—What difficulty would there be, then, in getting into an American news-paper a paragraph about JEFFERY? Nay, go ask the Editor of *L' Eclair* what difficulty there would be, if the temptation were sufficiently great, to have a whole news-paper printed for the purpose, and dated at whatever time the person who paid for it might wish for.—In short, it is clear, that nothing of this sort can be called proof; and, that a million of such loose circumstances are not worth the single fact of JEFFERY's being able to write and keep accounts.—When the story was told to SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE, it must have been evident enough, that something would, first or last, be wanted to confirm the truth of it. Measures, supposing the story to be invented, would, of course, be taken to secure that confirmation, if possible; and, how easily that might be done we have now seen, as far as concerns the paragraph. With regard to the personification, that would be easy enough too, through the means of any person having the needful, at any of the West India ports, where American ships were to be met with.—But, it was not easy to find any body to write in JEFFERY's hand to his mother. It was quite easy to take him, or "pick" him, off the rock; equally easy to carry him to Marblehead; still easier to land him; easy enough to pass him off upon the people as an object of compassion; very easy to get a col-

lection of clothes and money for him, and, if amongst the Quakers of Lower Dublin and Bucks counties in Pennsylvania, as easy to place him at free quarter all the year round for the rest of his life, with only the trouble of moving now-and-then from one house to another. It was easy to get a report spread abroad about the having "picked" him off a desert island; it was easy to get this report moulded into a paragraph and published in a newspaper; it was easy enough to find him out at Marblehead, when a noise began to be made about him in England; it was easy to prevail upon him not only to forget all resentment against LAKE, but to come forward and make a declaration, that he was the man who was landed at Sombrero; it was easy to get him to go to WENHAM from Marblehead, to *make* this Declaration, then to go to Boston, back through Marblehead, to *swear* to the truth of it, before Mr. STEPHENSON, who is a Notary Public, and who, perhaps, knew not the contents of the paper sworn to. All this was easy, all this it was easy to do with money. But it was not easy to make him write to his mother: money would not purchase his *hand-writing*.—The fact of his being able to write well, for a young man in his rank of life, is now, to my mind, established beyond a doubt. The letter, of which I have inserted a copy from the Morning Chronicle, and from the manuscript in my own possession, is of undoubted authenticity. It was shewn to me by a gentleman, who knows the writer well, and whom I know well. The writer attests the authenticity of Mrs. COADE's letter, and he himself states the declaration of the school-master.—How, then, are we to believe, that this young man would have remained nearly three years at Marblehead, without writing to his mother? From Marblehead, or close by it, vessels are continually sailing for England. Not less than one or two *every week*, perhaps, all the year round. JEFFERY, who had been a seaman, would not be ignorant of such matters. And, yet, he remains at that place nearly three years, and never writes a word to his mother.—Nothing but the identity of the man proved, and then the man's oath to the fact, would make me believe this.—Observe, it was *early in February 1808* that LAKE went back to Sombrero to look for JEFFERY, and it was in about three weeks after that time (as Mr. EVANS's friend's friend's letter says) that a boy,

"picked" off a desert island, was landed at Marblehead. This was just about the interval required for a vessel's sailing from the West Indies to New-England. Viewed in this way, there is consistency enough in all the parts; but, viewed in the other way; that is to say, proceeding upon the supposition, that JEFFERY is *alive*, all is inconsistent, improbable, unnatural, and rejected by reason.—I cannot dismiss this subject, even for the present, without repeating my earnest hope, that the government will not fail to avail themselves, to its full extent, of this opportunity, afforded them by SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, of convincing the whole nation, and *the scamen of our ships of war in particular*, that such an act as that of LAKE has their decided reprobation. An Address has been presented to the king. The king has issued his orders to make search for the unfortunate man, who was the subject of that address. And, there can be no doubt, that the matter will never be suffered to rest, till the fate of JEFFERY be proved beyond dispute.—I know of no act of cruelty equal to this, committed upon JEFFERY; I have never read and never heard of any act to equal this act committed upon an English sailor for taking *two quarts of spruce beer* (which did not belong *exclusively* to him) at a time when there was a *scarcity of water* in the ship; and, I do hope, and trust, and, indeed, I have *no doubt*, that the government will leave nothing undone, upon the subject, that *justice demands*, and that it is in *their power to do*.—The character of the nation is at stake, in this case. When we read, in the Morning Post and the Courier, the attacks upon Napoleon and the French Generals for their cruelties, can we suppose, that the French newspapers will pass in silence over this act of LAKE, this treatment of an English sailor? And, what reason should we have for surprise, if the play-makers in France and Holland and Denmark and Sweden were to make this act a subject amongst their exhibitions. It is due, therefore, to our national character, that nothing, as touching this matter, be left undone, in order to prove to the world, that no part of the act attaches itself to either the nation or the government.—Let me, in conclusion, observe, that this act was not committed by any of those, who are represented as *Jacobins*. I do not wish, by any means to insinuate, that the disposition, by which the act was dictated, is an ap-

pendage of *nobility*; but, as often as the act is mentioned by me, so often will I repeat, that it was not committed by a *Jacobin*.

PORTUGAL.—The Victory of Busaco has rendered what we shall have to say under this head of remark an object of much less interest than it used to be, when we could not help entertaining some latent fears as to the result of the campaign in Portugal. This victory, of which a full account was given in my last, appears to have removed every particle of apprehension, upon this score, from the minds of my diurnal contemporaries, upon whose sleeve, as to every thing relating to Portugal, I pin my faith, and on whom, if I should be in error, I have, I presume, a right to throw the whole of the responsibility.—The *Times* newspaper, of the 18th instant, contains some admirable remarks upon the consequences, which must inevitably result from the Victory of Busaco, part of which remarks I cannot refrain from inserting here —“ But now observe what towering hopes open to us, which the country may indulge, we may say, with the most perfect confidence: Massena is on a remote frontier, and with an inferior army, and that army with nothing but the ground it covers, as Lord Wellington stated in his dispatches; while his Lordship had an open and friendly country to retire through. The original *SEVENTY THOUSAND* French, exclusive of all other deductions, sunk by the single battle of Busaco to *SIXTY THOUSAND*; and supposing any fresh supplies to have arrived from France, yet these, and more, must be expended upon the garrisons of the captured towns, and in supplying the places of those who fell in the capture of them. Against these *sixty thousand*, if there are in truth so many, the British General is able to bring into the field *thirty-six thousand* English, and *forty-five thousand* Portuguese troops of the line, the latter tried and found worthy of contending in the ranks with the former; in all, *eighty-one thousand* men.—There are besides these, the Portuguese militia *fifty-four thousand* in number, and the *ordonanza*; whom Lord Wellington describes as having harassed the flanks and rear of *Massena's* army, (even) in his advance from *Celerico to Viseu*: how will they infest him in his retreat? His communication with *Almeida*, too, (as his

Lordship's dispatches likewise inform us) is completely cut off. To all these circumstances must be added the natural *despondency* created in the minds of his men by the signal overthrow at Busaco, wherein they lost more than a seventh part, more than half a quarter, of their whole body. Lord Wellington retreated before an army that had not defeated him, and that could not defeat him; Massena will have to escape from one by which he has been already beaten.”—This picture is very ably drawn; and, as the writer further observes, “it is not easy to see how it is possible for Massena to escape; and that we may look, with confidence, and a kind of anticipating exultation, to the opening of the future dispatches from Portugal.” It is not frequently that I agree with the *Courier*, but to its statement of numbers, upon this occasion, there is not much to object.—To those who entertain apprehensions, from a belief that the enemy's force is so superior, it will be gratifying to hear, that with the reinforcements on their march from Lisbon to join our army, Lord Wellington will have between thirty and forty thousand British troops, with a force not much inferior of Portuguese. The enemy's army consists of three divisions, *Regnier's*, *Ney's*, and *Junot's*; these divisions are about 25,000 men each, or 75,000 men in all; from that amount however must be deducted the loss sustained by the enemy in the late battle, about 10,000 men.”—Thus, this print, too, gives to *Viscount Talavera* the decided superiority in point of numbers; and, in other respects, there is, we know well, no comparison at all. We all know, how much superior an English army, including officers of course, is to a French army of the same numbers. That point has long been settled. And, we are now told officially, by our Commander himself, that the Portuguese regulars are worthy of contending in the same ranks with our men; that is to say, that they are as good soldiers.—Besides these, there are all the Portuguese militia, amounting to above 60 thousand; and, what sort of troops these are, how nearly equal to the regulars, we may easily guess from the circumstance of Lord Talavera's having ordered a body of them, under a Colonel, to perform the duty of stopping the French army in their attempt to get round into the road between Coimbra and Oporto. This clearly shews what a description of troops

these are ; and, remember, there are *sixty thousand* of them.—The MORNING POST of these last four days, tells us, that, as to Oporto, if Massena should attempt to escape by going thither, preparations are made in all the northern provinces for the destroying of mills and provisions, the inhabitants having resolved to withdraw to the mountains ; that there are at least 20 thousand men to the north of the Douro, under General Silveira, exclusive of the armed peasantry ; that there is a large Spanish army collecting very rapidly in Galicia ; that the armed peasantry with two brigades of Portuguese Troops, under Cols. Miller and Trant, are “operating upon Massena’s communications ;” that Lord Talavera, with an *increasing* army, is in Massena’s front ; that, the country does not afford supplies for its own inhabitants ; that Lord Talavera is obliged to get part of his from his ships ; that, of course, Massena can get none ; that his men were actually starving before he was defeated ; that, in the dead Frenchmen’s haversacks a little INDIAN CORN (whether boiled or not is not said) was found, but neither bread nor biscuit ; that, since his defeat, his men have deserted more than ever ; and, that, in short, “his hour is come.”

—It is an old saying, that what every body says must be true ; and, every account, from all quarters, seems to say, that Massena never can get off with whole bones. Here we see him fairly caught. Twenty thousand men besides numerous bodies of irregulars occupy the North, in the rear of him ; he is cut off from Almeida to the East ; Lord Talavera, with a victorious and increasing army, is in his front ; Cols. Miller and Trant are “operating upon his communications ;” so that, he seems to have nothing but the West open to him, and there, for his comfort, he has the sea, which seems kindly to tender him and his army an effectual cure for all their diseases, wants, and misfortunes.

W^M. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
October 19, 1810.

POST SCRIPT.—Just as I was sending off the above, the following article reached me through the COURIER news-paper of this evening.—“We are enabled officially to contradict the report of a second battle. None had been fought down to the fifth. Dispatches of that date have just been received from Lord Wellington, by a messenger who left

“Lisbon on the 7th.—The Dispatches are dated from Alcobuca, to the S. W. of Leyria, on the road leading by the sea coast to Torres Vedras.—Having ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECT of giving time to the inhabitants of Coimbra to remove themselves and their effects, his Lordship retreated from the Banks of the Mondego on the evening of the first, as we understand.—Meanwhile Massena continued to advance from Avellans, and crossed the Mondego.—There had been some sharp skirmishing with his advanced guard. Our army conducted its march gradually and in the greatest order. The first fortified position is near Torres Vedras.—Massena’s Headquarters were at Leyria.”—ALCOBUÇA is, by the road, about 70 English miles, I should think, from COIMBRA, which, of course, is the distance that our army has moved since the 30th of September, on which day the Viscount’s dispatches were dated at Coimbra. LEYRIA is about 15 English miles from ALCOBUÇA ; so that, it appears, that Massena and his scare-crows push on, as if resolved to get a belly-full of our provisions before they take their farewell of this world.—I should have been for letting them die empty, and, therefore, I would not have stopped to bury the 2,000 dead Frenchmen and to examine the ears of Indian Corn in their haversacks.—N. B. We are not told, whether Colonels Miller and Trant were still “operating upon Massena’s communications.”

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SICILY.—Proclamation.—Ferdinand IV. by the Grace of God, King of the two Sicilies, Jerusalem, &c. Infant of Spain, Duke of Parma, Placenza, Castis, &c. Grand Hereditary Prince of Tuscany, to our beloved and faithful people of Sicily.—10th July, 1810. (Concluded from p. 672.)

.....In vain does he try, with unequalled impudencies, to pervert and misrepresent facts for the purpose of animating his soldiers and sailors ; they all know the losses he has sustained ; they all know, that to flight alone they are indebted for their lives, and they all see that the batteries on the Calabrian coast are their only asylum and protection.—Sicilians! experience clearly shews you what an unlimited confidence you should repose on the heroic valour of our royal navy, and that of our august ally, the

King of Great Britain. To this moment they have baffled the enemy's attempts, and, with unimpaired zeal and courage, they will continue to avert from our shores the dreadful evils with which you are threatened. But what brilliant results have you not a right to expect of cherishing in your own breasts the enthusiastic love and loyalty with which you are nobly animated, and join your assistance, exertions, and means to the forces which we and our gallant allies oppose to the enemy. Then will victory be certain, and your tranquillity insured. The preservation of our holy religion, and of all the objects of your regards, and the sentiments of love and attachment which you have always displayed towards our person, call for all your exertions.—Hold, then, yourselves in readiness to join, at the voice of your Sovereign and Father, our troops and those of our faithful ally, the King of Great Britain, for the purpose of resisting the threatened invasion, and thereby securing his throne and its independence, and let your alacrity in obeying this call, afford the enemy an additional proof, that, making common cause with our allies, the English, you follow our example, and comply with our will; and that, therefore, he will find in all the inhabitants of this island a general and unanimous determination to shed the last drop of their blood, and to die with arms in their hands, rather than submit to his abhorred yoke. Sicilians! remember your former glory, and you shall be invincible.

FERDINAND THOMASO DI SOMMA.

RUSSIA.—*Note, relating to Confiscated Shipping.*—*Petersburgh, 20th July, 1810.*

Having observed, from the Note you presented me with, the Representations made by the Commissioners (of the Neutral Navigation Act) who were appointed to examine the case of the ships that have, during this season, reported their arrival from Teneriffe.—1st, That these cargoes from all appearances and confronting circumstances, are evidently doubtful and suspicious—2d, That the false papers and documents of the said vessels, given in for examination to the Commissioners, have been proved to them, and discovered, without the least doubt, to have been forged, this act alone admits of sufficient reason for confiscating the said cargoes without any further proof. I therefore agree with your opinion, that examining

the Masters and Owners of these ships, as heretofore has been usual by the Commissioners, in ordinary cases, will occasion a detention to them, without any utility arising to them from such an examination, but occasion a prolongation of the business. And as a quick decision will be beneficial to the commercial interest, during the present Navigation, and to the general credit, I empower you, through the medium of the Commissioners of the Neutral Navigation Act, immediately to confiscate the cargoes of said ships.—The Captains, Owners, and part Owners of said confiscated cargoes, having permission, within the usual time, to appeal according to the form of law prescribed, you shall receive particular instructions in what way the sale of the confiscated cargoes are to be made. *Ad interim*, you are to take proper care of the same. And although from the above-mentioned circumstances of forged documents being discovered, and false declarations of their coming from Teneriffe, the ships ought equally to be confiscated; but finding that most of the vessels are the property of the subjects of Neutral Powers, the resolution with respect to them shall be shortly formed. I order you immediately to take off the arrest of such vessels as are absolutely Neutrals, permitting them to load with our produce, and sailing, taking the usual precaution, that it is agreeable to the prescribed rules of permitting the export of our produce. ALEXANDER.

SPAIN.—*Order relating to the Caraccas.*—*31st July, 1810.*

The Council of Regency no sooner received the unexpected and disagreeable intelligence of the events that have occurred in the Caraccas, the natives whereof, instigated no doubt by some intriguers and factious persons, have committed the indignity of declaring themselves independent of the mother country, and created a Junta of government, which exercises the pretended independent authority, than his Majesty determined upon taking the most active and efficacious measures to attack an evil so scandalous both in its origin and progress. But in order to proceed with that mature deliberation and circumspection, which a matter of such importance demands, his Majesty thought it proper to advise thereon with the Supreme Council of Spain and the Indies. This has accordingly been done, and such mea-

asures have consequently been adopted as his Majesty entertains no doubt will accomplish the object in view; more particularly as, according to subsequent accounts, neither the capital and Province of Maracaibo, that of Coro, nor even the interior of Caraccas itself, have taken part in so criminal a proceeding; but on the contrary, that they have not only recognized the Council of Regency, but also, animated with the best spirit in favour of the people of the mother country, have taken the most efficacious measures to oppose the absurd idea of the Caraccas declaring themselves independent, without the means of maintaining their independence. His Majesty has, nevertheless, deemed it indispensable to declare, as he hereby declares, the province of the Caraccas to be in a state of rigorous blockade; ordering that no vessels shall enter the ports thereof, under pain of being detained by the cruisers and vessels of his Majesty, and forbidding all Commandants and Chiefs, civil or military, of any of the provinces or dominions of his Majesty, to authorise vessels to proceed to La Guaiara, or to grant permits or licences to any vessel bound thereto, or to any port or creek of the said province; and further, commanding that all vessels sailing therefrom, whithersoever bound, shall be seized, detained, and confiscated; and, in order to carry this measure into effect, his Majesty is forwarding a sufficient naval force to prevent any vessel from entering, or departing from the ports of the said province.—His Majesty also directs, that all the Commandants, and Chiefs of the provinces, contiguous to the said province, do obstruct the introduction therein of any description of provisions, arms, or stores, and likewise the exportation of the productions of its soil or industry; and that they exert themselves to cut off all communication with the inhabitants of the said province.—This Royal resolution does not extend to such provinces of that Captain-generalship as, declining to follow the pernicious example of that of the Caraccas, have manifested their constant fidelity, by renouncing the project of rebellion, which has solely originated in the unbounded ambition of some of the inhabitants, and the blind credulity of the rest, in suffering themselves to be hurried away by the inflamed passions of their fellow countrymen. His Majesty has taken the proper means for the complete extirpation of these evils, and chastising the authors thereof with all

the rigour which the rights of sovereignty authorise him to exercise, if they do not previously make a voluntary submission; in which case his Majesty grants them a general pardon.—His Majesty orders that these dispositions be circulated in his dominions for the purpose of being carried into effect, and also in foreign parts, that they may conform themselves to the measures adopted for the blockade of the above mentioned coasts; and by order of his Majesty I transmit the same to your honour for your information, &c.

FRANCE.—*Copy of a Letter from the Minister of Foreign Relations to Mr. Armstrong.—Paris, August 5, 1810.*

Sir; I have laid before his Majesty the Emperor and King, the Act of Congress of the 1st of May, extracted from the paper of the United States, which you had transmitted to me. His Majesty could have wished that this Act, and all other Acts of the United States that may concern France, had been always officially notified to him.—The Emperor applauded the general embargo laid by the United States on all their vessels, because that measure, if it has been prejudicial to France, contained at least, nothing offensive to her honour. It has caused her to lose her colonies of Guadaloupe, Martinique and Cayenne. The Emperor did not complain of it. He made this sacrifice to the principle which determined the Americans to impose the embargo, and which inspired them with the noble resolution of interdicting themselves the use of the sea, rather than submit to the laws of those who wish to become its tyrants.—The Act of the 1st of March removed the embargo, and substituted for it a measure which must have been particularly injurious to the interests of France.—That Act, with which the Emperor was not acquainted for a considerable time after, interdicted to American vessels the commerce of France, whilst it authorised a trade with Spain, Naples and Holland, that is to say, with countries under French influence, and denounced confiscation against all French vessels that should enter the ports of America. Reprisal was a matter of right, and commanded by the dignity of France, a circumstance upon which it was impossible to make any compromise. The sequestration of all the American vessels in France was the necessary result of the measure taken by Congress.—At present the Congress treads

back its steps. It revokes the Act of the 1st of March. The ports of America are open to French commerce, and France is no longer interdicted to the Americans. In short, the Congress engages to oppose such of the Belligerent Powers as shall refuse to recognise the rights of neutrals. In this new state of things, I am authorised to declare to you, Sir, that the Decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that, from the 1st of November, they will cease to be in force, it being understood that in consequence of this declaration the English shall revoke their Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade which they have attempted to establish; or that the United States, conformably to the Act which you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English.—It is with the most particular satisfaction that I inform you of this resolution of the Emperor. His Majesty loves the Americans. Their prosperity, and their commerce, enter into the views of his policy. The independence of America is one of the principal titles of the glory of France. Since that epoch the Emperor has felt a pleasure in aggrandizing the United States; and in all circumstances, whatever can contribute to the independence, the prosperity, and the liberty of the Americans, will be regarded by the Emperor as conformable to the interests of his Empire.

FRANCE.—*Decree, relating to Goods imported.*
—*Dated Trianon, 5th Aug. 1810.*—*N. B. The Moniteur declares (See Register page 377) this Decree not to have been published in France.—It appears to have been forged somewhere.*

Art. 1. The duties upon the importation of the undermentioned goods and merchandize are settled as follow:—By metrical quintal: the Cottons of Brazil, Cayenne, Surinam, Demerary and Georgia, long staple, 800 francs; Levant cottons, imported by sea, 600 fr.; the same by land, through the offices at Cologne, Coblentz, Mayence, and Strasburgh, 300 fr.; cottons from all other places, those from Naples excepted, 600 fr.; those from Naples, the old duties. Raw sugar, 300 fr.; clayed or loaf sugar, 400 fr.; Hyson teas, 900 fr.; green teas, 600 fr.; all other tea, 150 fr.; Indigo, 900 fr.; cocoa, 100 fr.; cochineal, 2,000 fr.; white pepper, 600 fr.; black do. 400 fr.; common cinnamon, 1,400 fr.; fine do. 2,000 fr.; cloves,

600 fr.; nutmegs, 2,000 fr.; mahogany, 50 fr.; Pernambuco wood, 120 fr.; Campeachy do. 80 fr.; dye-woods ground, 100 fr.—Art. 2. When the Custom-house Officers suspect that the declarations concerning the species or qualities are false, they shall send specimens to the Director-General of our Customs, who is to cause them to be examined by Commissaries who have a knowledge of these branches, attached to the Ministry of the Interior; and who, in every such examination, shall be assisted by two manufacturers or merchants, chosen by the Minister of the Interior.—If it shall appear that the declarations are false, all the merchandize shall be seized and confiscated.

FRANCE.—*Decree relative to News-papers.*
—*Dated at Trianon, 3rd Aug. 1810.*

1. There shall be only one journal in each of the departments with the exception of that of the Seine.—2. This journal shall be under the authority of the Prefect, and cannot be published but with his approbation.—3. Nevertheless, the Prefects may provisionally authorize in our great cities, the publication of papers containing advertisements in the nature of posting bills, or hand-bills, relative to sale of articles of merchandize and immoveable property; and journals, treating exclusively of literature, the sciences, arts, and agriculture. The said publications must contain no articles foreign to their object.—4. Our Minister of the Interior shall, on the 1st of September next, make a report to us upon the said advertising journals; the publication of which may be definitively determined.

DENMARK.—*Royal Decree, 9 Aug. 1810.*

We, Frederic the 6th, hereby declare that in consideration of the peculiar circumstances of the times we find it necessary to order and decree as follows:—Art. 1. The line extending from the city of Neustadt through the several places in a direct line as far as Husum, in the plain of Norderdith, shall be considered as a line of customs over which no produce that is not of Europe shall, either by sea or land, be exported from our Duchy of Holstein.—Art. 2. Refined sugar and molasses are not to pass the above line.—Art. 3. An exception is admitted as to small quantities of Non-European or refined sugar and molasses, which evidently are designed

for domestic use in places beyond the line.—Art. 4. Such Non-European produce which is indispensable for manufactures, may be passed over the line in the necessary quantities, under an engagement that the manufactures in which they are used shall be sent to the countries within the line.—Art. 5. A Committee is appointed for the distribution of licences for the above mentioned quantities of Non-European produce, which Committee is to secure the fulfilment of such engagement, and to attend to the respective destinations.—Art. 6. For these objects all Non-European produce shall be previously announced to the Commission, with the manufacture in which it is to be employed, for its future transport over the line.—Art. 7. All Non-European produce found beyond the prescribed line, in greater quantities than the Commission deems necessary for retail trade in six months, and for domestic use in a year, shall, after six weeks from the date of this Decree, be subject to confiscation.—Art. 8. The City of Altona alone shall be exempt from these regulations, but all Non-European produce in this city, and refined sugar and molasses, shall be placed under the controul of a Committee of Export (whose duties are explained).—Art. 9. Every carriage is to give the security of 25 per cent. on the worth of the carriage and the loading, and for misconduct and false papers the whole is to be confiscated.—Art. 10. All Non-European produce which, in transport, shall be found within the boundary of the above mentioned places, shall be subject to confiscation; and further, both the owner and the carrier shall be fined in the value of the goods. The punishment shall be increased for each repetition of the offence; and if the party be guilty a fourth time, the offender is to suffer according to the judgment delivered in a General Chamber of Customs.—This Decree is to remain in force until superseded by some other, and the Military Commanders, as well as Officers of the Customs, are to watch over its punctual execution.

CASSEL.—1st Sept. 1810. *A Decree, published here, contains, among other things, the following:—*

1. The public debt of the ancient Hanoverian provinces will be administered se-

parately from the other departments of the kingdom, till it is otherwise ordered.

—2. The interest will be paid at the rate of two per cent. for the current year.—3. A Commission will be formed, charged with the liquidation of the Hanoverian debt, which will enter on its functions the 15th of September, of the present year.—4. The works of the Commission will form the basis of the grant-books, which henceforth will be the only and fundamental title for all the creditors of the State.—5. The Commission is to terminate its labours before the 15th of next March.

FRANCE.—*Instructions, relative to Commerce, in the North. 15th. Sept. 1810.*

The following is a copy of the instructions transmitted from Paris to General Molitor, and by him to the Directors of the Customs in the Rivers Elbe, Weser, and Jade. The 6th article is important, inasmuch as it allows vessels proceeding to France, under licences from that Government, to touch at an English port, and even land part of its cargo there, without danger of being prosecuted for the same:

—1. Every vessel must be provided with a licence, bearing the number and series of the port, and the number of the licences, delivered in each series.—1st series, Hamburg; 2d series, Bremen; 3d series, Lubek.—To these licences will be affixed the signature of the Emperor; those of the Ministers of the Interior; and of Marine; and also, that of the Director-General of the Customs, who will transmit them to the Directors of the Customs at the ports above-mentioned.—2. The Director of the Customs at each of these Ports, must instantly send advice of the arrival of these licences to his Majesty's Charges d'Affaires and Consuls in the Hanseatic Cities. He will notify to the Consuls the applications addressed to him for licences. The Consuls are to fill up, in their own hand-writing, the number of the licence, the name of the vessel, the amount of tonnage, and the number of the crew; the name of the Captain, the firm of the Commercial-house under bond for the vessel, and the port of destination in France.—They will also inscribe on the licences a motto, with the cypher which they have from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; this motto to be different for each licence. (*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 22.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1810. [Price 1s.

" He that fights, and goes away,
 " May live to fight another day ;
 " And, when the fight becomes a chase,
 " He wins the day that wins the race."—HUDIBRAS.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGAL.—The two common-place couplets, which I have taken for my motto to this Number, which the celebrated author of them used, in his mock-heroic poem, in an ironical sense, and which have generally, heretofore, been in such sense applied to events in real life, may, (if our intelligence be correct) be literally applied to the recent events in Portugal, and understood as conveying serious commendation on the conduct of our Commander, who fought at Busaço, who, immediately after went thence with great celerity, and who has lived to fight another day, and that, too, according to all our intelligence up to this time (Monday morning; 22nd October,) with every chance in his favour, and with almost a dead certainty of gaining a glorious and decisive victory. The fight, or the contest, between Baron Douro of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera and the French Marshal, the Prince of Essling, whose name is Massena, has, in fact, been a chase. The two armies were at, probably, when they started, *four hundred miles* (by the road) from the spot where they now are, and at which spot, being a very strong, if not impenetrable, position, our Commander and his army arrived first. That is to say, he, in the language of my motto, won the race, and thus far, at least, he may be considered as victorious.—In a former Number (page 661), I expressed my dislike to the detailing of the events of a campaign, such as the present, by piecemeal; because such a mode of proceeding always greatly diminished the pleasure of contemplating final success; and I added, that, in the case before us, the final overthrow, the route, the destruction, or the capture, of Massena and his army, when it should happen, would not afford nearly so much satisfaction, as it would have afforded, if we had never heard of the Victory of Busaço.—The objections, however, to this sort of anticipation seem now to be removed, or, rather, there can be

no more anticipation, and the time is come for recording the events of the campaign, seeing that, when the last Dispatches came away, every thing was prepared for the final battle, and that, in all probability, the intelligence of that battle having been fought, and of the last victory having been gained, will reach us before this sheet gets into the press. So near the close as this; with the whole historical materials of the campaign lying before us; and with nothing to add but a sentence or two, just to describe the time and manner in which our Commander gave the desperate enemy the *coup-de-grace*, or, in plain English, *put him out of his misery*; thus circumstanced, it would be wrong any longer to delay giving, or, at any rate, attempting to give, a brief history of this interesting, and will be long-remembered campaign. —The campaign did not, as far as we have much interest in it, begin 'till after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, a large city of Spain, about 20 miles (English) from the frontiers of Portugal. This city the French, under the chief command of Massena, had completely invested so early as the 31th of June last, and, after a most gallant defence, under the command of DON ANDRES HAYESTI, it surrendered on the 10th of July. (See page 188.) During this siege, the head quarters of our army, under its present Commander, Viscount of Talavera, was at ALVERCA, a small place about twenty miles from Ciudad Rodrigo, our advanced guard, under General Craufurd, being placed between that city and our head quarters. On the 4th of July Massena sent forward a body of troops, at the approach of whom General Craufurd fell back (See page 188) into the neighbourhood of Fort Conception, which is situated between Ciudad Rodrigo and ALMEIDA, the latter being a strongly fortified place, one of the frontier towns of Portugal, and situated at about ten miles from the frontiers. Some little skirmishing took place upon this occasion, in which our troops and those of Portugal distinguished themselves. —We must

now, for want of ample details in an official form, have recourse to those of a sort of *accredited news-paper* authority, it being of much importance, that we confine ourselves to what has been asserted, from time to time, by those of our public journals, which are looked upon, or, at least, which choose to look upon themselves, as being most friendly towards the Ministry, and are, therefore, vulgarly called ministerial news-papers.—By these prints, we were told in the latter end of July, that the French army were oppressed by every sort of calamity; that they had recently been beaten in such a manner by the Spaniards at Pandeo, whence four hundred carts loaded with wounded French had been sent into Madrid; that a considerable portion of their army had actually deserted and gone over to the Spaniards, and that the remainder was full of discontent. We were at the same time assured, that the Portuguese soldiers behaved well, and had displayed great steadiness and courage (see page 143).—The French newspapers, in remarking upon this information, insisted upon it that it was intended to deceive the people of England; and added, somewhat sarcastically, that while all these favourable appearances for the English existed, the French were besieging Ciudad Rodrigo, and the English quietly looked on, though the cries of the inhabitants were heard in their camp (see page 180 and onwards).—In answer to this, our ministerial news-papers insisted, that it would have been bad policy in us to attempt to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo; but that the cause of Portugal was in no danger whatever; that independently of the natural strength of Portugal, there were various fortified places, which were *adequately garrisoned* and must be regularly besieged, among which were Elvas, Almeida, Penishe, St. Julien and Caceres; that, besides, we had complete military possession of the country, all the resources of which were at our disposal, and all the people hearty in our cause and strenuous in their exertions; that in every part of the Peninsula, the prospect was fairer than ever, and in short, that there appeared to be no doubt of ultimate success; and the superiority of our troops over those of the French was confirmed by the dispatch of Lord Talavera giving an account of skirmishes with the enemy.—The former dispatch of our commander was, as we have seen, dated at Alverca, on the 11th of July. In his next, dated on the 26th of July, he gave us an

account of the attack made by the French upon gen. Craufurd's advanced guard near Fort Conception, where the enemy assailed him in his position, overpowered him by numbers, and drove him back, with considerable loss (see page 221 and onwards).—Coeval with this intelligence were the assurances of the Morning Post and other ministerial prints, that our army in Portugal was full of confidence, that the Portuguese soldiers behaved admirably, and that, in general Craufurd's affair we gave the enemy an *earnest of what may be expected in a general engagement* (see page 212).—The next dispatch of Lord Talavera of which the public in England have any knowledge, was dated on the 29th of August at Celorico. But we must first see what we had been told at home in the interval. It had been stated to us that Massena had been outwitted by our Commander; that the former had hoped that we should *relieve Rodrigo*; next, that we should *make a stand* at Fort Conception, and lastly that we should *risk a battle* for the sake of Almeida; in all which hopes the Frenchmen had been disappointed. We were further told, that Massena had made a movement forward with a view of *turning* us, but that our Commander, "with great judgment and promptitude," disappointed it by *throwing back his flank*," which we were told, made the enemy *retreat* with all possible speed. It was added at this time that desertions were still very great in the French army, and that our Portuguese allies had uniformly conducted themselves very gallantly. (See page 239.)—After this it appears (from the authority before mentioned, of course) that the French army became sorely afflicted with the dysentery, while our troops were free from that disease; that the main body of them, instead of advancing, had retreated, perhaps for want of provisions; that the Portuguese militia were numerous and fully prepared to meet the French, whose soldiers were deserting in all directions; that his languid operations had falsified the predictions of Lords Grenville and Grey; that Lord Talavera's army was in the highest health and spirits; that (and several instances were given) the Spaniards and Portuguese were beating the French and driving them before them wherever they came near them; that, at last Massena was in *full retreat*, owing to want of provisions and to desertion, disaffection and sickness; and that Lord Talavera, whose army had plenty of provisions, had

certainly once offered Massena battle, and that Massena had as certainly declined the offer. (See page 283.)—By the 12th of September, our authority seemed to waver as to numbers, and an attempt was made to diminish the force of our army. That point, however, was set to rights, and we still saw our commander with 60 thousand fighting men. We were now informed that the siege of Almeida had been commenced, and that the English Chief was concentrating his forces, with a view of compelling the French to keep in a collected body, and thus increase their difficulty of getting provisions, (see page 340).—The dispatch, which was just mentioned above, dated at Celorico on the 29th of August, gave us official information, that Almeida had fallen, and that our army had moved into the valley of Mondego; that the enemy had attacked our picquets, and had been repulsed. About the time that this dispatch was received, we saw an order of Lord Talavera, respecting letters written from the Army being published in newspapers, (see page 444 and 442.)—Our home authority before mentioned, now repeated to us, with more confidence than ever, that the soldiers of the French army were discontented in the highest degree; that the Portuguese intended to erect a monument to perpetuate the memory of that British generosity by which the independence of Portugal had been maintained; that though Almeida had fallen our prospects were none the worse for that; that the fall of that fortress would have no influence in the fortunes of the campaign; and, we were now told, in a very detailed account, that the English army consisted of 30,000 men, the Portuguese regulars of 59,755, and the Portuguese militia of 52,848, making a total of 142,603; a number far greater than it had ever been supposed Massena's army amounted to, even before that army had been wasted by hunger, sickness and desertion, (see page 406.)—Before any further dispatches came, we were told that Massena's circumstances had not been at all bettered by the fall of Almeida, and that the hopes that the opposition party entertained as to the destructive operation of the French against our army would prove delusive, (see page 437.)—The accounts, which we received through the French papers, which contained Massena's report of the siege and surrender of Almeida (see page 440 to 448 and 503 to

507); these accounts were calculated to give us a different impression as to the consequences of the fall of Almeida. We saw in that account, every reason to fear that the French would now be able to follow up their advantages. These fears were, too, rather augmented than lessened by the next dispatches of our commander, which was dated at Govea, on the fifth of September, and which gave us an account of the treachery and cowardice of the Lieutenant Governor and the commander of Artillery in the fortress of Almeida (see page 598).—Nevertheless, it appeared, from the aforementioned authority, that the cause was in as fair a way as ever, and though a conspiracy had, soon after this, been detected in Lisbon and in other parts of Portugal, the Government of that country was perfectly secure, and the people perfectly loyal; that the French army was greatly diminished in numbers; that Massena could bring only 50,000 men to face us in the field, while we had 30,000 British soldiers actually present, which number, when all the reinforcements arrived, would be augmented to 40,000, and while we had double the number of Portuguese, who had given so many proofs of their valour, and of their devotion to the cause (see page 545).—It now appeared, from the same authorities, that things were in the most encouraging situation (this was on the 10th instant); that nearly the whole population of the country accompanied our commander in his movements, who destroyed such part of their property as they were unable to remove; that Massena by advancing in an exhausted country must add to the embarrassments he previously laboured under from the insufficiency of his supplies; that our commander, in addition to the advantage of a strong mountainous position, had concentrated his forces, brought the Portuguese army within the range of his operations, and drawn nearer to his main resources, while the enemy got further from his supplies, was compelled to divide his forces, and was exposed to attacks from the mountains (see page 593).—Such was the state of things, agreeably to our intelligence (from the sources before mentioned) on the 10th of this present month, at which time our last dispatches from Lord Talavera came down to the 5th of September, and were dated at Gouvea, a place situated at about 80 miles from Ciudad Rodrigo, 60 from the Eastern frontiers of Portugal, about

50 from Almeida, and about 25 or 30 from Celorico, the place where his former dispatches were dated—After waiting eight days without any fresh official communications from Portugal, which brought us to a distance of thirty nine days from the date of the dispatches just mentioned, we had, on Sunday the 14th instant, announced to us from the mouth of the Park and Tower guns, the intelligence of the victory of Busaço, won upon a ridge of hills of that name situated at a distance of about fifty miles from Gouvea, and at a few miles distance from the City of Coimbra. In this victory, which was gained on the memorable 27th September, we are officially informed, we killed two thousand French, the wounded being immense. The enemy, our commander says in his dispatch, did not (and well he might not) renew his attack on the 28th; *except by the fire of his light troops*, but that he moved a large body of his army in such a direction as induced our Viscount to withdraw from the mountains of Busaço, that is to say from the field of battle, and to take his army in a Southern direction, that is to say, nearer to Lisbon, that is to say, further from the place where the two armies started, and nearer to our commander's strong holds, his reinforcements, and his shipping. In this dispatch, (see page 662) which is dated from Coimbra on the 30th of September, and to which, for an account of the particular acts of bravery performed by the officers and soldiers of the allied army, I beg leave to refer the reader; in this celebrated dispatch, the noble Viscount says, that this movement has afforded him a favourable opportunity of shewing the enemy the description of troops of which his army was composed; that the Portuguese troops were worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops; that Marshal Beresford had so disciplined the Portuguese army, that the latter had shown itself capable of engaging and defeating the enemy; that, throughout the contest upon the Sierra de Busaço, and in all the previous marches, and in those which he had since made (that is to say between the Victory and the date of his dispatch), "the whole army, says he, has conducted themselves in the most regular manner; Accordingly all the operations have been carried on with ease; the soldiers have suffered no privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the army is in the highest

"spirits." To all which he added, on the other side, that the enemy's communication with Almeida was completely cut off, and that he "*possessed only the ground on which his army stood.*"—This is the last intelligence, which has been communicated to us *officially*, and this, as was before observed, was dated at Coimbra, on the 30th of September. What was left unexplained by the Dispatch of the Noble Viscount of Talavera was fully communicated to us by the Ministerial Prints, the MORNING POST and the COURIER, who, upon information which they said was of the most authentic nature, stated, that our army had actually *buried* the 2,000 French, whom they killed on the 27th of September, and that the number of wounded French was 8,000, so that the enemy had lost, in this defeat, not less, at any rate, than 10,000 men; that the enemy was driven to despair for want of provisions; that, in the dead Frenchmen's haversacks, nothing but a little Indian Corn was found; that it was by mere accident, that the whole of the enemy's army was not captured, and that, as to an *escape* by the way of the North that was impossible.—Upon this occasion the MORNING POST (15th October) said, in a tone of moderation, that it should "not indulge in any triumph over its political adversaries, who had blamed the ministers for employing and re-inforcing our army in Portugal."—On the 17th instant (for we will now stick to particular days) the Morning Post said, that those writers who endeavoured to detract from the merits of the victory of Busaço ought to be exposed to the public; on the 18th, the same print said, that we offered battle to Massena on the 28th of September; that it was uncertain whether Massena would follow our army across the Mondego (that is to say about 25 miles from the place where he then was), but if he did, he would get *another* drubbing. On the 19th instant the same print said, that when Massena left Almeida he had 13 days provisions with him (which, of course, were all spent before he got to Busaço); that the prisoners had their *knap-sacks* full of Indian Corn unground, all the mills having been destroyed before the French came; that each French soldier was obliged to *pound his own Corn*; that the City of Coimbra would be *intirely* evacuated by its inhabitants, who would carry away their effects; that Lord Wellington had proved his superiority over Massena in every respect;

that there were at least 20 thousand men in the north together with a Spanish army rapidly collecting to harass the French in that quarter; that the armed peasantry with two brigades of Portuguese troops, under colonels Miller and Trant, were "*operating upon Massena's communications*;" that Lord Talavera with an increasing army was in Massena's front; that the country did not afford supplies for its own inhabitants; that Lord Talavera was obliged to get part of his from his ships; that of course, Massena could get none; that his men were actually starving before he was defeated; and that since his defeat the discontents and desertions of his army had been greater than ever.—On the 20th instant, the same print told us that dispatches had been received from Lord Talavera, dated Alcobaca, that is to say at about 70 miles from Coimbra along by the sea coast towards Lisbon; that these dispatches were dated on the 6th of October; that our army had retired gradually, first to Pombal, next to Leyria, and next to Alcobaca, having, by this gradual retreating, travelled 70 miles in 6 days; that there had been skirmishing almost daily, and that the advantage had uniformly been in favour of the British; that our commander had accomplished his object of giving time to the inhabitants of Coimbra to remove themselves and their property; that Coimbra and all the villages on the same day were deserted; that, whatever might be the opinion which prejudiced persons might be induced to build on present appearances, the public might be assured, that the British Chief was pursuing a plan long meditated by him, and now acted upon, not from necessity, but from judgment and choice; that a letter from Massena had been intercepted, in which he represents the difficulties of his advance, from the state of the roads and the circumstances of the country; that the English and Portuguese armies were in excellent health and spirits. The same print, under the same date, added, in another part of its pages, that the enemy's ravages were horrible; that the Porto road was covered with dead horses, mules, and bullocks; that the whole country was a scene of complete devastation; that such rapine, violations and murders were never before heard of; that many villages, towns, and country villas had been burnt to the ground; that every place was deserted; that

large tracts of Indian corn had been trodden down; that every thing was destroyed; and that, notwithstanding all this the people universally *blessed the English and execrated the French.*—On the 22nd instant, the same print, the Morning Post, communicated to the public, the following Bulletin, under authority of the Government in Downing Street:—"BULLETIN.—DOWNING-STREET, Oct. 20.—Dispatches have been received from Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, of the 13th instant, by which it appears that the Allied Armies had retreated within their lines. Their right being at Castanhero and Villa Franca, on the Tagus, and their left at Torres Vedras, on the 7th and 8th instant. They had not been molested in their retreat, but some affairs had taken place between the cavalry of the two armies, in which the British and Portuguese cavalry distinguished themselves.—The Marquis de la Romana, with 8,000 infantry, and 1,200 cavalry, was on his march to join Lord Wellington. He had arrived at Aldea Galega, on the Tagus, opposite to Lisbon, where transports were ready to carry him over. This movement had been masked by Mendizabal; and Mortier had fallen back towards Seville.—The rains had begun on the 8th. The British Army are protected from them in the villages and under huts. The French Army severely exposed to them. The Zezore River is more swollen.—Colonel Wilson had occupied the Sierra de Busaco with a Portuguese brigade on the 6th; and it was reported that Colonel Trant had entered Coimbra on the 7th, and had taken a French garrison, with their wounded prisoners. General Miller with another Portuguese brigade, was at Viseu. We had a strong garrison at Abrantes. Massena's head-quarters were at Rio Mayor. Lord Wellington's at Arruda, a short distance from Alenquer. General Hill was at Alhandra on the Tagus. General Craufurd in rear of Arruda, and our Cavalry in rear of the Army."—Thus, we see, that, not only had our commander completely succeeded in reaching, with his whole army, his impregnable positions near Lisbon; not only had he now attained that great object, which he had so long had in view; not only had he put into complete execution the plan long meditated by him, and acted upon, not from necessity, but from judgment and choice; not only had he, at the time of which this

bulletin speaks, to wit, on the 13th instant, got safely within his lines, and under cover from the rains, while the enemy, that same enemy, whom he had beaten but 15 days before, was on the outside of those lines, without any villages or huts to shelter them and exposed to the "pitiless pelting of the perilous storm;" not only had our commander received all this amazing increase of advantages, but we see, that he was also about to receive, besides his English re-inforcements, a reinforcement under the Marquis de la Romana, consisting of 8,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry.—This, then, was the situation of our army on the 13th instant, its right being protected by the Tagus, its left by the strong fortifications of Mafra and Cintra, there waiting the attack, with almost certainty of success.—The Morning Post of the 22nd instant informed us in addition to the above bulletin, that it was happy to observe, that every thing wore the most promising appearance on our side; that every thing had happened hitherto that was wished for and expected; that since the victory of Busaco Lord Talavera had as he intended from the outset of the campaign, *drawn the enemy after him*, to that very spot which he had selected as the most favourable ground upon which to wait their attack, and the manner in which this had been performed exhibited one of the most complete proofs of skilful and dextrous generalship that an admiring world ever witnessed; that he had reached this point of *pre-destination*, before the rains set in, and with his army un-impaired in every respect. It was now stated by this print that Massena's army amounted to 70,000 men, and Lord Talavera's to 60,000, though, as the reader will bear in mind, this same print had made Massena's army but 70,000, before his defeat at Busaco. In the mean time we were now positively assured, that Colonel Trant, in coming upon the rear of the French, had entered Coimbra and taken 5,000 of them prisoners; that all was destruction in the rear of the French army; that there was no way in which Massena could retreat without imminent peril; and that it must be by a *miracle* if the French commander or his army should escape.—As we now draw towards the close, we must take in the evening as well as the morning print. The Courier of the 22nd instant informed its readers, that the intelligence from Portugal was most encouraging, and that it inspired every

man with the greatest confidence; that Massena's rear was not only laid waste, but rendered very difficult for the passage of heavy artillery, that the whole line of country in the rear of him, was occupied by the Portuguese Militia under Colonel Trant, General Miller, Colonel Wilson, and Generals Silveira and Bucellar; that the position of our army was the strongest that could be conceived; that it was possible that Massena might endeavour to tread back his steps, but that this would be full of peril and difficulty; that his *wants* rendered it imperious upon him to make an attack upon us, and that in that attack, in all human probability, he the last, that the French will make in the kingdom of Portugal.—The Morning Post of this day, after an attempt to explain away what it had formerly asserted respecting our superiority of numbers, as if it were not content with a victory that will drive the French out of Portugal or make them prisoners, without the additional circumstance of doing this with inferior numbers; after this attempt, which is now made too late to be of any weight, the Morning Post proceeds to inform us, that on the 13th instant, 800 of the enemy were made prisoners, part of whom had arrived at Lisbon on the 14th instant; that the Marquis de la Romana had actually arrived with from 10 to 12,000 troops, and was then crossing the Tagus to join our army; that the position of our army was formed in three lines of defence, the rear commanding the front, so that even supposing the enemy were to carry our first lines, they could not turn their cannon against us with effect, whilst we could completely command them from the second line; that besides this, we have immense reserves of troops in the rear, and our right flank is protected by the gun-boats, sent from our men of war and transports; that the country between Coimbra and Lisbon is almost all like *Bagshot heath*, every hill a fortification, and the form a *crescent*; that within the chain, we have collected *all the produce of the country*, through which we have retreated, that we are consequently abundantly supplied, with Lisbon in our rear, and that the enemy has nothing; that within the chain, we have 70,000 fighting men, exclusive of those which are hastening on, and are ready to join under the Marquis de la Romana.—Such is the history of the campaign, up to the 13th instant, and such the relative situation of

the hostile armies on that day; thus has ended the *race*, and our Commander has fairly won it.—At the beginning of the campaign, I, with others, had in my head, the usual notions about *advancing* and *retreating*, the former of which I looked upon as a sign of *success*, and the latter as a mark of *failure*; and, as the reader will have perceived, the representations of my *authorities* were for a good while, calculated to foster this erroneous view of the matter. The putting of a garrison, too, into Almeida tended to keep me in error; because I could not see why a garrison and such immense quantities of provisions and ammunition were placed in that fortress, except for the purpose of *keeping the French back*, which seemed altogether incompatible with a plan for drawing them on into the heart of the country, and even into the neighbourhood of Lisbon. It did, besides, appear strange, that, if, as we are now, from my authorities, so positively assured, Lord Talavera's *long-meditated* plan was to draw the French after him towards Lisbon; in this case it did appear somewhat strange, that he should have exposed general Craufurd's corps to an attack at Fort Conception. There were other attempts at, or shews of, *resistance*, too, which, in the case supposed, did not appear necessary to the execution of the long-meditated plan, and which, indeed, might, by giving the enemy the alarm, have defeated that plan altogether.—But, whatever effect these circumstances, which seemed to me to indicate an *unwillingness* to move back, might have had upon my mind, and especially when I saw *reinforcements* daily marching to join our Chief, and which reinforcements appeared to me to indicate any thing rather than a *design* to draw the enemy into the heart of the country; whatever effect these circumstances might have had upon my mind, before the news of the victory of Busaco was received, that news removed all doubts upon the subject. For, when I saw, that our Commander, even after beating the French, after killing out right 2,000 of their men, and "putting 10,000 of them *'ors de combat*;" when I saw him after this, after so signal a victory, "*forbidding a pursuit*," and, on the contrary, turning upon his heel and making off back towards Lisbon; after seeing this, it was quite impossible for me to doubt, that his plan was to *draw the enemy after him* some whither or other; and, accordingly, it now appears, that this deep laid scheme of drawing the

enemy from the frontiers to *Torres Vedras*, a distance (including all the windings) of not less than 400 good miles, has succeeded even beyond expectation, and, perhaps, beyond the limits of the most ardent wishes.—One cannot, however, help being a little staggered at the idea of this cunning Frenchman having been so deceived, during such a length of time, and I am inclined, as to this point, to adopt the sentiments, so well and so forcibly expressed by the Editor of the *Times*, on the 20th instant:—"Still it cannot enter into our conception but that Massena must but be *ensuring his more absolute ruin* by these desperate movements in the face of a superior and victorious army; they are the most *singularly daring* of any that ever occurred in military history. Massena may have been urged to this rapid advance through the *wants* of his army, and the hope of anticipating by his celerity the *destruction of the resources* of the country, according to the system hitherto practised by the English General; and if *famine is warring upon our enemy*, it may have been as well to *suffer so useful an ally to perform its complete work*, and to *clear a free range and scope for its operations*, before we put in *aid the sword*: if, indeed, the latter is yet to terminate the dispute, we hail it as an auspicious omen that the conflict will take place near a spot already *consecrated to the glory of the British name*, the town of Vimiera."—The armies, however, passed through, or by, this town, at the distance of about 20 miles from where they now are.—This idea of our clearing a free range and scope for the operations of our ally, famine, is beautiful, and opens to one quite a new view of the matter. But, with submission, this clearing the scope for our ally may have been carried a little too far; because, we all know, how very formidable hunger is to the opponents of the hungry party. It is said, you know, that hunger will break through *stone walls*, and, therefore, we should, by no means, be desirous of seeing an army, under such influence, assailing our "fortified positions." If, therefore, I were to venture to point out any part of the campaign, in which I think it possible, that our Commander has committed a little oversight, it would be that he did not leave some little matter of eatables and drinkables to amuse the French on the way between COIMBRA and TORRES VEDRAS. But, he knows best; and, perhaps, the sooner

they got to him the better; the sooner he drew them into his last trap, the sooner would they be destroyed.—From the above-inserted Bulletin, it appears, that our army reached its long-meditated destination on the 7th and 8th instant, and that, on the last-mentioned day, the periodical rains set in. This seems to have been owing to something of a super-natural interposition; and it will, doubtless, be ascribed to "Divine Providence," under which we have, agreeably to the expressions we so often see made use of, been so long carrying on the good cause. That we should have fine weather to get along all our cannon and baggage; that the Sun should shine, 'till our army got into the houses and huts; and that the rain should instantly set in, and, as it were, fall on the French without mercy, is, really, very surprizing; but, there is no reasoning against facts, and this fact, be it observed, is communicated to us in a *Government Bulletin*.—Let us now, by way of conclusion, take one more look at the relative situation of the two armies, the conflict between whom has, in all probability, taken place some days back, seeing that the French were in such distress for provisions, and, in the language of our authorities, *had nothing*.—In the *Courier* of this evening, it is stated, in express terms, that our Commander has planted, on his lines, *twelve hundred pieces of cannon*, which, at one piece in every *thirty-four yards*, would reach *twenty-three miles*, leaving, for that distance, scarcely room for a single Frenchman to creep through, though there were neither horse nor foot to oppose him. The same print says, that the right of our line will be supported by gun-boats and launches from the men of war; that (which can surprize nobody) Lord Talavera is *rather* desirous that Massena should attack him where he now is; that this position has been strongly fortifying from the commencement of the campaign; and that "Lord Talavera (when Sir Arthur Wellesley) has been heard to say, that, "if he could have the *choice* of any ground "to contend with the French army upon, "it should be Torres Vedras, where he "now is," a choice, which, when we consider the security of the position, any fond mother would, doubtless, make on behalf of a darling son.—The *Morning Post* says, that nothing in nature can exceed the strength of our position; that supplies of all sorts are constantly moving from Lisbon towards the lines; that, the city

of Lisbon exhibits scenes truly warlike and terrific to the enemy; soldiers and officers at every step; processions of carts of 40, 50, and 60, at a time with provisions; commissaries waggons in dozens; mules loaded with biscuits in immense numbers; artillery moving along the streets towards the army; prisoners and deserters arriving 3 or 400 at a time, and *police horse guards* patrolling the streets in every direction; that while all is thus bustle and preparation and vigour and plenty on our side, on the side of the enemy all is misery, dejection, and languor; and, that, such is the state to which Massena is, at last, reduced, "our just resentment against "him and his army, almost yields to that "*compassion*, which is the natural effect of "British generosity towards a *fallen enemy*, "and which, while we detest his atrocious "crimes, bids us *spare his life*."—Thus ends (or in a few days must end, if our intelligence be true) the campaign in Portugal; and, I trust, that such an use will be made of success, purchased with so much treasure, valour, suffering, and blood, as will form some compensation to the country, to both countries indeed, for all the sacrifices they have been called upon to make, and have made, in order to insure it. To have defeated the French, to have cleared Portugal of them, will have been doing much in the way of *military glory*; it will have been doing much for our own fame, and have given a severe blow to the fame of the enemy; it will, perhaps have done more, towards the checking of the progress of France, than all that even we have done before. It will have removed the danger to have been apprehended as to an attack upon Ireland from the ports of Portugal, if those ports had not been thus prevented (for ever, let us hope) from getting into the possession of the French. This will be of great value to us; and, besides, there is every reason to suppose, that this terrible example made upon the army of Massena, will produce in the minds of the French soldiers, such a dread of us, as effectually to set aside all thoughts of an invasion of this or the Sister Island; for, if we thus beat them in a foreign country, under many disadvantages upon a general scale, what should we do with them here, where the very women and children would assist in knocking out their brains?—But, while I clearly see, and am, I trust, as ready as any man to acknowledge, the vast benefits of this total overthrow of the

French power in Portugal, and though I, by no means, wish to see any change of ministry, being of opinion, that such change would produce no one good whatever to the country, and would even retard any good that is to be hoped for; though these are my sentiments, as to these points, I cannot agree with the *MORNING POST* in the unqualified praises, which it bestows upon the Ministers for having projected the defence of Portugal and having reinforced our army there with every regiment that could be spared. It is very well to boast, now the result has been so fortunate; but, what would have been the tone, if the result had been the contrary? What would have been said, if Lord Talavera and his army had been one half of them cut to pieces and captured and the other half driven helter-skelter, head-over-heels, on board their shipping, and sent sprawling upon our shores like a parcel of half-drowned sheep in flood time? It is very good boasting now; but we are to consider, not only what *is*, but also what *might have been*; and, if we do this, we shall, I think, be persuaded, that the Ministers and their friends, ought to rest satisfied with moderation in their triumph.

JEFFERY.—The *Morning Post* of today, as well as several other of the newspapers, contain the following paragraph, from which it appears, that this poor fellow is actually alive:—"A private letter from Portsmouth, dated Sunday, has the following:—Jeffery, the seaman, was this day discharged from the navy, by order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. He was immediately brought on shore by Captain Proctor, of the *Thistle*, and set off for London, with two Gentlemen, one of whom was said to be the Attorney of the Hon. *Warwick Lake*, and the other a friend. Captain Proctor had been sent to Boston by Sir John Warren, with the necessary documents to bring Jeffery to England. He found him working at his trade as a blacksmith. Jeffery's account of the transaction has appeared before the public: he now states nothing new concerning it."—I have no room to say much upon this subject; but, reader, is it not (if this be true) exceedingly good to see the company that **JEFFERY** is got into, upon his arrival in England? *Lake's Attorney*, above all men in the world! *Lake's Attorney* to go to re-

ceive Jeffery, and escort him to London! *Lake's Attorney*! And "a friend?" A friend of Lake, of course. How kind they are become all at once. How tender-hearted. Just as if there were no such place as *Sombrero* in the world!—But, this will not suffice. *Lake's Attorney* may, perhaps, settle the matter with the poor fellow; but, something is now to be done to prevent any other English sailor ever being treated in the same way again; and, this, doubtless, will be done, the moment that the Parliament meets.—*Lake's Attorney*! Who would have thought it?—That the man is really come there can, I should hope, be now no doubt; but, we shall see more of the matter in a few days.

W^m. COBBETT:

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
October 23, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—*Instructions, relative to Commerce, in the North. 15th Sept. 1810. (Concluded from p. 704.)*

.....3. A minute will be drawn up of the delivery of each licence, to be signed by the Consul and the Director of the Customs; and notified to the military commandants at *Hamburgh*, *Bremen*, and *Lubeck*; who will report thereon to your Excellency. This minute, besides the descriptions in the body of the licences, will contain a specification of the packages of all the articles of merchandize composing the cargo of the vessel.—4. The same day that the vessel sets sail, the military commandants must apprise me thereof, and also notify the same to your Excellency. The military commandants will thus continue to notify the departure of every vessel sailing from any of these ports.—The destination of the vessels will be for *Dunkirk*, *Nantes*, and *Bourdeaux*.—5. For every licence there must be paid at the Port of Departure, and to the Treasury of the Customs, the sum of 60 francs for each ton of the burthen of the vessel for which the licence shall have been granted.—6. The vessels provided with licences may proceed direct to their port of destination in France, without being liable to be questioned for having been visited by English men of war or privateers. They may even land in a port of England the whole or such part as they may think proper, of their cargo,

without being questioned for having touched in England.—7. These vessels will be admitted into the ports of France, either in ballast, or with such articles of the merchandize of the North as are useful to the marine; and also with the productions of the soil of Germany and Poland, permitted to be imported into France, conforming nevertheless to the laws, tariffs, and regulations relative to the French customs.—8. Licenced vessels entering the ports of France above-mentioned may load, in return, wines, brandies, merchandize of French manufacture, and all other productions of the soil or industry of France; grain and flour of every description excepted.—9. Each licence will be in force only for a single voyage, including the going and returning. On re-arrival at the port of departure a fresh licence may be obtained on the same conditions.—10. The master of any vessel inclined to sail from the ports of Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck, with a cargo, consisting exclusively of all other merchandize, of timber, spars, hemp, and other articles of the North, proper for the service of the French marine, may apply to the Directors of the Customs in the ports of France respecting the disposal of his cargo.—11. The laws relative to the embargo must be re-published, and put in full force in the three ports before mentioned.

ENGLAND.—*Famous Horse Guards' Order about the honours to the Conquerors in Spain and Portugal.*—9th Sept. 1810.

His Majesty having been graciously pleased to command, that, in commemoration of the brilliant victories obtained by divisions of his army over the enemy in the battles of Roleia, Vimiera, also in the several instances where the cavalry had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves against the enemy in Spain, and in the battles of Corunna and Talavera de la Reyna, the under-mentioned officers of the army, present on those occasions, should enjoy the privilege of wearing a medal; and his Majesty having approved of the medal which has been struck, is pleased to command that it should be worn by the General Officers, suspended by a ribbon of the colour of the sash, with a blue edge, round the neck; and by the Commanding Officers of corps (not being of rank inferior to Lieut.-Col.), and the Chiefs of Military Departments,

attached by a ribbon of the same colour to the button-hole of their uniform:—His Majesty has also been pleased to command, that the medals which would have been conferred upon the Officers who have fallen at or died since the above-named actions, shall, as a token of respect for their memories, be deposited with their respective families.—Lieutenant-Generals.—Sir John Moore, K. B. Sir David Baird, Sir John Hope, K. B. Mackenzie Fraser, Lord Paget, and Viscount Wellington, K. B.—Major-Generals.—Sir John Sherbrook, K. B. William Payne, Lord W. Bentinck, Hon. Edw. Paget, Sir Brent Spencer, K. B. Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart. Rowland Hill, Coote Manningham, W. Carr Beresford, Ronald Craufurd Fergusson, Henry Warde, James Leith, John Randall McKenzie, and Christopher Tilson.—Brigadier-Generals.—John Slade, Moore Disney, William Palmer Acland, Miles Nightingall, Alexander Campbell, Henry Frederick Campbell, Richard Stewart, Hon. Charles Stewart, Ernest Baron Langworth, Alan Cameron, Bernard Foord Bowes, Henry Fane, Robert Anstruther, George Anson, James Catlin Craufurd, and Edward Howarth (Artillery).—Colonels.—Sigismund Baron Low, King's German Legion; Robert Cheney, 1st Foot Guards, 3d Battalion; W. Anson, 1st Foot Guards, 1st Battalion; John Stratford Saunders, 61st Foot; Andrew Hay, 1st Battalion Royals; James Kemmis, 40th Foot; Robert Burne, 36th Foot; Rufane Shaw Donkin; Hon. Edward Stopford, 3d Foot Guards; George Townsend Walker, 50th Foot; Samuel Hawker, 14th Light Dragoons; and George Murray, 3d Foot Guards (Quarter-Master-General).—Lieutenant-Colonels.—George Duncan Drummond, 24th Foot; Richard Hulse, Coldstream Guards; George Leigh, 10th Light Dragoons; William Guard, 45th Foot; James Wynch, 4th Foot; Oliver Thomas Jones, 18th Light Dragoons; Denis Pack, 71st Foot; Sir Granby Thomas Calcraft, 3d Dragoon Guards; Lord Robert Edward Henry Somerset, 4th Dragoons; Robert Ross, 20th Foot; Alexander Napier, 92d Foot; Joseph Fuller, Coldstream Guards; Ralph Darling, 51st Foot; Sir Windham W. Dalling, 3d Foot Guards; James Stirling, 42d Foot; John Harding, commanding Royal Artillery; Samuel Venables Hinde, 32d Foot; Colquhoun Grant, 15th Light Dragoons; James Lyon, 97th Foot; Sir William Myers, 7th Foot; Thomas Sidney Beckwith, 95th Foot; Charles D.

Taylor 20th Dragoons; Honourable George A. F. Lake, 29th Foot; Frederick de Arenschild, 1st Light Dragoons King's German Legion; Philip Cameron, 79th Foot; Alexander Gordon, 83d Foot; Richard Hussey Vivian, 7th Light Dragoons; Charles Donnellan, 1st Battalion 48th Foot; Charles P. Belson, 1st Battalion, 28th Foot; James Muter, 3d Foot; John Stewart, 9th Foot; Henry Torrens, 89th Foot; Daniel White, 29th Foot; John Brauns, 2d Line Battalion King's German Legion; Henry Seymour, 23d Light Dragoons; George Ridout Bingham, 53d Foot; Hon. Charles Greville, 36th Foot; William Maxwell, 1st Battalion, 26th Foot; Charles Fane, 59th Foot; James Bathurst, 60th Foot; Hoylet Framingham, commanding Royal Artillery; John B. Mackenzie, 5th Foot; Robert Barclay, 52d Foot; William Henry Bunbury, 3d Foot, commanding 1st Battalion of Detachments; William Robe, commanding Royal Artillery; George James Buere Tucker, Deputy Adjutant-General; John Cameron, 9th Foot, Jasper Nichols, 2d Battalion, 14th Foot; George Henry Duckworth, 2d Battalion 48th Foot; John Ross, 52d Foot, 2d Battalion; William Edgell Wyatt, 2d Battalion 23d Foot; William Breuninger, 2d Foot; Archibald Drummond, 3d Foot; Edward Copson, 5th Foot, 2d Battalion Detachments; Henry Craufurd, 1st Battalion 9th Foot; Edward Hull, 2d Battalion 43d Foot; William Douglas, 91st Foot; Chichester Macdonnell, 82d Foot; and Richard Fletcher, commanding Royal Engineers.—By his Majesty's command, DAVID DUNDAS, Commander in Chief.

FRANCE.—*Decree, relating to the Debt in Holland.*—*Dated, Tuilleries, Sept. 23, 1810.*

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation. Wishing to ensure the payment of all the arrears of the Government of Holland, anterior to its union with the French Empire, we have decreed, and do decree, as follows :

TITLE I.

Arrears of the Ministerial Services of Holland.

Art. 1. The 24 millions due by the Minister of Holland for services performed prior to 1810, comprising the sum of 2,700,000 francs, decreed but not paid,

shall be reimbursed and liquidated, according to the manner hereafter stated.

TITLE II.

Liquidation of the Arrears of Ministerial Services.

2. There will be established at Amsterdam a Council of Liquidation, presided by a Master of Requests of our Council of State.—3. All the arrears of debts for services performed and not paid shall be revised and liquidated before the 1st of July, 1811.—4. Every month, commencing from the 1st of November next, the state of liquidation of the preceding month shall be sent by the Arch-Treasurer to our Minister of Finance, to be submitted to our approbation.—5. Our Ministry of Finance shall transmit the state of liquidation, which shall have been approved, to our Minister of the Public Treasury, who shall cause the debts agreeable to the said statement to be paid in bills called Bills of the Syndicat of Holland.

TITLE III.

Of Bills of the Syndicat of Holland.

6. Our Minister of the Treasury shall cause 24,000,000 of Bills of the Syndicat of Holland, of 500 francs each, to be made; they shall be signed by the Secretary of the Syndicat.—7. These 24,000,000 of bills shall be divided into four series of 6,000,000 each. Each series will be payable from year to year, commencing from the 1st of January, 1812, at the rate of 500,000 francs per month.—8. The bills of the Syndicat of Holland will be conformable to the subjoined models.—9. They will be given in payment to the creditors. The payment will be made in Holland by the Paymaster of sundry expenses. The first distribution of the bills of the Syndicat will be in favour of those possessing orders, not paid, on the Treasury of Holland.—10. The bills of the Syndicat of Holland will be received in payment of the arrears of contributions.

TITLE IV.

Of the Syndicat of Holland.

11. There shall be formed at Amsterdam a Syndicat of thirty members, at the head of which will be our State Counsellor Appellius.—12. The Syndicat shall be charged with the payments of the bills of the Syndicat of Holland, at the period they become due; for this purpose they shall watch over and accelerate the re-

ceipts of all contributions in arrear to the 1st of January, 1810, and especially the payments resulting from the ratification of the Registers, to the amount of 24 millions.—13. The Syndicat of Holland will have a particular chest, in which will be deposited the produce of the arrears of contribution. It may, by a division of the Council, allow some time to the debtors when it has more funds than are necessary for paying the bills. It may likewise employ a part of the excess of the recovered arrears, in accelerating the payment of bills by anticipation, and before they fall due. The Council will settle in a conference, the series or section of series of bills of the Syndicat which will profit by this anticipated payment.—14. We reserve to ourselves to decree, if there is occasion, when the definitive account shall have been presented to us, respecting what remains due above the 24 millions.

TITLE V.

Of the Payment of the Interest of Arrears of the Public Debt.

13. The sum of 30 millions at which is valued the amount of interests and arrears of the public debt of Holland, from July 1809, to Oct. 22, 1810, shall be paid in bills of 500 francs each, admissible in payment for the Imperial domains of Holland, or the redemption of domain tithes of the same origin.—16. There shall be deducted from our domain revenues of Holland, an annual sum of 1,200,000 francs, destined to serve as a pledge for the payment of the interest of these 30 millions.—17. There shall be created by our public treasury, orders for payment at half-yearly periods of 500 francs, for the sum of 30 millions, the amount of the said interests; these orders will be admissible in payment for Imperial domains and the domain tithes of Holland, they shall be delivered to the creditors to whom the interest is due from the public debt, by the Paymaster of sundry expences, in each chief town of the department.—18. The Director of our domains and the domain revenues of Holland, shall form a list of the country domains, of the domain tithes and houses which shall be sold, and the payment discharged in orders of our public treasurer, conformably to the above article.—19. The said domains shall be sold by public auction; the country domains and domain tithes shall be put at the rate of 25 times the amount of their

annual revenues, and the houses at 16 times their yearly rent.—20. The orders, admissible in payment of the said domains, will be transferable by the way of endorsement. An interest of 4 per cent. for the years 1812 and 1813, shall be attached to such of the orders as have not been employed in purchasing of domains during the year 1811. This interest will be first taken from the produce of the 1,200,000 francs of the revenue deducted from the general budget.—21. Our Minister of Finance will render us an account monthly of the amount of sales of domains, sold or redeemed from tithes, in execution of the orders above.

TITLE VI.

Discharge of divers other Credits.

22. Our Caisse d' Amortissement of France shall reimburse, at the stated time, the bills of exchange, payable by the Treasury of Amsterdam for the service of the year 1808 and 1809, amounting to 6,600,000 francs, including 172,000 francs for the loans made by the Treasury of Holland upon different pledges, and the sum borrowed upon the dépôt of cloves, amounting to 1,505,000.—23. The 1,920,360lbs. of cloves, which are in the State warehouses in Holland, are to be placed at the disposition of the Caisse d' Amortissement, which will take care to successively sell it upon the most advantageous terms. With the produce of the sales it will reimburse itself to the amount of the advances which it must make in the execution of the above article.—24. Our cousin the Prince Arch-Treasurer, our Lieutenant-General in Holland, and our Ministers of Finance and the Treasury, are charged with the execution of this Decree. (Signed) NAPOLEON.

By the Emperor.

(Signed) H. B. Duke de BASSANO,
The Minister and Secretary of State.

GENOA.—Decree of Napoleon, relating to the Monks.—Sept. 25, 1810.

An Imperial Decree, dated the 13th of December, has been published here, by which all monastic orders and regular congregations of men and women, are definitively and entirely suppressed in the departments of Genoa, the Appenines, Montenotte, and Alps Maritime; and, in consequence, all exceptions made by anterior laws, decrees, and arrears, relative to the suppression of convents, in the said

departments, are revoked. The existing convents are to be shut up at the latest by the 15th of October next; and the religious dress is not to be worn from the 1st of November.

FRANCE.—*Commercial Decree. October 3, 1810.*

The exportation of French butter shall be permitted, but it shall continue only until the price be raised: That is to say—In the department of the mouths of the Meuse, in the marshes of Leyde and Delft, at two franks per kilogramme.—In the department of the Marsh of the Calvador, of the Lower Seine, of the Somme, and other maritime departments, at one frank and 50 cents. per kilogramme.—The duties of exportation are fixed by the kilogramme at 25 cen's. for the departments of the Calvador of the Lower Seine, of the Somme, and other departments of Old France.—At 20 cents. per kilogramme for the departments united in 1810.

FRANCE AND BARBARY. — *Orders to the French Consuls, resident at every port in Italy.—September 7, 1810.*

It is the intention of his Majesty the Emperor, that Barbary vessels shall be treated in the same manner as Ottoman ships, as, like them, they may have loaded at Malta, and paid the duty of 20 per cent. to the English.—You, therefore, will immediately sequester all Barbary vessels which may be arrived, or which may arrive in the harbours of your division, with whatever goods their cargoes may consist of.—You will inform me as soon as possible of the sequestration, laid as well on Barbary ships as on Ottoman vessels.—You will forward to me the *Proces Verbal*, with all the documents you may have collected relative to the circumstances of their voyage, the origin and nature of their cargo, and the insurances (if any) as well on ship as on cargo.

NAPLES.—*King Joachim's Proclamation to his Marine Army.—Camp of Melia, June 23, 1810.*

Brave Sailors:—The expedition against Capri has entitled you to the gratitude of your country; and the battles of the 28th June, 1809, the 3rd of March, and the 9th, 10th, 12th, and 22nd of this month, are proofs of your bravery. Your King is

satisfied with your behaviour.—But nothing is done, so long as any thing remains to be done. Sicily opens to you a new field of glory; the expedition for delivering from the yoke of the enemy this beautiful part of my territories, is determined on. The English shall be driven from that island, and the glory of the Neapolitan navy will be immortal.—Brave Sailors! You will fulfil what I expect from you. The Great Napoleon fixes his eye upon you. In his name I confide to your intrepidity 20,000 of his braves, and 10,000 of your countrymen. You will assert in the face of Europe the honour that is reserved for you to transport so glorious a trust, and pass the strait of Scilla. Yes, you will land these brave fellows on the opposite shore. The wind will favour your noble efforts, and nought will remain for you but to give battle to an enemy, who supposes himself invincible because the sea is between us; an enemy that you have seen withdraw in the most cowardly manner from our islands, without attempting to land, as he had insolently announced in his numerous proclamations; an enemy, in short, who does nothing but burn our cities, and plunder and devastate the peaceable inhabitants of our coasts.—Brave Sailors, you will fight under the eyes of your King; he will always be in the midst of you. Honour and rewards await you. The hearts of your countrymen in Sicily call upon you. Swear to overcome all obstacles, to brave all dangers; swear to conquer, and you will conquer.

SICILY.—*The English Commander, Sir John Stuart's Address to the British Troops in Sicily.—August 6, 1810.*

The enemy, who announced his approach with so much pomp, who proclaimed to Europe his intention to compel the English, your allies, to withdraw their assistance from you, and who founded, on the expected plunder of this happy island, his hopes of rewarding his exhausted legions; this bragging enemy, who hardly having made the first step, boasted that the fate of Sicily was almost decided, and who fixed the eyes of the whole world on his promised enterprise, has been forced to keep his boats drawn up for their security under the batteries of the opposite shore of Calabria.—For two months he has remained ingloriously hesitating on the margin of that strait, the barrier between

you and his oppression; and he draws back at the sight of that element, upon which the force of his nation has only met with disgrace, and sees snatched from him a spot guarded by troops who hear his menaces with scorn, and view his spurious eagles with the most perfect indifference.—Brave and loyal Sicilians! You have anticipated the paternal wishes of your gracious Sovereign, who has told you, that by your fidelity towards his allies, he would judge of the place which he held in your affections. It is for the preservation of his throne and for your own safety that we contend.—Noble inhabitants of Messina! a connection of years has made us as well known to you as brothers; like brothers you have joined us at the first sound of impending attack. In the exemplary zeal and loyalty of your respectable governor, we have found the most efficacious support to our measures for counteracting it. Your principal magistrates, your nobles, have assisted us with their authority. Your citizens have laboured for us, and have obtained the reward of their labours. In our anxiety for your defence, you will judge of the sentiments which unite us to you. Persevere with firmness in the noble spirit which you now shew. Reject with scorn the title of subjects, with which the Usurper has the insolence to insult you. Let the enemy know that your sailors, your soldiers, and your citizens feel no other jealousy to their allies, except who shall be first in the glorious contest for the common cause. And rely with security, that wherever the standard of your lawful Sovereign shall be displayed in union with the banners of his august ally our King, we shall have but one destiny as we have but one cause, and that we will never separate except in the last extremity.

SPAIN.—*Acts of the Cortez.*—Sept. 24, 1810.

Don Ferdinand VII. by the grace of God, King of Spain and of the Indies, and in his absence and captivity, the Council of Regency, authorised *ad interim*, to all to whom these presents come: Know ye, That in the general and extraordinary Cortes, assembled in the Royal Isla of Leon, it is resolved and decreed as follows: The Deputies who compose this Congress, and who represent the Spanish Nation, declare themselves legitimately constituted in General and Extraordinary Cortes,

and that in them resides the National Sovereignty.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes of the Spanish Nation, assembled in the Royal Isla of Leon, conforming wholly to the general will, pronounced in the most energetic and public manner, acknowledge, swear, and proclaim anew, as their only and legitimate Sovereign, Senor Don Ferdinand VII. of Bourbon; and declare null, of no value or effect, the cession of the Crown said to be made in favour of Napoleon, not only on account of the violence which attended those unjust and illegal acts, but principally on account of their wanting the consent of the Nation.—It not being suitable that the Legislative Power, the Executive and Judicial, should be united; the General and Extraordinary Cortes declare that they reserve to themselves the exercise of the Legislative Power in all its extent.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes declare, that the persons to whom they delegate the executive power, in the absence of our legitimate King and Lord Don Ferdinand VII. are responsible to the nation during the time of their administration, conformably to the laws.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes authorise the individuals of the Council of Regency, that they, under that same denomination, in the mean time, and until the Cortes choose a Government more suitable, exercise the Executive Power.—The Council of Regency, acting under this authorisation, declared anteriorly, shall acknowledge the national sovereignty of the Cortes, and shall swear obedience to the laws and decrees which emanate from them; for which purpose, it shall pass immediately, when this decree is made known to it, to the Hall of the Sitzings of the Cortes, who wait for its performing this act, and are in permanent sitting.—It is declared, that the formula of acknowledgment and oath, to be taken by the Council of Regency, is as follows;—Do you acknowledge the Sovereignty of the nation represented by the deputies of these general and extraordinary Cortes? Do you swear to obey their decrees, laws, and the constitution to be established according to the sacred ends for which they are united, and to order them to be observed, and to make them be executed? to preserve the independence, the liberty, and integrity of the nation? the Catholic Apostolic Roman Religion? the monarchical government of the kingdom? to re-establish on the throne our beloved King

Don Ferdinand VII. of Bourbon? and to act in every thing for the good of the State? According as you act thus, may God assist you! but if otherwise, you shall be responsible to the nation conformably to the laws.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes appoint for the present, that all the tribunals and courts of justice established in the kingdom, do continue administering justice according to the laws.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes confirm for the present all the civil and military authorities, of whatever class they may be.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes declare, that the persons of the Deputies are inviolable, and that no action can be brought by any authority, or any individual, against the Deputies, except in the terms which shall be laid down in the General Regulation about to be formed, and for which purpose a Committee shall be appointed.—The Council of Regency shall be made acquainted with this, and shall forthwith pass to the Hall of the Sitzings of the Cortes, to take the oath pointed out; deferring the publication and circulation of this Decree in the kingdom, till the Cortes point out how it is to be done, which shall be declared with all expedition.—(Signed) RAMON LAZARO DE DOU, President. EVA- RISTO PEREZ DE CASTRO, Secretary.—Royal Isla of Leon, Sept. 24, 1810, at 11 o'clock at night.

SPAIN.—*Acts of the Cortes.*—Sept. 25, 1810.

By a Decree, dated the 25th of September, the Cortes are to be addressed by the title of Majesty; and the Executive Power by that of Highness. The publication of the laws which emanate from the Cortes, is to be made in the following manner:—"Don Ferdinand VII. by the grace of God, King of Spain and the Indies, and in his absence and captivity the Council of Regency authorised *ad interim*, to all to whom these presents come: Know ye, that in the general and extraordinary Cortes assembled in the Royal Isle of Leon, it has been resolved and decreed as follows," &c. The same Decree requires all Civil, Military, and Ecclesiastical authorities, to acknowledge and take the oath of obedience to the General Cortes of the nation.

SPAIN.—Sept. 26, 1810.—*Memorial addressed by the Council of Regency to the*

General and Extraordinary Cortes, and the Royal Decree in Answer.

Senor;—The Council of Regency desires nothing with so much ardour as to convince the nation of the profound respect which it feels for the laws, and of its proper performance of the arduous functions which have been committed to its charge. Guided by this principle, which shall always be the rule of its conduct, it hesitates not a moment to take the oath of obedience to the laws and decrees which emanate from the Cortes, agreeably to the copy of the Decree which your Majesty addressed to the Council by a deputation.—In that same Decree, by which *your Majesty* reserved to yourself the exercise of the Legislative Power in all its extent, it was appointed that the Council of Regency should in the mean time, and until the Cortes elect a Government which may be more suitable, exercise the executive power, under responsibility to the nation, conformably to the laws. The Council of Regency cannot stir a single step in the difficult career of the authority entrusted to it without knowing beforehand the precise limits of the responsibility to which that Decree subjects them; for how can they regulate themselves by it, if they know neither its latitude nor the boundaries by which it is circumscribed? If it be not clearly and distinctly pointed out, what are the obligations of the Executive Power, and what are the powers that are conceded to it? Without this clear and precise distinction, the responsibility expressed in the Decree will remain without effect; for the line of separation between both powers, not being fixed by our ancient laws, nor the powers peculiar to each, the Council of Regency will find itself between two extremes, in danger of stumbling upon either, notwithstanding all it may do to avoid it; either at one time exercising an authority, which may, in the opinion of the Cortes, not to be comprehended in the attributes of the executive, or omitting at another time, from the same respect for the laws, to use those powers which are necessarily included in the idea of the executive Government, and the free and expeditious exercise of which is at present rendered more necessary than ever by the circumstances of the State. In proportion as these circumstances imperiously demand that there be a rapid and continued communication between the two authorities, in order that they may contribute by their

combined efforts to the salvation of the country, so it must be of the greatest importance that the mode of pursuing that object be fixed and established by a Decree.—The Council of Regency awaits, therefore, your Majesty's declaration;—first, what are the obligations annexed to the responsibility imposed by the said Decree, and what are the distinctive powers which are entrusted to the executive; secondly, what rule or order is to be followed in the communications which must necessarily and continually take place between your Majesty and the Council of Regency.—(Signed) FRANCISCO DE SAAVEDRA. XAVIER DE CASTANOS. ANTONIO DE ESCANO. MIGUEL DE LARIZABAL Y URIBE.

Answer.

The general and extraordinary Cortes declare, that in the Decree of the 24th of September of this year, limits have not been fixed to the powers which are proper to the executive, and that till a regulation be formed by the Cortes which may mark them out, it do exercise all that power which may be necessary for the defence, security, and administration of the State in the present critical circumstances; and also that the responsibility which the Council of Regency requires, exclude only the absolute inviolability which belongs to the sacred person of the King. With regard to the mode of communication between the Council of Regency and the Cortes, till these shall establish a more convenient one, the mode now adopted shall be followed. This shall be communicated to the Council of Regency in answer to their memorial of the 26th of the current month.—Given at the Royal Isle of Leon, at four in the morning of the 27th of Sept. 1810.—(Signed) RAMON LAZARO DE DOU, President. EVARISTO PEREZ DE CASTRO, MANUEL LUXAM, Secretaries.

SPAIN.—Names of the Members of the Cortes.

Don Nicholas Maria de Sierra, Secretary of State, Principal Notary of the Kingdom, &c. makes known, that the Council of Regency, constituted in this royal isle of Leon from the 22d instant, in expectation of the wished-for moment of the installation of the General and Extraordinary Cortes, after having repeated the summons of convocation, circulated

by the central Junta, the opening of which meeting was fixed for this day; having caused it to be preceded by a most solemn public supplication for three days, to implore of the Father of Lights that illumination which is requisite for fulfilling the sublime objects of a Congress of which there is no example in preceding ages, in respect of the universality of the national representation, which has been organized and assembled; having arranged that, in order to accomplish as much as possible what is requisite for the Provinces unhappily occupied by the enemy, Deputies should be elected to supply these deficiencies from the emigrants from such provinces; and the Divine inspiration being again implored by the mass of the Holy Ghost, celebrated pontifically by the Cardinal de Scala, Archbishop of Toledo; and the moment having now arrived when the installation was to take place, it was arranged, that all the Senors Deputies from the free provinces, and those supplied for the provinces occupied, being met in the Royal Palace of Regency, should, in conjunction with the Supreme Council, pass forth to the parochial church of this Isle, where the mass of the Holy Ghost might be celebrated, and the hymn of *Veni Sancte Spiritus* be sung; after which, a short exhortation being delivered, the Senors Deputies were to make profession of fidelity, and take the necessary oath. All which was prepared and executed with that dignified grandeur which the interest and sublimity of the object required, and the following Senors assembled in the said Palace and Hall destined for their reception; Don Benito Ramon de Hernida, Deputy for the kingdom of Galicia; the Marquis de Villafranca, for Murcia; Don Felipe Amat, for the principality of Catalonia; D. Antonio Oliveros, for the province of Estremadura; D. Ramon Pover, for the island of Porto Rico; D. Ramon Sans, for the city of Barcelona; D. Juan Valle, for Catalonia; D. Placido de Montolin, for the city of Tarragona; D. Jose Alonzo y Lopez, for the Superior Junta of Galicia; D. Jose Rioboo, for the province of Sandago; D. Jose Cevero, for that of Cadiz; D. Manuel Ross, for that of Santiago; D. Francisco Papiol, for Catalonia; D. Pedro Ric, for the superior Junta of Aragon;

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"But it was urged that the Bank had temporary difficulties to encounter, and that it behoved them to adopt some mode of granting relief to that important public body. The House of Commons, however, knew nothing of this. No application was made to them by the Bank, nor did it appear even that application had been made for the Order in Council: on the contrary, it appeared that this factious council, instead of examining the Directors of the Bank, acted entirely upon the authority of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Nay, what added to his surprise was, that *not one of the Bank Directors* who had seats in that House, had ever come forward and expressed an opinion upon the subject. Some information was certainly necessary before the House sanctioned so novel and dangerous a measure. They had heard of the Bank a short time ago lending two millions to Government, and they had also heard of the dividends on Bank Stock increasing. Was it not material to be informed therefore how they had come to stop payment at a time when their affairs seemed to be going on so prosperously?"

—MR. SHERIDAN. Speech 28th Feb. 1807.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XIII.

Alleged ability of the Bank—Proceedings out of doors for what was called support of Public Credit—Mansion House Meeting—Brook Watson—Quarter Sessions Resolutions—Privy Council Resolutions—Representations of the Venal Prints relative to these Resolutions—Real Origin of the Mansion House Meeting—Directors prevail upon Mr. Pitt to have a private Meeting of Bankers at his House—Plan of a public Meeting there laid—Peep behind the Curtain—Meeting of the Bank Proprietors—Declaration of the Governors, Mr. Bosanquet and Mr. Thornton—These Declarations compared with the private Minute of the Bank—Private Minute of the Bank, expressing their alarm for the Safety of the House, and for calling upon Mr. Pitt to know when he would interfere.

Gentlemen,

When we look at the boast, referred to in the words of my Motto, and consider how many boasts of the same sort the Minister had uttered, and which he had continued in the habit of uttering, down almost to the very hour of the Bank Stoppage, we cannot help wondering that he could longer endure his existence. What, then, will be the astonishment of posterity, to hear him, in a few months

after that event, speak of it and of the measures growing out of it, as the happy means of *safety to the country*; and what will be their shame to find, that he was still confided in and supported?

As we proceed with the history of the measures of *remedy* which were now adopted, we must not fail to pay particular attention to the *opinions and doctrines*, at this time expressed and laid down by the Minister and his adherents, especially by those of his adherents, who had a more immediate interest in the concerns of the Bank of England. We must take care to bear in mind what they *then* said as to the *origin*, of the Order of Council for the Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments at the Bank; what they said as to the *nature and necessity* of the measure; what they said as to the *ability* of the Bank to resume its payments; and what they said as to the *time* of such resumption. What they *then* said, as to all these points, we must take care to bear in mind; because, we shall have to compare it with what the same persons have said since, and have to shew how, in this case, as well as in so many others, the nation has been led on, by degrees, to acquiesce in what, if proposed to it all at once, would have made it shrink with affright, or fired it with indignation.

Before the House of Commons met, the day after the Message and Order of Council had been laid before it, that is to say, on the 28th of February, 1797, the Anti-Jacobin adherents of the Minister had been hard at work *out of doors*. A meeting had been called in the Mansion House of the city of London consisting of *Merchants, Bankers, and others*, the Chairman being

the Lord Mayor, whose name was Brook Watson, who then, or very soon afterwards, filled the lucrative office of *Commissary General to the Army*, and who was, in a very few years after that, made a *Baronet*. The persons assembled upon this occasion proclaimed their resolution *not to refuse bank notes* in payment of any sums due to them, and to use their utmost endeavours to make *all their payments* in the same manner * ; which, as you will perceive, Gentlemen, was neither more nor less than resolving, that they would do their utmost to keep up their own credit and consequence, and, in fact, to preserve themselves from instant ruin.

Similar Resolutions were passed in the country, where the Quarter Sessions happening to be then taking place, the Resolutions were sent forth from the *bench*, with, of course, something of a magisterial weight and authority, as will be seen in the instance of the magistrates of Surrey, who, with *Lords Grantley* and *Onslow* at their head, appear to have led the way †. The *Privy Council* (pray read

* MANSION-HOUSE, LONDON.—

February 27, 1797.—At a meeting of Merchants, Bankers, &c. held here this day, to consider of the steps which it may be proper to take, to prevent Embarrassments to Public Credit, from the effects of any ill-founded or exaggerated Alarms, and to support it with the utmost exertions at the present important conjuncture.—The LORD MAYOR in the Chair;—RESOLVED UNANIMOUSLY,—That we, the undersigned, being highly sensible how necessary the preservation of Public Credit is at this time, do most readily hereby declare, that we will not refuse to receive Bank Notes in payment of any sum of money to be paid to us; and we will use our utmost endeavours to make all our payments in the same manner.—BROOK WATSON.

The resolution lies for signing at the following places; London Tavern, Bishopsgate-Street; Crown and Anchor Tavern, Strand; St. Alban's Tavern, St. Alban's-Street; Three-Crown Coffee-house, in Three-Crown Court, Borough; and at Lloyd's Coffee-house.

† SURREY.—At the General Quarter Session of the Peace of our Sovereign Lord the King, holden at Saint Mary, Newington, by adjournment, in and for the said County, on Thursday the 2d day of March, 1797.—We whose names are hereunto

their names all over) had also a meeting upon the subject, and it was quite curious to see the Judges and great pensioners and even the *Ministers themselves*, not excepting the *Lord High Treasurer*, publishing their promises to receive and to pay bank notes, and, as far as depended on them individually, to support the circulation of those notes †.

subscribed, being desirous to contribute, as far as we can, to the support of the public and commercial credit of the kingdom, at this important crisis, do hereby agree and bind ourselves to receive the Notes of the Bank of England in all payments as Money, and to support, as far as depends on us individually, their circulation for the public benefit.

Grantley,	Edward Layton,
Onslow and Cranley,	John Morgan,
John Frederick,	Peter Broadley,
Joseph Shaw,	M. Nolan,
Thomas Evance,	George Shepley,
Rd. Carpenter Smith,	Thomas Barrow,
George Griffin Stone-	Francis Lawson,
street,	John Jos. Shermer,
James Bulcock,	Robert Forrest,
William Hill,	John Pardon,
Robert Burnett,	Edward Morris,
Gideon Fomtier,	Vitruvius Lawes,
Benjamin Rol ertson,	Samuel Marryatt,
Jonathan Stonard,	W. D. Best,
James Feilding,	Arthur Onslow.

Ordered, That the Clerk of the Peace do cause the above to be forthwith advertised in the Morning Papers.—*By the Court,*
LAWSON.

‡ At the Council Chamber, Whitehall, the 28th of February, 1797,—Present,—The Lords of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council.—We, whose names are hereunto subscribed, being desirous to contribute, as far as we can, to the support of the public and commercial credit of this Kingdom at this important crisis, do hereby agree and bind ourselves to receive the Notes of the Bank of England in all payments as Money, and to support, as far as depends on us individually, their circulation.

J. Cantuar,	Bute,
Loughborough, C.	Pembroke,
Chatham, P.	Westmorland,
Dorset,	Chesterfield,
Leeds,	Sandwich,
Montrose,	Drummond Hay Kin-
Roxburgh,	roul,
Portland,	Macclesfield,
Townshend,	Spencer,
Corwallis,	Liverpool,

These Meetings and their Resolutions furnished the venal prints with the pretence for asserting, that the alarm was at an end; that the people had had time to reflect, and that reflection could not fail to convince them, that there was no room for suspecting the solidity of the Bank. The meetings and resolutions (to which latter, in London there were soon obtained thousands of signatures) were represented as having been perfectly *voluntary*: that they were the spontaneous effects of *pure public-spirit*, working in the breasts of *loyal* and disinterested men, and, of course, that those who did not come forward to resolve, or to sign, were *disloyal* men.

Gentlemen, stop with me here for a minute. Some of *you* may have been induced, by these venal writers, to think ill of all those of your neighbours, who disapproved of Mr. PITT and his deeds; some of *you* may have been thus led, by the representations of these writers, to hate your honest neighbours, to stigmatize them as Jacobins, and to suspect them, in fact, of treasonable designs; some of *you* may, from this corrupt and deadly source, have had your minds so poisoned, and so perverted from their natural bias, as to have contributed towards those fatal divisions in the nation, the effect of which, it is to be feared, your children's children will rue. Of such of you, therefore, as answer to this description, let me beg the earnest attention, while I develop the true source of the above-mentioned meetings and resolves, which, as you have seen, were described, by the venal writers, as being *perfectly voluntary*, and flowing from *pure public-spirit*.

You will bear in mind, that the Order in Council was signed on Sunday, the 26th of February, and that it was laid before the House of Commons on Monday the 27th, on which last-mentioned day, the Mansion House Meeting, Mr. BULLOCK

WATSON in the Chair, took place. The next, Tuesday, the 28th, the Minister, in opening the way for his first motion about the law to sanction the Order in Council, said *in allusion to this meeting*: "With respect to the first step to be considered, the state of the Bank, that already has, in a great measure, been ascertained by the confidence of public opinion. Of this public opinion the most unequivocal and satisfactory proofs have been afforded, even within the short space that has elapsed since the minute of Council has been issued. It has been clearly evinced, that there is no doubt entertained with respect to the solidity of the Bank to answer all the demands of its creditors." Thus he appeared to consider the resolution of the Meeting of the Bankers and Merchants as expressive of the opinions and feelings of the nation at large, and, of course, as being a voluntary act, an act of *their own*, an act not, by any means, dictated by him, or by the Bank, nor hatched or contrived by them. Thus the thing appeared to the world; thus it appeared to the "most thinking people in all Europe;" this was its outside look; but, let us now take a peep behind the curtain.

For a while no official documents were laid before Parliament, relating to the Stoppage. This was avoided by one means or another. But, it could not be for ever avoided; and, at last, some of the papers were laid before the House of Commons; but, by the time that these got printed, the public was lulled again, and the papers passed with little or no notice. Amongst these papers was a minute of the BANK DIRECTORS, respecting an "Interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Pitt) on the 24th of February 1797;" which, you will observe, was on the *Friday before*, the Bank having issued Gold on Saturday for the last time. On the Thursday the run upon the Bank had been very hard; and, the measure of Stoppage of cash-payments seems to have then been looked upon as settled. With this measure in their eye, the Bank Directors and Mr. Pitt did what we shall see recorded in the following minute of the Bank Directors' Proceedings, under the date just mentioned, of the 24th of February, 1797. "The Governor and Deputy Governor this day waited on Mr. Pitt, to mention to him, that it would, in the present circumstances, be

Mornington,	HENRY DUNDAS,
Gower Sutherland,	Chas. Fownshend,
Sydney,	C. F. Greville, V. C.
Grenville,	J. C. VILLIERS,
Onslow and Cranley,	James Greville,
Walsingham,	R. P. Arden,
Kenyon,	Wm. Wynne,
Malmesbury,	THOMAS STEELE,
Auckland,	A. Macdonald,
St. Helen's,	S. Douglas,
Henry Addington,	W. Windham.
W. PITT,	

"highly requisite, that some general meeting of the bankers and chief merchants of London should be held, in order to bring on some resolution for the support of the public credit in this alarming crisis; and they took the liberty to recommend to Mr. Pitt, to have a private meeting of some of the chief bankers at his house to-morrow, at three o'clock, in which the plan for a more general meeting on Tuesday or Wednesday next might be laid, in the propriety of which Mr. Pitt agreed, and said he would summon a previous meeting for to-morrow accordingly. This was communicated by the Governor to the Committee."

Thus, Gentlemen, were "the most thinking people in Europe" treated. Here you see the origin; here you see the real cause, of the public spirited meeting at the Mansion House; here you see how those pure and disinterested persons were put in motion. You have, heretofore, seen the show; but, you have now seen, as to this part of it, the funnels, pullies, pegs and wires; and the only misfortune is, that you see them a little too late; though, I trust, that the exposition may yet do some good, and, at any rate, it must, I should think, make you a little less credulous in future, a little less inclined to believe every word that comes forth under appearances like those above described.

While Meetings were going on, in such a jovial way, in all other quarters, it would have been strange indeed if the Bank itself had not had its meeting. This took place on Thursday, 2nd of March. The Order of Council had been issued on the Sunday, 26th of February; it had been laid before the House of Commons on the 27th; on the same day the Meeting had taken place at the Mansion-House; on the 28th (as we shall presently see) the conduct of the Bank began to be discussed in parliament, and it had been asserted there, that the Order of Council was the sole work of the government and not of the Bank; the manifest intention of which was to cause it to be believed, that the government forced the Bank not to pay its creditors agreeably to its promissory notes; and, that the Bank neither wanted nor wished any such measure on its own account. Declarations to this amount had been made in parliament; but, it appears, that a repetition of them at a Bank Meeting was thought necessary; and accordingly a meeting took place; or,

to use their own language, "A COURT of PROPRIETORS was held" on the day just-mentioned, namely, the 2nd of March.

At this meeting at the Bank, where one might have expected to see the Directors and Proprietors clothed in sack-cloth and ashes, the first thing done was, the passing of a vote of THANKS to the Directors for having acted agreeably to the Order of Council, that is to say, for having availed themselves of this Order to refuse payment of their promissory notes, to refuse payment of their just debts legally demanded. They had been guilty of a violation of the law, and for that violation they were thanked by their constituents, the stock Proprietors, who, in fact, were the Debtors of the holders of Bank notes! Having, with an unanimous voice, dispatched this part of the business of the day, the GOVERNOR of the Bank took, it appears from the report of the proceedings, the opportunity of publicly declaring (in a way that it might get into print) that the Bank Directors had made no application to the government for an Order for the stoppage of Cash payments at the Bank. Mr. BOSANQUET, who, it seems, was a Director, declared, that the measure "was not adopted at the instance of those concerned in the direction of the Bank;" and Mr. THORNTON, also a Director, said, "that he wished it to be understood explicitly, that the Order in Council was not issued at the instance of the Bank Directors." Mr. BOSANQUET called the stoppage "a great state measure;" a measure dictated by "national policy." He said it was "meant to operate only for a short time;" and that "he earnestly hoped" (how different from the language of Mr. Randle Jackson and the present governor of the Bank); yes, "he EARNESTLY HOPED, that the Bank, which was quite able, would soon be PERMITTED to pay its notes in cash, in the same manner that it had formerly done."*

* The following is the Report, taken entire, from the Morning Chronicle of the 3rd of March, 1797. —

"Yesterday a Court of Proprietors was held at the Bank.—The GOVERNOR of the Bank, after the Order in Council, of the 26th of February, was read, stated, that the Court of Directors had thought it their duty to acquiesce in the Order, and hoped that they had acted in conformity to the opinion and wishes of the Proprietors of

When, Gentlemen, you have read through the report of the Bank Proceedings of the day here referred to, and I beseech you to read every word of it, you will, doubtless, be astonished at the hardihood of men, who could, under such circumstances, hold such language. What! *thank* the Directors for not paying their

Bank Stock.—MR. HARMAN moved, “that it is the opinion of this Court, that the *thanks* of the Proprietors of Bank Stock are due to the Court of Directors for their acquiescence in the Order in Council, and for their speedy communication thereof to this Court.”—The motion was put and carried unanimously.—MR. ALLERDYCE asked, *whether the application had been made from the Bank to Government, for the Order in Council, to prohibit them from issuing specie?*—The Governor of the Bank replied, that *no such application had been made by the Court of Directors*, but that the Bank having experienced an unexampled drain of specie for some time past, that Court had thought it their duty to acquaint the Minister of the Country with the circumstance, that he might take what measures he might deem necessary, and at the same time remove all responsibility for such measures from the Direction. He added, that a Secret Committee of the House of Commons had been appointed to enquire into the state of the Bank accounts, and that the Court of Directors were *fully persuaded that the result of that enquiry would be a report of the perfect solidity of the Corporation*.—MR. SANSOM wished to be informed whether there was any precedent for the House of Commons appointing a Committee to enquire into the affairs of the Bank? In his opinion, if a Committee was to be appointed, it ought to be a Committee chosen from the Proprietary; but after the assurance which they had from the Directors of the solidity of the Bank capital, he saw no necessity for any enquiry at all.—A Proprietor stated, that there was a precedent for the measure on the Journals of the House of Commons, in 1696.—MR. MANNING said, he had examined into the proceedings of the House of Commons, in 1696, and found that there was not the smallest resemblance between that and the present measure. At that time the Bank had been established for only two years, their Notes were at a discount all over the Kingdom, and the silver coinage was called in, circumstances which were totally different from the present.—MR.

promissory notes! *Thank* them for this! The Proprietors of Bank Stock, who were the persons composing the Meeting upon this occasion, were the persons who owed the amount of the Bank notes; they were the debtors of the note-holders; the Directors were their agents. So that, here we see a parcel of people, who had issued great quantities of promissory notes, as-

BOSANQUET begged leave to trouble the Court with a very few words. He said that the Order in Council was to be considered *entirely as a great state measure*, which was *not adopted at the instance of those concerned in the direction of the Bank*. The Court of Directors, in the present state of public affairs, had considered it to be their duty to keep the Minister of the Country informed respecting the situation of the Bank. For some time past there had been an *unexampled run for specie* upon the Bank, and this they communicated to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, leaving him to adopt what measures he might think proper. The consequence was, the Order in Council, of the 26th of February, was issued. It would have been *absurd* in the Directors of the Bank to have resisted this Order, because the Minister must have been supposed to be in possession of a great deal of information to which they had no access, and to be in the knowledge of circumstances of which they were not aware; besides, that there was no knowing what might have been the consequences had the unusual drain for cash, which they had experienced, been continued for any length of time. They *complied* therefore, with the Order of his Majesty's Council, understanding it to have been dictated by national policy, and *meant to operate only for a short time*. He had no hesitation in saying that the affairs of the Bank were in a state of the *greatest affluence and prosperity*, that they had even a considerable surplus, and that he *earnestly hoped* they would soon be permitted to pay their Notes in cash in the same manner as they had formerly done.—MR. THORNTON wished it to be understood explicitly, that the Order in Council was *not issued at the instance of the Bank Directors*; that their accounts were not tendered to the House of Commons for examination, and that they neither asked nor wished for the partnership and guarantee of Government.—There being no other business before the Court, they adjourned to yesterday fortnight, when the dividends become due.

semble together, and *thank, aye, and publicly thank*, their agents for having refused, *illegally refused, payment of those notes!* Gentlemen, our venal prints may talk as they please; they may refer us to what instances they choose; but any thing equal to this, any such instance of cool assurance, I defy them to produce from the history of the world, or, even from the works of imagination.

But, as yet, we have not seen these proceedings in their true colours. We have seen them in colours pretty strong; but we have not seen them as they will appear when we have taken another look at the Bank documents, which were afterwards laid before parliament, and which, as was before observed, never got out fairly to the knowledge of the people. We have seen these Bank Directors making public declarations, that *they* had no hand at all in the Stoppage; that they did not *apply* for the Order in Council; that it was a measure of *the government*; that it was a *state measure*; and that they *earnestly hoped soon to be PERMITTED to resume their payments in cash.* This is what they told *the public* on the 2nd of March. And, it was not only at the Bank meeting that this declaration was made. It was repeatedly made in the House of Commons; but, we will, at present, confine ourselves to what was said by the Bank Directors themselves.

Such, then, were their declarations on the 2nd of March. Now, then, let us see what they had been at *in secret* with the Minister, during the *nine days before.* On the 21st of February, they, observing, with great uneasiness, the large and constant decrease in their cash, held a particular consultation on the subject, and perceiving that their cash was reduced to a certain sum, of which certain sum, be it observed, *they do not state the amount,* they came to a resolution, to go to Mr. Pitt, and tell him “how their cash was *circumstanced*” they did so, and Mr. Pitt observed to them (and you will laugh heartily at the observation) “that, the “alarm of invasion, was now become much “*more general than he could think necessary,*” they then, pressed Mr. Pitt, to make some declaration in parliament, upon this subject, “in order to *ease the public mind.*” This is a pretty specimen enough of the intercourse that existed between these parties, and will serve to explain the rea-

son for many of the speeches that we have, at different times, heard *. MR. PITT,

* *Resolution of the Court of Directors, and Deputation's Interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 21st of February, 1797.*—The Committee observing, with great uneasiness, the large and constant decrease in the cash, held a particular consultation on that subject this day; and on examination into the state of the cash *since the beginning of this year,* they found that in the course of the month of January there had been a decrease of *l.* and since the beginning of this month a farther loss of *l.* and that the cash was now reduced to between *l.* and about *l.* value, in bullion and foreign coin, about the value of *l.* in silver bullion. Perceiving also, by the constant calls of the bankers from all parts of the town for cash, that there must be *some extraordinary reasons for this drain,* arising, probably, from the alarms of an expected invasion; the Committee, after maturely considering the matter, resolved to send a notice to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of the situation of matters at the Bank; and to explain exactly to him *how the cash is circumstanced,* that he may, if possible and proper, strike out some means of *alleviating the public alarms,* and stopping this apparent disposition in people's minds for having a large deposit of cash in their houses. The Governor, Deputy Governor, with Mr. Darnell and Mr. Bosanquet, were deputed to wait upon Mr. Pitt; who went to him; and after describing to him the anxiety of mind which all the Directors were under on this subject, they explained to Mr. Pitt the exact particulars above-mentioned. Mr. Pitt seemed aware that this unusual drain of cash from the Bank must arise from the alarm of an invasion, which he observed was now become *much more general than he could think necessary.* He said, that by all his informations he could not learn of any hostile preparations of consequence making in France to invade this country, except the fleet which was re-fitting at Brest, after being driven off from the coast of Ireland; but that he could not answer that no partial attack on this country would be made by such a *mad and desperate enemy* as we had to deal with. The deputation pressed on Mr. Pitt to declare something of this kind in Parliament, in order to *ease the public mind.* Mr. Pitt also mentioned, that he hoped the

however, did, it seems, press them, in his turn, "to endeavour to obtain a supply of gold from abroad," and the Governor told him they would do what they could in that way.

On the 22nd of February they had another interview with Mr. PITT, and they gave GOLDSMIDT and ELIASON orders for the purchase of gold at *Hamburgh*. But, we nowhere find any account of the success of this order, which was, besides, rendered useless by the Order of Council, which rendered Gold unnecessary. ‡

On the 24th of February they had another interview with Mr. PITT; and, what they say as to this interview we must pay particular attention to. At a committee consisting of the whole Court, it appeared that the cash was going away faster than ever, "which gave such an alarm for the SAFETY OF THE HOUSE" (mark the words) that no time was lost in sending a deputation to Mr. PITT, to ask him how far they might venture to go in paying cash, and "when HE would think it necessary to INTERFERE." Mr. PITT told them, that this was an affair of such importance, that he must be prepared with some resolution to bring forward in the Council. §

Committee would, in the present situation of matters, think it necessary to *endeavour at obtaining a supply of gold from foreign countries*, which the Governor told him they were considering about, and should do what they could therein.

‡ Interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 22nd of February, 1797.—Messrs. Goldsmid and Eliason attended the Committee this day, and were directed to give farther orders to *Hamburgh for the purchase of gold*; and were told that an application would immediately be made to the minister to order a frigate or armed sloop to go to *Hamburgh* to take in such gold as might be bought, and also to desire that the restriction on the captains of the packets, not to take any gold on board at *Hamburgh* for this country, might be taken off. The Governor and Deputy Governor waited on Mr. Pitt on this subject, promised to apply to the Admiralty for directions about sending out a frigate or armed sloop; and that he would apply to the Postmaster General to give the orders to the captains of the packets.

§ Interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 24th of February, 1797.—At

Thus, you see, Gentlemen, the Stoppage measure clearly originated in the representation of the Bank Directors; and, which is very well worthy of your marked attention, Mr. BOSANQUET was one of the persons, deputed to wait upon Mr. PITT on this last-mentioned occasion. The shuffle of saying, that the Bank Directors were afraid that the drain might injure the "public service" is too paltry, in any view of the

a Committee of the whole Court held this day, it appeared that the loss of cash yesterday was above £. and that about £. were already drawn out this day, which gave such an alarm for THE SAFETY OF THE HOUSE, that the Deputy Governor and Mr. Bosanquet were desired to wait on Mr. Pitt to mention to him these circumstances, and to ask him how far he thought the Bank might venture to go on paying cash, and when he would think it necessary TO INTERFERE before our cash was so reduced as might be detrimental to the immediate service of the State. Mr. Pitt said, this was a matter of great importance, and that he must be prepared with some resolution to bring forward in the Council, for a Proclamation to stop the issue of cash from the Bank, and to give the security of parliament to the notes of the Bank. In consequence of which he should think it might be proper to appoint a Secret Committee of the House of Commons to look into the state of the Bank affairs; which they assured him the Bank were well prepared for, and would produce to such a Committee. Mr. Pitt also observed that he should have no objection to propose to Parliament, in case of a Proclamation, to give parliamentary security for Bank notes. The Governor and Deputy Governor this day waited on Mr. Pitt, to mention to him, that it would in the present circumstances be highly requisite that some general meeting of the bankers and chief merchants of London should be held in order to bring on some resolution for the support of the public credit in this alarming crisis; and they took the liberty to recommend to Mr. Pitt, to have a private meeting of some of the chief bankers at his house to-morrow, at three o'clock, in which the plan for a more general meeting on Tuesday or Wednesday next might be laid; in the propriety of which Mr. Pitt agreed, and said he would summon a previous meeting for to-morrow accordingly. This was communicated by the Governor to the Committee.

matter, to have any weight; for, whose claim upon the Bank could be so good as that of the *holders of the Promissory notes*? And who were “the public” but the holders of these notes? But, as if it had been resolved to leave no room even for this miserable attempt at excuse, the Minute of the Directors of the 24th of February, expressly says, that it was “*alarm for the safety of the HOUSE*” that sent the deputation to ask for the *interference* of Mr. Pitt; alarm for the safety of the HOUSE, and not any motive at all connected with the public service or the public good.

Having now pulled aside the curtain; having laid the whole thing bare to your view; having placed the application to Parliament in its true light; I shall, in my next, lay before you an account of the *measures*, which the Parliament adopted, and which have, under one pretence or another, been continued in force to this day.

In the meanwhile, I remain,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,
October 25, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGAL.—I have little to add to what was said in my last, closing at page 721, where we left nothing wanting but the mere *date* and *manner* of MASSENA’S overthrow.—The wind has been foul for some days past, and, of course, no intelligence could be expected. The public curiosity seems, however, to have a good deal abated; and, as to *anxiety*, there appears (from the language of the public prints) not to be a particle of that remaining in any man’s mind.—The prospect being so fair; the public opinion being unanimous; and the matter being settled, that the foe must be exterminated, or nearly so, it was not my intention to say a word more upon the subject, ’till the hour came for me to record the last acts of the campaign. But, the Morning Post newspaper has published a paragraph, which calls upon me for a word or two.—This paragraph treats of *numbers*, a point upon which I am, I will confess, rather tenacious. It had, some days before, given a statement, apparently *official*, and, indeed, said to be from *official returns*, of the strength of the allied army,

which it made amount to only about 50 thousand men. At this the TIMES and the MORNING CHRONICLE took fire; as well they might, after this same print had repeatedly stated the allied *regular* force at little short of double that number, and after the recent dispatches from Lord Viscount Talavera, who said, that, with the exception of his trifling loss at the Victory of Busaço, he had not lost a man, or, at least so I understood his dispatch.—I began the literary campaign by showing, that we were *paying* 60 thousand fighting men in Portugal. We have been informed of the arrival of re-inforcements to the amount of 10 thousand men; so that, if we deduct the garrison of Almeida (who, by the by came, we were told, to us again) and the men lost at Busaço, we must still have, according to the original account, nearly 70 thousand fighting men, regular troops; and, we well know, that they are now all got into a small compass; all immediately under the command of Lord Talavera.—Yet does the Morning Post now put the allied army at 50 thousand men! Nay, and that print most grossly abuses all those, who are dissatisfied with its statements. The ground of abuse is this: *We* are said to swell out the amount of the allied army for the purpose of *lessening the glory* of the approaching victory; and, the TIMES and CHRONICLE are accused of enlisting themselves under SERJEANT COBBETT for the purpose of making the world believe, that the *victory will have nothing glorious in it*.—There is a small mistake, or, rather omission; for Serjeant Cobbett’s proposition was a *conditional* one. There was an *if* in it. It was this: “*They*” (the Morning Post and Courier) “have proclaimed to the world facts, which, IF TRUE, put it completely out of the power of our general in Portugal to gain any victory over Massena, that shall be worthy of the epithet *glorious*; and which would render defeat *infamy*.”—This *if* the Morning Post has omitted; and, well it might; for the proposition, as it here stands, is incontrovertible.—On the 17th of September the Courier newspaper published the following statement of the numbers of the allied army.

“English Army	30,000
“Portuguese Regulars	59,755
	<hr/>
	89,755
“Portuguese Militia	52,848
	<hr/>
“Total	142,603

Now, we know that our loss has been a mere trifle; we know that 10 thousand *English* and *Brunsvicker* regulars have since joined; we know that all the regulars and part of the militia are with Lord Talavera; and, therefore I leave the public to judge of the truth of the statements, which the Morning Post and Courier are now giving to the world.—Which of their statements is true, or which false, I cannot pretend to say; but, that one of them must be false is certain, though, if my opinion were asked, I should say that the latter was, and that we have an army greatly superior in numbers to that of Massena; which is, indeed, to be inferred from Lord Talavera's own dispatch, for he says nothing at all about the relative strength of the two armies, and he took good care to say much about that in the affair of Talavera, the place where he won the victory that gave him his title and his pension for three generations.—As to the circumstance of the other papers having existed under a *Sergeant*, all that I need say upon that is, that the famous *Convention of the HELDER* was not less real, because one of the parties to it had been, but a few years before, a *private soldier* in the French grenadiers, and who was, not long afterwards, *Embassador* at the Court of Berlin. Truth is truth, let it come from whom it may; and, if the Morning Post and the Courier had, all along, adhered to the truth, they would not have experienced their present difficulties, and the question of the relative strength of the armies would not have been involved in its present uncertainty; an uncertainty not now easily removed, and which will, in all probability, greatly deduct from the glory of that Victory, which were now, has, in all probability (if our latest intelligence be correct) been achieved by the allied army to the confusion and consternation of the foe.—This accusation, against the TIMES and MORNING CHRONICLE, of endeavouring to swell out our numbers comes much *too late*. It should have been made, if at all, long ago. It looks awkward at this moment. Not that I can suppose it to proceed from any latent fears of failure, which, really, appears to me to be impossible; morally, and almost physically, impossible. The allied army is full of health; it has an abundance of provisions and stores of all sorts; it is well lodged in houses and huts; it is covered by some of the strongest lines in the world, mounted with a thousand pieces of ar-

tillery; it is guarded and supported on its flanks by the sea, by the Tagus, and by gun-boats and sloops of war; while the foe is wasting away by sickness; is in a starving condition; has neither stores nor artillery, except what he has been able to drag along with him; has a country in his rear all inimical to him and all desolated; is uncovered and exposed to every storm; is wholly unsupported by either water or shipping; and can receive no assistance from any quarter. Well may it be conjectured, and, indeed, it is *positively said*, that Massena has been urged on by Buonaparté. Deserters and prisoners have, it is said, given us this news; and, this explains the cause of Massena's rushing on into such manifest perdition. But, let us not, in addition to all this, want to make the world believe that our Victory has been gained (for gained it must now have been) with *inferior numbers*, such a statement being in direct contradiction to every statement heretofore made by our Ministerial writers.

SPANISH CORTES.—The meeting of this assembly has been recorded in the Official Papers, at page 731; and, the English reader will, I am certain, be much gratified with what they have already done.—They have laid down, as fixed principles, that they, as representatives of the people, have a right to elect their chief magistrate, and, of course, that Joseph is not their lawful king, because the transfer of the sovereignty to him was *without the nation's consent*. They have decreed, that the chief magistrate, or executive power, is *responsible to them*; and that in them, as the representatives of the people, resides *the sovereignty of the nation*. They have decreed, that to them, as representatives of the people, belongs the title of *Majesty*; that the executive department shall be called by the title of *Highness*; and that in them and them alone shall reside the *legislative functions*.—Having thus (See page 731 and onwards) laid down the great principles of the constitution; having taken to themselves the powers, which they look upon as their right, in virtue of their quality of representatives of the people, they have next proceeded to a measure intended to exclude corruption from amongst themselves; and, with that view, have decreed, that *no member of the Cortes shall, during the time of his being a member, and for one year afterwards, receive any PENSION*,

or hold any PLACE OF EMOLUMENT, or receive any TITLE OF HONOUR OR DIGNITY; except in the way of his *profession* as a soldier, sailor, or clergyman, or in consequence of some signal and well-known service to the public.—Upon a regulation like this it is, I trust, unnecessary to make any eulogium, it being so perfectly in unison with the spirit of one of the very best principles of our own Constitution, as laid down and enacted in that great Constitutional Law, the ACT OF SETTLEMENT, by which Act it was, that the present family was raised to the throne of this kingdom.—Not in this light, however, does this inestimable decree, a decree which revives the hopes of all the real friends of the people of Spain; not in this light is this admirable decree viewed by the writer of the COURIER news-paper, who, however, though a *ministerial* writer, does not, in this respect, I trust, speak the sentiments of any one but himself, it being as clear as the sun at noon day, that, if the Cortes be not now supported, the cause of Spain is gone for ever.—This is a question of vital importance. The decree of exclusion *has passed*. It is become the corner stone of the Constitution of Spain; and, as every friend of freedom must now wish success to the Spanish cause, let us hear what this writer has to say against this all-important decree.—“They” (the Cortes) “have passed a decree, declaring that no Member of the Cortes shall, except during the continuation of his functions, and for a year afterwards, any executive place. This decree, we see, has been *highly praised in this country*; and, indeed, it carries upon the *face* of it the features of great patriotism and disinterestedness. But Englishmen are disposed to reflection; their eyes are turned not only to the future but to the *past*; they refer to the evidence and experience of their history, and they remember the *Self-denying Ordinance* of the *Independents*. It excluded the Members of both Houses from all civil and military employments; and though the Presbyterians had the best of the argument; though they shewed that such an ordinance was contrary to the principles of ancient times, that the Greeks and Romans, the most passionate lovers of liberty, had never admitted such a distinction between the civil and military powers, that, on the contrary, they had ever entrusted to their Senators the

“command of their armies, the Independents, with Cromwell at their head, succeeded in carrying the ordinance through both Houses—*And Cromwell was the first person that violated it!* Being at the time a Lieutenant General in the army as well as a Member of the House of Commons, he should have resigned his command with other Members who had also military commissions: “but “this impartiality,” says Hume, “would “have disappointed all the views of “those who had introduced the self-denying ordinance.” Fairfax, who was entirely governed by Cromwell, wrote to the Parliament, desiring leave to retain Lieutenant General Cromwell for some days, whose advice would be useful in supplying the place of the Officers who had resigned. Shortly after he begged with much earnestness that they would allow Cromwell to serve that campaign. “This self-denying ordinance was productive of no benefit (quite the contrary to England), whilst under a *contrary principle* she has risen to what she is at this moment; the only free nation in Europe, equally great in freedom and in power. The Cortes have undoubtedly much to correct, much to reform, but we are happy to see in the first use of their power a respect and love for their ancient constitution. *Sorry* indeed should we be to find them impressed with the *presumptuous principles of the French Legislators*, who acted as if the world had been in utter darkness before their time, involved in utter ignorance and brutality.”—Yes, the people of England, if they are not, will, I trust, become, a reflecting people; and, the more they reflect, the more they will, I am persuaded, approve of this Decree, and will, were it for this decree alone, wish the people of Spain success against all their enemies.—The *Self-denying Ordinance*, in the time of Cromwell did, we are told, produce no good effect; it produced “no benefit” to England. This is *pure assertion*, observe; but, why did it not? Why did it produce no benefit? Because it was *immediately violated*. Because it never went wholly and fairly into effect. This is the statement of this writer himself; and surely, then, the failure of the Self-denying Ordinance ought not to be cited against the Spanish decree, unless the writer means that we should, at his suggestion, assume, that the Cortes are as insincere as the Independents were, and

that their decree is a *mere trick* to get rid of some particular commanders, which assumption, however, would not help his argument out, because it would, in that case, produce *no effect at all*, and, of course, would not produce mischief.—The members of the Spanish Cortes are told by this writer, that the Self-denying Ordinance, and, of course, the Spanish Decree, are contrary to the best principles of freedom in *ancient times*; and that England, whilst under a contrary principle, has become the *only free nation* in Europe.—We will leave the question of English *freedom*, as at present *enjoyed*, for future discussion; but, we must deny, that the *principles* of the English constitution are hostile to the principle of this decree. For, in the Act of Settlement, before-mentioned, it is provided, that “No person, who has an *office*, or place of *profit*, under the king, or receives a *pension* from the Crown, “shall be capable of *serving as a Member of the House of Commons*.” (See Act 12 and 13 William III. Chap. 2.) It is true, that this clause of the Act of Settlement has been modified; and, indeed, the effect of it has, in a great degree, been done away, by subsequent enactments, which allow such persons to sit; but, still, as an homage to this favourite principle of Legislative Independence, it is necessary for a Member who receives a place or pension, to be *re-elected* before he can again act as a legislator.—This modification of the Constitutional Act is disapproved of by a great part of the people of England, as numerous petitions upon the journals of parliament will prove. There is certainly a difference of opinion upon the subject. But, at any rate, complaints of long-standing, and from men of undoubted integrity and wisdom, have been made against the possession of places and pensions by our Members of parliament. The question has *never ceased to be agitated*; it is, at this hour, more agitated than ever; there are millions of men in this kingdom, who contend for the practice of the Act of Settlement in this respect; and, while the Cortes have this contest before their eyes, it is, I think, a little too much to upbraid them with rashness and ignorance, and to insinuate that they are treading in the steps of the French Revolutionists, because they have passed a Decree, which, if faithfully adhered to, must prevent all such disputes from disturbing the harmony between the people and the government in Spain, a

harmony, without the preservation of which it is utterly impossible to entertain a rational hope of that country's escaping final and complete subjugation.—The reader will, probably, not be at a loss to guess at the *motive*, which may have dictated the criticism, and hardly-disguised censure, of the COURIER, who appears to have been aware that the effect of this excellent and wise and virtuous Decree of the Spanish Cortes would not be confined within the boundaries of the Spanish territory; and, there are few persons, who pay attention to such matters, who will fail to call to mind, what was said, at the out-set of the Spanish contest, by those, who like me, called upon the leaders in Spain to declare openly for political freedom, to tender the *people* a prize to fight for, and thus to *insure* success to their cause by beating up, to use a Sergeant's phrase, for the *hearts* of the best and most valiant of the people. The reader will bear in mind, too, our complaints against that CENTRAL JUNTA, who are now censured by every body, who did no one thing for liberty, who began their career by stilling the press, and under whom all the good spirit of the nation seemed to have expired in an instant.—The CORTES, from what has hitherto appeared, seem to be animated with a different soul. Their language and their Acts breathe the spirit of freedom in every line; and, the only thing now to be feared is, that they have been called together *too late*. Instead of issuing their Decrees from Madrid, they are issuing them from the Isle of Leon, where they are, in fact, little better than *closely besieged*.—What a *lesson* ought this to be! And what must be the mortification, what the remorse, of those who have had the power to take the lead in Spain, if, after all, it now should prove fruitless to appeal to the hearts of the people! At any rate, however, we have, in the present conduct of the Cortes, a recognition of the great principles of political liberty, and a proof that they have been, by experience, convinced, that, unless something be done to engage the *hearts of the people* in the cause, a country, however fortified by nature, and however populous, cannot resist the arms of a powerful invader. *Troops* the Spaniards are in no want of. They have troops and stores enough. What they wanted was an *animated people*. Such a people they now seem resolved to have. The Cortes are taking the true way to obtain that ob-

ject ; and, what must we think of the English writer (not encouraged thereto, I hope, by any thing but his own turpitude) who can coolly set about the task of throwing discredit upon their laudable efforts?— I have been, by this writer and his twin-brother of the *Morning Post*, many times abused for my discouraging forebodings as to the contest in Spain, and for my want of zeal in the Spanish cause. As to my forebodings, they have proved to be but too well founded, as witness the present local situation of this excellent Assembly of the Cortes, who are penned up in a little island of Spain, while their fine country is overrun by invaders, and while the Capital of the kingdom is the seat of the intruding king. And, as to zeal in the cause, I must confess, that I felt none at all ; that I felt perfectly indifferent about it, after I saw the line which the Central Junta pursued, and which appeared to me to promise no good to the people in case of success. But, now the thing is totally altered. Now the language of Spain is what it ought to be. It is what I heartily approve of ; and it is such as gives me hope in spite of every discouraging appearance. I now come back to the point at which I started ; and, if the *Turtle Patriots* will proclaim another festival in honour of the Spanish cause, they shall have my hearty and sincere approbation, which shall, too, not be withheld from the Odes that even poet Fitzgerald may grind in praise of the CORTES.

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. — *Kent Meeting.* — On the 22nd instant a Meeting, pursuant to notice and requisition, was held, at Maidstone, for the County of Kent, to consider of a Petition to parliament for a Reform in the Commons' House. The High Sheriff, JAMES BURTON, Esq. was in the chair. The meeting was very numerous and consisted of all the real respectability of the County, as has been the case in every other county, where a meeting for a similar purpose has been called. — The petition was moved by Mr. HODGKINS, and seconded by Mr. FOOT, in two admirable speeches, and, agreeably to the report in the public papers, it concluded in the following words: — "The times demand this open avowal of our sentiments, and in the language employed to convey them we intend no disrespect ; though we are persuaded that no words can be too strong to express our feelings upon this occasion. Therefore, we most earnestly intreat your

"Honourable House to undertake, BE
"FORE IT IS TOO LATE, in a true and
"cordial spirit, the measure of Reform
"upon principles, which, by conciliating
"the affections of the people, and restoring
"to your Honourable House its due weight
"and character, may rescue our country
"from domestic discord, and secure it from
"the foreign foe, give stability to the
"Throne, and perpetuate the Constitu-
"tion." — I have no room to add any
thing but an expression of my approbation, and of my sincere wishes, that these sentiments may be acted upon, as I am sure they are those of ninety nine hundredths of the nation.

WM. CORBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
26th October, 1810.

P. S. JEFFERY's affair in my next.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN. — *Names of the Members of the Cortes.*
(concluded from p. 736.)

D. Antonio Abadin y of Guerra, for the Province of Mondonedo ; D. Ant. Payan, for that of Corunna ; D. Juan Quiroga, for that of Orense ; D. Jose Becerra y Liemas, for that of Lugo ; D. Pedro Ribero y Pardo, for that of Betanzos ; D. Luis del Monte, for the same ; D. Ant. Vasques de Pargus, for that of Lugo ; D. Manuel Valcarcel, for the same ; D. F. Mondo, for Catalonia ; D. Felix Aytes and D. Ramon Urges, for the same ; D. Jose Vega y Sentmenat, for the city of Cervera ; D. Salvador Vinas, for Catalonia ; D. Jayme Creus, D. Ramon de Lledos, and D. Jose Castellarnau, for the same ; D. Antonio do Parga, for the province of Santiago ; D. Fr. Pardo, for the same ; D. Vicente Terrere, for that of Cadiz ; D. Fr. Riesco, for the Superior Junta of Estremadura ; D. Gregorio Laguna, for the city of Badajoz ; D. Vicente de Castro Lavandeyra, for the province of Santiago ; D. Domingo Quintano, for that of Lugo ; D. Andres Morales de los Rios, for the city of Cadiz ; D. Antonio Llaneras, for the island of Majorca ; D. Ramon Lazaro de Dou, for Catalonia ; D. Alonzo de la Vera y Pantoja, for the city of Merida ; D. Antonio Capmany, for Catalonia ; D. Juan Herrera, for Estremadura ; D. Manuel Martinez, for the same ; D. Alfonso Nunez de Haro, for the province of Cuenca ; D. Pedro Antonio de

Aguirre, for the Superior Junta of Cadiz ; D. Joaquin Montenegro, for the province of Santiago ; D. Benito Mosquera, for the city of Tuy ; D. Bernardo Martinez, for the province of Orense ; D. Pedro Cortinas, for the same ; D. Diego Munoz Torera, for that of Estremadura ; D. Manuel Luxam, for the same ; D. Antonio Duran de Castro, for that of Tuy ; D. Augustine Bahamonde, for the same ; D. Fr. Calvet y Rivacoba, for the city of Gerona ; D. Jose Salvador Lopez de Pan, for the city of Corunna ; D. Jose Maria Conto, D. Fr. Munillo, D. Andres Savariego, D. Salvador S. Martin, D. Octaviano Obregon, D. Maximo Maldonado, D. Jose de Teran, *suplentes* (supplying the place of Deputies) for New Spain ; D. Pedro Tagle, D. Jose Manuel de Conto, *suplentes* for the Philippines ; D. Jose Caicedo, *suplente* for the Viceroyalty of Santa Fe ; the Marquis de S. Felipe y Santiago, and D. Joaquin Santa Cruz, ditto, for the island of Cuba ; the Marquis de Puneourostro, ditto, for Santa Fe ; D. Jose Mexia, ditto, for the same ; D. Doniso Juca Yupanguí, ditto, for the Viceroyalty of Peru ; D. Vicente Morales, ditto, for the same ; Don Ramon Felin and D. Antonio Suazo, for the same ; D. Joaquin Leyba, ditto, for Chili ; D. Miguel Riesco, for the same ; D. Francisco Lispergardo, for the Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres ; D. Luis Velasco and D. Manuel Rodrigo, ditto, for the same ; D. Andres de Llano, ditto, for Guatimala, and D. Manuel de Llano, for the same ; D. Jose Alvarez de Toledo, ditto, for the island of San Domingo ; D. Augustine Arguelles, ditto, for the principality of Asturias ; D. Rafael Manglano, ditto for the province of Toledo ; D. Antonio de Aldana, *suplente* for that of Toro ; D. Manuel de Arestogni, ditto, for that of Alava ; D. Francisco de la Huberta, ditto for that of Burgos ; D. Juan Gallego, ditto, for that of Zamora ; D. Jose Valcarcel, ditto, for that of Salamanca ; D. Jose Zorraquin, ditto, for that of Madrid ; D. Manuel Garcia Herreros, ditto for that of Soria ; D. Jose de Cea, ditto, for that of Cordova ; D. Juan Quintano, ditto, for that of Palencia ; D. Geronimo Ruiz, ditto, for that of Segovia ; D. Francisco de la Serna, ditto, for that of Avila ; D. Francisco Eguia, ditto for the Lordship of Biscay ; D. Evaristo Perez de Castro, ditto, for the province of Valladolid ; D. Domingo Duenas, ditto, for that of Granada ; D. Francisco de Sales Rodriguez de Barcena, ditto, for that of Seville ; D. Fr. de Escudero, ditto, for that of Navarre ; U. Fr. Gonzalez,

ditto, for that of Jaen ; D. Esteban Palacios, ditto, for the Caraccas ; D. Fermin de Clemente, ditto, for the same ; and D. Francisco Fernandez Gollin, Deputy for Estramadura.—They all passed forth at half past nine in the morning, with the Council of Regency, all the troops of the Royal Household and those of the army quartered here being drawn up ; and walking to the parochial church, Mass was celebrated by the abovementioned Prelate : upon which, after the Gospels, and a short and plain exhortation from the Most Serene Senor President Don Pedro Quevido, Bishop of Orense, I repeated twice, in a loud voice, the following formula of the oath :—" You swear to the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Religion, without admitting any other in these kingdoms ? You swear to preserve, in its integrity, the Spanish nation, and to omit no means to free it from its unjust oppressors ? You swear to preserve to our beloved Sovereign Senor D. Ferdinand VII. all his dominions, and failing him, to his legitimate successors ; and to make all possible efforts to deliver him from captivity, and re-place him on the throne ? You swear faithfully and legally to fulfil the trust which the nation has committed to your care, guarding the laws of Spain, without hindrance to your making such alterations, changes, and modifications, as the good of the nation may require ?" And all the Deputies having answered " We so swear," they passed, two by two, to touch the book of the Holy Gospels ; and this being concluded, the Senor President said :—" If you shall thus act, may God reward you ; and if not, may he require it at your hands." This was immediately followed by the hymn, *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, and *Tu Deum*, being sung with gravity and solemnity ; and the ceremony being closed, they re-passed in the same order to the Hall of the Cortes. The Deputies having there taken their places, and the Council of Regency being stationed near the Throne, the Senor President pronounced a very energetic though short discourse, in which, pointing out the disorganization and confusion of the times in which they were installed, and the obstacles, almost insurmountable, presented by existing circumstances to the worthy and advantageous discharge of a trust so important and perilous ; he concluded by bearing the strongest testimony to the patriotism and generous sentiments of the Council of Regency ; adding, that they left to the discernment and intelligence

of the Cortes, the nomination and election of a President and Secretaries for that august Congress. With this the inauguration was ended, the Cortes remained installed, and the Council of Regency retired to their Palace, having observed in all these acts the majesty and circumspection becoming the most noble, generous, and invigorated of nations; accompanied by a joy and applause on the part of the people which it would be very difficult to describe. All which I certify as Principal Notary, NICHOLAS MARIA DE SIERRA.

Royal Isle of Leon, Sept. 21, 1810.

TURKEY.—Proclamation of the Grand Seignior.—August 20th, 1810.

To my First Chief of the Belief, the High Pontiff of the Mortals (Mufti); To my brave Caimachan Pacha; my eminent Ministers; my worthy Prelates; my very honoured Teachers and Professors of Theology, Explainers of the Koran and of Tradition; my Imams; the Great of my Court; my Seven Military Corps; my Agas, Officers, and Soldiers, &c. &c.

—After my Imperial Greeting, it is necessary to inform you, that the treacherous Moscovites, those enemies of our Faith, persevere in their audacious resolution to bring the devices which their depraved souls have invented more and more into execution. They have already invested our imperial cities and fortresses with war, and further over-run the territory of the True Believers. They are not satisfied with putting the adherents of our Holy Faith, without distinction of age and sex, in chains, wherever they come, and to drive many of our plundered brethren naked from their homes to seek a shelter in the wilderness; but they menace us, the devout followers of the Holy Prophet, the adorers of the True Religion; we to whom power and command have been given by the Almighty at the express intercession of Mahomet, whose holy blood now flows in our veins, with further indignities. — Desirous of consulting only the happiness of our people, we have not hesitated to make known our pacific wishes; but the proposals we have received in return, have been too degrading, to make us hesitate in rejecting them—in every line of those proposals, the insatiable ambition of our foes may be traced—indeed, nothing but submission, say they, can save us from everlasting war.—I, for my own part, cheerfully embrace this latter alternative, rather than endure so great

a shame, well remembering the precepts of our Holy Prophet, as contained in the two following sentences of the Koran:—God has momentarily left you, in order to make you sensible of your weakness and dependance. Supplicate him and he will assuredly return; then with one hundred men who put their trust in him, you will vanquish two hundred enemies.—In another part, God says to the Prophet, assemble the true believers for battle: if there be twenty firm and brave men, they shall conquer two hundred; and if there be an hundred, they shall vanquish a thousand of their foes.—I entreat the assistance of the Most High; I pray for the spiritual influence of the Prophet. Full of hope, I hasten to share the labours and dangers of my brave troops, to put myself at their head; to rouse the valour of some, to confirm that of others, and to direct that of all: in short, to lead them to battle—to victory!—It is not my design to attribute the fruits of our victories to myself. No, the only aim of my ambition is to make the faith of Mahomet triumph; to frustrate the devices of our enemies, and if possible, to contribute to the fulfilling of his Holy Will. Though my design to put myself at the head of the armies has been known some time, fail not to renew it by a Calif, on receiving this Proclamation. Every Naib, who shall not make the inhabitants of the towns and villages under his jurisdiction join our army forthwith shall be suspended, and the religious Teachers shall lose their places. Without wasting further time, we exhort you to be watchful over the tranquillity of the empire in our absence, and zealous to promote its happiness.—For myself, considering the urgency of the occasion; the activity of our enemies, and above all, that good men ought not to be more slow in frustrating evil deeds than bad men are quick in executing them, I shall set out immediately for the army.—May the Prophet intercede for us—May the Almighty grant us the victory and cover our enemies with shame. Oh! that this may happen! The glorious issue depends upon the Divine Will; from him comes all success. He knows the justice of our cause; let us then with implicit confidence believe that he will crown our arms with victory.

FRANCE.—Commercial Decree.—St. Cloud, August 31, 1810.

Art. 1. There shall be formed at Paris, near our Counsellor of State, the Director

General of the Customs, a Council de Contentieux (Arbitrators,) composed of two Masters of Requests, and four Auditors, reporters.—Art. 2. Our Director General of the Customs, assisted by the Council of Arbitrators, shall fix the value of the cargoes exported and imported by all vessels having licences.—Art. 3. Each Auditor shall keep a register of the licences that may have been granted under the heads of the respective ports of each of the under-mentioned precincts, viz. from Embden to Cherbourg, from Cherbourg to Bayonne, from the Pyrenees to St. Remy, from St. Remy to the coast of Naples.—Art. 4. This register shall contain, for every vessel having a licence, the number of the licence, the date of delivery, the name of the outfitter, that of the vessel and captain, the tonnage, the assortment of the cargo, the day of departure and arrival, and the decision of the arbitrators as to the value of the imports and exports for each voyage.—Art. 5. The outfitter of a licensed vessel shall deliver in at the Custom House of the port of departure, the manifest of his cargo, and the value of the merchandize of which it consists, signed by himself and the supercargo of the vessel.—Art. 6. The Director General, or superior officer of the Customs, shall cause the kinds, quantities, and qualities of the produce or merchandize to be examined, and ascertain that they accord with the manifest.—In case of a voluntary fraud, the vessel and cargo shall be sequestrated, and be subject to confiscation. Our Director General of the Customs shall report the same to us in a Council of Commerce, for the purpose of a definitive decision thereon.—Art. 7. The Superior Officer of the Customs of the port of departure shall transmit to the Director General the manifest of the outfitter, with the certified report of its examination. These vouchers shall be transmitted to the Auditor, who shall report thereon to the Council of Arbitrators.—Art. 8. The Council of Arbitrators, upon perusing the report of the Auditor, shall determine the value of the produce and merchandize composing the cargo.—Art. 9. His decision shall serve to regulate the value of the cargo that may be imported.—Art. 10. On the return of the vessel, the outfitter, the owner and the consignee of the vessel shall deliver in a similar declaration of the sorts, quantities, and qualities of the produce and merchandize composing the return cargo, and of the prices at which they may have been purchased at

the port of lading. This declaration shall be signed by himself and the supercargo of the vessel.—Art. 11. The Director or Superior Officer of the Customs, shall cause the sorts, quantities, and qualities of the produce and merchandize to be examined, and ascertain that they accord with the declaration.—Art. 12. He shall transmit the said declaration, and the result of his examination, to the Director General of the Customs. These vouchers shall be transmitted to the Auditor, who shall report thereon to the Council of Arbitrators.—Art. 13. The Council of Arbitrators, upon perusing the report of the Auditors, shall determine the value of the produce and merchandize composing the cargo.—Art. 14. If the value of the imports exceed by one-third that of the merchandize exported, the merchandize constituting such excess, shall be placed in real *entrepot*, and shall not be discharged therefrom, until the said amount of value shall have been covered by fresh exports.—Art. 15. If the value of the merchandize imported shall exceed by less than one-third the value of the exports, this excess shall be taken into the account current, and the outfitter shall be held bound, upon making a fresh exportation, to cover the said excess, exclusive of the value of the merchandize which he intends to import.—Art. 16. In all cases where the importations by a licenced vessel shall have preceded the exportations, the declarations and verifications shall take place in the manner prescribed in the third title.—Art. 17. The Council of Arbitrators shall fix the value of the imports, and determine accordingly the counter-value to be exported.—Art. 18. As soon as the cargo for exportation shall have been made up, the declarations and verifications shall take place in the manner presented in title II.—Art. 19. The Council of Arbitrators shall fix the value of the cargo, and strike the balance between the imports and exports.—Art. 20. The Decree of the Council shall be arbitral and summary, without documents, and proceeding merely upon a general knowledge of the matters in question.—Art. 21. This Decree being exclusively intended for the purpose of establishing a general balance between the imports and exports, cannot be produced at the Custom House with regard to the payment of duties, nor before the Tribunals, upon any pretext whatsoever.—Art. 22. Our Minister of Finance is charged with the execution of the present Decree.

ROME.—*Decree respecting Priests, 12th September, 1810.*

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, &c. has decreed, and decrees as follows:—The Priests of the departments of Rome and the Thrasimene who, from ignorance of the duties prescribed to them by the Church, and by our Lord Jesus Christ, shall have refused to take to us the appointed oath, shall be considered as enemies of the secular power, and declared incapable of exercising the sacerdotal functions within our empire.—NAPOLEON.

NAPLES.—*General Orders. — Head-quarters at Scilla, Sept. 26, 1810.*

Soldiers; The expedition to Sicily is postponed. The object which the Emperor had in view, by causing that island to be threatened, has been accomplished; and the effect of the attitude which has been maintained upon the Strait with so much dignity for four months, has even surpassed expectation. You are about to enter your winter quarters. And you, also, brave sailors, you are about to return to your families. You have done more than your duty; you have supported with a courage above all praise more than fifty combats, against a force three times stronger than your's, and the success which you have constantly obtained proves what you would have done against an equal one. Above all, you have solved one grand problem; you have proved that the enemy's flotilla cannot prevent even the smallest boats from crossing the Strait, and that Sicily will be conquered when its conquest is seriously set about. Receive the testimony of my satisfaction. I also testify the same to the land forces, who have powerfully seconded you. The zeal which you have shewn in answering the call which has been made to you, is a sure pledge for your king of that which you will always display when summoned for the benefit of his service and the good of the country. JOACHIM NAPOLEON.

SPAIN.—PROCEEDINGS OF THE CORTES.—*Liberty of the Press.—27th Sept. 1810.*

Arguelles said, that without the intention of bringing the subject completely under discussion, he could not do less than

call the attention of the Cortes towards an object of the greatest importance, and which he looked upon as a necessary preliminary to the salvation of the country; he meant the Political Liberty of the Press. He said he was far from wishing that they should immediately proceed to determine on a point of such high interest and material consequence; but that if the proposition should meet the approbation of the Assembly, they might appoint a Committee, which, taking into consideration all that has already been written on this important subject, might examine and investigate the question, and submit to the Cortes the result of their labours and their reflections, and point out the manner in which it might appear to them that the political liberty of the press may be fixed. —Zorraquin and Perez de Castro supported the motion of Arguelles.—A Clerical Deputy manifested some opposition.

Torrero, another Ecclesiastic, ascended the Tribune, and in a very animated manner pointed out the evils which had already been experienced from the want of the liberty of the Press, and the benefits which would result to us from its political freedom. He said that it was necessary the Cortes should proceed in the *opposite course from that which the Central Junta had taken*, substituting for the criminal silence and mysterious conduct of that Government, the publicity of their sittings, and the *liberty of writing upon political subjects*. The prohibition of that freedom had discredited the Central Junta from the first moment of its institution. The public, he observed, had a right, and it was even their duty to interest themselves in the conduct of their Representatives, and to warn them of the errors which they might notice in their proceedings; and which warning could only be given through the *medium of the Press*. It was always necessary to consult public opinion, whose echo was the Press. The want of the liberty of the Press was, at the present moment, an impediment to the labours of the Committee which the Cortes had appointed to consider certain questions relative to the august duties of the Executive Power.—Almost all the Members voted for the motion, and a Committee was appointed, composed of eight Members, among whom were Arguelles, Perez de Castro, Palacios, and Hermida.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"The hope of the HYPOCRITES shall perish."—Jos.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

JEFFERY.—From what has been published in most of the news-papers, it is not, I think, to be doubted, that this poor fellow is now actually alive, and arrived safe in England.—The *Times* of the 25th of October contained the following paragraph respecting him.—"Jeffery the seaman, in his account of his sufferings and preservation, says, that at first he did not believe that it was intended to leave him on the island; he saw the ship the morning after he was put on shore, and expected every moment that a boat would be put off to take him on board. He suffered at first very much from thirst, and to allay it he drank a considerable quantity of salt water, which only increased it. Most fortunately for him some rain fell on the third day after he was put on shore, and the quantity that remained in the cavities of the rocks supplied him while he remained there: he was under the necessity of sucking it out with a quill. He saw great numbers of birds of the gull kind, rather larger than a gopse, but he could not catch any of them. He found only one egg, but it was in such a putrid state that he could not eat it; the only food (if it may be called food) that he had, was some bark, which he found on the shore. He saw five ships pass by while he was on the island, but at too great a distance for him to be visible to the people on board, and the vessel by which he was at last taken off, would probably have passed on in the same manner, if the Captain had not hove to from motives of curiosity, to examine the birds which were flying in great numbers about the island.—Some of the industrious gentlemen who snatch at every opportunity of turning a penny, it seems, were extremely anxious to get possession of Jeffery, for the purpose of exhibiting him at a certain price of admission. The Admiralty, aware of the improper use that might be made of this poor fellow, gave him his discharge from the navy, on condition that he should im-

"mediate proceed to his mother's in Cornwall. Had he remained in town, it is not improbable he might have been persuaded to appear at one or other of the twelpenny debating shops. His sufferings would have furnished a copious theme for the *vehement eloquence* of the doctors of these schools."—The *MORNING POST*, of the same day, has this article relating to him.—"Jeffery, the seaman, has left town, having, as we stated yesterday, made a very satisfactory arrangement with the family of Captain Lake. He says, that at first he did not believe that it was intended to leave him on the island; he saw the ship the morning after he was put on shore, and expected every moment that a boat would be put off to take him on board. He suffered at first very much from thirst, and to allay it he drank a considerable quantity of salt water, which only increased it. Most fortunately for him some rain fell on the third day after he was put on shore, and the quantity that remained in the cavities of the rocks supplied him while he remained there; he was under the necessity of sucking it out with a quill. He saw great numbers of birds of the gull kind, rather larger than a goose, but he could not catch any of them.—He found only one egg, but it was in such a putrid state that he could not eat it: the only food (if it may be called food) that he had was some bark, which he found on the shore. He saw five ships pass by while he was on the island, but at too great a distance for him to be visible to the people on board, and the vessel by which he was at last taken off, would probably have passed on in the same manner, if the Captain had not hove to, from motives of curiosity, to examine the birds, which were flying in great numbers about the island."—And the *COURIER* of the same day said, that the friends of Captain Lake had made him a liberal compensation for his sufferings."—I noticed, in a former Number, page 721, the circumstance of Jeffery having been met at Portsmouth, and brought from that place to London, in a post-chaise by *Lake's* Solicitor.

citor and a friend; that is to say, I suppose, a friend of Lake or of his Solicitor.—Now, if we are to believe the foregoing statements, he has made an arrangement with the family of Lake, who, we are told, have made him a liberal compensation for his sufferings.—But, without any desire to pry into other people's affairs, the public should, I think, be informed of the nature of this arrangement; of the exact amount of the compensation; and of the state, in which the man was, and company, in which he was, when the arrangement was made. I do not say, that he has not had fair play; that any advantage has been taken of his ignorance; but, I wish the circumstances to be made known, that the public may be satisfied, the affair being by no means of a private nature. It is a thing, in which the best interests of the nation may become involved; and, therefore, nothing relating to it should be transacted in secret, or in an underhand manner.—It is stated, in the above paragraphs, that JEFFERY received his discharge upon a certain condition, namely, that he should immediately leave London, and go into Cornwall. This is impossible. The Lords of the Admiralty are not empowered to make any such condition; and, besides, it is not to be believed, that they would attempt it. The man could not have been brought from the American States by force. He must have been prevailed on to come away by a promise of his discharge, if a discharge be necessary to an impressed man. And, therefore, the story of a condition, imposed by the Lords of the Admiralty, must be erroneous. It must be false; and, it should be contradicted, the tendency of it being manifestly injurious to the country, as, if believed, it must cause the seamen of the fleet to look upon the Admiralty as being very anxious to prevent any further exposure of Lake, the consequences of which may, first or last, prove extremely dangerous to the country.—The news-papers, above-quoted, seem to approve of the measure by which, as they say, Jeffery was prevented from getting into the hands of the *Debating Clubs*, "where his sufferings would have furnished a copious theme for the vehement eloquence of the doctors of these schools."—What, then, this print looks upon those sufferings; it looks upon this act of horrible cruelty; this act of cool, reflecting barbarity, as a theme for no eloquence but what is, in the eyes of this writer, of a nature to be ridiculed?

If I had met with this sentiment in the *MORNING POST*, or the *COURIER*, it would not have surprized me; but, I must confess, that it does surprize me to find it in the *TIMES*.—Why should not Jeffery's sufferings be the subject of discussion in the Debating Societies? What harm would that have done? What harm would it have done to exhibit him to the view of the people? Why should they not see this man? Why should they not hear, if possible, from his own lips, the narrative of the cruelties exercised towards him?—It is not yet openly denied, even by the *MORNING POST* and the *COURIER*, that wickedness, when committed by the great and the powerful, ought to be exposed. This does, indeed, appear to be the principle, upon which certain pious people proceed; but, it has not yet been openly avowed, I believe, by any one, except by one whose name, or, rather, whose names (for his life requires the use of more than one), are too detestable to mention. Excepting this one man, I know of no writer, who has, as yet, undisguisedly avowed, that the wickedness of the great and powerful ought to be disguised. And, as long as we hold, that wickedness ought to be exposed, and held forth to public detestation, it will hardly be denied, that the exhibiting of JEFFERY, in any way agreeable to himself, would have done good. Why, then, are those who are supposed likely to have wished for such an exhibition, to be represented as sharpers and persons of base designs?—From the first starting of the subject to the present day, the *MORNING POST*, the *COURIER*, and even the *MORNING CHRONICLE*, have preserved a cautious silence with regard to it. They all reported the proceedings in parliament, and especially the speeches of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, in a very brief way; they offered none of those long commentaries upon the subject, which they are in the habit of offering upon all those subjects, as to which they wish to excite an interest in the minds of their readers; they seemed to wish, that the thing should excite as little attention as possible; and, from the first to the last, never have they, upon any occasion, published, from themselves, one single word in disapprobation of the conduct of Lake; not one single word, and this is a fact, which ought to be kept alive in the public mind. Those of them, who have, at any time, stepped beyond mere narrative, and have expressed any thing like a sentiment upon the subject,

have expressed sentiments, the fair construction of which would lead their readers to suppose, that they looked upon Lake's conduct as by no means of a very detestable nature. They began in this way, and in this way they have continued. They have not ventured to praise Lake, nor have they gone so far as to attempt, in direct terms, to justify him; but, they praise the conduct of *his family* towards JEFFERY; and, they insinuate abuse of those, who have taken the part of the latter; an instance of which abuse, we have in the following paragraph of the MORNING POST, published the day after JEFFERY'S arrival at Portsmouth.—

"Robert Jeffery, the seaman, respecting whom some GOOD SOULS have been writing letters in the name of his mother, expressing her conviction that her son was dead," is arrived at Portsmouth on board the Thistle, from Halifax—a circumstance which will prove most MOR-TIFYING to the writers of the letters alluded to, and probably to SOME OTHERS."—As to the LETTERS, under the name of MRS. COADE, I have seen a letter from herself, declaring that she was the writer of those letters, of the truth of which declaration there is no reason to doubt. But, suppose the letters to have been written by others; are those others to be abused for that? Is it so uncommon for a person to sign a letter, written by another? And, why was this poor woman to be deprived of the assistance of talents superior to her own? Why, then, is this sneer at those, whom this writer supposes to have rendered her that assistance? Why this attempt to stigmatize the motives of such persons? The object is clear: it is to throw discredit upon them, because, and only because, they have done something towards the detection and exposure of this act of unparalleled tyranny and barbarity.—Then again, it is, by this writer, assumed, that the proof of JEFFERY'S being still alive will be a most mortifying circumstance to certain persons, alluding, obviously, to those, who have been most forward in interesting themselves in his behalf, and who, it is thus insinuated, would be sorry to hear of his being alive and well. What a shameful slander! What an insult to the public mind and heart! What an outrage upon humanity itself! And, remember, reader, this sentiment is addressed to "the fashionable world," a part, at least, of the criminality of which sentiment does,

in fact, attach itself to every one, who gives encouragement to the print, in which it is promulgated. I know of few things more scandalous to this country; few things more injurious to its character; few things more likely to do it dishonour in the eyes of the world, than this fact, that hardly one of its daily prints has uttered a word in reprobation of the tyranny and cruelty of Lake, while one of them has thus openly abused those, by whom that tyranny and cruelty have been exposed, and by whom, and whom alone, something, at least, has been obtained in the way of compensation towards the unfortunate sufferer.—The public have lately seen many articles in the Morning Post, containing sentiments of humanity towards the Debtors in our several jails, and, though the schemes proposed were, (except an act of grace were passed) utterly impracticable, the sentiments, as far as they went, were for the most part, very good; but, what are we to think of the sincerity of the writer, who, at the very same time, abuses those, who have stood forward in the cause of this most cruelly oppressed seaman, and, indeed, in the cause of all the scamen of the navy, who, from what has been now said, cannot fail to be protected against any such acts, which a man like Lake might be disposed to commit? What are we to think of the sincerity of this writer, in his other efforts in the cause of compassion and of mercy?—But, there is a motive for the abuse of the Morning Post and for the scarcely less censurable silence of the Morning Chronicle, which motive will, probably, have suggested itself to the reader, namely, hatred of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, who first brought the matter before the parliament and the public; who, after letting a sufficient time elapse for the Ministers to do the thing themselves, obtained the printing of the minutes of the court martial; and who then, just two days before he was committed to the Tower, made that motion for an address to the king, which caused an order to be issued for a search after JEFFERY. It is, therefore, to the exertions of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, that is to be ascribed, and that the nation will not fail to ascribe, the search after the man; the discovery of him; the sending of the ship to the American States to bring him away; his restoration to his mother and his friends; and the compensation, whatever it may be, that he has received from Lake or his family. And this, I have

no doubt, is the principal cause of the abuse of the prints of one party and the silence of those of the other party.—But, why did this task fall to the lot of SIR FRANCIS? Only because he found nobody else ready to perform it. He discovered no anxiety to be the principal actor. He was in no haste to catch at the subject. He shewed no desire to get applause from the obtaining of justice in this case. He told the ministers what he had heard of the matter; asked them whether they meant to do any thing in it; left them to take the necessary steps themselves; and only added, that, *if nothing was done by them*, he should make, *on a future day*, some specific motion upon the subject. He waited several days, and no notice being taken of the matter, and no intimation of any intended inquiry being made to him, he moved for the production of the minutes of the Court Martial. They were produced and printed. He let them remain for many days before the House; and, finding still, that no one took the matter up, he, *two days before he was himself committed to the Tower*, made the motion for an address to the king, and even consented, for the sake of unanimity, and that the House might not be exposed to the effects of a division upon such a subject, to modify that motion. I believe, the suggestion of the minister. So that, not only has the work been his, but it has been his without any desire, on his part, to be the actor; without any of the motives which manifestly animate the traders in humanity, of which this country contains not a few; without any puffing about his feelings; without any of the trappings of feigned woe and of the tricks of the base hypocrisy of these hypocritical times. Neither has he, since the address to the king, been concerned in any correspondence with the friends of JEFFERY. Without blaming, and even, in all probability, highly approving of it, in others, he has taken no part therein himself; but, with that frankness and true dignity, which characterize all his actions, he has left the matter where it was to be resumed, of course, openly when the parliament meets, in that way, which shall appear to be most conducive to justice in this particular case, and to the general good of the navy and the country at large.—As some persons still (and very naturally) entertain a doubt of the fact of JEFFERY's arrival, I think it right to add, that I have before me a letter, dated at Loos, on the 27th instant, which

contains what is to me a sufficient proof of the fact. In this letter it is stated, that upon JEFFERY's arrival at Portsmouth, "two gentlemen came down from London, and he was discharged. They took him to London, where he made the matter up with Captain Lake's friends. ONE OF THE SAME GENTLEMEN HAS ACCOMPANIED HIM TO POLPERO, and returned from that place last evening."—How kind! How affectionate! Not leave him a moment to himself, lest, I suppose, any accident should befall him; lest he should be robbed, or wronged; lest any one should hurt him in any way! What a difference! How wide the difference between this treatment and that which he experienced on board the *Recruit*! How wide the difference between this treatment and that which he received from those, who, in cold blood, left him, half-naked and with bleeding feet, crying upon the rock of Sombbrero! This change, such, perhaps, as no human being ever before experienced, has, be it remembered, been the work of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT. This is a fact, which neither the abuse of the Morning Post nor the silence of the Morning Chronicle will be able to disguise from the nation, and which will, in spite of all the counter workings of malice and hypocrisy, produce, in due time and manner, its appropriate effect.—Since the foregoing was written, I have seen the following paragraph in the Morning Post of the 29th instant:—"Mr. Whitbread, when at Portsmouth last week, visited the prison ships in that harbour, and was particular in his inquiries as to their situation, and if they had any grievances to complain of. He also went and saw Jeffery, the seaman, on board of the Thistle, but it is understood the result of his inquiries turned out different from what he might have expected, for it appears that the circumstances of this man's case have been greatly misrepresented."—What is meant by misrepresentation? How have the circumstances of his case been misrepresented? How has this been done? We have the facts in evidence, taken upon oath; and these facts are, 1. That the man was, by WARWICK LAKE's Order, put upon a barren and uninhabited rock, half naked and with neither victuals nor drink; that he cut his feet in climbing up the rock; that either the cowardly or hard-hearted men, who put him upon the rock, left him crying there; that LAKE and his ship were within sight

of the rock the next day, and that he cold-bloodedly sailed away and left the man on the rock to perish, in all human probability with hunger and raving madness preceded by anguish and horrors too great of mind to endure the thought of; and, finally, that LAKE signed a book, a copy of which was sent to the Admiralty, in which the letter R (standing for *Run away*) was put against JEFFERY's name. — These facts are all proved upon oath, as will appear from the minutes of the Court-martial, in the Register Vol. XVII, page 396 and onwards. — What does this writer mean, then, by *misrepresentation*? How has JEFFERY's case been "*greatly misrepresented*?" Here is the representation of it in evidence upon oath. Here are the facts, which are not, and which cannot be, denied. That the man is alive is owing to the *American Captain*; and that he is restored to his friends with some little compensation for his sufferings is owing to *Sir Francis Burdett*. — I have before observed, that the Morning Post had never, from first to last, expressed any *disapprobation* of Lake's conduct; and, as the reader will see, it is now at work to *apologize* for that conduct; nor shall I be at all surprized, if this same writer, should, in a few week's time, be found *defending* it. — Indeed, there is no act of oppression or inhumanity, which this print is not ready to defend, at the same time that it is crying out against the tyranny of Buonaparté. Neither NERO nor LOUIS XIV was ever guilty of an act of cruelty surpassing that of the landing of JEFFERY; and for this act it is, that the Morning Post is making an apology. What has Buonaparté to do, in answer to all this print's charges of cruelty against him, but to remind it of its apology for Lake? — This print is, too, observe, not the print of the JACOBINS, but of the "*fashionable world*" in England. That is, the description of persons, who support this vehicle for the apology for the most horrid barbarity. The writer knows well whom he is addressing himself to. And, I do hope, that this apology will be *born in mind*.

JACOBINS. — I said, some weeks back (at page 427), that my serious belief was, that the HYPOCRITES would "not have the smallest scruple to applaud, or even join, *His Most Satanic Majesty*, were he, in his proper person, to come, according to their own notions of him,

"horned and hoofed and clad in sheets of fire and brimstone." But, I really did not believe, that they were so near the time of openly proclaiming their readiness to form an alliance with the Jacobins of France, and upon the ground, too, of those Jacobins being, the "*friends of liberty*," and the "*real lovers of their country*." That such was and is the case, however, we are now to see; and the subject is one of great importance, because this is, in all probability, to become the foundation of some *new hope*, some *new delusion*, some *new cheat*, intended by the venal press to be practised upon this "*most thinking*" nation. The article, which I am about to insert, is taken from the COURIER newspaper of the 18th instant, and the reader will see from it, that a *Jacobin Plot*, in France, against the power, and, of course, against the life of Napoleon, is now openly recommended in one, at least, of the English Daily prints, that print being one of those, which has, for many years past, been amongst the loudest in its cries against Jacobinism, and in its invectives against all those, who, under whatever circumstances, have contended for what has usually been, in this country, denominated *liberty*, or *freedom*. — "The flight," says the COURIER of the date above-mentioned, "of Lucien Buonaparté, the state of war in which Napoleon stands with most of his family and coadjutors, justify hopes of the downfall of his power, from the rebellion of his instruments. — Lucien flown from his tyranny; Louis flown from his tyranny; the quiet Joseph buffeted about from Italy to Spain, forced to remain amidst a sea of terrors; Jerome bereaved of his love; the stupid bully Murat, incapable of giving assistance; the legitimate wife divorced; her family consequently full of resentment and revenge; Fouché and other main instruments disgraced, thus exciting the suspicion and disgust of others equally necessary. This is a situation of affairs highly dangerous to Buonaparté, which the adoption of Bernadotte as King of Sweden, of Berthier as King of Poland, and of Massena as King of Portugal, may not be able to counteract. Incapable of finding ruffians sufficient in his own family for his Kings, incapable of having legitimate children, whatever he may call the bastards begotten on a Princess of Austria; he may rave, and swagger, and dictate, but it is evident that

"circumstances conspire against his designs, and that they are likely to frustrate the views of this *splendid villain*, notwithstanding all his triumphs in the field.—In all he does there is nothing of permanence. He is a destroyer merely, and were he *to die*, the whole machinery would stand still for want of a director. The open defection of his family and friends gives rise to the hope that his tyranny may provoke a powerful party, even in his own palace, to overthrow him. Such a party would, and could only consist of the *friends of liberty*, called the *Jacobins*. Were they to rise masters, and for such an event the Government of this country should be prepared, it would be the *enthusiasm of the spirit of freedom* that would alone give them strength and success. But experience would deter them as well from renewing the wild horrors of Robespierre's reign, as from continuing the military tyranny of the Corsican Usurper. The necessary consequence of the accession of such a party to power, would be great moderation and circumspection, and it is more likely that they would bring back the Bourbon Family, on conditions, to strengthen themselves, than any other party. Nay it is likely even that they would renounce all foreign conquests, bending their exertions and benevolence to the *amelioration of France singly*. Such a change should be hailed by the British Government, encouraged and assisted. What! assist the French Jacobins! our *stupid Royalists* would exclaim. Yes: any change in France must be for the better; no change can be effected without a party, and no party has sufficient strength for the purpose, but that which is called the Jacobins. Perhaps this would be thought too great a triumph for the English Jacobins, who might become dangerous at home. Fear not. The moment the ruling party in France not only ceased to be our enemies, but became sincerely on good terms with us, from that moment the *English Jacobins* would execute them. Our home Jacobins sympathize with every thing that is in opposition to the *English Government and Establishments, which they wish to destroy*. Place but the friends of freedom in France in amity with this country, and one half of the Opposition, with nearly the whole of the *Burdettites*, will become their enemies. Witness the base conduct of these factions towards the Spa-

riards, a people making the most great and gallant struggles for independence, of which there is any record in history."—This article presents itself to us in three distinct lights: First, as an instance of abuse of Napoleon and his Empress: SECOND, as an invitation to the supposed Jacobins of France; and, THIRD, as a description of the state of the public mind in this kingdom.—To take them in the order, in which they come before us, we here see Napoleon represented as a "VILLAIN," and so called without any qualification whatever. The children which he shall have by Maria Louisa are, by anticipation, called BASTARDS, and, what Maria Louisa, the daughter of our very late "august ally," the Emperor of Austria, what this Princess herself must be, it is unnecessary to say, and it is rather a wonder that this writer did not, by giving her the name, save us the trouble of pointing out an inference.—It is only on the 6th of this month, that the Morning Post contained the following passage: "To the People of the United Kingdom. The detestable characters lately exposed in the Pillory, may be considered as the real representatives of the Corsican Tyrant and his Ministers, who BOAST OF THE MONSTROUS VICE, which excites such horrors in every British bosom."—Such, reader, is the language of the Courier and the Morning Post newspapers. Such are their charges, their positive, openly made, distinct and plain charges against a Princess of Austria, a daughter of our late ally, the Emperor Francis, and against her husband, whom, in our late capitulation in Portugal, we acknowledged as an Emperor, and whom Sir Arthur Wellesley recognized as an Emperor more than two years ago.—Is this a disgrace to the English press, or is it not? Was the like of this ever seen to issue from any other press in the world? Is this dictated by a love of country, and feelings of manly hostility towards its powerful enemy, or by the selfish fear of pecuniary loss, which seldom fails to shew itself in effusions of mean and impotent malignity? Arise from what source it may, there can be doubt, I think, in the mind of any rational man, that it must be productive of mischief to the country.—It has always been a maxim amongst nations, that wars should be carried on with as little of personal acrimony as possible; and for this plain reason, that such personal acrimony, while it cannot possibly do any good, may

not only possibly, but very likely, do a great deal of harm, by exciting passions, which, without it, would never have existed. This maxim is peculiarly applicable to the war now going on, and especial care should be taken not to make the quarrel with Napoleon a personal one, seeing that the happiness of so many British subjects depend upon his breath. I am not foolish enough to suppose, that any thing that can be said by these venal writers, or, by any body else, can, in the smallest degree, tend to the strengthening of his resolution to subdue this country, if he can; but it must be evident to every one, that there are a great variety of ways, in which he may be induced to add to the severity of war, and especially while he has so many British subjects in his hands. Viewing the matter in this light, who can help feeling indignation at these unnecessary attacks, this bootless abuse, these foul, atrocious, and unpardonable calumnies, calumnies which nothing but an almost infernal malignity could invent, and which it is not in human nature to forgive. The writers of this country justified the invasion of Holland by the Prussian army, under the late Duke of Brunswick, on the score of a personal insult, alledged to have been offered by a very small part of the people to the then Princess of Orange. But if that insult had been offered by every individual soul in the United Netherlands, it would not have amounted to a millionth part of the insult, which, in the above quoted passages, is offered to Napoleon and to a Princess of a Royal House, but a short while ago in alliance with England.—Am I told, that the English government and nation are not answerable for what is published in the *Morning Post* and *Courier*? My answer is, that the English government has, upon several occasions, ordered persons to be prosecuted for what were deemed libels against foreign Princes, and even against Napoleon himself; and that, as to the nation, these prints are published in the metropolis, are circulated through the country, are upheld by numerous purchasers, and that, too, amongst that class of society, who ought to be judges of the fitness of what they read.—This being the case, the nation must expect to be looked upon as answerable for what these prints contain; and, though it is well known that all persons of a just way of thinking do hold these publications in abhorrence, yet, it would be very

foolish for us to expect, that the world, in its estimate of the act, would make this exception with respect to its authors; and, whatever may be our wishes, we may be assured, that, in whatever country these atrocious publications may be read, a deaf ear will be turned to all our complaints against the persevering hostility, rancour, and vindictiveness of Buonaparté, who, if he has in him the feelings common to mankind, can never be satisfied with any thing short of the total extirpation of those, from whom have proceeded these diabolical charges.—It is, therefore, the duty of every man, and especially of every man, who has at his command any portion of the press, to endeavour to wipe from his country in general this foul, this deep disgrace, and to fix it exclusively upon the heads of those MERCENARY, MEAN and MALIGNANT HYPOCRITES, from whom, and from whom alone, it could possibly flow.—As to the SECOND point, the invitation to the *Jacobins of France*, this writer tells us that powerful a party may be raised in Napoleon's own Palace to overthrow him; that such a party could consist, only, of the *friends of liberty, called the Jacobins*; that if they were to become masters, their strength would be derived from the *enthusiasm of the spirit of freedom*; that it is likely they would bend their exertions and benevolence to the *bettering of the condition of France*.—This is no bad picture of the Jacobins, and one would really suppose, that the writer of the *Courier*, had, for a moment, forgotten himself, and taken a leaf out of his old book.—We Jacobins may now hold up our heads, I think; for what better character than this can we ask or wish for? Were I to choose the words of my epitaph, they should be these: "*He was a friend of Liberty, his power he derived from the spirit of freedom, and his exertions were directed to the benevolent purpose of bettering the condition of England*;" a character which I would not exchange for the accumulated sums, arising from the sinecures of the Perceval and Grenville families.—Having given this character of the French Jacobins, this writer tells us, that they may probably become masters in France, an event for which *our government should be prepared*; and that our government should *hail the return of the Jacobins to power, encourage it, and assist it*.—The reader will not fail to recollect how many years we carried on war, how many millions of

money we spent, and how many thousands of men were slain in war, because France was under the domination of Jacobins; and here we have, at the end of fifteen years of bloody war, a writer who scruples not to insult us with a project for the spending of more millions for the purpose of restoring the Jacobins of France to power! I have often said, that no nation was ever so outrageously insulted as this, but, really, this insult is greater than even I could have expected to witness.—How often was it urged against the French Revolutionists, that they invited the people of other countries to conspire, to revolt, and to rebel? How often was this stated as the ground of hostility against them, and as a proof of their insincerity in their offers to treat for peace? How often was it represented as a proof of the impossibility of living at peace with them, and made the bar to all overtures for peace when no other was alledged? And now, behold! we are told that the readiest way effectually to serve our own cause is to hail, to encourage and to assist conspiracy, revolt and rebellion in France, against a person whose right of sovereignty we have recognized in a solemn treaty; against a person, from whom, as *sovereign of France*, we have received *cessions of territory belonging to Spain and Holland*; against a person whose sovereignty has been recognized in the Court of King's Bench in terms the most express and explicit!—Does the reader believe that conduct like this, on the part of our press, tends to give us credit, and to do us honour, in the eyes of the world? And, what can those, who in any way whatever, give encouragement to these prints, and who feed and fatten these venal writers, say in defence of their own morality and taste?—Does it not, besides, occur to the reader, that this invitation to conspiracy, revolt, and rebellion, may be applied to ourselves? If it be *right* for our government to invite the French people to conspire against their sovereign, and to *encourage and assist* them therein, may it not be said, that it is *right* in the French government to do the same with regard to our sovereign; or, do these writers suppose, that even the immutable principles of reason are to give way to their *humours, wishes, and interests*?—Again, if it be *justifiable* in the people of France, or any part of them, to rise in rebellion against a person, whom we have, in so many ways, and by such solemn acts,

recognized as their *sovereign*; if it be *justifiable in them* to rise in rebellion against and to dethrone *their sovereign*, does it not require something to convince the people of *this country*, that such an act towards *our sovereign* would not be *justifiable*?—Thus, you see, reader, that these hypocritical writers are, as far as they have any influence, cutting the throat of that authority, which they profess to admire and defend. They preach the *right* of conspiracy, revolt, rebellion, and regicide; and, though they would fain, perhaps, address themselves to the people of France exclusively, they do, in fact, address themselves to nobody but the people of this kingdom, to the subjects of their own sovereign, who alone hear what they say, and who, of course, are the only persons that can possibly, through their means, imbibe these principles of anarchy and bloodshed.—The *THIRD* light, in which we have to consider this publication from the *Courier* is, as a *description of the public mind in this country*. And here one might reasonably have expected a good account of the *English Jacobins*; but, this writer has, it seems, discovered, that, while the Jacobins of France are "*friends of liberty*;" are animated by "*the enthusiasm of the spirit of freedom*;" are of "*a benevolent*" disposition; have "*moderation*" in their views; and wish for nothing so much as "*the bettering of the condition of France*;" he has discovered, that, while this is the character of the Jacobins of France, that of the Jacobins of England is just the reverse, and that they *hate nothing but their own country*, and would even hate their brother Jacobins of France, the moment these latter should *show any friendship for England*.—Having communicated this discovery to his readers, he proceeds to describe the classes and strength of the English Jacobins. He says, that "*our home Jacobins sympathize with any thing that is in opposition to the English government and establishments, which they wish to destroy*."—There is, indeed, some difference, in the words, at least, between "*governments*," and "*establishments*," and *country*; and it is possible that this writer may mean, that we Jacobins in England, are not enemies of our *country*.—Well, then, we, the English Jacobins, or in other words, the English "*friends of liberty*;" are, as he says, the enemies of the English "*governments*" and "*establishments*." Let us, therefore, now, see, who we are, and what is the probable num-

ber of us. "*One half of the Opposition, with nearly the whole of the Burdettites.*"—It is well known, that in spite of all the influence of place and of power about one half of the members of the two houses of parliament belong to what is called the Opposition. Thus, then, this writer declares to the world, that about one quarter part of those members wish to destroy the English government and establishments; and that the same wish is entertained by nearly the whole of the Burdettites, who, without the smallest exaggeration, consist, taking all the classes of the people together, of more than four fifths of all the able bodied men in this kingdom. And, this writer proclaims to the world; he tells our enemy, that all these persons are not only discontented, are not only hostile to the ministers of the day; but that they actually wish to destroy the English governments and establishments. I thought, that we were told, only the other day, that we were an united people; and, I am sure, I must have read, within these thirteen months, some hundreds of paragraphs and poems, in which it has been asserted, that the people of this country, with one united voice, blest the day that the King was born, returned thanks to Heaven for the good they enjoyed under his government, and prayed most earnestly to the Lord long to preserve the life of him, owing to whom, under Divine Providence, they enjoyed so much freedom and happiness. But now, behold, it is asserted, by one of the writers of these very paragraphs, that a great part of the people wish for the "*destruction of the English Government and Establishments,*" in which it would be treason to say, that the king is not included.—These writers, these profound HYPOCRITES, know that they publish falsehoods, and they know, too, that such falsehoods must be greatly injurious to the nation; they well know, that such falsehoods must tend to encourage the enemy, must invite him to invade us, must disincline him towards any reasonable terms of peace, and, which is more than all the rest, must make an invasion truly perilous by previously making one part of the people look upon the other part as their enemies. All this these HYPOCRITES know full well; but, they themselves thrive, and, indeed, exist only through the means of domestic divisions and animosities, were it not for which they would be compelled to sweep the streets or black shoes, and, therefore, though excessively mischievous, their con-

duct is perfectly natural. I am, however, of opinion, that the day is not far distant, when their efforts in this way will become unavailing, when the people shall see how they have been abused and cheated, when they shall be convinced that the safety of the country and, of each individual in it calls for an union of exertions; and when we see that day, we may say, in the words of my motto: "The hope of the HYPOCRITES shall perish."

PORTUGAL.—The wind having been foul, for some days past, no intelligence has been received, it appears, from Lisbon. There is now, however, no anxiety in the public mind, we are told, as to the result of the campaign; and, indeed, after the statement of numbers, inserted in the ministerial prints, and copied from them into my last Number, at page 752, and which statement was as follows

" English Army.....	30,000
" Portuguese Regulars	59,755
	<hr/>
	89,755
" Portuguese Militia.....	52,848
	<hr/>
" Total	142,603

After this statement, which was published with all the air of full authority, in the COURIER news-paper of the 17th of September; after seeing this, and knowing that 10 thousand men, English and Brunswick troops, have joined our army since, and knowing also, from Lord Talavera's own dispatch, that he has, in the race which he has so fortunately won, lost neither men nor stores, except at Almeida and the trifling loss at the Victory of Busaco: with these facts before us, and knowing that Massena had nothing but the ground he stood upon after he had been routed at Busaco, and that, though, some how or other, he did make shift to drag his soldiers' carrion carcasses along in spite of the crows and other birds of prey, still he and his wretched raggamuffins were, when the last advices came away, half-naked, unhoused, unfed, and afflicted with the dysentery, with a ravaged and depopulated country behind them, their retreat to Spain cut off, Colonels Miller and Trant "operating upon their communications," and with a superior and victorious army in their front: after this, it would be strange indeed if any man in England were to entertain the smallest anxiety for the result of the campaign, which,

as I observed before, has now nothing left to complete it but the mere *hour and manner*; the *event* itself being looked upon as *certain*, and the rewards to the winners of the victory being, in all likelihood, already in contemplation.—We have, too, now received, in Marshal Beresford's account of the Victory of Bnsaco, indubitable proof of the *discipline and valour* of the Portuguese Troops. He says (See his report to Don Miguel Pereira Forjaz) that the Portuguese troops covered themselves with glory; that they shewed themselves worthy of their companions in arms, the English army; that they made it a glorious day for the Portuguese name; that they obtained the admiration and full confidence of the English army; that they shewed courage in the attack and firmness during the whole day in receiving the fire of the enemy; that they added discipline to valour; that it is impossible there can be any better troops; that they charged with the bayonet, and performed an act of the most perfect gallantry, both on account of discipline and courage; that they supported, during the whole battle, the fire of 14 pieces of artillery, killed a great number of the enemy, dismounted three of their guns, and made two of his ammunition waggons blow up; that their conduct would have done honour to the most veteran troops, for, by the avowal of all the English Officers, they displayed equal discipline and valour.—After this, which, as the reader will see, is no more, not a word more, than the Marshal has said; after this, let us hope, that no one, in estimating the force of the allied army will attempt to make any distinction between the English and Portuguese; and, of course, we may hope, that no attempt will be made to diminish the numbers before stated, which numbers are, it is, on all hands allowed, greatly superior to those of Massena.—While such is the state of things, or, rather, was the state of things when the last intelligence came off, the French have, it seems, been at their old work; namely, publishing accounts, in which (See the latter part of *this Number*) they represent the state of their affairs in Spain as being extremely prosperous, and in which, with regard to Portugal, they not only do not seem to be in despair from sickness and famine, but in which they deny having been beaten at Bnsaco, but even say that they beat us upon that day of immortal glory to the English and Portuguese names; though we know that

they left 2,000 men dead upon the field, and that Marshal Beresford has, in consequence of our victory, been made a *Knight of the Bath*!—The first hint of this French intelligence was given in the Morning Post of last Saturday, and I do most earnestly beseech the reader to observe the tone, the manner, and especially the *logic* of it:—"Paris journals to the 10th inst. have reached town. They contain MASSENA's account of the battle of Buzaco, in which, with his wonted disregard of truth, he boasts of having driven the British before him, an assertion which the fact of his having left 2,000 dead on the field of battle, to be buried by us, serves completely to falsify. He also states, that he took a great number of prisoners, though it has been accurately ascertained, that the number of our missing was very few. He concludes with saying, that he was in full and close pursuit of the British, with his sword nearly in Lord Wellington's back. He certainly was close upon the British lines, and it is for information of the result of the conflict, which ensued, that the British Public are at present in such anxious expectation."—Reader, look at the *logic*. Look at the way, in which this writer answers what he gives us as Massena's assertions; and, when you have looked well at that, take a look at what his twin brother of the COURIER said on the same day:—"It was said yesterday evening that a Moniteur had been received, containing an account of the battle of Buzaco; that Massena claimed the victory, asserting, that he had gained it by the bayonet, his troops advancing at the *pas de charge*, and driving us from our positions; that he had forced us to retreat with the greatest precipitation to Lisbon, pursued *l'épée dans les reins*; that he had taken a large quantity of provisions and ammunition, and that our loss amounted to 7,000 men. That Massena would claim the victory was to be expected; but WE who KNOW the REAL FACT, and who have received the OFFICIAL DETAILS, can SMILE at his boast of having killed and wounded 7,000 of our troops, taken stores and provisions, and forced us to retreat with precipitation. As a proof of the correctness of his assertions, our readers will recollect, that Lord Wellington did not quit Coimbra till the fourth day after the battle of Buzaco."—Oh! Admirable logician!

What a neat and short-cut mode of answering a statement. Yes, you may "smile and smile and smile;" this and the context may do very well for you; but, really, Sir, why was it to be expected that Massena would *claim the victory*? Why? Come, Sir, none of your wriggling and twisting. Stand up, look us in the face, and tell us, why it was to be expected that *Massena would claim the victory*. Tell us why, after we had witnessed the honour of Knight of the Bath conferred upon Marshal Beresford and after you had told us that Lord Talavera was to be *promoted in the peerage*; tell us why, after this, we were to expect that *Massena would claim the victory*. It is useless to spur and goad you. You will not answer, because you cannot.—These, considering the source from which they proceeded, were ngly ill-favoured paragraphs. People asked, "if Massena's account be come, why not let us see it? It may be full of falsehood, but why not publish it? What he says we may possibly know to be all lies, but why not favour us with a sight of it? His account may very likely, be calculated to make you, Mr. Editor, smile, but why not let us smile along with you?" In vain did they ask, however. A glum, sulky silence was preserved, until this morning (the 30th) when the TIMES, which seems always to be the earliest with foreign intelligence, gave us, along with the French account of the war in Spain, the following article, relating to the war in Portugal, taken from the French official paper, the *Moniteur*, of the 20th instant.—"General Drouet, commanding the 9th corps of the Army of Spain, communicates under the date of the 10th inst. the arrival of a person in whom he can place confidence at Valladolid, from whom he received the following intelligence:—On the 30th the Prince of Essling arrived at Coimbra, one of the principal towns of Portugal, situate half way between Almeida and Lisbon. The French army had already marched forty leagues since it broke up from Almeida. The advanced guard and flanking parties had several engagements with the Portuguese regiments and the militia; it had taken up wards of 2,500 prisoners, and disarmed several Portuguese regiments. On the 27th of September it fell in with the English army, in a strong position, within a day's march of Coimbra, which it conceived impregnable. The English were attacked, turned, and closely pursued; they

abandoned some of their sick and magazines. The result of the affair on the 27th was 700 prisoners, of whom 400 were English, and two pieces of English cannon. But what was of more importance, the army became masters by this affair of the superb positions of the Mondego and the town of Coimbra, which affords great resources. The officer bearing the dispatches, containing the details of the events subsequent to the 27th of September, was proceeding with the guard that escorted the prisoners. The person from whom this intelligence was received left them at Viseu.—The army was in excellent health, and abundantly supplied with provisions. The wounded had been sent to Viseu, they were principally those who suffered in the affair on the 27th; they scarcely amounted to 500 men, including the sick.—General Drouet was proceeding to Almeida, to keep up the communication with that part of Portugal in the rear of the army."—Reader, look well at this article. Go over it twice. The French say, that they made 700 prisoners, of whom 400 were English, while Lord Talavera says, that he lost, in missing, but 32 English and 20 Portuguese, in the whole of the battles of the 26th and 27th of September. Then, again, the French say, that the whole of their wounded, including their wounded in the battle of Bosaço, amounted to scarcely five hundred men, whereas Lord Talavera tells us (see page 665) that "their loss in wounded was immense;" that (see same page) their loss altogether was "enormous;" and that (see same page) they "left 2,000 killed upon the field of battle;" whence "the Morning Post wounding 8,000 by computation," thus rendered the total loss of the enemy 10,000 men. And, after all this, are we to be told; are we to see it in print; are we to read it in an English newspaper, no matter from whom proceeding, that the French lost, upon this occasion, only 500 men in wounded? Oh! Mr. Drouet, if you were here, the Morning Post would pay you off for your lying, and I am not sure, that it would not pay you in your own coin.—As to the story about our having abandoned some of our sick and our magazines, it is very odd, but it is not less true, that the moment I heard of the Victory of Bosaço, I exclaimed, "I trust that our sick and wounded have not been left behind, this time!"—For in my Lord

Talavera's dispatch, nothing, that I recollect, is said about sick or magazines, and as to what happened at Coimbra, after the victory of Busaco, we, as yet, have no account, and I much question whether we ever shall! We know indeed, that Colonel Trant, who was "operating upon Massena's communications," took 5,000 French at Coimbra, which were marched to Oporto, and 3,000 of whom were *actually put on board of ship to be sent to England*; but we have never heard any thing about *magazines and sick*.—Fear to the winds, however, for we know that, (if the COURIER and MORNING POST have spoken truth) we have 100,000 British and German and Brunswicker troops, and Portuguese troops "equal to any in the world," posted behind strong lines, upon which are planted nearly 1,000 pieces of artillery; and that the Frenchman has not much more than half the number of skin-and-bone wretches, afflicted with the dysentery, without houses to cover them, and without any means of prolonging, for many weeks, their miserable existence.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
30th October, 1810.

P. S. There is a humorous thing going on, in the Morning Post, about the *Portuguese Conspiracy*. I beg the reader to keep his eye upon it.—Let him also watch what is saying about *Lucien Buonaparté*.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Marshal Beresford's Account of the Battle of Busaco, in a Letter, dated 30th Sept. at Coimbra, addressed to Don Miguel Pereira Forjas.*

Most Illustrious and most Excellent Senator.—I have the great satisfaction of announcing to your Excellency, for the information of his Royal Highness, that the allied army under the command of his Excellency Marshal General Lord Viscount Wellington, has defeated the enemy's army under the command of Marshal Massena, in an attempt which it made against our position on the heights of Busaco. As his Excellency the Marshal General will transmit to you, in order to be submitted to his Royal Highness, all the details of the movements and dispositions which led to this brilliant victory, I shall confine myself to what relates to the

particular troops of his Royal Highness, *who covered themselves with glory and shewed themselves worthy emulators of their companions in arms of the English army, and worthy inheritors of the glory of their ancestors*.—The enemy having, on the 25th, pushed forward his advanced posts to the lower part of our position on the mountain, he established himself there, and during the 26th concentrated the whole force of the three corps of his army. At six o'clock in the morning of the 27th, he attacked our position with strong columns at two different points, and a fire was maintained with great vigour for about two hours and a half. The Portuguese troops who distinguished themselves were all those who had *the good fortune to be at the points of attack*, and consisted of the following corps:—The brigade of the 9th and 21st, under the orders of Col. Champalimaud; and after that officer was wounded, under Lieut.-Col. Sutton. The 8th regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Douglas. The brigade of the 1st and 16th of the line, and 4th battalion of Caçadores, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Pack. The brigade of the 7th and 19th, and the Caçadores, No. 2, under Brig.-Gen. Colman. The battalions of Caçadores, Nos. 1 and 3, with the English light division, and the 6th battalion of that brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Campbell. Two brigades of artillery, under the immediate command of Major Arentschild, and two of the 3d division, which were posted more to the left.—The only difference in the conduct of those troops consisted in the opportunities which afforded the different corps occasions for distinguishing themselves. This may be called *a glorious day for the Portuguese name*, our troops having, by their behaviour, obtained the admiration and *full confidence of the English army*. The conduct of the 8th regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Douglas, and in which Major Birmingham distinguished himself, secured to it the glory, along with two English regiments, of *dislodging the enemy from the heights*, which he had gained, making him pay dearly for his momentary advantage. The 9th and 21st regiments have merited the complete approbation of Major-General Picton and Colonel Champalimaud, Lieut. Colonel Sutton, and Lieut.-Colonel Jose Maria de Araujo Bacellar, who commanded the 21st regiment, deserve the highest praise.—My thanks are due to Brigadier General

Pack, as well as to the corps which were under his orders, and also to the Commanders of those corps, Lieutenants Colonel Hill, and Luyz do Rego, and Major Armstrong. The conduct of the battalion of Caçadores, No. 4, deserves to be particularly mentioned, both for its *courage in the attack*, and for the firmness with which it *supported, during the whole day, the fire of the enemy*. The battalion of Caçadores, No. 1, commanded by Lieut. Col. Jorge de Avilez, conducted itself extremely well, and merits my highest commendations. The battalion No. 3, under the command of Lieut. Col. Elder, particularly distinguished itself, and having to the reputation of *discipline* added that of *valour*, *it is impossible that there can be any better troops than those which compose this battalion*. The Brigade of Brigadier General Colman, consisting of the 17th and 19th, and the Caçadores, No. 2, merited also *every eulogium*, and equal praise is due to the Commanders of these corps, Colonels Palmeirim and Jose Cardoso de Menece, Sottomaior, and Lieut. Col. Nixon. Five companies of the 19th regiment, under the immediate command of Lieut. Col. Macbean, made a charge with the bayonet on the enemy, which is particularly mentioned by all the Officers of both armies who saw it, as *an act of most perfect gallantry, both on account of the discipline, and courage which the troops displayed*. The battalion of Caçadores, No. 6, belonging to General Campbell's brigade, and commanded by Lieut. Col. Sebastian Pinto, behaved also very well, and deserve my thanks. The two brigades of artillery of the 9th and 6th, under the personal orders of Major Arentschild, greatly distinguished themselves; they *supported, with much firmness during the whole battle, the fire of 14 pieces of artillery, killed a great number of the enemy, dismounted three of their guns, and made two of his ammunition waggons blow up*. The other two brigades *merit equal approbation*.—All the Officers and soldiers of these corps have acted so as to render it my duty to *convey to his Royal Highness an account of their good and excellent conduct, which would have done honour to the most veteran troops, for, by the avowal of all the English Officers, they displayed equal discipline and valour*. With respect to the troops not engaged, I observed in them the *most anxious desire to attack the enemy*, and according to appearances they will soon have the opportunity they wish for. With such gallan-

try as the Portuguese troops displayed in the battle of Buzaco, aided by the known valour of the English army, it is impossible not to anticipate a favourable result to our present contest, and not to be convinced that the enemy will *soon dearly pay for the devastation and cruelties which he has committed in Portugal*.—I cannot refrain from seizing this opportunity to acknowledge the important services which I have received on every occasion, from the talents and zeal of the Quarter Master General of the Army, Colonel D'Urban; I have every reason to be satisfied with the Adjutant General Brito Mozinho, and with my Military Secretary, Brigadier Lemos, both of whom accompanied me during the battle; and also with all my Staff.—I subjoin a return of the loss of the army of his Royal Highness, in the battle of the 27th. The loss of the enemy *must have been immense*, as appears from the statements of the prisoners, and the wounded, *whom he abandoned*, when he made his movement towards our left. He left on the field of battle *more than two thousand killed*, and several of his Generals have been wounded. Brigadier General Simon was made prisoner, and the officers whom we have taken, say, that Generals Merle, Lacune, and Grandorge, are among the wounded.

FRENCH ACCOUNT

Of the Military Operations in Spain and Portugal, up to September, 1810.

ESTREMADURA.

JULY.—Before quitting the banks of the Guadiana, General Reynier, commanding the second corps of the army, caused an attack to be made on an enemy's corps which was in the mountains of Xeres de los Caballeros. Gen. Merle was charged with this expedition. He set out on the 5th of July from Feria, with his division and the brigade of dragoons of General Marizy. Having arrived near Salvatierra, he met the advanced guard of the enemy, who at the sight of our troops took a position on a woody mountain; they were immediately attacked, overthrown, and pursued to another position, where some other troops made resistance, and from which they were also chased. The enemy likewise held and defended two other very strong positions, which our troops could only attack by *defiling one by one, and by leaping over the walls*. But nothing

could stop the voltigeurs of the 2d and 3d régiments of light infantry. All the Spanish troops, to the number of 8,000, then concentrated themselves on the heights near Xeres de los Caballeros, which afforded positions still more strong, and the approach to which was extremely difficult. Gen. Merle ordered a halt, and directed several dispositions with the view of turning the attention of the enemy from the point which he wished to attack, but the ardour of the voltigeurs obliged him to hasten his attack. The 2d and 4th régiments of Light Infantry carried all the positions with the bayonet; and in spite of a very brisk fire on the part of the Spaniards, they were precipitated from the mountains in the greatest disorder. The regiment of the Princess, desirous of covering their flight, formed itself into a square near the bridge of the Ardilla. General Marizy, who pursued it with 100 dragoons, charged it, made 200 prisoners, and killed the rest. The enemy then dispersed themselves entirely, and fled in small troops in all directions, vigorously pursued for several leagues.—The régiments of the Princess, of the Union, and a battalion of Catalonians, which composed the best troops of this corps, were totally destroyed. The enemy had more than 2,000 killed, among whom were some officers of rank, and we have made 1,000 prisoners. Our loss only amounts to a few men killed, and twenty-seven wounded.—Generals Marizy, Sarraz, and Graindorge, as well as the Chief of Battalion Paris, of the 4th Light Infantry, and the Aide-de Camp Chevilly, particularly distinguished themselves in this affair.—While the enemy was thus completely beaten at Xeres, General Gazan, of the 5th Corps, pursued upon the Lower Guadiana the division of Ballasteros, and drove it back upon Portugal.—**AUGUST.**—The second corps of the army, however, having crossed to the right bank of the Tagus to join the army of Portugal, the enemy had been able to re-unite all his forces in Estremadura, and was able by replacing with Portuguese the garrisons of Badajoz, Campo Mayor, &c. to form a new corps of 10 or 12,000 infantry, and 900 cavalry, with which he had conceived the project of marching upon Seville.—The General of Division Girard was at this time in Estremadura. Informed of the march of the enemy upon Bienvenida, on the 11th of August he marched rapidly from Llerena upon that point by Villagarcia. The

Spaniards, astonished at this movement, suspended their march, and thought only of defending themselves. Their General drew up his line in positions surrounded by natural entrenchments, and awaited the attack. General Girard made demonstrations upon the centre, while Gen. Chauvil marched to turn their left, and General Brayer observed their right. Two squadrons of the enemy had the boldness to charge the brigade Chauvil, which gave them a volley within pistol-shot, and destroyed them in an instant. The position of the left was immediately carried at the point of the bayonet. At the same moment the brigade Brayer advanced, and with the bayonet carried the level part of the ridge, which was defended by 5,000 men. The two brigades now crowned the heights and the victory was decided. The enemy's cavalry made vain efforts to cover the flight of their infantry; the voltigeurs united, charged them at full speed, and the route became complete.—The enemy lost in this affair 2,500 men killed or wounded, and 700 prisoners; we took from him four pieces of cannon, and immense stores of provisions. Our loss was 28 killed, and about 50 wounded; the most slightly.—Generals Chauvil and Brayer; Colonels Reymond, of the 31th regiment; Chasseraux, of the 10th; Vigeant, of the 64th; the chief of the battalion Monnot, commanding the 89th; Major Gaidon, of the 21st Chasseurs; the chief of battalion Marquet, commanding the Voltigeurs; Captain Gritte, of the 34th; Captain Levêque, of the 10th hussars; the Captain of Grenadiers Martin, of the 64th; Adjutant Lefebvre, of the 88th; Andouard, officer of engineers, and the Aide-de-Camp Duroc-mesle, have deserved praises for their good conduct.

SEPTEMBER.—The English sent a division of Portuguese troops to reinforce Romana, and required that he should march forward. This assistance, and what he could collect of the remains of his troops, formed about 12,000 men. He put himself in march in the beginning of September, and advanced to the defiles which command Andalusia. He occupied Arcena, Santa Olalla, Monasterio, and Guadalcanal.—During his continuance in that quarter, one of his divisions attacked, during four successive days, the post of Castillo de los Guardios, and was constantly repulsed, losing there 150 men. On the 6th of September, 2,000 men marched upon Fuente Ovejuna, where

there were 96 men of the 51st regiment. This detachment fought for 13 hours; at first at the entrance of the village, then in their quarters, in the church, and at last in the steeple; all the soldiers chose rather to die than surrender; surrounded on all sides they defended themselves with the greatest courage. The enemy had already lost 200 of his troops; despairing to vanquish with honour this handful of men, he set fire to the steeple, and the whole detachment was about to fall a prey to the flames, when the approach of some troops made the enemy take flight, and saved it. It had lost one-half of its number in this courageous defence.—In the mean time the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia assembled at El Requillo the 5th corps of the army, under the orders of the Marshal Duke of Treviso, for the purpose of driving back the enemy into the lower parts of Estremadura. Accordingly, this corps of the army, after having chased the troops which were in its front at Santa Olalla and Monasterio, arrived on the morning of the 15th Sept. near Fuente de Cantos, where the enemy's cavalry, to the number of 2,700, comprising 1,000 Portuguese, thought to make a stand, and oppose our passage. General Briche, commanding the cavalry, received orders to attack the enemy with his division. Every thing was overthrown, and put to the route; 500 cavalry, among whom was the Colonel of the regiment of the Infanta, and a great number of Officers, were made prisoners. Six pieces of light artillery were also taken with their draught horses and caissons: the enemy left a great number killed upon the spot, and that of their wounded was very considerable. We had eight killed, and 30 wounded.—The enemy precipitated his retreat; his consternation was complete; and he lost a great many men by desertion. On the 16th, the Duke of Treviso was already at Zafra, and was continuing his operations. His reconnoitering parties had pushed on as far as Fuente del Maestro.

ANDALUSIA.

AUGUST.—Provisions becoming more and more scarce in Cadiz, the besieged have made a new effort to re-victual the place, and to operate, if possible, a diversion on the Rio Tinto. On the 24th of August, Lascy landed a body of 5,000 men from Cadiz, between Moguer and the tower of Oro, and marched immediately against the Duke of Aremburg, who occupied Moguer with 200 horsemen of his regiment. During this movement,

Copons with 1,500 men marched from the frontiers of Portugal, and marched rapidly upon the Rio Tinto, to cut off the retreat of the Duke of Aremburg. Attacked by a superior force, the Duke of Aremburg notwithstanding supported the combat with success during the whole day, and in the evening took up a position at Villarasa, without suffering his troops to be broken. On the 25th he continued his retreat upon San Lucar Mayor, without the enemy daring to oppose it. Some detachments from the 5th corps joined the small column of the Duke of Aremburg. Lascy then stopped his march. General Pepin, who had taken the command of the troops at St. Lucar, marched against him without delay. On the morning of the 28th he attacked him at Manzanilla, from whence he pursued him as far as Villalba. A corps of 300 Spanish cavalry having attempted resistance, the Duke of Aremburg, at the head of the 2d regiment of hussars, charged them immediately; all who were not killed were taken, and on the 29th our troops re-entered Moguer. The enemy re-embarked in disorder during the night, leaving a great deal of property on the beach, and great part of their casks both empty and full. Thus this expedition, which had for its object to re-victual Cadiz, and to make a diversion, kept in check by General Girard, produced nothing but disgrace to the enemy, who lost besides a great number of soldiers by desertion.—SEPTEMBER.—The want of water induced the besieged to attempt a new debarkation. It took place on the 15th of September at Moguer, whither Copons marched from the banks of the Guadiana to support it; but the Adjutant-Commandant Remoud, and the Duke of Aremburg, manœuvred with so much promptitude, that Copons was soon come up with, beaten, and chased anew beyond Saint Bartholomew and Castaya, and the troops of Cadiz were again obliged to re-embark with precipitation.

GRANADA AND MURCIA.

SEPTEMBER.—The collections of the Murcian peasants under the command of Blake, threatening the frontiers of Granada, General Sebastiani set out from the city of Granada at the latter end of August to disperse or destroy them. On his approach they became panic-struck, and fled in every direction. The army entered Murcia without having occasion to fire a single shot. From thence he directed his march to several points in pursuit of the enemy, but he was not able to come up

with them any where. Two detachments only were overtaken within two leagues of Carthage, and destroyed.—While the General was employed in this expedition, two bands of robbers from the Mountains of Granada united, forced some hundreds to join them, and proceeded to the environs of the town of Granada. Rollet, chief of squadron of the 16th regiment of dragoons, fell in with them on the 4th of September above Padal, completely routed and killed upwards of 400 of them, among whom was their leader. He also took some prisoners, their standard, and several horses. Those who escaped fled to the mountains.—In another quarter the English and the insurgents endeavoured to take advantage of the absence of General Sebastiani's corps to raise the country. There were seditions in some villages. Troops were landed near Alpujarras, and the castles of Motril and Almunejar, where there were only some coast guards, were taken. After the affair of Padal, General Werle directed his march upon these two towns, which he found occupied in force; but the resistance he met with only contributed to encrease the enemy's loss.—The English were overwhelmed, and after leaving several dead on the place fled to their ships. The castles of Motril and Almunejar, in which they had planted an additional number of guns, and supplied with provisions, fell into our power again.—The civic guard of Grenada, the Spanish troop in that town, the company of town chassours, the guard of honour, the clergy, the several authorities of the Province, and all the persons of distinction, have on this occasion conducted themselves in a most praise-worthy manner.

LA MANCHA

SEPTEMBER.—The number of robbers decreases daily. They are so closely pursued that they have not time to establish themselves any where. A party of them had the impudence to make an attack on Thomellosee on the 2d of September. Colonel Baron Kruse was dispatched against them. He came up with them at Saquellamos; they consisted of 300 infantry and 200 cavalry.—Colonel Kruse made such excellent movements, that upwards of 100 of them were killed, a greater number were wounded, and their baggage was taken by Colonel Kruse, who ordered the miserable remains of the gang to be pursued. The others are defeated in the

same manner when it is possible to come up with them.

GUADALAXARA.

The band of L'Empecinado, 1,200 strong, had approached Cifuentes and the environs. General Hugo, who was stationed at Brihuego with 900 infantry, and 250 horse, marched to attack them on the 14th of September, drove them from all their positions, entered Cifuentes, and killed and wounded upwards of 200 of them.

CATALONIA.

AUGUST.—General Suchet having received information that several thousand Valencians were marching towards Udecona, for the purpose of attacking his advanced guard, dispatched on the 14th of August 100 hussars, under the command of Captain Galbois, of the staff, to reconnoitre. This officer fell in with 200 horse, which he charged and pursued to Benecarlos, where having received a reinforcement, they appeared disposed to maintain themselves. There was a sharp and close action, in which Captain Galbois killed 25 men, took 42 prisoners, one of whom was an officer, and had only three hussars wounded. He learned in fact that a considerable corps from Valencia was proceeding by this route. General Suchet proceeded to meet it with several battalions and 800 cavalry, but the enemy did not wait for him; they retired precipitately by five or six different roads, leaving behind them 150,000 rations of biscuit, a great deal of baggage, and one standard. The advance guard only was able to come up with about 100 of them.—The army of Catalonia has effected a junction with the 3d corps of the army; and the works for the siege of Tortosa are begun and carried on with great activity.

ARRAGON.

AUGUST.—On the 20th of August, Renouvier, Chief of battalion, commanding at Jaca, surprised at Anso, a notorious leader of robbers, with 30 of his followers, the residue of the gang. This leader, as well as 14 of his band, were killed on the spot, and 15 others taken and shot. This was the last of the leaders of robbers on the left bank of the Ebro, where they did much mischief to the inhabitants.—The Arragonese are animated with the best spirit; they occupy themselves only in their ordinary business, and can travel throughout the whole province without a guard.
(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 25.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1810. [Price 1s.

"The question for the people to ask, and the only question, is this: whether the quantity of Bank Notes, payable on demand, which the Bank has issued, be greater than the Bank can pay off in Gold and Silver."—PAINE.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XIV.

The Measures adopted by Parliament, in consequence of the Bank Stoppage—Names of the Bank Directors in 1797—King's Message—Mr. Pitt's motion for a Secret Committee—Mr. Fox and other Members wished for an inquiry into the cause of the Stoppage—Mr. Pitt's motion carried by a great majority—List of the Minority—Necessity of a Parliamentary Reform—Manner of appointing the Secret Committee—Names of the Committee—Restricted powers of the Committee—Reports from the Committee—Not a word said about the quantity of Gold and Silver in the Bank—Mr. Paine's assertion about the inability of the Bank to pay in Gold and Silver—No attempt made to disprove this assertion—Mr. Pitt's, Sir John Mitford's, and Lord Hawkesbury's assertions—Mr. Grey not satisfied with the evidence produced before the Committee—Mr. Sheridan's answer to Lord Hawkesbury.

Gentlemen,

I have now to beg your attention to a very important part of our subject; namely, the measures, which, by way of remedy, were adopted by the Parliament, in consequence of the run upon the Bank and the Stoppage of Gold and Silver payments there.

The Letter immediately preceding this put you in possession of a thorough knowledge of the way, in which the Bank Directors and the Minister had gone to work, in order to prepare the way for the Parliamentary Measures which were to

follow. You were there placed behind the curtain; you saw all the actors in their natural persons; * all the paints, patches, cloaks and visors; all the trap-doors, pullies, pegs and wires. You not only saw the *Resolving* and *Subscribing* show acted, but you saw it got up; you saw the Showman and all his people busy in making their preparations; and, after that, you were let into the rehearsal.

In Letter XII, at page 675, you have seen how the matter was first brought before the Parliament, on Monday the 27th of February, 1797, in the form of a Message from the King;† and, you have seen,

* Truth and Justice demand, that, as far as possible, the NAMES of all the persons, who took an active part, upon this memorable occasion, should be recorded. Parliament may yet revise the measures of that day; and, then, the names of all the parties, immediately concerned, ought to be known, and must be known.—From this opinion it is that I insert here the names of the persons who were the DIRECTORS of the Bank of England, at the time when the Stoppage took place, and amongst them we find our friend, BROOK WATSON, who was, as we have seen, in the Chair at the Mansion House Meeting.

Thomas Raikes, — Governor.

Samuel Thornton, — Deputy Governor.

Thomas Boddington.	Job Mathew.
Samuel Bosanquet.	Sir Richard Neave.
Alexander Champion.	Joseph Nutt.
Edward Darell.	John Pearse.
Thomas Dea.	George Peters.
George Dorrien.	Charles Pole.
N. Bogle French.	John Puget.
Daniel Gilcs.	James Reed.
Jeremiah Harman.	Peter Isaac Thellusson
Thomas Lewis.	Godfrey Thornton.
Braston Long.	Brook Watson.
Williams Manning.	John Whitmore.

† GEORGE R.

His Majesty thinks it proper to communicate to the House of Commons, without delay, the measure adopted to obviate the effects which might be occasioned by the

that the Minister, the hitherto-bragging Minister, being, upon that occasion pressed by Mr. COMBE and others for an answer to the question as to *what he meant to do*, had no answer to give.

On the 27th PITT gave notice of a motion, to be made next day, for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the *ability* of the Bank to pay the demands upon it; and also to inquire and make report as to the necessity of *continuing of the measure* adopted by the Council, that is to say, *continuing the refusal of money-payments at the Bank.*†.

We shall have to speak more fully about this Committee by-and-by; but we must stop here a moment, and take a brief sketch of the *debate* that ensued upon PITT's motion. Mr. Fox and those who were with him said, that they had no objection to the appointment of a Committee, provided it was appointed fairly; but, they insisted, that it would discover a shameful disregard of their duty, if the House moved an inch further without inquiring into the *causes* which produced that alleged *necessity*, upon which the Order of Council, sanctioning a violation

unusual demand of specie lately made from different parts of the country in the metropolis.—The peculiar nature and exigency of the case appeared to require, in the first instance, the measure contained in the order of Council which his Majesty has directed to be laid before the House. In recommending this important subject to the immediate and serious attention of the House of Commons, His Majesty relies with the utmost confidence on the experienced wisdom and firmness of his Parliament for taking such measures as may be best calculated to meet any temporary pressure, and to call forth, in the most effectual manner, the extensive resources of his kingdoms in support of their public and commercial credit, and in defence of their dearest interests. G. R.

† "That a SECRET COMMITTEE be appointed, to ascertain the total amount of the out-standing demands on the Bank of England, and likewise of the funds for discharging the same; and that they do also report their opinion of the *necessity of providing for the confirmation and continuance of the measures*, taken in pursuance of the minute of Council on the 26th instant."

of the law, was *founded*. They said, here is the minister calling upon you still to confide in him, in him, under whom the bank has been compelled to stop paying its notes. Ought you not to inquire, first of all, into his measures? Ought you not to inquire into the *causes* of the fatal and disgraceful necessity of this Stoppage? Here is a minister, who has had a majority of your votes for years; he has had your unlimited and blind confidence; he has had the absolute command of all the resources of the nation; he has done what he pleased for years past; he has *within these very few weeks*, told you himself, and advised the King to tell you, in the most solemn manner, that your pecuniary affairs were in the most flourishing state, and rested upon the most solid foundation; and this same man now comes and tells you, that *necessity*, that *urgency*, that *something*, had compelled him to issue an *Order to sanction the Stoppage of Cash payments at the Bank*, and to *oblige* the public creditor, contrary to law, to receive his dividends in paper instead of the Gold and Silver coin, which the law gave him a right to demand.

This, said Mr. Fox and his friends, is what this Minister now tells you; and, will you not, before you proceed to inquire into the propriety of *continuing* the Stoppage, inquire into the *cause* of the imperious necessity, which is said to have produced it? Will you attempt an expedient, will you attempt a remedy, without inquiring into the *cause* of the evil? Will you do that, which, even now, after all that you have seen and felt, shall prove to the world that your confidence is as blind as ever? "Have any three months, in the course of this war," said Mr. Fox, "past without the minister's producing some new expedient? and have not all his expedients proved erroneous? Year after year he has been amusing us with predictions with respect to France, which was now on the verge and now in the gulf of bankruptcy; the *assignats* and the *mandats* could not possibly continue," he said; which was very true, but while he was thus amusing us, he led us to the very same verge, aye, into the very same gulf." Mr. HOBHOUSE said, "that the assurances of the minister would never beat down this plain dictate of common sense, that by his conduct the Bank had been obliged to commit an act of insolvency, by refusing specie for

"its paper, and, therefore, he wished for "a full inquiry into his conduct." Mr. SHERIDAN, in a most admirable speech, laid the whole matter open, completely exposed the motive of the proposed committee, and moved to Mr. Pitt's motion an amendment, in the following words, "That the committee should inquire into the "causes which produced the order in "council."

In spite, however, of these speeches; in spite of all the arguments made use of on this side, and none of which met with even an attempt at an answer from any one but Mr. PITT himself; in spite of all this, the House decided, by a majority of 244 to 88, against Mr. SHERIDAN's amendment, that is to say, against inquiring into the *cause* of the alledged necessity which induced the Privy Council to issue an order, sanctioning a refusal, on the part of the Bank, to pay their promissory notes in Gold and Silver. The men, who voted upon this occasion, should be known. We have only the names of the *Minority* recorded. Those you will keep in mind, Gentlemen, and, before we have finished the subject, we shall come at the names of the *Majority*: or, at least, we can get the names of all the members *besides the minority* *. Mr. Fox renewed the subject,

* List of the Minority, on Mr. Sheridan's amendment, on the 28th of Feb. 1797.

Aubry, Sir J.	Fitzpatrick, General
Baker, J.	Fletcher, Sir H.
Bampfylde, J. C.	Folkes, Sir R.
Barclay, G.	Fox, Right Hon. C. J.
Bastard, J. P.	Galway, Viscount
Beaucherk, C.	Greene, J.
Biddulph, R.	Hare, J.
Baker, W.	Harrison, J.
Bunbury, Sir C.	Hobhouse, B.
Bird, W. W.	Hussey, W.
Burdett, Sir F.	Jefferys, N.
Bouverie, Hon. E.	Jervoise, C. J.
Brogden, J.	Keene, W.
Burch, J. R.	Kemp, T.
Byng, J.	Knight, R. P.
Clarke, E.	Langston, J.
Coke, F.	Langston, W. G.
Combe, H. C.	Lemon, Sir W.
Courtenay, J.	Lloyd, J. M.
Crewe, J.	Miller, Sir W.
Curwen, J. C.	Nicholls, J.
Copley, Sir L.	North, D.
Dolben, Sir W.	Northey, W.
Dashwood, Sir H. W.	Pierse, H.
Denison, W. J.	Prick, L.
Dundas, C.	Phillips, J. G.

on the 1st of March, by a motion for the appointment of a separate Committee "to inquire into the causes, which produced "the Order in Council of the 20th of "February," for the Stoppage of cash payments at the Bank; and he was left in a *similar Minority*.

Here, it is, Gentlemen, that you see the real cause of all the calamities that have fallen upon our country, and of all the dangers that now threaten it, and these are dangers that will not be frowned out of countenance, that will not be made to hide their head, at the sound of the voice of men in power; dangers that are not to be talked or voted away. You have seen these dangers creep on upon us by slow degrees, but you have seen their pace to be steady. They have never stopped. They keep gathering about us; and he is a very foolish man, who expects any remedy, till the great cause of the evil be removed; that is to say, until there shall take place a radical reform of the Commons' House of Parliament, agreeably to the principles of the English Constitution, which reform, to use the words of the Kent petition, is *now* more than ever necessary to the safety of both the people and the throne.

The motions for a full inquiry being rejected, the minister proceeded in his work of getting a SECRET COMMITTEE, who were to inquire into the *affairs of the Bank*, and to report their opinion relative to the necessity of continuing, by Act of Parliament, the refusal of coin at the Bank. And, now, Gentlemen, I beg you to observe well the manner of appointing this committee. It was to consist of fifteen members; every member of the House, who was present,

Plumer, W.	Smith, W.
Pollen, G. A.	Spencer, Lord R.
Porter, G.	Stanley, Lord
Pulteney, Sir W.	Sturt, C.
Rawdon, Hon. J.	Tarleton, General
Rawdon, Hon. G.	Taylor, C. W.
Ridley, Sir M.	Tyrwhitt, T.
Richardson, J.	Townshend, Lord J.
Robson, R. B.	Tufton, Hon. H.
Russell, Lord J.	Vane, Sir F.
Russell, Lord W.	Vyner, R.
St. John, St. A.	Walwyn, J.
Scudamore, J.	Walpole, Colonel
Sheridan, R. B.	Western, C. C.
Shum, G. C.	Wilkins, W.
Shuckburg, Sir G.	Winnington, Sir F.
Sinclair, Sir J.	Wycombe, Earl of.

TELLERS.

Charles Grey and Samuel Whitbread.
2 C 2

might put *fifteen names* into a box; and, when all the names were taken out, the fifteen persons, whose names appeared *of-tenest* upon the tickets put in, were the Committee. Of course that side which had a *majority of tickets to put in* would choose the members of the Committee. The custom, indeed, is, upon such occasions, to make out a *List* and send it round amongst the members, and, of course, all those, who are on the side of the Minister will take the ministerial List; so that, in fact, whoever has a majority in the House, chooses the Committee. Upon the particular occasion before us, MR. SHERIDAN, before the report of *who were* the Committee was made to the House, read the names of them out loud in the House; and, when the report came to be made, it appeared, that his List was perfectly correct.* Indeed, he had got hold of one of the Ministerial Lists, and of course, he could not be in error in this respect.

But, even a Committee, thus formed; a *Secret Committee chosen by the Minister's own party*; even this committee were, Mr. PITT said (See Debates, 28 February) "by no means called upon to *push their inquiries*, into circumstances, the disclosure of which would be attended with "temporary injury to the credit of the country, and with permanent embarrassment to the operations of the Bank." Mr. PITT said, that his principal object in appointing such a Committee was to have it ascertained, that the *affairs of the Bank were in a prosperous state*; that the Bank had abundant means to answer all the demands upon it; and that, therefore, the holders of Bank Notes ought to look upon them as being equally good with gold and silver. Now, the way, and the only way, to produce this so-much-wished-for conviction was, one would have thought, to let the Com-

mittee ascertain that the *quantity of Gold and Silver in the Bank* was sufficient for paying off the Notes; or, at any rate, was in a due proportion to the Notes. But, so far from this being done, the Committee did not make any inquiries at all relative to the *quantity of Gold and Silver* in the Bank. They merely inquired into the state of the books at the Bank, setting their *Bank notes* on one side and their *Stock* on the other side. The Bank said: We owe the holders the amount of our Notes, but the Government owes us still more; and not a word was said about *Gold and Silver*, though one would have thought, that this was the great, and, indeed, the *only*, thing to make inquiry about; especially as MR. PAINS, in his pamphlet, published the year before, had made statements, whence he had drawn a conclusion, that the Bank, if put to the test, "had not money to pay *half a crown in the pound.*"

This was a charge, which, one would have thought, it would have been the great object of the Minister and the Bank to do away. But, no such thing was even attempted, and the two reports of the Committee,* did accordingly not at all tend

* FIRST REPORT, March 3, 1797.—The Committee appointed to examine and state the total amount of out-standing demands on the Bank of England, and likewise of the Funds for discharging the same; and to report the result thereof to the House, together with their opinion on the necessity of providing for the confirmation and continuance, for a time to be limited, of measures taken in pursuance of the minute of Council on the 26th of February last; and who are empowered to report their proceedings from time to time to the House; have, pursuant to the order of the House, proceeded to examine into the several matters referred to their consideration, and have unanimously agreed upon the following report, viz.—Your Committee have examined the total amount of outstanding demands on the Bank of England, and likewise of the Funds for discharging the same; and think it their duty, without loss of time, to state those total amounts, and to report the result thereof to the House.—Your Committee find upon such examination, that the total amount of out-standing demands on the Bank, on the 25th day of February last (to which day the accounts could be completely made up) was £.13,770,390;

* *List of the Secret Committee.*—William Hussey; Charles Grey; William Plumer; Thomas Powys; Thomas Grenville; William Wilberforce; John Blackburne; Thomas Berney Bramston; Charles Bragge; Sir John Mitford (Solicitor General); William Wilberforce Bird; John Fane; Isaac Hawkins Browne; Sir John Scott (Attorney General); John William Anderson.

The *three first* had, as will be seen by a reference to the List, voted with Mr. Fox for a full inquiry; but all the rest belonged to the party of Mr. Pitt.

to the restoration of *that sort of confidence*, which would have enabled the Bank to open its doors to the applicants for *Guineas*. It was in vain that Mr. PITT told the House, that the reports of the Secret Committee were highly *consoling*;

and that the total amount of the Funds for discharging those demands (not including the permanent debt due from Government of £.11,686,800, which bears an interest of three per cent.) was on the same 25th day of February last £.17,597,280; and that the result is, that there was, on the 25th day of February last, a surplus of effects belonging to the Bank beyond the amount of their debts, amounting to the sum of £.3,926,890 exclusive of the above-mentioned permanent debt of £.11,686,800 due from government.—And your Committee farther represent, that since the 25th of February last considerable issues have been made by the Bank in bank notes, both upon government securities and in discounting bills, the particulars of which could not immediately be made up; but as those issues appear to your Committee to have been made upon corresponding securities, taken with the usual care and attention, the actual balance in favour of the Bank did not appear to your Committee to have been thereby diminished.

SECOND REPORT, Tuesday, 7th March.—Mr. Brampton brought up the following Report:

The Committee appointed to examine and state the total amount of outstanding demands on the Bank of England, and likewise of the Funds for discharging the same; and to report the result thereof to the House, together with their opinion on the necessity of providing for the confirmation and continuance, for a time to be limited, of measures taken in pursuance of the Minute of Council on the 26th of February last; and who were empowered to report their proceedings from time to time to the House; have farther examined into the several matters referred to their consideration; and have agreed to report to the House;—That, in their opinion, *it is necessary to provide for the confirmation and continuance, for a time to be limited, of the measures taken in pursuance of the Order of Council on the 26th of February last*; submitting to the wisdom of parliament to determine for what limited time it may be necessary that those measures should be continued.

that the affairs of the Bank were in a most prosperous state; that persons most conversant (alluding to the Mansion House Resolvers) believed in the solidity of its means; that the public had nothing to do with the internal economy of the Bank; that it was sufficient for the public to know, that the corporation was a rich corporation; that the solidity of the Bank was asserted in the report of the Secret Committee then on the table; that that report left *no doubt* upon the subject; that it was an important consolation, that there were funds *amply sufficient* for the ultimate security of those who could not have their demands satisfied for a time; and that as to what was due from the government to the Bank, it rested upon the *best possible* security, because it rested upon the *aggregate powers of the country*. (See Debates 9th March, 1797.) In vain did lord Hawkesbury, in answer to Mr. Fox, deny that the term *Bankruptcy* applied to the situation of the Bank or the government. He said, what was very true, that the embarrassments of the Bank were imputed to the scarcity or *want of specie*. But, in vain did he question the truth of this proposition; in vain did he say that *want of money* was no proof of poverty; in vain did he say that a *scarcity of guineas* might arise from an *increase of trade*, and not from the *excess of paper*; (Debate 9th March, 1797) in vain did Sir John Mitford, then Solicitor General (same Debate) say that no man, however rich, would be able to stand a run; that it was unfair to call the stoppage a Bankruptcy; that the Bank was solvent, although at this time unable to pay in cash; that the refusal to pay in cash could not be called a fraud, *because the public knew that such an event might happen*; that the stoppage at the Bank was like that which might be enforced by the door keepers of a theatre, upon a false alarm of fire, in order to prevent the people from rushing out all at once, to their destruction or injury; that if nothing had been done to put a stop to the run upon the Bank, the Bank must have been totally ruined; that there were other public creditors besides the Stock-holders, the army and the navy; that they were as much *public creditors* as the holders of Bank-notes could be, and that they required payment in cash more so than any other description of men in this country.

In vain was all this said. MR. GREY

(now Earl Grey), said that the evidence brought before the Committee had not satisfied him; and the satisfaction to the public was evidently not greater; for, if it had been satisfactory, or if the report of the Secret Committee had been satisfactory, there could have been no occasion whatever for continuing the power of the Bank to refuse payment in specie. This was told them by Mr. Fox and Mr. SHERIDAN, who asked: if the Bank be in so prosperous a situation as you say it is, why do you wish to pass a law to protect them against the demands of the holders of their notes? If the Bank be so rich as you say it is, what need has it of any of your assistance? You tell us, said Mr. SHERIDAN (alluding to the speech of Lord Hawkesbury) that paper "is not only a cleaner, neater, and more portable medium to represent property; but that it is the very essence of wealth itself, and that the flourishing state of our commerce is the cause of this inability to produce specie to answer demands upon the Bank of England." See Debate of 9th March, where these observations are followed up by an inimitable instance of what is called by logicians the *reductio ad absurdum*. You tell us, said he, that the public are of your opinion, and that they reject our opinion; you tell us that the public are satisfied with the report of the Committee; you tell us that the public like Bank-notes as well as guineas. But, with these assertions upon your lips, you pass a law to protect the Bank against the demands of that public; you pass a law to *compel* that public to receive paper at the Bank, instead of that gold, which you say they like no better than that paper.

The truth is, Gentlemen, the public generally speaking, knew nothing at all about the transactions between the Government and the Bank; they knew nothing at all about the trade or the property of the Bank; they knew that they held promissory notes issued by the Bank, payable to the bearer on demand, and they looked upon these notes as being equally valuable with gold, because, until now, they could, at any time, carry them to the Bank, and receive gold in exchange for them. Nothing, therefore, could have the smallest tendency to convince them of the solidity of the Bank, unless it, at the same time, tended to convince them, that there was gold in the Bank, sufficient to an-

swer the demands of those, who presented notes for payment, or who chose to demand gold in payment of their dividends, or interest upon their Stock. And, not a particle of conviction, in this way, were the reports of the Secret Committee calculated to produce.

MR. SHERIDAN (see Debate 28th February 1797) said that he was "convinced that if the Bank was not able to resume its payments immediately, he foresaw it *never would be able afterwards* to defray its outstanding engagements in cash." And the reason he gave was, that the suspension of cash payments would produce the issue of a greater quantity of paper. This reason was so manifest, that it was impossible, that the truth of it should not be felt, though, owing to the prejudices of the times, there were few persons amongst the Merchants and Bankers, by whom it would be acknowledged. The same was said, by Mr. NICHOLLS and Mr. HOBHOUSE, in whose speeches, together with those of Mr. Fox and Mr. SHERIDAN, will be found predictions of all the consequences, which have already flowed, and which are likely to flow from the stoppage of gold and silver payments at the Bank.

We have now seen enough of the measures which were adopted as fore-runners of the *Acts of Parliament* relating to the Bank stoppage; and, in my next letter, I shall, I flatter myself, be able to present you with a complete, though a concise, view of those Acts, with which every man in this country ought to be thoroughly acquainted. In the mean while, I remain,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,
November 1, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

KING'S ILLNESS.—Events like this, as to which rumour is always so busy, and as to which so much misrepresentation is sure to take place, generally become, in a few months, so involved in doubt and uncertainty, that no one knows what to think about them. While, therefore, others are, upon the present occasion, amusing the public with *opinions* and *sentiments*, it shall be my endeavour to present them with such *facts*, or, with such a chain of circumstances as shall be likely

to enable them to form a tolerably correct opinion for themselves.—One would have thought, that, upon a subject of this sort, a subject, which, in itself, is so well calculated to inspire serious reflections, and to banish all the ideas of trick and delusion; one would have thought, that, upon such a subject, even the venal writers of the *MORNING POST* and the *COURIER* would have laid aside, for a short while, at least, their practice of cheating their readers with falsehoods.—That no such reflections were awakened in their minds, or that, if they were, they were too completely hardened to give way to them, will clearly appear, from the paragraphs I am now about to quote, and through which the reader will clearly trace a *settled design*, a premeditated contrivance to *deceive* and *cheat* the public with respect to this most interesting of all subjects.—It is now *known*; it has now been declared in parliament, that the King was incapable of affixing his signature to the Commission for proroguing the Parliament; and, that this was the case *on Monday last* it is now proved by the publication of the *Bulletins of the Physicians*. On that very day, the *Morning Post* told its readers, that the King had *transacted official business* with the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Perceval. Nay, it now appears, that the Physicians were sent for in the *night of Saturday*. And yet this false, that impudent, this shameless writer, tells his readers on *Tuesday last*, that the King had *transacted official business on Monday*.—But let us take the whole of the paragraphs, relating to this subject, beginning with those of the 25th of October.—“About ten days or a fortnight since, on the communication being made known to the Princess Amelia that it was the opinion of the Doctors that she could not survive long, she expressed a wish to have a very valuable and choice stone, in the possession of her Royal Highness, put to a ring for the King, for him to wear in remembrance of her; and to complete her wishes, she desired it to be manufactured without delay, that she might herself have the pleasure of presenting and putting it on the finger of her beloved Royal Father. To satisfy her wishes, a jeweller was sent for express from London.” On his arrival he was shewn into the chamber of her Royal Highness, and she gave him instructions herself. The ring, with the stone, was executed in a very

“short time, and she had her wished for felicity of placing it on his Majesty’s finger. Her Royal Highness had a very bad night on Tuesday, she only slept one hour, and that was one hour in twenty-four. During yesterday she was in the same state as on Tuesday.”—Great attention should be paid to this paragraph, the contents of which will be found to be of importance by-and-by.—On the same day, (25th October) there appeared, in the *MORNING CHRONICLE*, the following paragraph: “This day his Majesty enters into the fifty-first year of his reign; and we rejoice to learn that he possesses *perfect health* and *promises the enjoyment of many years in the bosom of his family and people*. The day would have been universally devoted to rejoicing, but for the melancholy state of the amiable Princess, whose sufferings are expected every hour to terminate.”—Thus spoke the *Morning Chronicle* on the 25th of October. Thus, and in such positive terms, did this print speak on that day. Now, let us hear what it says to-day, the 2nd of November:—“Three weeks ago his Majesty received from the physicians the afflicting report, that the Princess might be no more in an hour, or that she might languish for many days; but they felt it to be their duty to apprise his Majesty of the imminent danger in which she then was. From that time the King’s agitation was manifest. He passed some days in excessive grief, and some days, according to the gleams of hope, was equally elevated by expectation. He at times kept the physicians with him, when they made their report, two or three hours, in minute inquiries. He was accustomed to receive a report every morning at seven o’clock, and afterwards every two hours in the day. At three o’clock regularly he went in his coach to the Lodge to visit her, and the effect of these visits upon his heart was visible in his tears. The affecting incident of the ring, put upon his finger by the dying object of his tenderness, completed the shock his nature had received. On Thursday morning, the 25th ult. the Gentleman whose duty it was to be near his person, felt it necessary to communicate to Mr. Perceval the obvious alteration that had taken place in his Majesty’s speech and deportment. On Friday this became more manifest, and on Saturday it was so alarming, that a Coun-

"cil was held; the Lord Chancellor was sent for; Dr. Heberden was directed to attend, and orders were given that the Physicians and medical attendants only should have access to the royal apartments. On Monday, Lord Eldon and Mr. Perceval had a long audience of the Queen, and afterwards received the opinion of the Physicians, who all concurred in declaring, that the fever might speedily subside; but in his present state they did not consider his Majesty to be able to attend to business."—What are we to give credit to after this? Here, you see, it is stated, that the King has been somewhat ill for *three weeks*, and that he had become so ill on the *25th of October* as to cause a report of his state to be made to Mr. Perceval: aye, on that very *25th of October*, when (it being the anniversary of his accession to the throne) we were told, by this same print, that he was in perfect health, and promised the enjoyment of many years! What is one, after this, to believe?—The Morning Post of Saturday last, 27th of October, (two days, observe, after the report of the illness was made to Mr. Perceval,) told us, that, the day before, "the King, Dukes of York, Kent, Cumberland, and Cambridge, Princesses Augusta and Sophia, rode out in Windsor Park, till half-past one. The royal party was accompanied by lord St. Helens, lady Thynne, generals Manners, Garth, and Cartwright."—On the Monday, 29th October, the same print said:—"The King is so much afflicted in consequence of the sufferings of his interesting and beloved daughter, that he did not attend divine service at St. George's Chapel yesterday."—This you will observe was told us on Monday last.—On Tuesday the 30th, "We are rejoiced to state that his Majesty's indisposition is only a slight cold. On Saturday he went into the warm bath, by advice of the Doctors who attend the Princess Amelia. Same day Dr. Heberden arrived at Windsor to attend his Majesty and remain with him, and yesterday Sir Francis Millman arrived for the same purpose. We repeat, however, that his Majesty's indisposition proceeds merely from a slight cold, of which he was, yesterday, somewhat recovered."—At twelve o'clock the Lord Chancellor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer waited on his Majesty and transacted official business with him. His Majesty since he complained of a cold, has re-

"moved from his own apartments in Windsor Castle, to the Queen's, which overlook the Terrace."—Now, reader, mark this well. This is the account of Monday, given us on Tuesday. Here we are repeatedly assured, in terms the most positive, that the King has only a slight cold, and that official business had been transacted with him. This is well worthy of attention, especially when you consider the source whence it proceeded.—On Wednesday, the 31st of October, the same writer gave us the following, and, mind, this the very next day after he had almost sworn, that the ailment was a slight cold.—"It is with heartfelt sorrow we announce, that his Majesty's indisposition still continues. It commenced with the effect produced upon his tender parental feelings on receiving the ring, mentioned in a former paper, from the hand of his afflicted beloved daughter, the affecting inscription upon which caused him, blessed and most amiable of men, to burst into tears, with the most heart-touching lamentations on the present state and approaching dissolution of the afflicted and interesting Princess. His Majesty is attended by Doctors Halford, Heberden and Baillie, who issue daily Bulletins of the state of the virtuous and revered Monarch, for whose speedy recovery the prayers of all good men will not fail to be offered up."—This was followed by two Bulletins, from the first of which it appeared, that the King had been ill for "a few days," before the day, on which this false print had assured its readers that he had transacted official business with the LORD CHANCELLOR and MR. PERCEVAL; and we now were told, in another paragraph, that it was at night, instead of noon, that these Gentlemen were at Windsor. "On Monday night as the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Perceval were returning from Windsor to Mr. Perceval's house at Ealing, their carriage was overturned (owing to the darkness of the night) on Hounslow Heath."—After this, will these writers pretend, that they have any claim to be believed by any body? It is the business of their lives to gull and cheat the public. They have no other business or care. To utter falsehoods is their profession; and, if it were possible, to effect the threat of Falstaff, to lie truth out of the world, these are the men that would do it.—I shall, for the present, close the article upon the King's Illness by inserting the official Bulletins,

all of which, thus far are signed by Drs. HENRY HALFORD, W. HEBERDEN, and M. BAILLIE, and dated from Windsor Castle.—Bulletin of the 29th October.—

“The King has been indisposed for a few days past: His Majesty has had fever, and his nights have been restless; but he has had several hours sleep this morning.”—That of the 30th of October:—“The King has passed a restless night, and his Majesty is much the same to-day as yesterday.”—That of the 31st October:—“The King has passed a restless night, but his Majesty’s fever is not increased.”—That of the 1st November:—“His Majesty has passed rather a better night, and is much the same to-day as yesterday.”—That of this day, 2nd November:—“The King has passed the night with very little sleep, and is much the same to-day as his Majesty was yesterday.”

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS.—The two Houses of Parliament met on the 1st instant in consequence, it appears, of the King’s inability to sign a commission for a further prorogation. There was a Proclamation issued, on the 17th of October, in the following words: “At the Court of Windsor, the 17th of October, 1810; present the King’s most excellent Majesty in Council. It is this day Ordered by his Majesty in Council, that the Parliament, which stands prorogued to Thursday, the 1st day of November next, be further prorogued to Thursday, the 29th of the same month of November.”

—But this order was not, it seems, sufficient; and that to effect the prorogation, it was necessary that a Commission should be given, which Commission must be signed by the King; and, as it appears, the King being not in a state to sign the Commission, the parliament could not be prorogued beyond the 1st instant, and, of course, it met on that day.—The report of the proceedings will, of course, be inserted in their proper place in the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES; but, seeing that the occasion is so very interesting and singular, and that nothing more is to be done in parliament for a fortnight, I shall insert here the whole of the report, of that day’s proceedings, as I find it in the MORNING CHRONICLE of this day (2nd November), in order that my readers may have it always at hand to refer to.—IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. The LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord Eldon) said:—My

Lords, your Lordships are now assembled without any notice having been given that Parliament was to meet for the dispatch of business, and after a notification had been published directing that this Parliament should be prorogued to the 29th of this month, and authorising the Chancellor to issue a Commission under the Great Seal, for such prorogation. My Lords, I have to state to your Lordships, and I do it with the greatest concern and regret, that in consequence of his Majesty’s personal indisposition, that Commission has not received his Majesty’s signature. There may be a question, whether the Chancellor is authorised to put the Great Seal to such a Commission, without the King’s Sign Manual, and whether such Commission would be legal? but upon this question, looking to the Precedents in our proceedings, and to the Records of Parliament, I do not think it proper to enter into any discussion. Under the circumstances of his Majesty’s indisposition, I have thought it my duty to abstain from proffering the Commission to his Majesty for his royal signature. It is, therefore, for your Lordships, in your wisdom, to determine what course of proceeding it will be expedient to adopt. It remains for me to state, that the indisposition of his Majesty has arisen from the pressure of domestic affliction operating upon his paternal feelings, and I have the satisfaction to add, that a confident expectation is entertained of his Majesty’s speedy recovery.—The EARL OF LIVERPOOL. My Lords, under the afflicting circumstances stated by my Noble and Learned Friend, circumstances which have arisen entirely from the domestic cause to which my Noble and Learned Friend has alluded, I think it my duty to move an adjournment for the shortest period, within which, by law, the Parliament can be summoned to meet for the dispatch of business. It is my intention, therefore, to move, in conformity with a precedent before us, that this House do adjourn till Thursday, the 15th instant; that the House be summoned for that day; and that letters be sent to the Lords, informing them that their attendance on that day is required. It would not be proper for me to enter into any discussion, whether any, and if any, what proceeding it may be expedient to adopt on that day, should his Majesty’s indisposition unfortunately continue; but it is highly requisite, whatever course it may be deemed advisable to adopt, or, although

no proceeding may be then requisite, to take the necessary steps to ensure as full an attendance as possible. I have *great satisfaction* in adding to what has been stated by my Noble and Learned Friend, that the Physicians attending his Majesty entertain *the most confident hopes* of his Majesty's *speedy recovery*. His Lordship concluded by moving an adjournment.—

LORD HOLLAND. I trust, my Lords, under the melancholy circumstances in which we are assembled, it will not be supposed that in rising upon this question, I intend to offer any opposition to the motion of the Noble Lord, neither do I wish to make any remark that can lead to discussion. I cheerfully acquiesce in the motion, founded as it is upon a precedent within recollection. Were that precedent to be made over again, I should rather prefer a proceeding *de die in diem*, but the motion of the Noble Lord being founded upon the precedent, and being aware of the importance of unanimity upon such an occasion, I cheerfully acquiesce in the proposition for adjournment.—The motions of the Earl of Liverpool were then put by the Lord Chancellor, That this House do at its rising adjourn till Thursday the 15th day of this instant, November; That the Lords be summoned to attend the service of this House on Thursday the 15th instant; That the Lord Chancellor do write letters to all the Lords, informing them that their attendance is required on Thursday the 15th day of this instant, November. Which were severally agreed to. The Lord Chancellor then put the question upon the motion of the Earl of Liverpool, That this House do now adjourn; which was also agreed to; and the Lord Chancellor notified, That this House is adjourned till Thursday the 15th instant.

—IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, where, it is reported, there were about a hundred members present, the SPEAKER said:—The House is now met on the day to which it was last prorogued, but I am informed, notwithstanding the Royal Proclamation for the further prorogation of Parliament, which has been issued, we are not to expect any Message from the Commissioners, no Commission to prorogue having been made out. Under such circumstances it becomes my duty to take the Chair, in order that the House should be enabled to adjourn itself, and I therefore take the Chair accordingly.—Mr. SPENCER PERCEVAL, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said: Mr. Speaker, I am persuaded that it

is wholly unnecessary for me to state, that this House is now assembled upon the day to which it was last prorogued, and that a Proclamation has been notified in the Gazette, intimating the pleasure of his Majesty, that Parliament should from this day be still further prorogued; the House must therefore be naturally anxious to ascertain how it has happened that his Majesty's servants have not executed his commands, and why on this day they were not prepared with that Commission which his Proclamation notified. It is now my duty, and a painful duty it is, to communicate to this House, that it is owing to the indisposition of his Majesty that this occurrence has taken place. It is owing to the severity of that indisposition that the Lord Chancellor, whose immediate duty it is, has not been able to procure to that Commission the Signature of his Majesty. I presume it is unnecessary for me to state to this House, that it would not be becoming in his Lordship to affix to such a document the Great Seal, without the sanction of the Royal Signature. [*Hear! hear! hear!*] Perhaps the House will excuse me, in making one or two observations on the subject of his Majesty's regretted indisposition. It will not be imputed, I think, to me, that I would unnecessarily increase and aggravate the public anxiety, which is so universally felt upon that event. Indeed, I should altogether refrain from the topic, did I not feel that the communication I am about to make is *truly consolatory*; for, if any thing could more sensibly increase those feelings of affection and diminish those of affliction, which are at this moment felt by his people for their Sovereign, it is the knowledge that his disorder has originated from his constant unremitting anxiety and attention during the painful and protracted sufferings of a dearly beloved child. [*Hear! hear! hear!*] This being the cause of his Majesty's complaint, it affords strong satisfactory and additional reasons for hoping a speedy recovery. [*Hear! hear!*] I have further the *sincere happiness* of being able to state, that the symptoms of his disorder are *peculiarly mild*; and that the Physicians, who attend his Majesty, express a most confident hope of his speedy restoration. It would be unbecoming both the duty I owe this House, and inconsistent with my own feelings, not to have afforded that communication before I adverted to that which is at this moment the practical question for our consideration. That question barely

is, what the House, now assembled, should under such circumstances adopt. You, Mr. Speaker, have, in my apprehension, intimated the proper course we ought to pursue. There can, as it strikes me, be no discussion upon any other subject but the adjournment, and the interval of that adjournment. But setting aside the question, whether this House is competent or incompetent to entertain any other than that of adjournment, surely when we take into our consideration the circumstances under which this day we are assembled, no intimation from the Sovereign expressive of his desire that we should meet, but on the contrary, the most authoritative expression of his will that such meeting from this day should be further prorogued, there can be no doubt that any other course than adjournment would be highly inconsistent. Then the next point is, to what period that adjournment should extend, so as to afford that notice and preparation which is best calculated to obtain a full attendance—such a degree of attendance as would produce a true parliamentary opinion as to any ulterior measure, whether of a farther adjournment or not. For this object, I think the least time should be fifteen days. Indeed, we have a parliamentary enactment that may operate as a guide; I mean that which empowers his Majesty upon any unexpected emergency, to convene his Parliament in fourteen days. In modern times there has also been a case which might indeed be judged a precedent, and to be only analogous, where a similar motion was proposed and universally acceded to. A motion to that purport it is my intention to make before I sit down. I apprehend there is only another consideration springing from that motion, immediately incident to that proceeding which goes directly to further its object. I allude to the necessary means of procuring that very full attendance which, under such circumstances is most desirable. I conceive that the best means are a Call of the House on this day fortnight, and that in the intermediate time a circular letter be written by you, Sir, requesting the attendance of members. I have only to conclude with moving, that this House do, on its rising, adjourn to this day fortnight; that on that day there should be a Call of the House; and that in the interim the Speaker be requested to write a circular letter to all Sheriffs of counties, Stewards

of towns and boroughs, to acquaint their representatives thereof.—MR. SHERIDAN said: Mr. Speaker, fully concurring in the propriety of every sentiment expressed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and feeling, as I do, highly gratified, as I am confident every man who has heard him must, in the sanguine hopes he entertains of the speedy recovery of our gracious Sovereign, I only rise for the purpose of seconding his motion!—(*Marked and continued cries of hear! hear! after this speech.*) —The motions were then put and agreed to; after which the House adjourned to Thursday the 15th inst.—There is little room for commentary upon these proceedings. They contain mere matters of fact, which, though of a very interesting nature, are simple and dry.—It appears, from what was said, in both Houses, that the illness of the King is not, however, likely to be of long duration; and, probably, before the two weeks are expired, he will be found capable of affixing his signature to the Commission for the further prorogation of the parliament, in which case, the session will, of course, not begin till after the Queen's birth day, as has been the custom for many years past.—It will be a session, begin when it will, during which questions of great moment will and must be agitated. The operations of war in the South and the silent accession of dominion by France in the North of Europe, are not, I should think, any longer to be passed over in silence.* Napoleon is gradually getting round us; and, if his army in Portugal should not, without loss of time, be completely defeated, and even annihilated, it will be time for us seriously to look to ourselves. The danger is, every hour, becoming visibly greater and greater. It is hidden, as much as possible, from the eyes of the people, by the falsehoods of the venal press; but, those falsehoods do not stay the danger, which is making, and will continue to make, its approaches, in spite of the cheats practised by a set of venal writers, and, in spite of the stupid blindness of their dupes.

I am compelled, for want of room, to omit several articles, and especially one upon the conspiracy in Portugal.

W^m. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
November 2, 1810.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH ACCOUNT

*Of the Military Operations in Spain and Portugal, up to September, 1810.
(Concluded from p. 800.)*

NAVARRÉ.

General Drouet having sent some troops to pursue an assemblage, composed of the wrecks of several half-destroyed bands, killed a great many of them in different engagements, and drove them back into the province of Soria, from whence they were also driven by the column under the command of General Raquet, who killed 300 of them in two engagements. The remains of this collection, which does not exceed 500 men have retired to Valencia. —There are at present only three small bands of ten or twelve each in Navarre, wandering in the forests and mountains.

BISCAY.

The weak bands that were in Biscay are entirely dispersed, with the exception of one only, which commits the most horrible excesses upon the inhabitants. It is pursued and will soon cease to exist.—All the towns and villages of the three provinces of Biscay are forming civic guards to preserve that tranquillity which they enjoy at present, and to assist our troops in case the brigands should again make their appearance.

ASTURIAS.

SEPTEMBER.—The Marquisitto had assembled a body of troops at Potes which appeared to assume some consistence. General Seras was dispatched by General Kellerman from Benevente to Potes to disperse these troops. Marquisitto did not deem it advisable to wait his arrival, but made an irruption into the Asturias, for the purpose of attacking General Bonnet in Oviedo. On the 14th of September he was discovered within four leagues of that town, at the head of 3,000 men. General Bonnet instantly marched to attack him, killed 400 men, destroyed his cavalry, took upwards of 300 prisoners, and dispersed the remainder.

OLD CASTILE.

SEPTEMBER.—The leader of a small band, which was collected at Yangas, formed by compelling the peasants to join him, a corps of 900 foot and 150 horse. General Roguet, commanding at Soria, marched against him with 1,000 infantry

and 300 cavalry. On the 6th of September, he discovered them in a position before the village, and immediately charged them. Their line was thrown into confusion, our cavalry seized the opportunity, they were all overwhelmed and cut to pieces. Upwards of 200 men and 55 officers were killed; 300 were wounded, and several hundreds surrendered.

PORTUGAL.

The English, after having suffered Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida to be taken, took a position on the fine heights of Guarda, and gave out that they intended to wait for the French army there. We marched against them, and they deemed a retreat the most prudent. On the 15th, the head-quarters of the Prince of Essling were at Viseu. The English army had then fallen back four marches, and was at Coimbra.

SPAIN.—PROCEEDINGS OF THE CORTES.—
Decree against accepting of Places and Pensions.—29 Sept. 1810.

In the sitting of the Cortes of this day, it has been resolved; that none of their deputies, whether those now attending, or those that may hereafter be admitted to complete their number, shall be permitted during the period of their exercising those functions, and for a year afterwards, to solicit or accept for themselves, or to solicit for any other person whomsoever, any pension, favour, or reward, or any honour or distinction whatever, from the interim Executive Power, nor from any other government that may hereafter be appointed under any designation whatsoever. From this regulation, however, it is understood, that those persons be exempted, who, from rank or age, are accustomed to succeed, according to the Rules, or Statutes, which are observed in Military, Ecclesiastic, and Civil Bodies; and, at the same time, such cases as may occur, in which extraordinary and confessedly superior services performed in behalf of the King and the country, may deserve in the opinion of the Cortes themselves, a reward also extraordinary. The Cortes direct us to communicate this to your Excellency, that the Council of Regency, receiving the information, may take such measures with respect to the public offices, as to carry the resolution into its full effect.—God preserve your Excellency many years.—EVARISTO PEREZ DE CASTRO, President.—MANUEL LUXAN, Secretary.

PORTUGAL.—*Dispatch from Lord Talavera to the Portuguese Government, dated at Alcobaca, 5th Oct. 1810.*

The enemy having moved forward in force, his advanced guard in front of Coimbra, on the afternoon of the 30th ult. and morning of the 1st inst. I conceived it time to withdraw the advanced guard of the allied army to this side of the river Mondego, on the 1st inst. and to continue to withdraw the main body of the army.—

In the retreat of the British cavalry from Fornos, Captain Kraukenberg of the first regiment of Hussars, and Captain Cocks of the 16th Light Dragoons, attacked and charged the enemy. In this skirmish Captain Kraukenberg was wounded, but I am happy to say but slightly.—I continued to withdraw this part of the army by the roads of Soute and Pombal, for Leiria, near which town it all arrived on the 3d, and halted during yesterday, the advanced posts being at Pombal. General Hill retired with his corps, by the road of Espinhal, upon Thomar, where he arrived yesterday.—The advanced guard of the enemy arrived yesterday at Redinha, causing our piquets to retire from Pombal towards evening. I have received information that their 8th corps was at Condeixa, and their other troops on this side of the Mondego. I have, in consequence, continued to withdraw, and our advanced guard will to-day be on this side of Leiria.—

With few exceptions, the troops have continued to conduct themselves with great regularity, and have not suffered fatigue.—The army is now at no great distance from the position where I propose to receive the enemy; and continues animated with the best dispositions.—By all the information I have received, the enemy suffers the greatest distresses. *The inhabitants of the towns and villages have universally abandoned their homes; carrying with them all that they could transport, and that might be useful to the enemy; and by this means, in spite of the habits and practice of plundering by which the armies of the enemy have at all times been animated, they have been prevented from deriving any advantage from the few resources which the inhabitants of the country may have left, in consequence of the impossibility of bringing them off.*—Nothing of importance has occurred in the north, or in the provinces of the south of Spain, since my last dispatch. My last letters from Cadiz are dated the 22d of September. I have, &c. WELLINGTON.

P. S. I have learnt that Generals Graindorge and Foix, both belonging to the 2d corps, were wounded in the action of the 27th ult. It is added that the former is since dead of his wounds.

ENGLAND.—*Prayers and Thanks-giving for the abundant Harvest.*—Oct. 17, 1810.

At the Court at Windsor, the 17th of October, 1810, present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.—It is this day ordered by his Majesty in Council, that his Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury do prepare a form of *Prayer and Thanksgiving to Almighty God for the abundant Harvest*, to be read immediately after the General Thanksgiving on Sunday the 18th day of November next, and to be continued until Sunday the 25th of the same month inclusive; and it is hereby further ordered, that his Majesty's Printer do forthwith print a competent number of the said form of Prayer and Thanksgiving, that the same may be forthwith sent round and read as above directed in the several Churches and Chapels throughout those parts of the United Kingdom called England and Ireland.—W. FAWKENER.

NAPLES.—*Report to the Minister of War. Head-quarters at Scilla, Sept. 25, 1810.*

Monseigneur.—I had the honour of giving an account to your Excellency of the attack made on the 11th instant, by the English on the transports of the Division of Reserve commanded by General Cavagnac, which were at that period lying at anchor in the bay of Pentimele, near Reggio.—I now hasten to communicate to you a journal of the events which have taken place since that time, up to the 25th inclusively.—On the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th, there was nothing new.—On the morning of the 17th, his Majesty having ordered that some troops of his guard should reconnoitre a transport-ship to the south of Messina, there issued from the port of that city several gun-boats, which came to attack them. His Majesty then, also, sent several gun-boats to support their fire, together with some light vessels filled with troops, with the design of boarding the enemy.—The enemy's vessels then formed in line, and opened a very well-supported fire on those of his Majesty. The latter advancing in order to board, did not return the fire, lest their progress

should be thereby retarded; but the enemy having perceived their design, tacked about, and regained with all sail the coast of Sicily. The vessels of his Majesty then taking the enemy in flank, kept up upon him a very brisk cannonade, and a well-supported fire of musketry.—His Majesty, present at this action, directed all the movements. The enemy's loss must have been considerable.—On the same day, his Majesty having given orders at four in the afternoon that all the troops of the army should hold themselves in readiness for embarkation, each corps was in consequence placed behind the boats destined for its respective transport, for the purpose of effecting their embarkation with the least delay when the order should be given.—At eight in the evening, the order for embarkation was given; the division of reserve, eight miles distant from the others, did not receive the order till half-past nine. The wind, which during the whole day had been favourable for this expedition, had totally ceased in the channel at nine in the evening; it still lasted, however, at Pentimele, where the channel, beginning to widen, affords a freer approach to the southerly winds.—The divisions Partonneaux and Lamarque were embarked at eight in the evening, as well as the Royal Guards; at half-past nine the reserve was also embarked, so that at ten the whole army was ready to sail: his Majesty was himself embarked, together with all his Staff.—Detailed instructions had been given to each of the Generals commanding the divisions and the corps of guards, with regard to the manner in which they were respectively to act, and also, after the debarkation, with regard to the plan of attack, the only one which local circumstances permitted his Majesty to adopt: it was perfectly understood; but there was room to regret that it could be only partially carried into effect.—The Generals commanding in chief the Artillery and corps of engineers had also received the instructions necessary for their service, as well as the head commandant and director in chief of the marine. In short, nothing had been neglected by his Majesty to secure the success of such an enterprise; the good spirit of the army gave every reason for hope.—The wind continued during the whole night deficient in that part of the channel occupied by the two divisions Partonneaux and Lamarque, and the Royal Guards; but it still blew, though

weakly, off Pentimele, where the division of reserve lay at anchor.—This division set sail about half past ten, and arrived, without meeting the enemy, on the coast of Sicily, not at Scaletta, which was the point marked out for its debarkation, (the sea-breeze which it fell in with on the coast not having permitted it to ascend so high), but at Saint Stephano, 4 miles farther to the north, and of course nearer to Messina.—All the troops were landed and formed in an instant, so as to leave nothing to fear from the dispositions which the enemy might adopt. All the dispositions to be wished for in such circumstances were taken by General Cavagnac.—In the mean time the two divisions Partonneaux and the Guards found themselves constantly destitute of the least breath of wind, and could not execute their movement. His Majesty vainly hoped, and waited the whole night in his barge with the most lively impatience, for a breeze to fill his sails; the most complete calm on the contrary prevailed, and lasted till day break.—It was far from being supposed, that the sea at Pentimele was not subject to the same calm which prevailed at the Punta del Pezzo, there being only eight miles distance between them. It was, therefore, with surprise and extreme uneasiness, that his Majesty at five in the morning learnt that the division of reserve had been able to execute its movement, and was on the opposite shore; a very brisk firing at the point of its landing confirmed this intelligence, and unfortunately the signals agreed upon could not be given at that hour. But as that division had orders to retreat, in case the two others could not effect their passage; it saw, at the same time, that the divisions Partonneaux and Lamarque were still on the Calabrian beach, and General Cavagnac ordered a return.—Two brigs and an English corvette, followed by a great number of scurridors, immediately issued from Messina, to attack this convoy; but a contrary wind did not permit them to execute this design; and they were obliged to confine themselves to a fruitless cannonade.—His Majesty had hitherto preserved the hope that his reserve division had returned untouched, and even after having obtained some advantage over the enemy; but by a fatality, which in great enterprises often depends on the smallest details, thirteen of the transport ships, after having landed the troops which they had on board, pro-

fited by the darkness of the night to regain the coast of Calabria, so that a part of the troops which they had transported to Sicily, having no longer means of re-embarkation, were necessarily left there, and in the affair of next day fell into the hands of the enemy, after a most vigorous defence, which left them not a single cartridge remaining.—The number of these prisoners amounts to from 200 to 250 men, all Neapolitan troops; among whom are Colonel d'Ambrosio, and some subaltern officers.—On the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st, nothing new took place.—On the 22d his Majesty gave orders to the division Partonneaux and the Royal Guards to embark, and sail up the Channel, the former to Bagnara and the guards to Scilla. These movements were made without any loss, though the enemy fired a number of cannon shots. On the same day the division Lamarque replaced the division Partonneaux, at the anchorage of Pezzo and Canitello.—On the 23d, 24th, and 25th, there was nothing new.—I have the honour to salute your Excellency with the highest consideration.—GRENIER, General of Division, Count of the Empire, Chief of the Staff.

PORTUGAL.—*Paris, Oct. 24.*—*The General of Division Drouet, Count D'Erlon, commanding the 9th corps, to his highness the Prince of Wagram, major-general.—Head-quarters at Valladolid, Oct. 12, 1810.*

Monseigneur,—I communicated to you the day before yesterday the favourable news which I had received from the army of Portugal. I hasten this day to transmit to your Highness a letter which I have just received from M. the Intendant General Lambert who remained at the dépôt of the army at Viseu. This letter was brought me by a Portuguese agent who is in our service, and who has already given numerous proofs of zeal. It would appear that the affairs of the army of Portugal are going on well. I am on march to brush away the militia who infest the rear of the army, and that the Prince of Essling may not be obliged to make a detachment, and may pursue, with all his force, the English at the point of the bayonet.—As soon as I shall have arrived at Almeida, if the officer carrying the dispatches of the Prince of Essling is not yet arrived there, I will collect all the intelligence, and transmit it to your Highness.—I shall

be at Almeida on the 15th. Assure his Majesty the Emperor, that the 9th corps aspires to the glory of not being reduced to fight only against militia and brigands; I solicit for it, if there is yet time, the honour of marching to the advanced posts. My four regiments of chasseurs and hussars, by their brilliant uniform and their fine appearance, are the admiration of the Spaniards. They say, that except the Imperial Guards, they have never seen such fine troops.

Lambert, Intendant General of the Army of Portugal, to his Serene Highness major-general the Prince of Neufchatel.—Viseu, Oct. 5, 1810.

Monseigneur,—Conceiving the solicitude of his Majesty the Emperor for his army of Portugal, and foreseeing that his Majesty can have no news of it for some days, because the officer who is the bearer of the Prince of Essling's dispatches, containing an account of the success obtained by the army since its entrance into Portugal, is obliged to proceed with the prisoners, and by stated marches; I sent to General Drouet one of my Portuguese emissaries, an intelligent and trust-worthy man, to inform your Highness of what has passed, and to implore him to hasten his march, and to come and clear the country in our rear (*balayer nos derrières*). It would not be convenient that the Prince of Essling should be under the necessity of weakening his forces, and detaching a part of it for that purpose.—We have had no affair of great importance since we entered Portugal. On the 26th of September, the Prince encountered the English army, occupying the mountains and defiles of the Mondego, within eight leagues of Coimbra. The enemy's light troops, driven back on the 26th, 27th, and 28th, abandoned all their positions, which were as strong as any in the world. The Prince, in consequence, did not attack them in front; he was satisfied with holding in check by his light infantry the English army, and he marched with the Duke of Abrantes, the cavalry and three-fourths of the army, by the route from Coimbra to Oporto. But the English General was already in retreat, had repassed the Mondego, and abandoned to us all his fine positions, and the resources which the town of Coimbra affords—The army is in excellent health; it is abundantly supplied with provisions. We found some resources at Viseu. The Hospital is plentifully sup-

plied; there are only 500 wounded, and 250 sick. No General or Colonel was wounded in the battle of Coimbra. I am informed, but the information is not to be relied on, that the General of Brigade Simon, having attempted with three battalions of voltigeurs, to carry the Convent of Buzaco, was made prisoner with some men. Several of the wounded who were engaged in this rash enterprise (*échauffourée*), assure me, that the enemy have taken but few prisoners; for having received repeated orders neither to attack the Convent, nor to advance, our troops had full time to fall back.—We have a free communication with Coimbra. I am informed that our cavalry is already arrived at Pombal. The stores found at Coimbra are considerable.—It appears that Lord Wellington calculated upon remaining a long time in his position on the Mondego. He had only time to destroy part of his magazines.—I expect this evening 190 English, of whom 18 are officers. As to the Portuguese prisoners, we have several thousands of them, and find great difficulty in guarding them. Unfortunately a great many of them make their escape.

FRANCE.—*Decree issued from the Palace of Fontainebleau, Oct. 3, relating to persons of both sexes who are in service as domestics at Paris, or who wish to become such.*

1. Within the month following the promulgation of the present Decree, all individuals of both sexes who at present are or who wish to be engaged in service by the year, month, or even day, as domestics under whatever denomination, in our good city of Paris, shall be inscribed in registers, which shall be pointed out by the Prefect of Police, either upon their own declarations, or upon the statements and verifications which the Commissaries of Police shall be bound to make, under the penalty of an imprisonment, not exceeding three months nor less than eight days. There shall be delivered to each individual thus inscribed, a card bearing his Christian name and surname, place of birth, his employment, his description, whether married or not, and also pointing out the master whom he serves.—2. Those who serve as temporary domestics by the month or day, besides declaring their

domicile to the Prefecture of Police, shall be obliged to produce the master of a furnished hotel, or some other house-keeper, who may be answerable for them under the penalty contained in the 7th article.—3. No one is permitted to receive or take into his service any domestic not provided with a card of inscription; the said card shall remain in the hands of the master.—4. He whom a domestic leaves shall address the card of inscription to the Prefecture of Police, having first inserted the day of departure. The domestic shall be bound to repair to the Prefecture within 48 hours, and make declaration whether he means to continue to serve, or take up some other employment, under the penalty of an imprisonment, which shall not exceed four days nor be less than 24 hours. The card shall be returned to him, signed according to his declaration, and if the master has neglected to send it, the office of the Prefecture shall require him to send it, or shall give a new one.—5. No one shall take a domestic into his service, unless the card of inscription presented to him has been signed at the Prefecture of Police.—6. Domestics are forbidden to hire any chambers or closets without the knowledge of their masters, and unless they have given notice of the same to the Commissary of Police, of the division where the said chambers or closets are situated, under the penalty of an imprisonment which shall not exceed three months nor be less than eight days. Proprietors or principal tenants are also prohibited from letting or subletting to them any chamber or closet, without having made declaration of the same to the Commissary of Police, under the penalty of a fine, which shall not exceed 100 francs nor be less than 20.—7th. Every domestic out of place for more than a month, and who cannot give a satisfactory account of his means of subsistence, shall be obliged to depart from our good city of Paris, if he is not authorised to reside there, under pain of being arrested and punished as a vagabond.—8. There shall always be at the office established by the Prefecture of Police, an officer of police, charged to receive every complaint of domestic theft, to order pursuit without delay, and to take all measures necessary for discovering the perpetrators.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 26.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1810. [Price 1s.

"When the situation of the Bank of England was under the consideration of the two Houses of Parliament, in the year 1797, it was my opinion and that of many others, that *the extent to which Paper currency had then been carried, was the first and principal*, though not the sole, cause of the many difficulties, to which that corporate body was then, and had of late years from time to time, been exposed, in supplying the Cash occasionally necessary for the commerce of the Kingdom; for the Bank of England being at the head of all circulation, and *the great repository of unemployed cash*, it necessarily happens, that whenever a sudden increased supply of Coin becomes indispensable, in consequence of private failures or general discredit, by which Notes of the before-mentioned description are driven out of circulation, the Bank of England can alone furnish the Coins which are required to make up this deficiency, and this corporate body is thereby rendered responsible, not only for the value of its own notes, which it may have issued, but, in a certain degree, for such as may be issued by every private Banker in the Kingdom, let the substance, credit, or discretion of such a Banker be what it may."—LATE EARL OF LIVERPOOL. LETTER TO THE KING. Published in 1805.

"The quantity of Cash in the Bank can never, on the evidence of these circumstances, be so much as two millions; most probably not more than one million; and on this slender twig hangs the whole funding system of four hundred millions, besides many millions in Bank Notes. The sum in the Bank, if Mr. Chalmers be correct, is not sufficient to pay one-fourth of only one year's interest of the national debt, were the creditors to demand payment in Cash, or to demand Cash for the Bank Notes in which the interest is paid. A circumstance always liable to happen."—PAINE. DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF FINANCE. Published in 1796.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XV.

A more minute view of the Affairs of the Bank necessary - State of the case between the Bank and the People—The property of the Bank—The statement of Debts and Credits in the Report of the Secret Committee—The Bank renders its own Account—The more detailed statement published by Mr. Allardyce—The property of the Bank is in Paper and not in Specie—Amount of the Bank Notes compared with the Cash—The great question was, what Cash and Bullion there was in the Bank—Mr. Paine's opinion founded upon the Estimate of Mr. Eden and Mr. Chalmers—Error in supposing that the Minister took Specie out of the Bank to send it abroad—Mr. Pitt's answer to Mr. Hobbhouse and Mr. Hussey—Mr. Pitt's argument verifying the opinion of Mr. Paine—The whole become a system of Paper.

Gentlemen,

In the foregoing Letter (at page 808), we have seen the Reports of the Secret Committee of the House of Commons, relative, FIRST, to the state of the Bank's Affairs; and, SECOND, relative to the continuance of refusal of cash-payments at the Bank. We shall next take a view of the Acts, passed by the Parliament, upon this memorable occasion; not, however, 'till we have looked a little more minutely into the state of the Bank's affairs.

It was before observed, that the Committee; that even a Secret Committee, and that Committee, appointed, too, in the manner that we have seen (at page 807); that even a Committee like this were not permitted (to use the phrase of Pitt) to "push their inquiries into circumstances, the disclosure of which would be attended with injury to public credit." Accordingly, not a word do this Committee say about the quantity of Gold and Silver in the Bank, though the great, and indeed, the only cause of the Stoppage, and of the whole of these proceedings, was, the alarm felt by the Directors at the daily decrease in their Gold and Silver. The question, and the only question of any importance to the people, that is to say, to the holders of the Bank Notes, was: "Is there a quantity of real money in the Bank sufficient to pay us the

"amount of our notes, when we may choose to present them for payment." This was the question, to which the people wanted an answer; but with nothing relating to this question, were the Committee to meddle. This question was, with assurance unparalleled, said to belong wholly to the "*private economy of the Bank, with which the public had nothing at all to do.*"

Surely nothing ever was heard so impudent as this. The holders of the bank notes, the creditors of the Bank Company, the creditors of this Company of Merchants, carry their notes and demand payment; the Company of Merchants apply to the Minister, and he obtains from the Privy Council an Order to authorize the Company to *refuse to pay the just and lawful demands of their creditors*, and then the Minister, when he comes to the Parliament for an Act to sanction and to continue this refusal, tells the House of Commons, that even a Secret Committee of them, though chosen as we have seen, are *not to push their inquiries into circumstances*, the disclosure of which might injure the *credit of the Bank*; and yet he has the face to say, at the same time, that the report of this Committee cannot fail to *satisfy* the country of the *ability* of the Bank to pay all its outstanding demands.

Gentlemen, we will now look a little more minutely into that report. It states, that the *Government owes the Bank Company* 11,680,800*l.* which bears an interest of *three per cent.*; that is to say, that the Bank Company, like our neighbour GRIZZLE GREENHORN, is a Stock-holder, and has its name written in the GREAT BOOK; which Great Book, you will bear in mind, is kept at the Bank itself, and the interest upon the said stock is paid by the Bank Company to the Bank Company and in bank notes made at the order of the Bank Company! This was all very fine, to be sure; but, it certainly did not go one inch towards convincing the holder of a bank note, that the Bank was able to pay him in Gold or Silver. The Committee next state the means and the Debts of the Bank as follows:

Total amount of the Funds of the Bank (exclusive of debt due to it from the Government of 11,680,800 <i>l.</i>) on the 25th of February, 1797.....	£17,597,280
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Total Amount of outstanding demands upon the Bank on the 25th of February, 1797.....	13,770,390
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Surplus in favour of the Bank	3,826,890
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This was all very fine again; but what was it to the public? What was it to the holders of the bank notes, who wanted Gold for them? Besides, *whence came the evidence of the truth of this?* The proofs of a trader's solvency is not, I believe, generally left to himself. The Bank Company had stopped payment, and, when an inquiry was taking place into the state of its affairs, and especially with regard to its *ability to pay*, how comes it that the inquirers were content with *its own statement and its own story?* This is not the way that inquiries are made into the affairs of other traders, when they stop payment. Mr. GRAY, as we have seen before (See Debate of 9th March 1797), said that, though one of the Secret Committee, the *evidence had not satisfied him*; and, indeed, what was this report more or less than the Bank's representation of the state of its own affairs?

But, supposing the statement to be correct, still what was there to satisfy the people of the country; what to satisfy the holders, of the notes, that the Bank was able to *pay those notes*, that is to say, to *give gold and silver for them*. For, as to *payment* in any other way, it is nonsense to talk of it. What was there, in this Report, then, to cause it to be believed, that the Bank was able to *pay its notes?* Here is very big talk; high-sounding words and more high-sounding figures; but, if we put them to the scrutiny we find nothing at all in them: we find not the smallest circumstance to induce any holder of a bank note to suppose, that the Bank is, or ever will be, able to pay that note off, agreeably to the promise, expressed upon the face of it.

The statement, however, from which it appears, the Secret Committee made up their report, was more in detail. This statement was afterwards given to the public by Mr. ALLREDYCE, a member of the then Parliament, and a person who constantly voted with the Minister. The statement, thus given, was as follows.

STATE OF THE FINANCES OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND, FEB. 25, 1797.

<i>Particulars of Debt Account.</i>		<i>Particulars of Credit Account.</i>	
Drawing account	£. 2,389,600	Bills and notes discounted }	4,176,080
Exchequer bills	1,676,000	Cash and Bullion	8,228,000
Unpaid dividends	983,730	Exchequer Bills	65,000
Do. in Bank stock	45,150	Lands and Tenements	700,000
Do. in India annuities	10,210	Money lent to India Company	1,510
Sundries, unclaimed	1,330	Stamps	15,890
Due from Cash on the loan		American debentures	54,150
of 1797	17,060	Petty Cash in House	5,320
Unpaid Irish dividend	1,400	Sundry articles	24,150
Do. on Imperial loan	5,600	5 per Cent. annuities	795,800
	5,130,110	5 per Cents 1797	1,000,000
Bank notes in circulation,	8,640,250	Treasury bills paid for the	
		Government	1,512,270
	13,770,390	Loan to Government	376,000
Balance	3,826,890	Bills discounted unpaid	88,120
		Treasury and Exchequer fees	740
	17,597,280	Interest due on different Loans	
		advanced to government ...	554,250
			17,597,280

Now, what is all this? Why, it is, with the exception of *three of the items*, a mere account of *paper* between the *Government* and the *Bank*, and in which the people, who held the bank notes, could have no interest whatever. The Bank held Exchequer Bills, and Navy and Victualling Bills, and had lent money (that is to say bank notes) to the East India Company and had five per cent. stock and Treasury Bills and had interest due upon loans; all which might be very well for the Bank, but what was it to a man, who held a bank note and who could not get payment for it when he presented it to the Bank? These fine articles of credit were very good for the Bank Company; but, what good were they to SQUIRE GUIL, who, being alarmed at the prospect of a Jacobin invasion, wished, in spite of his loyalty, to turn his bank notes into guineas? What use were they to our neighbor, GRIZZLE GREENHORN, who now wished, of course, to put by a few guineas, and who, of course, wished to receive her dividends in gold, to prevent her from doing which by law this very report was a preliminary step? What consolation was Grizzle to draw from this account of debts due from the Government to the Bank, especially when it was clear, that if the Government ever paid the Bank, it must pay it in bank notes, seeing that in bank notes the taxes were now paid?

The *three items* to which the people would look, were those expressing on one side, the amount of the bank notes in circulation; and, on the other, the amount of the cash, or coin, and bullion in the Bank Company's House, commonly called the Bank. According to the above statement these were on the 25th of February 1797, as follows:

Amount of Bank notes in circulation	£. 8,640,250
Bills and Notes discounted, Cash and Bullion	4,176,080
Petty cash in the House	5,320
	4,181,400
Difference	4,458,850

But, who is to say how much the Bills and Notes discounted amounted to? Who is to answer, that they did not make one half; who is to say, that they did not make nine tenths of the sum of 4,176,080 pounds? Why was the amount of the cash and bullion huddled up in one sum along with the amount of Bills and Notes discounted! Why were things so different in their nature confounded together? If GRIZZLE GREENHORN wanted her bank notes payed at the Bank, she

would not take *discounted bills* in payment. What the nation wanted to see, was, how much the Bank had of *that sort of thing, in which bank notes could be paid*; how much it had of *that sort of thing, the value of which no invasion or revolution would destroy*; how much it had of *that sort of thing, in which it had promised to pay upon demand the bearers of its notes*; how much, in short, it had of *MONEY*, and not of *bills and notes discounted*, with which the people had nothing at all to do, there being no man of common sense, who could care a straw about how much of its paper the Bank gave to others for their paper, so that he got guineas for his bank notes; and, if he could not get this, what consolation was it to him to know, that the Bank had lent but little of its paper to the merchants?

As to the exact quantity of *cash and bullion* in the Bank, when the Stoppage took place, Mr. ALLERDYCE gives a table, shewing the amount at stated periods, for several years, according to which Table, the total amount of the cash and bullion in the Bank, at the time of the Stoppage, was 1,272,000*l.* Aye, ONE MILLION, TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND POUNDS. He comes at this sum thus. The Bank of England have *Numbers*, to denote their quantity of *cash and bullion*. When they submitted their accounts to Parliament, in 1797, it was thought necessary to keep the amount of the *cash and bullion* a secret from Parliament and the public. They, therefore, only gave the *Numbers* for distinct periods in several years, in order to shew the proportionate increase or diminution of the cash and bullion. From these *Numbers*, however, a discovery was, it is said, made, and the sum, above-named, ascertained to be the amount of the cash and bullion in the Bank at the time of the Stoppage. But, upon this, I wish to place no reliance; nor do I care, whether the statement above given, of cash and bullion and discounted bills be correct, or not. These are things of inferior consequence compared with the great and well known facts; namely, that no proof was produced, or attempted to be produced, that the Bank Company had gold or silver, or both together, sufficient to pay its promissory notes; and that, no account was rendered to the Parliament of the amount of the cash and bullion in the Bank.

Mr. PAINE had, only the year before, said, in the words of my motto, that the quantity of cash in the Bank could never, on the evidence of circumstances, be so much as *two millions*, and most probably *not more than one million*; that, on this slender twig, always liable to be broken, hung the whole funding system of four hundred millions, besides many millions in bank notes; that the sum in the bank was not sufficient to pay one fourth of only one year's interest of the national Debt, were the creditors to demand payment in cash, or to demand cash for the bank notes in which the interest is paid: a circumstance always liable to happen. Mr. PAINE founded this opinion upon a statement of Mr. EDEN (now Lord AUCKLAND) and Mr. CHALMERS, clerk to the Board of Trade, who had given an account, or, rather an estimate, of the gold coin circulating in the kingdom; and, it is truly surprising to observe how near Mr. PAINE was to the exact truth as to this point, though at the time when his pamphlet was published, its calculations and predictions were treated with scorn, and the work itself was ascribed to a malicious desire to cause the ruin of England; just as if it were in the power of PAINE, or of any one else, to injure the credit of a nation; or, as if any thing but the want, the real want of the gold and bullion could shake the faith of the public in such an establishment as that of the Bank. PAINE might have written 'till this time without persuading any one that a guinea was a thing not to be relied upon. He never would have written people out of their belief in the goodness of *guineas*. And, if the Bank had stood a run for only *one week*, he might have written his pen to the stump, but would not have shaken the people's confidence. Credit that has a *solid foundation* need fear no assaults.

At the time, when this subject was under discussion in the House of Commons, the Minister was charged, by the Opposition, with having *taken the Money from the Bank* and sent it abroad in *subsidies*. This was certainly a very great error, or, it was made use of for the purpose of *annoying the Minister* at the expence of truth. I am, however, disposed to attribute it to error; for, it was urged in such a manner, and by such persons, as to obviate all suspicion of its being a mere party weapon. Mr. HOBHOUSE (Debate 28th

February, 1797) said, that he suspected that the money had been buried in *Germany*, and not by the people of England, in dread of invasion. And Mr. HUSSEY said, that the Minister "had laid his rapacious hands upon the sums destined for the payment of the public creditor. He knew that the public creditors had been refused their just demands. He had witnessed the truth of this woeful circumstance himself. He had been told by a person who had applied for payment, that, in payment of a sum of *twenty three pounds*, *three pounds* in cash had been offered, and the rest only in notes. Such a melancholy day as this for England he had hoped never to live to see. Let the Chancellor of the Exchequer pay the *ten millions* Government owed the Bank, and then it would be able to fulfil all its engagements. It was not that the Bank was unable to satisfy its creditors, but it was the continued demand of money to feed the expences of this ruinous and disastrous war, which rendered it unjust to those who depended upon its credit."

Mr. PITT, who seemed to have avoided this point with all his care, and who, as I once heard Mr. WINDHAM describe him, was so dextrous in the selection and use of words as to be able "to speak a king's speech off-hand," could not remain longer silent under this attack. He had been told nearly the same by Mr. SHERIDAN; but he seemed to be willing to take the chance of that being ascribed to party motives. When, however, he heard the same, seriously urged by Mr. HUSSEY, and saw that the notion was making its way amongst the public, and, of course, that the whole of the calamity would be ascribed to him and his Anti-Jacobin war, he could no longer refrain from declaring what was the nature of the property of the Bank, and to avow, that the whole of its transactions with government, or nearly so, were transactions of *paper*, a fact of which the country had, till that moment been in complete ignorance.

He said that Mr. HUSSEY was wholly in error to suppose, that the Bank made advances to the Government in *specie*; he said, that the advances were made in *notes*, and paid in the same manner; that, if the Government were to raise money and pay the Bank, the Bank would not thereby be supplied with an additional guinea in cash; that the taxes were not paid in

specie; that loans were advanced without any expectation of re-payment in *specie*; that the Bank never had it in contemplation that every quarterly dividend was to be paid in cash; that the receipt of the revenue was in *paper*, and that the whole of Mr. HUSSEY's observations were intirely founded in mistake.

Mr. SHERIDAN, in answer to this, said that the deficiency, or inability at the Bank arose not merely from the positive want of cash, but from the disproportion between the quantity of cash and the quantity of paper; and, of course, that, if their lent paper was returned to them, they would find themselves at liberty to issue more of their *specie*. This would have been true in a state of things where the difference between the quantity of *specie* and the quantity of paper was less; but, in the present case, it was too great for confidence to be restored, and, of course, for the Bank to return to its payments in cash. Mr. PITT's answer was complete. It was the plain truth, which he was obliged to bring out, in order to divide the blame with the Bank. He was told to borrow and to pay the Bank what he owed them. What good will that do, said he, when my loan will consist of Bank notes, and I must pay the Bank in those notes? He was told to raise the sum in taxes and so pay the Bank. What good will that do, said he, when my taxes will consist of Bank notes, and I must pay the Bank in those notes. The answer was complete towards his adversaries in debate, and not less complete as a demolisher of his own reputation as a Minister of Finance. He now said precisely what Mr. PAINE had said the year before; he now confirmed, with his own lips, what PAINE had been so abused for saying.*

* I speak here of those writings merely of Mr. PAINE, which relate to *Finance*, without wishing to convey any commendation of some of his other writings, the subjects of which are, in no-wise, connected with this subject. In the principles of finance he was deeply skilled; and, to his very great and rare talents as a writer, he added an uncommon degree of experience in the concerns of paper-money, the rise and fall of which he had witnessed in the American States and in France. Truth is truth, come from whom it may; and there is no greater folly than that of rejecting it, that of shutting one's

He appears clearly to have perceived his dilemma; but, to extricate him from it was beyond the power even of his dexterity. He was obliged to acknowledge, that the whole was become a *system of paper*, or, that *he had taken the gold from the Bank*, and, of the two evils he chose that, which would expose him to the least share of public odium.

This view of the State of the Bank's Affairs has led me further than I expected; but it was quite necessary as an introduction to that of the Acts of Parliament, which will be the subject of my next.

I am, in the meanwhile,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

W^m. COBBETT.

St. Peter's, Newgate, Monday,
November 5, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

KING'S ILLNESS.—The *Bulletin*, inserted in my last, at page 517, came down to the 2nd instant. The succeeding ones, up to this day, are as follows:—3rd November, Saturday,—“His Majesty passed a better night, but his fever is not diminished.”—4th November, Sunday,—“The King is in no respect worse to-day, though his Majesty has passed the night with very little sleep.”—5th November, Monday,—“The King has had a good night, and his Majesty has been rather better through the last 24 hours.”—6th November, Tuesday,—“His Ma-

eyes and ears against it, merely because it proceeds from persons, of whose conduct, in other respects, one may disapprove. The writings of Lord Bacon are held, and justly held, in great estimation; though he was, as our elegant and virtuous poet describes him, “the meanest of mankind.” The late Lord Liverpool, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Nicholls, Mr. Hobhouse and others, and, as we shall see by-and-by, a Committee of the House of Commons, have since acknowledged the truth of the principles of Mr. Paine's work. Events have proved the truth of them, and, to point out the fact, is no more than an act of justice, due to his talents, and an act the more particularly due at my hands, I having been one of his most violent assailants. Any man may fall into *error*, but a fool or a knave will seldom *acknowledge* it.

“jesty has passed the night with very little “sleep, and is not better this morning.”

—In addition to the intelligence, contained in these official documents, it is stated, in most of the public prints, that the King is better, and in a gradual way of recovery. Some conversations are given, as having taken place between him and the physicians, which, if correctly given, contain ample proof of his being in a way of restoration; so that, it is probable, that, before the two Houses of Parliament again meet, the means of providing for a prorogation, may have been legally taken, in which case the session will not, I should suppose, begin at an earlier period than usual.—I am sorry to connect with a matter like this any thing in the way of disputation; but, the cause of truth and of freedom demands, at my hands, something in answer to an article in the *Morning Chronicle* of the 5th instant, arising out of what I said, in my last, at page 814.—The article is as follows: “Mr. Cobbett affects to have discovered an *inconsistency* in our account on Friday last, of his Majesty's illness, compared with our paragraph “on the Friday preceding. We said, on “the 26th instant, “His Majesty possesses “*perfect health, and promises the enjoyment of many years in the bosom of his “family and people.*”—Of this paragraph “Mr. Cobbett, with a *violent perversion* of “the text of our account of his Majesty's “present awful condition, says: “What “*are we to give credit to after this?*— “It is stated that the King has been “*somewhat ill for three weeks, and that “he had become so ill on the 25th of “October as to cause a report of his “state to be made to Mr. Perceval— “Aye, on that very 25th of October, “when (it being the anniversary of his “accession to the Throne) we were “told, by this same print, that he “was in perfect health, and promised “the enjoyment of many years! What “is one after this to believe?”—Such is Mr. Cobbett's animadversion! “It is not easy to account for the motive “which induces this writer to endeavour “incessantly to vilify and calumniate the “Press, as if he wished to justify the attempts that have been made by men in “power to subject it to uncontrolled privilege, as the readiest means of shackling “it without the forms of trial. It is for “Mr. Cobbett himself to account for this “practice to the friends of a free press—*

"but it behoves us to repel the charge of attempting to impose on the People of England by any concealment of a fact so important to them as that of the King's indisposition.—Our Readers will do us the justice to recollect that we stated distinctly, that for the fortnight preceding the Anniversary of his Accession to the Throne, his Majesty had been alternately depressed by grief or elevated by expectation, according to the successive reports he received from the Physicians attending on the Princess Amelia, but there was not the slightest appearance of indisposition in his Majesty. It was not till the very day of the Anniversary that the symptoms of a change in his deportment were remarked by the quick and intelligent eye of the Gentleman whose duty it was to be near his person—and this was communicated with great secrecy to the Prime Minister. It was not known even in the Castle, for on Friday the 20th his Majesty rode out in Windsor Great Park, and it was not until that occasion (as we have already said) that the afflicting condition of the Royal mind became manifest to all his attendants. Unless, therefore, we are to call the sorrows of an affectionate Parent on seeing the sufferings of a beloved daughter, by the name of indisposition, we cannot truly be accused of having imposed upon our Readers. On Monday, for the first time, we received a whisper of his being unwell, but his illness was attributed to a slight cold. It was not till Tuesday that we had an authentic communication of the nature of his malady, and we instantly gave the Bulletins which had been issued, but from that DELICACY which WE shall ever feel on such topics (however it may heat the gentle blood of Mr. Cobbett), we abstained from entering into the detail of the origin and progress of the afflicting malady, until by the Royal inability to perform one of the most important functions of the Prerogative, it became a question of the most serious national interest, and was promulgated by the Government itself. —We have thought it our duty to say thus much in vindication of our integrity in the discharge of our duty to the Public; not that we think the *capitious misrepresentations* of Mr. Cobbett, or of Mr. White, are likely to deprive us of the confidence which our Readers from long experience have of OUR SINCERITY in

"their service."—Let us take this in its own order; and, FIRST, I did not affect to have discovered any thing. I actually did point out by name and date; and it was not an *inconsistency* that I pointed out, but a *falsehood*; a clearly defined falsehood; a falsehood not to be denied, or disguised; and what Mr. PERRY can hope to effect by this attempt at justification, I am wholly at a loss to conceive. He told us first, that the King was in *perfect health* on the 25th (being the anniversary of the accession to the throne); and, he afterwards told us, that, on that *very day*, the King's illness, which had been for some time coming on, became so manifest, that it was reported to the Minister. How did I "*virulently pervert*" the text of those statements? I inserted the statements in the words of the text itself; and, I only said, in the way of commentary, "what is one, after this, to believe?" How can this be called *perversion* of the text? The falsehood was clear; there was a flat contradiction in terms; one of the assertions was the opposite of the other; there was a self-conviction of falsehood. The falsehood might arise from *misinformation*, and I neither said nor insinuated that it was *wilful* on the part of Mr. PERRY; but, still it was a falsehood, and one of such importance as to deserve pointing out. And, what is now said to do it away? Nothing at all. There is nothing now said that was not said before, and that I did not insert. The fact remains just what it was, and the only difference in the case is, that Mr. PERRY has now made it appear, that the falsehood did not arise from *misinformation*, because, if it had, he would, doubtless, have said so. He said, that the King was in *perfect health*, on the 25th of October. He has since said, that the King was ill, that he was *not in perfect health*, on that day; and, unless he can account for his having made the first assertion, what is the use of the protestations about his integrity; what is the use of his talk of *repelling the charge*, of having endeavoured to impose upon the people? The way to repel the charge of having asserted a falsehood, is to shew that what you asserted was *true*; and, if you cannot do this, your best way is to plead guilty, or, to hold your tongue. —My motive for pointing out this falsehood, was, to prevent, as far as I could, the like in future. This falsehood was criminal, not because it was *maliciously meant*; not because it had a tendency to produce injury to any particular person; but be-

cause it tended, and must tend, to diminish the confidence of men in the assertions of one another, which is always a great moral evil; and, in the important case now before us, what man is there, who will be so ready to confide in the statements of the Morning Chronicle, or of any other of the public prints? This instance of falshood will make men suspect every thing that shall, in future, be asserted upon the same subject. It is for this reason that all serious falshoods are criminal; and, to prevent them, I, for my part, know of no other way than that of exposing and censuring them.—The SECOND point in Mr. PERRY's article relates to certain alledged "*calumnies*," which, he would insinuate that I am in the habit of uttering against *the press*; and he kindly leaves me to account for this my practice to the friends of a *free press*.—What does Mr. PERRY mean by "*calumnies*?" Calumny includes *falshood*; and he has made no attempt to shew, that I have uttered any *falshoods* even against the venal writers of the day, who, indeed, are quite enough exposed to the state's of truth.—What have I complained of in the conduct of the press? Have I not complained of its promulgating *falshoods*? Yes, and I have always *proved* the *justice* of my complaint. I have complained of its being made use of, by many persons, as a channel of deception; as the means of duping and cheating the people; as the means of vilifying the real friends of the country; as the means of upholding abuses; and, have I not, at every step, shown my complaint to be *well-founded*?—To the friends of a *free press* I have no apology to make for this my practice; but, on the contrary, am convinced, that of this part of my labours, I have their warmest approbation; because, the friends of a *free press* want, like myself, no liberty to publish *falshoods*; they and I want the liberty of publishing any thing that we can *prove to be true*; and, whoever has read the Register, must know, that this is what I have constantly contended for. But, I never have contended for the liberty of publishing *falshoods*; I have never held that forth as necessary to the freedom and happiness of the people; I have always stood upon this adamant principle of morality, "*truth is great, and she shall prevail*;" against which principle whatever is hostile has a direct tendency to vitiate the morals and to undermine and destroy the liberties of a nation.

—There is a *THIRD* passage in Mr. PERRY's article, which I must beg to be excused for noticing. It is this: "It was not till Tuesday that we had an authentic communication of the nature of his malady, and we instantly gave the Bulletin which had been issued; but, from that Dr. LICACY which WE shall ever feel on such topics, however it may heat the gentle blood of Mr. Cobbett, WE abstained from entering into the detail of the origin and progress of the afflicting malady."—Now, pray, Mr. PERRY, what do you mean? Do you mean, that my blood has been heated by your *delicacy*, or by the *topics*, or by your *abstinence* from entering into a detail of the king's illness? Really, Sir, if confusion of ideas be a sign of heated blood, there can, I do not myself, be but little doubt as to which of us has his blood in the most feverish state.—Your *delicacy* might, I must confess, be likely enough to warm the blood of a less constant observer than myself; nor should I be surprised if a similar effect were, in some persons, produced by the solemn protestation of SINCERITY, made at the close of your article; but, in me, I give you my word, that neither the one nor the other has caused the slightest emotion, and that my pulse has been no more affected thereby than it was by your lengthened eulogium on the *loyalty*, which shone forth with such resplendence from the lamps of the proprietor of "that truly national establishment, the Yellow-Fever warehouse."—Do you mean, that my blood was heated by the *topics*? If so, you will do your readers a favour to give them something like an explanation of the sense of your words; and, if you mean, that this heat of mine arose from your *not entering into a detail of the king's illness*, the public, or, at least, the readers of the Register, who must have observed *with what care I have avoided every thing bordering upon such detail*, will, I am afraid, conclude, that my "*animadversion*," as you are pleased to call it, upon your late publications, has wholly failed in producing the effect for which it was intended. But, even this failure shall not prevent me from offering you, towards whom I feel no ill-will, this one observation: that *delicacy* and *sincerity* are virtues, which stand in no need of words to, indicate the seat of their existence.

JEFFERY.—It was not my intention to say any more about this man at present;

but, the following paragraph, inserted in all the Daily papers, that I have seen, of the 31st of October, calls for a remark or two; and, besides, it is of importance to put it upon record.—“This young man, whose case has excited such extraordinary interest, arrived safely on Thursday last at Polperro, where his mother and father-in-law reside. The following are stated to have been the circumstances attending his reception:—The professional gentleman who was employed on the occasion by the LAKE family, (Captain LAKE himself has been abroad some time), after having adjusted every thing entirely to the satisfaction of Jeffery, properly conceived that one so inexperienced should not be trusted by himself with a large sum of money, and anxious that he should be safely restored to his family, sent his clerk to accompany him to the spot.—On the road from Plymouth to Polperro they met the father-in-law of Jeffery, who recognised him immediately, and went forward to apprise his mother of his arrival. By the time that they reached the village all the inhabitants were prepared to receive him, and it is hardly possible to express the cordial greeting and exulting transport that attended his arrival. After the tumult of joy had a little subsided, they began to look on the clerk with apparent suspicion, and some degree of hostility; but Jeffery immediately assured them that he was one of his friends, and had taken the trouble of so long a journey for the purpose of protecting him. Their sentiments were changed at once, and the clerk was received with respect and kindness.—The meeting between Jeffery and his mother was particularly interesting. At first she gazed on him with a kind of bewildered anxiety, as if doubtful whether she could trust what she saw; in a few moments she recovered herself, and they rushed into each other's arms.—‘Oh! my son,’ and ‘Oh! my mother,’ interrupted by sobs on both sides, were all that they could utter for some time. At length the agitation of their feelings subsided, and a scene of calm endearment ensued. Nothing but the arrival of Jeffery engrossed the attention of the villagers, and the whole place was a scene of generous tumult till a late hour in the night. Jeffery repeatedly declared that he entirely forgave Captain Lake himself, and could take him by the hand with sincere good-will if he were

“on the spot. Jeffery arrived at the village at six o'clock in the evening. The Clerk stayed with him till one in the morning, and after a short repose set off for London on Friday.”—In a former article, upon this subject, at page 721, I observed upon the rare kindness, shown towards Jeffery by even the Attorney of Lake. Not only by his family, but even by his Attorney, who seemed to be afraid, lest he should dash his foot against a stone; and so he not only took care of him while in London, but actually accompanied him down to Polperro, a distance of about three hundred miles. But, there is one thing, which appears to have escaped this “Professional Gentleman.” We are here told, that this gentleman, “who was, upon this occasion, employed by the Lake family, after having adjusted every thing to the satisfaction of Jeffery, properly conceived, that one so inexperienced, should not be trusted by himself with a large sum of money, and anxious, that he should be safely restored to his family, sent his clerk to accompany him to the spot.”—Kind again. Very kind. But, as this professional gentleman was employed by one of the parties, is it not rather odd, that, where a pecuniary agreement was to take place, there was not some professional man on the other side, especially in a case where the party is declared to have been so inexperienced? What answer will any professional man give to this question?—Jeffery, if this account be true, was, by this professional gentleman, employed by the Lake family, thought “not fit to be trusted by himself with a large sum of money.” We are not told what the sum was; and, it is of no consequence to the argument. Be it what it might, JEFFERY, it is here said, was not fit to be trusted alone with it, on account of his inexperience. Was it, therefore, proper, that the compromise should have been made with him, without his having the assistance or advice of any professional man, or any friend? And would a court of equity say, that such a compromise was binding?—I shall leave the matter here, for the present; but more of it we must have hereafter. It is a thing impossible, that the matter can be dropped thus. It is not the affair of Jeffery alone. It is the nation, and as such it always ought to be considered.

PORTUGAL.—There is not, I believe, any intelligence from our army near Lis-

bon; but, it is hourly expected; and (*from every thing that we are told*) the total destruction of Massena and his army may be expected. In the mean while, I see, I must confess, with rather a suspicious eye, a paragraph in all the Ministerial news-papers, the object of which is to show, that, though the loss of the impending battle would be ruinous to *Napoleon*, the loss of it, on our part, would *not be ruinous to us*. The paragraph, which, I perceive, has been carefully and conspicuously inserted in all the ministerial news-papers, is as follows: "It has more than once been observed, by some of our cotemporaries that the *security* or *insecurity*, the *permanence* or *destruction* of the British and French Governments, depend upon the issue of the great battle between Lord Wellington and Massena. That a power which has been ill-gotten, and has been upheld by the most tyrannical measures, which, having been obtained by success in the field, is indebted for its continuance to an unbroken series of victories, that such a power, of new growth, not bottomed in the esteem and affections of the people, but on the contrary odious and oppressive to them, should be unable to stand against the tide of disaster; that its main props and pillars should be weakened by the decisive defeat of a large army, the flower of its military force, commanded by the most consummate of Buonaparté's generals, will not create surprise in any man. But that the *British Power* should be placed in the same scale and on the *same footing*; that a constitution which has grown to greatness through a long progression of ages; which has its root in *our love and esteem*, in our habits, in our recollections; which is endeared to us *by the prosperity it has produced*, by the *rights of freedom* it has established, that a Power which puts forth its resources and strength to *protect not to oppress*, to *rescue not to enslave*, that such a Power cannot survive a disaster or defeat (which yet, we trust, it is not destined to experience), is an assertion which we shall never hear without branding it as an *atrocious calumny and insult*."—Very well. Agreed; Agreed. An "atrocious calumny," if you like, and an insult besides. But, *why talk of it?* Why think about any such thing? How came any such thing into your head; for, as to the opinion that you affect to combat, that

is a complete *sham*, no such opinion having been given in any print in London? *Why*, therefore, start any such idea?—This is, in truth, a very ugly paragraph, and, were not our last accounts from Lisbon of so very flattering a nature, one would be almost tempted to fear, that there were, at Whitehall, some dark forebodings. Else why this laboured attempt introduced under a false pretence; why this hatched occasion for introducing an argument to convince us, that the *loss of the battle* in Portugal would *not prove our ruin*? Why all this? Never, surely, was so much pains before taken without some purpose in view. Why, again I ask, say any thing, which seems to contemplate the consequences of a *lost battle*.—But, though I think this paragraph so ugly, I cannot doubt of the success of the allied army, which, besides all other advantages, is (if the Morning Post and Courier have given us true statements) so *superior in numbers* to the famished, ragged, sick, and disaffected army of Massena. The Morning Post of to-day says:—"On Thursday 300 deserters from the *French army in Portugal* landed at Portsmouth, and were marched to Fort Cumberland. They are to join the *Royal Sicilian regiment*. A more *deplorable* body of men were never seen: they had *scarcely any clothing* on, and appeared *half starved*. They are of *all the nations* on the *Continent*."—Here, then, we have before the Morning Post's eyes, a *specimen* of Massena's army. I wish, with all my heart, that I could go into Hampshire to see them! Since I cannot, I must take the fact upon trust. Here, then, in my mind's eye, at any rate, I have before me the 300 deplorable, nearly naked, half-starved creatures, of all nations, whom we (if this man tells truth) have put into our "*Royal Sicilian Regiment*!" He does not say, how many *Frenchmen* there are amongst them; nor does he show us, from this fact, how it follows, as a matter of course, that Massena's army, remaining with him, must be in the same condition; nor, further, how this fact of the deserters of *all nations* proves the utility of *foreign troops*. These men may possibly have had time to eat since they left Massena.—But, on the other hand, it may have been owing to their having been the *strongest* amongst his men, that enabled them to escape; and, if what we were told, some time ago, was true, his army must be too much exhausted by

want of food for many of the men to have strength sufficient to desert.—All, however, at present, is conjecture. His army may have been slain, or they may have been eaten by the crows and magpies. One or the other appears (from what we have been told) to be their inevitable destiny; and, all that I have now to add, is the expression of my wishes, that we may speedily hear the intelligence of their fate, and of the safety and health of our own army.

TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND. — A news-paper, published in DUBLIN, by J. LAPHEN, No. 19, Sycamore Street, near Dame Street, dated October 4, 1810, and bearing the sham title of "THE PATRIOT," contains a letter, with the following head: "From Cobbett's Political Register: To the Freemen of the 'Aggregate Meeting of Dublin,'" and signed: "WILLIAM COBBETT, State Prison, Newgate, Saturday, September 29, '1810.'"—This letter, which fills more than two columns of the paper, is a FABRICATION FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END.—No such letter ever was written by me; and no such letter ever appeared in the Political Register; and this, I am convinced, the independent Editors in Ireland (whose conduct, by the bye, puts many of our editors to shame) will not fail to state to you.—There are, however, three circumstances, connected with this attempt at imposition, which circumstances give me great pleasure: FIRST, it is a proof, that the supporters of this sham "Patriot" feel, that it would be *desirable for them* to injure my reputation: SECOND, that they are compelled to resort for tools to men capable of such fabrications as this, which proves to me, that all men of *talents* and of *honour* hold them in contempt: THIRD, that, in order to obtain a chance of getting you to listen to them, they must assume the name of *Patriot*. These are all bad signs for them, and are so many proofs to me, that you are worthy of all the admiration and all the fellow-feeling, which real Englishmen have towards you, and which have ever been entertained by your faithful friend,
WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
November 6, 1810.

P. S. Upon consulting the stars, I think I have discovered, that it will not be many days before the MORNING POST and the COURIER will begin to rat.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—Decree issued from the Palace of Fontainebleau, Oct. 3, relating to persons of both sexes who are in service as domestics at Paris, or who wish to become such. (Concluded from page 832.)

..... 9. The obligation of getting themselves inscribed, and of receiving a card, is not applicable to domestics serving the same master for the last five years, except at the time when they shall leave him.—10. The obligation imposed upon masters by the present decree, shall be executed by the house stewards, where there are any.—11. The penalties contained in the present decree, shall be prescribed for six months, where the domestic who has incurred them, had got into the service of a new master.—12. Our Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, and our Minister of General Police, are charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the Bulletin of the Laws.

FRANCE.—Commercial Decree. — Fontainebleau, 8th October, 1810.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, &c.
—Considering that a great quantity of colonial merchandize, proceeding from prizes taken by the Danes, is accumulated at Altona, and other ports of Holstein, and wishing to favour the Danish Court, we have decreed, and do decree as follows:—
Art. 1. All kinds of colonial merchandize actually existing in Holstein, being the proceeds of prizes made by the Danes, may enter our line of customs by way of Hamburgh, by paying the duties of our tariff, of the 5th of August, which shall be annexed to the present decree.—Art. 2. All merchants, and holders of colonial merchandize, inclined to avail themselves of the permission granted by the present decree, shall be obliged to appear in the presence of our Director of the Customs at Hamburgh, and to deliver to him their declaration in the course of October.—Art. 3. They shall have permission to enter their goods within the line of customs, upon paying the duties of the tariff.—Art. 4. The holders of colonial merchandize in Holstein, who shall not have made their declaration before the 1st of November, shall not afterwards be permitted to do so; nor to avail themselves of the privilege granted them by the present decree.—Art. 5. Our ministers of Foreign

Relations, Finance, and War, are charged, in what concerns them respectively, with the execution of the present decree.—

(Signed) NAPOLEON: by the Emperor.—

(Signed) H. B. Duke of Bassano.—A true copy. (Signed) The Count de Sussy.”

[Here follows the *Tarif* annexed to the Decree of the 5th of August.]

FRANK. COT.—*Decree by the Grand Duke Charles.*—Oct. 11, 1810.

We Charles, by the Grace of God, inasmuch as his Majesty the Emperor and King has invited us to introduce into our States the new *Tarif* of Duties which were decreed in France on the 5th of August last, respecting colonial produce, we the more willingly adopt this measure, as we are convinced that the application of this *Tarif* to all the States of the Rhenish Confederation will prove the most effectual means of promoting the consumption of those continental articles which shall displace colonial produce, and at the same time diminish the consumption of that produce, by means of which the Continent is rendered tributary to England. Accordingly we have with the consent and advice of our Council of Finances decreed, and do decree as follows:—1. That the Decree given by the Emperor at Trianon, 5th of August, 1810, containing the *Tarif* of Import Duties upon different kinds of produce and goods, shall, from the 9th of October of the present year, be of force through the whole circle of our States for all kinds of colonial produce there used and consumed.—2. This *tarif* respects only the trade of Germany, and makes no alteration whatever in the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, which remain in force, nor with the decisions of the Emperor, according to which it is unalterably fixed, that the sugars, coffee, and cotton accumulated in the warehouses of England shall never be admitted into France.—3. Our Minister of Finances is commissioned with the execution of the present Decree, which shall be inserted in the Code of Laws, together with the manner and method in and by which the new *tarif* shall be collected in our States.

SAXONY.—*Decree of the King, relating to Colonial Produce.* Oct. 4, 1810.

Whereas, by the accession of his Majesty to the system contained in the Imperial French Decrees, with regard to the

trade with England and her colonies, all direct or indirect commercial relations with England or her colonies, except in so far as the same may take place in virtue of a special permission from the French Government for certain ports, are to be considered as unlawful and continue to be prohibited; and that, consequently, where such relations are still maintained, the confiscation of the merchandise proceeding therefrom must necessarily result—his Majesty thinks it proper to establish and decree the following provisions with regard to such English and colonial merchandise of any description as may come into the course of trade, more particularly by the confiscations that may take place, or by prizes made at sea:—Art. 1. The under-mentioned commodities, when imported for home consumption only, shall be subject to the duties respectively affixed thereto, exclusively of the duties already payable thereon:—Cotton wool, from the Brazils, Cayenne, Surinam, Demarara, and Georgia, per quintal 100 dollars, Levant do. 25. All other description of cotton wool, Neapolitan excepted, which remains exempt from this impost, 75 dol. raw sugar 37 dol. 12 grosh; refined sugar 50 dol.; Hyson tea 112 dol. 12 grosh; green do. 75 dol.; all other kinds of tea 18 dol. 11 grosh; coffee 50 dol.; indigo 112 dol.; cocoa 125 dol.; cochénille 270 dol.; white pepper 75; black pepper 50 dol.; common cinnamon 175 dol.; fine cinnamon 250 dol.; cloves 75 dol.; nutmegs 250 dol.; mahogany 6 dol. 6 grosh; Perambucco wood 15 dol.; Campeachy wood 10 dol.; dye woods ground 12 dol. 12 grosh.—Art. 2. This impost is to be in force from the 8th of October of the present year until further orders, and to be paid by the waggoner or boat master, upon passing the frontier, when the said goods enter this country, or in case of their being unable to defray the same, they shall give due security for the payment of the impost by the receiver of the goods.—Art. 3. As it is not intended that any commodity upon which a similar duty shall have been already levied on the continent should again be subject thereto in his Majesty's territories; in cases of this nature such goods shall be exempt from the aforesaid impost, if accompanied by regular and lawful certificates of such impost having been levied at any Imperial French Custom-house, or in any State where such impost is in force, and of the same not having been paid back

upon exportation from such State.—

Art. 4. Upon the importation of any of the above-mentioned commodities into this country, the Collector of the Customs on the frontier shall affix thereto a particular ticket, on which shall be marked the amount of the impost paid, or for the payment of which security may have been given. This ticket is to be examined upon the inspection of the goods at the other Custom-houses in succession, and upon their arrival at the place where they are to be unloaded for sale, care is to be taken to ascertain whether the duty has been correctly charged, and the same is to be levied, if not already defrayed on the frontier; and where it has been already levied in another country, the certificates and documents relative thereto are to be examined, and if found correct, are to be certified accordingly.—Art. 5. The same regulation applies to commodities in transit for an ulterior destination, in case of their being unloaded at any place in the interior, but the impost levied thereon shall be repaid by the Custom-house, or if security only has been given, the same shall be cancelled.—Art. 6. Transit commodities on the other hand, which are not to be unloaded in the country, require only to be correctly declared at the place where they pass the frontier on entering; upon which, proper security being given and the other duties paid, they shall proceed, without being subject to this impost, to the place where they pass beyond the frontier.—Art. 7. In case of the abovementioned commodities being clandestinely introduced, without payment of the impost, or being unloaded in any village by the way, and being there or elsewhere privately deposited, or in case of a particular article being introduced under another name:—upon the detection of one or other of these frauds, such commodities shall be confiscated.

PORTUGAL.—*Order of the Day, issued at Coimbra. Sept. 30, 1810.*

The Commander in Chief thanks the Generals, the other officers, and soldiers of the army, for their good conduct during the whole period in which they occupied the position of Bazaco, and in the action which took place with the enemy on the 27th. He was himself a witness of many proofs of intrepidity in the officers and troops, and the general officers have communicated to him others, with respect

to which he would not fail of giving his opinion to his Majesty, and the Government of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.—Every friend to his country, and the liberty of the world, and the whole British army, must have observed, with the greatest pleasure, the valour and firmness of the Portuguese troops during those days, who, equally with their comrades in arms in the service of his Majesty, merited and obtained the approbation of Marshal Beresford and the Commander in Chief.—Though the designs which the enemy manifested by his movements determined the Commander in Chief to withdraw the army from their position, which the enemy was incapable of forcing, he hopes, however, that the unquestionable discipline and valour of the officers and soldiers will keep him in a condition to frustrate all the designs of the enemy, and to save this country (where the British army has been so well treated) from the humiliating yoke with which the enemy threatens it.

Adj. Gen. MOZINHO.

PORTUGAL.—*Order of the Day, issued at Lisbon. 3d Oct. 1810.*

His Excellency the Marshal, commanding in Chief, has great satisfaction in publishing to the army the subjoined order of the day issued by his Excellency Marshal General Lord Viscount Wellington, and of being having occasion to make public so decisive a proof of their brilliant conduct in the battle of the 27th of last month, as that which the testimony of such a General as Lord Viscount Wellington affords.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation, issued at Lisbon, 8th Oct. 1810, by Lucas de Seabra da Silva, Gentleman of the Royal Household, Commander of the Order of Christ, &c.*

The duties of humanity requiring that all possible assistance should be afforded to those who, abandoning their homes, have sought an asylum in the capital, against the tyranny and oppression of the enemies of this kingdom; and it being incompatible with the duties of the Police to allow these unhappy fugitives to perish, exposed to the calamity of a rainy season, I order as follows:—1. No proprietors of houses that are at present unoccupied, shall refuse them to the inhabitants of the provinces that are repairing to this capital

from the causes above-mentioned.—2. The hire of such houses shall be regulated by the rate of the last rent, without the least increase; and in every case where the master or landlord has received a greater remuneration, he shall restore the same within 24 hours from the date of this notice.—3. Every proprietor who shall, to avoid this restriction, decline putting up bills to let out his property, shall lose all right of exacting any hire: such houses shall be given gratis to poor families till next Christmas, and he shall pay a fine corresponding to the rent, for the benefit of such poor families.—4. The Ministers of Justice of the several Wards shall proceed summarily in taking cognizance of the said excesses, notwithstanding any privileges to the contrary, as all other causes must give way to cases of such urgency.—5. The aforesaid Ministers of Justice shall also take care to lodge in unoccupied houses poor families, and not to leave them without a shelter, conforming themselves in this respect to the Chief Judge, Counsellor Bernardo Xavier Barbosa Sachetti, authorised for that purpose by his Royal Highness.—6. All delegations and executions that are made out for this purpose shall be done gratis, except such as are intended to enforce payment of the fines imposed on Proprietors included in the 3rd Article. And every Officer of Justice who shall be guilty of any thing to the contrary, shall be punished with three months imprisonment.—In order that this information may be in the possession of all concerned, I have ordered this Proclamation to be posted up. By his Royal Highness our Lord the Prince Regent.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation, issued at Lisbon,*
10th Oct. 1810.

Lucas de Scabra da Silva, Member of the Council of our Lord Prince Regent, one of the Gentlemen of His Royal Household, Commander of the Order of Christ, one of the Royal Judges, Chancellor of the Court and Hall of Supplication, Intendant General of Police of the Court and Kingdom, &c.—I hereby make it known, that it having been represented to his Royal Highness, that a great number of persons, who had left their habitations in order to withdraw themselves from the barbarity of the enemy, were wishing to pass to the left side of the Tagus, that they might more easily obtain the means of subsis-

tence, his Highness has ordered the said persons to be permitted to pass freely, without experiencing any interruption. They are, however, to avail themselves of this indulgence in such a manner as not to endanger the public peace; and in order that no extortion may be committed on the passengers, by excessive charges for their passage, and that no unnecessary difficulties may be placed in their way, he has ordered the following regulations—1. All the persons who are to pass to the left bank of the Tagus, must present themselves, within twenty-four hours, before the Magistrates of the different districts where they are to reside, declaring their names, occupations, designations, the number of individuals belonging to their respective families, and the day on which they left their respective districts. This declaration is to be taken gratuitously, and to be transmitted without the least delay to the Intendant General of Police.—2. No housekeeper shall refuse to those families whatever accommodations they have to let; observing in this respect what has been ordered by the proclamation, which, by order of his Royal Highness, I directed to be published on the 8th current.—3. The freight for passage shall not exceed the rates which have been hitherto fixed in the several ports south of the Tagus, by the statutes of the several places, and when the contrary takes place, the pecuniary mulcts shall be imposed on them, as directed in the said regulations or statutes.—4. And whereas the masters of passage boats, the better to secure the excessive prices which they are accustomed to expect, exact the payment before hand; they are hereby prohibited from receiving any compensation till they shall have reached the opposite ports to which they are destined, under pain of a month's imprisonment; and they shall incur the same punishment when, for the same reason, they maltreat any passenger, if not incurring thereby a more severe criminal proceeding.—5. The officers of justice, of both sides of the Tagus, and the patrols of police, who watch the quays of this capital, shall take care that the provisions of this edict be carried into effect.—6. The petty and ordinary Judges of the districts of the south of the Tagus, shall provide with their chambers the necessary regulations, that the necessities of life may not be sold at an extravagant price, under pretext of this emigration, thus depriving families of subsistence, who have found it

necessary to seek an asylum against the oppression and tyranny of the enemy; and that no person concerned may alledge ignorance, this Edict shall be made public, and stuck up in the capital, and in the several districts of the right bank of the Tagus.

HOLLAND.—*General Ordinance for the Organization of the Departments of Holland.*
—*Dated Palace of Fontainebleau, 18th Oct. 1810.*

WE, Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, &c. Considering that the Departments of Holland have a system of taxation quite different from that of the Empire; that it cannot be changed in order to introduce the French system in 1811, but by making our finances sustain a considerable loss: Considering, also, that the persons employed in the administration of the finances of Holland stand in need of their employments in order to support their families, and that they have given us good proofs of their zeal and of their probity; that it would be necessary, however, to displace the greater part of them if a new system of account were introduced before they had time to learn it; that there are in the Departments of Holland arrears for years back, as well as for the present; that the book of the public debt is not yet formed, and cannot be formed before the year 1812; having, therefore, resolved to establish progressively the system of finance of our Empire in the departments of Holland, and to content ourselves, for 1811, with introducing such mitigations, that these Departments will have to pay much less heavy taxes than they have paid in preceding years: Have ordained and do ordain, decree and do decree, the following organization for the year 1811.—[*We shall here give the principal arrangements of this ordinance.*—The first article establishes the General Government in the following words:—The General Government of the Department of Holland is organized in the following manner:—1st, A Governor-general, Grand Dignitary of the Empire; 2d, A Counsellor of State, Intendant-general of Finances and of the Interior; 3d, A Master of Requests to take charge of the Dykes, Canals, and Roads; 4th, A Master of Requests, Director of the Central Treasury; 5th, a Master of Requests, Principal Director of the Customs; 6th, A Director of the Public Debt; 7th, A

Director of Police. —There shall be a Secretary for the orders of the Governor-general, and a Keeper of the Archives. The General Government shall have its seat at Amsterdam. The Governor-general shall have the same prerogatives as those which were laid down in our Decree of the 24th of February, 1808, for the General Government of the Departments beyond the Alps. The Generals commanding the two military divisions of Holland cannot make any movement of troops but in consequence of his orders. In cases where they shall have received direct orders, on this point, from our Minister at War, they shall take care to acquaint the Governor therewith before the troops are put in motion. Nevertheless, when we think proper to form our troops of the departments of Holland into an army-corps (*corps d'armée*), he shall continue to enjoy the military honours at Amsterdam, but shall cease to interfere in that which concerns the movements of the troops. The nominations to employments under Government, and in the administration of the finances, which are not such as are appointed by us, shall be submitted to him by the Intendant-general. He shall have a general inspection with regard to every thing relating to public establishments and works, and a particular inspection of the operations relative to the formation of the book of the public debt, the liquidation of the arrears of ministerial services, and over the Syndicate of Holland created by our decree of the 23d of September last. He shall render to us, at least once a month, a direct account of the progress of the different services, and of the conduct of the different bodies of the departments and cities. The Counsellor of State, Intendant General of Finance and of the Interior, shall exercise the functions assigned to the Intendant General of Finance in the departments beyond the Alps, by our decree of the 31st July, 1806. As Intendant of Finance, he shall be charged with all that relates to the organization of the public contributions, to their apportionment, levying, and recovery. He shall take his orders from our Minister of Finance. As Intendant of the Interior, he shall be charged with what relates to the mode of accounting, and the budgets of cities; he shall exercise the immediate superintendence of prisons, depots of mendicity, charitable and other public establishments, of every kind. The Master of Requests,

charged with the care of the canals and dykes, shall exercise all the functions assigned to the Director of the Waterstraedt. He shall correspond with our Minister of the Interior, through the medium of our Director General of the Bridges and Causeways. He shall form part of our Corps of Bridges and Causeways. He shall reside at Amsterdam, and shall make frequent tours in the departments. When he happens to be at Paris, he shall take his seat in the Council of Bridges and Causeways. The Master of Requests, Director of the Central Chest, shall correspond with our Minister of the Treasury, and shall do nothing but by his orders. The Director of the Public Debt shall exercise the same functions as the old Director of the Public Debt in Holland. He shall correspond with our Minister of Finance, and shall do nothing but by his orders. The Director of Police shall exercise the same functions as those assigned to the Director of Police in the departments beyond the Alps, &c. by our Decree of the 24th February, 1808. The Secretary of Orders shall exercise the functions prescribed in the 12th and 15th articles of our decree of the 24th February, 1809, relative to the organization of the departments beyond the Alps. The Keeper of the Archives shall exercise the functions prescribed in our decree of the 29th May, 1805.—By the 2d title, the Palace of Amsterdam is declared an Imperial Palace.—By the 3d title, the Dutch language may be employed conjointly with the French, in the tribunals, in the acts of administration, in those of notaries, and in private deeds.—By the 4th title, the territory of Holland is divided into seven departments, namely, the department of the Zuyderzee, of the mouths of the Meuse, of the Upper Issel, of the mouths of the Issel, of Friseland, of the Western Ems, and of the Eastern Ems.—The 5th title relates to the administrative organization.—The 5th chapter of this title, intitled Of Commerce, is as follows: There shall be established Chambers of Commerce at Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Embden, and in other cities where that establishment shall be demanded, and authorised by us on the report of our Minister of the Interior. Eight Deputies shall be summoned to the Council of Commerce instituted by our decree of the 27th June, 1810. The masters of the ports of com-

merce who exercise the functions pointed out in our decrees, under the title of Captains of the Port, shall be nominated upon the report of our Minister of Marine, and shall be under his orders.—The 6th title regulates the judicial organization.—The 6th chapter of the same title relates to the tribunals of commerce.—There shall be a tribunal of commerce in each of the cities of Amsterdam, Utrecht, Haarlem, the Hague, Rotterdam, Dort, Anheim, Zwooll, Leeuwarden, Groningen, and Embden. These tribunals shall be composed as follows:—That of Amsterdam, of a President, eight Judges, and sixteen Assessors; that of Rotterdam, of a President, six Judges, and four Assessors. In those districts where there shall be two or more tribunals of commerce, the boundaries of their jurisdiction shall be specially pointed out by us. The salaries of the Registrars of the said tribunals of commerce shall be fixed according to the bases and in the proportions established by the laws and statutes of the Empire, with the augmentation of an additional fifth.—By title vii. chap. 1. the debt of Holland is preserved in its integrity; but only a third of the interest shall be paid as is ordained in the 8th article of the decree of the 9th July, 1810. A Commission, composed of the Director of the Debt and of three Administrators, shall be charged with the formation of the *Great Book*. Its labours shall be directed so as to terminate before the 1st January, 1813.—The arrears of the public debt up to June 30, 1809, shall be charged on the funds provided in the budget of 1810. The interest from the 1st of January, 1809, to the 22d September, 1810, shall be paid conformably to what is prescribed in the decree of the 23d September last. The interest, counting from the 22d September, 1810, shall be paid on the 22d March, 1811; and so in future half yearly, conformably to the mode practised with regard to the public debt of France. His Majesty reserves to himself, when the book of the debt of Holland shall be formed, the ordaining in what manner the book of the debt of Holland shall be blended with the great book of the public debt of France.—The master of Requests, Director of the central chest at Amsterdam, shall make payment of the interest of the debt for the years 1811 and 1812.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 27.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1810. [Price 1s.

"The mere *personal* attachment to the Sovereign, founded upon his practising those virtues, which are met with in every rank of life, must necessarily be confined to the breast of a few, and, comparatively speaking, a very few indeed, of his subjects. In truth, such attachment makes not of the nature of *loyalty*. Loyalty is a firm and immoveable adherence to the King *as King*, not as a man: it is shewn in a reverence for his *title and office*; in a prompt and cheerful *obedience to his commands*; in a devotion of life, if called for, in his service: and it arises, amongst the mass of his subjects, from an habitual, an hereditary persuasion, that the King is the repository of all that is necessary to the preservation of the *national character*, in which the heart of every man, however humble his condition, tells him that he has a share."—POLITICAL REGISTER. Vol. VI. Page 616, Oct. 27, 1804.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

KING'S ILLNESS.—From *Official Reports* of the state of the King, it would appear, that there has been, since the publication of my last Number, some change for the better; and, if one could rely upon what is said in the Morning Post and the Courier, there would be reason to believe, that the amendment proceeds at a rate that is likely to lead to a restoration of the King to that state in which he was previous to this attack.—— This being the case, I shall now give my opinion upon matters, connected with the subject, with more freedom than I should have done, had there been no hopes of his Majesty's recovery. There is, I must confess, no good reason for this. The risk of having, by foolish or malicious men, mean motives imputed to me, ought not, for one moment, to have withheld my pen from a subject of such vital importance to the country; and, at any rate, it shall restrain me no longer.——Reader, I beg you to look at the *Motto*. It makes part of a letter addressed by me to Mr. PITT, upon the causes of National Decline.——Such being my opinion of the nature of *real* loyalty, it is impossible for me to behold, without regret, and even without some degree of anger, the conduct of most of our diurnal writers, whose actions, whatever their motives may be, have, in my opinion, a tendency, not only to prepossess the ignorant against the rightful Successor to the Royal authority, but to subvert the very foundations of the throne itself.——From the pens of those gentlemen we hear of nothing but *woe*. All, with them, is *sorrow*. To hear them, one would almost imagine, that, not only our political and civil rights, but that the national safety, and even our individual existence, depended upon the King's restoration to

health; than which notion, the reader will not, I think, want much to convince him, nothing can possibly be more unjust in itself, or of a more mischievous tendency.——There are, as is observed in my motto, but very few indeed of the King's subjects, who can *possibly* feel any *personal* attachment to him. Not one in a thousand of them have ever *seen* him even at a distance; and not one in a hundred thousand of them ever heard the sound of his voice. The attachment to him is of the sort described in my motto; an attachment to him *as King*; it *must* be so; it is impossible that, amongst the mass of his subjects, it can be of any other sort.——His illness, his grievous calamity, must affect every person, who has any feeling about him. There is that in our nature, which bids us feel for one another's bodily sufferings; and, there is, in the peculiar malady of the King, that which cannot fail, and never does fail, to produce a more than ordinary degree of compassion in every serious mind. It is the very greatest affliction that can befall human nature. He who can think of it without feeling sorrow is less than man. Nature demands for it a sigh from every bosom; and, in the present case, the degree of sorrow is greatly heightened by the circumstance of the immediate cause of the malady having been, as it has been officially stated to us, agitation between hope and fear for the fate of a child, whose sufferings had been so great and of such long duration. In short, there is no parent, there is no man, upon earth, worthy of the name of parent or of man, who hears of the King's malady, but must feel sorrow for his affliction.——But, here I bound my sorrow. Both reason and real loyalty: a sense of what is due to my sovereign, and to myself as an Englishman, forbids me to utter any sentiment of *prospective* sorrow;

forbids me, in the most peremptory manner, to utter any expression, which shall convey an idea of the malady, or even the death of the King, proceeding from *natural* causes, being a *political evil*; for, if I do this, what is it short of insinuating that the *accession of the King's successor would be a political evil*?—Yet what do we hear from most of our diurnal writers? They speak of the calamity as being not so much a cause of sorrow on the King's own personal account, as on account of *his people*; they are continually reminding us of the loss which the *nation* would sustain in the want of his superintendence of its affairs; they represent the people as *dreading the consequences* of his incapacity to resume his functions as sovereign; while they seem most studiously to avoid suffering any thing to escape them, that shall direct the public attention towards his natural and lawful successor. And this, they appear to regard as a proof of *loyalty*.—

MR. PERRY was, last spring, prosecuted by the ATTORNEY GENERAL, for having published the following paragraph in the MORNING CHRONICLE.—"What a crowd of blessings rush upon one's mind that might be bestowed upon the country in the event of a *total change of system*! Of all the Monarchs, indeed, since the Revolution, the successor of George the Third will have the *finest opportunity of being nobly popular*."—This was alleged to be a

malicious and seditious libel; and, it was contended, that the meaning of it was, that *the death of the King was an event for which the people ought to wish*. Mr. PERRY, to the great satisfaction of every good man, was acquitted; but, he was acquitted upon the ground of his words *not having this meaning* (See the Judge's Charge, Register, Vol. XVII, page 474;) he was acquitted upon the ground of his not having said what fairly meant, that the death of the King; that, the natural cessation of the King's reign and power, was an *event for which the people ought to wish*, an event from which *they might expect good*.—Now, then, if it was criminal to express a sentiment like this, and if it was so very criminal as to call for the most rigid mode of prosecution in cases of libel; what are we to think of those, who are, every day of their lives, holding language, the natural tendency of which is, to make the people believe, that the cessation of the royal functions in the present Majesty would be *productive of evil to his people*? If Mr. PERRY's words, supposing them to have had the meaning

given to them, amounted to a *malicious and seditious libel*, what does language like this amount to? If it was so highly criminal to express a *wish for the present King's death*; what is it to say that which may be fairly considered as expressing a *wish that his Successor may not reign*? And this wish is clearly deducible from every one of those numerous passages, in which the malady of the King has been spoken of as a *national calamity*.—The truth is, that, from, perhaps, no worse a motive than that of wishing to be thought more *loyal* than others, the writers, to whom I have alluded, are striking at the very vitals of the kingly office, which always, agreeably to our constitution of government, ought to be considered as suffering no obstruction, diminution, or change; which can never want an occupier, and which has nothing *personal* in its qualities. If the people were, from the writings of these persons, or, from insinuations of any sort, made to believe, that their individual happiness, or that the safety of the country against a foreign enemy, depended upon the health or life of the present, or any other, king, must not the reasonings, which would be the natural consequence of such belief, tend directly to the destruction of the kingly government altogether? Is it possible, that, with such a belief in their minds, they could cheerfully submit to all the expences, which are necessary to the support of the dignity and splendour of a king, and which, from the contrary belief, they never do and never have grudged, even amidst all the burdens they have had to endure? They cheerfully bear these expences, not from *personal* attachment, but from a persuasion that the kingly office is necessary to the maintenance of the power and honour of their country, and of their own liberties and properties and happiness; but, if they once become persuaded, that all these are dependent upon *personal* qualities and considerations, away goes, in an instant, that notion, from which they now cheerfully contribute towards the support of the throne.——For these reasons, which I have, I repeat it, been too tardy in stating, I must decidedly condemn all that language, in our public prints, which is destitute of the expression of *hope*, and which seems calculated to make the nation *despair*, in case the King should not be able to resume the functions of his high office. Feelings of *deep sorrow for the King's situation* are not only proper; but nature herself expects them in

every breast, to which she has not denied the qualities common to human beings; though, perhaps, in the evincing of these feelings, she would gladly dispense with a *multitude of words*. But, accompanying these feelings, and a not-fulsome expression of them, we ought to hear something about *reliance* in the King's Successor, who to his undoubted right of succession, adds the prime of life, the vigour of his faculties, together with ample experience. —As to the question of a *regency*, there will, I hope and trust, no *disputes* arise. The Parliament and the nation have quite cares and dangers enough to attend to, without the new dangers, which such disputes could not fail to create. If it should be found *unnecessary*; if this fact should be *fully proved*; there, for the present, at least, rests the matter. But, if it should be thought *necessary*, no attempt will, I hope, be made to *shackle* the Prince in the exercise of the royal functions. He is now at an age when the mind has attained its full maturity; he is quite qualified for the performance of the whole of his important duties; and, for him to render us effectual service, he must be free to use the kingly prerogatives, with no other checks than those imposed by the laws and the constitution. —The dangers, by which the country is beset, are too manifest to be any longer disguised, and too great not to inspire even the most thoughtless with some degree of apprehension. Whether we look at our situation at home or abroad; in whatever way we view it, we discover abundant reasons for being anxious, that our affairs should be in the hands of able, experienced, upright, and liberal-minded men. Extensive information, ability in the planning and conducting of measures, frankness and sincerity in every word and action, perfect honesty towards the people, a cordial and constitutional attachment to the throne, and, above all, a *spirit of conciliation*; these may save us, but without these we cannot be saved; and to ensure such a co-operation seems to me incompatible with a shackled regency, a broken or imperfect authority, which, I think, no one can doubt, must be productive of new divisions, of discontents, of heart-burnings, and, of course, both of weakness and oppression, from the destructive effects of which, surrounded as we are by almost every species of danger, nothing short of a miracle could save us, even for a year. The existence of such a state of

things would be a new encouragement to the enemy; it would enhance all his demands; it would give new life to his attempts against us; it would plunge us into despair, and doom us to inevitable ruin. —Having thus fully expressed my opinion upon these higher matters, I shall now proceed to notice, what is stated, in the public prints, to have passed at Windsor, since the publication of my last Number; and also to notice certain passages in the public prints relating thereunto. These things all belong to the *history* of the country. They appear of little comparative importance at the present moment; but, they must be of great importance hereafter; and even at the present time, it is of advantage for us to have, under our eye, a fair view of all that is passing. —The reader has seen, that, at first, there were *three* medical men, attending the King. To those three, another, Dr. REYNOLDS, was added, some days ago; and, now, it appears, that a *fifth* was added, who has brought *two assistants* with him. Of the introduction of this last person, the Ministerial prints of to-day, gives the following account. —“ Little or no alteration in the state of his Majesty's health “ has taken place since our last Reports. “ *Dr. Willis*, a Gentleman of acknowledged great skill, whose father so successfully attended the King in his former severe illness, has been added to the “ number of attending Physicians on the “ present occasion. He was sent for express on Wednesday morning, and in a few hours arrived at Windsor from London. He immediately consulted with the other Doctors, and, after seeing the King, set out in a chaise and four, for London, and returned to Windsor in the evening. About *twelve o'clock at night*, “ TWO GENTLEMEN arrived at Windsor in a post-chaise and four from London. Their arrival had for some time “ previously been expected with great “ anxiety by Dr. Willis, and he immediately conducted them to the Castle.”

—These circumstances were not, after the declarations of the Ministers themselves, wanted to produce a general conviction, that the King was afflicted with a return of his former most melancholy disorder; but, if any thing had been wanting to produce this conviction, the above intelligence would have been more than sufficient for the purpose. —Having, by some means, got an early knowledge of the calling in of Dr. Willis and his assist-

The King was then 48 years of age, he is now above 70; he had then other faculties in their full vigour, which have now failed him; the nation was then at peace with all the world, and its internal affairs and resources were in a state of unexampled prosperity. What were the opinions of His Royal Highness the PRINCE OF WALES, of the discretionary power that the then Parliament assumed, and of the restrictions proposed to be imposed on his exercise of the Royal Authority, will be best seen in his own truly dignified Answer to the propositions, which Answer will be found at the end of this Summary, copied from the Morning Chronicle of the 8th instant, to which print the public thanks are due for the republication at this time. We have nothing to do but to read this Answer to be convinced of the justice and the wisdom, by which it was dictated. The spirit of the constitution breathes through every sentence of it. It is, perhaps, the best eulogium that ever was uttered on the kingly part of our government. We have, too, only to read this paper to be convinced, that the principles it contains ought now to be acted upon in their full extent; and that to attempt to impose any shackles or limitations upon His Royal Highness, would not only be contrary to the principles of our government and laws, but, taking into view the critical situation of the country, would be dangerous in the extreme, as well to the throne itself as to the liberty and safety of the nation.—It is not yet certain, that a Regency will be, at this time, thought necessary; but, I do not like to hear men referring to the "*precedent*," as they call it, of 1788; because, then, the Royal Authority was not, in fact, proposed to be lodged in the hands of the Heir to the Throne. He was to have a sort of partners, or associates, in power, which never, in my opinion, ought to have been thought of, and which, I am persuaded, could not have failed to produce intrigues, cabals, divisions, discordance, and discontent without end. Cordial co-operation would have been impossible: it would have been a constant struggle of power against power; and, between the two, the people would have shared the fate of the Frogs in the contest of the Bulls. If such would have been the consequence then, what would be the consequence of such an arrangement now? If, to all our other dangers and calamities, this, greater than all the rest, were to be added, what chance

would remain for our escape from that ruin, which has been so long hanging over our heads?—The venal prints have been in the habit of asserting, that there is a part of the people of this country, who "wish for the destruction of the government and the establishments of England." This is a very fine fact to hold forth to the world. It is a fine fact to hold forth to the people themselves. It is likely to conciliate those, who have, as they think, cause for complaint. It is, indeed, a base calumny, proceeding from the worst of motives, namely, that of wishing to thrive by means of divisions and mutual distrust and hatred amongst the people. But, if the assertion were true; if there were men, whose wish was to see the destruction of the government and the establishments of the country, certain I am, that the desire, the longing of their hearts must be, to see a Regent invested with a shackled authority, and wielding a broken sceptre.

IRISH CATHOLICS.—On the 2nd instant a Meeting of the Catholics of Ireland was held in Dublin upon the subject of their petition to Parliament, the objects of which petition are well known to my readers. A Resolution was, at this Meeting, moved by Mr. O'GORMAN, "That the General Committee be requested to prepare Petitions to Parliament, on our behalf, for the purpose of being presented early in the next session, and that they be continued in the management of the Catholic Affairs."—This motion, upon the ground of its being an insult to the Catholics, was opposed by several gentlemen; but, after a speech of great eloquence, from Mr. FINNERTY, who it appears, was called upon to give his opinion upon the feelings of the people of England upon this point, and who thereupon entered into a discussion of the whole of the subject; after this speech, by which the opponents of the resolution acknowledged themselves convinced, the opposition was withdrawn, and the motion passed unanimously.—This petition will now come, then; and, I hope, that it will be attended with success; for, though I by no means think, that what was contemplated by the late ministry, nor even what will be asked for in this petition, would have the effect of completely giving content to Ireland; I at the same time, should approve of doing this, because it would be doing something in the way of conciliation. Mea-

tures of a different complexion have been tried for many years. If such measures could have effected the purpose of tranquillizing Ireland, Ireland would have been tranquillized long ago.—It is no new source of discontent that now agitates Ireland; it is not any temporary obstruction to commerce, nor any cause whatever of a *temporary* nature; the cause is of long-standing; its roots lie deep, and its branches are widely extended. Were there any proof of this wanted, were not the fact universally acknowledged, what need we of any proof more complete than that afforded in the constant and multitudinous *emigration* from Ireland to the American States? This is a sign, which has no deception in it. It is a sign which carries conviction along with it. No one voluntarily leaves the spot where he is happy, or even comfortable; nay, where he does not feel that he is not so well off as he might be elsewhere, and as he ought to be where he is. And, when we see the people of Ireland crowding to every departing ship; leaving their native land and encountering all the inconveniences and dangers of a thousand leagues at sea; and, for the want of pecuniary means, selling their freedom for years, voluntarily becoming bondmen and bondwomen, in payment of their ship-room and their hard fare during the voyage: when we see this, how can we doubt, that some *great alteration* is necessary in Ireland? It was religious intolerance, that first peopled the American States; and, is it not to the shame of Europe, that their population is still augmented from the same cause?—But, the lot of Ireland is peculiarly hard. There have been, for years past, grants of money made, by Parliament, for the making of roads, canals, and bridges in the Highlands of Scotland, and the avowed object, or, at least, one of the avowed objects, stated in the reports upon which the grants are made, is, that these works, by giving employment to the people of Scotland, will *prevent them from emigrating to America*. And, while this is going on, year after year, why is not something done to *prevent the emigration of the Irish*, who, be it observed, do not want *grants of money*? Why, within these 35 years, there has, I verily believe, in America, been brought into tillage, by Irish bones and sinews, land equal in extent to the whole of the cultivated land of all Scotland, highlands and low-lands together. It was by Irish valour and hardihood, chiefly, that

the American Independence was achieved. I should suppose, that four fifths of all the increase that America now receives to her population from Europe goes from Ireland; and, amongst the emigrants, are not a few of those *men of talents*, of whose exertions there we are now feeling the *annoying* effects: The fact is, and it is a fact which ought to be known, that it is not so much a *French* party in America, as it is an *Irish* party, that is our enemy there. This party espouses the cause of France against that of England; and having in their hands no small part of the *press*, of which they are now at liberty to make free use, they are powerful beyond what even the Americans themselves would be willing to allow; but of which power Mr. Jackson, if he be an attentive and accurate observer, cannot be ignorant.—Now, why is all this? Why should this be? Why should all this inestimable value in population and in talent be alienated from us? The Irish people are brave, generous, hospitable, laborious, and full of genius. They are kind and frank in the extreme, and have been found faithful to all those who have confided in them. There is not a country in Europe unmoistened by their blood; and to none of their employers have they ever proved traitors. What, then, should shut them out from our confidence? What should prevent their having commands in our army and navy, and in being, in short, admitted to every office and every honour to which any of us can be admitted? What, at any rate, is there to prevent them from being admitted to the same footing as *foreign* officers; and especially as foreign officers of the *same religion* with themselves?—It is, I believe, very well known to every man, who will hear what I am now saying, that, if Spain and Portugal should fall under the domination of France, Ireland will be much more exposed to an attack, from that quarter, than England. Is it not, then, of the greatest importance to have Ireland sound at heart; to have the people of Ireland united for the repelling of such an attack? Is it not of the greatest importance, that we should be able to say, that Ireland is *safe*?—It has been declared in the House of Commons, that there is a *French* party in Ireland. Ought not every thing possible to be done to get rid of that party? It has been very lately asserted, in the ministerial news-paper, the Morning Post, that *an army is necessary* to keep down this party in Ireland. Ought not, then,

every possible means to be made use of to place things in such a state, as that *this army may be dispensed with*? This assertion was made in the Morning Post of the 13th of August last, in a most elaborate essay upon the subject of our military means and the employment of those means. But, why should Ireland *stand in need of an army*? Why should an army be necessary to counteract the French factions and conspiracies in that country? There is nothing in the geographical situation of Ireland that can attach her to France. There is nothing in the language, the trade, the taste, the manners, or in any thing else, that *naturally* inclines the people of Ireland to love France. In short, France can give them nothing, which we cannot give them at an infinitely cheaper rate; and, indeed, without any cost at all. But, if what they want were to cost us *millions*, would it not be better to expend our money in this way than to expend it upon *an army* for the purpose of keeping down the French party in Ireland?—We are now about to enter upon a new session of parliament, and why should not *conciliation* be immediately tried? There would be no necessity to do all at once; proper time might, and ought to be, taken; no good could be done by haste; and, if the people of Ireland saw reason to *hope*, if the evidence of facts encouraged them to hope, they would be patient. But, during this very session *something* will, I hope, be done for them. They are in a state of irritation, and it is perfectly useless to call their leaders by the names of *Jacobin* and *demagogue*; for, even if this were true, which it is not, the fact would only be another, and a very strong reason, for doing something to gain their good will and confidence, and, thereby, take them out of such dangerous hands. The enemies of England, in Ireland, derive their strength, not from the love of the Irish for them. Their strength is founded wholly in the discontents of the people; and, therefore, if you wish to have no enemies in Ireland, your way, and your *only* way, is to remove effectually the ground of those discontents; and this, I confidently hope and expect, will now be done.—Upon this occasion I cannot help noticing the following paragraph, which, I believe, has appeared in all the London news-papers:—"The Roman Catholic inhabitants of the City and Liberties of Londonderry having found it expedient to *enlarge their chapel*, the Lord

BISHOP OF DERRY, with that *magnificence* and *liberality* which have *always* characterised his Lordship, has been pleased to contribute the sum of 50*l.* to enable them to complete this *necessary* but expensive undertaking."—Now, reader, you will observe, that this is a Protestant Bishop, who has a very rich See in Ireland; and here, *if this be true* (for which I do not pretend to vouch) we see, *FIRST*, that the Roman Catholic religion is not upon the *decline*, in this part of Ireland, at any rate; and, *SECOND*, that one of the Church of England Bishops does not think it inconsistent with his office to aid in the providing of conveniences for the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion.—Upon what ground, then, I should be glad to know, are the Irish Catholics, or any Catholics, excluded from commands in the army and navy? Upon what ground are they debarred from any office or post or honour under the crown? And, I, for my part, would go still further, and ask, upon what ground it is, that their Clergy should not be provided for in the same way, be that way what it may, as the Protestant Clergy, in that country, where the Catholics form three fourths, if not four fifths of the people?—I approve of this act of the Bishop of Derry; but, from that approbation I cannot exclude the idea of the act containing a proof of the Bishop's conviction, that there is *no harm*, of any sort, in the Roman Catholic religion; because, unless this be his conviction, he has been giving his aid, and that, too, in a most marked manner, to that which he regards as having harm in it. And, if there be no harm, of any sort, in the Roman Catholic religion, why, again I ask, are the Roman Catholics, or their Clergy, to be excluded from any thing, which we or our Clergy enjoy?—I leave these questions to be answered by Dr. Duigenan, or any of the Addressers of 1797, who, at this time, may find leisure and spirits, sufficient for the performance of the task.

SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS.—The *head*, or *title*, under which I am now writing, may seem to forbid the introduction of the *private* affairs of any one; but, there are cases, which call for an exception to this rule; and, I am satisfied, the reader will allow, that this is one of them.—It is a fact generally known, that SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS has lately made one of the numerous Bankrupts whose names have ap-

peared in the Gazette. This circumstance has, it seems, led to some publication against him, in a Sunday news-paper, which he does not name. In consequence of this publication he has inserted a Letter in the Morning Post news-paper, from which I copy it, as follows:—"Mr. Editor.—With reference to a paragraph regarding me in a Sunday Paper, I feel it my duty to state, that I shall afford the Author an opportunity of justifying his assertions by an immediate appeal to the laws of my country.—In the mean time, I shall, perhaps, be warranted in stating, that the paragraph alluded to is false in point of fact; and although it is very painful to me to be thus forced to play the egotist, I venture to assert, without the hazard of refutation, that universally, with regard to me, the words "*legitimate creditor*," and "*zealous friend*," are synonymous; and that, although a Commission was an alternative rendered necessary and desirable by a combination of untoward circumstances, susceptible of satisfactory and easy explanation; yet my estate, is equal to the payment of *forty-five shillings in the pound*, or, in other words, I cannot well fail to enjoy a net surplus of seventy or eighty thousand pounds, after every claim on my estate has been satisfied."—R. PHILLIPS.—6, Bridge-street, Nov. 5."—Respecting the publication, of which Mr. PHILLIPS complains, I shall say nothing, as I have not seen it; but, with regard to his pecuniary circumstances, from what I have (not from himself) heard, and heard with sincere pleasure, I believe what he says to be perfectly true, provided that his affairs are managed in the best manner. The truth is, that it is *over-estimated*, to which booksellers, more, perhaps, than any other description of tradesmen, are exposed, which has produced Mr. Phillips's present embarrassments; and he, who is, and always has been, more enterprising than any other man, even of his own trade, was exposed to these consequences in a peculiar degree. But, for my own part, I have not the smallest doubt of his riding out the storm, and of coming at last into port as successful as the best of his rivals.—He is a man of everlasting industry; of undaunted spirit; and of talents superior to those of many persons who scruple not to set up great pretensions. It is not a commission of bankruptcy that can *subdue* a man like this. It may put him back for a while; it may

rob him of a year of his life; it may expose him to the slights of summer friends; but, were it to leave him without a shirt to his back, it would not subdue him; he would still rise again, and, perhaps, bettered by his experience.—I blamed him for his having, or acting as if he had, a hand in the prosecution for libel against the author of a critique on Sir John Carr's book; and, I also blamed his vanity in accepting of a Knighthood. But, I did not then forget, and I never can forget, nor ought the public to forget, and no real lover of English liberty ever will forget, his indefatigable exertions, while Sheriff of London, in the cause of humanity and of justice; and it would be peculiarly unjust and cruel, if he, who held out a helping hand to so many unfortunate and oppressed Debtors, and who laboured so zealously and successfully in their cause, should himself, under the present circumstances, become the object, not only of slight, but of unmerited reproach.—His "*LETTER TO THE LIVERY OF LONDON, ON THE EXECUTION OF THE OFFICE OF SHERIFF*," is a work which alone including his merits in the acts of which it treats, entitles him to the gratitude of the whole kingdom, and it will, perhaps, lead to the adoption of measures, which may be regarded as amongst the most beneficial of this age. SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY, surpassed by few men either in integrity, judgment or benevolence, referred to this work, in his speech of 9th of March last, and pointed it out as worthy the attention of the House of Commons. This work, in which the writer's exertions respecting *Special Juries* are recorded, will, in all likelihood, never be forgiven by those who have an abhorrence of the very name of English freedom; but, by all those who still retain the principles, for which so many of their ancestors wrote and fought, this work will be read with approbation and delight, and, with such persons it will not fail to insure gratitude towards its author.—SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS (I wish with all my soul I could rub off this *Sir*) has depended upon *himself* for his gains. He has depended upon his *own exertions*, upon his *labour*, of which he, perhaps, has performed as much as any man of his day. He has shared in the profits of no monopoly; he has not drawn upon the public treasure; his wealth and his consequence arose solely out of his own merits, and the faculties of his own mind. Surely,

then, his is a *case*, which calls for the regret of every just man. He does not fly to the bottle or to a pistol or a knife or a cord for relief from his embarrassments; but meets them like a man, resolved to overcome them, and, in spite of all obstacles, to ensure competence and respect for a numerous family; and which has excited in me great admiration, he proves, by the manner, in which he continues to conduct his widely-circulated and unrivalled publication of the kind, *THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE*, that all the accumulated and complicated troubles of his situation have not been able to enfeeble or to check the powers of his mind, —I have not seen Sir Richard Phillips for years past; and it has not fallen in my way to have any communication with him. But, I did know him, and all that I ever knew of him was good. Though our degree of intimacy was not great, and no opportunity was ever offered him of proving his friendship to me; I have known enough of his conduct towards others to be able to say, that he was a most "*zealous friend*." He has been a liberal rewarder of literary talent; he has done more than any man that I know of in the fostering of such talent; and, which is but too peculiar to himself, he has always treated literary men, however low their degree, with kindness and with respect. —To endeavour to pull down such a man; to degrade and vilify and put in the very dirt such a man, is natural enough in all those who hate public liberty, and who hate talent and the press for liberty's sake; but, to counteract such endeavours is certainly not less natural, and is, indeed, a bounden duty, in all those, who wish to see talent, truth, and liberty triumph over stupidity, falsehood, and oppression.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
November 9, 1810.*

THE PRINCE OF WALES'S ANSWER

To the Proposition of a Limited Regency, as submitted to him by Mr. Pitt on the 30th December, 1788.

It will be recollected that Mr. Pitt proposed, by the authority of Parliament, to impose restraints and limitations to the power of the Regent; and he submitted a sketch of the measure to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, for his consideration. The conditions were,

1. That the care of his Majesty's royal person, the management of the household, and the direction and appointment of the officers therein, should be in the Queen, with a council.

2. That the Regent should not grant the real or personal property of the King—or any office in reversion, or any pension or place whatever, except for his Majesty's pleasure.

3. That he should not grant peerages.

And afterwards it was proposed to put the King's privy purse, of 60,000*l.* a year, into the Queen's hands.—The dignified answer of the Prince of Wales to this proposition, will shew the people of England the just and constitutional knowledge of the Regal functions which the Prince possessed at that early period of his life, and which, with the further experience that he has had, must give them confidence in the upright administration of the Kingly office in his hands.

"The Prince of Wales learns from Mr. Pitt, that the proceedings in Parliament are now in a train which enables Mr. Pitt, according to the intimation in his former letter, to communicate to the Prince, the outlines of the plan which his Majesty's confidential servants conceive proper to be proposed in the present circumstances.—Concerning the steps already taken by Mr. Pitt, the Prince is silent—nothing done by the two Houses of Parliament can be a proper subject of his animadversion; but when previously to any discussion in Parliament, the outlines of a scheme of government are sent for his consideration, in which it is proposed that he shall be personally and principally concerned, and by which the Royal Authority, and the public welfare, may be deeply affected, the Prince would be unjustifiable were he to withhold an explicit declaration of his sentiments. This silence might be construed into a previous approbation of a plan, the accomplishment of which every motive of duty to his Father and Sovereign as well as of regard for the public interest, obliges him to consider as injurious to both. In the state of deep distress, in which the Prince, and the whole Royal Family were involved, by the heavy calamity which has fallen upon the King, and at a moment when Government, deprived of its chief energy and support, seemed peculiarly to need the cordial and united aid of all descriptions of good subjects, it was not expected by the Prince, that a plan should be offered to his consi-

deration, by which Government was to be rendered difficult, if not impracticable, in the hands of any person, intended to represent the King's Authority ;—much less the hands of his eldest son, the Heir Apparent of his kingdoms, and the person most bound to the maintenance of his Majesty's just prerogatives and authority, as well as most interested in the happiness, the prosperity, and the glory of the people!—The Prince forbears to remark on the several parts of the sketch of the plan laid before him ; he apprehends, it must have been formed with sufficient deliberation to preclude the probability of any argument of his producing an alteration of sentiments in the projectors of it. But he trusts with confidence to the wisdom and justice of Parliament, when the whole of the subject, and the circumstances connected with it, shall come under their deliberation.—He observes, therefore, only generally, on the heads communicated by Mr. Pitt, and it is with deep regret the Prince makes the observation, that he sees, in the contents of that paper, a project for producing weakness, disorder, and insecurity in every branch of the administration of affairs. A project for dividing the Royal Family from each other ; for separating the Court from the State, and thereby disjoining Government from its natural and accustomed support. A scheme disconnecting the authority to command service from the power of animating it by reward ; and for allotting to the Prince all the insidious duties of Government, without the means of softening them to the Public, by any one act of grace, favour or benignity.—The Prince's feelings on contemplating this plan, are also rendered still more painful to him, by observing that it is not founded on any general principle, but is calculated to infuse jealousies and distrust (wholly groundless he trusts) in that quarter, whose confidence it will ever be the first pride of his life to merit and obtain. With regard to the motive and object of the Limitations and Restrictions proposed, the Prince can have but little to observe. No light or information is afforded him by his Majesty's Ministers on these points. They have informed him what the powers are, which they mean to refuse him, not *why* they are *with-held*.—The Prince however holding, as he does, that it is an undoubted and fundamental principle of the Constitution, that the powers and prerogatives of the Crown are vested there, as a trust for the benefit of the peo-

ple, and that they are sacred only as they are necessary to the preservation of that power and balance of the Constitution, which experience has proved to be the true security of the liberty of the subject, must be allowed to observe, that the plea of public utility ought to be strong, manifest, and urgent, which calls for the extinction or suspension of any one of those essential rights in the Supreme Power of its Representative ; or which can justify the Prince in consenting, that in his person, an experiment shall be made to ascertain with how small a portion of the kingly power, the executive government of this country may be carried on.—The Prince has only to add, that if security for his Majesty's repossessing his rightful government, whenever it shall please Providence, in bounty to this country, to remove the calamity with which he is afflicted, be any part of the object of this plan ; the Prince has only to be convinced, that any measure is necessary, or even conducive to that end, to be the first to urge it as the preliminary and permanent consideration of any settlement in which he could consent to share.—If attention to what is presumed must be his Majesty's feelings and wishes on the happy day of his recovery be the object, the Prince expresses his firm conviction, that no event would be more repugnant to the feelings of his Royal Father, than the knowledge that the government of his Son and Representative had exhibited the sovereign power of the realm in a state of degradation, of curtailed authority, and diminished energy ; a state hurtful in practice to the prosperity and good government of his people, and injurious in its precedent to the society of the Monarch and rights of his family.—Upon that part of the plan which regards the King's real and personal property, the Prince feels himself compelled to remark, that it was not necessary for Mr. Pitt, nor yet proper, to suggest to the Prince the restraint he proposed against the Prince's granting away the King's real or personal property.—The Prince does not conceive, that, during the King's life, he is by law, entitled to make any such grant ; and he is sure that he has never shown the smallest inclination to possess any such power. But it remains with Mr. Pitt to consider the eventual interests of the Royal Family, and to provide a proper and natural security against the mismanagement of them in others.—The Prince has discharged an

indispensable duty in thus giving his free opinion on the plan submitted to his consideration.—This conviction of the evils which may arise to the King's interests, to the peace and happiness of the Royal Family, and to the safety and welfare of the nation, from the Government of the country remaining longer in its present maimed and debilitated state, outweighs, in the Prince's mind, every other consideration, and will determine him to undertake the painful trust imposed upon him by the present melancholy necessity, (which, of all the King's subjects, he deplores the most) in full confidence, that the affection and loyalty to the King, the experienced attachment to the House of Brunswick, and the generosity which has always distinguished this nation, will carry him through the many difficulties, inseparable from this most critical situation, with comfort to himself, with honour to the King, and with advantage to the public.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

HOLLAND.—*General Ordinance for the Organization of the Departments of Holland.*
—(Concluded from p. 864.)

For this purpose a sum of 25 millions, destined for the payment of the interest of the public debt of Holland, shall be set apart from the produce of the taxes in Holland, and in preference to every other service.—Civil and ecclesiastical pensions shall be paid in the same manner as those of the Empire. They shall be preferably liquidated by the Commission for the public Debt, which shall send statements of the same to the Intendant-General of Finance, in order to be transmitted to the Minister of Finance, and submitted to the approbation of his Majesty, before the 1st of Jan. 1811.—The taxes at present established in the Dutch territory shall continue to be raised for the whole year 1810, together with the arrears of former years, conformably to the laws which regulate the same.—In consequence, the liquidation of the land-tax since the year 1806 shall be successively proceeded in till the payments are entirely finished. The produce of this liquidation is set apart for the payment of expenses in arrear for 1810, and preceding years, in respect of the part of that produce which belongs to the above years and conformably to what is laid down in the decree of the 23d Sept.

—CHAP. V.—*Of Taxes suppressed, and of those that are continued.*—From the 1st of January, 1811, the following taxes shall be suppressed, namely, 1st, The tax upon moveables; 2d, That upon soap; 3d, That upon meat; 4th, That of stamps upon articles of commerce and luxury.—The following taxes shall be continued from the same period:—SECT. I.—*Direct Taxes.*—1st. The land tax, as established by the law of the 20th January, 1807.—2d. The personal tax, reduced to one half of the rate fixed by the law of the 11th April, 1807.—3d. The taxes upon domestics, horses, horned cattle, and hearths, conformably to the laws of the 11th March and 9th May, 1806; the 9th January, 1807, and 22d April, 1809.—SECT. II.—*Indirect Taxes.*—1st. The tax on successions, on the footing laid down in the laws of the 4th October, and 29th December, 1806, excepting the augmentations laid upon rents and effects at the expense of France and the countries thereto united, which shall cease to affect inheritances arising from deaths since the 31st Dec. 1810.—2d, The stamp duties on deeds and patents, conformably to the laws of the 28th November and 2d December, 1805. A revision of the Tariff and Nomenclature of the deeds and instruments subject to these duties shall be proceeded in, for the purpose of regulating them according to the judicial forms which shall be introduced into Holland, in consequence of its union with the Empire.—3d. The duties on cards, conformably to the existing laws.—*Consolidated Taxes to be continued.*—1st. The tax upon grinding corn (*mouture*), to be reduced, however, from 108 to 72 florins only per last of corn or wheat. The price of bread, composed in whole or in part of flour, shall be reduced in the same proportion, to commence from the 1st Jan. 1811.—2d. The tax on turf.—3d. Upon salt in the proportion of two decimes per kilogramme.—4th. Upon strong waters, brandy, geneva, and all others of foreign or home manufacture, at the rate of 24 florins the barrel.—This duty is divided into two parts, that on distillation and that on consumption; the former shall be the same as that paid in the interior of the Empire.—5th. The tax upon coals, and upon gold and silver ware.—6th. The duty on tonnage, and internal navigation.—7th. The duty on wines, conformably to the existing laws.—8th. The stamp duty on discharges of different imposts.—These different taxes shall be classed under

the denomination of the Consolidated Duties.—III. *Of the Posts.*—The service of the Posts shall be organized in the new departments, conformably to the French laws.—IV. *Of the Lottery.*—The *ci-devant* Dutch Lottery is provisionally kept up. The plans of each Lottery shall be sent to our Minister of Finance, in order to be approved by us.—V. *Of the Customs.*—SECT. I. *On Importation and Exportation.*—From the 1st January, 1811, the laws, decrees, and regulations of the Empire, with regard to imports and exports, shall be carried into effect in the new Departments, with the exceptions to be afterwards mentioned.—SECT. II. *Of the establishment and organization of the Officers of Customs.*—The Officers of Customs in Holland shall be charged with the service relative to importations from abroad, and exports to foreign countries, as well as with the imports and exports of Holland to the departments of the interior, and from the latter to Holland.—In respect to all commodities subjected to the duties on internal consumption in Holland, the formalities in force for the purpose of securing the levying of the duties, from the time of their being cleared from the Customs, in order to become articles of commerce, shall continue to be observed.—The Customs of Holland shall be divided into four sub-divisions, of which the chief places shall be Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Dookum, and Embden.—The division of Rotterdam shall comprehend Dort, the islands separated by the Volkerak from those lately united to the district of Antwerp, and the coast of the North Sea, as far as Haarlem, inclusively.—That of Amsterdam shall comprehend the coast of the North Sea, from Haarlem to the Zuyderzee, the islands of the Texel, Vlieland, and the coasts of the Zuyderzee as far as Elburg, exclusive of that place.—That of Dookum shall comprehend the coast of the Zuyderzee from Elburg; that of the North Sea to Delfzyl inclusively, and the islands of Terschelling, Ameland, and Schiermonnikood.—That of Embden shall extend from Delfzyl, following the coasts of the Dollart, those of the North Sea, and of the Jathe, to the extremity of the coast of Holland; its land frontier shall extend from Newstadt to Vollen on the Ems.—The Directors at Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Dookum and Embden, shall be under the supervision of the Master of Requests, who shall reside at Amsterdam, and shall have the title of Chief Director.—The

Chief Director shall be under the immediate orders of our Director-General, and shall conform exactly to all his instructions; he shall transmit them to the inferior Directors, shall correspond with them on all points of the service, and shall give an account of all operations to our Director-General, who, nevertheless, may himself correspond with the inferior Directors, whenever he shall judge it proper.—The Chief Director shall render an account to the Intendant-General of Finance of the produce of the Customs, and shall furnish him with the necessary documents.—SECT. III. *Of the importation of Tobacco into Holland and its export for France.*—The importation of manufactured tobacco from abroad is prohibited in Holland.—Foreign tobacco in the leaf shall be subjected to the duties at present in force in Holland. Tobacco, in the leaf, of every sort, may be imported from Holland into France, upon paying the duties of the French tariff.—Tobacco manufactured in Holland may also be admitted; but besides the duty imposed on tobacco in the leaf, it shall also pay that upon the manufacture.—The said tobacco can only enter France by Custom houses which shall afterwards be marked out.—The said tobacco in leaf and manufactured, after having paid the duty on importation at the custom-house where it is entered, shall be conveyed with permits to the entrepôts nearest the office for collecting the consolidated duties.—The tobacco may remain there eight days, during which it shall receive the Custom house marks; there shall be paid at the offices of the Consolidated Duties eleven decimes per kilogramme, covering the duties on manufacture, of the license of the manufacturer, and of the first sale.—Tobacco in leaf and manufactured, upon its entry shall be subjected to the same regulations with tobacco of French origin.—Tobacco in the form of segars cannot be introduced into the Departments of the Empire.—SECT. IV. *Of the exportation of the Malt Liquors of Holland into France.*—Dutch malt liquors cannot enter the interior but through the offices pointed out, and upon payment at the Custom-houses of a duty of 2 francs per hectolitre.—SECT. V. *Of Flour, Bread and Biscuit, and their Importation into Holland.*—Corn, bread, and biscuit which, from the departments of the Empire shall enter the new departments which at this day constitute Holland, shall pay the duty on grinding corn; bread and biscuit

from abroad shall pay the duties hitherto levied.—SECT. VI. *Of Grain, Flour, and Pulse, and their Exportation from Holland.*—Exportation shall cease when the price of the hectolitre shall rise to 24 francs in the markets of the Department of the Two Nethes, or when it shall be prohibited by special decrees.—When exportation is prohibited, corn and pulse shall pay an export duty, regulated according to the following scale:—When the price of corn does not amount in the Department of the Two Nethes to 19 francs per metrical quintal, 2 francs; at 19 francs ditto, 2 francs, 50 cents.; at 20 francs ditto, 3 francs, 80 cents.; at 21 francs ditto 4 francs; at 22 francs ditto, 6 francs; at 23 francs ditto, 8 francs. At 24 francs, the exportation shall be suspended.—Small grain (*menus grains*) and dried pulse shall pay only half the duties contained in the above scale.—SECT. VII. *Of the circulation of Corn and Flour in Holland.*—The circulation of corn, flour, and bread, in the interior of the Departments of *ci-devant* Holland shall be entirely free, conformably to the law of the 21st Prairial, year 5.—SECT. VIII. There shall be a depot of foreign produce and merchandise, not prohibited in each of the ports of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Embden.—These depots shall be regulated upon the same principles as those which are established in France.—SECT. IX. *Of the Transit of Goods.*—Goods which shall be admitted to the depot of Amsterdam, may be forwarded in transit to Germany and Switzerland by the navigation of the Rhine.—The conditions of this transit, and the duties to which the goods enjoying this privilege are subjected, shall be pointed out in a future decree.—SECT. X. *Of the Nationality of Ships.*—After the 1st of November next, there shall be a list for each port of the ships possessing the conditions necessary to entitle them to be considered as national by the laws of Holland; the said ships shall immediately have all the privileges of French ships.—In future, in order to be considered as national, ships must in Holland, as in France, possess all the conditions prescribed by the laws and decrees of our Empire.—The 8th title, which relates to the military organization, establishes in Holland two new military divisions, two corps of artillery, two of engineers, &c. By the 9th title, Holland is to form one single maritime district. By the 11th title, the existing organization of the Catholic worship,

and of the Protestant clergy, is maintained. The 12th title places under the orders of the Director-General of Police, four general Commissaries of Police, who, in addition to their other functions, are charged with the inspection of the line of the Customs. By the 13th title, after Jan. 1st, 1811, all the accounts forming part of the general system of account in Holland shall be decided upon by the Court of Accounts at Paris: The Chamber of Accounts at present existing in Holland is prorogued to the 1st of Jan. 1812.—In the 15th and last title it is enacted, that tithes and land-rents continue to be raised in Holland, conformably to the existing laws; and that, ulteriorly, directions will be given with regard to the power of redeeming the said tithes and rents.

ENGLAND.—*Isle of Bourbon. 25th Oct. 1810.*

On the above day was published, by the English Government, an account of the capture of this Island, by troops, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Henry Keating, with less than 100 men killed and wounded.—CAPITULATION for the surrender of St. Denis, the capital, and the whole Island of Buonaparté, agreed upon between Colonel St. Susanne, commanding the Island of Buonaparté, for his Majesty the Emperor of France, King of Italy, &c. &c. &c. on the one hand, and Commodore Rowley, commanding his Britannic Majesty's squadron, Lieut.-Colonel Keating, commanding his Britannic Majesty's and the Hon. Company's land forces, and R. J. Farquhar, esq. on the other.—The whole of the Island of Buonaparté shall be delivered up to his Britannic Majesty, the city of St. Denis, at twelve o'clock to-morrow, the 9th of July, and the other military stations in succession, as early as intelligence of the present Capitulation can be communicated.—At twelve o'clock to-morrow, the French troops which occupy the arsenal and Imperial battery, shall evacuate their post, and the grenadier company of his Majesty's 86th regiment, and the grenadier company of the 6th Madras native regiment, will take possession of them, when the French flag will be struck, and that of his Britannic Majesty displayed.—The troops of the line and Garde Nationale shall be allowed all the honours of war: they shall march out of the city with their arms and baggage, drums beating, matches

lighted, together with their field artillery; they are to lay down their arms on the sea face, in front of the Imperial battery: the troops of the line are to surrender themselves prisoners of war, and to be embarked as such for the Cape of Good Hope, or for England.—In consideration of the distinguished character of Colonel St. Susanne and his Officers, and of their gallant defence of the place, the Officers of all ranks are allowed to preserve their swords and military decorations; they are to continue prisoners of war, and to embark for the Cape of Good Hope or for England. Colonel St. Susanne and his family shall be allowed a passage to the Isle of France, or to France, upon his giving his parole of honour not to serve during the war, or till he shall be regularly exchanged.—Funeral honours shall be paid to the French Officers who have fallen in the battle, according to their respective ranks.—An inventory shall be made of property of all descriptions belonging to the State, which shall be delivered over to the person appointed by the English Government to receive it.—All warlike stores, magazines, provisions, charts, plans, and archives, are included in this article.—The Laws, Customs, and Religion of the Inhabitants, as well as their private Property of all descriptions, shall be respected and insured to them.—Done at St. Denis, the 5th July 1810, at six o'clock, P. M.—ST. SUSANNE, Col.-Comm. L'Isle Buonaparté pour sa Majesté, L'Empereur des Français, Roi d'Italie, &c. &c. &c.—JOS. ROWLEY, commanding his Britannic Majesty's Squadron.—HENRY S. KEATING, Lieut.-Colonel commanding.

SPANISH SOUTH AMERICA.—*Journal of the Proceedings which took place in the City of Mendoza from the 13th of June, written by the Deputy of that City.* 1810.

When this City applauded, with transports of joy, the installation of the new Government of Buenos Ayres, and was on the point of nominating a Deputy, being the wish of all its inhabitants, it received an Extraordinary Courier from the Governor of Cordova, directing that no obedience should be paid to that Junta, being illegally installed, and for which reason neither that Cabildo, that of Monte Video, nor that of Salta would acknowledge its authority, and to await the orders of the Viceroy of Lima. These orders, so contrary to the determination of the Junta

and to the wishes of the people, caused considerable consternation, and had the effect of creating three violent parties, encouraged by the Governor, who had it in his power to destroy them.—In this situation and the delay in convocation for the nomination of a Deputy, before sedition should gain the ascendancy, taking into consideration the Governor's intentions, as expressed in another letter of the 22d of June, repeating his former orders, and sending us a copy of the proceedings of the Cabildo of that town, he proclaimed, with great enthusiasm, that the town should instantly proceed in the nomination of a Deputy, naming the most respectable persons for that purpose. The Cabildo heard the voice of the people; the Congress was formed the following day, the 23d. With one unanimous voice it was agreed that this town should unite itself to the capital, appoint a Deputy to represent it.—To this the ministers of Finance, Don Domingo Torres, Don Joaquin Liano, and the Commandant, Don Faustino Ansey, objected, and from their opposition the nomination of a deputy was delayed until the 25th.—On the 24th the people waited on the first Alcade, in order that the Commandant should deliver up the command to some other person more acceptable to the people. Upon being informed of the wish of the people, the Commandant immediately agreed to resign. At one o'clock in the morning he delivered up the command, which was given to Don Isidro Saenzdela Maza, retaining his pay, honours, and the interior management of the troops. Every thing was settled without the least disorder. On the evening of the same day, Commandant Ansey wrote to the Cabildo demanding to be reinstated in his command, as it was not the people who called for his resignation, but a few individuals. The Cabildo answered that it being the unanimous wish of the people, they should not oppose it.—On the 25th, we proceeded to name a deputy, when the Regidor Don Bernardo Artiz was elected.—On the 26th and 27th, there was nothing new occurred, the town remaining perfectly tranquil.—On the 29th, at three o'clock in the morning, the Commandant, with the above-mentioned Ministers, took possession of the barracks by assault, in three different points, at the same time. Having surprised the sentinel, overcome the guard, made the Officer prisoner, and seized the arms, the people confiding in their new Commandant, and he on the

word of honour of the late Commandant, did not place a competent guard at the barracks, under circumstances so critical.—At the moment the assault happened, the Alcalde was informed, and forgetting his illness, he went to the Cabildo, and alarmed the town, the alarm bell was rung, and the people united. During this time Commandant Ansay sent for the soldiers of the garrison to muster under pain of death, and was able to join 200 men, who were dragged to the barracks by the corporals, placing at the corner of the streets cannon loaded with grape shot, matches lighted, and orders to fire in case of necessity. This criminal disposition greatly incensed the people, who flew to arms with a full determination to revenge the insult heaped upon them by the criminal officers of the old government; but the illustrious Cabildo wishing to avoid such a fatal catastrophe, was able to contain the people, and sending Don Domingo Garcia, the Alcalde Don Joaquin Sosa, and the Commandant of the Frontier, to the Barracks, they entered into the following capitulation:—1st. To form a complete union between the Cabildo and the Commandant, in virtue of which both parties were to govern, and to which effect, all orders issued were to begin with the word “the Government.”—2nd. That the present force should remain upon the footing it now was on.—3rd. That a Proclamation to that effect should be issued by the Treasurer.—4th. As this union of authorities had its origin in necessity, it was to cease the moment the capital ordered to the contrary.—5th. That it is solemnly declared this mode of conciliation does not carry with it any obligation to pursue the steps of the Juntas established, nor any other that may be contrary to the established form of government.—6th. That the union of the different Authorities shall be celebrated by a general illumination.—With this the town was somewhat appeased, and strictly adhered to the capitulation; nevertheless the people could not entirely forget the dishonourable behaviour of the Commandant in assaulting the barracks, and putting so little value upon his own word of honour.—From this day until the 3rd of July nothing extraordinary occurred, when a courier arrived from the Governor

of Cordova demanding 1,000 men to be sent him; and stating, that with 3,000 men he possessed, he was determined to defend himself against any force sent to disturb the old government. To this the Cabildo answered, that it was not in their power to comply with his request.—This town still entertained strong suspicions against the Commandant for the following reasons:—1st. Because he and the Ministers were hostile to the Governing Junta, and expressed themselves to that effect the day of the election of a Deputy.—2dly, For having expressed themselves in the most disrespectful manner against the Members of the Junta.—3dly, For having said, that with 500 Europeans they would subjugate the town, and compel it to obey the Governor of Cordova.—These fears were augmented by the preparations in powder and other warlike stores, made on the 10th of July by the Commandant doubling the guards, loading the cannon with grape shot, and his orders, that from the 11th the artillerymen should have lighted matches.—On the 16th of July we received an express from the Junta by Lieut.-Col. Don Juan Moron, with orders to afford us every assistance in his power, at the same time communicating the agreeable intelligence of the stability of the Junta, which had the powerful effect of compelling the insolent conspirators to surrender themselves, who already wish to acknowledge the supremacy of the Junta. The troops are withdrawn from the barracks, and the criminals remain confounded with the enormity of their crimes. They will leave nothing undone in order to disguise their infamous proceedings.—Note.—The Commandant Ansay, and the two Ministers of Finance, principal authors in this horrid conspiracy at Mendoza, march prisoners to that city; and this town reposes in tranquillity, without the least fear that it can again be disturbed.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates:

The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Volumes of the above Work will be published in about a Fortnight.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

Vol. XVIII. No. 28.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1810. [Price 1s.

"It is admitted that a paper medium, under the form of bank notes or government-securities, is circulated in France, England, and most other commercial countries: but nobody is compelled by law to receive the payment of any debt in such money: hence it is, that the paper of those countries bears no resemblance to ours, except in name. Every man receives a bank-note or refuses it at pleasure. When he receives it, he knows that on the next hour he may have it changed for gold or silver, as the Bank is obliged to make such payments on demand. For this reason, bank-notes, being portable, are frequently preferred to coin of the weighty metals."—SYLVIVS, on the American paper-money. 1787.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XVI.

Introduction of the Bank Restriction Act into the House of Commons—The origin of this measure—The Bill moved for by Mr. Pitt—Suspension of the two Acts prohibiting small Promissory Notes—The Title and Preambles of those Acts—The Principles of those Acts—Title and Preamble of the Bank Restriction Act—View of the Provisions of that Act—The Legal Tender—The meaning and application of the word Restriction.

Gentlemen,

We have now to take a view of the *Acts of Parliament*, passed in consequence of the Stoppage of cash payments at the Bank of England; then to see what was, at the passing of these Acts, said by the advocates of them, respecting their *duration*; and this will enable us to form a pretty correct judgment as to the statesman-like wisdom of those advocates, and also as to the probability of the Acts ever being hereafter removed, except by a total annihilation of the paper-money.

Until the time at which the Bank Stoppage took place; until the 26th day of February, 1797, the Notes of the Bank Company were considered as good as real money, because, if the holder chose it, he could, at any moment, demand and re-

ceive real money in exchange for them. But, when the Bank, in the manner that we have seen, refused payment upon demand, the nature of the Notes was wholly changed. They were no longer equal in value to real money; and nothing but a species of *compulsion* would, of course, induce the people to receive them in payment of any debt theretofore contracted.

Now, then, came the pinch. Now came forth the fact, that it was beyond all the powers of hypocrisy, trick, and confusing verbosity any longer to disguise: forth came the fact, that Bank Notes were to be, in reality *forced* upon the people; that the man, who had a debt due to him, must take them in payment, or, if he refused them, be unable to arrest his creditor: forth came the fact, aye, forth it came, after all the railing against French assignats; forth came the fact, that no man who held a Bank note; that no man who held a note of that Company of Traders, payable on demand, could compel them to pay him, except in *other such notes*. Forth came this fact, and yet those who had brought the finances of the country into such a state, were still kept in power; to their management were the nation's affairs still left; to their promises did the credulous and affrighted people still listen; and of their measures has the nation ever since been feeling, and will, it is to be feared, long feel, the consequences.

The Order of the Privy Council (See it in Letter XI, page 652) required the Bank Company to stop paying their notes in money. The words are "to forbear issuing any cash in payment." I beseech you, Gentlemen, to consider well the nature of this transaction. Look back at the origin of the Bank. Consider it, as it really was, a mere Company of Traders. Then view the holders of the Notes, who were so many legal cre-

ditors, so many persons having a just and legal claim to be paid upon demand. See all these creditors at once deprived of their legal rights of payment by an order of the Privy Council, of which the Minister himself was a member. See here a Company of Traders, having promissory notes out to the amount of many millions, required by the Privy Council "to forbear" to pay off the said notes; and, above all things, observe, and NEVER FORGET, that this order, or request, was made in consequence, as we have seen from the official documents, of representations made by this Company of Traders themselves, who, as is stated in those documents (Letter XIII, page 750), made such representations in consequence of the drain upon their cash and of the alarm they therefore felt for the safety of their House.

This was a fine spectacle to behold: it was a fine thing to be held forth to the world by a Minister, whose boasting about his financial resources and about his support of public credit had been incessant from the day he first vaulted into the saddle of power. If this could be done with regard to one Company of Traders, why not with regard to any other Company of Traders, or any other single Trader, in the kingdom? If the Privy Council, avowedly upon the representation of the Minister, were to protect this Company of Traders against the lawful demands of their creditors; what reason was there that other Traders, that other Debtors, should not be protected in the same way, if they should "feel alarm for the safety of their House?" We must never lose sight of this fact, that the Order in Council arose from a representation of the Minister; that representation arose from one made to the Minister by the Bank Company; and this latter representation arose (See Letter XIII, p. 750) from the drain of cash at the Bank, and from the alarm, which the Bank Company felt for the safety of their House. This should be constantly kept in view. We should never, for one moment, lose sight of the fact, that the whole of this measure of protection to the Bank had its origin in representations made by the Bank Company itself. And, if we keep this fact steadily in view, we shall be in no danger of coming at a proper conclusion.

Thus far, then, we have seen the transaction going no further than the Privy Council. We have seen it originate with

the Bank Company, the demands of whose lawful creditors had given them alarm. We have seen the Bank Company calling upon the Minister to know when he would interfere. And, we have seen the Minister, after saying, on the 24th, that he would prepare a resolution of Council, go to the Council, on the 26th, and obtained the Resolution and Order that we have seen. Thus the Privy Council became a party to the transaction; and we are now about to see how the Parliament put the finishing stroke to it by giving to the order of Council the sanction of law; we are now about to take a view of the Legislative Acts, by which, to use the expression of the late Lord Liverpool, *paper-credit* was exchanged for *paper-currency*, by which *bank-notes* were moulded into *paper-money*.

In Letter XII, page 681, we have seen how the minister first introduced to the House of Commons the project of passing a law to sanction the Order in Council; that is to say, to sanction the refusal of the Bank Company to pay their promissory notes. We have seen, that, upon being asked by Mr. ALDERMAN COMBE, whether he meant to make the bank-notes a *legal tender*, he knew not what to answer; that he twisted and writhed in great apparent embarrassment of mind; but, that he knew not what to answer. We have also seen, that, before the House met the next day (28th of February, 1797) the meeting at the Mansion-House had taken place, having been, as we have seen, previously contrived, in private, with the Minister. We have seen an account of the other Meetings through the country; and we have seen, in Letter XIV, the manner of forming the SECRET COMMITTEE, from whom came Reports (Letter XIV, p. 808), declaring the affairs of the Bank to be in a most flourishing way, and that the Company were possessed of a great surplus of means.

Thus prepared, and perceiving, by this time, that his adherents were resolved to stand by him (See Letter XIV, p. 805) the Minister, on the 9th of March, 1797, moved for leave to "bring in a bill to confirm and continue the Order in Council of the 26th of February, for a time to be limited." This was the first motion towards the making of the law for authorizing the Bank to refuse to pay its creditors their just demands; that law, which has filled the kingdom with banks and with

paper-money, and which, as we shall by-and-by see, has produced no small share of our present dangers and distress. But, before we proceed any further in the history of this Act, which, you will bear in mind, is the Act, which the Bullion Committee have proposed to repeal in two years from this time; before we proceed any further in the history of this Act, we must shortly notice two other Acts, which were passed before it, and which, though of inferior importance, were the *first-born* of the Bank Stoppage.

The refusal of the Bank Company to pay their notes was, as every one must naturally suppose, productive of the consequence of driving all the gold coin out of circulation; for, under such circumstances, the moment a guinea or a half guinea got into the hands of a person *able to keep it*, and not an idiot, it would remain very quiet in the chest of that person; and, as the smallest notes then in circulation, were notes for *five pounds*, the difficulty in making payments would necessarily be very great. The distress, arising from this cause, was so great, that, on the 1st of March, it was resolved by the House of Commons to bring in a bill to legalise the issuing of *small notes* by private persons; and, on the same day a bill was read a second time for enabling the Bank of England to issue notes *under five pounds*.

The reason for passing these Acts was this; there were in existence two Acts of Parliament, which prohibited the negotiating of promissory notes and other paper of an amount under *five pounds*. These Acts are, upon this occasion, worthy of our particular attention; because they were passed upon the principle, that *small paper promises* were *injurious to the community*. The first of these Acts was passed in the year 1775, and, as will be seen from the Title and Preamble, which I beg of you to read*, *small paper currency* was, at

that time, declared by *law* to be of "*great, prejudice to, trade and public credit.*" There were, in 1775, as we have already seen, no bank notes for sums less than *TEN POUNDS*, and, it was then supposed, that smaller notes would be an injury. In two years after the above Act was passed, the effect of it having been found good, another Act was passed carrying the prohibition to any sum under *five pounds*. And, Gentlemen, I beg you to pay particular attention to the language of these Acts. The first says, that the circulation of notes for very small sums, *in lieu of cash*, is to the great prejudice of *trade and public credit*; and, after the parliament have had two years experience of the effects of this Act, they pass another, in which, after declaring that the effects of the former Act have been "*very salutary*," they extend the provisions of it from the sum of *twenty shillings* to the sum of *five pounds*†. Thus,

great prejudice of trade and public credit; &c. &c. Be it, therefore, enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by, and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That all promissory or other notes, bills of exchange, or draughts, or undertakings, in writing, being negotiable or transferable for the payment of any sum or sums of money, *less than the sum of twenty shillings* in the whole, which shall be made or issued at any time from and after the twenty-fourth day of June one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, shall be, and the same are hereby declared to be, absolutely void and of no effect, any law, statute, usage, or custom to the contrary, therefore in any wise notwithstanding.

† SEVENTEENTH Geo. III. Cap. XXX.

—An Act for further restraining the negotiation of promissory notes, and inland bills of exchange, under a limited sum, within that part of Great Britain called England.—Whereas by a certain Act of Parliament passed in the fifteenth year of the reign of his present Majesty (intituled an Act to restrain the negotiation of promissory notes and inland bills of exchange under a limited sum, within that part of Great Britain called England), all negotiable promissory or other notes, bills of exchange or draughts, or undertakings in writing, for any sum of money *less than the sum of twenty shillings* in the whole, &c. &c. and whereas the said Act

* FIFTEENTH Geo. III. Chap. LI.—An Act to restrain the negotiation of promissory notes and inland bills of exchange under a limited sum, within that part of Great Britain called England.—Whereas various notes, bills of exchange, and draughts for money, for *very small sums*, have for some time past, been *circulated or negotiated in lieu of cash*, within that part of Great Britain called England, to the

then, small paper currency was proved to have been an evil; it was proved, by experience, to have been injurious to trade and to public credit; and, therefore, while there were no bank notes for sums less than ten pounds, the law forbade that there should be any other circulating or negotiable notes, under five pounds.

Thus, as to paper-currency, stood the law in 1797, when the Bank Stoppage took place; and as we have already seen, in the former part of this Letter, the country was, in consequence of the Stoppage, thrown into the greatest distress for the want of something to represent small sums. The manufacturers, and, indeed, all the journeymen and labourers, throughout the kingdom could not be paid in the usual manner. The coin had disappeared, as it naturally would the moment a bank note would not fetch its amount in guineas at the Bank; and, the guineas and half guineas having gone out of sight, which they did instantly, there were no means of paying small sums. Therefore, the very first thing to be done, was to provide something to supply the place of the guineas and half guineas, and, indeed, the whole of the coin, except the hammered-out shillings and sixpences, such as we now see current.

For this purpose it was necessary to pass an Act to *repeal*, or, at least, to *suspend*, the two Acts, of which we have just taken a view, and, accordingly a *suspension* Act was passed on the 10th of March 1797, the title and preamble of which Act are here inserted, as worthy of attention, and as matter for future remark*. This Act,

hath been attended with very salutary effects and in case the provisions therein contained were extended to a further sum, the good purpose of the said Act would be further advanced. Be it, therefore, enacted, &c. &c. And the Act extends the prohibition to any sum under five pounds.

* THIRTY SEVENTH Geo. III. Cap. XXXII.—An Act to suspend for a limited time, the operation of two Acts of the fifteenth and seventeenth years of the reign of his present Majesty for restraining the negotiation of promissory notes, and inland bills of exchange, under a limited sum, within that part of Great Britain called England.—Whereas an Act of Parliament was past in the fifteenth year of the reign of his present Majesty, in-

by which the suspension was to be continued only till the first day of the then ensuing month of May; that is to say, for forty days only, was, as we shall by-and-by see, afterwards extended in its duration, and has continued in force till this day.

But, this was nothing without giving a power of making small notes to the Bank of England. The Bank had dividends to pay; and, of course, all the sums, or parts of sums, under five pounds (there being, as yet, no notes under that sum) they were still compelled to pay in cash, which was what they did not like, and, in fact, what they were not, perhaps, able to do. It was, therefore, necessary, above all things, to give them a power of making small notes. There was a doubt, whether the two Acts of the 15th and 17th of George the Third, above-mentioned, applied to bank notes; and, it was thought, by some persons, that they did not so apply; but, an Act of Parliament, the great cure for all doubts and difficulties, was passed to remove this doubt; and such was the haste in doing this, that the Act was passed on the 3rd of March, though the bill was brought in only on the 28th of February. This Act authorized the Bank to issue notes for sums under five pounds; and, accordingly, two and one pound notes were immediately issued.*

intituled. an Act to restrain the negotiation of promissory notes, and inland bills of exchange, under a limited sum, within that part of Great Britain called England: And whereas another Act was passed in the seventeenth year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, an Act for further restraining the negotiation of promissory notes, and inland bills of exchange under a limited sum, within that part of Great Britain called England; And whereas IT IS EXPEDIENT that the said Acts should be suspended for a certain time, so far as the same may relate to any notes, draughts, or undertakings made payable on demand: &c. &c. &c. The Act then suspends those laws until the first day of May 1797.

* THIRTY-SEVENTH Geo. III. Chap. XXVIII.—An Act to remove doubts respecting Promissory Notes of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England for payment of sums of money under five pounds.—Whereas it is expedient for the public service, and for the convenience of commercial circulation, that the Governor and

Now, Gentlemen, I beg you to stop here, for a moment, and take another look at the language of these Acts of Parliament, these solemn declarations of the Legislature. In the year 1775, they say, that the circulation of small notes, in lieu of cash, is of "great prejudice to trade and public credit." In 1777 they declare, upon the evidence of two years of experience, that their having lessened the quantity of small notes had produced "very salutary effects." And, in 1797, under the ministry of PITT, whose debts the public have paid, and for whom they are to pay for a monument; aye, under the ministry of this man, the Parliament were brought to declare, that, to make small notes, that to do just the contrary of what the above two acts were intended to effect, was "expedient for the public service, and for the convenience of commerce." In 1775 and 1777 it was enacted, that small promissory notes, in lieu of cash, were "a great prejudice to trade and public credit." In 1797 it was enacted, that small promissory notes, in lieu of cash, were "expedient for the public service and for the convenience of commerce." Gentlemen, when you have paid due attention to this, you will hardly want any thing more to enable you to answer those, who have yet the folly or the impudence to attempt a defence of the ministry of PITT, who, as it has been well observed, in reply to one of his eulogists, found the country gold, and left it paper.

But, the grand measure was yet to come. There was, as yet, no law to sanction the deed of refusing to pay the bearers of the Bank's promissory notes. This was a thing that the people had yet to receive at the hands of those, who had plunged them into the Anti-jacobin war, and who had fed them with the hopes of beating France through her finances. Yes, the people of England, the "most thinking people," had yet to swallow this; they had yet to gulp this bolus from the hands of those, who had buoyed them up, for so many years, by comparisons of the flourishing state of the English finances compared with those of France, which last nation they still believed to be, as PITT told them, "in the very gulph of bankruptcy."

Company of the Bank of England should issue Promissory notes, payable to bearer, for sums of money under five pounds; &c. &c.

This measure was, as we have seen, introduced into the House of Commons, in form, on the 9th of March, 1797, in a motion, made by PITT, for leave to bring in a Bill for continuing, for a limited time, what he called the RESTRICTION (pray mark the word) upon the Bank, relative to its issue of specie. This Bill, after undergoing the discussions, some of which I shall have to notice more particularly, by-and-by, became a Law on the 3rd of May, 1797. *

* THIRTY SEVENTH Geo. III. Chap. XLV.—An Act for confirming and continuing for a limited time the Restriction contained in the minute of council of the twenty-sixth of February one thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, on payments of cash by the Bank.—Whereas, by minute of his Majesty's Privy Council, made on the twenty-sixth day of February one thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, upon the representation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, stating, that from the result of the information which he had received, and the inquiries which it had been his duty to make respecting the effect of the unusual demands for specie, that have been made upon the metropolis, in consequence of ill founded or exaggerated alarms in different parts of the country, it appeared, that unless some measure was immediately taken, there might be reason to apprehend a want of sufficient supply of cash to answer the exigencies of the public service; it was declared to be the unanimous opinion of the board, that it was indispensably necessary for the public service, that the directors of the Bank of England should forbear issuing any cash in payment until the sense of Parliament could be taken on that subject, and the proper measures adopted thereupon for maintaining the means of circulation and supporting the public and commercial credit of the kingdom at this important conjuncture; and it was ordered, that a copy of the said minute should be transmitted to the directors of the Bank of England, and they were thereby required, on the grounds of the exigency of the case, to conform thereto until the sense of Parliament could be taken as aforesaid: And whereas, in pursuance of the minute, the said governor and company of the Bank of England, have, since the said twenty-sixth day of February one thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, forborne to issue cash in pay-

When you have read the Title and Preamble of this act, you will accompany me in a brief sketch of its provisions, which you will find not only curious and interesting as an object of public attention, but useful also to each of you as *individuals*, who will hence learn, how far you are *compelled* to receive payment in Bank notes, and in what way your previous contracts have been affected by this Act.

The Preamble of the Act having repeated what was contained in the *Order of Council*, and having declared, that to *confirm* and *continue* the refusal to pay in Gold and Silver, though such refusal was *not warranted by law*; having acknowledged the *illegality* of the things done, and declared the necessity of *continuing* to do them; having made this beginning, the Act next proceeds, SECTION I. to *indemnify* the Bank Directors and all other persons for having done these illegal things; that is to say, to protect all such persons against any *appeal to the law* that any suffering party might be inclined to make. So that, whatever loss or hindrance or injury any man might have suffered from the non-payment of the promissory notes of the Bank Company, such sufferer was, by this Act, at once deprived of all legal means of obtaining redress. The Act next provides, in SECTION II, that the Bank should be liable to no prosecution for the non-payment of any of their notes, that they might be willing to *exchange* for other notes; and, that in case the Bank were sued by any one for the non-payment of their notes, they might apply to the Court to stop proceedings in such actions, who might stop them accordingly, and without costs to the plaintiff in any action brought against the Bank for non-payment of its notes, unless the Court should think the action necessary. SECTION III. Permits the Bank to issue cash in payment of any sum under twenty shillings, or where less than twenty shillings should be a fractional part of a sum to be paid by the Bank. This was a very gracious permission.* The same Section allows them to is-

ments, except for purposes for which the issue of cash was deemed unavoidable; it is necessary that the Restriction in the said minute, although *not warranted by Law*, should be *confirmed*, and should be *continued* for a limited time, by the authority of Parliament: Be it, therefore, enacted, &c. &c. &c.

sue cash for the service of the Army, the Navy, or the Ordnance, in pursuance of an order of the Privy Council. SECTION IV. Specifies, that the Bank, during the restriction or stoppage, shall not advance to the government any cash or notes exceeding in amount 600,000 pounds. SECTION V. Permits the Bank to repay cash to those persons that may choose to lodge cash in the Bank. But, the Section permits the Bank to repay in cash only three fourths of the amount of what shall be so lodged with them. SECTIONS VI. and VII. Permit the Bank to advance the sum of 125,000 pounds to the Bankers of London and Scotland. SECTION VIII. Treats of payments between private individuals, and it provides, that all payments which have been made, or which shall be made during the continuance of this act, in Bank of England notes, shall be deemed payments in cash, if accepted as such. SECTION IX. Contains the great alteration made in the law between debtor and creditor. We have seen, that, by the 2d Section, the Bank notes were made to be *quite equal to cash* in the case of all demands, made upon the Bank for payment of its notes, which, therefore, made the notes of the Bank, as far as related to debts due from the Bank, on account of its notes, a LEGAL TENDER, which words mean, such money or currency as the law regards as good in the payment of debts. Guineas, for instance, are a LEGAL TENDER, because, the tender or offering of them in payment is sufficient to prevent any action or proceeding at law being entertained against the person, who may have offered them in payment, in quantity equal to the amount of the debt. But, Bank notes were not made a legal tender, and they are not now a legal tender, between private individuals. If a man owe me money, I can still demand coin in payment; and the only difference is, that I cannot, if my debtor tender me the amount of the debt in Bank of England notes, cause him to be arrested and held to special bail, as I might have done, if this act had not been passed. This part of the act every one should read, and, therefore, I have put the 9th Section in a note*. SECTION X. Pro-

* SECTION IX.—And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That during the continuance of the restriction on payments by the said governor and company in cash, imposed by this act, no person shall be held to special bail upon any

vides that the collectors of the public revenue shall accept payment in Bank of England notes. SECTION XI. Permits the Bank to issue cash, in certain cases, upon giving five days notice to the Speaker of the House of Commons. SECTIONS XII, and XIII. Provide for the continuance of the act to the 24th of June (a duration of only *fifty-two days*), and for the repealing or altering of it during the then present session of parliament.

This, gentlemen, is what is called the Bank-RES^TRICTION Act, a very convenient phrase, calculated to convey the notion, that the Bank is *able* and *willing* to pay; but, that it is *not permitted* to do it. I beg you to bear along with you the meaning of the word *Restriction*, which implies an act done by one party to prevent another party from doing *what he would do if not prevented*. To *restrict* is to

process issuing out of any court, unless the affidavit which shall be made for that purpose according to the provisions in the Act of the twelfth year of the reign of his late Majesty King George the first, for preventing frivolous and vexatious arrests, shall not only contain the several matters required by the said Act, but also that no offer has been made to pay the sum of money in such affidavit mentioned, and therein sworn to, for the purpose of holding any person to special bail, in notes of the said governor and company, expressed to be payable on demand (fractional parts of the sum of twenty shillings only excepted); and if any process shall be issued against any person upon which such person might have been held to special bail before the passing of this Act and no affidavit shall be made as aforesaid, that no such offer of payment in notes of the governor and company had been made as aforesaid, such person shall not be arrested on such process, but proceedings shall be had against such person in the same manner as if no affidavit had been made for the purpose of holding such person to special bail under the provisions of the said Act of his said late Majesty King George the first; and all provisions in such Act, or in any other Act of Parliament, for preventing frivolous and vexatious arrests, shall be applied to the provisions in this Act contained, so far as the same are capable of being so applied: provided always, that if affidavit shall be made

limit, or confine. I am *restricted*, for instance, from going out of Newgate. I am here in state of *restriction*. I should go home to my farm and my family, if it were not for this restriction; and so "the *most thinking* "people of Europe" think, of course that the Bank Company would pay their notes in gold and silver, if they were not *restricted* in the same manner. But of this we shall see more in the next letter, when we come to speak of the *duration* of this restricting Act; and, in the mean while, I remain,

Gentlemen,
Your faithful friend,
WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,
November 12, 1810.

upon which any person or persons might have been held to special bail upon any such process as aforesaid, before the passing of this act, and it shall be likewise sworn in such affidavit that such offer of payment has been made as aforesaid, so that the person or persons who might have been arrested and held to special bail upon such process, if this Act had not been made, cannot, by reason of such offer and of the provisions in this act contained, be so arrested and held to special bail, it shall be lawful for the court out of which such process shall issue, or for any judge of such court, in a summary way, to order the defendant or defendants in the action in which such process shall issue, and who might have so held to special bail as aforesaid if this Act had not been made, to cause notes of the said governor and company, expressed to be payable on demand to the amount of the sum of money for which such person or persons might have been so held to special bail, if this Act had not been made, to be deposited in such manner as such Court or Judges shall direct, to answer the demands of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in such action; and if such deposit shall not be made within the time limited by such order after such notice thereof as shall thereby be directed to be given, it shall be lawful, upon affidavit duly made and filed that such deposit has not been made according to such order, to arrest such defendant or defendants, and hold him, her, or them to special bail, in such and the same manner as if this act had not been made.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"I understand, that the enemy's communication with Almeida is completely cut off; and he possesses only the ground, on which his army stands."—Baron Douro of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington's Dispatch, dated 30th of Sept. 1810.

PORTUGAL.—The public were, a month ago, in hourly expectation of hearing of the complete overthrow of Massena and his army; and, very reasonably might they entertain such expectation, after having been told what they were told, relative to the state of the enemy's army and resources. Now, however, at the end of a month, we are told, that no battle at all has been fought; that the two armies remain in the same positions, where the intelligence of the 14th of October left them; and that the half-naked, half-starved, and houseless army of Massena is still not only in existence, but lies close to the lines of our army.—The MORNING POST of yesterday (the 12th instant), contains the following paragraph upon this subject, the language and tone of which are really ominous:—"A Telegraphic Communication was succeeded last night by the arrival of an Express, with intelligence from Lord Wellington of so late a date as the 1st instant. At that time no general action had taken place, nor had there been any movement of consequence on either side. Indeed both armies remained in precisely the same situations in which they were left at the date of the former advices brought by the Apollo frigate. Lord Wellington continued to present a bold formidable front to the enemy, who had not dared to attack his Lordship in the fine positions which he had so judiciously taken; but the reports circulated yesterday afternoon, of Massena's retreat, pursued by Lord Wellington, and of the destruction of the greater part of the enemy's force, are entirely void of foundation. Massena had certainly not retreated so late as the 1st instant. He had several times reconnoitred the British lines, but had not yet attempted to attack them. Lord Wellington, on the other hand, though he most prudently had not ventured to advance upon the enemy, continued to bid a proud defiance to his utmost efforts, and should Massena ultimately be induced to attack his Lordship, the most sanguine hopes of a glorious result on our part, were universally entertained throughout every divi-

sion of the British force. The whole of our gallant countrymen in arms, the Public will be happy to hear, continued in good health, excellent spirits, and most perfect order of battle, ready and anxious to meet in combat the enemies of their country and of civilized man."—Yes, yes: this last is a matter of course. There can be no doubt of the anxiety of our army to attack the French, especially as they have such admirably hearty associates in the Portuguese, whom Marshal Bessières has, in the most solemn manner, declared to be equal to any troops in the world. It is quite natural that the army should be eager to join in combat with the enemies of civilized man. Though the idea is new, it is a very fine one. Fighting for civilized man! Laying a country waste, as we have been told, and making it a desert for the sake of civilized man! There is something so truly sublime in this, that I should suspect it to have flowed from the pen of Rosa Matilda herself.—But, while I assent to the propriety and admire the beauty of this passage there are some expressions in the above article, which, as I said before, appear rather ominous. The noble Viscount, we are told, "continued to present a bold and formidable front to the enemy;" and then, again, that he "continued to bid a proud defiance to the utmost efforts of Massena." What! a bold front and a proud defiance to that enemy, who, as we were before told, had neither provisions nor covering; whom we had beaten, and for the beating of whom we had fired the Park and Tower guns a month before; and who, at the time of our shewing this bold front and proud defiance had received no re-inforcements. While our Viscount had, as we were informed, been greatly re-inforced subsequent to the victory. What! a bold front, a proud defiance to those wretched scare-crows, the remains of that army, of whom we left two thousand dead upon the glorious field of Buzaco, and to whom we left nothing but the ground, upon which they stood, with their retreat to Almeida completely cut off! a bold front and a proud defiance to such an enemy! Come, come, Sir Morning Post, you must unsay this; or I must send it back down your throat.—Nay, this writer, who had before given us every reason to suppose, that Massena and his army could not exist five days in front of our lines, now tells us, that this Frenchman has been reconnoitring these lines. Aye, that the

man, whom we had got into a trap; whom Lord Talavera had drawn after him to the very spot whither he wished to get him to; we are now told, by this same writer, that this Massena, who had been urged on by the rage of Buonaparté into this trap, has now been reconnoitering our Viscount's lines; reconnoitering the lines of him, who had got him into his trap; looking to see where and how to attack the lines of him who had got him into that trap!—Then, we are told now, that, in case Massena should be induced to attack our Viscount. What! attack him? Attack him? Is this thought possible, then? Is it thought possible, that the half-naked, half-starved, the discontented, deserting, unloosed army of Massena, whom we had beaten at Busaco, and whom we had drawn over a desolated country into a trap; is it, then, really thought possible, that this army, that such a disgraced and famishing enemy, will dare to attack our Viscount and his army? This writer must be mad. I thought him so some time back. He must be mad; or, at any rate, all that he told us before about the desolation of the country, the distress and misery and discontents and desertions and entrapment of Massena's army, *must have been false.*—But, if this attack should take place: well? what then? why, "the most sanguine hopes of a glorious result, on our part, are entertained." And, is that all? Only *hopes*? Sanguine, indeed, but still nothing but *hopes*. It is come to this, is it? We *hope*, with the assistance of three tier of fortified lines, in the finest natural position in the world, to meet with success the *attack* of an enemy, whom we have already *beaten* in the open field, and whom we have drawn into a trap, where he is destitute of provisions and where his retreat is cut off? We *hope*, under such circumstances, to resist the *attack* of such an enemy!—There is another article, in the Morning Post of this day (13th), which I must beg the reader to go through; for he may be assured, that we shall have to refer to it again. This history of the Portuguese war is one of very great importance on account of the war itself, but of infinitely greater importance as an illustration of the manner in which the people of England are, with respect to intelligence, treated by such prints as the Morning Post. The campaign must, sooner or later, come to an end; and, by the nature of that end we shall know what we ought to think of those, who have related to us, in its different

stages the state and progress of the contest. "The enemy are positively stated to have sustained a defeat on the 11th ult. with the loss of from 9 to 10,000 men; and if this be correct, the affair must have taken place, in the neighbourhood of Leiria, where indeed several private letters mention it to have been fought, but reduce the loss of the enemy to six thousand men. Between the two main hostile armies, however, as we have already stated, no battle had taken place so late as the 1st instant, and therefore the statements of Massena having been defeated, and in consequence offered to evacuate Portugal, are totally unfounded. Lord Wellington, as we stated yesterday, waited the attack of the enemy, in the perfect confidence of success; but Massena had not yet dared to advance against him. The long delay of Massena can only be ascribed to a conviction that the force at his disposal is incompetent to the task of forcing the positions of the Allied Army; and it is highly probable he was waiting to be reinforced by Drouet's division from Spain before he made any attempt upon our lines. This delay, however, has afforded Lord Wellington an opportunity of strengthening still further his already formidable positions; and even in the event of Massena being joined by the division of Drouet, that addition (we suppose from 12 to 15,000 men) would not render Massena's army so formidable as to create any apprehensions of his being able to force Lord Wellington's triple line, so strongly fortified by nature, and by art, as we have already described it. Besides the private letters from Lisbon continue to represent the enemy's army as in great want of provisions—a fact which it would certainly be very difficult to dispute, from the consideration that so large an army must soon exhaust its provisions, while the Portuguese Militia, being in its rear, would prevent its receiving fresh supplies, unless escorted by a very formidable force indeed.—There seems no doubt of the success of Colonel Trant's enterprise against Coimbra, where he took between 5 and 6,000 prisoners, the greater part of whom, it is said, are about to embark at Oporto for England. It is also ascertained that Gen. Silveira made 1,400 prisoners at Figueira."—Hence, then, we are to believe, that the enemy has lost another 9 or 10 thousand men! Twenty more: kill them! Twenty

more: kill them too! Here, again, we have repeated, the assertions, that even a reinforcement of 15 or 20 thousand men will not make Massena so strong as to create on our side any apprehensions, so strong are our positions from nature as well as from art. And, mind, that we are here again, for the fifth time, assured that there can be no doubt that COLONEL TRANT made 5 or 6 thousand French prisoners at Coimbra. Nay, we are again told, that these prisoners are about to embark for England from Oporto; and that General Silveira had made another 1,400 Frenchmen prisoners. And, after this, we still make it matter of *boast* that Massena does not dare attack us in our lines three deep!—But, let us now take another view of the matter. Suppose that Massena should not attack us? This writer tells us, that our Viscount *prudently* does not advance against Massena. So that, if Massena should remain where he is, our army will, it would seem, from this writer's account, remain where it is; and, then, I take it, the campaign will have changed itself into something very much resembling a *siege*, with this peculiarity, that the beaten and starving party will be the besieger. What might be the effect of such a siege in other respects I shall not here attempt to inquire; but, with one thing we may, I think, lay our account; and that is, that the food and all other necessities, not only for the whole of the army, but for the whole of the people of Lisbon and the population within the lines, must find its way thither by sea, the expences of which I shall leave our financiers to estimate.—We have been told, that along with our army, the whole of the people of the country through which it passed, took flight, destroying all that part of their property which they could not carry away, and laying waste the whole country, so that there were no resources, of any sort, left for the enemy. This we were told over and over again. We were told it in all manner of shapes and ways. We had it in gross and in detail.—Now, if this was true, then must the little nook of land, which we still hold, be nearly covered with people as close as they can stand one by another, all of whom must have their food sent them by sea. And, if it was false, then has Massena some resources left in the country; and, of course, is able to maintain his army at the expence of the Portuguese.—The object of sending an army to Portugal was to defend that country against the French; it was to protect the

people of Portugal against the inroads, the extortions, and the violence of the French; and, as the only means of doing this, to keep the French out of Portugal, or to drive them out if they, by any chance, should get in. This, as I believe, it will not be denied, was the object of the campaign, and of the war, indeed, in that country. Whether this object is, or is not, likely to be accomplished, it is impossible for me, at present, to form an opinion, seeing how contradictory are the accounts that we have received. If the French should be beaten and taken, or if they should be again driven out of Portugal, even at some time hence; in either of these cases, though we may not be able to refrain from regretting the sufferings of the people in Portugal, we shall and must acknowledge that the object of the war has, so far, been accomplished. But, if neither of these should happen; if the French army should not be captured nor compelled to retreat; and, if all Portugal, except one little corner, should remain at their mercy; if this should be the case, *what shall we then say?*—That the present state of things in Portugal can long continue, is, however, by no means probable; for, if we cannot march out to the attack, and if Massena can remain where he is, it is improbable in the highest degree that he should not receive reinforcements; for, as to his communication with Almeida being cut off, the advance of DROLET has nearly disproved the fact. If we wait till he receives reinforcements, it will, I think, be attended with imminent danger; so that there appears to be no choice, on our part, but that of speedy attack or a speedy retreat.—Since writing the above, I perceive, there are, in the COURIER of this evening, accounts of Massena's having begun his retreat, after having, for some time, fed his army upon *stewed horses*.

KING'S ILLNESS.—In my last but one, at page 843, the Bulletins, or official Reports, of the state of the King's disorder, were brought down to the sixth instant, inclusive. Since that time, the following have been issued, all of them dated at Windsor Castle, and signed by Doctors WILLIS and REYNOLDS, in addition to the three who signed the Reports before.—TUESDAY, Nov. 6, 9 o'clock, P. M.—“His Majesty has had some sleep, and has appeared a little better throughout this day.”—WEDNESDAY, Nov. 7. “His Majesty had more sleep last night, and

" continues fully as well as in any part of yesterday."—SAME DAY, three o'clock.—" His Majesty is much the same as he was in the morning."—THURSDAY, Nov. 8. " His Majesty has had a little sleep, and continues nearly in the same state as yesterday."—SAME DAY, Eight o'clock, P. M.—" His Majesty has had a considerable degree of fever in the course of this day, but has slept since six o'clock, and is now asleep."—FRIDAY, Nov. 9. " His Majesty had several hours sleep, and appears rather better to-day."—SAME DAY, 8 o'clock, P. M.—" His Majesty has had several hours sleep, and has continued rather to improve."—SATURDAY, Nov. 10.—" We consider his Majesty, this morning, to be rather better than he has been for five or six days past."—SUNDAY, Nov. 11.—" His Majesty is still a little better this morning than he was yesterday."—SAME DAY, 9 o'clock P. M.—" His Majesty has a little more fever this evening than he had in the morning."—MONDAY, 12 Nov.—" Although his Majesty has passed the night with very little sleep, yet he appears in no respect worse than he was yesterday."—SAME DAY, 8 o'clock, P. M.—" His Majesty has had some hours sleep in the course of this day; and upon the whole appears better than he has been since the commencement of his illness."—TUESDAY, Nov. 13.—" His Majesty has had little or no sleep in the night, but continues as well as on the two preceding days."—From these reports it would seem, that the melancholy state of his Majesty remains what it was some days back, or not much changed for the better since the Parliament met, on the 1st instant. If no favourable alteration should take place before the meeting on Thursday, the Houses, I suppose, will not again separate, except from day-to-day, which, as Lord Holland suggested, on the first meeting, would certainly have been as well, especially when we consider a constant attendance, under such circumstances, as a mark of the anxiety of the Members, and of their respect for the kingly branch of the government.—Whatever tends to excite a notion, that the kingly office can be dispensed with, or the functions of it suspended or diminished or divided, must necessarily be injurious to that branch of our government, and, in times so critical as the present, may produce very mischievous consequences. And, therefore,

while, on the one hand, no indecent haste should be discovered to put the exercise of the Royal Authority into the hands of the Heir Apparent, there will, I hope, on the other hand, be no reluctance discovered to place it there as soon as it shall be found necessary, as soon as plain reason shall say, that the measure ought no longer to be delayed.—The state of things, at this moment, requires an uncommon degree of wisdom in their management. The minds of the people are at work. They are observers of all that passes. They notice every step. Nothing can be hidden from them. And, perhaps, on what is done, upon this occasion, will, in a great measure, depend their opinions, as to certain great points, for the future, and their conduct relating to those points.—It is now an ascertained fact, that the nation has been without a King, capable of attending to business, capable of executing the kingly functions, for some time. It is a fact now officially promulgated, that the King has been in his most afflicting state for more than two weeks; and, though I should not like to give my opinion, as to the precise time when the kingly authority ought to be put into the hands of the Prince of Wales, I can have no scruple in expressing my hope, that, while the present state of things exists, the two Houses of Parliament will not separate, except from day-to-day.—I agree, that, in every thing that is said as well as done, the greatest possible tenderness should be shewn towards the unfortunate Personage, whose malady is the cause of the proceedings now contemplated as likely to become necessary. But, at the same time, great care should be taken not to let the kingly office suffer in the estimation of the people, by saying or doing any thing that shall seem to argue any regret at seeing the powers of Royalty approaching the hands of the Prince, or by keeping those powers from him longer than a manifest regard to propriety demands; because, those powers are exercised, not for himself and his family alone, but for the whole of the people of the kingdom.—As to any associates with the Heir Apparent, no man, that I have heard of, now thinks of any such thing. The answer of the Prince to the PROPOSITIONS of 1788 has, I imagine, left no one unconvinced of the injurious tendency of any such scheme; and, indeed, except in a pamphlet by the elder GEORGE ROSE, published since the death

of Mr. PITT, and intended to eulogize his character, I have not, for many years past, seen any attempt, either direct or indirect, to justify those PROPOSITIONS, which almost all men of all parties and all sects and descriptions seem to have agreed in regarding not only as injurious towards the Prince himself, but as striking at the very root of the Kingly Office and Authority. That the King might be capable of exercising the functions of Royalty during his natural life, every man would wish; but, at the same time, that there should be as little as possible of suspension of the Royal Authority is not less, I am convinced, the universal wish of the people.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
November 13, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND.—*The Thanksgiving Prayer for the late abundant Harvest.*

At the Court at Windsor, the 17th of October, 1810, present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.—It is this day ordered by his Majesty in Council, that his Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury do prepare a form of *Prayer and Thanksgiving to Almighty God for the abundant Harvest*, to be read immediately after the General Thanksgiving on Sunday the 18th day of November next, and to be continued until Sunday the 25th of the same month inclusive; and it is hereby further ordered, that his Majesty's Printer do forthwith print a competent number of the said form of Prayer and Thanksgiving, that the same may be forthwith sent round and read as above directed in the several Churches and Chapels throughout those parts of the United Kingdom called England and Ireland.—W. FAWKENER.

The following is the Form of Prayer and Thanksgiving to Almighty God, for his mercy in having vouchsafed to bestow on this nation an abundant crop and favourable harvest, to be read in all Churches, &c. on the 18th instant.

O Almighty God! who openest wide thine hand, and satisfiest the desire of every living thing, we thank Thee that Thou hast reserved unto us the appointed Weeks of Harvest, and caused our valleys to be covered with Corn.—Sustain and keep alive in us, we beseech Thee, such a sense of Thy bountiful goodness, that

we forget not in the pride of our hearts, the Hand from which every blessing flows. It is Thy mercy, O God, that humblest us in want. It is Thy mercy that feedeth us with plenteousness. Protect and cover us, we pray Thee, from the abuses of each; lest we be full, and deny Thee, and say, who is the Lord; or lest we be poor and steal, and take the Name of our God in vain. More especially at this time dispose us to acknowledge with all humility, Thy good Providence, in supplying our wants at the moment of approaching necessity, in upholding our cause against the increased aggression of our enemies, and in continuing Thy protection to our most gracious Sovereign, the Father of his people, and the Dispenser of Thy mercies.—These praises and prayers we humbly offer at the Throne of Grace, through the merits and mediation of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, Amen.

ENGLAND.—*Prayer for the Restoration of the King's Health.*

. At the Council-Chamber, Whitehall, the 5th of Nov. 1810, present the Lords of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council.—It is this day ordered by their Lordships, that his Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury do prepare a Form of Prayer to Almighty God for the restoration of his Majesty's health: and it is hereby further ordered, that his Majesty's Printer do forthwith print a competent number of copies of the said Form of Prayer, that the same may be forthwith sent round and read in the several churches throughout those parts of the United Kingdom called England and Ireland. CHERWYND.

At the Council-Chamber, Whitehall, the 5th of Nov. 1810, present, the Lords of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council.—It is this day ordered by their Lordships, that every Minister and Preacher, as well of the established Church in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, as those of the episcopal Communion, protected and allowed by an Act passed in the tenth year of her late Majesty Queen Anne, cap. 7. intituled "An Act to prevent the disturbing those of the episcopal Communion in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, in the exercise of their religious worship, and in the use of the Liturgy of the Church of England; and for repealing the Act passed in the Parliament of Scotland, intituled An Act against

irregular baptisms and marriages," do, at some time during the exercise of the Divine Service in such respective church, congregation, or assembly, put up their prayers to Almighty God for the restoration of his Majesty's health.—CHETWYND.

PRAYER.—Form of Prayer for his Majesty's Recovery, prepared by the Archbishop of Canterbury, To be used immediately before the Litany, when it shall be read; and when it shall not be read, immediately before the Prayer for all Conditions of Men; in all Cathedral, Collegiate, and Parochial Churches and Chapels in England and Ireland, as soon as the Ministers thereof shall receive the same; and to be continued during his Majesty's present indisposition.

O God, who commandest us, when we are in trouble, to open our hearts, and to tell out our sorrows unto thee in prayer, and dost promise to listen with compassion to our humble supplications, give us grace so to approach thee, that we offend not in word or thought; put away from us every impatient feeling, silence every unworthy expression: let not our prayers assume the language of complaint, nor our sorrows the character of despair.—Upon thee, O God, and upon the multitude of thy mercies, we repose our grief. To thee alone we look for that blessing, for which our hearts bleed.—Raise, we implore thee, our beloved Sovereign from the bed of sickness and of affliction; soothe his parental cares; restore him to his family, and to his people.—And of thy great mercy, O God! look down with pity and compassion on the accumulated sorrows of the Royal Family. Give them strength, and courage, and virtue, to meet with pious submission the grievous trial to which they are exposed; and whether it shall seem fit to thine unerring wisdom, presently to remove from us this great calamity, or for a time to suspend it over us, teach both them and us patiently to adore thy inscrutable Providence, and to bless thy holy name for ever and ever.—These prayers and supplications we humbly address to thy Divine Majesty, in the name, and through the mediation of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Amen.

BRAZILS AND BUENOS AYRES.—*Note of Lord Strangford to the Junta at the River Plate.—Dated Rio Janeiro, July 1, 1810.*

His Majesty's ship Bedford is arrived at

this port with 13 Spaniards, who were taken out of the Neptune, coming from Lima, under very peculiar circumstances; for which the English Captain must be accountable. In the name of my Sovereign, I instantly remonstrated with him in the strongest terms, that he should deliver to me the above-mentioned Spaniards, which being complied with, I instantly placed them at the disposal of the Spanish Minister.—The conduct of the Captain of the Bedford, with respect to the said vessel and men, I entirely disown, and am absolutely ignorant how he will be able to justify himself with his government, under such delicate circumstances. Upon this occasion the detained men shall be sent to that city, and I beg in the most serious manner, that your Excellency will overlook the conduct of a mere individual, when the character of his nation is at stake; and that it may not in the slightest manner disturb the harmony and friendship which subsists between the two nations.—I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the sentiments of my esteem and respect, and have the honour to be, &c. &c.

CASSEL.—*Commercial Decree of Jerome Napoleon, 11th, Oct. 1810.*

On inspection of the Imperial Decree of the 5th August of this year, with the Tariff annexed of the 5th of August, respecting the Duties on Colonial Produce, in pursuance of the necessary Continental System, to put an end to the trade of England: and on hearing the Report of our Minister of Finances,—We have decreed and do decree as follows:—[Here follows the Tariff of 5th of August.]—2. Our Minister of Finance shall have the power to enforce this Tariff.—3. This Decree shall, like that of the 26th August last, respecting the confiscation of Colonial Produce, take effect upon goods in transit as well as in port.

FRANCE.—*Commercial Decree, Copied from the Times News-paper of the 2. Nov.—Said to have been received, under date of Paris, 19. Oct. 1810.*

Art. All Merchandizes of whatever description the produce of the English manufactories, which are at present in France, or in any country (without exception) where French troops are stationed, shall be publicly burnt.—Art. 2. There

shall every where be established especial Courts of Judicature to detect Smugglers, and persons concerned in illicit traffic; and to inflict punishment by imprisonment, for a term not less than three, nor more than ten years.—In addition to the above articles, there is another which specifies the punishment on the Merchant, or Smuggler, viz. to be branded on the forehead with the letters V. D.

SWEDEN.—Letter said to have been written by BERNADOTTE to the Old King, upon the news of his election being communicated to him.

SIRE,—I will not attempt to represent to your Majesty the feelings by which I was pervaded, when I understood that a nation, highly celebrated in the annals of the world, had thought fit to direct their attention towards a military character, who owes every thing to the affection of his country. It will be equally difficult for me to express my gratitude and astonishment at the wonderful magnanimity with which your Majesty presented, as your successor, a person bound to you by no ties. The more your Majesty has endeavoured to accomplish this object for the Swedish people, the more infinite is my gratitude.—I do not conceal from myself the extent nor difficulty of my duties; but if I can trust to my own heart, I shall fulfil them. There never existed in the soul of a man a more powerful spring of action, and never was there a happier opportunity presented for him to dedicate his existence to the welfare of a nation.—As soon as your Majesty's letter was delivered to me by the Count Morner, I hastened to forward it to his Majesty the Emperor and King. He was pleased completely to crown his goodness towards me, by authorising me to become the adopted son of his Majesty. According to what you have been pleased to address to me, I shall hasten my departure, to lay at your Majesty's feet my grateful homage, and to make your Majesty the depositor of my oath. To this day I have placed my whole fame and character on serving my country, but France will, I venture to flatter myself, assist me in my exertions for the benefit of Sweden. She cannot without emotion see one of her children destined by the voice of a magnanimous people to govern a kingdom which has been long numbered among her Allies.—I am, with profoundest

respect, Sire,—Your most devoted and obedient,
J. BERNADOTTE.

PRUSSIA. —*Commercial Decree.*—Berlin, 10 Oct. 1810.

We, Frederick William, by the grace of God, King of Prussia, &c. make known hereby, that a desire to support the design of the general continental system, as it is more specifically set forth in the Imperial French Decrees, and to accomplish more completely the regulations respecting commerce, and to carry them fully into effect, has moved us to decree as follows:—1. The commerce of England, and with her colonies and independencies, shall be governed completely and entirely throughout our States by the former decrees and regulations for the empire of France.—2. All colonial produce conveyed by sea, without respect to its origin, shall be considered as belonging to England, and as being conveyed for the benefit of her merchants.—3. All colonial produce coming by sea shall, without respect to its having a French license, be subject to the duties stated in the following tariff, on its conveyance into our territory, whether it be derived from prizes taken, ships confiscated in our ports, or otherwise.—[Then follows the tariff of Trianon, but it is added that a higher tax upon tea is under consideration, and will be imposed.]—4. Those increased duties shall be paid upon all colonial produce entering our kingdom after the 20th of this month, and shall with respect to the produce seized on our account be immediately paid by the buyer after the sale, and with regard to goods imported from neighbouring states shall be paid by the importer before unloading the vessel. And should the importer not be able to pay, or give security for the same, in such case the goods are to be detained under the care of the Custom-house.—5. The laws in favour of inland manufactures, with respect to the Consumption Tax of the raw materials, remain unaltered; inasmuch as a higher duty upon these only injures the industry of the Continent, and makes the contral and trade in English manufactures more profitable. Those manufacturers who shall be convicted of disposing of materials received for the manufacture, at the lower tax, to consumers or tradesmen, shall for ever forfeit this privilege; and moreover, as a fine, pay the value of the goods so sold.—6. The colonial produce confiscated in

our ports, which is either received from foreigners, or are by the buyers declared, to be for sale to foreign countries, as also that which enters from neighbouring States into our dominions, not for inland use, but for transit, and actually is exported, is free from the new Consumption Duty, but remains subject, in all respects, to the increased Transit Duty formerly imposed upon such produce; and so long as it remains in the country, is subject to the constant control of the Custom-house Officers; they must, therefore, before they are expedited, upon entering into the territory, be examined as to their quality, accurately weighed, loaded, and their actual export out of the country be attested by the proper officer.—The person expediting, or carrier, who does not prove the regular delivery of the goods within the time allowed by the laws of the Customs, is obliged to pay the additional amount of the new Consumption Tax.—7. Every omission to declare the entry of colonial produce at the frontier Custom-houses of the country, incurs the confiscation of the same. Hitherto the Custom Laws have not assigned a greater punishment; on this footing it therefore remains.—Every person is bound to abide by this regulation, and our ministers are commissioned duly to publish the same, and to see to their execution, and to watch incessantly over the punctual obedience to them.

FRANCE.—*The Distribution of the Forces in September, 1810.*

From the Imperial Printing Office at Paris, a little work has been issued, under the title of "Situation of the troops of the French Empire, at the Epoch of the 1st of September, 1810." It comprises a full account of all French auxiliary and foreign regiments in the French service, and among others the following:—

1. FRENCH INFANTRY.—122 French regiments of the line, each 5 battalions strong. Of these 23 are united with others, leaving 99. These 99 are disposed as follows:—

51 in Spain and Portugal.

5 in Naples.

11 in Italy and Tuscany.

4 in Illyria.

5 in Holland.

4 in camp before Boulogne.

12 in Germany with the division of Friant, Gudin, and Morand: 32 regiments

of light infantry, of 3 battalions, 5 of which are incorporated with others, leaving 27 thus situated:

15 in Spain.

6 on the road thither.

3 in Germany.

2 in Illyria.

1 in Naples.

10 Provisional half brigades on the way to Spain.

4 Provisional regiments of various kinds. They make the second division of the rear guard of the army of Spain.

2. FRENCH CAVALRY.

2 Carbine regiments in France.

14 Cuirassier Regiments; 4 in Germany.

1 in Spain, the remainder in France.

30 Dragoon regiments; 25 in Spain.

28 Chasseur regiments; 1 in Germany.

5 in Italy.

3 in Holland.

•2 in Naples.

3 in Italy.

9 in Spain.

2 in Illyria.

1 before Boulogne.

11 Hussar regiments (the 11th was formerly Dutch.)

6 in Spain.

1 in Italy.

1 in Holland.

1 in Germany.

1 Provisional regiment of light horse in Spain.

10 Provisional dragoon regiments of 6 or 8 companies, and two squadrons in Spain.

2 Provisional Chasseur regiments of 5 companies in Spain.

3. IMPERIAL ALLIED TROOPS AT PRESENT IN SPAIN.

Swiss,

4 Regiments of the line.

1 Walser battalion.

1 Neufchatel battalion, with

1 Company of Artillery.

Italian,

2 Light Infantry regiments.

5 Regiments of the line.

2 Squadrons Napoleon Dragoons.

2 Ditto Royal Jagers.

1 Regiment of Artillery on foot.

1 Company of Artillery on horseback.

5 Companies of Artillery Train.

Neapolitan,

1 Light Regiment.

2 Regiments of the Line Infantry.

2 Regiments of Horse Jagers.

Rhenish,

1 Regiment of Infantry (two battalions.)

Baden,

1 Company of Artillery and Train.

1 Regiment of Infantry.

Hesse Darmstadt,

1 Company of Infantry.

2 Regiments of Ditto.

Nassau,

1 Squadron of Horse Jagers.

3 Regiments of Infantry.

Saxon,

1 Regiment of Infantry.

Wurtzburgh,

1 Battalion from Frankfort, Walduck, Schwartzburg, Radolstadt, Sanderhausen, Lippe Detmold, Lippe Bückburgh, and Reuss, 1 Company from each.

Warsaw,

3 Regiments of Infantry.

1 Company of Sappers.

Dutch,

2 Regiments of Infantry of the Line.

1 Squadron of Hussars.

2 Companies of Artillery.

1 Company of Train.

1 Company of Miners.

Westphalia,

3 Regiments of Infantry of the Line.

1 Battalion of Light Infantry.

1 Company of Foot Artillery.

1 Regiment of Horse Jagers.

Duchy of Berg,

3 Regiments of Infantry.

1 Company of Artillery and Train.

Then follow a List of the Regiments of Foreign troops, of about 30 Legions, or 59 Squadrons, and Gens d'Armerie. It gives the names of six Inspecting Generals, 36 Sub Inspecting Generals, 54 Commissary-Generals, 436 Commissaries of War.

SWITZERLAND.—*Measures adopted in the different Cantons for the sequestration of English and Colonial Goods.*—22d Oct. 1810.

The Government of Fribourg ordered, on the 15th of October, the sequestration of English and colonial merchandize, the confiscation of the former, and the levying of the duties fixed by tariff on all the colonial produce at present in the canton, or which shall enter it in future.—Similar measures were taken on the same day by the Government of Soleure, and it has ordered that no depot of colonial produce

be permitted on the frontiers of France.

—In the canton of Schaffhausen all English and colonial goods have been ordered to be placed in depots. Every person who wishes to get away colonial produce from the magazines, where it is deposited, must pay the duties conformably to the tariff.—The government of Vaud has subjected all colonial produce to a tariff, and has prohibited every depot of that commodity on the frontiers of France.—The canton of St. Gall ordered, on the 16th of October, that all English merchandize should be sequestrated and confiscated; that colonial produce should be sequestrated and subjected to a tariff.—The government of Thurgau adopted the same measures on the same day.—That of Uri has ordered the sequestration of colonial produce; there was no English merchandize in that canton.—The Lower Unterwald has adopted the same measures.—The Grand Council of the exterior Rhodes of Appenzell, was convoked on the 10th, for the purpose of adopting similar resolutions.—On the 15th, the government of the Grisons had already ordered the declaration of all the colonial produce to be found in that canton.—The measures taken by the Cantonal Governments could not be simultaneous, because they lie at very different distances from the Central Government; but all of them adopt successively the same resolutions.—A Commission appointed by M. the Landamman is employed about the means of maintaining in Switzerland the system which has been adopted.—M. the Landamman has invited all the Cantonal Governments to cause an account to be taken of all the colonial merchandize in Switzerland, for the purpose of ascertaining such as belongs to foreign merchants.

COBBETT'S**Parliamentary Debates:**

The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Volumes of the above Work will be published in about a Fortnight.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 29.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1810. [Price 1s.

"Sir Francis Burdett agreed in almost all the sentiments of the Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Whitbread) who had just spoken; but he could not content himself with merely stating his opinion as a protest against the course proposed by Ministers, but he felt it to be his duty to divide the House upon the question. He conceived that course to be so indecorous and insulting to the House, that he would betray his duty to it if he consented to any compromise. If he had had any notice of the meeting of Parliament on the last day, he should have felt it his duty to have attended in his place, and to have made some observations respecting the necessity of providing for the due maintenance of the executive power, without which there could be no legitimate Government in the country. It would be a dangerous thing, indeed, to teach such a lesson to the people, as to make them believe that the executive Government was merely a farce; that the kingly office was not necessary; and that all the functions of it might, without injury to the public, be discharged by the Ministers. There was no doctrine which could possibly bring the kingly office into greater contempt. What could be worse than placing the crown upon a cushion, and leaving all its prerogatives and attributes to the pleasure of Ministers? He felt, in common with all his Majesty's subjects, deep sorrow for the calamity with which he was afflicted, a calamity which had now visited him for the second time; but however much he felt for the King, as a man, he felt still more for the calamities, and perils, and dangers of the country."—

Speech in the House of Commons, 15th Nov. 1810.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CORN CROPS, BREAD, PRAYER.—Reader, in my last Number, at page 919, I inserted the Order of the King's Privy Council, which is dated on the 17th of October, and at issuing, or, rather making of which Order the King himself is said to have been present. This Order, as you will have seen, commands his Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury to prepare a Form of Prayer and Thanksgiving to Almighty God for the **ABUNDANT HARVEST**. Then follows the Prayer, as it has been published in all the newspapers, and in the Prayer, God, through the merits and mediation of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, is thanked for having caused our valleys to be *covered with corn*. The first day appointed for the using of this Prayer, in the Churches, is the 18th instant; and, as you, reader, may, perhaps, be just going to Church or coming from Church; as you may, possibly, be just going to say, or just come from saying the Prayer, at the moment you will open this Register, I shall endeavour to avail myself of this sober and serious state of your mind, and to impress upon that mind some useful truths upon the subject of the *Corn Crops* and the *Price of Bread*.—Of late, enormous has been the abuse, heaped upon me, for having, in the month of June last, given it as my opinion, that the crop of corn generally, and of wheat in particular, would be very short, and, of course, that corn and bread would be very dear.—The article to which I here refer, will be found in Vol. XVII,

under the date of 23d of June, and at page 935. I had, in a former article, at page 880, given my reason for this opinion, namely, that hundreds and thousands of acres of wheat had been *ploughed up*, and that a great deal of what remained unploughed up was *so thin upon the ground*, that half a crop was not to be expected from it. And, in my article of the 23rd of June, I, upon these, and other grounds that were stated, said: "From America, then, nothing of any consequence can be expected; and the question is, whether Buonaparté will, or will not, permit corn to be sent from the Baltic to England; if the former, the price may possibly be kept a little down; but, if he does not permit us to get corn from the Baltic, my sincere opinion is that wheat will be 30 shillings a bushel, and the *quartern loaf half a crown before Christmas*."—Supposing this opinion to have been wholly erroneous, and founded upon false grounds. Supposing that it had not been at all warranted by the then appearances. Still, it was, as Mr. ARTHUR YOUNG has observed, in his letter to me, published in the present volume, at page 184, impossible that the publishing of the opinion could *do any harm*; and, Mr. YOUNG adds, that he was *glad to see my apprehensions in print*. So far, however, were the venal prints from being of Mr. YOUNG's way of thinking, that they not only represented the publication of my apprehensions as *mischievous in itself*, but as proceeding from a *desire to make corn and bread dear*, and thereby to injure the people of this country, to produce

distress and misery amongst them; forgetting, in the heat of their charity, or not being aware, that very few men would be greater sufferers from this cause than myself.—But, in what was my opinion so very erroneous? Any man may be deceived by appearances; and I am not at all anxious about the fate of my opinion upon this matter; yet, as so much as been said about it, in the venal prints in every part of the kingdom, it seems no more than due to myself, and I am sure it is due to the public, to inquire a little how far I was *grounded* in the opinion that I gave.—It will, I think, be allowed, that I have never set myself up as a *conjurer*. At least, I am quite sure, that it will be allowed, that these Venal •Gentlemen have never allowed me to possess any powers of penetration beyond those which fall to the share of mortals in general. This being the case, it is, I think, fair to say, that my opinion of the 23d of June must be tried by the *appearances of the Crops at that time*; and, as I saw a great part of the wheat fields without any straw in them, and naturally concluded, that the quantity of wheat would be in proportion to that of the straw, my opinion was, that the quantity of wheat would be very short.—Now, what was the result; What does the High Priest of the Venal Tribe, the Morning Post writer; what does he say was the result? How does his description of the crop agree, or disagree with my opinion of the 23d of June? I am now about to quote what he said, in his paper of the 12th of September, and what, indeed, was said by almost all the news-papers in the kingdom.—“We have this day the happiness of congratulating the people of the United Kingdom on a fact which affords the most unequivocal testimony of the satisfactory state of the harvest, the price of Bread has been lowered five-pence in the Peck Loaf. What will those wise and good men say, now, those *pure patriots* who so sedulously sent forth the comfortable assurance that the quartern loaf would be at *half-a-crown by Christmas*, and who did all they could, unfortunately too, not without some success, to raise it as high as it would go, by propagating exaggerated and groundless alarm in the mean time. We have now had three successive weeks of fine weather, during which the far greater part of the corn has been saved. The produce is every where great. Of the last year’s crop, it required the produce

“of 90 to 100 *wheat-sheaves* on the average, to make a bushel; whereas that quantity “is obtained in the present year from 50 “to 60 *sheaves*. Barley and Oats are “*equally abundant*.”—Now, if this was true, what need have I of any more to justify, fully to *justify*, my opinion of the 23d of June? What was I to judge from but from the *then appearances*? What was I to judge from but the quantity of *straw* upon the ground; that is to say, from the quantity of *sheaves* that there was likely to be? How was I to *know*, and how was I to *imagine* that each sheaf and each ear would produce nearly twice as much corn as each sheaf and ear of the preceding crop?—Thus, upon the shewing of the Venal Writers themselves; upon their own acknowledgments; upon their own distinct and unqualified assertions, my opinion was not only not greatly erroneous, but it was wonderfully correct; for if the sheaf of this year had yielded no more than the sheaf of last year, the quartern loaf would, even at this time, have sold at *half a crown*, at least, seeing that, with the nearly double yielding of the sheaf, that loaf now sells at *one shilling and three pence halfpenny*. The venal writers are thus answered, then, without any further ado. They are twisted up in a web of their own weaving; and I might here safely leave them to the contempt of the public.—But, besides the very favourable change in the crops, which no human foresight could be expected to reach, these candid Gentlemen appear to have wholly forgotten, that I attached a *condition* to my opinion of high price, namely, that Buonaparté should *not permit any corn to be exported from the Baltic to England*. It was upon this condition that my opinion of the price, in some measure, depended; and, it is perfectly notorious, that *many thousands of quarters have been imported every week from that time to the present day*. It is not less notorious, that the price of corn and of bread has been kept down by these importations. Nay, I believe, that there can be no doubt at all, that, if the importations were now to stop, the price would be very greatly augmented, if it did not attain (in spite of the double producing sheaves) the height that I predicted, on the condition of a stoppage to importation.—Let us, however, admit, that, contrary to my opinion and my expectations, *the harvest has been abundant*; and, then, that opens to us, in spite of ourselves, another view of the subject, much more interesting to the public than any

thing can be, which relates either to my judgment or my wishes.—The harvest has now, by the highest authority, been thought; nay, it has been declared and proclaimed, to have been *abundant*; and, by the performance of the most solemn act; the people, the whole nation, are to join in ratifying the fact, in the form of an appeal to the Searcher of Hearts. This fact, therefore, I shall now take to be indubitable. I shall take it to be as impossible to be questioned, as the fact of the Sun's giving light. But, at the same time, it is not a fact better proved; it is not a fact more certain; it is not a fact less to be questioned, than is the fact, that *great importations of corn* have been all the year and are still going on. Whence inevitably results one of two things, either that these importations are *not necessary* for the supplying this nation with bread, and, of course, ought not to be permitted to drain away our *remaining gold*, in which this corn is paid for; or, that England is brought to such a pass, that, even when there is an *abundant harvest*, a harvest so abundant as to call for an order from the government for the people to return particular thanks to Almighty God on account of such abundance; aye, that England is brought to such a pass, that, even in times of her greatest internal abundance, she stands in need of the aid of foreign countries, countries now at the nod of her implacable enemy, to supply her people with bread.—As this is a dilemma, which the Venal Gentleman of the Morning Post seems not to have foreseen, it is but fair to leave him to time to choose the horn on which he shall be exhibited; and, in the meanwhile, reader, we will take a look at what he said, on the 13th of September, about the propriety of a *Prayer* upon this occasion.—“We are ever ready to offer up our prayers to the Almighty whilst suffering under the immediate pressure of misfortune: when we want rain or sunshine, we appoint Fast Days to interest Divine Providence in our behalf, and to entreat that he would bestow upon us whatever our immediate necessities point out to us as being essentially necessary towards prosperity, or that he would avert some threatened calamity. But when our prayers are heard, and our wants supplied, *even to profusion*, how very negligent we are in acknowledging the blessing, and in offering up our thanksgiving to the Giver of all good for his merciful

interference.—I am led into these reflections by observing the *plentiful and very excellent appearance of the present harvest*; and there are few things have given me more pleasure than being told by an *aged gleaner*, that she and her little daughter had, with ease, this season, gleaned as much wheat as would supply her with four bushels of excellent flour. Last year she scarcely gleaned *half the quantity*, and that *not so good*; the best of the corn was of an inferior quality, but that which was left by the reapers, was scarcely worth the labour of gathering, particularly as the heavy rains which fell after the corn was cut, and before it was taken in, exposed the scattered heads to be almost entirely destroyed; not only affording a smaller quantity of flour, but of an *unwholesome quality*. This year, on the other hand, the *very worst* of the heads of corn are *well filled*, and the gleaners have been able to gather it in excellent condition, from the long continuation of dry weather after the corn was cut.—This appears to me so important a blessing, that if our hearts do not *expand with gratitude*, we are *unworthy the Divine favour*; and I do conceive that we are called upon to offer up our praises and our thanksgivings in the most public and solemn manner.—Of this opinion the government appear to have been, and, accordingly, in about a month afterwards, the Prayer was, as we have seen, ordered. Acquiescing then, in this opinion, and continuing, of course, to take the premises as indubitable, let me now beg the reader to look at the actual price of the *quartern loaf*. This price is 1s. 3½d. This, then, is the price at a season of abundance; just after the close of an *abundant harvest*; and on the very day appointed for a General Prayer and Thank-giving for that abundant harvest. This is the price, which the people of England have now to pay in times of *plenty*; a price at which 12 shillings, which is about the average of the country labourer's wages, will purchase about 9 ½ quartern loaves, rather less than 42 pounds of bread,* which, supposing the labourer's family to consist of

* Weight of Bread according to Law.

	lbs.	oz.	dr.
The Peck Loaf	17	6	0
The Half-peck Loaf	8	11	0
The Quartern Loaf	4	5	8
The Half-quartern Loaf	2	2	12
	2	6	2

4 persons, 2 children besides the man and his wife, will give each of them $1\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of bread a day, supposing them to want neither *meat, drink, clothing, lodging, or fire*; and, if you give the labourer 15 shillings a week, he has 3 shillings left for all these purposes.—Well, but how stands the matter if viewed in the way of comparison? The quartern loaf is now 1s. 3d. $\frac{1}{2}$, and we take the fact for certain that this is a season of *abundance*; what, then, would the price be, if this were a season of *scarcity*? But, to our comparison. This is a year of *abundance*, and of so great abundance as to call for a general Thanksgiving. Now, in the year 1792 (that is to say, by the by, the year before the war against the “Jacobins” of France began) the average price of the quartern loaf, during the whole year, was 6d. $\frac{1}{4}$, much less than *half* of what the price now is. See Political Register, 11th August, 1804, Vol. VI. page 239, where there is a statement of the average price of the quartern loaf for every year for more than *half a century back*.—In the year 1792, when the price of the quartern loaf, during the year, was only 6d. $\frac{1}{4}$, there was not, I believe, any Prayer and Thanksgiving on account of an abundant harvest; whence we may fairly conclude, that the abundance was not so very great and conspicuous as it is now; and, how are we, then, to account for the *difference in the price of the loaf*? If we allow, that this season is not more plentiful than that of 1792, still we are to account for this amazing difference in the price; a difference of about one fourth *more than half*. The price is now about one fourth *more than double* of what it was in 1792. How are we to account for this?—The MORNING POST accounts for it as arising from *fraud and rogues* of various sorts, and seems to wish to see the price lowered by some species of *force*, or, at least of *summary justice*. There are four articles, which have appeared in this print, since the 8th instant inclusive, which I shall here insert, and to which I beg the reader's attention. —The first, that of the 8th instant, was in the following words:—“We are happy to find that the worthy Lord Mayor has attended to our recommendation upon this subject. A small reduction, a farthing in the quartern loaf, takes place this day in the price of bread. We understand that the Lord Mayor, upon a consideration of the usual returns, and a comparison of the relative prices of wheat and flour,

“would have felt himself justified in reducing the assize sevenpence in the peck loaf. The quartern loaf would then have been sold for fourteen pence. Upon a representation however, from the bakers, that hundreds of them must be ruined by so sudden and excessive a fall (most of them having laid in their stock at an exorbitant price), and that in the ensuing week bread would again rise, his Lordship was obliged to relinquish his benevolent determination. The interview between his Lordship and the bakers lasted for nearly two hours; in the course of which his Lordship shewed that he was fully acquainted with the artifices by which the price of bread had been kept up, and that he was determined to frustrate them. There has not been so great a disproportion for the last 34 years between the prices of wheat and meal as at present. The bakers pretended to account for the enormous price of the latter by the want of water in the early part of the summer to work the mills; an excuse which the Lord Mayor very properly remarked they certainly had no pretext for assigning for some time past. The zeal and ability with which his Lordship has taken up this very important subject, afford a well-grounded hope that the abuses which have contributed to keep up the price of bread will be checked at least, if not wholly removed before he retires from office.”—The reader will do well to guard himself against the belief of any part of what is here said to have proceeded from the LORD MAYOR, of which the writer of the Morning Post could know no more than any one of Mr. Perceval's coachmen, or, indeed, one of his coach-horses. It is all *fiction* from the beginning to the end; for, though the Lord Mayor is what he is here described to be, he is not less just and considerate towards the sellers than he is towards the buyers of bread; and he knows as well as any man living, that, to attempt to force prices downwards is, in reality, to force them upwards; because, to the real current value of the article you thereby add the charge for risk from popular violence and the certainty of popular odium, which no man will encounter voluntarily.—On the 9th instant the same writer resumed the subject thus:—“I find it to be a fact, that there are people in the market who combine in their own persons the triple character of Factor, Miller, and Baker;

"nay, that it has become as common for
 "millers to take bakers' shops, and put in
 "their own servants, as it is for brewers to
 "take public houses! and the same con-
 "sequences will always follow, namely,
 "a bad article at a low price. But even
 "when *bonâ fide* sales of flour are made, it
 "is a common trick to deliver false in-
 "voices, and charge 5s. or 6s. a sack more
 "than is actually paid! Sometimes a
 "sack or two of remarkably fine flour for
 "Confectioners may be sold at a very
 "high price, and this is *foisted in* to aug-
 "ment the average price, although it is
 "not fit for bread at all."—To the next
 paragraph, stupid and brutal as it is, I so-
 licit the particular attention of the public,
 that public who have so long heard this
 same venal print talking of the *coarseness*
 and *vulgarity* of others; and, I take this
 occasion to observe, that this charge of
 coarseness and vulgarity is never prefer-
 red, except as the means of throwing dis-
 reputation upon truth.—The paragraph
 makes part of a letter, evidently written
 by the editor himself, under the feigned
 title of a letter from a poor unfortunate
 creature, now in London, called the
 "HOTTEHOT VENUS," to LORD "GRIN-
 "WELL," meaning Lord Grenville. The
 paragraph is as follows, from the Morn-
 ing Post of the 9th instant.—"Dere
 "many good tings in dis country; plen-
 "ty money and plenty to eat; de worst
 "is the bread so dear; dey charge great
 "deal for small loaf; dis very bad, as
 "plenty of corn; must be bad rogues
 "somewhere. *Hang de rascals or pillory,*
 "as toder day in de Haymarket. People
 "tell me Mare look into it; if Mare look
 "into it, *why he no lower de bread more den*
 "*pcnny when ought to full sevenpence.* Dey
 "say baker bread-men be ruined if do,
 "'cause dey buy much flour at high
 "price; whose fault dat? dey no ob-
 "liged to run before market; dey buy
 "when high, tinking it will be great deal
 "more dear. Dey fools to believe dat
 "*liar* Cobbett and speculate. What bu-
 "siness dey speculate? Me tink Mare
 "ought to say, "If you baker bread-men
 "gamble, must take consequence; you no
 "business to speculate if can't afford to
 "run risk. What *de Devil* right have you
 "to expect de Public to suffer because
 "you fools? If ruined serve you right.
 "No tell me bread ought not fall dis
 "week, *cause* must rise next, better say
 "will be dear next year, so ought be
 "sold at half-crown dis. If you out in

"calculations like de *Newgate bird*, you is
 "de peoples dat should suffer, and not de
 "poor honest hard work-man, so no *dam*
 "nonsense, lower de quartern loaf." Dat
 "me tink should be said by Mare—My
 "Lord, your sarvant."—Now, reader,
 when you have had the patience to read
 this through, I beg you, either before or
 after you have been to the Prayer and
 Thanksgiving, to consider soberly of the
 tendency of the print in which it was
 published. I beg you to consider what
 sort of persons those must be, who,
 in any way whatever, and in any degree
 however small, contribute towards the
 support or encouragement of such a
 publication. And, I put it to your good
 sense, to your sense of propriety and
 your regard for decency, whether it be
 not your duty to do all that in you lies to
 put down a thing so offensive to public
 morals and so directly tending to the de-
 struction of even the forms of law and of
 justice.—This paragraph, you will ob-
 serve, is taken from a print, known by
 the name of the "FASHIONABLE WORLD'S"
 news-paper. This is the print, which ad-
 dresses itself more immediately to the
 Fashionable part of this Metropolis; and,
 if we are to judge of the readers by what
 they read, what are we to think of them?
 What are we to think of that father of a
 family, who can admit such a publication
 within his doors? Can we regard such a
 man as worthy of respect, or, indeed, as
 fit for the society of people of honourable
 minds?—Our country is, in many re-
 spects, *under a cloud*; but, in no way what-
 ever is it so much disgraced and disho-
 noured as by these venal writers; men
 without talent; men who do what no talent,
 even of the very humblest sort, would sub-
 mit to; the miserable instruments of
 MEANNESS, MERCENARINESS, and
 MALIGNITY. Talk of an *enlightened*
 people! Amongst what people upon earth,
 but this, would such a print be suffered to
 exist, much less be encouraged and sup-
 ported?—We left this writer *cursing*, on
 the 9th, be not surprised, therefore, if you
 find him *praying* on the 14th.—"Yes-
 "terday the Lord Mayor inspected the
 "Meal-weighers' Reports, and ordered
 "the price of Bread to be continued at
 "1s. 3½d. the quartern loaf of wheaten,
 "and 1s. 2d. household.—Every week
 "serves more and more to prove that the
 "most extensive iniquitous proceedings
 "must be resorted to by the dealers in
 "flour to keep up the price of that article,

"and thereby mock the bounty and blessings of Providence, so eminently bestowed upon the land in the late abundant harvest. It is most vexatious and melancholy to contemplate, that while we are in our prayers returning thanks to Heaven for its distinguished favour in this respect, and the price of wheat continues almost every market day to fall, the price of flour, by which that of bread is regulated, should thus iniquitously be kept up, in sinful defiance of the manifold bounty and mercy of God. The worthy Lord Mayor must, we are persuaded, feel as much grieved on this occasion as ourselves, and we have no doubt that he will use every means, which the extent of his high office affords, of correcting so crying an evil, and doing justice to the Public, who look to him with confidence for redress, as far as redress is in his power."—Thus caps the climax of craft, cant, and cajolery, in which triple quality this writer excels all his fellow-labourers, though they are, by no means few in number. I put it to you, reader, whether there ever was, at any former period, either in England or any other country, an instance of such despicable cant such miserable ribaldry, such bald and barefaced balderdash, having met with encouragement and support? Now, I put to you if you be one of its supporters, whether you act the part of a man without honour or of sense. In many publications in AMERICA you meet with what is rough, and, if you will, very coarse. A great deal of rudeness sometimes; a neglect of good manners. But, amongst all this, you are sure to find wit, or argument, or valuable fact; you are sure to find something or other for the mind to rest upon with satisfaction; while, in the venal prints in England, you find hypocrisy, falsehood, and foolery, unrelieved by even a transient gleam of any thing but speaking the possession of intellect, by any thing, which, for a moment, can make you doubt, that, in the mind of the writer, the only struggle is between ignorance and turpitude; and, you, at last, lay down the paper, revolving in your mind, whether he be too great a fool to be a knave, or too great a knave to be a fool.—In dismissing this subject, I shall, I am persuaded, be excused for just noticing the charge, that I was induced to endeavour to raise the price of corn for the sake of selling my own the dearer. The fact is, that I never had but thirty one acres of wheat in my life; and I have not, this

year, more than enough for the consumption of my own house. Add to this, that, if wheat be dear, all the articles necessary in the support of a family are dear in proportion; while, as the public must well know, my publications have a fixed price; so that, from the dearness of wheat and of bread, I am sure to be a loser. I have said this in order to remove any little doubt that may, from a long string of unanswered falsehoods, have been imbibed by persons entitled to my respect; and for the further reason of bringing my friends, who do not know me personally, to as near an acquaintance as I can with all that belongs to me and my affairs.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT.—*King's Illness.*—Agreeably to the adjournment on the 1st instant, as stated at page 822, the two Houses met on the 15th instant. In both Houses, the Ministers moved for another adjournment to the 24th instant, which motions were finally carried; but, not without some debate, which debate is of a nature to call for our particular notice. —In the HOUSE OF LORDS, the LORD CHANCELLOR (Eldon), after some preliminary matter, said: "This is the unanimous opinion (I am anxious to state their own words) not only of the physicians then in attendance, but of those whose care has since been thrown around his Majesty, and is given with as much certainty as can be attached to prognostics upon medical subjects. Those physicians also who now attend his Majesty, and who attended his Majesty on a former indisposition, state, that they see in the present state of his Majesty, all the symptoms of approach towards recovery, and none of the symptoms which indicate the delay of recovery. Upon the statement which I made on the 1st of this month, one of your Lordships moved to adjourn for fourteen days, the shortest period within which Parliament can by law be assembled upon any emergency for the dispatch of business: your Lordships are now assembled in pursuance of that adjournment, and it is for the House to determine what course it is proper to pursue. Under the circumstances which I have stated, I trust in God from the favourable symptoms of his Majesty's indisposition, that there will be no necessity for the adoption of any proceeding by this House to supply the defect of the Royal authority, and I may be allowed to express my opinion, that the most

"delicate and proper mode of proceeding" in the present instance, would be to adjourn for fourteen days."—This motion he then made, and this motion was seconded by LORD MOIRA upon the ground, as stated by him, that no public injury was likely to arise from the delay proposed. —LORD GRENVILLE said, that the House ought to have had laid before it something in the shape of evidence of the improved state of the King's health, and not to be called upon to act upon the bare word of any individual, however respectable that individual might be. He did not, however, oppose the motion for the adjournment. —EARL STANHOPE consented to the adjournment for the purpose of giving ample time for the Scotch and Irish members to arrive and take part in the discussions; but he protested against it upon any other ground, and begged the House to recollect, that the parliament was not a parliament without the King, and without being assembled under his authority. —The EARL of LIVERPOOL and the Duke of NORFOLK each said a few words. The former in favour of, and the latter did not object to the motion. —EARL GREY assented to the adjournment, but he took care to speak in terms of decided reprobation of what was done in 1788, when, he observed, the two Houses assumed to themselves the title and powers of a parliament; and he concluded with expressing his firm hope, that no future steps, beyond the ordinary course of proceeding, would be adopted, without the necessity for such proceedings being fully and clearly in proof before them; and that, above all, they would take especial care, that it was a principle which actuated the minds of all who were raised above the consideration of present objects, that in whatever proceedings it might be deemed necessary to adopt, the common weal should not suffer by any measure which would tend to impair the integrity or power of the Kingly office, or to the diminution of these great necessary constitutional powers with which the Sovereign was vested. —LORD SIDMOUTH spoke in favour of what was done in 1788; and he said, that, with respect to what farther proceedings it might be necessary to adopt, the case was different. They could not, he said, proceed without evidence, fully establishing the fact of the necessity, and the extent to which ulterior measures, if necessary, should be carried, must be controlled by the nature of the evidence.

He thought it, he said, incumbent to state his opinion, that on the present occasion he did not think the conduct of Ministers was a deviation from the principle of 1788. Before the next meeting he hoped they might indulge the hope, that some important change might take place, and put circumstances in the train the most desired by the country at large. —After this the motion of Lord Chancellor Eldon was carried without a division, and the House adjourned, accordingly, to Thursday the 29th day of the present month. —In the HOUSE OF COMMONS the debate was of much greater length, and became of much greater interest, in consequence of a motion made by SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, upon which the House finally came to a division. —As we are here upon a most important subject, where almost every circumstance must become matter for history, and where to every word it may shortly be necessary to refer, I shall insert the whole of the speech of MR. SPENCER PERCEVAL (the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime Minister), made upon this occasion, to a House consisting of 401 Members, besides those who may have gone away previous to the division; which speech, in order that no suspicion may attach to my selection, I take from the Morning Post, which, as is well known, is called a ministerial news-paper, and which, as we shall see by and by, has made some most indecent comments upon the speech of Sir Francis Burdett. —MR. PERCEVAL's speech is given as follows. —"Sir—The House of Commons having again assembled without any notification of his Majesty's pleasure that they should do so, I feel it a duty incumbent on me to offer myself to their notice; conceiving that the House must necessarily be anxious to hear what his Majesty's servants have to state on the subject which has occasioned our peculiar situation, and conceiving also that they must be desirous to understand what is the view which his Majesty's servants take of that situation, and what are the measures which they mean to propose in consequence. After having stated, therefore, the ground for such a proposition, I shall humbly submit to the House the propriety, at then rising, of adjourning to the 29th instant. In the first place, Sir, I must observe that when I had last the honour of addressing you, I should have been very much disposed to propose the adjournment to

“ the 29th, instead of to the present day,
 “ had I thought we had assembled in such
 “ numbers and under such circumstances
 “ as would have justified us in taking into
 “ consideration a question of such magni-
 “ tude and importance; but with the as-
 “ semblage that then took place, I thought
 “ it incumbent on me to propose no other
 “ step than that by which the fullest at-
 “ tendance of Members might be insured
 “ at the earliest possible day. No man
 “ can doubt that the indisposition of his
 “ Majesty having prevented him from giv-
 “ ing to his servants his consent for the
 “ further prorogation of Parliament, it
 “ became our constitutional duty, and that
 “ of the other House of Parliament, to
 “ consider what ought to be done. But
 “ not only was it our duty to consider
 “ what ought to be done, but also at what
 “ period that which was to be done was to
 “ commence, and on what ground or in-
 “ formation we would proceed to do any
 “ thing. The House having assembled
 “ on the 1st inst. not only without notifi-
 “ cation, but contrary to notification, I
 “ did not conceive that we were plac-
 “ ed in a situation in which it would be
 “ proper for us to enter into a consider-
 “ ation of any public question of import-
 “ ance, and I therefore, with their unani-
 “ mous concurrence, proposed an adjourn-
 “ ment to the present day. It is not nec-
 “ essary for me, Sir, to go at any length
 “ into the circumstances which at that
 “ period induced me at one time to con-
 “ template the propriety of proposing a
 “ longer adjournment. There were many
 “ advantages which the House might have
 “ derived from the occurrence of events
 “ that might have occurred between the
 “ 1st and the 29th instant. There was
 “ also this strong fact, that except as the
 “ circumstances of the Government were
 “ altered by his Majesty's indisposition,
 “ there was no public reason for requiring
 “ the meeting of Parliament sooner than
 “ the usual period. But, Sir, if that was
 “ the view which the House might have
 “ then taken of the subject, I now address
 “ you under circumstances in which, if a
 “ doubt existed then, no doubt can now
 “ exist; because, Sir, having felt it my
 “ duty to proceed this morning to Wind-
 “ sor for the purpose of procuring as clear
 “ and explicit information as possible,
 “ with respect to the state of his Majesty's
 “ health, I have the satisfaction to acquaint
 “ the House, that I have seen his Majes-
 “ ty's Physicians, and that they are una-

“ nimously of opinion, *That his Majesty*
 “ *is in a state of progressive amendment; and*
 “ *that a very considerable amendment has ac-*
 “ *tually taken place.* On this statement,
 “ Sir, so truly cheering, and so consonant
 “ to the wishes and to the prayers of his
 “ Majesty's subjects, I ground the motion
 “ with which I shall conclude, for adjourn-
 “ ing this House to the day originally de-
 “ scribed in the Royal Proclamation.
 “ That the statement which I have been
 “ so happy as to be enabled to make, will
 “ be most grateful to the House and to the
 “ Country, I cannot possibly doubt; and
 “ unless peculiar difficulties and embarrass-
 “ ments existed, which actually do not
 “ exist, I am persuaded that the House,
 “ will not hesitate in adopting the delay
 “ which I recommend, in preference to
 “ the institution of any measure of a pub-
 “ lic nature under the present circum-
 “ stances. Reserving to myself the right
 “ of making any further observations,
 “ should a discussion arise on the ques-
 “ tion, I move you, Sir, *That this House,*
 “ *at its rising, do adjourn for a fortnight.*”

—Mr. WHITBREAD followed, and, after
 some introductory remarks, in reference
 to the conduct of the Ministers in not hav-
 ing given sufficient notice to the members,
 previous to the last meeting, he said, that,
 after the lapse of a fortnight, and the King
 not being in a state to transact the public
 business, the two Houses, being now in
 full attendance, ought to proceed to the
 best means of providing for the defici-
 ency; that the *parliament* could not be
 said to be now assembled, there being only
 the *two Houses*; that, if a physical neces-
 sity still existed for an adjournment, he
 should agree to it, but that such physical
 necessity ought now to be recorded on their
 journals; that the House ought not by any
 means, again to adjourn on the mere un-
 supported, uncredited assertion of the
 Chancellor of the Exchequer; that, as to
 the original intention of the King to pro-
 rogue the parliament to the 29th, that
 could have no weight, unless it were
 shown, that the King foresaw what has
 now happened; that, as to the precedent
 of 1788, the times and circumstances were
 wholly different, and that it was unrea-
 sonable to expect, that those, making a
 great part of the Members of the House,
 who had decidedly condemned both the
 present ministers and their measures,
 should now be content to leave the
 ruling of the country in their hands, with-
 out any controul or supervision what-

soever; that it was a great error in the Legislature not to have made a provision for the return of this calamity, and that it ought not now to fall into a similar error; that it was their bounden duty not to suffer this occasion also to pass away; that they ought to *adjourn from day to day*; that, in 1788, the House had better evidence before them, the then Lord Chancellor (Thurlow) having informed the Parliament, that he had had an interview with the King *himself*; that now they were only told, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been told certain things by the Physicians, without even any report of the Physicians being produced, and without any examination of them before the Privy Council; that he could not see, on the score of respect to the feelings of the King, any objection to such report and examination, or to the disclosing and recording of the facts; that he did not mean to dispute the veracity of Mr. Perceval, but that he still thought that common decency would have dictated the producing to the House information in an authentic form; that, though he felt, as much as any man, the reverence and affection due to the person of the King, he felt also a reverence due to the kingly office, and he was sure, that the people should not be accustomed to consider it *unimportant whether the Executive branch of the state were filled or not*. For these reasons he wished for an adjournment from day to day; but, that, as he wished to avoid creating party heats and jealousies, it was not his intention to *divide the House* upon the question.—The speech of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, who followed Mr. Whitbread, I shall, for the reasons I have already given, insert as I find it in the *Morning Chronicle*, where I find it most at length. He said, "that, agreeing, as he did, in the greater part of the observations which had fallen from the Honourable Gentleman who had just sitten down, he was determined not to let the question go to a decision *without dividing the House upon it*. The Motion now submitted to them he conceived to be one of the most irrational and unconstitutional propositions ever made in that House. He would never consent to compromise the Constitution. Had he been present on the *last day* of meeting, he would have opposed every Motion for adjournment. The Constitution was suspended, and he would not have agreed to a moment's delay, till that

"Constitution was restored; but now, after that delay, after deferring so long their duty to the people, were they now still further to postpone it for another fortnight? But the time was not of such importance as the *principle*. What principle was this mode of proceeding calculated to establish? Could the public business go on without the Executive Government? If it could not, why, at such a period, is it to be deferred? and if it could, were Ministers anxious to convince the people that the Executive Branch of the Constitution was a *mere nothing*? Was there any proceeding more likely to bring that part of the Constitution into contempt? Was it not holding it forth to the country as a *mere farce*? Were the people to be told, that in the votes of both Houses only consisted the Constitution; that the Crown might be placed on a cushion, or elsewhere, while the two Houses had in themselves all the virtual Government and Constitution of the country? If the present predicament was an awkward one, it was so because the House had not, in the first instance, done its duty, and not because the line of their duty was doubtful or difficult to discover. As to the mode of proceeding which they ought now to adopt, there could be no doubt or difficulty about it. He felt for the personal sufferings of the King, as every man must feel, but they need not, nor ought they to interfere with the discharge of their duty both to the King and to the People. He felt for the King, but he felt more for the perils of the Country. Was it treating the House of Commons with common decency to call on them to postpone their duty to the people at a period of such emergency, upon the mere *ipse dixit* of the Chancellor of the Exchequer? As to the distinction of seeing the King's physicians, and not the King himself, it did not weigh with him, because in either case it would have been but the mere assertion of an individual, and therefore no ground for parliamentary proceedings. Let the individual assertion have been what it might, he would have voted the same way. He would never agree to compromise the duties of that House to the Constitution, nor willingly submit to any power extended beyond it. The Act passed by a very prevalent and powerful fiction against his Royal Highness the Prince

“ of Wales, never should have had his
 “ sanction; an Act that put him into lead-
 “ ing strings, that threw him back into the
 “ stage of infancy, and made him a sort of
 “ constructive lunatic, enacting him in-
 “ capable of acting or of judging without
 “ the co-operation and controul of certain
 “ of the legislators; as it were stultifying
 “ him: this moment, when the next, by
 “ the laws of the land, might have raised
 “ him to the Crown of these kingdoms,
 “ and lifted him out of a cradle to have
 “ placed him on a Throne. The same
 “ course was now about to be adopted, as
 “ far as in them lay. He would resist it,
 “ and if he stood alone he was determin-
 “ ed to divide the House. If the Ministers
 “ were resolved, at the risk of the coun-
 “ try's safety, at all hazards to prolong to
 “ the utmost limit, the tenure by which
 “ they held their places and their power,
 “ they and others might do so; but he
 “ would not go back to the people to tell
 “ them that after the Constitution had
 “ been suspended for a fortnight, he had
 “ voted that it should be suspended for a
 “ fortnight longer. A state of anarchy
 “ had existed sufficiently long. He would
 “ do what he could to restore to the peo-
 “ ple the government of the Constitution.”

—This speech, a speech, as, I am con-
 vinced, the reader will agree with me,
 full of just views, and expressing, in every
 sentence, sentiments of *real* loyalty and
 attachment to the *real* constitution of the
 country, is, as we shall by-and-by see, an
 object of the foulest abuse in one of those
 prints called ministerial papers, from their
 constant praises of *all* that the ministers
 say and do.—Mr. TIERNEY, in addition
 to what had been said by Mr. Whitbread,
 said, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer
 had not held out any prospect of the King
 being able to attend to business before the
 expiration of the time to which it was pro-
 posed to adjourn; and he concluded by say-
 ing, that, if put to a vote, he should vote
 against the adjournment. He said after-
 wards in explanation, that neither he nor
 any of his friends wished the parliament
 to do *any thing immediately*; neither did
 they wish the physicians to be *examined*
at the bar. He only wanted some authen-
 tic grounds, whereon to vote for the ad-
 journment.—Lord ARCHIBALD HAMIL-
 TON, for reasons similar to those of Mr.
 Whitbread, said that he should vote against
 the adjournment.—Mr. PONSONBY wish-
 ed that the length of the adjournment
 might be reduced to a week. He felt, he

said, great reluctance in voting for the
 motion; but, if pressed to a division, he
 should do it, lest his opposition should be
 considered as a mark of want of respect
 and affection for the King.—Mr. CAN-
 NING having, in support of the adjourn-
 ment, referred to the instance and preced-
 ent of 1804, Mr. CHARLES WYNNE said,
 that the case in 1804, was mainly different
 from the present, for on that occasion it was
 the intention of an hon. gentleman, not
 now a Member of the House, to submit a
 motion on the subject, and he asked his
 Majesty's Ministers as to the state of his
 Majesty, who answered him that there
 was *no interruption to the exercise of the*
royal functions; that his Majesty was com-
 petent to all that was required of him.
 The case was not so now, and the House,
 was not to be considered as a Parliament,
 but as the Meeting of the States of the
 Realm. It was necessary to ascertain
 from the best possible evidence the state
 of the Royal health, before he could con-
 sent to vote for the adjournment.—
 He would have been, however, he said,
 much better pleased with the mode of
protesting, pointed out by Mr. WHITBREAD;
 but, that he could not refrain from ex-
 pressing his opinion.—We now come to
 the speech of Mr. SHERIDAN, which I will
 also insert as I find it in the news-papers,
 because it is the only speech that contained
 any thing in the way of answer to Sir
 FRANCIS BURDETT, and how far it is an
answer, the reader will easily judge, if, in-
 deed, he be able to exercise his judgment
 and his less serious faculties at the same
 time.—After having expressed his con-
 viction and his great pleasure, that the
 King's malady was greatly amended, he
 said (See Morning Chronicle), that “ He
 “ should not be inclined to object to the
 “ proposition of his Hon. Friend (Pon-
 “ sonby), that the adjournment should
 “ only take place for a week, if agreeing to
 “ that modification of the proposition
 “ could produce what was so highly de-
 “ sirable on the present occasion, *unani-*
mity. The Hon. Baronet (Burdett,) how-
 “ ever, was against any adjournment what-
 “ ever; and he would wish to know what
 “ that Hon. Baronet would propose that the
 “ House should do? The Hon. Baronet said
 “ that the House should not adjourn for a
 “ single day, or consent to remain in the
 “ state in which they were for a moment.
 “ Would the Hon. Bart. wish them now
 “ to proceed in providing for the suspension of
 “ the Executive functions? If so, he presum-

“ ed they would proceed to provide for
 “ that emergency in the ordinary form.
 “ The matter then came to this: *Was the*
 “ *House in a condition now to proceed in the*
 “ *ordinary form?* Mr Hon. Friend of his
 “ had said, that this was the second in-
 “ stance of his Majesty’s unhappy malady
 “ becoming matter of inquiry in that
 “ House.—[He was corrected by an Ho-
 “ nourable Member and proceeded.]—It
 “ was *unpleasant* to refer to this, as a matter
 “ of calculation, but he was now informed
 “ that this was the fourth recurrence of a
 “ similar malady. Be it so, but, *still*, the
 “ remembrance of *four instances of affliction*
 “ must bring along with it the *consoling re-*
 “ *collection of four instances of recovery.*
 “ His Hon. Friend opposite had referred
 “ to the year 1801, and not to the year
 “ 1804. That case, however, it was said,
 “ did not apply to the present. This he
 “ could not agree to. If Parliament was
 “ legally opened, and it was afterwards
 “ found that his Majesty was incapacitated
 “ from the discharge of his functions, Par-
 “ liament was equally bound to proceed
 “ in providing the remedy as if the inca-
 “ pacity had manifested itself previous to
 “ their meeting, and had been the occasion
 “ of their assembling prematurely. It
 “ was the duty of Parliament to proceed
 “ on the notoriety of the fact, as much as
 “ on the manifestation of the incapability
 “ displayed in the want or omission of an
 “ essential public act. On the occasion
 “ of his Majesty’s affliction in 1801, one
 “ of his Majesty’s Ministers had continued
 “ in office, declaring that his Majesty
 “ could not receive the seals of office from
 “ him. At that period his Majesty con-
 “ tinued in this state for a longer period
 “ than on the present occasion. A Gen-
 “ tleman, not now in the House, did give
 “ notice of a motion for an inquiry into
 “ the subject; but, on the day on which
 “ the motion was to have come on, he (Mr.
 “ Sheridan) anticipated it, by moving the
 “ question of adjournment, which was car-
 “ ried. In a few days it was clear and
 “ manifest that there was no occasion for
 “ such a motion, and no such motion was
 “ ever made. He knew that one of his
 “ Majesty’s first inquiries, after his re-
 “ covery, was *whether any Parliamentary in-*
 “ *quiry had been made into his situation*, and
 “ that it proved the *most gratifying thing to*
 “ *his feelings that no such inquiry had taken*
 “ *place* (cries of ORDER! ORDER!) He was
 “ sorry to be out of order. But this he
 “ presumed he might be allowed to say,

“ without any breach of order, that by an
 “ adjournment for the time proposed, there
 “ was reason to think that all further discus-
 “ sion on this calamitous subject would be ren-
 “ dered unnecessary, a circumstance which
 “ he knew must be highly gratifying to
 “ the feelings of the House and of the
 “ Country.”—Mr. SHERIDAN seems, from
 this report of his speech, to have been ex-
 tremely anxious, that Sir Francis Burdett
 should name some act which he wished to
 have done, which, indeed, the Baronet had
 clearly enough done; so clearly as to leave
 no doubt at all in my mind, and, I
 believe, it could leave no doubt in the
 mind of any man who heard him. He
 wished, doubtless, that the House should,
 on this very day (Friday the 16th) set
 about an inquiry into the real actual state
 of the King’s malady, and, if they found
 it to be such as called for the measure,
 that they should then adopt the measure
 necessary to supply the deficiency. This
 was his wish, to be sure; for, to suppose
 him to have any other, would be to sup-
 pose him not to be at all acquainted with
 his duty.—But, what Mr. SHERIDAN
 could mean by asking, whether the House
 was in a condition to proceed in the ordinary
 form, I am, for my part, wholly at a loss to
 discover. Suppose the King’s unhappy ma-
 lady were to continue for a year, or for
 seven years, the House would, at the end
 of that time, unless the deficiency were
 supplied, be in just the same condition that
 it was in yesterday. Did Mr. Sheridan
 mean, that the House had not sufficient in-
 formation before it? If so, the readiest way
 was to set about an immediate inquiry; for,
 in what other way is it to come at suffi-
 cient information? It was not Sir Francis
 Burdett who had called the House toge-
 ther. The members, and he amongst the
 rest, had been called by an Order of the
 House and by a circular letter of the
 Speaker; and, being so called, it was his
 opinion, apparently, that the House ought
 to do something more before they sepa-
 rated, than merely listen to a bare asser-
 tion (however true it might be) of the mi-
 nister; for, if the House, upon having heard
 that assertion, were to separate for 14
 days without doing any thing, upon the
 ground of such a precedent, why may they
 not separate for another 14 days, on the
 29th of the month, in virtue of another
 such assertion? That Mr. Sheridan’s
 wishes, and even his opinion, may be, as
 he said, “ that all further discussion on the
 “ calamitous subject will, by the 29th, be

"rendered unnecessary." I am by no means inclined to make matter of dispute; but his wishes, however sincere, may be disappointed, and his opinion (not more likely to be correct for coinciding with his wishes) may prove erroneous. And, if this should be the case, what argument can, by Mr. Sheridan, be urged against another 14 days adjournment, if the same statement that has now been made should again be made by the minister?—SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY agreed with Mr. Whitbread and Sir Francis Burdett. "He" would," he said, "ask those Gentlemen who reasoned in that way, was it nothing to consent to an adjournment for a fortnight, to put it out of their power during fourteen days to resort to any measures, which a possible, not to say a probable, contingency might render necessary? Was it to do nothing, to deprive themselves by such a proceeding of all opportunity, during that interval, of faithfully discharging those important duties which their constituents sent them there to perform? It was upon this ground that he felt himself bound to oppose the adjournment for a fortnight, with a view if that should be negatived to support an adjournment for twenty-four hours. In doing this, he was persuaded, *he was taking the most effectual mode of shewing his loyalty, his affection, and attachment to his Majesty*; because nothing could so directly tend to support and strengthen the *best interests of the Crown*, than that, during a period when there was a possibility of the occurrence of great national dangers and disasters, that House should be ready to resort to such measures as the exigency of the case might require."—MR. BRAGGE was for the adjournment, and MR. ELLIOT against it. The latter urged, very forcibly, the necessity of adhering to the principles of the constitution, and the objections to the adjourning upon such grounds as the bare assertion of a minister.—MR. WILBERFORCE declared for the adjournment; and, at the close of his speech, the House divided, when there appeared for the Adjournment 343, and against it 58.—We are now to see what the Morning Post news-paper has said upon the subject of this debate, and especially upon the subject of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT's speech. It begins thus:—

"Both Houses of Parliament met yesterday pursuant to the last adjournment, when, in consequence of the happy and

"progressive improvement in the state of his Majesty's health, a further adjournment for a fortnight was agreed to; in the Lords, *nem. diss.* and in the Commons by a gratifying and triumphant majority of 343 to 58; nor would the minority on this occasion, insignificant as it is, have amounted to any thing beyond the contemptible *Wardleite* and *Burdettic* Members, had not the mischievous sir Francis artfully entrapped several Members of the Opposition Party to divide with him upon the question so very indelicately pressed by him upon the House.—With very few exceptions, there was displayed in both Houses, on this occasion, a most creditable and becoming sympathy, and the conduct of Lord Moira and Mr. Sheridan, who on all occasions of real national importance are ever actively to be found at their post, is entitled to our best commendations. In the House of Lords, notwithstanding some observations from Lords Grenville and Grey, to the justice or necessity of which we can by no means subscribe, the question of adjournment was carried, as we have already observed, *nem. diss.*; nor would there have been any division in the Commons, where the Opposition were unwilling to expose the weakness of their numbers, had not Sir Francis Burdett, after some reprehensible and insidious insinuations, relative to the exercise of the Executive Power, entrapped Mr. Whitbread and some others, who to hide a still greater shame, and wear the semblance of consistency, found themselves compelled to vote with the mischievous Baronet. We are not, however, displeased at the patriotic expedient to which the worthy Sir Francis has thus had recourse, as it serves to shew how contemptible are the numbers of those whose nature is debased by the vile views of faction, and whose unmanly feelings and ungenerous hearts forbid, as it were, their sympathy, in a case which, to the everlasting honour of the country be it related, so deeply interests the best feelings, and fills with keen solicitude the fond bosoms of a people, who in duly appreciating his virtues, prove themselves deserving the best Monarch that ever adorned a Throne."—It was this same writer, who a few weeks ago, accused the Emperor of France and his ministers of *boasting* of the horrid crime, for which some infamous wretches had

just been exhibited in the Pillory in London; the very same writer, who, since, that, has represented the Empress Maria Louisa, daughter of our late ally, the Emperor of Austria, as being about to be the mother of bastards; and this is the writer, who calls Sir FRANCIS BURDETT mischievous, and who bestows his commendation upon the conduct of Mr. SHERIDAN. This is the writer, the leader of all those, who write against those whom they call "Jacobins." This is the writer, who accuses Sir Francis Burdett of disloyal designs. And, from these circumstanced alone, the man of sense will be able to form a pretty correct judgment of what is the real tendency of such designs.—But, will this publication be suffered to pass unnoticed by the House of Commons? Mr. GALE JONES was sent to Newgate for questioning the propriety of the conduct of one of the members. Now here is a writer, who publishes to the world, that the conduct of one of the members, in opposing a motion of the minister, is "*reprehensible, insidious, and mischievous*;" and, who describes all those, who voted against the minister, as being persons "*who by nature are debased by the vile views of faction*," and whose "*hearts and feelings are unmanly and ungenerous*."—This is what the writer of the Morning Post dares do. This is what the most venal of the venal dares publish. This is what he is not in the least afraid to promulgate and to vend. We shall see, now, whether this will be noticed by the House. I beg the reader to bear it in mind, and to observe, that the abuse is extended to the whole of the 58 members, who were not to be prevailed upon to refrain from voting against the minister; that it is levelled at the very character of every one of those, who voted against the minister's motion.—Sir Francis Burdett's conduct, upon this occasion, was in perfect agreement with all his former declarations relative to the nature of the kingly functions and office. He has always deprecated any attempt to chip away the just prerogatives of the King. He has always said, that one of the ends of a parliamentary reform was to make the King independent of cabals and factions. He has always said that he wished to see the King in a state to make it necessary for him to consult only the wishes and good of his people. He has, in short, always said, that he found no danger to liberty from the power of the King, exercised without any controul from combina-

tions of men; and that every thing which tended to the placing of the kingly power in other hands was dangerous, in the extreme, to the liberties of the people. Thus, then, has his conduct, upon this occasion, been the natural consequence of all the opinions, which he has, at any time, uttered respecting the Royal Office and Authority.—Sir Francis Burdett wanted to entrap nobody. He knew very well, that the greater part of those who voted with him yesterday had no liking to his political views. But, it was for him to do his duty, regardless of whether he had 50 or 1 vote with him. It was nothing to him, personally, whether the thing went on or not. He had nothing to gain and nothing to lose by any change that could take place. He had no hopes and no fears of a private nature. Nothing to whet him on into eagerness for a Regency, and nothing to make him affect a desire to postpone the accomplishment of a life of longing. Nothing to give a real blunt or a sham keenness to his feelings for an aged and most afflicted sovereign. He had, and he could have no motive for saying, upon such an occasion, what was not the genuine sentiments of his mind. These sentiments he uttered, regardless, as far as concerned himself, whether they were supported by others or not; and in so doing he has added another to his many former claims to the People's approbation and confidence.—As to the subject of the Regency, that subject, upon which every one talks in private, and as few in public, why, in the name of common sense, should men feel any shyness? Those, indeed, who are hunting after office, and who are afraid to look either to the right or to the left, may reasonably be shy; but, why should any body else? Why should any man, who has nothing to fear from the ups and downs of parties, be shy or timid or backward upon this subject more than upon any other? There are some men, who seem to avoid it with the same caution that weak minds turn from the making of a will. But, supposing the implied apprehensions to be just, and which I suppose only for argument's sake, is it not manifest, that the King's faculties cannot be restored nor his life preserved by avoiding to speak of his present malady or of his possibly approaching death, which must come sooner or later, and which, as with all other men, though it may yet be distant, may also be very near? It is, to say the very best of it,

therefore, contemptible weakness to avoid the subject of a Regency, and it is something infinitely wiser than contemptible weakness to attempt to make the world believe, that this shyness arises from any thing like tenderness towards the King. The good of it is that there are none of our young lords or 'squires (if there are any of the latter left in England) have any scruple at all to contemplate the prospect of their father's death, and to talk, with perfect composure, of what they will do in case of that event. Whose son does not do this? And what father has not done it before him? Away, then, with all this affected tenderness towards the King; and let us, as in other cases of human decline, talk like men of sense and sincerity, and let all our sorrows for the unhappy malady of the father, be accompanied by hopes in his son and lawful successor. There is but one other way, and that is to hold our tongues.

W^M. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
November 16, 1810.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—*Proceedings of the Cortes.*
(Continued from page 800.)

October 4.—A plan from general Vel-laba was presented, respecting the augmentation and other regulations of the cavalry, which was reserved to be finally discussed.—CAPMANY observed, that the Spanish language being very copious, all foreign expressions ought to be rejected, especially French expressions, with which the regulations were overloaded: he condemned, therefore the words, march, motion, assembly, session, mission, retire, guarantee, honourable, and bar: he objected to some on account of their real import, and to others on account of the meaning which was attached to them. "Gentlemen," he concluded, "We must both live and die Spaniards."—Deputy MEXIA ascended the tribune, and complained of the infidelity of the *Conciso*, in its manner of printing the deliberations of that Congress, and the little respect shewn in the said paper to its members.—TENREIROS demanded that their debates should only be on war and the means of exterminating their enemies. The President replied, that this was one of the great objects of their labours, and an end which would only be obtained through the regular means.—A

Member proposed the reading of some police regulations, which should have the air of an order from the Cortes, in order that after being compared with the former one, the best might be preferred.—The President ordered the public to withdraw at noon, and the sitting continued until half after four o'clock.

October 5.—MEXIA proposed certain regulations respecting the Royal Bank notes, in order to distinguish those circulated in the free provinces, from the others; but they came to no resolution.—CAPMANY complained, likewise, of the inaccuracy of the *Conciso*, and of its want of respect towards the National Deputies. On this account the propriety was suggested by Perez de Castro, of admitting a periodical publication, proposed by Oliveros, and edited by an officer of the military college, applying the products to the benefit of this useful establishment; which judicious proposal was approved.—OLIVEROS recommended the translation of the Cortes to Cadiz, pointing out the church of St. Philip as a very eligible spot; but on this important motion, nothing was finally settled.—The regulations were again examined, on which they debated upwards of two hours. The zealous Gonzales exclaimed, "Let us debate only on war and on justice." At the conclusion it was settled, that extraordinary sittings should be held from 8 to 10 at night, to be wholly occupied in the wished for regulations.—OLIVEROS mentioned his being informed from Cadiz, that the Executive Government had issued orders prohibiting any discussions on the Cortes at any public meeting.—The Cortes passed a resolution to make enquiries respecting this subject of the Regency.

October 6.—The sitting began with a petition from the Cardinal to be allowed to take the oath; and after some deliberations, on account of the peculiar circumstances, it was accorded.—It was resolved to intimate to the Regency, the wishes of the Cortes that their acts should be regularly published in a Gazette.

October 7.—The Count of Norona asked permission to speak, and his object being investigated by two deputies, it was resolved to hear him in private at one o'clock *p. m.*—MEXIA proposed some commercial regulations to be committed to a Junta, in which two members from that of Cadiz, and an equal number of Americans, should

be incorporated. The Congress granted a commission to this effect, comprising also agriculture, arts and sciences, but omitted the circumstance of the proposal.—FLERRETA complained of the violation of secrecy observed respecting the letters which were opened at the Post-office.—HUELTA exclaimed against this proceeding, and maintained this to be the worst period to adopt such a measure, when the provinces must necessarily communicate subjects of importance to their deputies, which it was highly proper should be kept from the executive power. The public retired at one, and the debates were privately continued till four o'clock.

October 8.—On this day several memorials were read respecting various branches of the revenue; and a project presented by ARGUELLES, respecting the liberty of the press, being the fruit of the labours of the commission charged with the same.—Nothing was ultimately decided, but the nation may flatter itself, because the opinion of all illustrious men will be heard. It is indeed a reflection on the human mind that there should be any one daring enough to write against the liberty of the press: to such an individual only it ought not to be free.—The answer from the executive power to the question proposed by the Cortes, respecting the order mentioned by Oliveros, in the 5th day's sitting, was read. The Regency has never forbidden any discussion on the Cortes, and the only thing it may charge its agents and ministers with is to watch over their calumniators.

October 9.—The Cardinal de Bourbon took the oath, after which the President addressed him in the following terms;—"The blood which flows through your veins, as well as that purple, recommends you to this Assembly."—A Secretary board, consisting of five members, was instituted, for which employment officers of the army, who are unable to undergo the fatigues of a campaign, are to be preferred. Three deputies were also named to investigate and report the merits of the candidates.—The President mentioned his having received several anonymous communications, complaining of the slowness in the operations of the Cortes. He ordered the public to withdraw at twelve o'clock, and the sitting was continued until three.

October 10.—A Deputy for La Mancha

took the oaths in the usual form. Perez de Castro made mention of a plan both defensive and offensive for this Isle, presented by General Galuzzo; and of another with regard to the cavalry, by the Marquis del Palacio; both were sent to the Commission of War to be examined. There was also read a circular letter from Senor Llorente, Inspector General of the Public Health, with regard to its present state. It declared that the number of sick persons was very small; and in order to calm the fears to which several unfounded reports had given rise, it added, the number of infectious disorders was unusually small.

October 13.—OLIVEROS, one of the most zealous members of the august Congress, and Deputy for Estremadura, read a memorial, in which he painted, in the most lively colours, the disorders in which the French leave those districts which they abandon, the numberless evils which their commissaries have caused by their requisitions of men and provisions, the waste of all resources, and the miseries, in particular, of the cultivators of the ground, by having to support the enemies' armies and their own; the decline of the manufactures of common cloths, in consequence of the manufactories being stripped of them without payment, in order to clothe the different armies:—the consequences of all which would be poverty, nakedness, and a general famine, if proper measures were not adopted. He then proposed such measures as appeared to him to be proper, for the purpose of being transmitted to the respective Commissioners of War, Finance, &c.; concluding with proposing the appointment of a commission for regulating and organising the provinces, which might guard against evils such as those which they had already suffered, and repair them in the best possible manner. Considering these matters as urgent, and calling for precedence before others—the Cortes passed a decree to this effect.

October 14.—In a former sitting ARGUELLES had produced the plan of a law on the liberty of the press, which comprised, first, the limits of that liberty, and the penalties for transgressors; and secondly, the appointment of a Junta of learned men, with the title of *Supreme Council Protector of the Liberty of the Press*, in order to protect it from ministerial despotism, and from tyranny.—It was

agreed that this plan should be printed, and copies distributed among all the Deputies, in order that they might consider the subject maturely, and be prepared to discuss it.—This day, the plan being again read, Tenreiro opposed it, alledging, that it was not right to discuss such an important topic without the concurrence of the Deputies who were still wanting.—What! (replied another Member), without their presence the Cortes were installed; without their presence, the Spanish people recovered their sovereignty, an event which will form an era in our annals; and is it possible, that for an affair not of such importance, we are to wait for a few Deputies?—"But the discussion of it was not fixed for to-day."—"It was," replied various individuals. This was confirmed by the President. "We do not come prepared," replied another; upon which LUXAN ascended the tribune, and the plan was read.—TENREIRO rose again: he declaimed against the liberty of the press, and represented it as the origin of the ruin of empires. (He would not, however, permit himself to see that this liberty supports the British empire). Some disapprobation was expressed, but Tenreiro continued to go on, till at last the disapprobation became more marked.—ARGUELLES then ascended the tribune. He shewed that the want of a free communication of ideas had given arms to the Tyrant for our destruction; that the English, aware of the cunning arts of those who meant to oppress them, gave freedom to the pen and liberty to the press; they disentangled and established their principles; they unveiled the plots of their enemies, and refuted their sophisms; their people were instructed, and not left exposed to illusion: by such means they were all united, and rendered themselves invincible. The reverse had been the fate of the Spaniards; deprived of its free course, knowledge became stagnant, the learned remained dumb, the ignorant were imposed upon; hence divisions, disunion, the ruin of the nation, and the exaltation of the enemy.—MEXIA succeeded, and with exquisite erudition and animated eloquence proved, that the sacred writings, our venerable religion, history and reason, favoured the liberty of the press.—It was resolved that the discussion should be continued on the following day.—To day at 10 in the morning, the troops took the oath to

the Cortes in the field at Torrealto, in presence of General LAPENA. The concourse of people was innumerable, the spectacle very fine, and the enthusiasm of all, both soldiers and peasants, was equal.

October 16.—There was read a Decree of the Cortes passed yesterday, on the claims of the Americans; in which it was declared, That the Spanish dominions in both hemispheres form one sole monarchy, one sole nation, one sole family; and that the native born subjects of the European and ultramarine dominions are equal in rights to those of this Peninsula; leaving it as the province of the Cortes to discuss all measures relating to the prosperity of those beyond sea, as well as of the form of the national representation and number of its members in both hemispheres; declaring also that, in all those transatlantic provinces where any commotions have taken place, there shall be a general act of oblivion with regard to them, from the moment when the sovereign authority which resides in the mother country is acknowledged.

October 18.—A letter was read, in which the Junta of Estremadura felicitated the Cortes, &c.—Various projects and memorials were transmitted to the respective commissions.—The discussion upon the liberty of the press followed. SENOR GARCIA HERREROS was for liberty of the press without any censorship, in imitation of the Supreme Tribunal, which never took upon itself to censure any book before it was printed.—SENOR MEXIA read an article from the Gazette, which mentioned, "that Buonaparté had decreed, that there should be only one newspaper, of which the Prefect was to be censor." He added, that the Cortes ought not to wish to resemble Buonaparté.—SENOR ARGUELLES pronounced an enlogium on the discourse of Munoz TORRERO in a former discussion on this subject, and refuted that of Llaneras. He observed, that the best mode of correcting man was the liberty of the press; and noticed, that during the ministry of Godoy, when there were censors, altars were raised to lasciviousness, &c. He defied any one to say that three ages of disorders arising from the liberty of the press could produce such great evils as those we have suffered from the want of it.

(*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 30.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1810. [Price 1s.

" Nothing but a law, declaring Bank notes to be a *legal tender* of payment, can relieve the Bankers and the trading part of the community from the hardships to which they are now liable; and, in fact, the remedy must, in the end, be worse than the evil."—Mr. HOBHOUSE, speech in the House of Commons, 27th March, 1797.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XVII.

The Legal Tender—Gold is the only legal tender for any sum above 25 pounds—Acts of the 11th and 39th of Geo. III.—Mr. Huskisson's remarks upon the legal tender—The effects of a legal tender in paper—Illustrated by the case of New Jersey—Act against legal tender in paper, 4th Geo. III. chap. 34—Mr. Huskisson's mis-statement as to the notions entertained respecting the legal tender at the passing of the Act of 1797—Mr. SMITH-BARN'S prediction when the Act was moved for—Sir F. Baring proposes to make the notes a legal tender—Mr. Pitt declines it for the present—The Mansion House and other Meetings held, in some sort, the effect of law—The law as it now stands as to the legal tender of Bank of England notes—Country Bankers may be compelled to pay their notes in Gold.

Gentlemen,

Before we proceed in our inquiries as to the DURATION of the Act, which was the subject of the foregoing Letter, and by which the Bank of England was protected against the cash-demands of the holders of their promissory notes; before we proceed in these inquiries, which will discover matter not a little curious in itself, and, very interesting as connected with what is now going on; before we thus proceed I must beg your attention to a few more words upon the subject of the LEGAL TENDER.

The truth is, that *gold* and *gold only* is a legal tender, in this kingdom, for any sum above 25 pounds, unless the silver be tendered in *weight*. This was settled by an Act, passed in 1774 (14 Geo. III. Chap. 12.) which act provided, that no tender in payment of money made in the *Silver Coin* exceeding the sum of 25 pounds, should be deemed a legal tender for more than its value by weight, at the rate of 5s. 2d for each ounce of Silver. This Act continued in force for two years, when it expired; but it was again revived in the year 1794, and made perpetual. Thus, you see, that even *Silver coin* was not, except in small sums, a legal tender, and is not a legal tender to this day.

But, though the Bank of England notes were not by the *Restriction*, or *Stoppage* Act, made a legal tender, to all intents and purposes, they were made so to a certain extent; for, by the tender of them in lieu of money, any debtor could escape arrest and also escape the giving of *special bail*; and, as to the Bank of England, the Act not only protected it against the demands of its creditors; that is, against the holders of its notes, but by the same Act, the Bank was to *pay to the public*, any thing due from the former to the latter, in its notes, and not to be compellable to pay in Gold or Silver. This was going some way, at least, in making bank notes a *legal tender*, and this seems to have been overlooked by Mr. HUSKISSON, (a Gentleman of whom we shall have much to say by-and-by,) who in speaking of the change created by the Act of 1797, in our money system, observes, that that Act did not repeal any of the former regulations relating to the *coin*, and that it did not alter the Act of the 39th of the King. "It did not," says he, "alter in any respect the existing state of the law, either as to the weight or the fineness of the gold coin; or the act of the 39th of the King." I have quoted this Gentleman's own words, because I am not

quite sure that I clearly understand them. Mr. HUSKISSON is a member of parliament, and a pensioner, and such people are apt to talk in a style that common men cannot comprehend. Whether he means, here, that the *weight* and the *fineness* of the Act of the 39th of the King remained unaltered; or, that the *existing state of the law* as to the act of the 39th of the King remained unaltered; or, that the Act of the 39th of the King *did itself remain unaltered*: which of these may be his meaning, I cannot positively say; but, of this am sure, that, in all the three suppositions, it was quite unnecessary to express such meaning, seeing that the Act, which he so positively and carefully assures us was not *altered* by the Act of 1797, was not in existence at the time, and was not passed till two years afterwards.

The mischievousness of forcing paper-money upon a people are very well known. It has been most severely felt in all the countries where it has been resorted to, and it has never failed, sooner or later, to annihilate the whole of the paper, attempted so to be forced upon the people. This was the case in all the States of North America, every one of which has, first or last, had a *public debt*, a *paper-money*, a *legal tender in paper*, and a *state bankruptcy*. The last of the States, I believe, that clung to a legal tender in paper, was NEW JERSEY, and, the consequence was, that, even in the year 1792, when I first went to the United States, that part of the Union was still suffering from the disreputation brought on it by the *legal tender*, which, before it was put an end to, had not only produced a total stagnation of trade, and had brought ruin upon thousands of people, but it had begun to drive the people out of the State; and, had it not been put an end to, the State would, long ago, have been *wholly depopulated*.

But, we need not go abroad for any thing to convince us of the settled opinions of statesmen and politicians as to the effects of a *legal tender in paper*. We have only to look into our own Statute-Book, where we shall find the thing sufficiently reprobated, as in the Act passed in the year 1763, which declares such a *tender* to be *discouraging and prejudicial to trade and commerce*, and the cause of *confusion in dealings and a lessening of credit*, in the Provinces where it was in use; and, having declared this;

having laid down these as principles, the Act goes on to forbid the issuing of any more such paper; it makes void all Acts of Assembly thereafter passed to establish or keep up such tender; and it inflicts a fine of 1,000 pounds (with immediate dismission, and future incapacity to fill any public office or place of trust) on any Governor, who shall give his assent to such Act of Legal Tender.*

MR. HUSKISSON, who was one of the *Bullion Committee*, of the labours of which we shall soon see a good deal; Mr. HUSKISSON, who enjoys a large *pension*, paid out of the taxes raised upon the people, and who, therefore, ought to understand something of such matters; this Mr. HUSKISSON (of whom I shall have to tell you a great deal before we have done) has just published a pamphlet, under the title of, "The Question concerning the Depreciation of our Currency stated and examined;" to the doing of which he was, it would seem, like Rosa Matilda, *reluctantly forced by the pressing partiality of friends*. This Mr. Huskisson, in his pamphlet, which is, apparently, intended to justify his conduct as a member of the Bullion Committee, has said, that, "if it had been proposed, at once to make bank notes a legal tender, and, in direct

* FOURTH YEAR, GEO. III. Chap. 34. An Act to prevent Paper Bills of Credit, hereafter to be issued in any of his Majesty's Colonies or Plantations in America, from being declared to be a *legal tender* in Payments of Money; and to prevent the legal Tender of such Bills as are now subsisting from being *prolonged* beyond the periods limited for calling in and sinking the same.—Whereas great quantities of Paper Bills of Credit have created and issued in his Majesty's Colonies or Plantations in America, by virtue of Acts, Orders, Resolutions, or Votes of Assembly, making and declaring such Bills of Credit to be legal Tender in payments of Money. And whereas such Bills of Credit have *greatly depreciated in their value*, by means whereof *Debts have been discharged with a much less Value than was contracted for*, to the great *discouragement and Prejudice* of the Trade and Commerce of his Majesty's Subjects, by occasioning *Confusion in Dealings, and lessening Credit* in the said Colonies or Plantations:—The Act then proceeds as *above* described.

"terms, to enact, that every man should
 "thenceforward be obliged to receive
 "them as *equivalent to the gold coin* of the
 "realm, *such a proposition would have ex-*
 "*cited universal alarm*, and would have
 "forcibly drawn the attention of the legis-
 "lature and the public to the nature of
 "our circulation and to the consequences
 "of such an innovation. But, certainly,
 "*nothing of the sort was in the contemplation*
 "*of any man* when first the suspension act
 "was passed." But, is this *true*, Mr.
 Huskisson? Your memory fails you, I
 hope; for, not only was it in the *con-*
templation of many persons; but several
 persons said, that, *in effect*, the bank notes
 would become a *legal tender*, and that, they
 would, of course, depreciate.

Gentlemen, it is at all times right, that
 the *truth* should be known, respecting the
 conduct and the characters of men in any-
 wise entrusted with the management of
 the public affairs; and, at *this time*, and
 especially as relating to this most im-
 portant subject, it is right that no part of
 the truth should be hidden. With this
 conviction in my mind, I shall be rather
 minute in my references to what was said
 at the time when the Act of 1797, which
 protected the Bank against the demands
 of the note-holders, was under discussion.

The bill, as was stated in my last, was
 moved for by PITT on the 9th of March;
 and, during the debate of that very day,
 Mr. Fox contended, that, if the bill passed,
 the property of the Stock-holder must, at
 once, be depreciated in value; and, Mr.
 SHERIDAN said, that "he believed, that we
 "should not long be able, after the inun-
 "dation of paper to which this system
 "gave birth, to stop them from making
 "bank notes a *legal tender*, and then adieu
 "to the appearance of specie at the Bank,
 "and soon afterwards to the *real value* of
 "the Bank note." When the bill was
 under discussion on the 27th of March,
 Mr. PITT having said, that the clause,
 respecting the bar to arrests for debt, did
 not go the length of making Bank-notes a
 legal tender, nor to take away the power
 of the creditor to pursue the debtor *in the*
usual course of law, in order to obtain pay-
 ment *in cash*, Sir FRANCIS BARING said,
 that he saw no means of avoiding the evil
 to be apprehended by bankers and mer-
 chants but that of making Bank-notes a
 legal tender; and Mr. DENT was for mak-
 ing Bank-notes a *legal tender* during the

suspension of cash payments. Now, what
 did Mr. PITT say, in answer to this sug-
 gestion from his friends? He said, that
 "as to making Bank-notes a *legal tender*,
 "he thought, that, if it was *possible* to
 "meet the present difficulty without it, it
 "ought to be met without it; that, upon
 "a subject of so much difficulty and un-
 "certainty, *no man could speak with con-*
 "*fidence*; but, that as long as the circula-
 "tion rested upon paper taken by consent,
 "he thought it would not be *advisable*
 "to have it taken *by compulsion*."

Upon this ground, the Act was passed;
 and, it is very clear, that one of the ob-
 jects of the short duration of the first Act,
 which was passed for only 51 days, was, to
 see whether people were inclined to have
 recourse to the law to compel *payments in*
cash for debts due from private individuals
 to other private individuals. Every means,
 as we have seen, had been taken to pre-
 vent this. A planned Meeting of Bankers
 and Merchants had been held at the Man-
 sion House in London, and its resolutions
 for taking and circulating Bank-notes
 had been issued under the sanction of
 the then LORD MAYOR. Similar resolu-
 tions had been issued from the several
 benches of *Justices* at the quarter sessions,
 in all the counties; and, indeed, as these
 resolutions were signed by the Clerks of
 the Peace, and had about them all the air
 of acts of authority, the effect upon the
 farmers and tradesmen in general was
 nearly the same as that of an Act of Par-
 liament, making Bank-notes a *legal tender*.
 If these means had failed, however, there
 can, I think, be very little doubt, that the
 measure of making Bank-notes a *legal*
tender would have been adopted; for, the
 only reason which Pitt offers, as we see
 above, for not doing it at once, is, that the
 people seemed, at *present*, to be disposed to
 take the Bank-notes as cash *without com-*
pulsion; and, he very clearly meant, that,
 if the people refused to consider them as
 cash, *compulsion* must and would be re-
 sorted to.

And yet, after all this, and with these
 facts recorded in the Parliamentary Pro-
 ceedings of the time, Mr. HUSKISSON, who
 was actually in office under PITT or DUN-
 DAS when the measure was discussed;
 with all this before his eyes, this Gentle-
 man tells the public, that neither the
 making of Bank-notes a *legal tender* nor
 any thing of the sort was in the *contemplation*.

of any man at the time when the Act for the suspension of cash payments was passed; and that any *proposition* of the kind would have excited universal alarm, and would have forcibly drawn the attention of the legislature and the public to the possible consequences of such an innovation!

Here, Gentlemen, we have an instance either of the *incorrectness*, I might say, the *ignorance*, or the *insincerity*, of Mr. Huskisson, who, to say the truth, is not without his temptations, as we shall by-and-by see, to draw a veil over the origin and the conduct of the originators of the measure of protecting the Bank against the demands of the note-holders; to do which it was absolutely necessary either to make Bank-notes a *legal tender*, or to do something that should answer the same purpose. To make them a *legal tender* by law, at once, would, indeed, have been a thing so shameful as not to be endured, in the face of the principles laid down by the parliament, in the Act of the 4th year of Geo. III., above quoted. To pass a law making English Bank-notes a legal tender, putting English Bank-notes upon a level with the colonial paper mentioned in that Act; to make Bank-notes the degraded thing there described, was what could not be thought of, until all the means of avoiding it had been tried; but, it is, nevertheless, very clear, that, if the circulating; if the promulgating (with all the appearance of official authority) of the resolutions from the Mansion House and from the benches of county Justices: it is very clear, that if these had failed in giving currency to the Bank-notes, these notes would have been made a *legal tender* in all cases, and to all intents and purposes whatever. They are a legal tender *from the Bank itself*. They are a legal tender to the Stockholder in payment of his *dividends*. No man can sue the Bank Company on account of their refusing to give him gold for any of their promissory notes of which he may be the holder; nor can any Stockholder sue the Bank Company on account of a refusal to pay him the amount of his dividends in cash.

They are certainly *not a legal tender* between man and man, any further than as far as relates to the barring of an *arrest* and of the necessity of *special bail*. You cannot arrest, or demand special bail from, the debtor, who tenders you the amount

of your debt in Bank of England notes; but, you may sue him in the other way. The tender of Bank-notes secures the debtor from arrest and from being obliged to give special bail, in the first instance; but, it does not protect him against being *finally* compelled to *pay in cash*. If, for instance, GRIZZLE GREENHORN owes either of you a hundred pounds; or, which is a better illustration, perhaps, if you have in your hands a hundred and five pounds in amount of the notes of MESSRS. PAPERKITE & Co. Country Bankers, and you have a mind to have gold for those notes, looking forward to a time when you may want them, and having a greater attachment to the King's picture than to the arms and crests of Paperkite & Co. In such a case, you go to Paperkite with his notes, and demand *payment* of them. He tenders you, as a matter of course, Bank of England notes to the amount of those of his own which you present for payment; but you, in pursuance of your design to be possessed of a hundred of the King's pictures, demand *gold*, and stick to that demand. If he cannot, or will not, pay you in gold, you cannot *arrest* him or compel him to put in *special bail*, but, you can bring the ordinary action of debt against him, the decision of which is *sure* to be in your favour with the usual costs, and, while the action is going on, he is obliged to *deposit the Bank of England notes in court*, as the ground of being protected in the meanwhile against arrest and against the demand of special bail; and, if he does not make this deposit, you can even *arrest* him, as in any other case of refusal or inability to pay.

Thus, Gentlemen, stands the law, with regard to the legality of a tender of Bank of England notes. The Tax-gatherer cannot refuse them in payment of taxes; the Stockholder cannot refuse them in payment of his dividends; and the noteholder cannot demand *coin* for them of the Bank Company or of any body else, of whom he has once received them in payment; but, any private individual may *refuse* them in payment of money due to him from any body but the Bank Company; and, may proceed to recover payment in real money, in the way above described.

Thinking it desirable to keep this subject of the *Legal Tender* distinct from that of the *Duration* of the Act of 1797, and

having necessarily a good deal to say upon the latter subject, and much interesting matter to develop, I shall not enter thereon till my next Letter; and, in the meanwhile, I remain,

Gentlemen,
Your faithful friend,
WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,
November 19, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

KING'S ILLNESS.—The accounts which, upon this subject, are given in the newspapers, are so very different; and indeed, so directly opposite to one another, that it is next to impossible to know what to believe, or what to guess at. The Official reports, or bulletins, as they are called, may mean any thing, or nothing, just as the interpreter is disposed to think, or to wish. The Morning Post of Friday and Saturday last told us, that the King had not only had *interviews* with Lords Chesterfield and Camden, but that he had attended to several points of *business*. The Times newspaper had said the same thing; but, yesterday (Monday, the 19th) it contradicted its former statements, thus: "In the eagerness of our anxiety for his Majesty's recovery, we naturally catch at every rumour of a favourable nature. It was in this spirit that we stated on Friday, that two noblemen, Lords Camden and Chesterfield, had been admitted to an interview with the King in the course of last week; and that various points of public business had been submitted to his Majesty. We feel the deepest regret in being under the necessity of stating, that there is *not the smallest foundation for these reports*. For upwards of three weeks his Majesty has in no instance exercised the functions of sovereignty; nor have the noblemen mentioned been admitted to his presence. We may even add, that no branch of the Royal Family has seen the august head of it during the above period. We the more readily adopted the flattering reports that were in circulation, as they were, in a great measure, sanctioned by the declarations of Ministers in both Houses on the preceding day."—The falshood of the Morning Post was, indeed, rather too flagrant to mislead any body; for, it said, that the King had attended to business *before* Friday; so that, he must have done it on *Thursday*, and that was the

day, upon which the Parliament met; and on which it was next to impossible that the fact, if true, should not have been stated.—To day (Tuesday, 20th) the Morning Post tells us, that it has the inexpressible happiness to announce the great amendment that has taken place in the King's disorder, and it then proceeds farther to state, that "Though his Majesty has not yet exercised any act of sovereignty it is certain that he has of late, more than once, spoken voluntarily of the state of things created by his illness, and the proceedings consequent upon them; nor is it less true that he has actually attended for three hours to the arrangement of the household of the much lamented Princess Amelia."—From the bulletins, no one would believe this to be true; and, considering the source whence it proceeds, there can, I think, be little doubt of its being wholly *false*. At the motive, which this venal writer has for promulgating such falsehoods, it is very easy to guess; and, it is my duty to caution the public against being deceived by them.—The state of uncertainty, in which we are placed by these contradictory reports, cannot, however, be of long duration. There must soon be an official and specific report made upon the subject, which will leave no room for these frauds, practised upon a credulous people by a venal vender of paragraphs. Hypocrisy and fraud, low cheating cunning, the budget of tricks of these prostituted pen-men, are capable of doing much. They have done much; they, with their aids, have created and kept up a delusion as complete, as disgraceful, and perhaps, as fatal, as any that ever existed in the world; but, there are certain things which they cannot do; there are certain bounds to the success of their falsehoods and their frauds; and, though we live in an age when *falsehood* and *hypocrisy* have met with such success, I flatter myself with the hope of living to see these two most mischievous vices a little less fashionable in England than they now are.—The publishing falsehoods, known falsehoods, is, with prints like the Morning Post, a *system*; settled method of proceeding; a fixed line of conduct. The writer, or writers, know well that all intelligent persons will, at once, perceive not only the falsehoods, but the motives whence they are published. They also know very well, that the whole of the public, including the stupid creatures whom they

intend to cheat with these falsehoods, will, 'ere long, perceive them. But, with all this before their eyes; with the certainty of being and of meriting to be, objects of contempt and of scorn with all men of sense and of worth, they proceed on, quite regardless of the consequences, provided they can secure the delusion of the twenty four hours in which they are writing.—On Saturday last, the 17th instant, there was published in the same print, an article worthy of notice, as it touches upon the *measures to be adopted in case the King should not recover*. This is a matter which interests one; because much must depend upon it.—I will here insert the article, and offer such remarks upon it as appear to me likely to be useful.—“Although the attention which *his Majesty has paid to business*, within the last few days, has been the cause of some return of fever, we are most cordially rejoiced at stating that every account concurs in representing his Majesty as *likely to be soon completely restored to his affectionate People*.—It is therefore less necessary than ever, as well as less becoming, to speak of the measures, which the two Houses of Parliament would have adopted, in the event of his Majesty continuing unable to attend to public business. But we cannot omit a few comments upon a most extraordinary article which appeared in the Morning Chronicle of yesterday—premising, however, that we will not be drawn into a controversy upon subjects which do not require discussion.—Nothing can be more entirely misrepresented than the proceedings of Thursday, if they are made to authorise the idea, that in the event of a Regency becoming necessary, the Heir Apparent to the Throne would be declared, *DE JURE*, Regent. This claim of divine and indefeasible right was brought forward, not by the Prince himself, but by Mr. Fox and Lord Loughborough, in 1789. It was no sooner urged, than those who urged it wished to avoid a decision upon it. But it was then too late; it was necessary to decide, and the claim was most decisively rejected. At the time, there was not any precedents either in favour of the claim or against it. The precedent then created, is certainly as decisive as a precedent can be. There was not then, nor is there now, any doubt as to the person to be appointed

“Regent;—there were many differences with respect to his powers; and we admit, that many of the circumstances which should guide the judgment in this respect now, are materially altered since 1788. But the question of absolute or limited Regency is not necessarily connected, though it has been most improperly confounded, with that of the indefeasible right of the Regency. Such a right would imply an absolute Regent, but the rejection of the claim of right does not necessarily imply a limited Regent. The discussion of Claims of Right is always to be avoided, if possible. In the present case, even if the hopes of his Majesty's speedy and entire recovery were less strong, it does not appear that such a discussion would be at all required. On the practical question, that is, as to what is fit to be done, there would not, we are convinced, be any material difference of opinion between the persons by whom the measures would probably be proposed, and those more immediately interested in them; the theoretical questions, we trust, would be avoided on all hands. —We take this opportunity of correcting the mis-statement of a *Weekly Publication*, in which it was insinuated that in 1788, there was an intention of joining others in the Government with the Prince of Wales. The fact is, that the Prince was to have been sole Regent, under certain restrictions, the principal of which were, that he should not, for three years, grant pensions for life, or Peerages. The Queen was to have a Council, to assist in the care of his Majesty's person and household; and this may possibly have led the *Weekly Writer* into his mistake.—It is hardly necessary to advert to what is said, as to the Irish Bishops, &c. sitting in Convention. The Livery of London, or Freeholders of Middlesex, might equally claim that right!”—FIRST: the reader will see, that on the day when the bulletin stated the King to have more fever, this writer ascribes it to the attention which the King had paid to business, which was, we are here told, the cause of the return of the fever.—SECOND: This writer confounds divine and indefeasible right, with hereditary right. With respect to the former, it has been denied, and the nation, in choosing a king, at the time of the Revolution, acted upon the principle of the denial. But, does this writer, in the *Morning Post* (who by-the-bye, from the decency of his

language, appears to be but an *occasional* writer), mean to deny the *hereditary* right? And this, I think, he must deny, before he denies the *right* of the Prince of Wales to be Regent, in case of the King's incapacity to exercise the functions of Royalty. If this right be not in the Heir Apparent, it is, of course, in *nobody*. Who, then, is to settle the point? If a Regent is to be *chosen*, he may or may not be of the Royal Family. Step aside from the line of descent, and there is no boundary left. Besides, *who* is to *choose* the person to supply the place of the King? The two Houses of Parliament? Why, if they can do this without the King's assent, what can they not do? They cannot authorize the making of a Turnpike Road without the King's assent; and yet, according to this writer, they can appoint, of their own will, a person, *any person*, to supply the place of the King himself, to the exclusion of his heir and even the whole of his family; for, this is a *necessary deduction* from the assertion, that the Prince of Wales's claim of *right* to the Regency was unfounded. The Regency, like the crown, must go by *descent* or by *election*; if the former, which this writer denies, then the Prince's claim of *right* was undoubted; and if the latter, the choice might fall upon any body else as well as one of the Royal Family. Which, I take it, is a doctrine for the preaching of which an accusation of *Jacobinism* and even of *treason* would not have satisfied the venal tribe, if I had been the preacher.—THIRD: this writer (who is not the same that writes in the Morning Post generally) throws out, that the *times* and *circumstances* are altered *now*; that it is desirable to avoid the *theoretical* questions; and that there will, he is convinced, be very little difference of opinion between the *persons* by whom the measures would probably be *proposed* and those more *immediately interested in them*.—Very well. I am glad to hear this, not being able to persuade myself, that the Prince would be content with any thing short of *the whole* of the kingly power and authority. Yet, though circumstances are altered, I cannot see, that they are so much altered as to make wholly unfitting the measure contained in the propositions of 1788, *if it was fitting then*. So far, however, was that measure from being fitting, that it was, as his Royal Highness himself (see page 885,) described it: "a project for producing weakness, and disorder, and insecurity in every branch

of the administration of affairs; a project for dividing the Royal Family from each other; for separating the court from the state; a scheme disconnecting the authority to command service from the power of animating it by reward, and for allotting to the Prince all the insidious duties of the government, without the means of softening them to the public, by any one act of grace, favour, or benignity."—This was the description, which the Prince himself gave of the scheme that was proposed to him. Whether I was right, then, in my former description of the *thing* which PITT meant to set up instead of the kingly office, let the reader judge.—This writer in the Morning Post affects to believe, that I had fallen into a *mistake*, and that I meant, that it was proposed, in 1788, to make some other persons *joint Regents* with the Prince. I meant no such thing, and I could mean no such thing, having, as I had, all the proceedings before my eyes. I meant what was really the fact, that the scheme of 1788 was intended to *keep from the Prince all real power*.—This writer tells us, that the Prince was to be *sole* Regent. He does, indeed, allow, that there was to be A COUNCIL, to assist the QUEEN, who, under the advice of this Council, was only to have the *care of the King's person*; only that, and management of the household and the *appointment of the officers therein*, such as master of the horse, lords of the bedchamber, &c. &c. &c.; only that and, which I had like to have forgotten, the management of the King's privy purse of sixty thousand pounds a year; only these little matters were to be left in the hands of the QUEEN and COUNCIL, while the Prince was to be denied the power of *making peers*, or of granting any office in reversion, or any pension, or any place whatever, except for the *King's pleasure*; and, of course, no such grant or appointment could have any *security*.—Well might the Prince complain, as he did complain, that this was an attempt to degrade both him and the kingly office. Who is there so blind as not to see, that, under the operation of such a scheme, the Prince could have had no real power; and, that, if it had continued long, the kingly office must have fallen into the state that His Royal Highness anticipated?—Yet does Mr. GEORGE ROSE the Elder, speak of the Minister's conduct upon that occasion in strains of the highest eulogium. "At that juncture," says he,

"there were *particular circumstances* in the political state and political opinions of Europe, which tended more than ever to *endeavour every good and virtuous man the monarch* they saw re-established, and the tranquillity which that happy event had restored. The display of wisdom and of firmness evinced by Mr. Pitt during that interval of national anxiety which the King's illness occasioned, *did him infinite honour*: he took that high ground, which his *virtue* as well as his *ability* entitled him to take; and with a dignity and courage inspired by both, rebuked at once the fears of the timid, and supported the rights of his Sovereign: not less faithful to his country than loyal to his King, he devoted his services to both in a manner equally manly and *disinterested*."—This was written and published only *four years ago*, and two years after the King had visited England. This is the description which Mr. Rose gives of conduct, of which the invention of the above-mentioned project made a part; and which project, of course, by this writer, looked upon as necessary to support the rights of the King, though, as we have seen, its obvious tendency was to withhold from his Son all the real powers of sovereignty.—The writers of this bitter faction have always thus dealt in insinuations. Look at the above-quoted passage, reader, and say what you think it means; say what you think it fairly means. And, to use a vulgar phrase, *why was this subject ripped up in the year 1806?* What good could it do? And what object but one could it possibly have, especially when thrust into a work upon finance? JOHN BOWLES, in *Mora-political pamphlets*, has, I must confess, acted in a more manly way. He has spoken out, and, if what he says be bad, it is at least, free from the charge of meanness. He has insinuated, but he has not assailed with insinuations only.—At page 917, I brought down the Official Bulleins to the morning of the 19th instant. I shall here insert them to the evening of yesterday, the 19th instant.—TUESDAY, Nov. 13, 1810, seven, P. M. "The King has had a little increase of fever this day, but his Majesty is now rather better."—WEDNESDAY, Nov. 14. "The King has had some sleep in the night, and his Majesty

is better this morning."—THURSDAY, Nov. 15. "His Majesty is much the same to day as he was yesterday."—Nov. 15.—nine o'clock P. M. "His Majesty has had a little increase of fever this afternoon."—FRIDAY, Nov. 16. "His Majesty has had some sleep in the night, and his fever is again a little abated."—Nov. 16. "His Majesty has had a little increase of fever this evening."—SATURDAY, Nov. 17. "His Majesty has had a restless night, and has, upon the whole, been more feverish for the last two days."—Nov. 17.—Nine o'clock, P. M. "His Majesty's fever has continued, but without an increase this evening."—SUNDAY, Nov. 18. "His Majesty had some sleep in the night, and there is a little abatement of fever this morning."—MONDAY, Nov. 19. "His Majesty has passed a quiet night though without sleep, having slept several hours yesterday evening. This morning he is quite as well as he was yesterday."—From these reports there is not much to be collected; and, as to what is said in the news-papers, beyond these reports, no reliance whatever can be placed, not even the smallest degree. Those, therefore, who wish to avoid being deceived, will wait for the official development; for, they may be assured, that that is the only way to avoid deception.

PORTUGUESE CONSPIRACY.—The reader will, doubtless, recollect the account, which was given us, by the Morning Post, early in last month, of a horrible conspiracy in Portugal, in the city of Lisbon, which extended itself, we were told, through the whole kingdom. In the Register of the 6th of October, at page 545, the subject was taken up, and descanted upon somewhat at large.—The Morning Post had asserted, that great numbers of the nobles and gentlemen, that many eminent merchants, that a Judge and a Marchioness, were amongst the conspirators; that arms and clothing for 5 thousand men were provided, that the plot extended far and wide; that it was the design to assassinate the English; and that the conspirators had been seized (some of them in their beds) and sent off to Africa without a trial. Whereupon the Morning Post bestowed great praises upon the vigilance and the vigour of Lord Viscount Talavera.—If the reader will look back to pages 557 and 558, he will see my reasoning upon the statements of the Morning Post, and

* Rose's Brief Examination into the Revenue, &c. published in 1806, by J. Hatchard.

he will see the *conclusion* drawn, and, indeed, naturally and inevitably proceeding from such premises.—The article appeared in the *Morning Post* of the *second* of October; my commentary was published on the *sixth* of October, and which commentary went all along upon the *condition* that the statement of the *Morning Post* was *true*.—Now, mark what has since happened: the Portuguese government, in the *LISBON GAZETTE* of the 29th of October, contradicts the statements the positive, the detailed, the circumstantial statements of the *Morning Post*; and even complains of the *calumnies* of that print, for, as will be seen, no other print, can the Portuguese Government mean.—“It appearing by positive information received by the Police, that “the residence of certain individuals in “this country might prove prejudicial to “the public tranquillity and peace, in circumstances so critical as the present, “the Government adopted the resolution “provisionally to remove them from Portugal. This measure having been grossly “calumniated in an English newspaper of the “2d instant, the Governor of the kingdom “has ordered the said calumnies to be contradicted, and to declare, that neither “Marshal-Gen Lord Wellington, nor the “Minister Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty, nor any other individual of the “English nation, had the least share in the “above proceedings, nor any previous notice “thereof, because it was merely the result “of authentic information, communicated “by the police. The other absurd accounts of a conspiracy, of arms found, &c. “are so notoriously false, that they deserve “no refutation. Offences of that description, did they really exist, would be “visited with punishments far more rigorous.—(*LISBON GAZETTE*, Oct. 29.)” This is very good. Here, we have the Portuguese Government protesting against the statements of this English newspaper, though, as it will be remembered, the *Morning Post* paid that government the highest compliments for having done those violent and tyrannical acts, which it now appears, that the government never had in contemplation. And, it is well worthy of remark, that particular pains are here taken to convince the world, that our Commander and our Envoy had no hand whatever in the shipping of any body off; though the *Morning Post* had taken as great pains to make the people of England believe, that both of them

came in for a share of the *merit*.—That this solemn contradiction has arisen from the article in the *Register*, just referred to, is more than I can positively say; but, I think, there can be no doubt of its having arisen from the desire of Lord Talavera and Mr. Stewart not to be thought parties to a measure, which had been so much praised in the *Morning Post*.—The measure, he it remembered, as described in this print, was *too moderate* for the writer. He had told us, that many most respectable and very aged persons had been seized on, some of them in their beds; had been prevented from seeing their children or their friends; and had been shipped off to Africa *without a trial*. And, upon the supposition that all this was *true*; nay, after having stated it *as truth*, this writer, who is continually uttering vehement attacks upon the *tyranny* of Buonaparté, told us, that he “knew not whether he should “altogether commend the *moderation* with “which the individuals had been *disposed of*.”—This is, by far, the most material circumstance belonging to the affair. Here is an English news-paper writer, who, in giving what he supposes to be a true account of a conspiracy in Portugal, to defend the *liberties* of which country an English army is sent, tells us, that many of the most respectable people have been seized upon suspicion, have not been suffered to see their children or friends, and have been transported without any sort of trial or examination, and he adds, that he does not know, whether he ought to commend the *moderation*, with which these people have been *disposed of*. This is the fact, upon which I wish the reader to dwell for a moment; and, then, I wish him to ask himself, what he thinks *men of this description* would gladly see done in England.—As to what did *really* happen at Lisbon, upon the occasion referred to, I cannot say. The contradiction in the *Lisbon Gazette* is not so full as to enable me to form any judgment upon that subject; nor, indeed, is it any business of mine.

SPANISH WAR. LORD BLANEY.—Under the head of CADIZ and date of the 26th of October, the following article has appeared in the London news-papers, and especially in the *TIMES* of yesterday.—“The expedition that sailed for the coast “of Malaga has not been successful. It “disembarked at Malaga, and was received by 4,000 French troops, to whom “the greater part of the foreigners who lately

"*passed from the enemy's army, and enlisted under the Spanish and English colours, deserted.* The regiment of infantry of Toledo sustained a very brisk fire, and covered the retreat and embarkation of the remainder of the forces. Our loss consists of 400 men; and the English Commander of the expedition (Lord Blaney) was wounded and taken prisoner. Such are the particular accounts which we have received respecting this unfortunate expedition; they will teach us what we have to expect from men who have once abandoned their colours."—I do not see why this should teach you any such thing. You have often enough been told of this before. You have been told, that those who had betrayed others would betray you. Nay, it is curious enough, but, I believe, that these men, so complained of here, are the very persons, of the enlistment of whom out of Dupont's army, Mr. WARDLE complained, in the House of Commons, and, at the same time, foretold the consequences of employing them. He wanted to save the money, laid out upon the enlistment of these foreigners. He wanted to leave that money in the people's pockets. It was a part of what he would have saved to the nation. Oh! how the venal writers; how the whole set abused him for that proposition! And, how dearly we shall, I fear, pay for the rejection of his truly wise and public-spirited advice. —The account here given of this adventure under Lord BLANEY (whom, I must say, I never heard of before,) may possibly be a mere romance; but, I do not think so any more for our not having seen much of it in the public prints. It is not an adventure to talk much about. It is a thing to keep quiet, and especially as the heroes of Dupont's army; the "*fine body of men*" (for so they were called), who "left the tyrant's ranks for liberty's sake," are so deeply concerned in it.—I should not wonder, if we were never to hear of this affair again: especially if it be true. And, here we have another instance of the nature of our press. I hope the Spanish Cortes will take care to provide for a press, that shall not be a bar to any thing but falsehood.

PORTUGUESE WAR.—We were told, forty days ago, that the battle must be fought in six days; and, we now find, that it was not fought ten days ago; or, at any rate, we find, that Massena was not, ten days ago, either dead from starvation, or

running away. —Now, I must confess, that I do not think he will be starved quite so soon as our Viscount's people seemed to expect; though, doubtless, he must be starved in the long run.—Our papers all agree, that Massena was laughed at. By whom they do not say; but, we are to suppose, of course, that he was laughed at by our own people. The Morning Post, beginning with the thirteenth of November, tells us, that Massena is retreating; that he has already begun to move his heavy baggage; that Lord Talavera did not mean to follow him with his whole army; that he meant to follow him with his cavalry and light troops only; that deserters had been constantly coming in at the rate of from sixty to 100 of a day, that they all agreed in representing the French army as suffering the extreme of want and wretchedness; that Lord Talavera had been heard, in conversation with his officers, to laugh at Massena, for getting so completely into the mire; that Lord Talavera was very secret, and, perhaps, meant to fall upon the French at the last moment. To this intelligence the Morning Post added these words. "We have the happiness once more of relieving the public mind of serious and false rumours, by laying before it authentic news from our brave army in Portugal. The French are retreating! And that too without daring to hazard an attack upon us."—So much for that true news. On the fourteenth the same paper told us, that the French had only 60,000 men, horse and foot, while our force consisted of 34,000 British, 30,000 Portuguese, troops of the line, 10,000 Spaniards from Romana's army, and 10,000 Portuguese Militia. Thus have I all my men. I have not so often mustered my 60,000 fighting men for nothing, for I have them all here, and 24 good thousands at their back.—Besides this force in Soldiers, we have, the same paper of the same date tells us, 120 forts, upon which are mounted nearly 1,000 cannons, besides the train of artillery belonging to our army, and 25 gunboats placed upon the river. We have now in the Tagus, adds the writer, 2 three-deckers, 7 two deckers, 3 frigates, and smaller vessels; therefore, we conclude that we have now nothing to fear, the enemy being destitute of provisions, and losing by desertion and otherwise not less than 100 men a day. Then he tells us, that Lord Talavera has immortalized himself; that he will go into Lisbon crowned with laurels; that

every thing wears a most cheering aspect; that Lord Talavera's movements and his success in drawing Massena after him, were thought a *chef d'oeuvre* of the Military art; that Massena's army must be destroyed in the retreat; that a great scarcity of provisions prevailed in Massena's army; that Massena was starving; that a great number of his horses had been killed and *stewed down for soup*. On the fifteenth the same print told us, that Lord Talavera's *firmness* and *decision* were of the *highest cast*, and stamped him qualified for the greatest enterprizes; that he would, doubtless, continue to pursue a system, by which he had already *accomplished so much!!!* But, let us go on if we can That all Massena's communications were cut off; that his army were in absolute want of bread; that no rations of bread had been served out to them for *forty days* past; that, of late, they had been without salt; that they must inevitably soon be afflicted with the *dysentery* and other complaints; that Massena was now *laughed at more and more*, that for seventeen days, previous to the 29th of October, the French had had *no provisions whatever, except some ears of Indian corn*!—All this news brought us down no later than the 29th or 30th of October. The newspapers of to-day tell us of dispatches to the 10th of this month; and *no battle yet!* And the French *still alive!* The Dysentery not killed them yet! They are tough dogs, I am afraid. Talk of a cat, indeed! A Frenchman must have ten times as many lives as a cat.—One can, however, now speak with something like *certainly* as to the time when this contest *must* terminate, unless Massena retreats or is attacked, for we have the most positive assurances, that Massena loses 100 men a day by desertions. Now, then, if he has only *sixty thousand* men, he will have lost the whole of them in 600 days from about the 1st of October last; that is to say by the 2nd day of May, 1812. And, be it observed, we can very well afford to lie watching him all that time, because the desertions from his army will much about make up for the wear and tear of ours.—There never was, I believe, before, an instance of an army of 84 thousand men being kept behind their lines by 60 thousand men. I believe, that, in the history of no war whatever there is an instance of the kind. It is very seldom that we have heard of an enemy's attempting even to

defend itself with means so *very inferior* as those, to which (as we are above told) Massena is now reduced. And, therefore, for the *honour* of the *English army* and the *English name*, let us hope, that he is really so situated as not to be able to get off: for, upon what other ground than that of being *sure* to beat him finally *without a battle*, can he be, for only one hour, suffered to exist where he is?—Reader, put this question home to yourself; and the answer to it will render unnecessary any further observations from your humble servant,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Wednesday,
November 20, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—Proceedings of the Cortes.
(Continued from page 960.)

LLANERAS spoke against it, observing that it was not the only road by which a nation reached distinction, nor the only means of knowing the public opinion.—GULFIN was for the liberty of the press, because he thought it just, useful, and necessary. He combated the opinion of Llaneras, observing, that since the art of printing more publicity had been given to our religion.—Another deputy also spoke in favour of it, observing that all were agreed in substance.—VALCARCEL, who also supported this liberty, was for putting it to the vote, "whether the question had been sufficiently discussed!"—The discussion, however, was continued; and CREUS read a plan, in which he proposed that the Cortes should permit political works to be printed without a censor; and at any rate, if there was a censor, that submission to him should be voluntary on the part of the author.—Tenreiro said, that it could not be doubted that this liberty produced illumination; but that also by means of it were introduced a thousand errors. He thought that it would be proper to consult the Universities, the Bishops, and the Holy Tribunal, who so much abhorred the French. That in Galicia and Catalonia this liberty would not be well received; that of the 10 millions of inhabitants in Spain, not more than 100,000 were for it; and that thus a bad opinion would be formed of the Cortes. He insisted that errors were introduced like poison, and that the philosophers had filled the world with darkness; that the truly wise were few in number, and had

been suffocated by the former ; that Spain had arrived at the height of its glory without the liberty of the press ; and without it, also, had raised its voice against the oppressor. He repeated, what the clergy of France had told their king ;—that this fatal liberty had introduced into England an infinity of sects, which filled the island and the throne with horrors, and which would one day destroy the constitution of which it boasted, as that of France was lost ; that it was much better to be rude and good, than knowing and bad, like the French ; that the executive power always had the greatest influence upon the press, even though it was free, so that the press and its liberty would be as the government. —MUNOZ TORRERO observed, that the English held it as a fundamental principle, and a declared right of the nation, to watch over the agents whom it appointed ; that this right was exercised through the press, in such a way, that what is done in Parliament being published, the most obscure individual could speak what he thought, and enlighten at the same time the parliament and the nation. Would to God it had never been said from the pulpits, that the Deity had inspired Charles IV to place power in the hands of Godoy, when he gave him the Admiralty, and when the liberty of the press existed only for such assertions. He did not speak of learned men only, but of the whole nation, who had a right to declare their opinions. This was not a theory without practice, but what was already established by the constitution in England. It was the grossest error to say, that the nation had not the right to declare its opinions, and yet that its deputies possessed that right ; that when Ferdinand arrived, he would possess more force than the executive power ; and then, if there was no public opinion, nor the means of establishing it, he might destroy, when he chose, the Cortes of the nation, as Godoy had done, because there was no public opinion, nor the means of freely establishing it. He shewed, that the French Bishops did not perform their duties ; and among other proofs, he mentioned that of 70 of them being present at an entertainment given by the Conde de Aranda. The best and strongest bulwark against vice was the moral and religious education of the citizens. He distinguished the civil and religious toleration of the English, from that liberty of the press which he wished to establish. The wise alone did not go to form the public opinion, but

the whole of the citizens. These ideas were general in Salamanca, Madrid, Badajoz, and in numerous other places. (Here Montes observed, that in Galicia the measure would be received with pleasure.) Torrero concluded, observing, that the army were in favour of the liberty of the press ; adding, that he had not deduced his opinions from the rights of man, but from principles which he had weighed.—ARGUELLES said, that even supposing the opinion of Galicia was against the liberty of the press, and though the Cortes should be deceived in supposing that the general opinion was for it, yet it was indispensable to allow it ; for by it alone could the general opinion be ascertained.—MORROS observed, that this was an affair of conscience, and ought to be decided by theologians and the holy fathers ; that the Council of Trent, in its 18th and 19th sessions, pronounced against the liberty of printing even books which treated of politics and the fine arts ; that the council of Lateran prohibited every kind of books without a previous review ; that the Cortes ought not to issue a declaration contrary to so many pious regulations, &c.—MORALES replied, that the Bull quoted by Morros only spoke of the books of heretics known to be such.—OLIVEROS observed, that the fathers in the first ages of the church cried out for the liberty of writing, for printing was then unknown ; the greatest persecution of the church was in the time of Julian, who prohibited all their books.

Oct. 18.—The discussion on the liberty of the press was resumed.—OLIVEROS said, that at present, in the great persecution of the French church, this liberty was prohibited ; and that in Spain lodges (of free masons) are establishing, which will destroy religion ; that obscure intrigues are formed in darkness ; and that had it not been for the people, a revolution would have broke out in Madrid in 1793, which would have deluged the kingdom with blood ; that if this liberty was not established, those persons would come to have the upper hand, who affect republicanism in order to obtain power—to be kings, dukes, peers, &c. ; and that, in fine, by means of the liberty of the press, England is a steady and moral nation.—MORALES added, that neither a Holy Father nor a Council could be mentioned which prohibited writing.—It was then put to the vote, whether the point of the political liberty of the press had been sufficiently

discussed; when it was almost unanimously agreed that it had.—It was then discussed, whether the voting should be public or secret. On this there were different opinions; and though Arguelles was of opinion the votes should be taken in the ordinary form by those who approved rising up, other Deputies expressed a wish that the voting should be private, because thus there would be more freedom.—On this some debate took place; and though all means were had recourse to, to support this opinion, yet LUXAN rose and observed, that it was the wish of the Spanish nation that they should all be heroes; that it required firmness and constancy, not only in those who were in favour of the liberty of the press, but in those who were against it; that the nation would look with the same aspect upon those who heroically gave their vote for the liberty of the press, and upon those who with virtue and constancy voted against it; since both acted equally from a sense of duty, and were equal in its eyes.—This question was then put, and it was almost unanimously carried that the voting should be public.

Sitting of October 19.—A letter was read from the Minister of Finance, in which he informed the Cortes, that the Council of Finance was sworn in, and also its inferior officers.—CAPWANY declared his opinion in favour of the liberty of the press; and upon wishing to speak at greater length, he was informed that the discussion was closed.—The Cortes then proceeded to a vote on the plan for the liberty of the press; which took place publicly, and every deputy was asked his opinion by name. The votes being counted, the result was, that the *Political Liberty of the Press* was carried by 70 votes against 32, of which last 9 were only against it for the present. The other 3 articles of the plan were then discussed and approved of.

SITTING OF OCTOBER 27.—The Sitting was secret; it lasted from seven in the evening of yesterday, till half-past three in the afternoon of this day.—What ought we not to expect from our august Congress, when we see it, at the expence of uninterrupted fatigue, occupied night and day in the great work of the liberty and happiness of Spain? Immortal glory, eternal gratitude to the Fathers of their Country, whose name shall be pronounced with respect and gratitude by all future generations!—The Senors Don Joaquin Blake,

Don Gabriel Ciscar, and Don Pedro Agar, have been appointed to the Executive Power; and to supply the places of the two first, who are absent, Senor Puig, and the Marquis del Palacio.

SITTING OF OCTOBER 28.—At ten in the morning the Sitting commenced in private, and continued till four in the afternoon, when it was made public. The Senor Don Pedro Agar, the Marquis del Palacio, and Don Josef Maria Puig entered, to take the oath.—Senor Agar took it in the established form. The Marquis of Palacio followed, who swore to the two first articles of the formula; and to the third he added, "I do swear without prejudice to the oaths which I have already taken to King Ferdinand the VIIIth." The meeting and the public were surprised; the President observed, that this act did not admit of more words than those that were set down, "I acknowledge and swear;" but that, if the Marquis was not properly acquainted with the formula, it should be repeated to him. The Secretary accordingly read it a second time, and the Marquis observed, that the point was delicate, and an affair of conscience; that he did not refuse to take the oath, but that he had made the addition to it to quiet his conscience.—M. ARGUELLES stated, that the oath should be taken in the established form; remarking, as well as Garcia Herreros, and Munos Torrero, that the Marquis was called there to take the oath, as all the other bodies and authorities had done; in the mean time they demanded, that the ceremony should be suspended, and that the Marquis should retire below the bar: but he requested to be heard, which was refused. Then Senor Puig advanced to take the oath, which he did according to the formula, and took his seat near the President, Senor Agar being on the right, and Puig on the left.—It was resolved that a letter should be sent to the Regency, acquainted them that an unforeseen accident had prevented the Marquis del Palacio from entering the office to which he had been appointed.—The Marquis then begged leave to speak, which was granted. He said, from below the bar, that he had always believed, that the unalterable essence of an oath consisted in the manner in which it was stated, and not in the precise and uniform words of the reply; he begged the Meeting to acquit him of any intention of disobedience; and repeated, that what he proposed was an addition on account of a scruple of con-

science; and that he was ready to take the oath in the form he first proposed. This was opposed by many of the Deputies, who required that the question should be put, whether it should be admitted or not. It was put to the vote, and carried almost unanimously in the negative.—The Marquis again begged permission to speak, to which the President replied, "His Majesty cannot hear the Marquis del Palacio any more, and orders him to retire."—Scarcely had he quitted the meeting, when CAPMANY having declared that it would be proper to secure his person, he rushed towards the door for the purpose of escaping; and silence being imposed by the President, a resolution was instantly passed for his detention in the Guard-house of the troops on duty at the Cortes.—Several deputies wished to discuss the further proceedings against the Marquis: but it was agreed that it was not proper to pass to that discussion, it being a matter of more consequence that the Regency should be installed. The President instantly rose, and the new Regency, accompanied by twelve deputies, proceeded to the gate of the Hall, and went to the house of the Ayuntamiento, with four deputies and the Secretary. They were received on their passage with all due honours.—In the mean time the proposal for securing the marquis in a proper manner was debated; and after a long discussion, he was ordered to be kept in custody in the Guard House, as had been proposed by TAGLE.—Senor LUXAN, the Secretary, reported that the new Regency had been installed: he stated, that their predecessors had come out to the gate of the hall to receive them, and conducted them to the cabinet; and that Senor Saavedra, who had acted as President, had seated himself on the left of Senor Puig; that Senor Castanós and Lardizabal, taking off their sashes, had put them upon the new members of the Regency, that the Minister of Dispatches had read, standing, the two decrees of the Cortes.—These Decrees were in substance; the first, that the Cortes, in consequence of the repeated requests of the Members of Regency to be dismissed, had agreed to receive the same, and to appoint the Senors therein named.—The second Decree stated, that in regard that two of the Senors appointed were absent, the Cortes had elected two others to supply their place until their arrival.—Some Deputies insisted that the sittings should be declared permanent, until the question relating to the Marquis

was determined and a successor appointed; but the President observed, that in consequence of the Regency being lawfully constituted by two Members*, it would be advisable to wait a little, and to take some relaxation, as the sitting had lasted from ten in the morning till after six in the evening. It was therefore adjourned to nine at night.

FRANCE. — *Commercial Decree.*—Fontainebleau, Oct. 18.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, &c.—Upon the report of our Minister of Finance, and with the advice of our Council of State, we have decreed and do decree as follows:—TITLE I.—*Of the Establishment, until a General Peace, of Tribunals, charged with the Repression of Fraud and Smuggling, in matters relative to the Customs.*—SECTION I.—*Of the Supreme Courts of the Customs.*—Art. 1. There shall be established, until a general peace, Supreme Courts of the Customs in the places, and with the districts of jurisdiction which are stated in the table hereto annexed.—2. These courts shall consist of a President, Grand Provost of the Customs, eight Assessors, at least, a Solicitor General, Register, and such a number of Tiptaves as may be necessary for their service. The Grand Provosts are vested with capital jurisdiction.—3. These courts cannot try causes unless from six to eight members are present.—4. They shall decide in the last resort.—5. They shall have cognizance, exclusive of all other tribunals, both of the crime of contraband executed by an armed force, and the crime of entering into speculations for contraband traffic, alledged against the chiefs of bands, the conductors or directors of companies of smugglers, the assurers, the parties interested and their accomplices, in all enterprizes for defrauding the revenue. They shall also have cognizance of the crimes and delinquencies committed by the officers of the customs in breach of their respective duties. The definitive sentences which they shall pronounce, after an interlocutory judgment upon the question of relevancy confirmed by the Court of Cassation, shall not be subject to appeal.—6. Our Solicitors General attached to the supreme courts, shall officially

* Senor Puig entered upon his office as has been mentioned; and the Marquis de Castelar has been appointed in the place of the Marquis del Palacio.

prosecute the crimes mentioned in the preceding article, without the necessity of the superior officers of the customs adducing a process verbal against the persons accused. All the proofs admissible, according to the provisions of the code of criminal process for the conviction of other crimes, shall be received in evidence against those charged with the crimes above stated.—SECTION II.—This establishes an inferior set of courts with jurisdiction in cases where confiscation, fine, or correctional punishment only are necessary. Their sentences are subject to an appeal to the supreme court of the district, and afterwards to the Court of Cassation.]—TITLE II.—[This Title relates merely to the forms of process to be observed in both the Ordinary and Supreme Courts of Customs.]—TITLE III.—*Of Punishments.*—SECTION I.—*Of the Punishments applicable to the Crime of Contraband exercised by an armed Force.*—ART. 14. There is no innovation as to the punishments enacted by law with regard to fraudulent traffic carried on by an armed force.—SECTION II. *Of the Punishments applicable to Speculators, Assurers, Persons interested, or being Accomplices in a fraudulent Traffic in Prohibited Merchandize, and also Chiefs of Bands and Conductors or Directors of Companies of Smugglers.*—ART. 15. Fraudulent dealers in articles of prohibited merchandize or produce, assurers, all the parties concerned, or being accomplices in such adventures, chiefs of bands, conductors and directors of companies for fraudulently trafficking in prohibited merchandize, shall be sentenced to ten years of hard labour, and branded with the letters V. D.; and this without prejudice to an adjudication of damages to the State, proportioned to the profits they may have derived from such traffic.—16. Persons merely employed in conveying the goods shall be liable only to correctional punishments, if there be any mitigating circumstances in their favour. But over and above such punishment, they shall be placed under the superintendence of the Supreme Police for a period of not less than five, nor more than ten years.—The securities which they must furnish, in order to their liberation, shall be regulated according to the demand of the Director of the Customs.—SECTION III.—*Of the Punishments applicable to fraudulent Traffic in tariffed Goods.*—17. Fraudulent adventurers in tariffed merchandize, persons conducting or directing companies of smugglers, &c. in such articles, shall be punished with four years of hard labour, besides being

adjudged to pay in the name of damages to the State a sum proportioned to the profits they may have received.—18. Mere carriers shall, in case of extenuating circumstances, be punished only according to Art. 16.—SECTION IV.—*Of the Punishments applicable to simple Smuggling.*—19. Every person who, without that concert or connection necessary to constitute an adventure or assurance, shall be found introducing articles of merchandize clandestinely, and to the defrauding of the duties of customs, shall be subject to the punishments of correctional police, in conformity to the existing laws, and shall be handed over to the special superintendence of the supreme police, for a time of not less than three, and not exceeding six years upon conforming to Art. 16.—[Title IV, relates to the distribution of the seizures made of run goods. Title V, prohibits any compromise to stop prosecution, except where the penalties and confiscations would exceed 3,000 francs, in which case a negociation may take place, under the authority of the Emperor, who will decide upon the report of a special commission.]—TITLE VI.—*Of the manner in which the Merchandize adjudged to confiscation shall be disposed of.*—SECTION I.—*Of Prohibited Goods.*—ART. 25. Prohibited merchandize adjudged to be confiscated, shall no longer be exposed to sale. Our Grand Provosts, and the Solicitors General of our Provosts (Supreme) Courts, shall draw up an inventory thereof, with a valuation of their ordinary prices in foreign countries, and the same shall be submitted to the approval of our Minister of Finance.—26. They shall then proceed to burn, or otherwise destroy them publicly, of which proceeding they shall draw up a process verbal.—27. The sum to be distributed among the officers of the customs, or others assisting in the seizure of prohibited merchandize adjudged to be confiscated and burnt, shall be regulated by the said valuations, and the same shall be defrayed as a special charge, out of the ordinary revenue of the customs.—SECTION II.—*Of tariffed Merchandize.*—ART. 28. Merchandize subject to the tariff, which may be adjudged to confiscation, shall be publicly sold by auction. They shall, in order thereto, be transported to and collected in those places where it may be presumed that the sale will be most advantageous. The said sales shall take place once in every six months, and shall be advertised a month, at least, prior to the time appointed, in the advertising papers of the

different departments, with a list of the articles and sorts of merchandize and produce.—29. If it shall be necessary to expedite the sale of any part of the said merchandize, special reports shall be made to us relative to the same, by our Minister of Finance.—30. Our Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, and our other Ministers, each in what concerns him, are charged with the execution of the present Decree, which shall be inserted in the Bulletin of Laws. (Signed) NAPOLEON.

[A schedule is subjoined, designating the places where the Supreme and Ordinary Courts are to sit, and describing their respective districts. There are seven Supreme and thirty-four Ordinary Courts.]

Frankfort, Oct. 23.—The following Decree and Proclamation have been published in this city:—Napoleon, &c.—Considering, that the city of Frankfort is glutted with English and colonial merchandize, imported in the course of last summer by Holland and the ports of the North; That the merchants who have entered into a traffic in the merchandize prohibited by the Decree of Berlin, 1807, knew that they were incurring the risk of confiscation; that the greater part of the merchandize in question is only entered to account current, and is still the property of the merchants; that these merchandizes also, are destined to be smuggled into France, which keeps up a war of customs upon our frontiers; that England is not only at war with France, but is also at war with the league of the Rhine; finally, That in the decree of Berlin we notified that wheresoever our troops should be, all English merchandize there found should be confiscated, and that this measure has already been carried into execution at Stettin, Dantzic, and all over the north of Germany; We have decreed, and do decree as follows:—Art. 1. All English or colonial merchandize, or articles proceeding from English commerce, found in Frankfort on the Maine, shall be put under sequestration. 2. A commission shall be appointed by our cousin, the Prince of Eckmühl, the Commander in Chief of the armies in Germany, to take all the measures necessary to the execution of the present Decree, until our determination shall have been declared with regard to the said sequestration. 3. Our Ministers at War and Finance are charged with the execution of the present Decree.—Done at

Fontainebleau, this 14th October, 1810.—
(Signed) NAPOLEON.

Proclamation.

From the date hereof all owners or consignees of English or colonial merchandize are prohibited from conveying any part of their merchandize out of the city of Frankfort, under pain of confiscation.—All the merchants are enjoined to repair to the office of the Commission established at Darmstadt Hotel, and to give in a declaration of every description of English or colonial merchandize which they may have in their houses or elsewhere.—Such merchants as may have deposited goods, and those who have them in keeping, shall be equally obliged to make declaration of the same.—All English or colonial merchandize, or articles proceeding from English commerce, not declared in the space of 24 hours from the date of the publication hereof, shall be confiscated.—For this purpose domiciliary visits shall be made to the houses both of merchants and others.—If the declaration should not be exact, the part of the merchandize not declared shall carry with it the confiscation of the whole.—The merchants, agents, and dealers, shall deliver to the Commission, within the space of twenty-four hours, a statement of all the merchandize proceeding from English commerce, that has been received, and sent off within the last four months, which statement must be corroborated by their book of entry for the articles received and sent off.—The said book shall be provisionally balanced, and immediately returned to the merchants, in order to their being reproduced at the time of verification.—Persons giving information of undeclared merchandize, shall be rewarded with a fifth of their value.—Inhabitants of Frankfort, measures are taken to ensure the execution of the orders of his Imperial and Royal Majesty, which task has been committed to me by his Serene Highness the Prince of Eckmühl.—Your repose, your commerce, with the exception of what is prohibited, and the festivities in which you habitually indulge at the period of the vintage, will not be for an instant interrupted by them.—The magistrates are required to publish and post forthwith the present Decree and Proclamation, in both languages.—(Signed) —FRIANT.—General of Division, Count of the Empire.—Head Quarters, at Frankfort on the Maine.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"And fight their stubborn guts to death."—BUTLER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR to the 3rd November, 1810.—On Monday, the 19th instant, the government published an EXTRAORDINARY GAZETTE, the whole of which, if possible, except the useless repetition of addresses, which only serve to swell out the sheets of a Gazette, shall be inserted in the subsequent pages of this sheet; and, be it what it may, every word of it should be attentively read by those, who wish to be able to state a correct opinion as to this war of wonders.—In my last, at page 979, and the following ones, I re-stated what had appeared in the Ministerial papers, for some days before, as to the relative situation of the two armies, and as to the prospects of each. We there saw, that it was little short of madness, downright insanity, for any one to suppose, that Massena could remain where he was much longer, many days, nay, many *hours* longer, seeing that he had neither victuals nor drink nor clothing nor lodging for his army; and, it was equal madness to suppose, that he would be able to retreat, seeing that we and our allies had the exclusive possession and absolute command of all the country in the rear of the French; so, that, there appeared not to be the smallest chance of the French, or of any part of them, escaping. We had, it was there explicitly stated, 81 thousand men opposed to 60 thousand Frenchmen. There were eighty-four thousand English, and Portuguese "as good as any in the world," opposed to 60 thousand Frenchmen, who had, for more than a month, been exposed to all sorts of hardships, who had been forty days without bread, who had been stewing down their horses for some time, and who had, within five weeks, been *beaten in the open field*, by a *part* only of that very army, whom they now had to encounter in lines three deep, mounted with a thousand pieces of heavy cannon, and flanked by waters covered by gun-boats.—From this description, the reader must have concluded with me, that Massena's choice lay between death by the sword or by

famine, and surrender at discretion; and, indeed, so useless did all further resistance appear, that, as we have seen, it was positively stated, that he had *offered to capitulate*.—Now, though the EXTRAORDINARY Gazette does not go this length; though, from that caution, which always ought to mark this species of official papers; though, from causes of this sort, His Excellency Marshal General Baron Douro of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera's dispatches do not go quite so far as the Morning Post newspaper; still they go a great way; and judging from them, as, doubtless, we safely may, we can have not the smallest doubt, that Massena and his army must *die, be killed, or be captured*; and that, too, in a very short space of time; nay, before the time at which I am now writing, which, being the 22nd of November, is *nineteen* days since the date of Lord Viscount Talavera's last dispatch.—But, in order the better to be able to judge of the wretched situation of the French, let us take a short view of the *facts*, stated in these dispatches and their enclosures. We are informed by these documents, that in the skirmishing between the French and our outposts the success was generally on our side; that Colonel Trant had taken 80 officers and 5,000 men at Coimbra; that General Miller and Colonel Wilson had taken many of the French who had straggled in search of food; that General Blunt had been successful in a similar manner, and had harassed the enemy and had taken prisoners and killed many; that the enemy experienced great difficulties for want of provisions and for want of a communication with Spain; that the French soldiers were continually straggling for want of food, and that not a day passed without prisoners and deserters being brought in; that in one of the battles, fought near Peniche, the French had five killed and four wounded; that the French had committed great spoliations at Coimbra; that they had destroyed in that city a great deal of valuable things; that the French at Coimbra had in their possession a quantity of

oxen and sheep; that the Commander there was Monsieur Flandin, a *commissary*, having the superintendence of the hospitals; that, agreeably to the dispatch of the 27th from Lord Talavera to Lord Liverpool, Major Pinto had had a battle, in which *one* of his men was killed, and *two* of the enemy's men, and this is reported by Brigadier General Blunt to Marshal Beresford, by Marshal Beresford to Marshal General Lord Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington, and by Lord Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, a circumstance which ought to give us a very high notion of the correctness of all these statements; that all the accounts brought in to our army concur in respect of the distress felt by the enemy for the want of provisions of all descriptions; that they are said to be endeavouring to make a bridge over the Tagus, but, that, the noble Viscount could not see any thing of it; that our troops in the rear of the French were pressing on upon them, and that the British cavalry and a battalion of Spanish light infantry and the troops of the garrison of Peniché confined the enemy's detachments, "and," says the Noble Viscount, "*they really possess no part of the country, excepting that on which their army stands;*" and in his very last dispatch, the Noble Viscount says, "it is impossible to form an estimate of the quantity of provisions which they have found in the villages on the ground which they occupy; but it is CERTAIN, that they can draw none from any other part of the country, the whole being in the possession of our troops."—This is the part of the Dispatches, on which the English eye ought to rest. This is what we ought never to let out of our sight, while the French army lies where it now is. This is what one may call a *clencher*; and, observe, it comes from our Commander, the Marshal General, himself, so that, of course, there can be no doubt as to the fact.—Well, then, how long is the wretched enemy to be suffered to remain where he is? I am not for any of your "*death and glory*" enterprizes; and, therefore, I am not one of those, who call upon the noble Viscount to go forth and fall upon Massena; for, though the enemy could not fail to be annihilated, still, some of our army must suffer; and, if the thing can be as effectually done without any suffering and without even any risk to

our army, why should it not be so done? —The MORNING CHRONICLE of the 21st instant has some remarks upon the noble Viscount's dispatches, at which remarks the Morning Post (the constant friend of his Excellency) seems very much offended. The complaint of the latter is in these words:—"We cannot sufficiently express *our indignation* at the mode in which the dispatches from Lord Wellington have been treated by the Morning Chronicle. The *ill-usage* which British Generals have to encounter from their Countrymen, has long been almost *proverbial*, but the pettish and flippant criticism which we now notice, is treatment really more *insulting* to the Commander, and more *disgraceful* to the writer, than we had expected even from those whose chief delight has long consisted in endeavours to *destroy the fame* of every Officer who does not happen to be politically connected with a particular party.—Fortunately, it is one of the noble and eminently useful qualities of Lord Wellington's mind, to hold in utter *contempt* those whose obloquy is founded upon ignorance, passion, or interest; he would otherwise, we think, be fully justified in refusing to serve a country, whose popular writers treat him as they might a demagogue or a pamphleteer. We should make these observations, though the comments which have produced them were as substantially just and fair, as they are in fact inapplicable. The style is such as *nothing could justify*: it is in the worst taste of political speakers, talking each other down, and quite *intolerable* in a military discussion." —Oh! pray, good Morning Post, do not *dragoon* your neighbour! Pray, do not *sabre* him! Especially just at this time, when you are giving us, as an indubitable proof of Napoleon's execrable despotism, that he will not suffer any *liberty of the press*. Pray, do not *sabre* us, good Morning Post! Fight us with your pen, as long as you like; but, if you have recourse to other weapons, the contest is at an end. —Reader, look well at this paragraph. Pay particular attention to this complaint. Be assured, that it was not put upon paper without an end in view. Be assured, too, that this was not the *last* time, that it was intended that this complaint should be made.—We shall presently see, what sort of remarks those were, which gave such offence; but, when, I should be glad to know, was it ever before said, that

British-Generals are *ill-used* by their countrymen? Who ever said this before? Who, till now, ever had the impudence to make this complaint? Who, but the author of this paragraph, or some one of his set, ever had the impudence, the *insolence*, to pretend that the Generals of our army go *unrewarded* by their countrymen? Look at the list of their names, and see what they *receive* as well as what they have *done*. And yet has the writer of this paragraph the impudence to say, in the face of this nation, that the "*ill-usage* which British Generals have to encounter from their countrymen has long been proverbial."—We are told, that the remarks alluded to are disgraceful to the writer, and that they are *insulting* to the Commander; that they were intended to *destroy his fame*; that they would fully *justify* him in *refusing to serve the country*; that, even if they were *just and fair*, they ought not to be suffered; because the *style* of them is such as *nothing can justify*, and is *intolerable* in a military discussion.—Now, then, let us see what these remarks were. But, reader, I beseech you to *mark well* this paragraph. I beseech you to note it well; for, he assured, it is not the last you will hear of the *sentiments* contained in it.—Let us see what these remarks; what these terribly offensive remarks; what these disgraceful, insulting, intolerable, fame-destroying, and indignation-exciting remarks were. Let us see what those remarks were, which, as this writer says, would fully justify our Commander in *refusing to serve the country*. Let us now, having seen the character and effects ascribed to them, take a look at the remarks themselves.—All the narratives of Count UGOLINO are mere trifles to the *gift of starving* possessed by Massena and his followers. He displayed his talent for starving in no common degree at Genoa, but he has *fully demonstrated his powers of abstinence in Portugal*. Lord Wellington, in the Gazette extraordinary, which we this day present to our Readers, speaks of the destitute state of the French, in repeated paragraphs, *though he does not know what quantity of provision they found in the villages which he abandoned to them*.—The Noble Lord says, that the enemy have pushed some troops across the Zezere above Punhete, principally cavalry—but he concludes that the rains which have fallen will have swelled that river, and *that these troops will have retired again*. In that case the

"enemy must have *established a bridge* across the Zezere, otherwise if the river has swelled the French could not recross it. Indeed we believe there is no doubt of the fact of their having established a bridge across that river—and which enables them at pleasure to cross the Tagus above the confluence of the two rivers. *How then can they be said to possess only the ground upon which they stand*, when even Major-General Fane is dispatched into the Alentejo to observe their motions?—Lord Wellington says that he sees no increase to the French army, and that he has heard nothing of the march of reinforcements either from Castile or Estremadura, though he avows he had not, on the 3d instant, had any accounts from General Silveira later than the 19th of October. So that it is probable the reinforcements from Castile may have interrupted the communication. Upon the whole, however, those accounts from Lord Wellington are written in the implicit belief of ultimate success. He describes the difficulties of the enemy to be so great, their situation so imminent, their stock of provisions so exhausted, their means of supply so impracticable, and their prospect of reinforcement so hopeless, that he seems desirous of inspiring his government and the Country with the most entire confidence in the result of the struggle. After the description of the state of the enemy which he has given, *he takes upon himself a great responsibility for the event. We trust he will realize the hopes which he has given*."—These are the remarks, reader! These are the offensive, disgraceful, insulting, intolerable, and fame-destroying remarks!—Really, if these remarks deserve these epithets; if such be the state of our taste and of the press, that the accusation against these remarks is to be listened to, it is time to look sharply about us. If remarks like these are not to be made upon the contents of Dispatches, published in the Gazette, professedly for the information of the public, I must beg to hear not another word about the *Liberty of the Press*; and I shall beseech the Morning Post to tell us what the Public would lose by the introduction of Buonaparté's decrees as to the press. If a man be not allowed to publish remarks like these, what is he to be allowed to do? What can he write or what can he publish

with safety, unless it has first had the approbation of an inspector?—To be sure, it is nothing but a venal writer, who *sends forth* this paragraph; and, therefore, I may be thought to be combatting an imaginary monster. Be it so. But, I am by no means convinced, that, for this reason, I ought to hold my tongue upon the subject. I see a great deal in this *complaining* paragraph; and, I am pretty sure, that this was not the *last* time, that it was intended that the public should hear its sentiments uttered.—What, if the people of England, through the public writers, make *remarks*, like those above-quoted from the Morning Chronicle, upon Dispatches published in the news-papers; if they *reason* upon such dispatches; if they offer their *opinions* of them; and, if these remarks, reasonings, and opinions do not accord with the wishes of the Commander who writes them, is such Commander to say, that he will *no longer serve*? This is very decent doctrine to preach. This doctrine was reserved for the present day, and for the use of the venal writers from whom it proceeds.—If it be an offence, if it be disgraceful, insulting, and intolerable, to *write* as the Morning Chronicle has written upon this occasion, it must be equally offensive to *speak* in the same way; and, then we are placed in this delightful situation, that we cannot even open our lips upon the contents of a Commander's Dispatch, unless we speak in his *praise*. Bravo! This is what I could not have expected, even from the venal writer of the Morning Post.—But, we must look at this paragraph in another light now.—What could make the writer of the Morning Post so *touchy*? If that writer felt quite stout about the situation and the prospects of the army, what was it that *nettled* him so much in Mr. PERRY's remarks, the concluding part of which are complimentary to the writer of the Dispatch. In saying, that he has assumed *great responsibility*, he pays him as high a compliment as, in such a state of things, he can pay him. And, it must be confessed, that, if, contrary to all expectation, our army should, at last, be beaten, this *bold tone*, this *favourable picture*, given by our Commander, will do him no discredit, at least. To boast of advantages of situation and circumstances *before* a battle is very different from boasting of feats *in* battle; and, it is but too often the way of of Commanders to talk of their *difficulties*, which they are apt to multiply rather than

diminish.—This charge does not apply to the Dispatches of Lord Talavera; and, though a Commander may fall into the opposite fault; though he may be too *sanguine*, still that is a fault on the right side. To multiply difficulties may, possibly, not argue cowardice; but, to see no difficulties at all can, at the very worst argue nothing but presumption, which, in my opinion, is always preferable to timidity, and even to what is generally called *caution*.—Therefore, the remarks of the Morning Chronicle really are flattering to the character of our Commander; and, nothing but the poisonous mind of the writer of the Morning Post could possibly have represented them in any other light.—The Morning Post adds the following, which has, I must confess, surprised me not a little.—“The fact is, “that in the relative situations of the two “armies, there are the circumstances of “hope on either side, which are so natural “in a contest in which the armies of the “two greatest nations in the world are “opposed to each other, each under a “Commander of great talent and experience. To be on either side *perfectly* “confident of success, would be *unwarrantably* “to underrate the skill and bravery *undeniably* “possessed by the other. We feel “certainly a very considerable portion of “confidence, but it does not make us *blind* “to the dangers which are to be overcome, “which we therefore state from time to “time, as they occur to us, without in “any degree altering the opinion to which “we have been led, by a *comparison in* “difficulties and advantages.”—What! *hope*, and hope on either side too, after all that you have told us, during the last thirty days? What! *unwarrantable* to be confident of success, after having told us, that Massena's army had had no rations for forty days, and that the French army had been living upon stewed horses; nay, after having told us, that Massena, at one time, had begun his retreat, and at another time, that he had offered to capitulate? Is it after all this that you tell us, that you have only a *considerable portion* of confidence, and that you are not blind to the dangers which are to be overcome? Is it after all this that you talk about a comparison of *difficulties* and *advantages*? Really, after this, those who believe what you say, must be the greatest fools that ever walked the earth without a keeper. You told us, in all forms of words, that Massena was become a laughing stock;

and, those who believed you, could not possibly imagine, that *hope* was a word applicable to the situation or prospects of either army; and, now all at once, you speak as doubtfully as if you had never expressed one single sentiment of confidence.—It is curious enough, too, that this doubting fit comes upon you after the season for doubting is past with all those who doubted before; after the official dispatches have, in the most circumstantial manner, described to us the situation of the enemy to be such as, I believe, no army in the world ever yet escaped from. We now see Massena with a superior army in front of him, guarded by a triple line of fortresses well mounted with cannon and flanked by gunboats; we see that army situated amongst friends, having an abundant supply of provisions and stores of all sorts; we see that army in good health and high spirits, and anxious for the onset, to which they are encouraged by their constant success in numerous skirmishes with the enemy; while, on the other hand, we see the enemy in a defenceless position, without covering for his troops, destitute of provisions of every description, beset in his rear and upon his flanks by our troops and those of our allies, having the possession of not an inch of ground except that on which his army stands, and, to crown the whole has an army daily wasting away, like butter before the sun, with sickness and desertion. And yet the Morning Post has nothing better than *hopes* for its Fashionable readers! It has no longer perfect confidence of success; it has only a very considerable portion of confidence; it is not blind to dangers; and it can see a comparison of difficulties and advantages!—The Morning Post newspaper of to day (Friday) makes the allied army amount to 105,000 men, besides 20,000 Portuguese militia in the rear of Massena. But, let us take the whole account; for it will be of the greatest consequence *in time*. It is not published as a *hearsay*; but, as *authentic information*, possessed by the conductor of the paper. It speaks in detail. It names the particular corps, and the particular Commanders. I beg the reader to pay attention to this; for this is, I think, what we shall be able to hold these venal gentlemen to.—“The position which Lord Wellington’s army occupies, extending from the sea, near Torres Vedras, to Alhendra, is so strong by nature, that it may be considered as almost impregnable. This is the first line of defence,

“and with the exception of four passes, is completely inaccessible to cavalry or artillery. Redoubts and forts have been constructed for the defence of these points, which are protected and fortified with nearly 200 pieces of cannon, independent of the field trains. The redoubts, too, are so advantageously stationed, as, by their commanding position, to provide for the two-fold object of annoyance and defence. In the rear of these formidable works, large detachments of infantry are posted. They are effectually protected by the redoubts, and maintain a position from which any attack made by the enemy between them may be immediately repelled. The second line of defence is supported by movable columns, consisting each of between 5, and 10,000 men, infantry and cavalry; who, as circumstances may render necessary, can advance or act on either flank of the allied army. A number of men of war’s launches, provided each with two carronades, effectually cover the right flank at Alhendra. The second line of defence which is considered as even stronger than the first, begins at Alhendra, extending thence by Bacellos and Mafra to the sea. A strong corps in the centre, advanced to within half a league of Sobral, (which is in possession of the French), is commanded by the gallant Brigadier-Gen. Pack, whose head-quarters are in the grand centre redoubt. For the purpose of communicating, with the greatest celerity, all intelligence of the enemy’s movements, a telegraph has been established in this redoubt, which, from its central and commanding position, is admirably suited to this important object. —The following is very nearly a correct statement of the force of the Allied Army:—

“ British Troops	35,000
“ Portuguese (Regulars) ...	45,000
“ Portuguese (Militia)	10,000
“ Volunteers	5,000
“ Spaniards	10,000

“ Total 105,000

“Massena’s force may be estimated at about 60,000. To the above statement of the force of the Allies should be added the militia in the rear of the French, who are commanded by Silveira, and amount to about 20,000 men.”—Now, here are no less than 80 thousand regulars, English and Portuguese (as good

troops "as any in the world,") and the French have but 60 thousand in all! It is non-sense to talk of a *battle* in such a state of things; and, it is not to be believed, as I said in my last Number, that our Commander can refrain one hour from the *attack* upon any other ground, than that of being morally certain finally to *capture the whole without any battle at all*; or, in the words of my motto, "to fight their *stubborn gets to death*." In other words; to reduce them to a state, in which they will have only the choice of *surrender or starvation*.—Let us hear no more, then, about *hopes*, and about a *comparison of difficulties and dangers*; for, one of two things must be: either this statement of positions and forces is grossly false, shamefully false; or, it would be indelible disgrace and infamy upon our arms, were we to suffer the French army to escape; if we suffered scarcely a man of them to get away to tell the story.

PARTIES.—The public have heard, during the last two years, a great deal of railing against those, who put the two parties upon a *level*. Nobody did this, till facts bade them do it. The voice of truth demanded it; and then it was done. —But, what I am now about to notice, is, a paragraph in one of the party papers, the *COURIER*, of the 22nd instant. It would, at least, be fair to give the parties full credit for what they say of one another. We are not the inventors of the accusations. They are mutual between the parties; and yet both parties join; they rally round one another, whenever we make an attack upon that corruption, which produces what they affect to condemn in each other, and which always must and always will produce it, so long as corruption is suffered to exist.—The paragraph that I am about to cite was called forth by some remarks of the *Morning Chronicle* upon the prospects of our army in Portugal; and the *COURIER*, after observing, that the *OPPOSITION* print, as he calls the *Morning Chronicle*, speaks with *gaiety* upon Massena's *wonderful powers of abstinence*, proceeds thus:—"Is it possible for the meanest understanding to mistake this language? Does any man speak with gaiety of an event which he deprecates? Will not every one think that *they* (the *Opposition*) *triumph in the ability of the enemy to protract his resistance?* that they contemplate with satisfaction the disappoint-

ment of the hope that distress would force him to retreat? This *DETESTABLE SPIRIT*, which seems to view the operations of an enemy, and particularly of Buonaparté, with *complacence*; which has nothing but candour and respect for the traitor who has abused the reputation won for him by the enthusiasm for equal laws, to set himself above the laws, nay, to trample all law, human and divine, beneath the bestial hoof of military despotism; which has ever a readiness to palliate or forget all iniquities to which prosperity has wedded itself; this *detestable spirit* may be seen in every one almost of the *SPEECHES* and writings of the *OPPOSITION*. They never seem to be heart and hand with the country. They never appear to be thoroughly happy at any *British triumph*. To fight double our numbers was rashness. But we beat them! No matter; and the General who did this, they will soon, no doubt, accuse of over-much caution. The clue to all this is, THAT THEY ARE NOT IN PLACE; and as every *success of our arms* serves to consolidate, as it ought to do, the power of the *Ministers* their opponents, they never contemplate, with pure and unmixed satisfaction, any event which must render their hopes of getting into *place more desperate*."—One might ask here, *who* it was that, in reality, caused Napoleon to set himself above the laws; One might ask this venal gentleman *who* it was that first set up the out-cry against *equal laws*, that prevented such laws from being established in France or any where else; one might ask him *who*, in fact, it was that compelled the French either to submit to the subduing and subdividing of their country, or to the restoration of those whom they had put down, or to the elevation of some such chief as Napoleon; one might ask the venal gentleman this, but, it would be foreign from our subject, which relates to the character of the *two parties* of candidates for power in this kingdom. —We are here told, by a writer of the *INS*, that the *Opposition*, or *OUTS*, are actuated by that *detestable spirit*, which induces them to view the successes of an enemy, and particularly Buonaparté, with *complacence*; that this detestable spirit is seen in almost every one of the *speeches* of the *Opposition*; that they never seem to go hand in hand with the country; that they never appear to be happy at their country's triumphs [he does not name them;] that

the sole cause of all this is, **THAT THEY ARE NOT IN PLACE**; and that, as every success of our arms [*name! name!*] serves to *consolidate* the power of the Ministers, the Opposition never contemplate those successes with real satisfaction. — There. There is the picture, which is drawn of one of the parties by a regular venal writer of the other party. There is the picture, which this writer gives of the Opposition, who consist of about *two fifths of the House of Peers, and very nearly one half of the House of Commons.* — It is very strange, but it is not more strange than true, that accusations of this sort, coming from one set against the other, never appear to give any offence at all. Both sides appear to take it *in good part*. But, the moment any one, arguing from these mutual accusations, suggests that *both parties are alike*, there is such a buzzing and murmuring and such black looks and such jostling and such rallying and such making a stand against popular encroachment, that the whole mass seems in commotion. What can the reason of this be? If two men accuse each other of folly, or of corruption, or of any thing else, no matter what, each may be angry with the other, and, possibly, with good cause; but, surely it would be very unnatural for them to join in endeavouring to tear to pieces a third man, because he gave pretty full credit to the assertions of them both. — Alas! the true reason of a junction apparently so unnatural is this, that those, who, upon their own assertions, believe both parties to be alike, adopt a course of reasoning, which, if acted upon, would *take away that for which parties but too often contend*; would take away the meat which faction feeds upon; and hence such persons always have been, and always will be vilified by those who prefer their own interests to the interests of their country. — Let us hope, however, that these workings of faction are drawing towards a close. Long and severely has the country suffered from them. Fatal has been their effects; and still more fatal will they be, if the cause be not speedily put an end to.

SPANISH WAR. — In my last number, at page 978, an account was inserted of the expedition from Gibraltar, under **LORD BLANEY**. Another account has since appeared, and, it would seem, of an official nature. — It is as follows, and it is, in more than one point of view, of considerable importance. — "By a dispatch re-

"ceived from Lieutenant-General Campbell, dated Gibraltar, Oct. 23, it appears that a detachment had been made from the garrisons of that fortress and of Ceuta, with the object of destroying a number of privateers and gun-boats fitted out by the French at Malaga, as well as for the purpose of harrassing the enemy's posts in that neighbourhood. This detachment, consisting of 370 British, 470 German deserters, and 630 Spanish troops, was placed under the command of Major-General Lord Blaney; the naval part of the expedition was conducted by Captain Hope, of his Majesty's ship Topaze, and the whole proceeded upon the 13th ult. to Frengerola, when a false attack was to be made, with a view of drawing away the enemy's principal force from Malaga. This object seems to have been answered, but unfortunately the Commander of the troops was induced to make a serious attack upon the town of Frengerola, to which the light artillery was inadequate, and time being lost in the attempt, the enemy's troops arrived from Malaga, and attacked such part of our force as was ashore suddenly and successfully. It appears that the troops were thrown into confusion from mistaking a party of French cavalry for Spaniards, and these being allowed to approach unresisted, surrounded and made prisoners Lord Blaney, with several other Officers, and dispersed the troops. Lieutenant-Colonel Grant arriving with the flank companies of the 82d regiment, he succeeded with this regiment, and a part of the Spanish regiment of Toledo, in checking the advance of the French, and in enabling most of the dispersed troops to re-embark. The loss of Major Grant, of the 89th regiment, who was mortally wounded in the first transactions of the expedition, is particularly regretted. The total amount of loss sustained by the detachment from Gibraltar consists of one Officer and nine privates killed; one Officer and 20 privates wounded; seven Officers, five sergeants, and 162 rank and file, missing — of whom 115 were **FOREIGN DESERTERS**. — The names of the Officers are as follows: — Killed — Major Grant, 89th regiment. — Wounded — Lieut. Read, 82d regiment. — Missing — Major-General Lord Blaney, Capt. Annesley, Lieut. Sheehy, Ensigns Watts, Moulson, and Hooper, of the 89th regiment. Lieut. Stanim, foreign corps."

—Here, you see, reader, that the blame is laid upon *Lord Blaney*, without the smallest hesitation. The *Morning Post*, of the 23d inst from which I take this article, does not give it in the form of a Dispatch, published from Downing Street; but, as you will observe, it clearly says, that a *Dispatch* to this effect has been received. —How comes this Dispatch not, then, to appear in the *Gazette*? It relates to an affair of as great importance as any that has happened for a long while past. Or, is it to be understood, that none but good news is published in the *Gazette*; and that we are to praise all the acts and deeds therein recorded? —We shall, however, I suppose, have Lord Blaney's account. He is, I have heard, a very gallant man, and a man who has, perhaps, seen as much foreign and actual service as any officer in the army, having been, I have been told, in upwards of twenty expeditions. One ought not, upon light grounds, to presume, that a failure such as that here recorded, proceeded solely from the fault of such a commander, and especially where we see, that, of 162 missing, 115 were *German deserters*, who had been received into our service. —If this be not an authentic dispatch, it will not be easy for the publisher of this article to justify his conduct, and, he it not forgotten, that it was only the day before, that this same *Morning Post* had declared that Lord Viscount Talavera would be fully justified in refusing to serve the country, merely because Mr. Perry had made some critical remarks, not upon his conduct of the war, but upon his Dispatch. —How tender the man of venality is here! How very tender; and yet, he has not the least hesitation in imputing the whole of a failure to Lord Blaney, who is peculiarly entitled to a suspension of judgment against him, seeing that he is now a prisoner with the enemy, and, of course, unable to answer the attacks made upon his character. —It was at first said, as I showed in my last, that the failure was owing to the ill-behaviour of the *foreign deserters* received into our pay. An attempt is now made to explain this away; but, it is even now confessed, that 115 of them are amongst the missing. I trust that we are to have a full account of this affair; that we shall have a detailed account of the missing in particular, and be informed of how many *British troops* were amongst them; and, I trust, that we shall soon have Lord Blaney's account of the causes of the failure.

BREAD PRICES. —There appears to be something going on about the price of bread, which, I should imagine, is likely to lead to consequences of importance; and, therefore, the matter is worthy of public attention. —The account of the matter, as given in most of the news-papers, and especially in the *Morning Post* of the 22d instant, is as follows: —“We have more than once stated “that some nefarious practices must have “been resorted to, to enable the dealers “in flour to keep up the price of that article “so much beyond the proportion of that “of wheat; and as often expressed our “conviction that the worthy Lord Mayor “would not be inattentive to so iniquitous “a system, and so crying a grievance. “We are now rejoiced to find that his “Lordship is actively employed in the “laudable pursuit of bringing to punish- “ment the authors of the evil, and we “have no doubt of his laudable exertions “being speedily crowned with success. “Yesterday a number of master bakers “were brought before his Lordship for not “having made weekly returns of the price “of flour, and some of them were charged “with making false returns of the same, “in order to keep up the price of bread. “The penalty for each offence of this nature is 20*l*. It was urged that the enforcement of this penalty would go to “ruin some poor men; but his Lordship “very properly observed, that however “severely it might operate upon individuals, he had a superior consideration “to govern his conduct, that of doing “justice to the Public, and his duty he “was resolved to perform. At the same “time his Lordship expressed himself of “opinion that the prime transgressors “were the mealmen, and in order to sift “the business to the bottom, he ordered “several of these Gentlemen to be summoned before him.” —It is a question that has often been discussed, whether an assize of bread, which, in fact, is a maximum, as far as relates to that article, be a regulation founded in sound principles; but, there can be no doubt, that, as long as such regulation exists, the information for making the assize ought to be correct, and, of course, that those who neglect to give such information, or give false information, are criminal and ought to be punished. —As to the attacks upon the bakers and mealmen; as to the accusations against them for keeping up the price; this is no concern of mine; the credit and the

advantage, if any should *arise*, of making such charges will belong to the Morning Post and its reverend correspondents and other supporters and abettors, and to the exclusive enjoyment of it I shall cheerfully leave them. But, upon the subject of the price of bread, I cannot help observing, that it is now said, that all the *Prussian* ports are shut against us. If so, there will, I should imagine, be very little more *importation* of corn; and, in that case, the Morning Post and Courier will have enough to do, I am afraid, to keep down the price of the loaf, even though their recommendation with regard to the Bakers and mealmen, that is to say, "*Hang the rascals or pillory*" (See page 937,) were to be strictly followed. Hanging Bakers and Mealmen would not supply the place of corn imported, and it would not add one single mouthful to the stock on hand. If the importations be put a stop to, therefore, let the supporters and abettors of the Morning Post look to the consequences of what they are now doing. They are supporting and abetting a writer, who tells the people that some, at least, of those who deal in corn, flour, and bread, ought to be *hanged, or pelted nearly to death by the populace*. They are supporting and abetting this print. All those who read this print are giving such support. And, therefore, to them I leave the enjoyment of all the benefits to be derived from its publications.

OLD PRICES. PLYMOUTH PLAY-HOUSE.

—There are other commodities as well as bread that people wish to have at *Old Prices*; and, I should suppose, that those who are for old prices in the one case, will be for old prices in *all* cases.—A Play-house *row* does not seem, at first sight, to belong to *politics*; but, odd as it may sound, it really does form an incident of no trifling nature in the political history of these times; and, the reflecting mind will not fail to perceive, in the following description of a scene on the Plymouth stage, circumstances strongly characteristic of the present state of things, and as strongly indicative of what we have to expect, unless there be great wisdom indeed exercised in the management of the nation's affairs.—"Plymouth Dock. Monday night (19th November instant) the Theatre at Plymouth Dock opened for the first time this season, with the tragedy of *Jane Shore*, and the farce of the

"Lock and Key. The house having been newly painted and decorated, the Manager raised the price of admission; the boxes from 3s. to 4s. and the pit from 2s. to 2s. 6d. with an additional sixpence on the half-price admission to the boxes. A great number of orders were distributed among the Manager's friends, and the first three acts of the play went off tolerably tranquil; but on the admission of half-price, a dreadful scene of riot and confusion commenced, which could not be exceeded by the height of the O. P. war in the metropolis. It was quite impossible to hear a word of the performance. Apples, oranges, halfpence, sticks, and even glass bottles, flew about in every direction, to the imminent risque of a number of lives. The most active among the advocates of O. P. were a body of sailors, headed by several midshipmen, who all seemed determined to conquer or die. Mutters at last began to wear so serious an aspect, that a military detachment was sent for and introduced on the stage. No sooner, however, had they made their appearance, than the sailors rushed on the stage in a body, and regardless of the fixed bayonets, they drove the soldiers from the stage, and kept possession of it themselves for a considerable time. Other parties of them took their stations in the Pit and Boxes, and were appeared every disposition both in them and the other advocates of O. P. to do serious mischief to the house, which had already felt the effects of their vengeance. At last the Manager finding the opposition to the new prices so general and strong, came forward, and having with difficulty obtained a hearing, informed the audience that the prices of admission should be reduced to their former standard. This speech was hailed with three cheers, and the audience shortly after separated. Several persons were severely bruised, but no lives were lost."—Here we see the whole thing complete.—The man who has amusement to sell raises his price to keep pace with the value of money and with the price of food, clothes, lodging and fire; those who have to pay this advance of price, being conveniently assembled, resist the demand, assail the vendor, and demolish his property; and what next? The peace officer and the law? Perhaps it was so; but, these are immediately followed, we see, by a soldier and the bayonet. These are assaulted by

the purchasers of amusement ; the former are driven from the scene ; and the wretched showman, thus left unsupported, offers his commodity for sale at the *Old Prices*.—It does not require any supernatural powers to foresee what all this must lead to, unless great wisdom be brought to bear upon the accumulating difficulties of the times.—The truth is, that all the pains imaginable have been taken ; that all possible means have been used, by those, who, with unblushing impudence, still call themselves the exclusive friends of *order* and of *law* ; all means that can be named have been used by this description of persons to prevent the people from believing that *Bank notes* have depreciated. This is a fact, for having openly and explicitly acknowledged which, even a Committee of the House of Commons have been much more violently attacked than the House was attacked by Sir Francis Burdett. This is a fact, which, if frankly declared to the people, would, at once, make them clearly perceive the *reasonableness* of a rise in the price of all things ; and, it would, of course, reconcile them to that rise, and prevent all the heart-burnings and contests and violences to be finally apprehended from their not seeing the real cause of what they complain of.—But, this fact will, I suppose, be disguised from the people at large as long as possible. How long that may be I do not pretend to say. It is the immediate interest of a great many persons to disguise it ; to deny the fact ; to confuse the question ; and, if nothing better can be done, to misrepresent the views, to abuse, to calumniate, all those who evince a desire to make the truth known. Hence all the vile and venal attacks, in the Morning Post, upon the Bullion Committee, who, I have no scruple to say, and am prepared to prove it, have done more service the country, than all the other Committees and Commissions, whose inquiries ever came under my examination. Yet, should I not at all wonder, to see the Members of this Committee held forth to the uninformed and unreflecting part of the community, as the *advocates for high prices*, as the co-adjutors of the *bakers* and the *meal-men* ; and, of course, as meriting the same fate.—Let those who correspond with, who write for, who abet and buy and read the Morning Post and other prints of the sort, reflect, however, upon the consequences before it be too late. Let them reflect upon the probable consequences of

the success of their misrepresentations and calumnies ; and, while they are accusing others of revolutionary designs, let them beware how they themselves set on foot that which no human power may be able to arrest or to controul.

SWEDEN. KING AND BERNADOTTE.—This unfortunate personage, of whom history will have hereafter to speak, having got on board of the *Tartarus*, from the port of Riga, sometime ago, and having on the 15th instant landed at Yarmouth, under the title of COUNT GOTTORP, the same under which he travelled on the continent, arrived on the 22nd instant in London, of which arrival the following account was given, in the news-papers of the 23rd. “ On Wednesday evening the King of Sweden arrived at the Clarendon Hotel. The Marquis Wellesley being out of town at Windsor, Mr. Culling Smith (Under Secretary of State) immediately waited on his Majesty, with whom he remained for some time. His Swedish Majesty looks extremely well. He is of a dark complexion, with a Roman nose, and is about five feet six inches in height.”—What is intended to be done by our government, in this case, we shall, probably, soon hear ; but, I cannot refrain from expressing my hope, that there will be *no grant of money* made to this personage out of the *taxes*, at a time when our resources are so much wanted for our own defence. Besides, such a measure might increase the obstacles in the way of negotiation for peace. I have not heard, that any such grant was in contemplation ; but, I could not let pass this opportunity of expressing my opinion upon the subject.—We are still, I believe, at *peace* with Sweden. I have never heard any thing to the contrary ; and, unless we mean to make war for the recovery of this sovereign’s throne, it will, in my opinion, be very inconsistent, to support him out of the public revenues ; because, if he has such support it must be given him as an *ally*, and of course as a *king* : for, in no other character can we consider him as an *ally*.—In the mean while, contrary to all the predictions of our venal writers, who never listen to reason, who never consult any thing but their wishes ; contrary to all their bold foretellings ; and, as it were for the express purpose of throwing ridicule upon their wheedling of the Swedes to reject BERNADOTTE, and upon their fulminations against

them if they did not reject him, he has arrived in Sweden, and has been received in the most flattering manner, according to the accounts from Stockholm, under the date of the 5th and 6th instant.—“Friday November 2, which was fixed upon for the solemn entry of his Royal Highness the Crown Prince into this town, he proceeded from Dretningholm to the royal country seat, New Haga, whence he was attended to this capital by Baron Hamilton, Lord High Chamberlain, and arrived here at two o'clock in the afternoon. On his reaching the Custom-house, he was received by the Governor General, the Magistrates, and the five Elders of the City; and a grand entry was made. After which he was introduced to the King, and dined in public.—On the 9th of October his Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Sweden solemnly professed the tenets and principles of the pure Lutheran religion, and answered in the affirmative several questions which were put to him for that purpose by the Archbishop Doctor Lindelön.—Stockholm, Nov. 6. The day before yesterday his Majesty adopted his Royal Highness the Crown Prince, in the Session-hall of the States of the Realm, for his son, under the name of *Charles John*, which name his Royal Highness is henceforth to bear.”—It may be very mortifying to us to behold this; but, to rail at the Swedes is perfectly useless. The thing is done. Another fleet is, in effect, added to the navy of France. This is another consequence proceeding from the Anti-Jacobin war. Our statesmen from 1793 to 1800, could not think of a peace with any thing but a regular government in France. We have now got a regular government there to our hearts' content; and, by a strange revolution in human affairs, the only friends and allies (except the King of Sicily) that we now have, present in their dominions, at least, are the *people* of Spain and Portugal, the former of whom have declared, that a Representative Assembly shall be styled *His Majesty*, and that the Executive Government shall be considered as their inferiors. This is not amiss at the end of 17 years of war against Jacobins and Levellers.

THE DAY NEWSPAPER.—Want of room prevents me from making some remarks upon a State Prosecution against the

Printer and Publisher of this paper, who are now in this prison. But, I shall not fail to take the matter up another time, and to point out the curious circumstances that mark this publication, especially as relating to the *proprietorship* of it. There were *Companies* enough at the time of the South Sea Bubble; but, in the whole list, I do not find any Company for publishing a news-paper, and, by means of the *numerousness* of the proprietors, *screening the whole from that responsibility*, towards individuals, towards the public, and towards the state, that the proprietors of all other public prints are liable. It would be curious to see how many of the bitterest enemies of the liberty of the press, and of public liberty of all sorts, have thought it worth their while to partake in the *profits* (if any) of this paper; and, it would be equally curious to know, who it was that went to the *Stamp Office* and swore themselves to be the *proprietors of this paper*.

KING'S ILLNESS.—From the official reports, which shall appear in my next, it would seem, that little alteration has taken place in the state of this unhappy malady.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
November 23, 1810.

MR. MALTHUS

AND THE

EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

SIR,—The title page of a pamphlet which I published sometime ago, and part of which appeared in the Political Register in answer to the Essay on Population, having been lately prefixed to an article in the Edinburgh Review as a pretence for making a formal eulogy on that work, I take the liberty to request your insertion of a few queries, which may perhaps bring the dispute between Mr. Malthus's admirers and his opponents, to some sort of issue. It will, however, first of all be proper to say something of the article in the Review. The writer of the article accuses the “anonymous” writer of the reply to the Essay, of misrepresenting and misunderstanding his author, and undertakes to give a statement of the real principles of Mr. Malthus's work. He at the same time informs us for whom this statement is intended, namely, for those who are not likely ever to read the work itself, and who take their opinions on all sub-

jects moral, political, and religious, from the periodical reports of the Edinburgh Review. For my own part, what I have to say will be addressed to those who have read Mr. Malthus's work, and who may be disposed to form some opinion of their own on the subject.—The most remarkable circumstance in the Review is, that it is a complete confession of the force of the arguments which have been brought against the Essay. The defence here set up of it may indeed be regarded as the euthanasia of that performance. For in what does this defence consist but in an adoption, point by point, of the principal objections and limitation, which have been offered to Mr. Malthus's system; and which being thus ingeniously applied to gloss its defects, the Reviewer charges those who had pointed them out with misrepresenting and vilifying the author? In fact, the advocates of this celebrated work do not at present defend its doctrines, but deny them. The only resource left them is that of screening its fallacies from the notice of the public by raising a cry of misrepresentation against those who attempt to expose them, and by holding a mask of flimsy affectation over the real and distinguishing features of the work. Scarcely a glimpse remains of the striking peculiarities of Mr. Malthus's reasoning, his bold paradoxes dwindle by refined gradations into mere harmless common-places, and what is still more extraordinary, an almost entire coincidence of sentiment is found to subsist between the author of the essay and his most zealous opponents, if the ignorance and prejudices of the latter would but allow them to see it. Indeed the Edinburgh Reviewer gives pretty broad hints that neither friends nor foes have ever understood much of the matter, and kindly presents his readers for the first time, with the true key to this much admired production. He accordingly proceeds with considerable self-complacency to translate the language of the essay into the dialect of the Scotch school of economy, to put quite on one side the author's geometrical and arithmetical ratios, which had wrought such wonders, to state that Mr. Malthus never pretended to make any new discovery, and to quote a passage from Adam Smith, which suggested the plan of his work; to shew that this far-famed work which has been so idly magnified, and so unjustly decried as overturning all the commonly received axioms of political phi-

losophy, proves absolutely nothing with respect to the prospects of mankind or the means of social improvement, that the sole hopes either of the present or of future generations do not centre (strange to tell!) in the continuance of vice and misery, but in the gradual removal of these, by diffusing rational views of things and motives of action, and particularly by ameliorating the condition, securing the independence, and raising the spirit, of the lower classes of society; and finally that both the extent of population, and the degree of happiness enjoyed by the people of any country depend very much upon, and, as far as there is any difference observable between one country or state of society and another, are wholly regulated by political institutions, a good or bad government, moral habits, the state of civilization, commerce, or agriculture, the improvements in art or science, and a variety of other causes quite distinct from the sole mechanical principle of population. And, this Sir, is what the Reviewer imposes on his unsuspecting readers as the sum and substance, the true scope and effect of Mr. Malthus's reasoning. It is in truth an almost literal recapitulation of the chief topics insisted on in the Reply to the Essay, which the Reviewer seems silently to regard as a kind of necessary supplement to that work.—In this account it is evident, both that Mr. Malthus's pretensions as an original discoverer are given up by the Reviewer, and that his obnoxious and extravagant conclusions are carefully suppressed. Now with regard to the general principle of the disproportion between the power of increase in population, and in the means of subsistence, and the necessity of providing some checks, moral or physical, to the former, in order to keep it on a level with the means of subsistence, I have never in any instance called in question either of "these important and radical facts," which it is the business of Mr. M.'s work to illustrate. All that I undertook in the Reply to the Essay was to disprove Mr. Malthus's claim to the discovery of these facts, and to shew that he had drawn some very false and sophistical conclusions from them, which do not appear in the article in the Review. As far therefore as relates to the Edinburgh Reviewers, and their readers, I might consider my aim as accomplished, and leave Mr. Malthus's system and pretensions in the hands of these friendly critics, who will hardly set the seal of their authority on either one or

the other, till they have reduced both to something like their own ordinary standard. But against this I have several reasons. First, as I never looked upon Mr. Malthus as "a man of no mark or likelihood," I should be sorry to see him dandled into insignificance, and made a mere puppet in the hands of the Reviewers. Secondly, I in some measure owe it to myself to prove that the objections I have brought against his system are not the phantoms of my own imagination. Thirdly, Mr. Malthus's work cannot be considered as entirely superseded by the account of it in the Review, as there are, no doubt, many persons who will still take their opinion of Mr. Malthus's doctrines from his own writings, and abide by what they find in the text as good authority and sound argument, though not sanctioned in the commentary.—I will therefore proceed to put the questions I at first proposed as the best means I can devise for determining, both what the contents of Mr. Malthus's work really are, and to what degree of credit they are entitled, or how far they are true or false, original or borrowed—Query 1. Whether the real source of Mr. Malthus's Essay is not to be found in the long extract from Wallace's "Various Prospects of Mankind," &c. quoted in the second letter of the Reply to the Essay? Or whether Wallace has not both stated the principle of the disproportion between the unlimited power of increase in population, and the limited power of increase in the means of subsistence, which is the corner-stone of the Essay, and whether he has not drawn the very same inference from it that Mr. Malthus has done, *viz.* that vice and misery are necessary to keep population down to the level of the means of subsistence?—2. Whether the chapter in Wallace, written expressly to prove these two points (or, in other words, to shew that the principle of population is necessarily incompatible with any great degree of improvement in government or morals) does not throw considerably more light on the history of Mr. Malthus's work, the first edition of which was written expressly to prove the same points, than the passage from Adam Smith, which the Reviewer says *he has heard* first gave rise to the Essay, but which Mr. M. might have read a hundred times over, without once dreaming either of his principle or his conclusion?—3. Whether it is probable that the Reviewer himself would have made so light of Mr. Malthus's pre-

tensions to originality on the mere strength of these vague, hearsay obligations to Adam Smith, if he had not been apprised of his real obligations to others, which he perhaps keeps in reserve, in case any indiscreet admirer of the Essay should represent the petulance with which the Reviewer has disclaimed "all pretensions to discovery" on the part of the author?—4. Whether the idea of an arithmetical and geometrical series, by which Mr. Malthus has been thought to have furnished the precise rule or *calculus* of the disproportion between food and population, is not, strictly speaking, inapplicable to the subject; inasmuch as in new and unoccupied countries the quantity of food may be made to increase nearly in the same proportion as population, and in all old and well cultivated countries must be stationary or nearly so? Whether therefore this mode of viewing the subject has not tended as much to confound as to illustrate the question, and to divert the mind from the real source of the only necessary distinction between food and population, *viz.* the want of sufficient room for the former to grow in, a grain of corn as long as it has room to increase and multiply, in fact propagating its species much faster even than a man?—5. Whether the argument borrowed from Wallace, and constituting the chief scope and tenour of the first edition of the Essay, which professed to overturn all schemes of human perfectibility and Utopian forms of government from the sole principle of population, does not involve a plain contradiction;—both these authors, first of all, supposing or taking for granted a state of society in which the most perfect order, wisdom, virtue, and happiness shall prevail, and then endeavouring to shew that all these advantages would only hasten their own ruin, and end in famine, confusion, and unexampled wretchedness, in consequence of taking away the only checks to excessive population, vice, and misery? Whether this objection does not suppose mankind in a state of the most perfect reason to be utterly blind to the consequences of the unrestrained indulgence of their appetites, and with the most perfect wisdom and virtue to regulate all their actions, not to have the slightest command over their animal passions? There is nothing, I believe, in any of the visionary schemes of human perfection so idle as this objection brought against them, which has no more connection with "the reasonings of

"Godwin, Condorcet," &c. than with the Millennium.—6. Whether, in order to give some colour of plausibility to his argument, and to prove that the highest degree of wisdom and virtue could be of no avail in keeping down the principle of population, Mr. Malthus did not set out with assuming this principle, or the impulse to propagate the species as a law of nature of the same order and cogency as that of satisfying the cravings of hunger, so that reason having no power over it, vice and misery must be the necessary consequences, and only possible checks to population?—7. Whether this original view of the subject did not unavoidably lead to the most extravagant conclusions, not only by representing the total removal of all vice and misery as the greatest evil that could happen to the world, but (what is of more consequence than this speculative paradox) by throwing a stigma on all subordinate improvements or plans of reform, as so many clauses or sections of the same general principle? Whether the quantity of vice and misery necessary to keep population down to the level of the means of subsistence, being left quite undetermined by the author, the old barriers between vice and virtue, good and evil, were not broken down, and a perfect latitude of choice allowed between forms of government or modes of society, according to the temper of the times, or the taste of individuals, only that vice and misery being always the safe side, the presumption would be in favour of the most barbarous, ignorant, enslaved, and profligate? Whether the stumbling-block thus thrown in the way of those who aimed at any improvement in social institutions, does not sufficiently account for the alarm and opposition which Mr. Malthus's work excited on the one hand, and for the cordiality and triumph with which it was received on the other? And, lastly, whether this view of the question, which is all in which the Essay differs from the most common place disquisition on the subject, is not palpably, and by the author's own confession, false, sophistical, and unfounded?—8. Whether the additional principle of moral restraint, admitted in the second and following editions of the Essay as one effectual, and as the only desirable means of checking population, does not at once overturn all the paradoxical conclusions of the author respecting the state of man in society, and whether nearly all these conclusions do

not stand as they originally stood, as false in fact as they are idle and contradictory in reasoning? Whether, indeed, it was likely that Mr. Malthus would give up the sweeping conclusions of his first Essay, the fruits of his industry, and pledges of his success, without much reluctance; or in such a manner as not to leave the general plan of his work full of inconsistencies, and almost unintelligible?—9. Whether, for example, in treating of the durability of a perfect form of government, or state of society, Mr. Malthus has "not sicklied" over the subject with the same pale and "jaundiced cast of thought," by supposing vice and misery to be the only effectual checks to population, and in his tenacity on this his old and favourite subject, has not formally challenged his opponents to point out any other, "except indeed" (he adds, recollecting himself) "moral restraint," which, however, he considers as in effect none at all?—10. Whether, consistently with this formal acknowledgment, and virtual rejection of the influence of moral causes, the general tendency of Mr. M.'s system is not to represent the actual state of man in society, as nothing better than a blind struggle between vice and misery, and the principle of population, the effects of which are just as mechanical as the ebbing and flowing of the tide, and to bury all other motives, all virtue, wisdom, and liberty, under a heap of misapplied facts?—11. Whether, instead of accounting for the different degrees of happiness, plenty, populousness, &c. in different countries, or in the same country at different periods, from good or bad government, from the vicissitudes of manners, civilization, and knowledge, according to the statement in the Edinburgh Review, Mr. Malthus does not expressly and repeatedly declare, that political institutions are but as the dust in the balance compared with the inevitable consequences of the principle of population, and whether he does not treat with the utmost contempt all those, who, like the Edinburgh Reviewer, not being in the secret of "the grinding law of necessity," had superficially concluded that political, moral, and artificial causes were of any considerable weight in determining the welfare of mankind? It were to be wished that the author, instead of tampering with his subject, and alternately holding out concessions and then recalling them, had made one bold and honest effort to get rid of the bewildering

effects of his former system, by affording his readers some clue to determine, both in what manner and to what extent other causes, independent of the principle of population, actually combine with that principle (no longer allowed to be absolute and uncontrollable) to vary the face of nature and society; under the same general law—and had not left this important desideratum in his work, to be apocryphally supplied by the ingenuity and zeal of the Reviewer.—12. Whether Mr. Malthus does not uniformly discourage every plan for extending the limits of population, and consequently the sphere of human enjoyment, either by cultivating new tracts of soil, or improving the old ones, by repeating on all occasions the same stale objection, that, after all, the principle of population will press as much as ever on the means of subsistence, in other words, that though the means of enjoyment will be increased, there will be a proportionable increase in the number of those who are to partake of it? Or whether Mr. Malthus's panic fear on this subject, has not subsided into an equally unphilosophical indifference?—13. Whether the principle of moral restraint, formally recognised in Mr. Malthus's latter writings, and in reality turning all that he has written into mere impertinence, does not remain a dead letter, which he never calls into action, except for the single purpose of torturing the poor, under pretence of reforming their morals?—14. Whether the avowed basis of the author's system on the poor-laws, is not the following; that by the laws of God and nature, the rich have a right to starve the poor, whenever they cannot maintain themselves; and whether the deliberate sophistry by which this right is attempted to be made good, is not as gross an insult on the understanding, as on the feelings of the reader?—15. Or whether this reasoning does not consist in a trite truism, and a wilful contradiction: the truism being, that whenever the earth cannot maintain all its inhabitants, that then, by the laws of God and nature, or the physical constitution of things, some of them must perish, and the contradiction being, that the right of the rich to withhold a morsel of bread from the poor, while they themselves roll in abundance, is a law of God and nature, founded on the same physical necessity, or absolute deficiency in the means of subsistence?—16. Whether the Edinburgh Reviewers have not fallen into the same unwarrantable

mode of reasoning, by confounding the real funds for the maintenance of labour, or actual produce of the soil, with the scanty pittance allowed for the maintenance of the labourer (after the demands of luxury and idleness are satisfied) by the positive, varying laws of any country, or the caprice of individuals? Whether these things are not really distinct in themselves, and ought not to be kept so in a question of such importance, as the right of the rich to starve the poor by system?—17. Whether Mr. Malthus has not been too much disposed to consider the rich as a sort of gods upon earth, who were merely employed in distributing the goods of nature and fortune among the poor, who themselves neither ate nor drank, “neither married nor were given in marriage,” and consequently were altogether unconcerned in the limited extent of the means of subsistence, and the unlimited increase of population?—18. Lastly, whether the whole of our author's management of the principle of population and of the necessity of moral restraint, does not seem to have been copied from the prudent Friar's advice in Chaucer?—

“Beware therefore with loves for to play,

“Singeth Placebo—

“To a poor man men should his vices tell,

“But not to a lord, though he should go to hell.”

The drift of these questions, is, I believe, sufficiently obvious and direct; but if they should not be thought clear enough in themselves, I am ready to add a suitable commentary to them, by collating a convenient number of passages from the Essay, the Reply, and the Review.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

The Author of a Reply to
the ESSAY ON POPULATION.

Nov. 21, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Dispatches from Lord Viscount Talavera; and from Marshal Beresford. and Col. Trant, up to the date of 3rd Nov. 1810.—Published by the Government in England, on the 19th Nov. in An EXTRAORDINARY London Gazette.*

From Lord Talavera to Lord Liverpool, dated Pernambuco, 20th Oct. 1810.

My Lord—Since I addressed you, the enemy have been employed principally in reconnoitring the positions occupied by our troops, and in strengthening their

own. In effecting the former object they have skirmished with the troops on our out-posts, who have always conducted themselves well.—On the 14th they attacked with infantry, supported by artillery, a small detachment of the 71st regiment, which formed the advanced guard of Lieut.-General Sir Brent Spencer's division, near Sobral de Montagaree, in order to cover one of their reconnoitering parties. This detachment having the Honourable Lieut.-Colonel Cadogan and Lieut.-Colonel Reynell at their head, charged the enemy in the most gallant style, and drove them into the town.—The whole of the 8th corps d'armee, however, and part of the 6th, arrived on the ground near Sobral on the evening; and I therefore thought it proper to withdraw Lieut.-Gen. Sir Brent Spencer's division from the advanced situation which it had occupied, and these troops marched to Zibreira, about one mile in the rear, on the 15th in the morning.—The gun-boats on the Tagus, under Lieut. Berkeley, with which Admiral Berkeley has supported the right of the army near Alhandra, have likewise been engaged with the enemy's reconnoitering parties, and have been of great service to us.—I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship, that the report which I communicated to you in my last dispatch, regarding the march of the detachments of troops under the command of General Barcelar, has been confirmed.—Colonel Trant arrived near Coimbra on the 7th, and immediately attacked the enemy's out-posts, which he cut off from the town, and he then pushed into it and took possession of it. The resistance made by the enemy did not last long, and he took 80 officers and 5,000 men (principally sick and wounded) prisoners. I have the honour to enclose the copy of his report to Marshal Beresford, and of a letter from Marshal Beresford upon this success. On the following day Brigadier-General Miller and Colonel Wilson arrived at Coimbra with their detachments, and they have since taken about 350 prisoners, being soldiers who had straggled from their regiments, on the enemy's march, as they say, in search of food.—Colonel Wilson has since advanced to Condeixa, with an advanced guard of infantry and cavalry, and Brigadier General Miller is at Coim-

bra. I inclose a letter from Marshal Beresford on these transactions.—A detachment from the garrison of Peniche, sent out by Brigadier-Gen. Blunt, under Capt. Fenwick, has been successful in a similar manner, and has brought in 48 prisoners made in the rear of the enemy's army, having killed nine; and Lieut.-Colonel Waters, who has been employed by me with small detachments of cavalry and infantry, also in the enemy's rear, has taken many prisoners.—The difficulties which the enemy experience in procuring subsistence, owing to their having invaded this country without magazines, and having adopted no measures for the security of their rear, or of their communication with Spain, has rendered it necessary for the soldiers to straggle in search of food; and not a day passes that prisoners and deserters are not sent in.—All remained quiet in the North of Portugal, according to the last accounts. Marshal Mortier retired from Zafra and Los Santos on the 8th; and, according to the last accounts, he had arrived at Seville with the troops under his command. General Ballasteros had followed him to the neighbourhood of Castillo de las Guardias, and the Portuguese and Spanish cavalry had moved on from the Guadiana towards the Sierra Morena.—In the mean time, the infantry of the Marquis de la Romana's corps was put in motion for this quarter on the 8th instant, and the head of it (the division under the command of General O'Donnell) arrived at Cabeza de Montechique yesterday, having crossed the Tagus in the morning.

Marshal Beresford to Lord Viscount Talavera, dated Fort Sobral, 17th Oct. 1810.

My Lord—I have the honour to report to your Lordship, that by letters from Brigadier-General Miller, from Coimbra, I am informed of our Northern Militia having entered that place on the 8th inst. Col. Trant, with the Oporto Militia, it appears (I have no report from that Officer), first entered it; and Brigadier-General Miller, and Colonel Wilson, who, with the Militia of the Minho, and some regular cavalry, had followed the enemy along his own line of march, on the eastward of the Sierra of Caramula, entered a few hours after Col. Trant.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 32.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1810. [Price 1s.

"He hoped gentlemen would direct their most serious attention to the subject. The bill was of the utmost importance; if a paper currency were once established, how could it be got rid of? If gold and silver were once driven out of circulation, how were they to be recovered? The sure consequences of a paper currency would be a debt so enormous, that it would never be removed. The old debts and the new would vanish together, and the funded property would sink with them. A revolution in property might produce a revolution in government, and all those scenes of blood which had disgraced France."—MR. NICHOLLS. Debate, 27th March 1797. On the Bank Restriction Bill.

1025]

[1026

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XVIII.

Duration of the Bank Stoppage or Restriction Act—Recapitulation of the dates of the principal occurrences leading to that Act—Apparent reluctance with which the Bank Company submitted to the restriction—They now discover that they have no objection to be restrained—Mr. Huskisson says that the Duration could not have been foreseen—The probable reasons of this—Mr. Huskisson's Pleas and Pensions—Such a person ought to have foreseen these consequences of the Act—Others did foresee them.

Gentlemen,

We now come to that subject, which naturally connects the proceedings and measures of 1797 with the Report of the Bullion Committee, namely, the DURATION of the Act of 1797, that Act, which was made for the purpose of protecting the Bank Company against the legal demands of the holders of its promissory notes, and which act, as you will not fail to bear in mind, arose out of an alarm felt by the Bank Company for the safety of their House. It is very material to keep constantly in view the progress which ended in the passing of this Act, which, as you will have already perceived, did, in fact, decide the fate of the paper-money in England; and, therefore, I will here again

place before you a recapitulation of the dates of the principal occurrences.

February 21st, 1797, the Directors of the Bank, "observed with great uneasiness the large and constant decrease in their cash," a deputation of them went to the Minister (Pitt) to make him acquainted therewith; and, as they attributed the run to the alarm of invasion, they begged of the Minister to say something in parliament, "in order to ease the public mind upon that score."

February 24th. At a meeting of the Directors, it appeared that the "loss of cash yesterday was above £. and that about £. * were already drawn out this day, which gave such an alarm, for the safety of the House," that a deputation was sent to Mr. Pitt, to ask him when he would think it necessary to interfere. At this meeting with the Minister it was agreed, that a resolution should be by him prepared to bring before the Council for stopping payments in cash; also that a general meeting of Bankers and Merchants should be contrived in order to pass resolutions to support public credit; and the Minister at the recommendation of the Deputation, agreed to get a private meeting of the chief bankers at his house the next day, in order then to lay the plan for a general meeting.

February 26th. The Order of Council was issued, stating, that the Minister had given the Council such information relating to a run upon the Bank, as induced the Council to require, and they therefore did require, the Bank Company, to forbear issuing any cash

* There were no sums inserted. The statement of sums was left in blank as it is here.

in payments, until the sense of Parliament should be taken upon the subject.

February 27th. An immense crowd of people assembled early in the morning at the doors of the Bank and in Threadneedle street, in order to get gold for the notes they held; but, instead of gold, they received a notification, that they might have *bank notes* lent to them in discounts, and that the *dividends*, or interests upon stock, would be paid in the same manner. Whereupon they retired, shaking their long ears, and consoling themselves with the hope, that they would get gold in a week or two.

On the very same day (27th Feb.) the general Meeting of Bankers and Merchants, which had been proposed to the Minister by the Bank directors, was held at the Mansion House in London; that is to say, the State House of Lord Mayor (Brook Watson) the Chief Magistrate of the City, who was Chairman of the Meeting, and who signed the Resolutions, to which, therefore, the air of *authority* was given.

February 28th. The Privy Council, including all the Ministers, of course, had a Meeting, and signed an agreement to take and give bank notes in the same way as the Bankers and Merchants who had signed their resolutions.

March 2nd. The Magistrates met at the Quarter Sessions for the County of Surrey, signed an agreement of the same sort, which was promulgated "by Order of the Court," and was signed, like any other *magisterial act*, by the *Clerk of the Peace*. The like was done in all the other counties.

March 3rd. At a Meeting of the Bank Company, consisting of the Bank Proprietors in general, was passed an unanimous vote of thanks to the Directors for having obeyed the Order in Council and for having refused to pay in cash. From this Meeting it was promulgated, that no application had been made by the Bank Directors for the Order to withhold cash; that the measure was not adopted at the instance of those concerned in the direction of the Bank; that they complied with the order, understanding it to have been dictated by national policy, and meant to operate only for a short time; that their affairs were in a state of the

greatest affluence, and that they earnestly hoped they would soon be PERMITTED to pay their notes in cash in the same manner as they had formerly done.

March 9th. The Minister moved in the House of Commons, for leave to bring in a bill to sanction what had been done by the Privy Council and by the Bank Directors; to protect both against any legal proceedings for having done an unlawful act; and to authorize the Bank Company to CONTINUE to refuse to pay their notes in cash, for a certain time to be named.

May 3rd. This bill became a law; and by it the Bank Company were authorized to refuse to pay their promissory notes in cash, until the 24th of June in that same year; that is to say for fifty two days.

Such, Gentlemen, was the progress which ended in the passing of the *Cash-Stopping act*, which is generally called the BANK-RESTRICTION Act, and which, to those, from whom the above facts have been kept hidden, would, from this name as well as from the language of the Act itself, appear to have been made without any application for such a measure on the part of the Bank Company, and even against the wishes of that Company, who would, from outward appearances, be looked upon as being compelled against their will, to refuse cash-payments of their promissory-notes, and to yield to this compulsion without remonstrating, merely from their sense of loyalty and public spirit.

These outward appearances, however, have nearly lost their effect; and, it certainly would be something very wonderful indeed if they had not, seeing that the advocates of the Bank now complain, not of the "restriction," but of the Bullion Committee, who have proposed to remove the restriction at the end of two years! Oh! this is delightful. This is, perhaps, the finest instance of putting professions to the test that ever was heard of in the world. Here are the Bank Company restrained; they are restrained from paying their promissory notes in the current coin of the kingdom; there is, which seems very hard, a prevent them from paying in gold; would seem to have been so eager that it was absolutely necessary to hold in their hands. JDD, Pall-Mall.

have, say the Bullion Committee, endured this *restraint* for thirteen long years, which is long enough in all conscience, and therefore we will *remove* this *restraint*; we will *permit* you to pay in gold. This kind proposition, however, instead of calling forth expressions of joy and gratitude, throws the advocates of the Bank Company into the utmost *consternation* and *dis-may*, and they abuse the Bullion Committee as men who have aimed a blow at the very vitals of public credit. Alas! what, then, the Bank Company were not so uneasy as we thought under this *restraint*? They did not *complain* and *moan*, in secret, as we supposed they did at being *restrained* from paying their promissory notes? Nay, by all that is wonderful, it would seem that they *like* to be *restrained*?

To return from this digression, into which I was drawn by this strange perversity of taste in the Bank Company, let us now, after having refreshed our memories as to the progress which led to the passing of the Cash Stopping, or Bank Restriction Act, see by what means, and upon *what grounds*, it has been *continued* in force from the 3rd of May, 1797, to this day; and, here, Gentlemen, you will find the most curious and most valuable part of this most curious and most valuable history.

One of the objects which we ought to have in view, is, to ascertain, and not only to ascertain, but to put safely upon record, so that they may be turned to at any moment, the *names* of as many as possible of those, who *had a hand*, who really aided and abetted, the measure of what is called the *Bank Restriction*, that is to say, the Act to bear the Bank Company harmless in refusing payment of its promissory notes. The Bullion Committee has described the consequences of that measure; they have plainly told us what mischief, have arisen from it; they have told us how very injuriously it has operated towards *creditors* of all descriptions, but they have been wholly silent as to the parties by whom the fatal measure was prompted and brought about, as well as to the parties by whom it was opposed; and, they have also been quite silent as to the *grounds*, *How*, which the Act authorizing the refusal of cash has, from time to time, been in the *land* from May 3rd, 1797, to the present. Nay, Mr. HUSKISSON, one of the members of the Bullion Committee, England; at least with the share he took

in the labours of the Committee, has, as we saw in Letter XVII, published a pamphlet upon the subject, has not only avoided to say *who* it was that was the *cause* of the Act, but would seem to wish his readers to believe, that those who caused that Act to be passed could have had no idea of its being *continued* so long, and, the inference he leaves to be drawn is, that, *Those Persons have not been the cause of such continuance.*

To explain satisfactorily the probable reason why Mr. HUSKISSON endeavours to give this turn to the thing, it might, perhaps, be sufficient to tell you, that he himself has been steadily on the side of the minister at the time when the first Act was passed, in 1797, and also at every renewal of that Act. This might suffice in explanation of this part of Mr. HUSKISSON'S conduct; but, I must not omit this opportunity of introducing this gentleman to you in form. He is one of the men, whom you help to *pay*; and, it is possible, that you will have to pay him as long as he lives. Therefore, you have a perfect right to know *who* and *what* he is; what he has *done*, and what he is likely *to do*, for the people of England.

Mr. WILLIAM HUSKISSON, the author of the pamphlet mentioned in my last, owes what he has got not to any *family* connection, but solely to his own personal exertions, having, in his early days, been, according to some, an Apothecary, and, according to others, a Banker. He did not waste the precious days of his youth at schools and colleges, learning Latin and laziness. Like you and I, Gentlemen, he owes nothing to pedagogues or to pedigree; and though he does not belong to that class of men whom PAINE calls the *Nobles of Nature*, yet, were Nature to give titles, she would certainly dubb Mr. Huskisson a *Knight*. This gentleman was in France at the breaking out of the ANTI JACOBIN war; that is to say, the war which begun in 1793, and which, as we have seen, produced such effects upon the bank-note system. He appears, from a French pamphlet which I have in my possession, to have been a very ardent friend of the French revolution, at the out-set, and, a speech of his, delivered in a club at Paris, upon *funds* and *tythes*, it would do your hearts good to hear. From Paris, however, Mr. Huskisson returned to England in 1793, having come away upon the recall of our ambassador,

Lord Gower, now Marquis of Stafford, to whom, it is said, he had been useful at Paris, and who is said, in return, to have recommended him to the notice of those two worthy associates in power, and never-to-be-forgotten ministers, PITT and DUNDAS. They found him *useful*; and, though his out-set was low, he found himself, at the end of less than seven years, an *Under Secretary of State* in the Colonial Department, and a *Member of Parliament*. In the winter of 1801, when PITT and DUNDAS went out of office, Mr. HUSKISSON followed them, but not without taking care to cast a look behind him; and, by the advice of Mr. ADDINGTON, the successor of Mr. PITT, our author had conferred on him a pension, for life, to be paid out of the taxes raised on the people, to the amount of 1,200 a year; and, afterwards, a pension, to be paid from the same source, was settled upon his wife, Mrs. ELIZA EMILY HUSKISSON, to the amount of 615 pounds a year for her life, to commence at her husband's death. What a nice comfortable way this is, Gentlemen, to make provision for one's wife and family! Mr. HUSKISSON's pension was to be *suspended* whenever he should be in possession of an office of the annual value of 2,000 a year, or upwards, and, when he quitted such office, he was again to receive the pension. So that he made sure of 1,200*l.* a year for life, and of 615 pounds a year for the life of his wife, if she should out-live him. This showed not only a *very provident* but a *very affectionate* disposition. But, our author did not stop here; for he obtained the *Agency* of the *Island of Ceylon*, acknowledged by himself to be worth 700 pounds a year, and this he still held along with the office of Secretary of the Treasury which he got in 1804, and which, at 4,000 pounds a year salary, he held, with an interval of about fifteen months, 'till about October, 1809. So that, while *in office* he got 4,700 pounds a year; and while out of office, 1,900 pounds a year, 1,200 pounds of which he has *for life*, with a provision of 615 pounds a year for the life of his wife, if she should outlive him.

Such, Gentlemen, is the history of the public life of the author of the pamphlet, of which I am about to speak. He is now one of the Members of Parliament for *Harwich*; he was one of the members of the BULLION COMMITTEE, and his pamphlet, the title of which was mentioned in my last letter, has been published

for the purpose of explaining some parts, and defending other parts of the famous and immortal Report of that Committee.

But as perfection is not to be expected in any thing human, this Report omits to say any thing about the *grounds* of the continuance, or *duration* of the *Cash-Stopping*, or *Bank-restricting* Act; and Mr. HUSKISSON seems to think it incumbent upon him to say some little matter upon that subject. He put himself in a ticklish predicament, when he took up his pen upon such a subject; for, we have seen, that he was in office; we have seen that he was in the receipt of the public-money from the year 1793 to the time when he became a member of the Bullion Committee; we have seen, that, from 1804 to the end nearly of 1809 (with the exception of about fifteen months) he was a Secretary of the Treasury, and, it is perfectly notorious, that he was what was called the Minister PITT's right-hand man; that he had, in fact, the chief actual management of the pecuniary affairs of the Exchequer and Treasury; that he was so closely intimate with Mr. PITT, that he was one of the few persons with him when he died; and that he was one of the witnesses of his will and one of his *creditors*.

A person thus situated ought to have had *some knowledge* of the financial affairs of the kingdom. A person thus situated ought to have known pretty well the nature and tendency of a measure like the *Cash-Stopping*, or *Bank-restricting* Act. A person, to whom the people of England pay 4,700 pounds a year while he is in office, and 1,900 a year when he is out of office. A person, to whom, at the very least, we are to pay, out of the taxes, 1,200 pounds a year for his life, with a contingent 615 pounds a year for the life of his wife. Such a person, Gentlemen, ought to have a mind capable of extending its inquiries and conclusions beyond the present moment; and, in a case like that of the *Stopping* or *Restricting* Act, to be able to foresee the consequences that will result. In short, the man, be he who he may, that receives from the people such pay, ought, if his department be that of the Treasury, to be ashamed to plead *ignorance* as to any principle or point connected with the subject before us.

Yet, what does Mr. HUSKISSON say as to the *duration* of the *Stoppage*, or *Restriction*?

tion, Act? He is in a dilemma. To pass over the matter in silence will not do, because he is compelled to speak of the injuries arising from the *long duration* of the Act; and, to censure the *passing* of the Act will not do, because it is so well known that he was in office when it was first passed, and also when it was twice or three times renewed. In this difficulty, he has recourse to a plea, which he does not appear to conceive makes against himself. He wishes his reader to gather from what is said, *that those who were the cause of the Act originally never could dream of its being continued in for so long.* He says, that the Act was, when first passed, "*considered and proposed, as an expedient that should be of short duration, the course of the proceedings of parliament abundantly indicates; but, if, in the year 1797, it had been foreseen, that this temporary expedient, would be attempted to be converted into a system for an indefinite number of years, and that, under this system, in the year 1810, every creditor, public or private, subject or alien, to whom the law, as it then stood, and as it now stands, had secured the payment of a pound weight of standard gold for every £46. 14s. 6d. of his just demand, would be obliged to accept, in full satisfaction, about 10½ ounces, or not more than seventeen shillings in the pound; with a prospect of a still further reduction in every subsequent year:—it is impossible to conceive that the attention and feelings of Parliament would not have been alive to all the individual injustice, and ultimate public calamities, incident to such a state of things; and that they would not have provided for the termination of the restriction, before it should have wrought so much mischief, and laid the foundation of so much confusion in all the dealings and transactions of the community.*"

Here are two questions: that of the *duration* of the Act, and that of *depreciation of the bank notes.* The latter will form the subject of a subsequent Letter. As to the former, Mr. Huskisson would evidently have us believe, the *continuation* of the Act for any length of time was *not foreseen*, either by *him, or by any body else.* HISTORY, TRUTH, JUSTICE; justice to the living and the dead; but especially to the dead, demand the proof of the contrary; demand that you, Gentlemen, and that the whole of the people of England should know, that if PITT and his colleagues;

that, if those to whom we have paid so many many thousands and hundreds of pounds, in salaries, pensions, allowances, and fees; that, if they did not foresee the consequences of the Act of May 3, 1797, there were others, who *did foresee* those consequences, though, unfortunately for the country, the parliament were deaf to their predictions, and still supported Mr. Pitt and his system.

It is now more than THIRTEEN YEARS since this act was passed, since this deed was done; since the blow, under which credit is now staggering, was struck; but, it is not only necessary to *justice* towards individuals but to *public safety* to shew, who it was that did that deed, and who it was that had endeavoured to prevent the measures which produced it and foretold its fatal consequences. It is now the practice of the PITT school, when they speak of the Stoppage, or Restriction, Act, to speak of it as of a thing that *nobody could help*; as men speak of a flood, or thunder-storm, or any other calamity, in the causing or the preventing of which it is well known that mankind can have nothing to do. But, we must not, Gentlemen, suffer them thus to get off. They have had the sway in the country for the last *twenty six years*, fifteen months excepted. They have followed their own plans. They have constantly insisted that theirs were the wisest plans. They have made people feel that it was full as safe to leave their plans unattacked. Well. We have now the result before us. PITT and his admirers and adherents have possessed the places and the powers of the state for *twenty six years*; and we now see what are the consequences. Those who like the consequences; those who think the present state of things *a good one*, will, of course, be thankful that we have had such men in power; but, those, who, like Mr. Huskisson, are able to discover some grounds for apprehension, must excuse me, if I point out those to whom we owe the danger; or, if, in the words of the old maxim, "I clasp the saddle upon the right horse."

This task must, however, be reserved for my next; and, in the mean while, I remain,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,

November 26, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

KING'S ILLNESS.—The following are the Reports of the Doctors, (Reynolds, Halford, Baillie, Heberden, and Willis,) published in the newspapers, since those last inserted by me, at page 970, which brought the account of the malady down to the 19th instant in the morning.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 19,
half-past Eight o'clock, P. M.

His Majesty's fever has rather increased in the course of this day.*

Windsor Castle, Nov. 20.

His Majesty has had some sleep in the night, and has rather less fever this morning.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 20, Evening.

The King's fever is not increased in the course of the day. His Majesty has had some sleep in the evening.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 21.

His Majesty continues much the same as he was yesterday.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 21,
half-past Eight o'clock, P. M.

His Majesty continues as he was in the morning.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 22.

His Majesty's disorder continues with little variation since yesterday.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 22,
half-past Eight, P. M.

No change has been observed in His Majesty's complaint since the morning.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 23.

His Majesty has had a little increase of fever this morning, after a bad night.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 23,
half-past Eight, P. M.

His Majesty's fever has continued undiminished throughout the day.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 24.

His Majesty has passed this night almost without sleep, but his fever is not increased this morning.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 24, Eight, P. M.

His Majesty has been in a sound sleep for the last six hours.

* On Tuesday, the 20th, the following appeared in the Morning Post:—"To the above favourable reports, exhibited yesterday at St. James's, we are rejoiced to be able to add the following, which was privately circulated last night."

Windsor Castle, Monday evening.

His Majesty is still improving.

(Signed as usual.)

This was a sheer fabrication.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 25.

His Majesty has passed a quiet night, with some more sleep, and is better this morning.

Windsor Castle, Eight
o'clock, P. M. Nov. 25.

His Majesty is not quite so well this evening as he was in the morning.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 26.

His Majesty has had very little sleep in the night, but is not worse this morning.

—From these reports, it would seem that the unhappy patient is in the same, or nearly the same lamentable state that he has been in from the beginning of his attack; and, if this be the case, there cannot I should suppose, be any doubt that a Regency will be appointed *without delay*; for, even if the King were to discover symptoms of recovery, and were, in the course of a month or two, to become well enough to converse, or walk and ride out, it is not to be supposed, that he would be quite able, or, indeed, that he would like, to attend to the *transaction of business* so soon, though the Morning Post, who has actually fabricated a bulletin, made him attend to business above a week ago. Not only would he have all the ordinary duties of his high station to attend to, but also the accumulation of business arising from the suspension of his faculties; which, if pressed upon him, would, in all probability, delay or prevent a complete recovery, if it did not drive him back into the depths of his most afflicting malady. So that, according to present appearances, there can be no ground whatever offered for putting off the Prince's taking upon himself the exercise of the Royal functions, under the title of Regent, until the King shall be in a state to resume the exercise of those functions himself.—The doctrine of Mr. PITT and his adherents, in 1788, that the two Houses of Parliament had a right to choose whom they pleased for Regent, does not seem to be openly held, at this time, by any body; but, if one may judge from certain articles in the Morning Post and other such papers, it would appear, that there are some writers, who wish to feel the public pulse as to a limitation of the kingly powers, if necessity should place them in the hands of His Royal Highness, the Prince.—Now, for my part, I cannot, for the life of me, perceive, upon what ground such limitation could be proposed, nor can I form an idea of the argument, by which any man, who is not ready to

deny the right of *heirship* in the Prince, could attempt to support such a limitation, unless in the case of a complete abdication, or, from whatever cause, a resumption of the sovereignty by the people.—If, indeed, it be allowed, that the two Houses of Parliament, who have been assembled under the authority of the King, whose functions are now suspended; if it be allowed, that they, without any authority but that which they already possess, have a right to *choose whomever they please to supply his place* while his incapacity continues; if it be allowed, that they have a right to do this, without calling any Convention, or without any legal addition to their present powers; if this be allowed, *then*, there will not be any dispute of their right to make what *limitations* they please of the powers to be exercised by such person; for, those who can do the one may very well do the other. And, not only may they limit the *number* of powers, but also the *extent* of each separate power; and not only may they limit the powers themselves, but also their *duration*, and may make a Regent for a *month* or a *week* at a time; and, in short, they may *make* him and *unmake* him whenever they please. But, if they have no such right of *election*; if they cannot put whom they please into the place of the King during his malady; if the Prince is not *chosen* to supply his Royal Father's place, but takes it as a matter of course in virtue of *his right* as Heir Apparent; if this be the case, there cannot, it appears to me, be the shadow of a right in the two Houses of Parliament to impose on him any *restrictions* or *limitations*, or to exact from him any *conditions* whatever. For, what would that be but to withhold from him a *part* of the kingly powers; to refuse him a *part* of his inheritance; to suffer him to exercise only a *part* of those prerogatives, and to enjoy only a *part* of the things held to be necessary to the support of the kingly office and dignity, and to the defence of the people as well as of the throne? Upon the question of *right*, therefore, it seems to me, that the right of *election* and of *limitation* must stand or must fall together: those who are ready to maintain the former, may consistently maintain the latter, but, it is, I think, as clear as day-light, that nobody else can.—Upon the score of *expediency* how is a proposition of *limitations* to be supported? Is it desired to shew the people, to convince

them by experience, that some of the powers given to the King and exercised by him, or some of the means possessed by him, are *not necessary* to the due execution of his high office, and that the kingdom can be governed full as well, if *not better*, without his having such powers and possessions; and, of course, that it would be wise and just and constitutional to take such powers and possessions from him? If any man desires to convince the people of this, that man may consistently propose to impose *limitations* of the powers of the Heir Apparent; but, no other man can, upon the ground of expediency, for one moment, support such a proposition. If for, instance, the project of 1788 had been carried into effect, and the Prince had executed the kingly office for three years, without the *power of making peers*, and the affairs of the kingdom had been well and prosperously conducted during that time; would it, not have been manifest to the whole nation; would not the fact have been *proved*, that the power of making peers was *not necessary* to the kingly office; that it was *not necessary* to the support of the throne or to the tranquillity and safety and honour of the nation? And, after such *proof*, what reason would there have been for giving the Prince such power at the end of the three years, or, indeed, at any other time, even when he should, in the course of nature, have become king?—Again, if the affairs of the kingdom had been well conducted for several years (for there was no limit to the time), without the Prince having the power to make a grant of any *office* or *pension* or *place*, except for the *King's pleasure*, that is to say, except during the *pleasure* of those who might become the *King's advisers* at a future day; if, with such a restriction, the affairs of the crown and the kingdom had been prosperously conducted for several years, would not the universal conclusion have been, that the absolute power of making such grants was an *unnecessary* appendage to the kingly office, and that such grants, if made at all, should be subject to the *revision* and *control* of persons not subject to the will of him by whom those grants were made?—There is *no limitation* that can be proposed, to which the same course of reasoning will not apply; and, I think, that we shall see no man, except, perhaps, the venal writers of the Morning Post, the Courier, and the Sun, who will attempt to deny, that, in whatever degree the kingly power had been, or could be, wisely

limited in the hands of the Heir Apparent, it might have been wisely limited in the hands of the same person *when he became King*: for, we are always to bear in mind, that, when the proposition was made, the Prince was *twenty six years of age*; and was, I think, something *older than the Minister*, who made the proposition, and who evidently intended to be at the head of that *Council*, who were to exercise some of the powers withheld from the Prince, and in all likelihood, to revise and controul his grants, if, indeed, under such circumstances, he could have been expected to make any even to his most meritorious servants!—There can, then, I think, be no doubt whatever, that *limitations*, of any sort, any in any degree, must tend, and that, too, in a most direct and forcible manner, to unhinge the notions of the people as to the powers appendant upon the kingly office, which powers they look upon as being possessed and exercised for *their good* as well as for the support of the throne, and which as it is in the nature of man to love power above all other things they would naturally be disposed to withhold, or to see exist with a grudging eye, if once persuaded that the possession of them by the King was of no use to themselves. And, if this be undeniable upon general principles, what was there in the *particular case* to warrant such an attempt to sever the powers, or any part of them, from the office, to which, by the constitution, they had been attached? The Prince was, in the first place, the undoubted *Heir* to the crown and the kingly office. There were no doubts as to his right of inheritance; and, of course, there could be none as to his interest in supporting the dignity of the crown, the rights of his Royal father and of his people. In the next place, he was of full age. He was arrived at that time of life, when the mind is formed and settled. Then, as to his past life, it had not been spent within the walls of a monastery or within the purlicus of a court. He had lived in the world; and, if he had partaken, as it was natural he should, of the follies of youth, he had had his ample share of all those inestimable advantages to be derived from the society of men of genius, of integrity, of enlarged understandings and of liberal views. Added to which was his own well-known character for disinterestedness, generosity, for all the amiable and manly virtues, and, which was more than all the rest, his conspicuous attachment to all the great prin-

ciples of *public liberty*, clearly evinced in the public conduct of those who had always been most in his confidence.—Such was the personage, from whose hands it was proposed to withhold, as from an insecure depository, some of the most material of the powers constitutionally belonging to the kingly office; such was the personage, rather than confide the whole of the kingly powers to whose exercise, it seems to have been resolved to run the risk of proving these powers to be *unnecessary*; and, indeed, for the sake of withholding those powers from him, it seems to have been resolved to produce this dilemma: either to prove that those powers were *unnecessarily possessed by the crown*, or to cause the Prince to fail in conducting affairs with advantage to the nation, and, of course, to become *an object of public dislike*.—This being my view of the question as it stood *twenty two years ago*, it is hardly necessary for me to trouble the reader with any additional reasons, applicable to the *present case*; for though there certainly are circumstances, and those very material ones, that might have weight with persons, if any such there still be, who contend for the *right* of the two Houses of Parliament to impose *limitations* such as I have been speaking of, or any limitations of any sort or degree, those circumstances can have no weight at all with me, who hold that the imposing of such limitations, *in any case*, directly tend to the subversion of the throne, and are, of course, violently hostile to the constitution of England, and, I will add, to all the notions and the wishes of the people of the whole kingdom, who, if there be a necessity for the Prince to take the exercise of the Royal Authority upon him, desire to see him do it unshackled, unrestrained, and at perfect freedom to follow the bent of his own mind, with no other limitations than those *prescribed by the settled and well-known laws of the realm*.—My objection goes to the *whole*, and to *every part*, of the limitations, proposed in 1788, even to that of withholding from the Prince the *care of the King's person*; and, if I could select any point to which my objections were more strong than to any other, it would be to this. For, was it for one moment to be said, that it was *necessary* (and nothing but *manifest and inevitable necessity* could make it fitting) to withhold from the Prince the care and protection of *one person*, and that person his own Royal Father, while it was proposed, by

the same instrument, to give him the rule over *fifteen millions* of people? In the making of this proposition, it is hard to say to whom the greatest indignity was offered; to the Prince, or to the People; but, I trust, and, indeed, I believe, that there is now no danger of its being repeated.—The title to the crown is *hereditary*, and what is the crown without the *kingly powers*? If this be a case which requires that the kingly powers should, for a while, go into the hands of the Heir of his Majesty, they ought clearly, in point of right, *all to go together*. To divide them, or to contract them, in whatever manner or degree; no matter how it be done; no matter under what name; no matter to how great or how little extent; the consequence must, I am persuaded, still be the same, namely, an unsettling of the notions of the people as to the *necessity* of such powers ever *existing at all*, or the producing of cabals, intrigues, and new corruptions, which must lead either to feebleness and contempt, or to an uncertain and capricious exercise of power, and to all the calamities, which, from such a source, have seldom failed to arise.—And, are *these times*, wherein to try such experiments? Are these the times, wherein to attempt to do any thing that shall have a tendency to teach the people, that any part of the settled powers of the kingly office are not necessary to the due exercise of that office for the public good? Let any man look at the situation to which we are come, whether as to our foreign or our domestic affairs. Let him look at the Continent, to the north or the south or in the centre; let him look at the state of our commerce and our money; let him look at the plans and preparations of the enemy; let him look at Ireland. In short, let him look where he will; and then let him say, if this be a time for doing any thing like that which was proposed in 1788, or any thing that shall tend to reduce the Prince to the necessity of resorting to an influence, calculated to produce public disgust.—The dangers to our country are very great and very pressing. They are such as I believe never menaced any nation before. We have seen other nations menaced by the same enemy, and finally subdued. But, simple subjugation is the smallest part of what we might reasonably expect. Does it not behove us, then, to exert all our powers, both of mind and body, to avoid such a fate? I, for my part, have no doubt at all, and I never

had, for one single moment, of our being able to resist all the power of the whole continent, if it were to be embodied and brought against us, provided only, that we are *united*. But, to produce that desirable, that, I could almost call it *blessed* union, there must be CONCILIATION; there must be something done to banish those asperities, which now divide and enfeeble us; which now keep one part of us, in mind, at least, pitted in unnatural conflict against the other, when every mental faculty ought to be exerted for our mutual preservation.—Conciliation, to be sincere and effectual, must begin on the side of *power*. Beginning on the other side, it is not conciliation, but disguise, resentment smothered, vengeance waiting for its opportunity. How many many proofs of this have we witnessed since the commencement of the French revolution! When the *mind* yields to mere *force*, so far is it from *conciliation*, that the very act adds a million fold to the thirst for revenge on the side of the yielding party; an observation, which is indeed very trite, but which seems to have escaped every government that has fallen, in appearance, before the arms of France, but which, in fact, has fallen from other and very different causes.—This conciliation, so much to be wished for in England, would certainly not be retarded by the kingly power being placed in the hands of the Prince, who, if we may judge from the past; if we may judge from the conduct of his whole life, would adhere to counsels distinguished by mildness, moderation, and liberality; to counsels towards which the people would look with confidence, and which they would repay, as they have always been ready to do, kindnesses received by kindnesses and attachment a thousand fold. By adhering to such counsels (and there is no good reason to fear that he would not) he would bind us not only to himself and his family, but, which is not of less importance even to him and to them, he would bind us to one another like the sticks in the fable; and then we might safely set at defiance all the powers of Napoleon, even if he succeed in subduing the whole of the continent, and in turning the whole of its resources against us.—This being my sincere belief, I cannot, I must confess, see any thing in the possibility of the Prince's being Regent, or even King, to make me partake at all, no, not in the smallest degree, in that *dependency*,

which, from the eternal whine in some of our news-papers, would seem to have taken entire possession of the hearts of those who write in them. Not a man of them surpasses me in sorrow for the most afflicting malady of his Majesty, and sorrow excited by the bare calamity itself is greatly aggravated by a reflection as to many of the peculiarly agonizing circumstances; but, this sorrow is not to bereave me of my reason; it is not to bereave me of all thought, and all care for my country; nor is it to blind me to that ground of *hope*, and of *confidence*, which I see in the Heir Apparent; and, it is by no means incompatible with my notions of loyalty, to believe most firmly, and to express my belief, that the full powers of the kingly office will be as safely lodged in the hands of the King's son, when the proper time shall come for his supplying his place, as they have been in the hands of his Majesty himself.—I am, therefore, I will acknowledge, quite indignant at hearing the commendations of His Royal Highness confined to his *forbearance*. To hear many of our public writers, one would really think, that they wished to inculcate the notion, that the Prince ought not to meddle with public affairs; that he ought not to show the smallest disposition to *interfere*, and, indeed, that he ought to have not even a *wish* about the matter. But, do they consider, that there is a little something due from him to the people? It would really seem that they do not. He, however, in his answer to the Propositions of 1788, has shown that he is not only aware of that duty, but that he is also well acquainted with its nature and its extent; and, though it is quite proper in him not to discover or to feel any indecorous *haste*, he will, there can be no doubt, not, on the other hand, discover any want of attention to what is due either to himself or to the nation.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
November 27, 1810.*

PRISONERS OF WAR.

The following three Articles relate to the Exchange of Prisoners of War, between England and France, the treaty for which has been broken off.—The first is The Project of our government; the second, are the Remarks of the Moniteur upon some observations in our prints upon the return of Mr. Mackenzie; and the third is the Answer of one of our

Ministerial Papers, the Courier, to the Remarks of the Moniteur.

PROJECT.

Article I. All British, all Spaniards, Portuguese, Sicilians, Hanoverians, and others, subjects of or in the service of Great Britain, or of the Powers in alliance with Great Britain, who are now prisoners of war in France, Italy, Naples, Holland, or any other country in alliance with or dependant on France, shall be released without exception.—Art. II. All French, Italians, and other persons, subjects of or in the service of France, &c. Italy, all Dutch and Neapolitans, and all others subjects of or in the service of the Powers allied to France, who are now prisoners of war in Great Britain, Spain, Sicily, Portugal, Brazil, or any other country in alliance with Great Britain, or occupied by British Troops, shall be released without exception.—Art. III. It is understood that in pursuance of the two preceding Articles, all prisoners of war belonging to Great Britain and her Allies, and to France and her Allies respectively, made on or before the signature of the present Convention, shall be released in the manner hereinafter to be arranged with regard to each Country respectively.—Art IV. The execution of the above Articles shall take place in the manner following:—§ 1. All British prisoners of every rank and quality detained in France, and Italy, and in the dependencies of France and Italy, shall be released; the exchange to commence immediately after the signature of this Convention, by sending to Deal or Portsmouth, or such other port of England in the Channel, as may be agreed upon, or by delivering up to the British Commissaries appointed to receive them, 1,000 British prisoners, for 1,000 French, to be released by the British Government, in the manner hereinafter provided.—§ 2. All French prisoners of every rank and quality now detained in Great Britain, or in the British possessions, shall be released. The exchange shall commence immediately after the signature of this convention, and shall be made by sending successively to Morlaix, or such other French port in the Channel as may be agreed upon, or by delivering up to the French Commissaries appointed to receive them, 1,000 French for 1,000 English prisoners, as soon and in proportion as the French Government shall release the latter.—§ 3. These successive and mutual

deliveries shall continue until all British prisoners in France, Italy and their dependencies shall have been liberated.—

§ 4. Great Britain engages also to release, over and above the numbers exchanged against *British prisoners* delivered in consequence of the above arrangement, 3,000 French prisoners in balance for 3,000 *HANOVERIANS* being the utmost number of those included in *Comte Walmoden's capitulation*, who are, or may be, or may have been actually in the service of *Great Britain*; this number of 3,000 being over and above the number of 1,905, who are also to be unconditionally released, on account of the garrison of *St. Domingo*, as heretofore agreed upon.—§ 5. The numerical value at which individuals of superior ranks and qualities shall be rated, in order to make up the numbers of 1,000 to be thus exchanged, shall be computed with regard to the persons in the land and sea service, according to the scale of the convention of 1798; and with regard to persons detained in France in 1803, according to the scale following, viz:—The Earl of *Beverley* to be exchanged for a General Officer of the highest rank of the prisoners now in England—Peers Sons and Privy Counsellors equal to the rank of Colonels or Post Captains. Barons and Knights equal to the rank of Field Officers and Commanders.—Gentlemen holding no distinction of rank, equal to the rank of Captains in the army, and Lieutenants of ships of war.—Tradesmen (*petite bourgeoisie*) Servants, &c. and all others detained, equal to the rank of Private Soldiers and Sailors. Recourse, however, shall be had to this principle of making up numbers by affixing a numerical value to rank, only in the extent of the failure of individuals who might be exchanged rank for rank against one another.—§ 6. When all the British prisoners detained in France, Italy, and their dependencies, shall have been exchanged against equal numbers (to be ascertained and rated on the principle established in the preceding section of this article) of French prisoners detained in England and its possessions, the balance of French prisoners which may remain in the hands of Great Britain shall be without delay released and sent to France, in exchange for an equal number of Spanish prisoners of war, which are to be sent to such ports or places in Spain as shall be agreed upon, in the manner following:—

§ 7. The French prisoners composing the

said balance shall be sent into France by successive deliveries of 1,000; and as soon and in such proportion as they are so released, France shall send to Spain a corresponding number of Spanish prisoners out of the numbers remaining in her hands. Great Britain engages to send over the first 1,000, and when information shall have been received of an equal number of Spaniards having been delivered upon that account at the ports or places in Spain agreed upon, 1,000 more will be sent to France, and so on till the whole are released.—§ 8. In the mean time, and while the above exchange is going on between Great Britain and France, on the above accounts respectively, all French prisoners of war in Spain, and its dependencies, and all Spanish prisoners of war in France or Spain, or in the countries dependant upon France, shall be released mutually by an exchange to be made either between the Spanish and French Generals, or by sending by sea to Toulon or Rochfort, or such other French ports as may be agreed upon, the French detained in Spain.—§ 9. The release of the Spaniards, prisoners of war in France, shall be effected by sending either successively to Cadiz, Valencia, or such other Spanish port as may be agreed upon, 1,000 or 500 Spaniards, for 1,000 or 500 French, as soon and in proportion as the latter shall be released. It is to be understood, that by the words prisoners of war, as referring to the Spaniards and French respectively, none are intended to be included except such as have been actually taken in arms on either side.—§ 10. These successive and mutual deliveries shall continue until all the French prisoners of war in Spain, and all Spanish prisoners of war in France, shall be released.—§ 11. The numerical value at which individuals of superior ranks and qualities shall be rated, in order to make up the number of 1,000 or 500, to be thus exchanged between Spain and France, shall be computed according to the scale of the Convention of 1798, as referred to in § 5th, or upon such other principle as may be hereafter agreed upon between the Spanish and French Governments.—§ 12. When these several and respective exchanges shall have taken place, whatever surplus may be remaining in the hands of the belligerents, of prisoners of war made, or before the signature of the present Convention, shall be immediately released (but on parole not to serve until regularly exchanged,) and sent back

to that country, to which it may belong, in the manner and under the same regulation of transport by which the mutual exchanges were conducted; so that after the execution of this Convention, no prisoners of war shall remain in the hands of Great Britain, Spain, France, or in those of their Allies, dependencies, or possessions.—13. All Portuguese or Sicilian prisoners of war in France, or in the countries allied to or dependant on France, and all prisoners belonging to France and the countries allied to her in the hands of Portuguese and Sicilians, shall be mutually released in a similar manner, and on the same terms as have been before established with regard to the French and Spaniards, with such alterations only as the particular circumstances and situations of those countries may require.—Article V. The priority and order of the release of the several persons to be exchanged under this Convention, shall be regulated according to the priority and order of their respective capture and detentions; except that no more than one fourth part of any number of British to be released at one time shall consist of persons detained in France in 1803.—Article VI. The British and French Governments undertake to communicate to their respective allies the terms of this convention, and to use their influence to engage them to accede thereto.—Article VII. A British Commissary and a French Commissary shall be appointed to reside, the first at Paris, the latter at London, to superintend the details and execution of this Convention.—Article VIII. A separate convention shall be as soon as possible entered into between Great Britain and France, to regulate the exchange of prisoners of war who may be hereafter made on either side, with a view of alleviating as far as may be practicable, the evils and misfortunes attendant on a state of warfare.

REMARKS

From the Monitor of the 16th of November, upon the annexed passage in a London paper of the 6th of November.

"A Messenger was sent on the 4th inst. to Morlaix, with dispatches for Mr. Mackenzie. Nothing that humanity can suggest will be omitted, by our Government to procure the release of our countrymen who have been so long and so cruelly detained in prison."

Monitor.—If you are desirous that your countrymen should be released, there

is but one way, that is, *to be just*, and exchange the French against the English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, *man for man, and rank for rank*. This is the *sine qua non* of every cartel of exchange, now or hereafter.—When a negociation for peace is proposed to you, you say, that you cannot enter into it, except the Spanish insurgents are admitted as a party. When a cartel of exchange is in question, you will not allow those men to be included in it who were taken in the ranks of your armies. What! the soldiers of the Spanish army of Galicia, *who were taken in covering the retreat of General Moore*, are not to be exchanged for the French who were taken in the same or other actions? What! the soldiers of the army of Cuesta, who at the battle of Talavera formed the right of the English army, and *were taken at the passage of the Tagus; when they formed the rear-guard of the English army*; those men taken for your safety, who sacrificed themselves for General Wellington, and enabled him to secure his retreat, are to be excluded from the exchange, and not considered as the English themselves. What! the Spaniards taken before Cadiz, *engaged in sorties with your troops*, you will not exchange them. What! the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, that of Almeida, *which you shut up in these fortresses, on a promise of coming to their relief, who covered your army, who sacrificed themselves for it, you disown them*. It is impossible. An army is an army. Since these men fought by your side, were armed with your arms, paid with your money, and clothed by you, they should be included in the exchange of prisoners, whatever their country might be.—Throughout the whole course of the negociation, the English Cabinet had perpetual recourse to subtleties; the result of which was, that they would not admit the exchange, man for man, and rank for rank, and consider the French, English, Germans, Portuguese, Spaniards, upon a footing of equality, and composing two beligerent masses. Mr. Mackenzie, after having twice applied for his passports, with an interval of a month between each application, has at length left Morlaix.— Besides, he was sent over by the English Government rather in the character of a spy than a negociator. It was impossible for a person to conduct himself worse than he did. He abused the liberty which he had of making excursions in the country to the distance of eight or ten leagues; he had his correspondents; he pretended to

be above the police of the province, and gave way to all the impertinencies of a young man, without experience or moderation.—Mr. Mackenzie was employed in the Cattaro business, at the close of the war of 1805. He was afterwards one of the agents in the horrible affair of Copenhagen. He is, in short, a man of the same kidney with the Drakes, the Wickhamis, and the Jacksons. When the English really wish to negotiate, they know what kind of men they should employ. When they wished to make peace at Amiens, they sent over Lord Cornwallis, whose character alone shewed the sincerity of their disposition.

“England abounds as much as any country in the world in men, respectable on account of their information, and the excellence of their characters, it also abounds in hideous characters, in political Figaros, in brokers of intrigue, spies and incendiaries. When it wishes to negotiate sincerely with France, it will be manifested in the choice of the negotiator. Whatever kind of treaty England may be desirous of entering into with France, should be founded on justice, good sense and candour. It is possible to deceive some ignorant Nabobs in the East Indies, but an enlightened Government is not to be imposed upon.”

ANSWER

To the above by the English Ministerial print the COURIER, of the 24th of November.

The failure of the Negotiation for a Cartel has at length been noticed, and, as telling the truth would have shewn that Buonaparté never entertained any serious intention of concluding a cartel, recourse is had to the most barefaced falsehoods—“If you are desirous,” says the *Moniteur*, “that your countrymen should be released, there is but one way, that is, to be just, and exchange the French against the English, Portuguese and Spaniards, man for man, and rank for rank.” This criterion and proof of the sincerity of our desire to effect an exchange of prisoners we assert, and the correspondence, when laid before Parliament, will prove it, our Government did afford. We did offer to exchange man for man, rank for rank, including prisoners of the Allied Powers on both sides; but this offer was refused. We have 50,000 French prisoners in this country—France has only 12,000 British. We required

that, in the first instance, the 12,000 British should be exchanged for 12,000 French; the surplus 38,000 French in our hands we agreed to exchange for that number of Portuguese and Spaniards, our allies, in the hands of France.—To this arrangement France would not consent. She insisted, that for every 3,000 French we sent, the number returned by her should contain two foreigners for one Englishman. To such a proposition, so contrary to all the principles and usages on which exchanges have been heretofore conducted, and so revolting to our national feeling and honour, by the delay it would occasion to the release of our own countrymen, our Government would not accede.—We feel with regard to our allies, the *utmost cordiality and esteem*, and we highly approve the offer of our Government to apply to the relief of their prisoners the surplus of French that might remain in our hands after the liberation of all the British should have been effected; but we must say that this country never could have tolerated so monstrous and so mortifying an arrangement as that Frenchmen made prisoners by British valour, and at the expence of British blood and treasure, should be set at liberty in exchange for foreigners, while our own soldiers and sailors still lingered in captivity. After this plain *unvarnished* statement, what becomes of all those fine sentimental exclamations of the *Moniteur*?—Had the French government been actuated by those feelings of humanity, which are made such a parade of in the *Moniteur*, 50,000 Frenchmen would ere this have been restored to their country and their homes.—After abusing the British Government, the *Moniteur* inveighs against Mr. Mackenzie, who will probably consider its invectives as the greatest compliment that could have been paid him.—To do one's duty *virtuously* and with *ability*, is quite sufficient to ensure the hatred of Buonaparté, and the abuse of the *Moniteur*.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Dispatches from Lord Viscount Talavera; and from Marshal Beresford, and Col. Trant, up to the date of 3rd Nov. 1810.—Published by the Government in England, on the 19th Nov. in An EXTRAORDINARY London Gazette.*

*Marshal Beresford to Lord Viscount Talavera, dated Fort Sobral, 17th Oct. 1810.
(Concluded from p. 1024.)*

.....Brigadier-General Miller had collected of stragglers and pillagers left in the rear of the French army, about 350, and more were continually bringing in. Colonel Wilson, with an advance guard of about 200 cavalry, and four battalions of Militia, was to be at Condeixa on the 10th and 11th.—The whole of these prisoners have been sent off to Oporto. I have, &c.

From the Same to the Same, dated Casal Cochín, 19th Oct. 1810.

My Lord—I have the honour to annex, for your Lordship's information, a letter which I have received from Brigadier-General Blunt, Governor of Peniché, informing of the loss occasioned to the enemy by some small parties sent out from his garrison, and of the good conduct of those troops of the line and militia employed on those occasions.

Brig.-Gen. Blunt to Marshal Beresford, dated Peniche, 16th Oct. 1810.

Sir; You will be pleased to represent to his Excellency Marshal Beresford, that a few days since I sent out a party consisting of one serjeant and 18 privates of the Tondella Militia (Volunteers) with the view of intercepting couriers, or any other service by which they might annoy the enemy: they returned yesterday, bringing with them two cavalry horses equipped, some swords, pistols, caps, &c.—The serjeant reports having fallen in with thirty horsemen, at the moment dismounted, attacking them and killing five; the rest made their escape. The horses flew in different directions, so that only two could be secured. One militiaman was killed and two wounded. You will also be pleased to report to his Excellency, that in consequence of information received from the country people that between two and three hundred marauders were destroying the habitations and committing dreadful outrages on the few peasants that fell into their hands, about five leagues and a half from this, I detached the Major de Praca Fenwick with one hundred and fifty recruits and militia yesterday evening to disperse or bring them in, in which he has succeeded, killing a few men * and making 28 prisoners, with the loss of only 2 men. Major Fenwick speaks in the warmest terms of the ardour of the recruits and militia, with the officers who com-

manded them; but what, under circumstances, he has considered equally worthy of admiration, was to see resentments stifled, and the soldiers, alive only to the feelings of humanity, anxious to spare the enemy they had subdued. You will also be pleased to report the arrival of twelve deserters, who with the prisoners shall be sent to Lisbon the first favourable occasion. I hope his Excellency will not disapprove my having permitted the party of militia to dispose of the horses.

Marshal Beresford to Lord Visc. Talavera, dated Casal Cochín, 20th Oct. 1810.

My Lord; Since writing to your Lordship the information I have received from Brigadier-General Miller relative to the re-occupation of Coimbra, I have received from Colonel Trant a more detailed statement of the circumstances, and which I have the honour of annexing a copy of for your Lordship's information. The prisoners, by Colonel Trant's statement, appear to have been more numerous than by the first accounts we were led to consider them; three or four hundred afterwards collected by Brigadier-General Miller, dispersed in plundering parties in the neighbourhood of Coimbra, will have to be added to what Colonel Trant captured. The circumstance and mode of the re-occupation of Coimbra is an additional proof of the activity and prudent enterprise with which Col. Trant has fulfilled the object of the instructions given to him, and which I have no doubt your Lordship will appreciate.

Col. Trant to Marshal Beresford, dated Coimbra, 7th Oct. 1810.

Sir; I have much pleasure in acquainting your Excellency with my having successfully attacked the town of Coimbra this day, with the loss of only a few men killed and wounded.—In my letter of the 6th, I had the honour to inform you, that it was my intention to proceed to Mealhada in the course of the day, with an expectation of forming a junction with the corps under the command of Brigadier-General Miller and Colonel Wilson, and combining an attack on this city, but on my arrival there, I learned that those two corps were delayed from want of supplies in the very exhausted districts extending immediately North of Busaco, and that the cavalry attached to them could not move forward in consequence of the fatigue it had experienced in its former

* FIVE KILLED, FOUR WOUNDED.

marches.—I had now no other alternative in order to prevent any measure of defence taking place at Coimbra, from whence I was only three short leagues distant, than to proceed on with my own division, while yet a strong probability existed of my arrival at Mealhada not being made known.—I therefore marched at mid-day, having a squadron of cavalry in my front, under the command of that gallant young officer Lieut. Dutel, whose name I have already had occasion to submit to your Excellency's notice, supported by 200 light troops; the column of infantry was headed by the Coimbra regiment as the post of honour. In my plan of attack it was intended to enter at two points at one time, one division by the high road from Oporto, the other to branch off from the column, on having passed Fornos, and by ascending the heights to the eastward of the town, enter by the Arco Santa Anna, passing through Loretto; but this arrangement was to take place only in the event of my finding the enemy on his guard.—At a short distance from Fornos, towards Mealhada, I fell in with a detachment of the enemy to the right of that village; it commenced firing, but having pushed on the cavalry to Fornos, I succeeded in cutting it off from all communication with Coimbra, and it surrendered, after losing some men; and I met no other post of the enemy. I directed the cavalry to gallop through the principal streets, cross the bridge of the Mondego, and by penetrating into the Lisbon road, to intercept any information sent to the main army. This was effected with the utmost spirit by Lieutenant Dutel, with the loss of only one dragoon killed. I dispatched divisions of infantry into the principal parts of the town; an unconnected resistance took place during an hour, in which we had only two men killed; Colonel Serpa, of the Penafiel, and about twenty-five men wounded of that corps. Colonel Serpa commanded the first brigade; and his spirited conduct has intitled him to your Excellency's approbation. On the Santa Clara side of the Mondego, where a great proportion of the enemy's force was stationed in the Convent, some irregular firing was kept up upon the cavalry in crossing the bridge: but the French Commanding Officer, immediately after Lieutenant Dutel had crossed, proposed capitulating. I proceeded to the Convent, and would allow no terms but discretion. On my

promise of exerting my protection against the insults of the peasantry, the troops laid down their arms and marched out.—I have reason to believe the number of prisoners exceeds 5,000, of whom nearly 4,000 are marched off towards Oporto, including an entire company of the Emperor's Marine Guards; 3,500 firelocks were found, and almost the whole loaded; from whence you may form an idea of the number in a state for defensive service; those arms I have distributed amongst the Ordenanza of the country; I found no artillery. We got possession of a quantity of oxen and sheep, which were collected for the subsistence of the enemy's troops, and have proved a seasonable supply to our own. Among the prisoners are, I should suppose, 80 officers. The Commissaire Ordinateur en Chef, M. Flandin, who represented a Governor, will remain sick at Coimbra.—From the nature of attack, your Excellency will easily conceive how difficult it was to control the soldiers, or to prevent the armed peasantry from plundering. Those latter, I am sorry to say, committed acts of violence; but, I believe, not more than six or eight Frenchmen were the victims of their resentment. I shall here observe, that nothing can exceed the state of wretchedness in which I found the city; the enemy, not content with sacking it to the very utmost extent, and stripping the few housekeepers who remained of even their personal clothing, had wantonly set fire to some houses, and had heaped into the streets, in one general mass of disorder, all the furniture, which they could not take with the army; it cannot be expected, therefore, that soldiers, of whom about 800 were relatives of the town and its neighbourhood, accompanied by their wretched relatives, could patiently witness a scene of devastation in which their property had been thus unjustifiably and irretrievably destroyed. I request your Excellency, however, to be persuaded that every possible exertion has been made to give protection to the French who have fallen into our hands; and, after the first moments, I succeeded in securing them from insult.—As Brigadier-General Miller and Colonel Wilson's corps will arrive here to-morrow, I propose to leave one of my brigades behind, and to march, with the remainder of my division, as an escort to Oporto; for such is the animosity of the people of this country, excited by the late passage of the French army, that I consider my presence absolutely neces-

sary, particularly in the intermediate district between Mondego and Vouga.—I shall conclude this report by assuring your Excellency that the spirit of the militia upon this occasion was such as would do credit to any troops of the line, and I have observed no individual exception; I do not, therefore, compliment any particular Officer.

Lord Visc. Talavera to Lord Liverpool, dated 27 Oct. 1810.

I enclose two letters from Marshal Beresford, with reports from Brigadier-general Blunt, of successes against the enemy's detachments, by parties detached from the garrison of Peniché. The former was mentioned to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 20th inst.

Marshal Beresford to Marshal General Lord Visc. Talavera, dated Cazal Cochín, 20 Oct. 1810.

My Lord.—I have the honour to annex the extract of a letter I have this instant received from Brigadier-general Blunt, by which your Lordship will see he continues to pick up the marauders and stragglers from the enemy.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier-General Blunt, to Lieutenant Colonel Arbuthnot, dated Peniche, Oct. 19.

You will be pleased to report to his Excellency Marshal Beresford, that in consequence of information, I detached a party on the 17th under the command of Major Tavares, to fall in with the enemy's foragers, but unfortunately the enemy had retired. Major Pinto was detached yesterday for the same purpose to a distance of five leagues. He succeeded in taking 23 prisoners, two of the enemy were killed, and one of the recruits. It is great gratification to see the alacrity with which they offer themselves on every occasion.

Marshal General Lord Visc. Talavera to Lord Liverpool, dated Pero Negro, 27 Oct. 1810.

The enemy still occupy the same positions in front of this army which they held when I addressed you on the 30th instant. They have detached some troops towards Santarem, and on the 23d General Loison marched towards that place, with the division under his command; and it appears, from accounts from the Commanding Officer at Abrantes, of the 24th,

that a body of the enemy's infantry and cavalry entered Thomar on that day. The reports which I have received from the prisoners and deserters which have been brought in, concur in the accounts of the distress felt by the enemy for the want of provisions of all descriptions. They state that they are collecting and preparing materials to construct a bridge over the Tagus; but although we have a good view of that river from different parts of the ground occupied by the army, and have officers and others employed on the left of the Tagus to observe the motions of the enemy, I have not been able to discover either where this work is carrying on, or where the bridge is to be placed on the river, if it should be constructed. The enemy appears to be very anxious to collect boats; and on the 24th endeavoured to drive a party of the Ordenanza from Chamusca, by the fire of artillery, in order to obtain possession of some which were under that place. Colonel Wilson had been at Leyria, with the cavalry attached to General Barcellar's division, and had proceeded to Ourém. The advance of the infantry was at Pombal. On the side of Obidos and Ramalhã, the British cavalry, and a battalion of Spanish light infantry, and the troops of the garrison of Peniché, confine the enemy's detachments; and they really possess no part of the country, excepting that on which their army stands. By the last account from General Silveira of the 17th instant, it appears that all was quiet in the north; and he had not received any accounts of the march of troops in Castile. The parties of Guerillas had been more daring than usual: and they had united in the neighbourhood of Valladolid, early in the month of October, to the amount of 1,500, in order to carry off a convoy of money which had been raised in contributions from the country; in which attempt, however, they failed. According to the accounts of the 21st from Estremadura, it appears that Marshal Mortier's corps was still at Seville; and General Ballasteros was observing it from Aracena. The second division of the Marquis de la Romana's corps, under General Carrera, arrived at Lisbon on the 25th, and will be with the army this day. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 4th instant.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 33.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1810. [Price 1s.

" In the year 1788, when the former suspension of the functions of the Crown took place, we were at peace, now we were at war. France was then weak, now it enjoyed an overwhelming strength. Then our national debt was under 300 millions, now it exceeded 800 millions; at that time we had profitable commercial alliances, now our commerce was excluded from every part of Europe; then we had *something besides paper currency*, now we had *nothing else*, and our paper was *greatly depreciated*. Every thing was then quiet at home, and we had nothing to apprehend from abroad; now how dilapidated the picture in every respect. Yet now, that House was told, that after a month of anarchy, they were to go on a fortnight longer in the same tract." — SIR FRANCIS BURDETT. — Debate, 29th Nov. 1810.

[1057]

[1058

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PRISONERS OF WAR. — This subject is one of very deep interest to the country; and, though I shall not here be able to enter into it so fully as I could wish, I cannot refrain from endeavouring to offer to my readers something bearing a little more the resemblance of political information than what was contained in my last Number, in an extract from the *COURIER*. — At page 1044 I inserted the *Project*, or set of *Propositions*, which has been published in the ministerial papers, as having been offered to the Government of France by a Mr. MACKENZIE, who, it appears, has been, for some time past, in France, on the part of our Government, for the purpose of making a Convention for the Exchange of all the Prisoners, possessed on both sides. — These propositions have, it seems, been rejected by the Emperor of France; and, the question for us to discuss, is, *whether the Propositions were such as our interest or our honour commanded us to insist upon*. — But there are certain facts belonging to this subject, that may, perhaps, never have been clearly understood by the people in general; and, if understood at the time, may very well have been forgotten, in the course of seven years and a half of a war that has produced an event for every month, that has driven four sovereigns from their thrones and their dominions, that has reduced as many more to be mere vassals of France, and that has put nearly all the ports and all the shipping and all the seamen of the Continent of Europe into the hands of that enemy, from whom to retain Malta and deliver Holland, we renewed hostilities. In the course of such a war the people, who have had to labour for the means of carrying it on, may very well have forgotten all the circumstances

attending its commencement; and, therefore, I shall here, as briefly and as clearly as I can, state the facts, which first came into notice, relative to prisoners of war. — The moment that NAPOLEON (who was, in May, 1803, when the war began, on our part, FIRST CONSUL) found, that some of the ships of France had been captured, and their crews made prisoners, by our cruisers, *without a declaration of war previously made*, he issued an order, which was rigorously enforced, for *detaining* in France all those subjects of the King, who, from whatever cause, or for whatever purpose, happened to be there at the time. The grounds alledged by France for doing this were; that England had acted contrary to the settled rules for the conduct of nations, in making such captures without a declaration of war; that, in seizing peaceable traders upon the *water*, on which she happened to possess the power of so doing, she justified the conduct of France in seizing British subjects equally peaceable, who happened to be upon the *land*, where France had the power of seizure; that justice towards the captives made by the English called for this measure, and that, the persons thus seized on in France (who were called the *Detained*) should be considered as prisoners of war, and should not be released, except in exchange for persons captured by the English. — Amongst the *Detained* were many noblemen; many women of noble families; many gentlemen of great estates; and, from the words of the above-mentioned Propositions, it appears, that there are still amongst the *Detained* an *Earl*, *Peers Sons*, *Privy Counsellors*, *Baronets*, *Knights*, *Gentlemen*, *Tradesmen*, and *Servants*. — But, at the out-set, our government *protested* against the proposal to make any exchange of French prisoners of war against these persons. We contended, that

a formal previous declaration of war was not necessary to make the captures complained of legal in the eye of the law of nations; that such previous declarations had been for a long time past, held to be unnecessary in order to constitute a state of war and to justify its usual operations; that the British subjects detained in France had been so detained in open contempt of the rights of all civilized nations; and that we would not, therefore, release them by an exchange for real prisoners of war, made by us from France or her allies.

—Now, however, it would seem, that this ground is given up, or, at least, that we have consented to exchange *real prisoners of war for the Detained*; though, at the time when the subject was first discussed (in 1803, Vol. IV of Register), every one seemed to be of opinion, that whatever prisoners of war we might make ought to be kept and applied *solely* to the purpose of obtaining the release of such of our own countrymen, who should be made prisoners of war *in actually serving against the enemy*, and that not a man of those, who, to use the words of the COURIER, should have been captured “at the cost of the blood of our sailors and soldiers, and the treasure of the nation,” should be given up to purchase the freedom of those, who had been seized in the enjoyment of their pleasures in France, in the act of spending their incomes in France, and, indeed, in the act of showing that they preferred a residence in France to a residence in England.—Now, however, it appears to have been proposed to abandon this principle; and, not only to exchange real prisoners of war for the *Detained*, but to make *distinctions* as to the *rank of the Detained*; to consider them, in this case, not only as prisoners of war, but as prisoners of war some of whom have higher claims than the common soldier or sailor, taken in actual combat with the enemy; for we now see, that an *Earl* was to be taken in exchange for the French General Officer of *highest rank* now in England; that *Peers Sons* and *Privy Counsellors* were to be taken in exchange for French *Colonels* and *Post Captains*; that *Baronets* and *Knights* were to be taken in exchange for French *Field Officers* and *Commanders*; that *Gentlemen* were to be taken in exchange for French *Captains of the army* and *Lieutenants of the Navy*; and that *Tradesmen*, *Servants* and all others detained, were to be taken in exchange for *Private Soldiers* and *Sailors*.—As to the justice or

injustice of this part of the Propositions, that is a question which I shall, for the present, leave untouched; nor shall I offer any remarks as to the difference between this part of the Propositions and our protests and declarations of 1803; because, these are matters, which belong wholly to *ourselves*, and have no connection whatever with the points *lately* in dispute, and upon which points the negotiation for a general exchange appears to have been broken off. Neither will I, at present, go into any inquiry as to the proposal for giving up 3,000 French Prisoners of war, “made,” to use the words of the COURIER, (see page 1050) “by British valour, and at the expence of *British blood and treasure*,” for 3,000 *Hanoverians*, who, it would appear from the Propositions, were included in the Capitulation made with the French in Hanover, and who are, or may have been, *in our service since that time*.—These are points for future discussion. At present I wish to see how the question stands between *England* and *France*; and, with this view, we must consider all the above descriptions of persons as being so many English prisoners of war in the hands of France, and that all were to be included in a Convention for a general exchange and release.—We must further remark, that, besides soldiers and sailors actually subjects of France, we have, in our prisons, captured in war, many soldiers and sailors belonging to the *Allies* of France; such as Dutch, Neapolitans, and others. These were, as appears from the Propositions, *all* to be exchanged against the subjects of England and her allies now held as prisoners of war in France and in the territories of her *allies*.—Now we come to the point in dispute, and upon which, it would seem, the negotiation was broken off.—Our Negotiator (see page 1045) proposed, that all the *BRITISH* prisoners in France and her dependencies should *FIRST* be exchanged against French prisoners in England and her dependencies; and that *AFTER THAT*, the French prisoners, who might still remain unchanged in the hands of England, should be exchanged for an equal number of *SPANISH* prisoners.—There will be seen, in the Propositions, other minor stipulations, but what I have here stated is the main one; it is that upon which the whole of the dispute turned, and upon the disagreement as to which the negotiation broke off.—Let us now, then, hear

what is said on each side, and leave the decision to reason and justice and honour.

—The Emperor Napoleon rejects the proposition, because it *discriminates* between *British* prisoners of war and the prisoners of war made from the *allies* of *Britain*. He says (or, at least, the Moniteur says for him) what we have seen at page 1047; that the only way for us to have an exchange of prisoners, is, to consent to an exchange of French against *English, Portuguese and Spaniards, man for man, and rank for rank*; that, when a negotiation for *peace* is proposed, we say our *allies* the *Spaniards* must be admitted as a party, but that, when an exchange of prisoners is to be settled, we will not allow the *Spaniards* to be included, though taken in the ranks of our armies; that the *Spaniards*, who were taken in covering the retreat of General Moore, in covering the retreat of Lord Wellington's army at the passage of the Tagus, in enabling him to secure his retreat, in sallies with our troops at Cadiz, in covering our army during this campaign by suffering themselves to be shut up in the fortresses of Rodrigo and Almeida without receiving from us our promised relief, that all these people are now *disowned* by us; that an army is an army, and that since these people fought by our side, were armed with our arms, paid with our money, and clothed by us, they should be included in the exchange of prisoners, to whatever country they may belong.

In answer to this, the *Commer*, ministerial news-paper, of the 24th instant (see page 1010), says, that Buonaparté, in order to disguise the fact that he never entertained any serious intention of concluding a cartel, has had recourse to the most barefaced falsehoods. Not having leisure, apparently, to point out the particular proofs of these falsehoods, this writer proceeds to state, that our government was perfectly sincere in the desire of effecting an exchange of prisoners, which the correspondence, when laid before parliament, will prove; that we did offer to exchange *man for man and rank for rank*, including prisoners of the allied powers on both sides, and that this offer was REFUSED; that we have 50,000 French prisoners in the country [he includes those of the *allies* of France I suppose,] and that France has only 12,000 British; that we required that, in the *first instance*, the 12,000 *British* should be exchanged for 12,000 French, and that *after that*, we would give up the

remainder of the French prisoners for an equal number of Portuguese and Spaniards; that France would not consent to this, but insisted that for every 3 prisoners which we gave up, we should receive in return *one* British subject, and *two* subjects of our *allies*. After having answered Napoleon thus far, the ministerial writer proceeds thus: "We feel with regard to our allies, the *utmost cordiality and esteem*, and we highly approve of the offer of our Government to apply to the relief of their prisoners the surplus of French that might remain in our hands *after* the liberation of *all* the British should have been effected; but we must say that this country never could have tolerated so monstrous and so mortifying an arrangement as that Frenchmen made prisoners by British valour, and at the expence of British blood and treasure, should be set at liberty in exchange for FOREIGNERS, while our own Soldiers and Sailors still lingered in captivity. After this plain *unvarnished* statement, what becomes of all those fine sentimental exclamations of the Moniteur?—Had the French government been actuated by those feelings of humanity, which are made such a parade of in the Moniteur, 50,000 Frenchmen would ere this have been restored to their country and their homes."—Here, then, are the reasons on both sides. It is for the reader to judge who has the best of the argument; but, it is but fair to observe, on the side of the ministerial writer, that he has in reserve *certain proofs to be laid before parliament*; and, when these appear, we shall, doubtless, see good grounds for the offering to give up Frenchmen for 3,000 Hanoverians, at the very outset of the Exchange; and also good grounds for considering the *Detained* as entitled to be exchanged before our military allies of Spain and Portugal. —Certainly it is a very mortifying thing to reflect, that many even of our soldiers and sailors, taken in battle perhaps, and taken, too, from their being amongst the boldest men in the service, should remain wasting their time and their health in those very prisons, from which they would (upon the terms insisted on by France) see foreigners released by our government. Very mortifying indeed is this reflection; but, if Napoleon persist, to this mortification we must submit, or see no exchange at all take place. The number of our own countrymen who are prisoners, is, as the reader will perceive,

comparatively small. We have, it is said, 50,000 of the enemy's subjects prisoners, while he has only 12,000 of ours; but, alas! the wars in Spain and Portugal have put so many of our allies into his hands, that, if the exchange of the prisoners of the three nations were to go on in the way on which Napoleon insists, it is to be feared, that no inconsiderable part of our own countrymen, who are now prisoners of war, would still remain prisoners after the exchange, and, of course, would, unless supported by uncommon strength of mind, become a prey to despair. Had there been no wars in Spain and Portugal, this would not have been the case; we might then have had an exchange without any difficulty; or, at least, those obstacles that now exist, could not then have existed. But, it is too late to make these reflections. We have had, and we still have, those wars; and, if we, as some persons appear to be, are convinced, that those wars are fraught with so much glory and advantage, we must, on the other hand, submit with patience to some little inconveniences, flowing from the same source; and, it can hardly be supposed, that even the Gentlemen, who, at the feast at the London Tavern, so heartily cheered on to these wars, did not, in the progress of them, anticipate the possibility of some trifling obstruction to the general current of prosperity and joy.

SWEDEN.—The affair in this country seems now to be settled. From an Article, which will be found in a future Number, and from the Speech of the NEW CROWN PRINCE, it will appear, that the dynasty of Sweden has been changed with as little difficulty as a man changes his servants; and with much less difficulty than any man can change bad servants for good. Not only has there been none of that opposition, none of those commotions, which were so confidently foretold by our ministerial prints, and so strongly recommended by almost all our prints; but, the people, the whole nation indeed, but more especially the people, seem to have hailed him as the Saviour of their country.—And what are the remarks and reflections that this event; that the completion of this event, calls forth from our ministerial writers? You shall hear in the words of the Morning Post of the 29th of November:—"The "Moniteur contains a long account of "Bernadotte's presentation to the King

"and Diet of Sweden. It would appear
"from his speech, that his Imperial Mas-
"ter and himself are two of the most pa-
"cific beings that ever drew breath.
"What a pity that men of such quiet dis-
"positions should, by some unaccountable
"destiny, have shed as much human
"blood, and spread as much havoc
"and misery, among their fellow-crea-
"tures, as they could possibly have done,
"had they been born with that ferocious
"temperament which delights in conquest
"and revels in carnage. This harangue
"is matter of curiosity, chiefly as a spe-
"cimen of the keen irony, the apparent
"mockery of reason, truth, and justice, which
"every modern French appeal to the
"sense and feeling of the people presents.
"We have already given an abstract of
"it. To complete the HUMBUG of the
"business, the new Crown Prince was en-
"tertained at Stockholm, in the evening
"of the 3d November with the Opera of
"Gustavus Vasa."—Suppose it true,
"that the mockery of reason, truth, and jus-
"tice is glaring enough in all conscience
"in this harangue; but, this is not the
"only occasion upon which we have heard
"of this species of mockery. There is not,
"to people of sense and spirit, any thing
"more provoking, than to be compelled to
"witness such mockery. One would endure
"whole years of the greatest pain, for the
"sake of seeing the practisers of such insult-
"ing mockery receive their due. To stand
"by and see such barefaced mockery is al-
"most beyond mortal endurance. Nothing
"much short of seeing the worms crawling
"into and out of the eye-sockets and the
"jaws of the insolent miscreants who prac-
"tise such mockery ought to satisfy the
"public vengeance. But, is this the first
"time that the Morning Post writer ever
"heard of such mockery? Oh no! he has
"heard of "mockery" and "humbug," far
"greater than this. This mockery and humbug
"is a trifle light as air to the mockery and hum-
"bug, which he has heard of before, and of
"which he has given an account; of which
"he has been the recorder.—But, humbug
"as this may be, it is not to be laughed at
"by us. To us, it is no joke. To us it is a
"subject for any thing rather than mirth.
"For, now we see Sweden in the hands of
"Napoleon; completely in his hands, with
"all its powers capable of being brought
"into play against this island, under the
"direction of one of the ablest even of those
"whom Napoleon has selected as the most
"able.—The order issued for the raising

of sailors at Bremen for the Imperial Navy is, perhaps, as good a proof as we could have of his intentions against us:—
 “Bremen, Oct. 30.—His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of France having *demanded of the city of Bremen a certain number of able seamen to serve on board the Imperial fleet*, our Senate has called upon “all seafaring men resident in this city and the districts thereof, who are yet “able and fit for the sea service, to avail “themselves of the signal advantages “which are offered by the agents of the “Imperial French navy, and enter on “board the French fleet.”—He will thus compel the several maritime towns to raise seamen, who, if they will not *enter*, will be *impressed*, and it will be quite good to hear the sentimental strains of the Morning Post and his brethren upon the latter subject especially.—What is to hinder the Emperor Napoleon, then, from fitting out as many ships as he may think necessary? It is emptiness hardly to be conceived to suppose, that he will not do it if he can; and that he can do it is certain. And, what, then, I should be glad to know, will the consequence be, if we should, by any unforeseen accident, be worsted in the South of Europe after having exhausted ourselves by the wars there? If that should be the case, it will be *then* that the war will *begin*, that the real war against England will have a beginning.—I do not say that this is *likely*; I cannot say so, after the Dispatches of Lord Viscount Talavera; but, it is, perhaps, *possible*, and I am, I must confess, not very easy under the belief of such possibility.—And yet, this writer looks upon the complete surrender of Sweden to France as a *humbug*; as a mere *mockery*; as a thing to call forth a little *contempt*; and nothing more!—In the mean while, the same writer recommends, in the most forcible terms, an acknowledgment of the King of Sweden, who is now, it seems, at Hampton Court; and also a *congratulatory* address to him from both Houses of parliament! Was I wrong, then, reader, in saying that this writer was *mad*?

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—Great indeed must be the mortification of my readers not to find that Massena and his army are taken. There is now said to be intelligence to the 15th of November, and that it left the starving French army, not only *alive*, but occupying their old posi-

tion. *Meat* and *bread* and all other human eatables they had none of long and long enough before. What, then, have they lived upon? They must surely have COUNT RUMFORD in their camp! But, if every man of them had a “*digestor*,” nay, if each man’s stomach was a *digestor* equal in power to that of the Count’s, what good would that do them, seeing that they can have not even *bones*, except those within their own skins, to digest? Their horses, as the reader well knows, they had *stewed down for soup*, long before the last Dispatches came away, and to suppose that the bones did not follow the flesh and the soup would be to give the cooks credit for incredible abstinence. PETER PINDAR was afraid that the Count’s invention would lead to a general gaol-delivery, for that it would teach the felons to cook their fetters and the stones of their prison walls, and thus eat their way into liberty. Surely, the French must have carried their culinary discovery to some such pitch, or they must have perished with hunger before now? At any rate, it really does appear, that this army is still alive.—From its arrival at Torres Vedras it was in a *trap*; it has never had more than the bare ground on which it stood; its general was got into the *wire*; Lord Viscount Talavera *laughed* at him; he was *laughed* at by every body; and yet he and his army were not taken on the 15th instant; nay, we are told, that there are some *doubts* as to when he will be captured, and some (of the *Oppositionists*, to be sure,) go so far as to say, that he will not, in their opinions, have been captured by *this time*! After this, I should not wonder, for my part, if they were to say, that he would not be captured at all; for, if they will say this, what will they not say? If they can coolly *doubt* of a man’s being *captured* who is already in a *trap*, they will not believe in his capture, though they see him landed at Portsmouth.—To reason with such persons would be folly; I shall, therefore leave them to be convinced, if that is possible, by the glorious event which all reasonable men and orthodox politicians anticipate with so much confidence.—In the meanwhile, however, I cannot help observing the altered *tone* of our friend of the Morning Post, who now insists upon it, that the sending of *reinforcements* to Lord Talavera is *wise*, and even *necessary*! I really must give way to my indignation at this. I *try*, but I cannot contain myself upon this point. What! *Beat* the French at Busaco and fire

the Park and Tower guns; we then draw them, *drag* them after us, as if by a rope round their neck, to Torres Vedras; we get them safely into a trap; then laugh at them, while they are starving there and stewing down their horses; and after all this, we want reinforcements from England in order to be able to attack them; attack, did I say? nay, by all that's impudent, in order to be able to *withstand* them! What! need reinforcements in order to be able to withstand an army, nay, a part of the army whom we had beaten so shamefully at Busaco? Need reinforcements in order to enable us to withstand an army that were without provisions or huts; whose rear was cut off; who had not an inch of ground but that on which they stood; an army that we had caught in a trap, and that we *laughed at*: stand in need of reinforcements from England to *withstand* such an army?—Ah! "fashionable world!" Ah! "the most 'thinking people' in Europe! Pray do look well at all this. Do, if you mean not to be 'laughed at' yourselves, guard your ears against the assertions of those truly abominable prints.—You will observe, that one of two things must be true, namely, that reinforcements *cannot be necessary*, nay that, as adding to the number of mouths at Lisbon and within the lines, they must be injurious to our army; or, that what the Morning Post has told us about *traps* and *starving* and *laughing at* is falsehood. Let the venal gentleman choose between these two. And, observe again, that, if he should say, that his intelligence about the *traps*, &c. was not of his own invention, he only shifts the falsehood from his own shoulders to those of his correspondents in Portugal. Here, therefore, let him choose again; but, let us be upon our guard. Let us wait the event, and believe not a word that he and his fellow-labourers say.

KING'S ILLNESS.—The reports, since my last, are as follows; signed by the same Doctors as before.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 26, Eight P. M.
His Majesty has continued nearly the same throughout the day.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 27.
His Majesty has had between two and three hours sleep in the night, and is this morning much the same as yesterday.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 27, Eight, P. M.
His Majesty has been rather better throughout this day.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 28.

His Majesty has had some sleep in the night, and upon the whole is much the same as he was yesterday.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 28, Nine, P. M.

His Majesty is not quite so well this evening as he was in the morning.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 29.

His Majesty has passed a quiet night, and appeared rather better this morning.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 29, Eight, P. M.

His Majesty is not quite so well this evening as he was yesterday.

Windsor Castle, Nov. 30.

His Majesty continues much the same to day as he was yesterday.

On Wednesday the 23th and Thursday the 29th of November, there was held a Meeting of the Privy Council, to which were called all the members of that body, without distinction.—Before this Council was taken the evidence of the five Physicians and Doctors as to the state of the King. This evidence, in the form of a Report, was, as we shall see, presented to the two Houses of Parliament the next day.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT.—(Continued from page 955.)—King's Illness.

—On Thursday, the 29th of November, the two Houses met agreeably to the adjournment. But, before we enter upon this day's proceedings, it will be proper to insert the names of the MINORITY in the division, which took place, upon the question of adjournment on the last day, that is to say on the 15th of November. The reader will recollect (see page 951.) that there were 343 for the then proposed adjournment, and 58 against it. The names of these 58 were as follows, errors excepted, and if there should appear to be any omission, or any wrong insertion, I shall be particularly attentive in the correcting of it.

LIST OF THE MINORITY,

On the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Motion for adjourning for fourteen days, on Thursday, the 15th instant.

Abercromby, Hon. J.	Bligh, T.
Aubrey, Sir J. Bart.	Combe, H. C.
Bradshaw, C.	Cuthbert, J. R.
Brougham, H.	Creevey, T.
Baillie, P.	Chaloner, Robt.
Bennet, Captain	Dundas, L.
Biddulph, R.	Dudley, North
Burdett, Sir F. (Teller)	Eden, G.
Byng, George	Elliot, W.

Fitzgerald, Lord H.	Martin, H.
Folkestone, Lord	Ossulston, Lord
Greenhill, Robert	Osborne, Lord F.
Hanbury, Tracey	Pellam, C. A.
Hurst, R.	Parnell, H.
Hamilton, Ld. (Teller)	Romilly, Sir S.
Halsey, J.	Somerville, Sir M.
Horner, Francis	Spiers, —
Hutchinson, C.	Sharp, R.
Hughes, H. L.	Smith, Wm.
Kensington, Lord	Scudamore, R. P.
Lambton, R. J.	Symons, Col.
Lloyd, J. M.	Tierney, Rt. H. G.
Mostyn, Sir T.	Wharton, J.
Milner, Sir W.	Williams, O.
Markham, John	Wynn, Sir W. W.
Matthew, M.	Wynn, C. W.
Maxwell, W.	Whitbread, Samuel
Madocks, W.	Wardle, G. W.
Miller, Sir T. Bart.	Walpole, General

The Proceedings of the 29th were begun, in the HOUSE OF LORDS, by the laying of the REPORT upon the Table, which was done by EARL CAMDEN, the President of the Council. The Report, at full length, will be found at the close of this Summary; and, it should be carefully read, and well considered by every man in the kingdom.—The report having been thus laid before the House, the EARL OF LIVERPOOL rose to propose another adjournment to the 13th of December instant. He stated, the confident expectations of the Physicians of the King's recovery without reference to time, and the actual amendment of his indisposition, and the weight of the precedents of 1788; and he added, that the House had *now*, what they could not have in 1788, *experience of the King's recovery from former attacks*. He acknowledged the inconveniences attending the suspension of the Royal authority, but urged that, on the other side, there were inconveniences attending the introduction of a new authority to supply its place for a temporary purpose. The only way, therefore, of avoiding the difficulty, was for the Houses to *adjourn* again. He further said, that, if, at the expiration of another fortnight, there should appear *no prospect of the King's speedy recovery*, he should then deem it his duty to propose the appointment of a Committee of the House, *for the purpose of examining the Physicians*, agreeably to the form adopted in 1788. He concluded by moving the adjournment to the 13th instant.—EARL SPENCER opposed the motion. He said that the Houses were not assembled as a parliament, but merely as estates of the realm; that they ought to remain so not

a moment longer than inevitable necessity required; that there was no proof of any such necessity; that, therefore, besides the reasons suggested by the *perilous state of the country, the spirit of the constitution* called upon them to take *immediate* steps for being prepared for supplying the place of the Royal Authority which was now suspended. He therefore moved, as an amendment, to leave out all the words of the Earl of Liverpool's motion but the word "*That*," and to insert "a Select Committee be appointed to examine the Physicians, in attendance on his Majesty, relative to the state of his Majesty," and to report the examinations to the "House."—EARL MORRIS, upon the question being about to be put, rose, and expressed his surprise that none of the ministers attempted to answer the objections of Earl Spencer. He then proceeded to say, that, instead of *three facts*, which the Earl of Liverpool had said the Physicians proved, namely, the *existing malady*, the *expectations of recovery*, and the *actual amendment*, they proved but *one*, namely, the melancholy fact of *existing malady and incapacity*; all the rest was *speculation*, and the House had *already seen* what confidence was to be placed in this species of speculation. The Noble Lord had talked, he said, of introducing a new authority, but what new authority was to be introduced? would not the object of their proceedings be to continue the functions of the Monarchy, of which the personal exercise by the Monarch was now unhappily suspended? He said, surely the King upon his recovery would be gratified to find that these measures had been adopted which were best calculated for the support of the Monarchy and the security of his Majesty and his family; that their Lordships had a great public duty to perform, and they could not justify themselves to their fellow-citizens if they now delayed proceeding to the performance of it; that they surely would not hold out to the people, that the personal exercise of the Royal Authority was of so little consequence that it might continue suspended from fortnight to fortnight, leaving the authority of the Crown in the hands of the Committee who were now exercising it, neither was it fitting that they should leave authority in the hands of a government who had not the confidence of the people, and who were believed by that people to be incompetent to the duties of their station. He was, therefore, for taking those prelimi-

nary steps which were necessary for the ground-work of their future proceedings, and, of course, was for the amendment moved by Earl Spencer.—The Earl of HARROWBY took the same ground as the Earl of Liverpool. He repeated the inconveniences that would arise from the measures to supply the place of the King, and also urged the *experience* they had had of the *former recoveries of the King*. He also said, that the House ought to consider *what King it was that would be set aside by measures of supplying his place; that it was this King of England, whose benignant reign it had pleased Providence to extend* Being called to order here, he repeated, that the appointment of a Regency, would, for the time, *set aside the King*. The objection to this language was repeated, and his Lordship soon afterwards sat down.—THE MARQUIS OF ABERCORN justified the language of Lord Harrowby; and said that it was necessary to introduce the name of the King, when his Majesty was the subject of debate.—LORD HOLLAND, after stating, in a very clear manner, the situation of the question before the House, proceeded thus:—"The Noble Secretary of State has talked of *inconvenience, of partial and comparative inconvenience*. Was it possible to compare the inconveniences, to use the Noble Lord's language, of the year 1788, to the dangers, the awful and unparalleled dangers of the present period? It was not to be forgotten that those who now constituted the Government of the Country, and who, he might venture to say, did not command the confidence of the nation, were now exercising an additional and supreme authority, and that they were extending their power almost beyond the verge of responsibility. He felt deeply the state of the empire, and was willing to adopt the metaphor of the Noble Earl (Harrowby). That Noble Lord had recommended delay, he could discover no danger in a still longer suspension of the Executive functions. The vessel of the State, the Noble Earl thought, was under an impulse which would not be likely to cease, and would probably enable it to escape the shoals if left unaltered. The *impulsus remorum* was in his mind still vigorous, still effective. Now he (Lord Holland) feared that we were not on so calm a sea as the Noble Earl appeared to apprehend, he saw the vessel of the State assailed by tempests, and

"nobody at the helm; he saw her driven in a storm that threatened awful and approaching danger. The Noble Lord informs us, that we ought not hastily to transfer authority, but he denied that any authority existed to be transferred, the Royal authority was suspended, and unless supplied or vested in another person, there could be no Executive Power in the country. He conjured the House, therefore, to reflect before they suffered it to go abroad, before they permitted it to be said, that at a moment so critical as the present, when, among many embarrassing circumstances, the absence of so large a part of our military force, was one not the least deserving of attention, or the least productive of the most justifiable apprehension, the House of Lords was content to confide the Supreme Power and Authority of the Realm to the hands of Ministers, and had adjourned for a second fortnight without the adoption of a single measure that could tend to the security or the benefit of the country. The noble Earl had talked of other facts, and remarked that we had now had experience of the nature of his Majesty's malady, and of the *probability of his recovery*. Whatever that experience might be, the Noble Earl seemed to forget that it was impossible it could have any weight or influence in their present deliberations. Neither of these facts were before them in an authentic shape; the report of the examinations taken before the Privy Council, was not ground on which they could institute any proceedings whatsoever. Before they could perform any legitimate act, they must ascertain in a regular form the fact of the Royal incapacity. But by the system into which it was now proposed to enter, this evidence would never be attained; for there was nothing in the reasons adduced to justify the proposed adjournment, that might not, should his Majesty's illness suffer no abatement, be applied with equal force and justice to future and indefinite adjournments. Thus the period, when it will be acknowledged on all sides that the defect of the Executive Authority ought to be supplied, is placed at a remote distance, and all the evils of such a state of things aggravated by being rendered in a manner permanent. He called on Ministers, and requested not to be considered in the light of their

“opponent, while he cautioned them to
 “pause on the verge of their strange
 “and unaccountable proceeding. A Bill
 “of Indemnity might hereafter screen
 “them from the personal consequences of
 “their rashness, but nothing could rescue
 “the country from the hazard of those
 “perils which were collected and darkened
 “round her.”—The EARL OF WEST-
 MORELAND was for the original motion,
 and LORD DARNLEY against it.—LORD
 GRENVILLE, in a speech which I have not
 room to insert and not time to analyse,
 went into the whole of the subject, in a
 very able manner, which the reader will
 easily conceive from the following brief
 sketch of its conclusion:—“He then ad-
 “verted to an observation, which had
 “fallen from a noble Earl, relative to set-
 “ting aside the King. In all the debates
 “of 1788, it was never said, that by the
 “establishment of a Regency the Monar-
 “chy was set aside. There was no ques-
 “tion about the vacancy of the throne, or
 “upon whom the crown should devolve;
 “but who was to exercise the executive
 “power, in trust for the sovereign, and in
 “his name. He felt it incumbent on him
 “to notice such expressions, because it
 “was improper they should go forth to
 “the public unreprieved. They were cal-
 “culated to excite a compassion that was
 “not called for, and to give invidious repre-
 “sentations of the conduct of others, and
 “ultimately to shake the confidence of
 “the people in the monarchy. There
 “was no question of setting aside the
 “King. A noble Earl had said, that the
 “suspension of the King’s authority did
 “not necessarily produce a suspension of
 “the Executive Government, but that it
 “might be *carried on by the existing authori-
 ties*. He would wish to have that ques-
 “tion determined. He would not go to
 “extreme cases of a day or a fraction
 “thereof, but he would maintain that the
 “Government could not be carried on if
 “the Royal Authority were suspended for
 “any time. For this he had the autho-
 “rity of the venerable person who at that
 “time filled the office of President of the
 “Council. That noble person declared it
 “in his place in these words, ‘*this calamity
 “has produced a complete suspension of all
 “the functions of the Executive Government.*’
 “If Ministers would look into the Foreign
 “Office, they would there find upon
 “record an avowal to the same effect
 “from the Marquis of Carmarthen, then
 “one of the Cabinet. They would find

“it in these words, in an answer to a dis-
 “patch from one of our Ministers at a
 “Foreign court: ‘*I have received your im-
 “portant letter, but can give you no instruc-
 “tions on account of his Majesty’s unfor-
 “tunate indisposition.*’ Did Ministers mean
 “to say that they might receive his Ma-
 “jesty’s commands, *though parliament
 “could not?* Talk of new Governments in-
 “deed, was there ever so monstrous an as-
 “sumption of power as this? What, are
 “they, uncontrolled by Parliament, to
 “issue their orders to Admirals and Gene-
 “rals: may more, that they shall exclu-
 “sively have the care of the King’s person?
 “He never heard of such a power in the
 “Constitution, as that the great officers of
 “State might act independent of the crown.
 “A Noble Earl had talked of leaving the
 “vessel of the state to be borne along for
 “some time *involens remorum*. Never
 “was there a more unfortunate application
 “of a figure. What, when the helm was
 “abandoned, the sails torn, the masts
 “gone by the board, and the vessel in
 “danger of going down, was she in such
 “circumstances to be left to the impulse
 “she had previously received; was no ef-
 “fort to be made to save her, to bring her
 “into port? Was she to be left, thus la-
 “bouring, to what the Noble Earl call-
 “ed *impulsu remorum*?”—The LORD
 CHANCELLOR (Eldon) said, “that the con-
 “stitution, acting upon that wise maxim
 “of law, that as the monarchy was heri-
 “ditary, the King was King in all in-
 “stances, either in infancy or in nonage,
 “in health or in sickness, in decrepitude
 “or dotage. It was upon the political
 “capacity of the crown being entire, that
 “the constitution wisely abstained from
 “any antecedent provision to meet such
 “deficiency, but knowing, though the
 “theory was perfect, that man was not so,
 “but subject to various infirmities, our
 “ancestors left it to the wisdom of pos-
 “terity to provide for the evil, when the
 “evil occurred. The sole consideration
 “now was, whether the House, with such
 “information as the Privy Council took
 “leave to submit to their Lordships,
 “should pause, or whether it should at
 “once go into that important work in
 “which they may be hereafter engaged.
 “For himself he would state his opinion,
 “that he would do nothing but what the
 “evil of the day required. Their Lordships
 “had certainly the right of interposition,
 “but it was to be recollected that it was
 “the necessity gave them that right,

“and that the proper correct time of interposing, was of the essence of that necessity. The Noble Lord felt that he would well deserve, as he would receive, the reprobation of his Sovereign, in case of his restoration, if through personal regards for him he abandoned the interests of the country. Believing both identified on the present question, he concluded with conjuring the House as it valued the feelings of the Sovereign and the interests of the country to accede to the adjournment.”—LORD ERSKINE said that the Noble and Learned Lord had alluded to the differences that took place in the opinions of the great men of that time, and certainly there never was any period of our history more distinguished by men of high talents—but though honest men might differ on the means of applying abstract questions, yet upon the whole, their differences were immaterial, and were more as to forms than as to principles. On the great maxim of the Constitution, that the Kingly office never dies, they were agreed. The pains of death the King must suffer like every other human being, but the office was immortal. And of this office there was no suspension: there could be no suspension, for all the faculties of the Government emanated from it and depended upon it. In case of natural demise, the next heir instantly supplied the place; and, in a case like the present, the States of the Realm had to find the fact by which alone their jurisdiction took place. In the year 1788, their jurisdiction was delayed, because a difference of opinion arose as to the mode of proceeding; but nothing of the kind took place now. They were not interrupted. There was no variance; and the only business they had to do was to establish the fact that was to give them jurisdiction. In the former instance they adjourned for four days, to obtain the information upon which they were to proceed.—Now it was proposed to adjourn for fourteen days for nothing. Till they had by their own examination found the King’s personal incapacity, they had no power whatever to act. He would abstain from all allusion to what they would think fit to do when their jurisdiction should commence—but he could not agree that the functions of the Executive should be suspended for seven weeks, which would actually happen, if the motion of ad-

“journalment should be agreed to. He denied the right of the two Houses to keep the country without a Government at that time. A Noble Earl talked of setting the King aside. It was Ministers who set the King aside; and they did against all the analogies of the Constitution; for nothing could be more outrageous than to take up the *ipse dixit* of the Privy Council, and to usurp the power of adjourning themselves from time to time. He said they had power to adjourn themselves for one day. He had thought so in the first instance and he had not voted for the adjournment to this day.—EARL STANHOPE said, The two Houses were in the present predicament declared by the Bill Rights to be the full and free Representatives of all the States of the Realm. And in that capacity alone could they act; nor could they do one act in that capacity more than the necessity of the case required. A Parliament acted by the authority of the King. A Convention acted by the authority of necessity, and the necessity must be proven. They could not act without first ascertaining the fact. They were like Judges and Jury in a Court of Law. They could not decide without having the evidence upon the case before them. They could take no hearsay evidence, no *ipse dixit* from the Noble and Learned Lord, no, nor from the Privy Council, who had not themselves any right to take such examination. They knew nothing in that House of the King’s incapacity but from the assertion of the Learned Lord, and from the Report of this Privy Council. By what Law did this Privy Council take upon themselves to declare the King’s incapacity? Not by the Common Law, and he was sure he had read more law books than the Lord Chancellor, and therefore he would take upon himself to say that it was not by any statute that they had derived such a right.—The Learned Lord had ingeniously contrived to drive their Lordships aside from the question, to which he had not spoken one word. He had chosen to talk about a Regent. Had any one else spoken a word about a Regent that day? That was not the business now before them. These blessed Ministers of the King were anxious only to possess themselves of the whole power of the realm, and that at a time the most tremendous. The Noble Earl concluded with exhibit-

ing a most striking picture of the present state of Europe, and of the dangers and confusion with which we are now threatened at home.—THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWN, in an elegant speech, inadvertently on the argument of the Lord Chancellor, and said it was proposed to make them commit the crime of abandoning the country, while the Executive Government was totally suspended.—HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF SUSSEX felt it his duty to explain the motive of the vote which he should give that night. He had on a former day voted for the adjournment to this day, because this was the day to which his Majesty had himself designed to prorogue the Parliament. But now when it was further proposed to adjourn, he must declare that he should vote against it from considerations of attention to his Majesty. They would believe that he was most sensibly affected by the melancholy situation of the public affairs. And that he most fervently prayed for his Majesty's speedy and perfect recovery. But he could not vote for an adjournment in circumstances so imminent, and particularly, because he desired to know WHO WAS TO HAVE THE CARE OF HIS MAJESTY'S PERSON? —The House then divided on the Amendment, Contents 56; Not-Contents 88.—They then divided on the main question, Contents 88; Not-Contents 56.—The House is therefore adjourned to the 13th December.”—In the HOUSE OF COMMONS, The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. Perceval) made a similar motion to that made by LORD LIVERPOOL, in the House of Lords. After stating all the reasons, whence he concluded, that there was a fair prospect of the King's *speedy recovery*; and that, in the meanwhile the House had a choice of evils before them, he went on to observe upon the precedent of 1789, and to state, that the prospect of recovery was now more promising. He concluded in the following manner:—“From an examination of that precedent, then, it would appear that it afforded no ground for the House in the present circumstances to proceed immediately to an inquiry of its own. It was indeed in direct opposition to any such proceeding immediately; for though an inquiry by a Committee had been instituted, though the suspension had existed for three months, and though a

Regency Bill had actually passed the House of Commons, yet when the Lord Chancellor, without any such authoritative document as that now on the table, stated on the 19th of February that an improvement had taken place in his Majesty's health, an adjournment was agreed to for five or six days; then a second adjournment was carried, and so the proceeding was suspended by successive adjournments up to the 9th of the succeeding month. He did not mean to say, (he wished to God he could) that the amendment which had taken place in this instance was equal to that which had been stated by Lord Thurlow in 1789: but what he had said sufficiently proved that they could not be justly charged with having violated the principle of that precedent. When an adjournment then had been agreed to upon a mere informal statement, after a suspension of the Royal functions for three or four months, it was in vain to say that the House was bound by that precedent or by the constitution to adopt any particular proceeding on this occasion. It was left completely at liberty to act according to its discretion, with a view to the interests of the public and the benefit of the sovereign. In the exercise then of the little discretion that belonged to himself, he concluded by moving, That the House do at its rising adjourn for fourteen days.” —Mr. WHITEBREAD, after commenting upon the statement of Mr. PERCEVAL as to the prospect of recovery, proceeded to point out some of the many inconveniences that must arise from the suspension of the Royal Authority. He said, “As to personal delicacy, that was a point very much misunderstood. His Majesty himself, he had no doubt, would be the first to scorn and reprobate any personal delicacy, if shown to him at the expense of bringing the kingly office which he had held with so much satisfaction to his subjects, into disrepute and contempt. What was the meaning of the words of Lord Camden, that the whole functions of the executive Government were suspended? What could be done in the actual situation of affairs? What sentence could be executed? Was there now any fountain of mercy? Could a criminal be pardoned? Could an assize be appointed? Could assistance be sent to Lord Wellington if that should be requisite? Who was to per-

"form these functions? Could they (the
 "ministers) do all this? they who pos-
 "sessed a power to which they had no
 "more right than any other individuals?
 "If they could, *then they were Regents.*
 "You, said Mr. Whitbread, talk of de-
 "throning the King, a most improper
 "and absurd expression; but you, your-
 "selves, do worse, for *you take the Crown*
 "*from the Constitution.* Had the right
 "honourable gentleman a greater right
 "to call the Privy Council together than
 "any other member of that body? The
 "necessity justified that measure, but if
 "the period of the existence of such a
 "necessity was improperly prolonged,
 "the justification was gone. Let the
 "House consider the time at which the
 "whole executive functions were sus-
 "pended, a time when a week had to
 "carry a load before borne by centuries!
 "If a military commander abroad should
 "be wanted—if it should be requisite to
 "appoint one at home, how was the de-
 "ficiency to be supplied? If they (the
 "ministers) were to abuse the authority
 "which they now assumed, so as to call
 "for the *annihilation of the House, to*
 "*whom could the Commons go with their ad-*
 "*dress?* Did they (the ministers) propose
 "any remedy for all this? No, the
 "House was misled by false impressions
 "as to the state of the King's health, and
 "even since the examination of the phy-
 "sicians it appeared that his Majesty had
 "had but an indifferent night. Yet ano-
 "ther fortnight was to elapse before any
 "steps were to be taken to find a substitute!
 "In 1801 and 1805 he was more or less
 "accessible, though during the latter
 "period the defect in his Majesty's eye-
 "sight ought to have directed the atten-
 "tion of Ministers to the proper measures
 "of preparation for a state of things like
 "the present. Now, however, his Majesty
 "was inaccessible, and it was only from
 "other persons that Ministers had their
 "information on the subject of the King's
 "malady. Even though his Majesty
 "should recover, it ought to be con-
 "sidered that it was the recovery of a
 "man in years; and of a man (speak-
 "ing of him as a man; who must be
 "more in the power of others than
 "before. The defect in his Majesty's
 "sight too has been stated by Ministers
 "themselves as a reason for refusing access
 "to him on many important occasions.
 "Let the House only duly consider the
 "present situation of affairs, and then

"let him who could do it, vote for the ad-
 "journment."—MR. YORKE spoke next
 after Mr. Whitbread, but the only thing
new, said by him, was upon the subject of
 the *inconveniences of a Regency.* He said,
 "he should state shortly what those in-
 "conveniences might be. Could it be
 "contended, if the existence of the ma-
 "lady should be of short continuance,
 "which there was every reason to hope,
 "that great inconvenience must not arise
 "from the very circumstance of substitut-
 "ing for this short period another person in
 "lieu of the reigning Monarch? Sup-
 "pose that the person so substituted might
 "change the system of Government pursued
 "by the reigning Monarch;—for though he
 "was satisfied that the person likely to be
 "appointed Regent, in the event of such
 "an office becoming ultimately neces-
 "sary, could hardly be supposed likely to
 "do this, yet it was possible, and he was en-
 "titled to put the case. Suppose it possible
 "that the Regent should be so ill advised
 "as to *overset the system pursued by the*
 "*reigning Sovereign,* would it not be an *exil,*
 "that on his return to the discharge of his
 "royal functions, the reigning Sovereign
 "should find all his measures overturned,
 "and a totally different plan, which he
 "did not feel equally conducive to the
 "interests of his country, or to his rela-
 "tions with Foreign States, substituted in
 "its place? Suppose, for instance, that a
 "Regent were to be appointed on the
 "present occasion in this country, and
 "that he were to abandon the interests of
 "Spain and Portugal, and to consign them
 "to their fate, would it not be a great in-
 "convenience on his Majesty's recovery;
 "and on his coming to resume his autho-
 "rity, that he should find those two coun-
 "tries abandoned?"—MR. PONSONBY'S
 speech offered, as far as the news-paper
 report, goes nothing new; nor does it
 appear that he met, in front, this argument
 of Mr. YORKE about the dangers to be
 apprehended from a change of system;
 though it was very material to meet it,
 seeing that it is an argument that will ap-
 ply with equal force at any other time,
 and may be a ground for an adjournment
 at the end of every fortnight for years to
 come.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, after ob-
 serving, that with all the respect that he felt
 for the King, he must be permitted to treat
 the subject with impartiality and freedom,
 said, that "he could not consent that
 "things should be left for a moment
 "longer in that perilous state in which

"they had continued for the last month,
 "and in which it was proposed that they
 "should be suffered to remain for a fort-
 "night longer. The only doubt which
 "remained with him was, who ought to
 "supply the deficiency which here oc-
 "curred? In the year 1688, when
 "James II. left the throne vacant, in con-
 "sequence of his having violated the
 "contract he had entered into with his
 "subjects, the right devolved on the peo-
 "ple. If that was the fact then, he was
 "not prepared to agree that any House of
 "Commons, far less a House of Commons
 "constituted and called together as this
 "was, should have the right of filling this
 "vacancy. The Right Honourable Gen-
 "tleman (Ponsonby) had shewn that the
 "Privy Council was assuming a right to
 "which it was not entitled, and that this
 "examination, now laid on the table, was
 "no ground for any Parliamentary pro-
 "ceeding, far less for persevering in the
 "system of anarchy to which we were at
 "present reduced. The evidence, as it
 "was called, was evidence of nothing.
 "If such had been offered in a Court of
 "Justice, it would not have been ad-
 "mitted. We all knew that interroga-
 "tories could be so put by interested
 "persons as easily to produce favourable
 "answers. The last person whose evi-
 "dence should have any weight in a mat-
 "ter, such as that now under considera-
 "tion, was the Minister, who was inter-
 "ested to deceive. Yet on such evi-
 "dence, the House was called on to
 "grant the Government of the Country
 "to the Right Honourable Gentleman.
 "If he were asked if he would agree to
 "the adjournment, he should feel himself
 "called on to say, that he could not
 "agree that the Right Honourable Gen-
 "tleman (Mr. Perceval) should have
 "the Government of the Country. But,
 "that the emergency ought to be pro-
 "vided for at once. The Honourable
 "Gentleman under him (Mr. Whitbread)
 "had alluded to various periods in which
 "Regencies had been appointed, and be-
 "sides the calamity under which the
 "country at present laboured, had al-
 "luded to the practice of petitions not
 "now reaching the ear of his Majesty
 "but through his Secretary of State.
 "The very idea of petitioning indeed
 "had in consequence become a mere
 "farce, so that when petitions were talked
 "of, persons could hardly keep their
 "faces. These were imperious and com-

"pelling reasons for resisting the ad-
 "journment. It was certain things could
 "not be allowed to remain in their pre-
 "sent state.—The arguments adduced on
 "the idea of delicacy were most absurd.
 "Delicacy was very well at a tea table,
 "but to talk of it in the affairs of a na-
 "tion was contemptible, particularly if
 "that nation was cruelly loaded, as this
 "was. When, in such circumstances, he
 "heard delicacy talked of, he always
 "thought it meant roguery. Delicacy to
 "the other sex was to be applauded; but
 "the law got over that where the matter
 "was of importance. In the delivery of
 "the Queen so much more was the regard
 "paid to the importance of the matter
 "than to any nice sense of delicacy, that
 "precautions were at that period resorted
 "to as to her, which in the case of any
 "other lady would be thought grossly in-
 "delicate. He hoped a prudential re-
 "gard to the feelings of the King would
 "not prevent the House from recollecting
 "that there was a Crown also; and when
 "people talked of the King of England
 "with reference to the Crown, let them
 "recollect, that he was never young,
 "never old, and his functions never inac-
 "tive or suspended. As to the precedent
 "of 1788, which had been referred to, in
 "his opinion it should be looked at only
 "to be avoided. The Right Honourable
 "Gentlemen opposite, however, only re-
 "ferred to it that they might pick out
 "what suited themselves. There was
 "nothing in their whole conduct that did
 "not prove them actuated by the inte-
 "rested motives attributed to them by
 "the Right Honourable Gentleman who
 "spoke last. Whoever the person ought
 "to be to whom the Kingly functions
 "should, in the interim, be confided, it
 "was not for him (Sir F. B.) to dictate
 "to the House or to the nation at
 "large; but, of this there could be no
 "doubt, they could not go on in that
 "ruinous tract they were now in.—
 He concluded with the words which I
 have taken for my motto, and was follow-
 ed by GENERAL MATHEWS, who strongly
 protested against leaving the government
 of the country in the hands of the present
 ministers.—Mr. C. W. WYNN, Lord
 MILTON, Mr. ADAM, and Sir T. TURTON,
 spoke against the adjournment, and Mr.
 BRIDGE for it, as did also Mr. WILBER-
 FORCE and Mr. FULLER, who ended the
 debate. A division then took place, when
 there appeared for the Minister's motion

233 and against 129.—MR. PONSONBY then moved for a Committee to examine the Physicians during the adjournment; for the motion 37; against it 230.—Thus ended this debate. How many more such debates and such decisions there will be, it would be extremely hard to guess.—MR. YORKE's argument was the *clencher*, and nobody, that I can perceive, met it at all. The argument was, that there would be a risk of great inconvenience in adopting measures preparatory to a Regency, because, when the King got well, he might possibly find, that the Regent had *changed the whole system of government*. Such change would, of course, include a *change of the ministers*.—The force of this argument, great as it is, is by no means of so much importance as its *universal applicability*. It is calculated for all times and almost all occasions; or, it is worth nothing at all. If it be good to-day, it must be good on the 13th of December, because the Regent if then appointed may make just the same changes as he might make if appointed now. A fortnight can make no alteration in this respect; nor can a month or twelve months, or any other space of time. And, in short, if to this argument any weight be allowed, there is but one way of getting over it, namely, making it a positive condition with the Regent, that he shall make no change whatever in the system, and, of course, that he shall make no change in those persons by whom that system has been advised and carried on; for that this last is absolutely necessary to the support of the system, is, I am sure, what no man living, who knows any thing of the matter, will attempt to deny. Of the effects of this system, which the nation has tasted most abundantly, and yet these effects are but just beginning to have their full relish. They are a sort of fruit that take long ripening; they are something like the flower of the aloe, which takes about half a century to bring it to perfection. Now, however, they seem to be upon the point of attaining all their richness; and, I must confess, that any thing that would check the progress or raise a doubt as to whom the merits of the culture belonged, would be injurious to the cause of truth.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,

November 30, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND.—KING'S ILLNESS.—*Report of the Privy Council, of the Evidence of the Physicians, on the 28th and 29th of November, 1810, laid before the two Houses on the 29th.*

COUNCIL CHAMBER, WHITEHALL, NOV. 28, 1810

DOCTOR HENRY REYNOLDS

CALLED IN AND SWORN, AND EXAMINED.

Q.—You are desired to acquaint this Board, whether the state of his Majesty's health is such as to render him incapable of coming in person to his Parliament, or of attending to any kind of public business?

A.—His Majesty is certainly incapable at present of attending his Parliament or transacting public business.

Q.—What are the hopes you entertain of his Majesty's recovery?

A.—I have very confident hopes of his Majesty's ultimate recovery.

Q.—Do you found the opinion, given in your answer to the previous question, upon the particular symptoms of his Majesty's disorder, or upon general experience in other cases of the same nature, or upon both?

A.—Upon both.

Q.—Whether, in that particular species of the disorder his Majesty has fallen into, it has been found from experience that the greater number of persons so affected have been cured?

A.—Undoubtedly.

Q.—Can you form any judgment, or probable conjecture, of the duration of his Majesty's illness?

A.—No; I cannot form any decisive opinion upon this subject; it varies in different persons, and the time has varied in his Majesty's former indispositions.

Q.—Whether, as far as experience enables you to judge of his Majesty's disorder, you think it more probable that his Majesty will or will not recover, so as to render him capable of attending to public business?

A.—I think it much more probable that his Majesty will recover. My expectations at present are very confident of his Majesty's recovery. I speak this however with reference to the uncertainty that always attends medical predictions. With this reference, I should say, from what I see in his Majesty, that I have no doubt of it.

Q.—What degree of experience have

you had, yourself, in this particular species of disorder?

A.—In above forty years practice as a Physician, I have seen many instances of it.

Q.—Whether any amendment has already taken place in the course of his Majesty's disorder, and whether the appearance of such amendment continues at present?

A.—His Majesty is certainly better; and I am not sure that he was not full as well, if not better, yesterday, and continues so this morning, than he has been since I had the honour to attend his Majesty in this illness.

SIR HENRY HALFORD, BARR.

CALLED IN AND SWORN, AND EXAMINED.

Q.—You are desired to acquaint this Board whether the state of his Majesty's health is such as to render him incapable of coming in person to his Parliament, or of attending to any kind of public business?

A.—I think it is such as to prevent his coming to Parliament, or attending to public business.

Q.—What are the hopes you entertain of his Majesty's recovery?

A.—I think it is in the highest degree probable, that his Majesty will recover.

Q.—Do you found the opinion given in your answer to the previous question upon the particular symptoms of his Majesty's disorder, or upon general experience in other cases of the same nature, or upon both? A.—Upon both.

Q.—Whether in that particular species of the disorder his Majesty has fallen into, it has been found from experience that the greater number of persons so affected, have been cured?

A.—I believe so.

Q.—Can you form any judgment, or probable conjecture, of the duration of his Majesty's illness?

A.—I cannot form a satisfactory conjecture.

Q.—Whether, so far as experience enables you to judge of his Majesty's disorder, you think it more probable, that his Majesty will, or will not, recover, so as to render him capable of attending to public business?

A.—Much more probable that his Majesty will recover.

Q.—What degree of experience have you had yourself in this particular species of disorder?

A.—In the course of 19 years, a good number of cases must have fallen under my cognizance.

Q.—Whether any amendment has already taken place in the course of his Majesty's disorder, and whether the appearance of such amendment continues at present?

A.—A very considerable amendment has taken place in his Majesty's symptoms; in the course of the last 24 hours his Majesty's mental health has improved; but in the same space his Majesty has been more indisposed bodily; but I have just reason to believe that I shall find that indisposition much mitigated on my return this evening.

• DOCTOR WILLIAM WEBERDEN,

CALLED IN AND SWORN, AND EXAMINED.

Q.—You are desired to acquaint this Board, whether the state of his Majesty's health is such as to render him incapable of coming in person to his Parliament or of attending to any kind of public business?

A.—I consider the state of his Majesty's health to be such as to render him incapable of coming in person to his Parliament, or attending to public business.

Q.—What are the hopes you entertain of his Majesty's recovery?

A.—The greatest expectation of his Majesty's recovery.

Q.—Do you found the opinion given in your answer to the previous question upon the particular symptoms of his Majesty's disorder, or upon general experience in other cases of the same nature, or upon both?

A.—I found my opinion upon the improvement that has already taken place in his indisposition and the present integrity of his faculties, and the analogy this disorder bears to his former illness.

Q.—Whether in that particular species of the disorder his Majesty has fallen into, it has been found, from experience, that the greater number of persons so affected have been cured?

A.—I firmly believe that it does appear that the greater number of persons have been cured; but my own experience has not been great in that disorder.

Q.—Can you form any judgment, or probable conjecture of the duration of his Majesty's illness?

A.—I can form no judgment of the precise duration. In general I should judge that the duration cannot be long.

Q.—Whether so far as experience en-

ables you to judge of his Majesty's disorder, you think it more probable that his Majesty will, or will not recover so as to render him capable of attending to public business?

A.—I feel in my own mind no doubt that his Majesty will recover, and be capable of attending to public business.

Q.—What degree of experience have you had yourself in this particular species of disorder?

A.—Very little experience.

Q.—Whether any amendment has already taken place in the course of his Majesty's disorder, and whether the appearance of such amendment continues at present?

A.—Considerable amendment has taken place in his Majesty's disorder, and the amendment still continues.

DOCTOR ROBERT DARLING WILLIS,

CALLED IN AND SWORN, AND EXAMINED.

Q.—You are desired to acquaint this Board, whether the state of his Majesty's health is such as to render him incapable of coming in person to his Parliament, or of attending to any kind of public business?

A.—His Majesty is incapable at present of coming to Parliament, or attending to any public business.

Q.—What are the hopes you entertain of his Majesty's recovery?

A.—I entertain very confident hopes of his Majesty's recovery.

Q.—Do you found the opinion given in your answer to the previous question upon the particular symptoms of his Majesty's disorder, or upon general experience in other cases of the same nature, or upon both?

A.—Upon both.

Q.—Whether in that particular species of the disorder his Majesty has fallen into, it has been found from experience, that the greater number of persons so affected have been cured?

A.—I believe the greater number are cured.

Q.—Can you form any judgment or probable conjecture of the duration of his Majesty's illness?

A.—I cannot.

Q.—Whether, so far as experience enables you to judge of his Majesty's disorder, you think it more probable that his Majesty will or will not recover, so as to

render him capable of attending to public business?

A.—I think it more probable that his Majesty will be capable of attending to public business.

Q.—What degree of experience have you had yourself in this particular species of disorder?

A.—From my earliest infancy I had opportunities of observing complaints of this nature, as long as I remained under my father's roof. During the last two and twenty years I have seen a great variety of cases of this nature in private practice.

Q.—Whether any amendment has already taken place in the course of his Majesty's disorder, and whether the appearance of such amendment continues at present?

A.—A very considerable amendment had taken place in his Majesty's disorder, which continued when I left Windsor this morning.

COUNCIL CHAMBER, WHITEHALL, NOV. 29, 1810.

DOCTOR MATTHEW BAILLIE,

CALLED IN, AND SWORN, AND EXAMINED.

Q.—You are desired to acquaint this Board, whether the state of his Majesty's health is such as to render him incapable of coming in person to his Parliament, or of attending to any kind of public business?

A.—I think his Majesty is at present incapable of coming to Parliament, or of attending to any public business.

Q.—What are the hopes you entertain of his Majesty's recovery?

A.—I think it highly probable that his Majesty will recover.

Q.—Do you found the opinion given in your answer to the previous question upon the particular symptoms of his Majesty's disorder, or upon general experience in other cases of the same nature, or upon both?

A.—I found the opinion which I delivered as an answer to the second question, upon the consideration of the symptoms of his Majesty, upon perceiving no failure in the faculties of his Majesty, upon the soundness of his Majesty's constitution, and upon the resemblance which his present illness has to what I have heard of his former illnesses of the same character.

(*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 34.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1810. [Price 1s.

" Thus, the measure of non payment originated with the persons bound to pay."—MR. TIERNEY'S Speech in the House of Commons, 22nd Nov. 1797.

1059]

[1090

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XIX.

The Reason for the Stoppage, or Restriction, Act—Mr. Pitt and his Adherents represent it as of short duration—Mr. Fox and others foretell that it will never be repealed—The dates of the several renewals of the Act—Pretence for the first renewal—Resolution of the Bank Directors—Report of the Secret Committee—Pretence for the second renewal—Exposure of this by Mr. Hobhouse—Miscellaneous answer of the Minister—Mr. Tierney's exposure of the whole thing—The measure traced to the end of the last War.

Gentlemen,

The task first to be performed, agreeably to the conclusion of my last Letter, is, to point out to you, and I flatter myself, to your children's children, those persons, who bore a distinguished part in the discussions of the Stoppage, or Restriction, Act; and, especially to show you, that that Act was not a thing that came like a flood or like thunder, as Mr. Huskisson appears to wish us to believe; and that its duration was a circumstance which was not only foreseen but distinctly foretold by several of those persons, who, by the party to which Mr. Huskisson belonged, were represented as the enemies of their country.

The Bill was, as we have seen, brought into the House of Commons on the 9th of March, and became a law on the 3rd of May. Between these days there were

several debates upon the subject; and, you will now see, whether, as Mr. Huskisson would have the public believe, there was nobody that could foresee, or dream of, this long continuation of the non-payment of cash at the Bank. Justice to the dead as well as to the living, as was before observed, demands that the truth of this fact should be well known; but, besides that, the knowledge of the truth here will be of great utility in the guiding of our judgment for the future. I shall, therefore, give the very words of the several speakers upon the subject, just as they stand in the Reports of the Parliamentary Debates of that time; and, that any one may, when he pleases, examine into the correctness of my statements, I shall give the date of the Debate from which I make my quotations.

MR. PITT and his adherents held a language of great confidence in the solvency, and even in the wealth of the Bank Company. You have seen, that the first Act of Stoppage, or, as it is called, of Restriction, was to last for only *fifty two days*, which, of itself, amounted to a declaration, that the Bank would be able to resume their payments in a short time; and, during the debates upon the bill, in its several stages, every thing was said, that could be thought of by the Minister and his adherents, to cause the public to believe, that the suspension of cash-payments would be very short indeed. In the debate of the 23rd of March, MR. WILBERFORCE said, that, "Gentlemen did not consider how much of this distress arose from the very nature of our commercial dealings. The credit we gave was one year, eighteen months, or two years, while we paid at six months; so that in the progressive increase of trade it was some time before the balance flowed in. *The bad effects were past, the good were yet to come.*" On the 24th of March, MR. PITT said, that, "as to the exact period, he could make no positive conjecture: for he felt it difficult to say, whether one month, or two, or three, would be

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"better. But when he reflected, that it must require some time for money to circulate back from the country to the Bank, and also to be refunded from abroad, and from all the other sources, from which its wealth may be derived, he could not entertain a firm hope that the restoration of the Bank could be other than gradual, he would, therefore, limit the operation of the present clause to the 24th of June 1797." On the 29th of March, Mr. LUBBOCK said, that "if no particular day was fixed, and the Bank began to pay specie without such notice, all would go on gradually and smoothly; that he was convinced, with a very little assistance, that the Bank might go on as usual immediately, and discount freely; if 3,000,000*l.* were added to their capital, it would enable the Bank to discount to a much larger amount, which would more than accommodate the commercial world; and he would venture to be d—d, if such a sum would not be subscribed in twenty-four hours; this would put all to rights." On the 31st of March Mr. PITT said, "Leave the Bank and them to exercise a discretion concerning it, which, at all events, could do no injury, and might, more than probably would, lead to the attainment of that which the right honourable gentleman himself seemed so anxious for, namely, the restoration of cash payments at the Bank." And, again, on the same day he said: "Probably then the cash in the Bank on the 25th of February was not yet diminished—then if more cash came in, it would gradually enable the Bank to open again and resume its operations by those slow and successive steps which would make a resumption safe."—On the same day, Mr. SAMUEL THORNTON, one of the Bank Directors, said, in speaking of the clause, which invites people to carry gold to deposit in the Bank, that, "on the whole he considered it as a most important measure, and that it would enable the Bank to resume its usual general payments long antecedent to the period fixed for its recovery." Thus, all of them spoke either of a gradual or a speedy return to cash payments; and this last gentleman, a most firm adherent of the Minister, and a Bank Director, expressed his opinion, that the Bank would be able to pay even before the expiration of the fifty two days, for which the Act was made.

Now, Gentlemen, hear the other side.

You have heard the Minister PITT and his adherents. Now hear Mr. Fox and those who stood with him. But, above all things mark the words of Mr. Fox. Look at his predictions; and, I need not point out to you how exactly they have been accomplished *thus far*, and how manifest it is that the rest are in the way of speedy accomplishment. Mr. Fox is no more; but his words will never die. The evils he foretold, and that he laboured to prevent, have all come upon us, or now menace us with horrid aspect.

In the debate of the 7th of March, Mr. HORNHOUSE said: "But we are told that this bill is to exist for a short time only. Has the Right honourable Chancellor of the Exchequer considered what is likely to take place when this bill shall expire? Will not the holders of Bank of England notes, the very moment that the suspension of payment in specie is at an end, rush in large bodies to the Bank and demand specie? Having been once deluded, will they ever expose themselves to the risque of being deluded a second time; having once lost the opportunity of converting their notes into specie by a sudden and unexpected Order of Council, will they ever voluntarily become holders of such notes again? The least wound given to public credit is not easily healed: public confidence once lost, is not easily recovered." What Mr. NICHOLS said, in the debate of the 22nd of March, we have seen in the Motto to Letter XVIII. In the same debate Mr. Fox said that, "He knew not what the duration of the bill was intended to be, whether for three weeks or for three or six months; but this he knew, that the longer the duration, the greater our difficulty would be; and he must be a sanguine man indeed, if he thought the country would not be ruined in its credit, if this bill continued for six or eight months. There were some persons who confessed that this evil could not be removed during the war: he agreed with them; but he doubted whether it could be removed EVEN IN PEACE, unless that desirable event should take place very soon. Every hour that it was delayed diminished our chance of removing the calamity. If we had not peace in the spring of 1797, what should we say in the autumn? This was a question which did not depend on the taking of a town, or a fortress. An enumeration

"of many successes in that respect would be of no avail. This was a time in which we should not conceal any thing from the public. A new loan of several millions was speedily wanted, which certainly would not tend to improve the situation of paper credit. He could not bring himself to state the circumstances of this country without the most painful anxiety. The House ought to consider that this country was now on the brink of a dreadful precipice, and that one false step might throw it into a gulph out of which it never could rise." In the same debate, in answer to a remark of Mr. PITT "that an increase of Bank notes would hasten the period of cash-payments," Mr. Fox said, that "to say that paper differed from the nature of every thing else, and that it was valuable in proportion as it was plentiful; and not as it was rare; and that the abundance of paper would incline people not to hoard guineas, but would induce them to carry them to the Bank, were positions so inconsistent with sound reasoning, that he was ashamed of calling up principles so merely elementary, and which were as clear as the simplest propositions of mathematics." In the same debate, Mr. SHERIDAN said, that "There would be no end to the bill, should it be carried into effect. He would repeat, therefore, what he had said before, that it would be better to suspend the proceeding altogether, than to hazard the evils which its enactment, without the prospect of a limitation, would produce." In the same Debate, SIR WILLIAM PULTENEY said: "Does any man, in his senses, imagine, that if this stoppage of payment in specie is to be of long duration, that the merchant will not advance the price of his foreign articles? This appears to me to be a great evil; and I have no idea of assenting to any bill of this kind, unless the duration be fixed, and irrevocably limited to a short period." In the Debate of the 24th of March, the same gentleman, SIR WILLIAM PULTENEY, said, that "he was of opinion that the longer the period was, the heavier would our difficulties grow. It was useless to say, that cash might flow back from the country and from abroad; for, while we were waiting for that reflux of specie, our destruction must ensue; it was impossible to restore the Bank by the balance of trade to which the right honourable gentleman, Mr. PITT, alluded. The theory was false, and no-

"thing solid could be expected from it. Three weeks had already been given to the Bank, and he was willing to grant it one month more; if, then, it could not pay, we must look for some other remedy: for that now proposed would be found of no avail. We should be only compelled to prolong the restriction from one period to another, till our paper met the fate of the French assignats."

Such, Gentlemen, were the opinions expressed, upon this part of the subject, when the cash-stopping bill was first before the House of Commons. You see, then, that, while Mr. PITT and his adherents were full of confidence of the Bank being able to return to its payments in cash; while they saw no danger at all from this measure; while they thought that the invitation contained in the act for people to bring money into the Bank Shop would again fill the Shop with real treasure; while they, and especially Mr. WILKESFORCE, described the Stoppage of cash-payments rather as a sign of prosperity and riches than the contrary; while they did not, as Mr. HUSKISSON says, dream of the Act being continued for a length of time; while their opinions, or, at least, their declarations, were of this sort, the declarations on the other side of the House, the declarations of those whom this "most thinking" nation would not believe, the declarations of those whom this "most thinking" nation were persuaded to look upon as its enemies and as the friends of France,* were just the contrary. Mr. Fox and his party not only foresaw, but they foretold, what has since come to pass. They said, that, if the Act was once passed, it must go on; and they gave reasons, for their opinion; reasons that were not attempted to be overruled by other reasons, and that were opposed by nothing but abuse or foul insinuation.

Having now, as far as relates to this point, done justice to the parties who took a part in the debates upon the occasion referred to; having shewn that Mr. HUSKISSON has not fairly represented the matter; having shewn that Mr. PITT and his adherents either meant to deceive the nation as to the ability and willingness of the Bank to return to payments in cash, or were themselves ignorant of the natural consequences of the measure, and that they had either less sincerity or less knowledge than their opponents; having placed the

important part of the subject beyond the power of future misrepresentation, we will now trace this famous Act of Parliament though its several renewals, from its first passing to the present day. In the whole, there have been *Six Acts*, passed; the original Act, of which the several clauses are mentioned in Letter XVI, page 906, and *Five Acts of Renewal*. There are, in some of these *five*, trifling deviations from the original Act; but, these are very unimportant. The great provisions about stopping cash-payments, about protecting the Bank Company against the demands of their creditors, and about the protection from arrests in individual cases, are all preserved, are now in full force, and, therefore, the alterations of no material consequence.

We have seen the *title* and *preamble* of the Act before, at page 906, and it will be best, before I offer you any observations upon the *reasons*, which, at the different renewals, were stated in *justification* of the measure, to furnish you with the *dates* of the six Acts, that you may, if your affairs should require it, and opportunity enable you to do it, refer to these Acts yourselves.

THE FIRST was passed in the 37th year of the reign of George III, and is, of the Statutes of that year, Chapter 45. The date, according to the common way of dating, is 1797, and on the 23d of May. To continue in force to the 24th of June, 1797; that is to say, for only *forty two* days.

THE SECOND: 37 year George III, Chapter 91. That is, in 1797; and the day when the Act passed was the 22nd of June; to continue in force *'till one month after the commencement of the then next Session of Parliament!* Mark this. See what a leap was taken. But you will see a greater presently.

THE THIRD: 38 year George III, Chapter 1. That is 1797; and the day when the Act was passed was the 30th of November; to continue in force *'till one month after the conclusion of the then war by a definitive treaty of peace!* Bravo! See how it gains strength as it goes. "Give them an *inck*, and they'll take an *ell*," says the old proverb. But, we have not yet seen the boldest leap. This Act, mind, was to *protect the Bank 'till the end of the war*;

and the reasons for that we shall see by-and-by.

THE FOURTH (*Peace was now come, observe*): 42 year George III, Chapter 40. That is, 1802; and the Act was passed on the 30th of April; to continue in force (*though peace was made*) till the 1st of March, 1803. We shall by-and-by, see the *reasons* that were given for this. These *reasons* are the interesting matter.

THE FIFTH (*Peace still continuing*): 43 year George III, Chapter 18. That is, 1803; and the Act was passed on the 28th of February; to continue in force till *six weeks after the commencement of the then next Session of Parliament*. This was the *second* renewal after the end of the war. The *second* renewal during peace.

THE SIXTH (*War was now begun again*): 44 year George III, Chapter . That is, 1803; and the Act was passed on the 15th of December; to continue in force till *six MONTHS after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace!*

This last, Gentlemen, is the Act which is now in force. This is the Act, which now protects the Bank Company against the demands of the holders of their promissory notes. This is the Act, which the BULLION COMMITTEE recommend to be repealed in such a way that the Bank Company shall be compelled to pay again in cash in *two years from this time*. You will now be so good as to recall to your minds, that the main question for us to determine is, whether, if such a law were passed, it is likely that it could be executed: in other words; *whether it be likely that the Bank Company will ever again be able to pay their notes in money*. This is the main question for our determination, because upon that question hangs the whole paper system; and, in order the better to enable ourselves to determine that question, and also to complete the *history* of the Bank Company and the Bank Stoppage, or Restriction, as they call it, we must now take a view of the REASONS, which, at the several renewals of the Stoppage, or Restriction, Act, were urged in *justification* of the measure.

The FIRST Act was, as we have seen, proposed to the Parliament by the Minister, and defended by him and his adherents upon the ground of *necessity*. The

drain of cash was said to have been sudden and unusual, arising from *false alarms of invasion*. The emergence was said to be temporary. The stoppage was acknowledged to be a *great evil*; but, it was maintained, that it was absolutely necessary, as the only means of avoiding a *greater evil*. It was, particularly by the then Attorney General (now Lord Eldon), and by the then Solicitor General (now Lord Redesdale), argued, that the measure was necessary to the safety of the public creditor, or Stock-holder; because, if the run upon the Bank had not been checked by force of law, the Bank would have been totally ruined, and, of course, that the Stock-holder would have lost his all.

But (and I beg you to mark it well) when the Second Act came under discussion, in June 1797, the Minister and his adherents began to hold a different sort of language, and to speak of the Act, not as the less of *two evils*, but rather as a measure adopted from *choice* and not from necessity. This act, which was the *first act of renewal*, had for its fore-runner, a correspondence between the minister and the Bank Directors. His letter to them was dated on the twelfth of June, and their answer on the thirteenth. These letters having been prepared, he, the minister himself, moved, in the House of Commons, on the fifteenth of June, that the said letters should be laid before the House, which was done. And, what do you think, Gentlemen, that these letters contained? Why, the minister's letter told the Bank Directors, that *he did not think that it was expedient*, that they should begin again to pay in cash, at the time specified in the first act of Parliament; and they, very submissively, *acquiesced in the minister's opinion*! Now, pray do not laugh, Gentlemen; for, you will find in the end, it is no laughing matter.

These two Letters, and nothing in the world besides, were made the ground of a legislative proceeding; made the ground, and the sole ground for continuing, for five months longer, an Act of Parliament, which protected the Bank Company against the demands of their numerous creditors, the holders of their notes. In the course of his speech the Minister, the "heaven-born Minister," said, "that he had the satisfaction to say, that there was in the affairs of the Bank, with regard to the means of payment in cash, an

"improvement that was highly consoling, and that the apprehension of their not recovering their ability to pay in the accustomed manner had been greatly exaggerated, when the subject first came before the House." He said, in another part of his speech, that "he was still anxious to come to the termination of the restriction; and, although that could not be on the day appointed, yet it was a satisfaction to the public to find, that the inconvenience of the measure was much less than had been foretold; and that, indeed, the consequence of the measure had been the reverse of what had been predicted by its opponents."

Without more ado the bill was brought in, and was passed, as we have seen, in seven days afterwards, without any further debate about the matter. Four fifths of the House of Commons were still at the back of the Minister; he appears to have lost not a single vote in consequence of the state to which it was now manifest he had brought the affairs of the nation; there were still the same majorities for him in the House, and there was still the same shouting for him at Lloyd's; the majority of the nation, partly from folly, partly from fear, partly from the influence of the paper system, were still as loud in his praises as ever, and Mr. Fox, apparently wearied with exertions which afforded no hope of success, left the people to feel the effects of their infatuation.

But, when the Third Act came to be passed, in November 1797, a little more preparation was necessary; and it was also necessary to find out *new reasons*, a quite new doctrine, in justification of it; or, to acknowledge, at once, that the Bank was unable to pay. The refusal to pay their notes in cash had now lasted for nine months; the alarm of invasion was over; and, it appeared difficult to conceive any reason whatever for the continuation of the Stoppage, or Restriction Act, other than that of the *inability* of the Bank Company to pay their notes in money. Other reasons were, however, found out; but, by way of preparation another SECRET COMMITTEE was now appointed in the House of Commons, which Committee were, as we shall see, the vehicle through which the new doctrines first made their way into that House.

This Committee, by the hands of Mr.

CHARLES BRAGGE (now Bragge Bathurst, and Member for Bristol), made their Report to the House on the 17th of November, 1797; and, I will venture to say, that a more curious document never was produced in the world. Every syllable of it is worthy of your attention; and I beg of you to go carefully through it before you proceed any further. The Report was, in part, grounded upon a Copy of a *Resolution of the Bank Directors*, which had been passed some time before, and which was laid before this Committee of Secrecy. I shall insert this Resolution first; and I must again beseech you to read every word of both documents with attention; for, you may be well assured, that the whole world never saw such documents before.*

* Copy of a Resolution of the Court of Directors of the Bank. At a Court of Directors, at the Bank, on Thursday the 20th October, 1797.

RESOLVED.—That it is the opinion of this Court, That the Governor and Company of the Bank of England are enabled to issue specie, in any manner that may be deemed necessary for the accommodation of the public; and the Court have no hesitation to declare, that the affairs of the Bank are in such a state, that it can with safety resume its accustomed functions, if the political circumstances of the country do not render it inexpedient: but the Directors deeming it foreign to their province to judge of these points, wish to submit to the wisdom of Parliament, whether as it has been ONCE JUDGED PROPER TO LAY A RESTRICTION on the payments of the Bank in cash, it may, or may not, be prudent to continue the same.

Mr. Chancellor Pitt said, that it was his intention first to move that the Report of the Secret Committee be printed, in order that all the members might have the satisfaction of informing themselves in detail of statements so very pleasing and important; but as it would take some time to have it printed, he trusted that those gentlemen who had now heard the Report read would think with him that, after the full examination the subject had undergone in the Committee; after the clear and decided opinion that Committee had pronounced upon it; and after the distinct statement, not only of them but of the Bank Directors; it would be unnecessary to detain the business merely on account of the printing; and that it would be proper to proceed

This Report, this matchless, this immortal Report, having been laid before the House, having been submitted "to the Wisdom of Parliament," the "heaven-born Minister" rose to move, at once, without any time for printing the Report, to bring in a bill to extend the duration of the Act of Stoppage, or Restriction, as it is called. He said, that he would, however, move for the printing of the Report, "in order that all the Members might have the satisfaction of informing themselves, in detail, of statements so very pleasing and important; those gentlemen, he said, who had now heard the report read would think with him that, after the full examination the subject had undergone in the Committee; after the clear and decided opinion that

without delay to the object of that Report; and move for leave to bring in a bill for that purpose. He avowed that the measure he meant now to propose was not confined to the strict terms of the former bill; but would move on the principle that, as the country was peculiarly circumstanced, it would be advisable to continue the restriction as long as the present contest continued, or at least as long as that contest continued in the shape and with the aspect it now bore, reserving however to Parliament the right to rescind the measure, and to limit, to qualify, or totally to annul the restrictions, as future circumstances might induce them in their wisdom to think necessary. The House would readily conclude that it must always be his wish, as it must be their own, to restore the issue of money from the Bank to its former situation; but they would also consider that their continuing the restriction could not reasonably produce the least alarm or apprehension, since they had now indisputable evidence before them that, so far from the gloomy predictions of those gentlemen who said that neither the Bank nor the national credit could survive the measure, being verified, both had rapidly risen to the high condition of prosperity which had just been stated—and that not one of those inconveniences which had been so confidently predicted to result from the restriction, had even yet arisen to justify the apprehensions of those who at first so violently opposed that measure. He therefore would move for leave to continue the restriction; but before he did so he must premise that some of the provisions would require amendment. The House would

“ Committee had pronounced upon it;
 “ and after the *distinct statement* not only
 “ of them *but of the Bank Directors*; it

“ would be unnecessary to detain the busi-
 “ ness merely on account of the printing;
 “ and that it would be proper to proceed

see how low the advances to government had been reduced—but they would hardly feel that the customary advances by the Bank upon the land and malt duties ought to be prohibited; yet as the law now stood they would; it therefore would be necessary to open the bill in that respect. He then moved, That leave be given to bring in a bill to continue the provisions in the former bill, for restraining cash payments at the Bank, and to amend and continue the other provisions in the same—which was granted *nem. con.*

The Committee of Secrecy, appointed to enquire whether it may be expedient farther to continue the Restriction, contained in two acts, made in the last Session of Parliament, respecting payments in Cash by the Bank; have enquired accordingly, and agreed upon the following Report; viz.

Your Committee have, in the first place, examined the total amount of out-standing demands on the Bank of England, and of the funds for discharging the same; and find, from the examination of the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, and the documents produced by them, that the total amount of out-standing demands on the Bank was, on the 11th day of this instant November, 17,578,910*l.*; and that the total amount of the funds for discharging the same (without including the permanent debt due from government, of 11,686,800*l.*, which bears an interest of three per cent.) was, on the same day, 21,118,460*l.*; leaving a balance of surplus in favour of the Bank (exclusive of the above mentioned debt from Government) of 3,539,550*l.*

Your Committee next proceeded to examine the principal articles of which the above mentioned sum of 21,118,460*l.*, being the credit side of the account, is made up, with a view of ascertaining how far the Bank might be enabled to resume its accustomed payments in cash, in case the restriction at present subsisting should be removed: and your Committee find, that the advances to Government have, on the one hand, been so much reduced, since the 25th of February last, as to amount, on the said 11th day of this instant November, to no more than the sum of 4,258,140*l.* while, on the other hand, the cash and bullion in the Bank have increased to

an amount more than five times the value of that at which they stood on the same 25th of February last, and much above that at which they have stood at any time since the beginning of September 1795.—Your Committee farther find, that the course of exchange with Hamburgh is, at present, *unusually favourable to this country*, and that, from the situation of our trade, there is good reason to imagine it will so continue, unless political circumstances should occur to affect it.—Your Committee next proceeded to examine the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, as to their opinion of the inconvenience which may have arisen from the restriction imposed on the Bank from making payment in cash, and of the expediency of continuing such restriction: and your Committee find, that they are not aware of any such inconvenience, and that they are supported in that idea, by knowing that the bankers and traders of London, who had a right by the act of Parliament to demand three fourths of any deposit in cash which they had made in the Bank, of 500*l.* or upwards, have only claimed about one sixteenth: and your Committee find, that the Court of Directors of the Bank did, on the 26th of October, 1797, come to a resolution, a copy of which is subjoined to this Report.—Your Committee having farther examined the Governor and Deputy Governor, as to what may be meant by the political circumstances mentioned in that resolution, find, that they understand by them, the state of hostility in which the nation is still involved, and particularly such apprehensions as may be entertained of invasion, either in Ireland or this country, together with the possibility there may be of advances being to be made from this country to Ireland; and that from those circumstances so explained, and from the nature of the war, and the avowed purpose of the enemy to attack this country by means of its public credit, and to distress it in its financial operations, they are led to think that it will be expedient to continue the restriction now subsisting, with the reserve for partial issues of cash, at the discretion of the Bank, of the nature of that contained in the present acts; and that it may be so continued, without injury to the credit of the Bank, with an advantage to the nation.—Your Committee, therefore, having taken

"without delay to the object of that Report; and move for leave to bring in a bill for that purpose." He further said, that it was necessary to continue the restriction during the war to defeat the object of the enemy, which was to destroy our credit; that the further continuation of the restriction could not reasonably produce any alarm or apprehension, since they had now indisputable evidence before them, that, so far from the gloomy predictions of the opponents of the measure having been verified, the national credit had rapidly risen to the high condition of prosperity which had just been exhibited. At the end of this harangue, he moved for leave to bring in a bill for continuing the Stoppage of cash-payments, at the Bank, till a month after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace; which, by the Representatives of "the most thinking people in the world," was agreed to without a single dissenting voice!

When, however, the subject came to be discussed again on the 22nd of November, the thing was not suffered to pass off in silence. Mr. HOBHOUSE observed upon the new doctrine, which was now brought forward in defence of the measure: "He reminded the House, that he had said on a former occasion that this would be the case; and now the Minister was making good his predictions, alledging as a reason for so doing, that the nature of the contest in which we are engaged demanded it, though this was no part of the grounds for the former restriction, and though in comparing the war now with its nature at that time, it did not appear there was any material difference. Why the nature of the war, then, made a restriction of six months only necessary, and its nature now made a restriction during the contest necessary, he could not discover; to him it appeared absurd and irrecon-

into consideration the general situation of the country, are of opinion, that notwithstanding the affairs of the Bank, both with respect to the general balance of its accounts, and its capacity of making payments in specie, are in such a state that it might with safety resume its accustomed functions, UNDER A DIFFERENT STATE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS; yet, that it will be expedient to continue the restriction now subsisting on such payments, for such time, and under such limitations, as to the wisdom of parliament may seem fit.

"cileable to common sense and sound policy." What answer was given to this by the Minister? What answer could he give? He had, in fact, nothing to say. He repeated all the former assertions about the riches of the Bank, though those assertions evidently made against him; and, as to the main argument, what did he do, but rely solely upon the opinion of the secret Committee, a Committee, who had, in fact, been chosen by his own adherents. He said: "As to the plan of continuing the restriction for the whole term of the war, the reasons for it being stated distinctly in the Report of the Committee, it was unnecessary for him to say a word more upon the subject; it would be found there distinctly set out that the Bank was in a state which in ordinary times would enable it to resume its cash payments and operations on the accustomed scale. But that the avowal of the enemy to attack us through our finances, and to ruin our public credit, was the motive (he presumed a sufficiently cogent motive) to make an additional term of restriction; and when it was remembered that no injury, nor even inconvenience, had been sustained by the restriction hitherto, the House could not but think it a sufficient encouragement to adopt that now called for." In a subsequent stage of the Bill, the next day, he said: "We were contending with an enemy whose object was to attack the credit of the country, and to embarrass its financial operations. It was necessary to meet these attacks in a manner that would defeat the object of the enemy. The House should take every measure to ward off the danger, and the present was, in his opinion, the best that could possibly be adopted." Mr. HUSSEY having pressed him closely upon this point, he further said, that, "It was necessary to hold out to the enemy, that the country was prepared to meet all its efforts of desperation; but it did not follow that the restriction would be continued during the whole of the war. While, however, it was pursued in its present shape, he certainly considered the restriction as absolutely necessary."

These miserable reasons; these most pitiful pretences, Mr. TIERNEY exposed, in his speech of the 22nd of November, in a manner so complete, that one is shocked at the thought of the House afterwards suffering the measure to proceed;

one cannot help wondering, that the Minister was able to sit and hear him; and, it is impossible to feel any compassion for the people, who still supported and extolled him, and who richly merit all that could, or can, befall them from that cause, they having supported him with their eyes open, and against the clearly and loudly expressed dictates of *reason* and of *truth*. MR. TIERNEY said: "That the enemy " would aim a blow at our credit and finances, all would agree, for all modern " wars have been without exception carried on upon that principle. Modern " wars are made upon resources rather than blood; but was this the " way to prevent the enemy from succumbing?—*most whimsical expedient!*—" In order to leave to the enemy no credit to " attack, they destroy credit themselves. But " at last they speak plainly, at last it " comes out that it will distress the financial operations of the country; and then " they deliberately weigh and find that " it will be expedient to continue the restriction, with the reserve of partial issues " of cash at the discretion of the Bank, " and that it may be so continued with " advantage to the nation, and without injury " to the credit of the Bank. This was the " result of the examination of the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank " of England. This was *their advice*. This " precious plan, which first originated in " the diabolical, but fertile mind of that " monster Robespierre."

MR. TIERNEY, in this speech, which was one of the best made upon the occasion, and to which I do not pretend to do full justice, then shewed how clear it was, that the Bank Company and the Minister went hand in hand through the whole of the transaction; that their operations were intended to screen one another; that the Bank Company called upon the Minister for protection; and the Minister made that the pretext for his propositions to Parliament. He observed, that the principal reason for continuing to protect the Bank from paying their notes, came from the Bank Directors themselves, who, even before the meeting of parliament, had come to a resolution, that they were able to pay if the political circumstances of the country did not render it inexpedient, but that the stoppage of payments in cash having been ONCE judged proper, they submitted to the wisdom of Parliament, whether it would

not be proper to continue the same. " Thus," said MR. TIERNEY, " the measure of non-payment originated with the " persons bound to pay," and who, from the language of the Act, the world would believe were restrained against their will from paying.

From the Report of the Secret Committee, you will have perceived, that the Bank Company, this Company of Traders, were the chief source of the Committee's information; for, the Committee say, that, having asked them what they meant by those " political circumstances of the country," mentioned in their Resolution, the Bank people told them, that they alluded to the war in which the Country was engaged? Upon this; aye upon this ground, suggested by the Bank Company themselves, did the Committee report, that it would not be safe for that company to pay its notes during the war; and upon the same ground did the House of Commons come to a like determination.

Gentlemen, were not these facts fresh in our memories; were they not capable of proof by living witnesses; nay, were they not proved by the existence of the Act of Parliament, of which we are speaking, would they, could they be believed? Could they be believed to have taken place in any nation upon earth; and, especially amongst a people, calling themselves " the most thinking people in the " world?"

Thus have we traced down this Act of Stoppage, or Restriction, as it is called, to the end of the last war. We have seen that its continuation was at last justified upon the ground of its being dangerous for the Bank to return to money-payments, DURING THE WAR. And now we have to see what reasons were given for continuing the restriction, or refusal to pay, AFTER THE WAR WAS OVER. But, this, by no means the least interesting part of the subject, must be reserved for another Letter. In the mean while, I remain,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
December 4, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—At last, then, it appears, that Massena has actually *begun his retreat*, as will be seen (if I have room for it) from the *Extraordinary Gazette*, published on Monday, the 3d instant, by our Ministers.—This intelligence, though, doubtless, the immediate fore-runner of the total discomfiture of the French, is not without its suggestions of a sort not altogether consistent with the former reports, received and believed in this country.—A *retreat* of the enemy, with so little loss as that of 400 men, does not at all correspond with the idea of his having been *in a trap*. A trap is a place out of which the party taken is not supposed to have the power of retreat. When any party, whether of men or of beasts, is *in a trap*, he merely waits for his doom at the hands of the party who has caught him; he merely waits to be taken out alive, or to be killed in the trap. What would any gentleman think, for instance, of his game-keeper, who, upon being asked where the venison were which he had caught for the last month, should tell him that they had retreated, or escaped into the covers, and were still at large, making their accustomed devastations amongst the game, to protect which he was employed?—Either, therefore, the fox, Massena, was not in a trap, and the accounts of the *Morning Post* were false; or the nation will be justified in saying to Lord Talavera what a country gentleman would naturally say, in the case above supposed, to his game-keeper.—Again, the noble Viscount himself told us, in his last official dispatch but one, that the French army *possessed no ground but that on which they stood*, which, indeed, seemed a little to favour the notion of a trap; but, if it be true, that that same army has retreated several miles, it must be true, that they had more ground than that on which they stood, or that they have gained more ground since. If, indeed, this favourite expression was meant in a sense strictly literal, it would certainly be correct; but, then it would equally apply to every army, in every situation; and, it would apply to the Duke of Bedford as well as to the beggar at one of his tenant's doors. But, if to be understood in the usual sense, namely, that of supposing possession to mean command of, or controul over, then, as was said before, the retreat of Massena proves, that he was in posses-

sion of more ground, and much more ground, than that on which his army stood; or, that he had gained such ground previous to his retreat, and since the date of Lord Talavera's former official dispatch.—Then, it appears to me, that the retreat, if it has been effected to any extent, shews, that we had been most grossly misled as to the enemy's stores and his means of subsistence; for, if the French had been, for *two months without bread*, how were they to be able to march? And, if they had, for a like time, been *sawing down their horses*, how were they to remove their cannon and their baggage? It will not do to tell us, that they effected this by the means of oxen or bullocks, because, there are very few of us who are quite beasts enough to believe, that the French, perverse as they are, would not rather make use of oxen and bullocks than of horses, for the purpose of making soup. Either, therefore, those stories about the French *sawing down their horses* to make soup were all falsehoods, falsehoods invented for the sole purpose, in all probability, of deceiving and cheating the people of England; or, it will be impossible to justify the having suffered the French to retreat with such small means of removal, without capturing or destroying the whole of them, instead of having captured only 400 men.—Another view of the subject remains to be taken with reference to former opinions and declarations of our venal writers. When Lord Viscount Talavera was retreating, and was followed by Massena, these venal gentlemen assured us, that the former was *drawing the latter after him*; that this was a plan settled before hand; that to *lay waste* the country was the true way of *protecting* the people; and, that, when, at the end of 400 miles of going on with the French behind them, our army arrived at Torres Vedras, our general had obtained his object, had accomplished his plans, had effected precisely the purpose, which, from the first day of the campaign, he had had in view. Now, if this was *true*, if our having retreated before the French was to be called *drawing them after us*; and, if our having succeeded in drawing them for so many miles, was to be looked upon as matter of joy to the nation and a subject of praise to our commander; if this was the case with regard to *our* retreat, why may there not exist the same grounds for self congratulation on the part of the French upon the score of Massena's retreat, whose march

does not, in all probability, promise our allies less of the protection than was afforded them in the former instance?—I am, indeed, aware, that it may be said, that our pursuit of Massena does not appear to be so *rapid* as his was of us; that he does not succeed in *drawing our army so fast after him* as ours drew him after them; that our general, more skilful than the Frenchman, pursues less in haste; and that, thus, there is a material difference in the circumstances. But, with all due deference to those who make use of this argument, I cannot refrain from observing that I think it will not be denied, that, to beat, or to capture, Massena, we must first *come up with him*; we must first *overtake him*; and, if so, we must *hasten* sooner or later.—We were told, that Torres Vedras was the *precise spot*, where Lord Viscount Talavera wished to meet Massena in battle; that, it was for the purpose of fighting him *there* that the former artfully drew the latter after him. And, leaving the *trap* out of the question, for the present, we were told that our army was *greatly superior to his in numbers*, besides the immense advantages of stores and every thing else. Now, if the venal writers did not tell the country falsehoods in this respect, if they did not deceive, abuse, and cheat the credulous people of this country, *why was not the battle fought at that favourite, that chosen spot?* Why was Massena, who was there destitute of every thing; whose men were running away from him; who was in such a miserable horse-stewling plight; why was he not, with a force and all sorts of means so superior possessed by us, *attacked and captured* or cut to pieces in that position, to *draw him to which had cost us 100 miles of as swift a retreat as was ever performed*, and which had cost our allies the laying waste, as we were told, of the whole country through which the armies passed? Why, if what the venal gentlemen told us was true; why, in that case was he not *attacked there*; why was he *suffered to retreat* and to get into another position, into a position *not chosen* by our commander?—Either, therefore, what these venal persons told us with regard to the position of Torres Vedras having been *chosen* by Lord Viscount Talavera; what they told us about that being the *precise spot* where he wished to fight Massena; what they told us about the former having laid a plan to *draw the latter after him*; what they told us about the miserably destitute state of Massena's

army; either all this was false, and invented, in all likelihood, for the purpose of deceiving and cheating and buoying up the people of this country; or, it may be expected and demanded at the hands of those venal gentlemen, that they will inform us, why Massena was not captured or cut to mince meat, or, at least, *why he was not attacked in the position from which he has escaped*.—Instead of this, however, we hear from them nothing but sounds of joy at his *retreat*; and, which is very well worthy of observation, we hear the same sounds from *Lisbon*, whence we before heard nothing but the most positive assurances that his *escape* was impossible. The public, the insulted and abused and cajoled public, will bear witness, that this is the *language* that we have heard for nearly two months passed. In every shape, in every form of words that our language will admit of, it was asserted, and that, too, in the most unqualified manner, that Massena *could not get away*; and the word *escape* was always applied to his case. Yet, behold! the same public now hear these same venal writers speaking in terms of exultation of this same entrapped General's *retreat*. They are overjoyed; they are "*so happy*" to tell their readers; so happy to confirm the news, that Massena has begun his *retreat*; so full of exultation that, thus far, he has effected that *escape*, which they positively assured us, which they did all but take their oaths, to make us believe as *impossible*! After this who is to be pitied that becomes the dupe of their asseverations? But, so often have they been detected and exposed; so often has their literary turpitude been held forth to public scorn; so often has it been gibbeted; that they are become callous, and the public are become insensible to the exhibition. They have done all that in them lies to murder *truth*; have long become dead to all the feelings of shame; and that they still obtain readers, or countenance from any quarter, is, perhaps, as foul a reproach as ever any nation endured.—As to our *present prospects* in Portugal, the Dispatch of Lord Viscount Talavera, or at least, that *extract* from it, which forms the Extraordinary Gazette, is judiciously silent. It does not repeat the statement, that Massena *possesses no ground but that on which his army stands*; and, indeed, it professes to know little either of his intentions or of his means of putting any design in execution. It speaks of *reinforcements*, making towards him from more than one quarter,

and it does not promise the preventing of these reinforcements from joining him. It does not say, that there is a probability of our being able to bring him to an engagement; but, one thing is quite certain, and that is, that if we *now* attack him, it must be in a position *chosen by him*, and *not by us*.—These who think that *going away* from an enemy and letting that enemy *follow you* is the way to *beat* him, can draw, from Massena's movements, no conclusions to his disadvantage; but, those who look upon *retreating* as a sort of *defeat* in itself may reasonably congratulate the country upon the intelligence in the Gazette, which, though not of a very *decisive* cast in general, speaks of one clearly conceived fact, namely, that Massena has *actually retreated*, some leagues; and this is a fact of importance.—To offer any *opinion* as to *future* operations or events is what I shall not attempt; and, it would have been much better for our army if other writers had observed the same caution. All that we *can* know either of the real situation or of the prospects of the armies is very little indeed; and all that we *do* know is much less; indeed it amounts at least to just nothing at all. We never know the truth but in the *event*; in the statement of what *has taken place*; and, it will be when the *war* shall have *ended*, when the *result* of all these retreats and pursuits shall be known, and *not till then*, that we shall be able to pronounce with *justice* on the merits, or demerits, of the planners and executors of the war. If we, *in the end*, beat the French; if we *finally* set Portugal *free from their power*, and leave it in a state to *preserve itself* so; the war, as far, it is a mere question of war; disconnected from other considerations it will have been *wise* in the plan and *successful* in the execution. But, if we fail in this great *ultimate* object the plan will have been *unwise*, and the execution *unsuccessful*; let the particular cause, or causes, and let the intervening operations be what they may. Wars between nations, like battles between individuals, depend upon the *last* blow; and, it is only because the duration of the former is longer than that of the latter, that we dwell upon any part of them but the *end*. When years are gone by, and we speak of a war from history, we look only at the *result*, and from that, and that alone, we denominate it *successful*, or *unsuccessful*. The war against the United States of America abounded in

successes and in "*glorious victories*," on our part; but, is there any man who *now* calls that a glorious, or a successful war? Yet, during that war, as well as during this, there was a route about successes and victories; there were huzzais, and bon-fires, and firing of Park and Tower guns, just in the way as we have seen them during this and the last war. The truth is, that these intervening events answer the useful purpose of making the people lose sight of the nature of the contest, of its professed object, and, of so confuse and confound all their notions about, that, in case of *final* defeat, their mortification is assuaged and their anger blunted. The shout of victory buoys up their spirit for the hour, their passions get enlisted in the contest, and that, which, with nations, ought to be a matter of cool calculation of advantages and disadvantages with regard to its *liberties* and its *happiness*, becomes at last the food of prejudice and of faction, and, by *dividing* the people, bends them to quiet submission to whatever may happen in the end, and, in the mean while, makes them yield to the burdens, which war invariably brings upon them.—There is one reflection, which, though it naturally arises out of this subject, seems seldom to strike those who write upon the war in Portugal; and that is, that this has its *costs*, besides those of *life* and *limb*. The cost in barns and houses and mills burnt or blown up or gutted or pillaged, of corn fields burnt, of mules and cattle and sheep and animals of all sorts maimed and devoured and destroyed, of a country laid waste and of families ruined for ever; the cost of all these, as falling upon the People of Portugal I shall leave the People of Portugal to estimate. But of our own costs I should suppose that the amount could not now be less than a *hundred thousand pounds a week*, a sum adequate, or nearly so, to the maintenance of *all the Parish Poor in England and Wales* for the same space of time. Napoleon, we are told by our venal writers, makes his troops extort their support from the countries in which they are at war; if this be true, it follows, of course, that, in any event, we wage a very unequal contest with him in all countries, and especially in Portugal, where besides provisions for our own army we have to find a part, at least, of those of the people of the country. Whatever else, therefore, we ought to wish for, it is certain, that we ought most anx-

iously to wish, that this war may be of short duration.

KING'S ILLNESS.—It was my intention to enter fully into the questions, agitated in the public papers, since the last meeting of the two Houses, relative to the subject then debated ; but, want of room compels me to postpone the discussion 'till my next.

WM. CORBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
December 4, 1810.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND.—KING'S ILLNESS.—*Report of the Privy Council, of the Evidence of the Physicians, on the 28th and 29th of November, 1810, laid before the two Houses on the 29th.*

COUNCIL CHAMBER, WHITEHALL, NOV. 29, 1810.

DOCTOR MATTHEW BAILLIE,

CALLED IN AND SWORN, AND EXAMINED.

(*Concluded from p. 1088.*)

Q.—Whether in that particular species of the disorder his Majesty has fallen into, it has been found from experience, that the greater number of persons so affected have been cured?

A.—I believe that the greater number have recovered.

Q.—Can you form any judgment or probable conjecture, of the duration of his Majesty's illness?

A.—I can form no idea of the duration of his Majesty's present indisposition. If one considers what has taken place in his Majesty's former illness of the same kind, it is probable that it may not continue very long.

Q.—Whether, so far as experience enables you to judge of his Majesty's disorder, you think it more probable that his Majesty will, or will not recover, so as to render him capable of attending to public business?

A.—I can perceive no failure of his Majesty's faculties, and therefore I presume, if his Majesty should recover, that he will recover with the same capacity for business as before his present illness.

Q.—What degree of experience have you had, yourself, in this particular species of disorder?

A.—My experience has not been extensive. I have been in business for 20 years, and have occasionally seen patients

afflicted with complaints of the same general character as that of his Majesty.

Q.—Whether any amendment has already taken place in the course of his Majesty's disorder, and whether the appearance of such amendment continues at present?

A.—His Majesty is considerably better than he was ten days ago. He is certainly somewhat better than he was yesterday evening, and—perhaps a shade better than yesterday morning.

PORTUGAL.—*Extraordinary Gazette, published by the Government in England, 3rd Dec. 1810.*

A Dispatch, of which the following is an Extract, has been this day received at Lord Liverpool's office, addressed to His Lordship by Lieutenant-General Viscount Wellington, dated Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

The enemy retired from the position which they had held for the last month, with their right at Sobral, and their left resting upon the Tagus, in the night of the 14th instant ; and went by the road of Alenquer towards Alcoentre with their right, and Villa Nova with their left. They continued their retreat towards Santarem on the following days.—The allied army broke up from their position on the morning of the 15th instant, and followed the march of the enemy ; and the advanced guard was at Alenquer on the 15th, and the British cavalry and the advanced guard at Azambuga and Alcoentre on the 16th, and at this place on the 17th.—In these movements they made about four hundred prisoners.—These troops have been followed on their march by Sir Brent Spencer's division, and the 5th division of infantry under Major-General Leith.—On the 17th I received accounts from Major-General Fane, from the left of the Tagus, that the enemy had constructed another bridge on the Zezere, that which had been first thrown over that river having been carried away by the floods ; and that they had on that day marched a large body of troops from Santarem to Golegao ; and I immediately passed Lieutenant-General Hill's corps across the Tagus at Valada, in boats which Admiral Berkeley had been so kind as to send up the river to aid and facilitate the operations of the army.—Having advanced from the position in which I was enabled to bring the enemy to a stand, and to oblige them to retire

without venturing upon any attack, it is but justice to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher and the Officers of the Royal Engineers, to draw your Lordship's attention to the ability and diligence with which they have executed the works by which these positions have been strengthened to such a degree as to render any attack upon that line occupied by the allied army very doubtful, if not entirely hopeless. We are indebted for these advantages to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher and the Officers of the Royal Engineers; among whom I must particularly mention Captain Chapman, who has given me great assistance upon various occasions.—Your Lordship will have observed how much the effective strength of the army in proportion to its total numbers has increased lately. There is no sickness in the army of any importance; and above one half of those returned as sick in the military returns are convalescents, who are retained at Belem till they will have gained sufficient strength to bear the fatigues of marching and of their duty in the field. Besides the Allied Army, your Lordship will observe that an additional force had been provided from the fleet; and I take this occasion of informing your Lordship that in every instance I have received the most cordial and friendly assistance from Admiral Berkeley, and the officers and men of the squadron under his command. Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Williams has even done me the favour to come up the Tagus to superintend the passage of Lieutenant-General Hill's corps over the river.—In my dispatch of the 20th of October, I informed your lordship, that the Marquis de la Romana had joined the Allied Army in their positions in front of Lisbon, with a considerable detachment of the Spanish army under his command; he still continues with us, and I receive from him much valuable advice and assistance.—Throughout the period, during which we occupied those positions, every thing went on with the utmost regularity and to my satisfaction, notwithstanding that the force was composed of troops of various descriptions, and of different nations; and I attribute these advantages entirely to the zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and the conciliating disposition of the Chiefs and General Officers of the armies of the different nations; and I have no doubt that the same cordiality will prevail as long as it may be expedient that the armies should continue united.—Lieute-

nant-General Sir Brent Spencer and Marshall Sir William Carr Beresford, and the Officers of the General Staff of the Army, have continued to give me every assistance in their power.

SWEDEN.—*The Reception, Inauguration, and Speech of the New Crown Prince.*

Stockholm, Oct. 31. This day the Deputies of the Diet went to Drottningholm, to pay their respects to his Royal Highness. To-morrow, it is said, that Prince will make his solemn entrance into this Capital. At mid-day there will be a levee, and in the evening a grand concert at Court. On the evening of the 2d Nov. there will be a grand illumination in the city. On the 3d, at mid-day, the oath of fidelity and homage will be taken in the hall of the Diet, and in the evening, the Opera of Gustavus Vasa will be performed. On the 5th, his Royal Highness will hold a levee in the morning, and receive congratulations; in the afternoon there will be a cene at Court. On the 8th, the dissolution of the Diet; and on the 9th, the usual discourse will be delivered at its close. When the Prince Royal came from Helsingbourg to Drottningholm, the people, impatient to see him, collected in crowds upon the road. To accommodate the wishes of the multitude, the Prince several times descended from his carriage, walked on foot a good way, and addressed several Swedish words to the peasants and other persons who surrounded him. He took up with him into his carriage several Governors of Provinces, in order to put questions to them on the country; he listened with the greatest interest to their information. These marks of goodness excited shouts of joy; the enthusiasm was general. The weather has been constantly favourable; his Royal Highness enjoys the best health.

November 1. The ceremony of the presentation of his Royal Highness the Hereditary Prince, took place this day with the greatest solemnity, in presence of the assembled Members of the Diet.—His Royal Highness pronounced the following address:—

SIRE;—In appearing this day before the throne of your Majesty, surrounded by the States-general of the realm, my first duty, as it is the first wish of my heart, is to lay at your feet the public homage of the sacred and inviolable sen-

timents, which for life, attach me to your Majesty.—I pay this homage to my king, Sire; but I also pay it to the person of a prince, who, long before he mounted the throne, had acquired, by his virtues, the confidence and love of the nation. In difficult circumstances, the State has always had recourse to your Majesty; twice the throne was vacant, and twice your Majesty performed the painful duties of royalty, without any other interest but that of the public weal. But all at once broke forth one of those revolutions which Heaven appears sometimes to permit, as a lesson to princes; and the nation conjured your Majesty to place yourself on that very throne which you had so long defended.—I could never have foreseen that I should one day be associated to destinies so glorious, and that your Majesty, after having deigned to fix upon me the suffrages of your people, would at last crown so many favours, by adopting me for your son. A title so dear, fills my soul with an ambition the most noble! What am I not bound to do to merit, to support that illustrious name which your Majesty has this day bestowed upon me! It is not without great distrust of my own powers that I have accepted a task at once so honourable and so difficult. If I have been able to resolve upon it, it was only from thinking that I should follow in every thing the counsels of your Majesty, and that near you I should be instructed in the great art of reigning. God grant, Sire, that I may long enjoy your lessons. God grant that the youthful mind of my son may be modelled after yours, and be penetrated with the great examples which your Majesty presents to his descendants.—Messieurs the Deputies of the Nobility, called to be the first Defender of the Throne and of the State, I trust that you will second me in that noble office. You know, Gentlemen, that primitive nobility was the reward of great services performed to the country: and what obligations are not they under to the State who enjoy by birth the rewards merited by their ancestors? The sacrifice of their life, on every occasion, is the least of their duties; it is only by giving an example of perfect disinterestedness, by an entire submission to the King and to the laws; it is only, in short, by living without reproach, that the nobility of your ancestors is really to be preserved.—Gentlemen, Members of the Clergy, the sublime morality of the Gospel, which it is your duty to preach,

should serve as a guide to all men; it contains a lesson for kings and people: I shall with pleasure avail myself of your information, and my heart will be grateful for the good that you do in diffusing like good Pastors the precepts and the succours of the religion of Jesus Christ.—Gentlemen Burgesses, industry, arts, and commerce, ensure the prosperity of a state, as they increase the happiness of families in a free nation and under a just government; genius and talents lead to every thing, and those who distinguish themselves, in your order, have great claims to the esteem of the sovereign.—And you, brave Swedish peasants, I have every where heard proclaimed the qualities which distinguish you; and I see with a pleasing emotion the particular consideration which your country grants to you. What, are not they highly worthy those distinctions whose arms alternately support and defend the country? Continue to honour by your labour and your virtues the useful and respectable order that you form in the state. Your King watches like a father over your dearest interests; his Majesty will permit me to participate in his tender solicitude.—It is, however, to you all, faithful Representatives of the Swedish nation, that I address myself. The King deigned to propose me as successor to the throne; you confirmed that choice by an election free and unanimous, and his Majesty this day indissolubly binds the ties which already attach me to you. So many favours, such esteem and confidence impose on me the greatest obligations; I feel them sensibly, and am firmly resolved to fulfil them. Tired in camps, I bring you a frank and loyal soul, an absolute devotedness to the King my august Father, an ardent desire to do every thing for the happiness of my new country; with such intentions, I hope to do good.—Sound policy; that alone which the laws of God authorise, must have for its basis justice and truth; such are the principles of the King: they shall also be mine. I have beheld war close at hand; I know all its ravages; there is no conquest which can console a country for the blood of its children shed in a foreign land. I have seen the Great Emperor of the French, so often crowned with the laurels of victory, surrounded by his invincible armies, sigh after the olive of peace. Yes, Gentlemen, peace is the alone glorious object of a wise and enlightened Government; it is not the extent of a state which constitutes its

force and independence; it is its laws, its industry, its commerce, and above all its national spirit. Sweden, it is true, has sustained great losses; but the honour of the Swedish name has not suffered the least attain. Let us submit, Gentlemen, to the decrees of Providence; and let us recollect that it has left us a soil sufficient to supply our wants, and iron to defend it.

PORTUGAL.—Dispatches from Lord Viscount Talavera; and from Marshal Beresford, and Col. Trant, up to the date of 3rd Nov. 1810.—Published by the Government in England, on the 19th Nov. in An EXTRAORDINARY London Gazette.
(Concluded from p. 1056.)

From Lord Talavera to Lord Liverpool, dated 3 Nov. 1810.

I have not observed any alteration in the enemy's position or numbers since I addressed you on the 27th ultimo.—They have a considerable body of troops, principally cavalry, on the Tagus, between Punhete and Santarem; and I have reason to believe that Loison's division of infantry had not marched in that direction, as I reported to your Lordship they had in my last dispatch; some of the corps composing that division have certainly remained in the camps in front of this army. The enemy have pushed some troops across the Zezere above Punhete, principally cavalry, apparently to reconnoitre the roads in that direction and the Fort at Abrantes; but I conclude that the rains which have fallen within these few days will have swelled that river, and that these troops will have retired again. They are still reported to be at work upon materials for a bridge both at Santarem and Barquinha; but I have detached Major-General Fane with a body of cavalry and infantry to the left of the Tagus, from whom I hope to receive accurate accounts of what is passing opposite to him on this side; and he will endeavour to destroy these materials, if it should be practicable. It is reported by all the deserters, that the enemy's troops continue to suffer great distress from the want of provisions.—It is impossible to form an estimate of the quantity of provisions which they found in the villages on the ground which they occupy; but it is certain, that they can draw none from any other

part of the country, the whole being in the possession of our troops.—The garrison of Peniché, and the garrison of Obidos, which place Captain Fenwick, of the Portuguese service, has lately occupied, under the direction of Brigadier-general Blunt, and the British cavalry, continue to carry on a destructive warfare in the rear of the enemy's right, while the high road from Coimbra by Leyria is in the possession of Colonel Wilson's detachment. I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford, on the effects of the operations of Brigadier-general Blunt, and Captain Fenwick. I have received no letter from General Silveira of a later date than the 19th of October. He had not, at that time, heard of the march of any of the enemy's troops in Castile. He occupied with his detachment the roads from Almeida to Trancoso, Celerico, and Guarda. He had heard that General Bonnet had evacuated the Asturias; and it is supposed, had moved into Biscay. I have letters from Estramadura and Castroarin of as late a date as the 27th of October, stating that Mortier's corps was still at Seville, in a very inefficient state, and having many sick. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 22d ult.

Marshal Beresford to Marshal General Lord Viscount Talavera; dated Supataria, Nov. 3, 1810.

My Lord;—I have the honour to annex a return taken from the several reports received from Brigadier-General Blunt, of the number of killed and prisoners to the detachment which he sent from Peniché to Obidos, under the command of Captain Fenwick (Lieutenant in the Buffs), since his former reports of the proceedings of that officer, and which, with what had been previously reported upon, will make the amount of the enemy's loss to that detachment, besides the wounded, which they are generally enabled to carry off, about 160 men.—I take the occasion of remarking to your Lordship the zeal and judgment of Brigadier-General Blunt, in re-occupying the town of Obidos when the principal force of the enemy had passed it; and he gives much applause to Captain Fenwick, for his activity and conduct in the command of the small detachment he has been enabled to detach from Peniché, under his command. I have the honour to be, &c. *(To be continued.)*

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 35.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1810. [Price 1s.

"I understand, that the enemy's communication with Almeida is completely cut off; and he possesses only the ground on which his army stands."—LORD TALAVERA'S Dispatch from Combra; 30th Sept. 1810.

"The enemy really possesses no part of the country, excepting that on which his army stands."—Dispatch from Pero Negro; 27th Oct. 1810.

"It is impossible to form an estimate of the quantity of provisions which the French found in the villages on the ground which they occupy; but, it is certain, that they can draw none from any other part of the country, the whole being in the possession of our troops."—Dispatch from Pero Negro; 3rd Nov. 1810.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SWEDEN'S DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ENGLAND. — The official promulgation of such a Declaration has not, I believe, yet been made. But there can be little doubt of its having been resolved on; and that we shall soon have it officially announced to us.—It is worth while, then, in spite of the levity, with which the venal writers affect to treat the subject, to devote a small portion of our time here to considerations belonging to this new state of things in Sweden. We will first, however, see in what light it is viewed by the writers in the Ministerial prints, who do not seem to be able to discover, that we have much concern in the matter.

—"We yesterday received a variety of Foreign Journals, some of which were brought by a Gottenburgh Mail, probably the last we shall have for some time; for *unfortunate Sweden* has at length been compelled to comply with all the *tyrannical and unprincipled demands* of France, not only with regard to the prohibition of all intercourse with this country and the confiscation of our colonial produce, but also to *declare open war against us*. Thus we find that Buonaparté, having established his Prefect Bernadotte in Sweden, lost no time in subjecting that *ill-fated country* to his own most *cruel and oppressive rule*. This hostility of Sweden, however, is obviously most *reluctantly* on her part, and as far as depends upon her will, we doubt not, be carried on as *sparingly as possible towards us*. But, were the case otherwise, her hostility could not, under the present circumstances, reasonably be viewed as an event in any respect very alarming to our interests; for how could we possibly view with

"any degree of dread a country whose councils would not permit her to defend herself against the incursions of the Cossacks, while they permitted a *French Serpent* to become the heir to the Throne of her hereditary Kings!—Upon the present occasion, indeed, *all feeling for ourselves* is lost in *commiseration for the unhappy Swedes*, who are made the instrument of attack by a malevolent Despot, whose plans for the destruction of human LIBERTY and happiness we have hitherto in a great measure succeeded in frustrating, and whose schemes we hope, UNDER PROVIDENCE, still and for ever to set at defiance. — By the same Papers we also learn that Buonaparté is making the *greatest exertions to procure seamen to man his fleet*; for this purpose embargoes have been laid in the Danish islands of Zealand and Norway. Can any one now doubt that had it not been for the *wise policy of the British Government in bringing off the Danish fleet*, that force would ere this have been incorporated with the fleets of France? Under the present circumstances, for any injuries the Danes or Swedes can do us by their open hostility, the most timid may sleep with perfect security in their beds; and with all the aid that the Tyrant derives from these powers, and all his vassals of the Continent, we may, in the words of Shakespeare, proclaim, that

"Nought shall make us rue,
"If England to itself do rest but true."

—Upon this old saying, which the writer of the Morning Post (in his paper of the 6th instant) uses, apparently for the purpose of *keeping up our spirits*, I cannot help making a remark or two, the matter being of more importance than would, at first sight, appear.—Nothing

is so common as this saying: "We have nothing to fear, if we are but true to ourselves," is made use of by every body; by all men of all parties and descriptions. It is an idea that the mind would very reluctantly dismiss. It is a sort of consolation, though without any clearly defined grounds. And, what is more powerful, it is an apology that men are very willing to make for the failures and disgraces of their country, or, at least, for what they must otherwise acknowledge to be their share of such failures and disgraces.—But, the question is, *what is meant* by this saying? It was a great favourite with PITT, who, in times of disappointment, used to wind off all his harangues with it. After having acknowledged the dangers of the times and talked about the power of the enemy, he used to say, that, still, we had "nothing to fear, if, under Divine Providence, the country was true to itself." What he meant by the country being true to itself evidently was, being true to him; that is to say, vote for him, shout for him, halloo for him, keep him in place. So, when you hear placemen and pensioners, and generally all those who live upon the taxes, talk about the country being true to itself, be assured that they mean, the quiet acquiescence of the country in the continuance of the system which feeds and fattens them; and when you hear the pensioned poetaster, FITZGERALD, or his more than prosaic brother author, JOHN BOWLES, calling out upon the country to be true to itself, you can have no doubt as to the meaning of their words.—There are, however, men of a very different description, who make use of the same phrase; and who think, that the way for the country to be true to itself is to begin by sweeping away all abuses and corruptions, and then to adopt such measures as shall effectually prevent their return. These persons think, that a nation, any more than an individual, cannot be said to be true to itself, unless it effectually prevents abuses and corruptions in the management of its affairs; and that, if it neglect to do this, it is not true to itself, but false to itself, and lends itself to self-deception and fraud.—Leaving the reader, now, to settle, in his own mind the question of *what the nation must do* to be true to itself, and, of course, to save itself from subjugation, I shall now return to the subject more immediately before us, the declaration of war against England, on the part of Sweden.—I agree with the

Morning Post, that this event was to be expected; that it was a natural consequence of the exaltation of the New Crown Prince; but, I do not, for that, or for any other reason that I can discover, think it a matter of little consequence.—Sweden is represented by this writer as being very *unfortunate*; as being compelled to yield, in this case, to the *tyrannical* and *unprincipled* demands of France; as being *ill-fated*; as most *cruelly oppressed*; and, the climax of compassion is wound up with a declaration: "that all feeling for ourselves is lost in commiseration for the unhappy Swedes." Oh! kind souls! what excessive kindness! We, sincere and compassionate and generous people, lose all feeling for ourselves in commiseration for the unhappy Swedes!—This is being very tender-hearted to be sure; but, this must not pass. To be cajoled in this manner would be a little too disgraceful even in this age of cajolery and hypocrisy.—The ability of Sweden to do us any immediate injury, in the way of attack, may be doubted; but, there can be no doubt at all, in the mind of any rational man, that the fleet and the seamen of Sweden are of great weight in the scale of naval power. This the venal gentlemen know, because they cannot but know it; but this it would not suit them to acknowledge; and which it is part of their trade to prevent their readers from seeing. Therefore, like the Crocodiles of the Nile, they set up a false howl of "commiseration for the unhappy Swedes," on whose oppressions, as they call them, they would have us keep our eyes steadily fixed, and, of course, not look at all at our own situation; they would have us "lose all feeling for OURSELVES;" aye, because, if we do not lose that feeling; if we look at our own state; if we make a just estimate of our affairs; if we fairly view the probable consequences of this acquisition of Sweden by France, then we shall naturally ask: "*who have been the cause of this?*" And, that is a question, which the venal writers wish that the people of England should not put to themselves.—This is the real object of their affected, their sham, their hypocritical commiseration for Sweden. And, indeed, they have the same object in view, when they are putting forth such piteous moans over the lot of Holland and Denmark and the other countries under the sway of France, and also over the lot of the French themselves. All their talk about the oppressions and miseries, that

these several nations endure; all their compassion for them, is a mere invention, and it is used for the purpose of drawing away the minds of the people of England from those objects towards which these foreign events, as they arise, would naturally direct them; and, especially from the great object of all; I mean, the *cause*, the *first cause*, of the events under consideration, and next, the *consequences* of those events. This affected compassion for the people of other nations is, in fact, a very material department of that system of deception and fraud, which these venal writers have been practising upon the people of this country for many years past.—Those who find a comfort in being thus duped and cheated it would be a pity to disturb; but, as my readers are not, I trust, of that description, I shall offer them a few remarks, in addition to those formerly made, relative to the effect which this close co-operation of Sweden and France may have with regard to England.—The pathetic writer, whose compassionating sentiments we have just read, tells us, that the Swedes have been "*compelled*" to declare war against us; that they have done it with great "*reluctance*;" that there is no doubt that this war will be carried on "*as sparingly as possible towards us*;" and, notwithstanding all the exertions of that "*FRENCH SERJEANT*" (the Crown Prince) to procure seamen to man his fleet, "*we shall, as we hitherto have been, be able to frustrate his plans and those of the 'malevolent Despot,' Napoleon, for the destruction of human LIBERTY and 'HAPPINESS, and their schemes we shall, under PROVIDENCE, still and 'for ever set at defiance.'*"—Now, what can this writer mean by *compulsion* in this case? What can he mean by saying, that the Swedes have been *compelled* to declare war against us? Is it meant, that *France* has compelled her to do it? How is the thing *possible*? That France might compel *Holland*, indeed, would be possible; it would be a thing to be believed; but, how was she to *compel* Sweden? Sweden was and is separated from France and all countries dependent upon France, by the sea; and, if Sweden did not *wish* to have any thing to do with France, why did we not go with our ships and assist in defending Sweden against her? What is the use of ships, if they could not do that?—It is the Crown Prince, who has, then, *compelled* the Swedes to declare war; but, what is that more than to say, that the declaration of

war has been *made by the ruler of Sweden*, against the will of the people! And who is to know this later? What proofs are there of it? And, besides, if there were ever so many *petitions and remonstrances* against the war, would this writer insist upon that as a *proof* of the ruler being a *despot*?—It is nonsense, sheer nonsense, to say, that the Swedes have declared war against us with *reluctance*. It is their *sovereign*, who has declared war. The people have had nothing to do with it, any more than the people of England have to do with declaring war; and, as to the Swedes carrying on the war "*as sparingly as possible towards us*," the idea is the most stupid and the uttering of it the most impudent thing that ever has, perhaps, been offered even to this nation. It is a very likely matter, indeed, that the "*French Serjeant*" means to make war upon us *in a sparing way*; that he means to carry on against us a war of foils and muffles! *French Serjeants* are remarkable for that! It was a pretty specimen of muffle-fisted warfare that the "*French Serjeant*," BRUNE, gave the DUKE OF YORK before the signing of the famous *Convention of the Helder*. Oh, no! Looking back at this last-mentioned event, I cannot entertain any hopes of our seeing a Swedish war carried on *sparingly* against us under the directions of "*Serjeant*" Bernadotte; and I cannot help, on the contrary, thinking, that he is even more formidable for being a *Serjeant*, because he cannot be expected to have any of those *fine feelings*, which belong, of course, exclusively to *high blood*, and which have been, in the wars of late years, observed to lead to a very *humane and gentle*, a very *sparing way*, indeed, of carrying on war.—That we shall be as able to frustrate the Plans of Bernadotte, "*as we hitherto have been*" to frustrate those of Napoleon, for the destruction of human *liberty*, the reader can have no doubt at all; but, I much question, that a firm belief in this proposition will afford any sensible man much consolation; for, *how* have we "*hitherto*" been able to frustrate the plans of Napoleon? *How? Where? When?* Answer us these questions; show us the instances, in which we have frustrated his plans, or any plan of his; show us one such instance, and then we will hope for the future without any of your hypocritical and blasphemous cant about Divine Providence. When you show us the case, in which we have succeeded in defending LIBERTY

against the attacks or attempts of Napoleon; when you show us the case, in which we have preserved human happiness from his attempts against it; when you show us only one single instance of this sort, we will not hesitate to hope as boldly as you can wish.—We have had for our allies the King of Naples, Austria, the King of Piedmont, the Italian Princes, the Swiss Cantons, the German Princes, the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, the King of Sweden, the Elector of Hanover, the Stadtholder, the King of Spain, the Queen of Portugal, the Family of Bourbon. These are amongst those who have been *our allies*, since the war against the French Revolution began. Let the writer of the Morning Post go and get from any of them an instance of our having succeeded in *frustrating the plans of Napoleon*; and, if he can get no such instance; why, then, let him hold his tongue upon the subject, or not cant any more about *Divine Providence*.—We are told here, which is, I dare say, very true, that Embargoes have been laid in the Danish Islands and in Norway, with a view of raising seamen to man the *Swedish Navy*. And, hereupon the *wisdom of our Ministers* in seizing upon the Danish Navy is pointed out; because, it is said that this proves, that, *if we had not seized on the Danish ships, they would have been added to the Navy of France*. Very good! But, do not, then, blame the Emperor Napoleon; do not so cruelly abuse him, because he seizes on the Swedish fleet or the Dutch fleet, or their arsenals or towns or countries, since he always says that he does it *to prevent them from being seized on by the English*. Nay, be not in a passion about this; for there is no getting out of it. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. He has just as much right to seize things, whether on land or afloat, to prevent them from falling into *our hands*, as we have to prevent them from falling into *his hands*.—But, it seems, then, that it was *wise* to keep the Danish fleet out of the hands of Napoleon. If so, does it not follow, that it was *unwise* to let the Swedish fleet fall into his hands? Had our ministers not the *power* of preventing it? No? And, yet, we are told, that the Swedish nation *lashed* the French, and are now *forced* into a war against us. This is very strange. Indeed, it is really too absurd and too impudent to be listened to with any patience.—The truth is, the undoubted truth, however grating it

may be to the ears of some people, that the election of the “French Serjeant” to be Crown Prince of Sweden was an act perfectly voluntary, on the part of the Swedes, according to all the accounts that have been published under the head of Sweden, relating to the matter. He appears to have been received with every mark of respect and esteem, by all ranks of the people, and, especially by the common people; and, as to the *SPEECH* of the “*Serjeant*,” I have heard a great many Colonels and even Generals, make Speeches not half so good. In short, it was not only a *good* speech; but, it was a more dignified speech, and contained more just sentiments, than any thing of the kind that I have read for many years. It is truly wonderful, that a “*Serjeant*,” should be able to make such a speech; but, when one thinks of it, our King will, possibly, have to make peace with this “*Serjeant*,” and to put himself, in the treaty, upon a level with him; or else, England may not see peace again for another half century. However, if these furiously aristocratical writers have no objection to keep it fresh in the people’s mind, that Sweden is ruled by a “*Serjeant*,” I, of course, can have no objection to it.—As to the *Navy* of Sweden, it is not, at present, very considerable; but, added to all the other ships that France has at her command, it is well worthy of attention. Means are now adopted, and vigorously acted upon, for *manning* that Navy; and, it is in vain to brag and vaunt, the French must, and they will, collect a maritime force, in a short time, sufficient to give us most serious annoyance. I speak not of *Commerce*, which is, comparatively, of little consequence. I speak of a naval force, capable of landing troops in England in spite of any thing short of a fleet of a hundred sail of the line. Napoleon is combining all the ports of the North, including Russia. Indeed, every ship and boat and sailor will be at his command. The three Baltic powers could now furnish not less than fifty ships of the line; and, as to any *refusal* on the part of Russia to give up her ships for the general purpose, that is, I think, out of the question. These together with the ships of Holland and those of France in the Scheldt will very soon swell into a fleet, formidable in point of numbers, at least, and requiring a very strong fleet to watch them. So that, at the same moment, and by the very same acts, that our commerce is cut off, a fleet is raised where-

with to attack, or menace our shores.—I do not, for my part, see any reason to suppose, that Napoleon means to make any attack upon England, or even upon Ireland, for some time to come; but, then, he is, all the while, making most furious assaults upon our pecuniary means, and is sending our paper-money downward with all convenient speed. The *defence of Ireland*, the *war in Sicily*, the *war at Cadix*, the *war in Portugal*, are all so many drains upon us, occasioned solely by the war; and, if, in addition to all these, we have another great fleet to maintain more than we have at present, it is not possible that the bank-note making should not go on increasing at a wonderful rate. In short, if we once see a large enemy's fleet in the Texel, or in the mouth of the Scheldt, we shall, if we have any senses left, begin to have some *new ideas*. Boasting songs and bragging paragraphs will not remove the hideous spectacle from our eyes; and, if they could still blind us to the danger from without, they would not pay the expenses of an additional fleet. Here it is; in this last-mentioned point it is, that we have most feeling, and, indeed, as was said by a most able writer, long ago, it is the *purse* upon which the whole depends. War would seem to be almost necessary as a component part of our system; for, Mr. ADDINGTON, when he began this war, said, "*we are at war, because we cannot be at peace*;" and, it really does appear, that peace is no more to be thought of; that we have been at war so long that peace would form a sort of revolution. Yet, the war cannot go on without increasing the paper-money, and this Napoleon knows as well as we; and, the consequence of a much further increase of that money every man must now know.—*A large fleet, steadily stationed opposite the mouth of the Thames*, would produce a sensation quite new in England. The spectre could neither be laughed nor hooted away. There would be men to *affect* not to see the danger; but, even those very men, if they, by any chance, got hold of a guinea, would take care not to let it again see the light — And, for such a fleet we have now to prepare. We are told, that, in one division there were 4,000 seamen arrived in Zealand on their way to the Scheldt, from Norway, where they had volunteered for service in the Imperial Navy; and that 2,000 more had been furnished by Hamburgh and the other Hans Towns. At this rate a fleet will soon be manned with a sufficient

number of seamen. The war, indeed, seems now to be very fast growing into a contest merely between England and France, the latter having now for her, all those nations, which England, at the outset, had for her; and, if we may judge of the length of the war from the language of our venal prints, the end of the war must suppose the *extermination* of one of the parties. In such a conflict out must come all the *naval* means. There will be more maritime fighting than there hitherto has been; and, therefore, the possession of Sweden and all her naval means is of the greatest importance to France, and is, in my opinion, the heaviest blow we have yet received, though it has cost our enemy neither a single man nor a single guinea.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR. In another part of this Number, will be found the French account of the Campaign in Portugal from the fall of Almeida to the arrival of Massena at Alenquer.—It makes some statements, which ought not to be passed over unnoticed. Relative to the battle of Busaco, it says, that the French had *two hundred* killed; Lord Talavera told us they had *two thousand*; and the Morning Post told us, that the French lost *ten thousand* men in killed and wounded, whereas the French say, that they had *only one thousand five hundred* wounded. They also tell us, that, in the battle of Busaco, they had *only two brigades* engaged, instead of their *whole army*, as we were led to suppose was the case; and, that, in fact, they amused the Lord Viscount with these two brigades, while they came round with their *army* to get at his back and to place themselves between him and Lisbon, which, we know, he only avoided by a speedy retreat. They tell us further, that they took 500 prisoners between Oporto and Coimbra, and 500 more between Coimbra and Torres Vedras, the place whether the Lord Viscount Talavera succeeded in *drawing* them. They made prisoners, even while they were *drawn along themselves*. They are a very singular sort of people!—As to what is now likely to happen, I shall not pretend to say. We, in fact, *know* nothing of the real state of the enemy, who, we now find, has had a *plenty of provisions* and of every thing else, and who appears to have moved not so much from necessity as from choice. I do not say that it is so; but, at present such are the appear-

ances; and it would by no means surprise me, if it should turn out, that, while all their Excellencies, the Marshals and other chieftains of our army, were engaged in celebrating the decoration of Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford with the insignia of the Order of the Bath (won on the immortal mountains of Bussaco); it would not at all surprize me, if, while this was going on within our lines, Massena and his Generals were contriving how they should get our army out of those lines.—Since my last I have seen very long paragraphs in the venal newspapers complaining of those, who do not seem to be filled with exultation by the late news from Portugal; but, I have seen, as yet, no attempt, on the part of any one to explain how it can be matter of joy to us that our enemy is gone out of a *trap* ~~trap~~ we had caught him in. To avoid, however, every thing like levity upon this subject, there is one view of it as to the *past*, which every man in his senses, ~~must~~ like; which is this: we saw our army, ~~cornered~~ at a vast, at an enormous, expence, to the frontiers of Portugal, with a view, as we thought, of *defending* Portugal, just as we should, I trust, defend England (if attacked) by meeting and fighting the enemy on the *outside* edge of England. This army of ours in Portugal did not do so. It came away from the outside edge of Portugal when the enemy came to that edge. I do not say that our Chieftain *retreated*, much less am I disposed to use another well-known phrase often applied to movements resembling his; but, I will clothe my ideas in the terms of the new military vocabulary. Our Chieftain took up *new positions*; he *retired* upon his resources; he *flung back* his flank; he *disappointed the French* when they expected him to give battle; he *avoided* all their attempts to get in his rear; he *drew the French after him*. Well, be this as it may; call it what you will, the plain undeniable fact is, that from the frontiers of Portugal to within a few miles of Lisbon, *our army came away before the French army, and the French army followed it*, over the hot cinders of burnt houses, mills, and corn-fields.—Now, did these operations proceed from *design*, or did they not? Were they, as the venal writers have told us, the effect of a *premeditated plan*; or were they *forced upon* our Chieftain? We heard nothing at all of any such *plan*, till he had reached his lines of Torres Vedras. It was

not 'till then that we were told, that he had any project of the kind. But, either the movements were the effect of design, or of necessity. He himself has made use, in those parts of his dispatches that we have seen, of only *one passage*, that I recollect at present, indicating that his “flinging back his flanks” and the rest of it, were all movements of choice designed to *draw the French to the lines of Mafra*. There is one passage, in his last dispatch, published in the Extraordinary Gazette of the 3rd instant, that would seem to favour the idea of a *design* to draw the French across smoking houses and fields from Almeida to Torres Vedras; for, he there says, in speaking of the position he had just quitted, in order to go after Massena: “having advanced “from the position, in which I was *ENABLED to bring the enemy to a STAND*, “and to oblige him to retire without “venturing upon an attack.” So, you see, reader, that the having gone before the enemy ‘till he got into his lines, he calls *bringing the enemy to a STAND*, and, as he says, he had been *enabled* to do this, the natural meaning of the whole sentence is, that to bring the enemy to the outside of his lines was what he *wished*; that, in short, it was his wish to bring Massena to the spot, whence Massena, after remaining there nearly two months, has just gone. This sort of *ability* to bring an enemy to a *stand* is a thing quite new to me. When an enemy is *running away* from you, and you contrive to *stop him* some how or other, and to get him to face you; then you say, that you have, at last, been enabled to *bring him to a stand*. But, surely, this phrase was never before used by him who had *gone away* before another and had taken shelter in his lines? If you were to pursue a man with your fist clenched, and he were to get away from you by all manner of means in his power, running up one street and down another street, and across this alley and through that passage, and were at last to run into a house, slam the door to, and locking it after him, hollow out, I have been *enabled* to bring you to a *stand*; what would you say? What would you say, in such a case as that?—However, let this be as it may, either “His Excellency the Lord Marshal” did design to bring Massena from ALMEIDA to ALENQUER, or he did not. If he did not design to do it, his *retrograde* movements may receive another name as soon as you

please, and it will remain for the planners or executors of the war to account for the Lord Marshal's being upon the frontiers of Portugal at all, at least after the fall of Rodrigo. If he *did design* it; if he has done what he *intended* to do, then, without stopping to observe upon the *laying waste of the country*, we may surely be allowed to inquire into the cause of the enemy's being allowed to remove from that chosen spot on which the Lord Marshal had been *enabled to bring him to a stand*. If it was the design; if it was the plan from the outset of the campaign; if it was the intention. and the fixed purpose, to *bring Massena to a stand at Alenquer*; surely we may be permitted humbly to inquire what could be the reasons for letting him go thence without attacking him. "The Lord Marshal" tells us that he had "*obliged the enemy to retire without venturing upon any attack*" Why, any man may be *obliged* to retire in the same way from before lines that are notoriously impenetrable. What we expected was *an attack upon Massena*, and in this we have been disappointed; or, at least, we should have been if we had relied upon what the venal prints told us.—The latter part of the Extracts from the *French Papers*, which will be found below, and which are dated so late as the 30th of November, gives us clearly to understand, that the design of Massena is to cut off all our communications with the *left side of the Tagus*, or, to compel us to go across to him and fight him upon equal terms as to *ground* at least. I beg the reader to look well at this article from the French paper. It says, that the *lamps* lighted up in the *illumination* at Coimbra for the Victory of Busaco, were *still burning when our army was in full retreat from the spot!* Let us hope, not only for the honour of our army, but for the honour of our country, that no time will be lost in *disproving* this. I do not mean *contradicting* it; I do not mean answering it by *abusing* Napoleon; I mean *disproving* by facts not to be doubted; for, if it were true, it might be fearlessly asserted, that such a thing was never before heard of in the whole world.—What is said about the *transportations from Lisbon* is also matter for attention and inquiry. It is useless to suppose, that it will make no impression. It will, unless contradicted.—Again, about the *desertions*. The French talk of our deserters as well as we do of theirs. They say ours "*desert to avoid corporal*

"punishment," and they deny that *any* of theirs desert. Now, these are facts that admit of *proof*. The returns from our army will soon speak as to the number of deserters from us; and, in this respect, at least, we may be able completely to *disprove* the assertions of the French.—It is manifestly the intention of Massena to occupy the ALENTEJO, a province on the left of the Tagus, and without the resources of which, it really does seem, that the expence of supporting our army and the refugees and the city of Lisbon into the bargain must be enormous. We cannot, I should suppose, have less than *two hundred thousand* mouths now to feed. It has been estimated, that it costs 15s. a day to support a dragoon, and for a foot soldier 7s. 6d. But, suppose, that, to feed the 200,000, the cost is only 2s. 6d. a day each, that is 25,000 pounds a day, 175,000 pounds a week; and, if this goes on only for the winter, the cost of the *bare food*, at this low rate, without reckoning the navy, will cost more than *four millions of pounds sterling*, besides the *pay* of this immense army, and all these expences of clothing, arms, transports, and other things. But, the probability is, that the food will cost twice or thrice what I have stated it at; and, how, then, can one bear to hear the *long duration* of this war talked of as a thing *likely* to be?—Suppose, now, that that which we are promised by the venal writers should happen; that is to say, the *evacuation of Portugal by Massena*. What will that have done? He will be only where he was at the outset of the campaign; we shall be no nearer our professed object though it will have cost us many millions of money; and, as to the *People of Portugal*, it surely does not require any deep knowledge of arithmetic to calculate what *they* will have gained by the campaign.—Nay, suppose, that, *eventually*, we should be able to *keep the French* out of Portugal. Can we do this without *an army*? And, if we are obliged to *pay* the Portuguese army *now*, what reason is there to suppose, that we shall not be obliged to continue to pay it? Nor can it be expected but we shall have an abundance of demands from *Portuguese Refugees*. Their property has, in many cases, at least, been destroyed *for our sake*. What are they to do? Where are they to look for *remuneration*? So that, at the very best, this war for Portugal will, in my opinion, prove, in the end, even more expensive than any, in which we have been before engaged;

and, what shall we say, if, after all the expence, the French should obtain, and keep, possession of the country? After all our millions of money (for Bank notes will not pass abroad) are gone, in the defence of Portugal, what shall we say, if nothing belonging to Portugal should remain under our controul, except the *Refugees*?—I shall be told, that this is not at all likely. Very true. But it is *possible*; and, it is proper to take the *possibility* into view.—In the meanwhile *fresh troops* and *fresh supplies* of stores are, we are told, going out to our army. And *why*? Of what use can these be, if the enemy be on his retreat? If he be about to evacuate Portugal, and, of course, to *run away* (for that is the phrase we apply to his movements) from our present force, what does our general want *with more*?—It is, however, in vain to go on asking questions, to which no answer can be obtained. The war in Spain and Portugal is certainly one of the great concerns of the nation at this time; but, anxious as we may be upon the subject, we must wait for the result.

KING'S ILLNESS.—Such things, since my last, have been said upon this subject, by the venal writers, that, really, one is ashamed to repeat their words. They have asserted, that the *private apartments* are going to be fitted up for the King at Buckingham House, and that the King himself gave the directions for doing it! All manner of things of this sort have they been saying; and, it is by no means difficult to see, that they expect, that, before the 15th instant, the King will be in a state to sign a Commission for *another prorogation of the parliament*.—In the meanwhile, they have made it completely a *party* matter. They have alledged, that the Opposition want to *get into place* by the means of a Regency, and that, for that purpose, *they would fain set aside the King*; which, to say the least of it, is a very amiable picture to draw of those who make up one-half of the men that have, at different times, filled offices of state, within the last seven years.—There has been a great deal said about *delicacy*; but, at last, the very semblance of it is thrown aside, and the two parties make no scruple of telling one another, that the great, and, indeed, the sole object, of the one is to keep their places, and of the other, to put them out of them, and to take them to themselves.—If a Regency were to produce nothing more than a mere *change of*

ministry, there can be no doubt at all, that it is a thing which no man in his senses can wish for, unless he has some motive of private interest in such change; for, besides that such change would do the people no good, it would do them all the harm of additional pensions and compensations to those who should be provided for at going out of place. But, it is not to be supposed, that the change would stop there; though, it must be confessed, that we have, as yet, heard nothing, or very little, from the other side, to give us confidence in them for any thing more than a sincere desire to get the places out of the hands of their opponents.—I know their thoughts very well. They say to themselves: "We will not make *advances towards the People*. We will not owe our return to power to those promises of reform or to any of those things which would *hamper us afterwards*. We will preserve a haughty silence; and, when the People have *tasted enough* of the effects of the exercise of power by our opponents, they will gladly come to us *upon our own terms*." Never were men more deceived; and, it is quite astonishing, that they should harbour, should cling to, the deception, after the result of the discussions, on the affair of Walcheren, and after the answers which they received from those counties, to whom they *applied for petitions against the ministers*. It is quite astonishing. The infatuation is unparalleled. The people care no more for them than they do about who is *sweeper of the Mall*; and, if they were now in place again, and were to act as they did before, they might, at any moment, be sent adrift without hearing a single voice lamenting it.—But, as the question has often been put to me, Do we not think, that a change of this sort would *make things a little better*? It possibly might for the present; but, in the end, it would not; and, that man is a most miserable politician, who, for the sake of a mere temporary alleviation of evil, would submit to an abandonment, or a compromise, of principle, which, instead of hastening, must retard, all permanent improvement.—It is, therefore, in my opinion, to be desired, that, unless a change of *system* were to take place; unless a total change of *system* were to be adopted, it is much better, that there should be no change whatever in the ministers, whether there be a Regency or not. The set of men that now rule are pursuing, without any deviation at all,

without any patching or botching, the system of "*the great statesman now no more*;" and, if that system, or *any part* of it, is to be still pursued, my sincere wish is, that it may remain in their hands. If it remain in their hands; if they are suffered to go on undisturbed, the system will have fair play; it will have its full swing; it will produce all its natural fruit; and, by that fruit will the tree be known. If the ministry were changed, the tree would be put into new hands; its branches might be lopped; its roots checked; it might be headed down and grafted, and so altered and disfigured, that history would scarcely be able to describe it, and posterity would thus be deprived of the most useful experiment that the world ever saw. No; let there be no botching or patching. Let the system of "*the great Statesman now no more*" go on whole as it now does, complete in all its parts; or let us have a new system. This is my wish, and I know of no man, who has no selfish object in view, whose wishes are not the same. It is now about *twenty six years* since this system began with what was called the *India Bill*. It has been regularly at work ever since, in peace and in war. It has produced some effects; but, it would not be fair to check it, or mutilate it. Let it go on, and then we shall see and feel what its merits are; or, let it be *wholly* changed. If it be suffered to remain in the same hands for a few years longer, we shall, I think, be able to form a very just estimate of it; and also to give their due praises to its conductors; but, if it were taken out of their hands and carried on by others, all our notions upon the subject would be confused.—For these reasons, I am immovably fixed in my opinion, that, though a Regency were to take place, it would be better for the nation, and beyond all comparison better, that no change of ministry should take place, if the system of "*the great statesman now no more*" is to be persevered in; or if *any part* of it is to be retained; nay, *any fragment* of it.—As to whether there ought to be a Regency or not, that is quite another question; but, it is a question, which it would, perhaps, be useless to discuss here, seeing that it is a matter so very clear, that he who does not see it in the right light must be wilfully blind.—In the last debate, the Opposition, commonly so called, had certainly the worst of the argument; for, when they were asked how they could

refuse to adjourn for a fortnight *then* upon the ground of the physicians' oaths, when they had before consented to a similar adjournment upon the *words* of the physicians *passing through the lips of the minister*; when they were asked this, they did not know what to say; and they found, they had the deep mortification to find, that they had got into this gross inconsistency by not following the line laid down by Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, against whom the greater part of them voted. Having once agreed to an adjournment, upon the bare word of the minister, why should they not do it again? Having agreed to an adjournment without any report of the Physicians, it was strange indeed that they should refuse to vote for another adjournment, when they had a report of the physicians to go upon.—In short, upon the ground of the first adjournment, there may be adjournments for the year through; and those who were against Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, upon that occasion, are very unreasonable if they oppose them. There can be *no ground* of opposition with such persons. They voted it once. They left the government for *one fortnight* in that state; and there can be, with them, no reason whatever, for not continuing to leave it in the same state, as long as *all the parties*, in power and out of power, are *the same*.—It is quite curious to contemplate the movements of the Opposition. They do not know what to be at. "Willing to *wound* and yet afraid to *strike*," the ministers I mean. They seem to act as if they had eyes in their poll, and saw behind as well as before. They seem to be beset with all manner of difficulties and fears. If the roof was every moment expected to fall upon their heads, while the floor was sinking under their feet, they could not appear more frightened. Alarm seems to have taken away their senses; to have bereft them even of the commonest of common sense; and, really, if this same sort of thing were to go on for some weeks longer, I should not wonder if the greater part of them were to be reported as unfit for further service.—There was but one thing for them to do from the beginning: and that was, at once to make a stand against all adjournments, and against every thing calculated to produce *delay*. If they had done this, they would have acted a consistent part throughout, but, now they must go on with the ministers in voting for adjournments, or, they will be fairly accused of inconsistency. They wished

to draw a line of distinction between themselves and SIR FRANCIS BURDETT; they were afraid to be thought "violent," and the consequence is, that they are now laughed at.—The plain truth is, however, that it is not principle, by which the Opposition, *taken as a body*, have been actuated. They are a set of people got together by patching and compromising. Resolved to have Place if possible, but, at the same time, wishing to preserve the appearances at least of consistency. Hence they have always been feeble, though possessing a thousand times the talents of their adversaries, who, by unity of principle as well as of private interest, are founded into a compact and indissoluble body, acting like one man. They are all animated with the same soul. They, as placemen, have been ingendered by the system of the great man now no more; and, really, when one thinks of the time that this system has lasted, and of the benefits which will inevitably arise from it, if suffered to proceed unchecked for a few years longer, it is impossible not to feel some regret at the prospect of seeing it disturbed in its progress.—At any rate, I repeat, and I cannot repeat it too often, that, if the same system, or any part of it, is to be pursued, the People ought to wish for no change of ministry; and that there is a design to make any change of system I have yet seen no proof, nor indeed, have I yet witnessed any very strong indication of such design. SIR FRANCIS BURDETT left the Opposition rallying round the ministers, and he found them in much about the same disposition. There were some exceptions, to be sure; but, when one speaks of them they must be spoken of in a body, and, at any rate, in that way will the people judge of their conduct and character.

BANKRUPTCIES.—The number of them this year will, according to all appearances, exceed that of the year 1793; but, as they are so many signs of increasing commerce and prosperity, the more of them the better of course. As far as they arise from the commercial regulations of Napoleon, they do not seem to be likely to stop; for he seems resolved, that our goods shall no longer go to the Continent. The burning decree is complete in its operation. There is no evading it; and, it is very great nonsense to suppose, that the Continent cannot do without our goods. In the course of a few years, there will be no need at all

of English goods upon the Continent. Why should there? They have wool and iron and lead and flax and hemp as well as we; and why should they not learn to work them up into articles of dress and furniture? Nor, will this change be, in time, any injury to England. It will reduce the number of manufacturers and merchants; but, I am convinced, it will not lessen the number of the people, nor will it take away from them their means of happiness.

W^M. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday,
December 7, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Dispatches from Lord Viscount Talavera, &c.*

(Concluded from p. 1120.)

Return of killed, wounded, and prisoners, by the detachment at Obidos, under the Orders of Captain Penwick, since last Report.

Oct. 27.—1 serjeant, 19 privates prisoners.

Nov. 1.—5 privates prisoners, 7 privates killed.

P. S. 46 bullocks and 200 sets of hospital bedding taken from the enemy on the first of November, likewise 2 horses.

Sapataria, Nov. 3, 1810.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing of the Army under the Command of Viscount Wellington, in skirmishes with the enemy on the 9th, 12th, 13th, and 14th October, 1810.

Killed.—1 serjeant, 19 rank and file, 22 horses.

Wounded.—7 officers, 7 serjeants, 77 rank and file, 10 horses.

Missing.—1 serjeant, 41 rank and file, 12 horses.

PORTUGAL.—*French Account of the campaign from the fall of Almeida to the end of the pursuit of the Allied Army at Alenquer.*—From the *Moniteur* of the 29th of November.—N. B. The first part is a commentary on Lord Viscount Talavera's Letter or Dispatch of the 3rd of November, for which see page 1119.

Moniteur.—This unimportant letter contains five or six lies.—1. That Loison's division is encamped in front of Lord Wellington; while it is detached more

than twenty leagues from it.—2. That the French have repassed the Zezere, on account of the rains; at the time that they have thrown a bridge over that river. Lord Wellington could not be ignorant of this important fact; he knew that this bridge had been constructed ten days before.—3. That the French have but little provisions; while they have supplies of wheat, rice, Indian corn, and beans sufficient for four months. Lord Wellington completely destroyed the country between the Mondego and Almeida; but as he was compelled to abandon the positions on the Mondego, where he hoped to maintain himself, he marched from the Mondego to the heights of Lisbon with so much precipitation, that in 5 days he passed over the fifty leagues which separated him from Lisbon, and could not destroy the fine valley of the Tagus. Thus he has ruined many people, destroyed a great part of the country which it was his duty to defend, without gaining his object, which was to deprive the French army of provisions.—4. That the Portuguese General, Silveira, occupies Celorico and Guarda, which, on the contrary, were occupied in the beginning of November by the division of Gardanne, composing the rear-guard of the army of Portugal. On the 15th of November, the troops of the 9th corps were spread through Portugal.—5. That General Bonnet has evacuated the Asturias, and retired into Biscay; which is known to be false.—6. That the corps of the Duke of Treviso is at Seville; which is also equally unfounded.

NOTES ON THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL.

On the 15th of September the army advanced from Almeida to invade Portugal. On the 17th the 2d and 6th corps were at Celorico; the 8th was pushed forward to Pinhel.—After the fall of Almeida, Lord Wellington withdrew his forces behind the Alva, the course of which river forms an impregnable position. As soon as he ascertained that we intended to invade the country by the valley of Mondego, he ordered the right wing of his army under General Hill to join him, by the route of Sobreira Formosa and Pedro-Gao, which until then occupied the position of As-Tal-Hadas, in the rear of Castel Branco. He blew up the bridge of Murcella, that on the Alva, and also the bridge of Santa-Comba-Dao, on the Dao. He left no force in front of his position, to observe

our movements, but the advanced guard, under the command of Brigadier-general Crauturil, with which our cavalry had some skirmishes, of no great consequence, during the march.—Marshal the Prince of Essling, seeing that the English had taken positions on the left bank of the Mondego, was of opinion that he could reach Coimbra sooner than they by marching on the right bank. On the 18th the army passed the Mondego by the bridge of Fernos. Two days after the English Colonel Trant, with some militia and a regiment of Portuguese cavalry, fell upon some baggage which was in the rear of the army, and took two waggons, one of which belonged to General Lazowski, of the engineers.—On the 21st the three corps were united at Vireu and Mengoaalde. They were obliged to halt there two days on account of their artillery, which was delayed by the badness of the roads. The English took advantage of this delay; in one march they could pass from the left to the right of the Mondego. Lord Wellington occupied with his centre divisions and the left wing of his army the Sierra de Busaco, which hangs over the river Mondego and covers Coimbra. He only left General Hill's corps at Ponte Marcella.—On the 24th our advanced guard overtook the rear guard of the English on the Oestus. An action took place at Montagoa. A single company of voltigeurs of the 31st regiment of light infantry overwhelmed an English battalion of 3 or 400 men. The English retreated on the Sierra de Busaco. We took 120 English prisoners in this affair.—On the 25th, the 2nd and 6th corps arrived at the foot of the enemy's position. The 2nd corps was formed in column by brigades, on the road to Coimbra, by San Antonio de Cantaro. The 6th corps was formed in the same manner on the road to Coimbra by the convent of Busaco.—On the 26th, the 3d corps, which had been delayed by its artillery more than the others, closed on the 6th corps. The division of General Loison, which composed the advanced guard of the 6th corps, skirmished the whole day for the purpose of occupying a village at the foot of the mountain. The position of the enemy was minutely reconnoitred by the General in Chief, and the Commanders of the corps of the army.—The Sierra de Busaco consists of a chain of mountains of granite, from 600 to 1,200 feet high, bristled with very steep rocks, extremely difficult of access. The crown

was covered with troops. There were 26,000 English, and 30,000 Portuguese. A numerous artillery was collected in the passes of San Antonio de Cantaro and Busaco. Both the roads were intersected in several places, and entrenchments formed. The cavalry was placed in reserve at the beginning of the western part of the position, opposite to the road by which we arrived. The height of the Sierra, and the difficulties of the ground, rendered our cavalry and artillery almost useless in the attack.—The Marshal Prince of Essling was aware of the strength of the position of Busaco. He determined on turning it. It required six days to make this flank movement, almost under the cannon of the enemy. Some of the best officers were of opinion that this manœuvre was impracticable, as we might be attacked on the march with great advantage to the enemy. But when it was considered that the English army was very heavy, and little accustomed to manœuvre, the Marshal resolved on this hazardous movement. Orders were however given for a swarm of sharpshooters to cover this movement, and to keep up a fire during the two first days, and that even a brigade of the 2d corps should pretend to attack the right of the English, while a brigade of the 6th corps should pretend to carry the position of Busaco. All these manœuvres completely succeeded. However, the brigade of the 2d corps, commanded by General Graindorge, and that of the 6th, commanded by General Simon, carried away by that impetuosity so natural to Frenchmen, pushed their false attacks too far; they overwhelmed every thing in their way; but as the army was in march, and far advanced, they could not be supported. General Simon, who received two musquet balls, and about 100 French, were made prisoners on the mountain. The enemy, as soon as they had passed the heights, attempted to descend in pursuit of our troops; but all the light artillery of the rear guard, which remained in position, fired so closely, and with so much precision, that it broke the English ranks.—In the mean time, the General of Brigade, St. Croix, who headed the march, on his arrival near Mealhada, fell in with, on the road from Coimbra to Oporto, a division of the Allied Army, which he put to the route, killed several hundreds, took 500 prisoners, and drove the division behind the Douro.—On the 1st of October, our

advanced-guard entered Coimbra; Lord Wellington had evacuated this position, and retreated with precipitation.—We had 200 killed at the Battle of Busaco, and from 12 to 1,500 wounded: the loss of the enemy must have been at least as great.—On our arrival at Coimbra, the enemy's rear-guard, placed on the heights on the left bank of the Mondego, cannonaded the first troops which entered the town.—From the 4th to the 11th the army advanced towards Lisbon. There were 6 days of very heavy rain. The Prince of Essling did every thing in his power to induce the English to dispute the country with him, but it was impossible to bring to battle an enemy who is extremely cautious, and who will not engage unless he is posted upon inaccessible rocks, or hid behind impregnable entrenchments covered with artillery. Lord Wellington, therefore, avoided with the greatest care a general engagement. There were even no partial actions but those which were unavoidable between the cavalry of the rear-guard of the army which retreated, and the cavalry of the advanced guard of the army which advanced. In this retreat of the allied army we took 500 prisoners, the greater part of which were loiterers, and half of which were English.—Through a misunderstanding, and the false movements of a corps of observation, our hospital at Coimbra, where we had from 15 to 1,600 wounded or sick, was taken, four days after our departure, by a corps of miserable Portuguese militia of about 2,000 men. The army had but one object in view, that was to overtake the English army before it could take shelter in its intrenched positions at Lisbon.—On the 12th we arrived in the neighbourhood of Alenquer: the right of the English was at Alhandra on the Tagus, their left at the outlet of the Sissandro into the Sea. They thus occupied a position of 10 leagues in extent, upon a line of entrenched mountains. The small number of passes by which we could get at them were bristling with artillery.—The Marshal Prince of Essling so disposed his army, as to be able to unite it in four hours. The 2d corps, forming the left, is at Villa Franca on the Tagus; the 8th corps occupies the centre at Sobral; the 6th corps is on the right at Otta and Villanova. A division of dragoons occupies Alentre, to cover the right flanks against the attacks of a division of English cavalry stationed on the Sissandro. We occupy Thomar, to

collect provisions in the neighbourhood, to be nearer to our reinforcements, and to protect the bridge of the Zezere. This bridge is of the greatest importance. Santarem has been selected for the depot of the army; it is now fortifying.—On the 12th Oct. at half past four, in the afternoon, General St. Croix, after having taken possession of Villa Franca, ascended a height to view three or four English gun-boats, which were firing on a patrol of ten cavalry going along the road. A shot rebounded and cut in two this brave General, whose loss has justly excited the regret of the whole army. Otherwise these gun-boats do little injury; they fire a great deal, as is their custom, but without any effect. The English seamen attempted to land: they were repulsed by the picquets with the loss of some men.—The English rule at Lisbon by the effect of terror. They treat with harshness and contempt the nobility and the people. They fabricate conspiracies, they imprison, they transport, they take up those Portuguese who dare to weep over the ruins of their country. Provisions are above all price at Lisbon: notwithstanding the resources which the possession of the sea gives, this capital is on the point of feeling all the horrors of famine.—From Almeida to Alenquer the army did not meet with 2,000 Portuguese. The towns and villages are deserted. This is the effect of the terror which Lord Wellington has established. He has ordered, under pain of death, the inhabitants of all places which our troops approach to retire immediately, to carry with them every thing they can, and to burn, or throw the remainder into the rivers. We have found the mills destroyed, the wine running in the streets, the corn burnt, even the furniture broken. We have not seen a horse, a mule, an ass, a cow, a goat. The rear-guard of the English have destroyed every thing as they retreated. They have even burnt a great number of villages. Our army has been supported by biscuit, and the numerous cattle in its rear. To this the soldiers added, by way of making it out, Indian corn, cabbages, beans, and grapes, with which the country is covered. They cannot be said to have been distressed.—After the battle of Busaco, our resources were improved. In the environs of Coimbra, and principally in the fertile country adjoining the Tagus, the army was not expected; the English had not time to carry into effect their system of exter-

mination. The vintage was ripe, and the country is covered with vines. We got possession at Villa Franca of considerable private stores of barley and wheat. In other parts of the Tagus, there were depôts of colonial produce, rice, sugar, coffee, rum, salt, fish, &c. Rice, Indian corn, beans, oil, and fish, being the chief subsistence of the Portuguese, these we found every where. We have collected cattle from the plain of Thomas and the islets of the Tagus. It required ten or twelve days to repair the broken mills. Until they were repaired, we endeavoured to regulate the marauding as far as possible. Toward the 20th Oct. the mills were assigned to the regiments, and the soldiers received their daily ration of bread. At the same time we formed stores of wheat, and baked biscuit at Santarem. Notwithstanding, the army of Portugal has received nothing from the left bank, and has not broken in upon the resources of several vallies; there is therefore nothing to fear for the subsistence of the rear-guard, nor for that of the 9th and 5th corps. All these may be supplied, keep the field, and defy the braggings of the English, who for two months do not cease to repeat that the army will die of hunger. The Marshal Prince of Essling displays great activity in procuring supplies, and regulating the delivery of provisions. He knows better than any body, that upon provisions depends the fate of the campaign in Portugal.—The army has not so many sick as it might have had, considering the long and painful marches which it has made. The number does not exceed 1,200. The hospitals are at Santarem. We are employed in organizing them. Although we lost fifteen medical men at Coimbra, as we have only one establishment for the sick, enough remains for the actual duty, and for such casualties as may occur.—The artillery lost some horses on the march. Their places were supplied by horses taken from the useless baggage of some officers. The artillery has not suffered from the fire of the enemy; it has wood, iron, lead, to repair its carriages. Workmen are not wanting.—Portugal seldom offers situations fit for the manœuvres of cavalry; it would be difficult to employ them advantageously to clear the rear of the army; for in this close country, intersected and full of thickets, the armed peasants may do a great deal of mischief without suffering any thing in return. The horses are in good condition.

PORTUGAL.—(*Copied from the Times newspaper of the 7th Dec. 1810, dated 30th Nov. 1810.*)—*Notes on the Conduct of the English in Portugal.*

The army of Portugal has encountered obstacles in the conquest of that kingdom, which arise from the very nature of things, and are the necessary result of an *inactive system of defence*, which was *profoundly meditated*, and has been executed without restraint, with a singular barbarity unknown in our European wars, for the honour of States and men.—The Portuguese do not love the English; the latter know it. They have taken possession of the Portuguese army, by filling it with English officers. The Portuguese general officers are no longer employed, but in the fortresses, and with the militia. All the *brigadiers*, one or two principal officers in each regiment, and a great number of subalterns, are English. Part of the higher order of Portuguese nobility followed the Prince Regent to the Brazils; there is another part in France; they have removed from place the few that remain. This system has excited great complaints. There have been, and still are, frequent quarrels between the officers of the two nations.—The capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, and particularly of Almeida, without any attempt having been made to relieve those two fortresses, gave great offence to the Portuguese nation. The Junta of Government was dissatisfied. Lord Wellington perceived that he had not sufficient influence over its members; it was determined, that the English Ambassador at Lisbon should become a Member of the Regency, and that no act of government should be executed unless he consented to it. Then appeared several decrees worthy of the time of Robespierre. One prohibited the Portuguese, under pain of death, to talk on military subjects, or to converse on any other news than what was printed in the Lisbon Gazette: another decree ordered the inhabitants, under the same penalty, to evacuate the towns and villages which the English should abandon, to carry with them their provisions and their cattle, to burn or throw into the rivers what they could not remove, to destroy the mills, the furniture, to burn the crops that were not cut down, and to let the wine run in the streets.—At the beginning of the month of September, the Marshal Prince of Essling assembled his corps of the

army in the neighbourhood of Almeida. Lord Wellington immediately evacuated thirty leagues of country. He took a position at Ponte Marcella, near Coimbra. This retrograde movement threw the Portuguese into consternation. The Regency became alarmed; the Portuguese troops began to desert; it was a common report in the ranks, that England intended to embark them, to waste them afterwards in expeditions in the West Indies, and in India. Lord Wellington removed the fears of the Regency, and appeased the commencement of the insurrection.—The French army entered Portugal: the orders of Lord Wellington were executed. The peasants who did not fly, and who were afterwards seized by the English, were either shot or transported. Their very troops pillaged and burnt the villages, whose inhabitants hesitated to destroy their provisions and furniture. The road from Almeida to Lisbon was a complete desert. We did not meet 2,000 peasants in that distance.—After the battle of Bussaco, Wellington caused Coimbra to be illuminated, by the way of rejoicing; the lamps employed on that occasion were still burning when the English were already in full retreat. Their troops pillaged Coimbra, and committed the greatest disorders before they withdrew. In six days Wellington ran from the banks of the Mondego to his entrenchments at Lisbon. By the rapidity of his march, the districts of the valley of the Tagus escaped the system of complete extermination. The discontent was extreme; the people of Lisbon broke out into insurrection; they declared that they would prevent the English from embarking in the ports of the Tagus. Then was imagined that absurd conspiracy of 60 individuals, nobles, priests, judges, merchants, former friends or enemies to the French, the greater number unconnected with political parties, whose only crime was to attribute to the English Machiavelism the ruin of their country, and to predict that their infamous oppressors would finish by evacuating the country, exposed by its very defenders to greater horrors than any people have yet experienced.—The ravage of the Palatinate, for which Louvois was so much reproached, perpetrated by an enemy's army, was nothing equal to the ravage committed among the Portuguese by their allies. Among these pretended conspirators, those who had most influence on account of their birth, their opulence,

their talents, were taken up, and sent to London. Others were imprisoned, and afterwards transported to the Brazils.—The English send to South America the Portuguese families who are disposed to embark. They do every thing to prevail upon those who hesitate to quit the country. The more people quit Lisbon, the fewer mouths will they have to feed. The situation of the English is alarming: they are only 30,000 at most, and by their side are 40,000 discontented Portuguese soldiers. Behind these are 100,000 refugees in despair, and the immense population of Lisbon. The English rule only by terror; they treat the nobility and the public with the greatest contempt. Every night is signalised by arrests, by seizures; provisions are above all price; it is only by enormous sacrifices of money that they are able to prevent an insurrection.—The English soldier receives at this time a pound of salt meat, a half ration of biscuit, and a certain quantity of rum. The Portuguese soldier receives bread; but only half a pound of meat, and no rum. This inequality of distribution is the cause of discord between the two armies.—All the refugees who wish to go there, are transported to the Alentejo. The others are huddled and bivouacked outside Lisbon. It is not possible to enter that city without a card of safety. The government causes biscuit to be distributed to the refugees. The occupation of the Alentejo will completely starve Lisbon, and produce a crisis fatal to the English.—The enemy has a great many sick. They also lose a great deal more by desertion than in any former campaign. *They desert to avoid corporal punishment.*—The French army is in good spirits: it has confidence in its Commander. We have had no desertion from the national troops. The army has few foreign battalions. *We may be assured, whatever the English may say, that there are no deserters.*

SICILY.—Dispatch from Sir John Stuart, Count of Maida, dated Messina, Sept. 22, 1810.—Published by the Government in England, in an Extraordinary Gazette, Nov. 19, 1810.

Count of Maida to Lord Liverpool. Date as above.

Early on the morning of the 18th instant our attention was much occupied by the opposite movements of General Murat, who, by the embarkation of the principal

body of his army in the whole of his long range of boats at Scylla and the Punta del Pizzo, and the disposition of these vessels after being cast off from the shore, seemed to indicate a conclusive design upon the part of our line extending towards the Faro. While the attention of our left was engaged by the above operation, information was brought to me that a division of the enemy, having embarked at Reggio during the preceding night, had been perceived completing a landing upon our right, just before dawn, about seven miles to the southward of Messina. Reinforcements, which were held in reserve in this garrison to move according to circumstances, marched to sustain our posts at the invaded point upon the first signal of alarm; but the active vigilance of the troops stationed at that extremity of our defences, and their prompt and spirited behaviour, under the conduct of Major-General Campbell, had already happily rendered the presence of these succours unnecessary. The repulse of the enemy in this partial enterprize, and the equally disgraceful and precipitate flight of the French General who commanded it, with the sacrifice of so considerable a part of his equipment, are more fully detailed in the adjoined report from Major-General Campbell to myself, on the proceedings of this fortunate day: and I hope his Majesty will be graciously pleased to draw an augur from the relation of this officer, of the future conduct of this army at large, in any emergency of service, which it may become their duty to encounter. The zeal, the warmth exemplified by the neighbouring peasantry in our behalf, and which were not manifested without a loss, and the judgment as well as alacrity with which I have since learnt that those in remoter districts made immediate dispositions to obstruct the progress of the enemy in their possible attempt to penetrate into the country, were far beyond what I could have hoped or expected from their peaceful habits; and so strongly was their animosity marked towards their invaders, that the interposition of our escorts was frequently necessary to protect our prisoners from their fury in conducting them, after their surrender, to the Citadel of Messina. A colour inscribed as a gift from Gioachino Napoleone to the Royal Corsican Corps, said to be new for the occasion of the expedition, fell among other captures of the morning into our hands; and I hope his

Majesty will be graciously pleased to approve my transmittal of this trophy to be respectfully laid at the feet of his Sicilian Majesty, as a token of our zeal in support of his royal cause, and as a record that the first effort of a daring enemy to plant the standard of usurpation in this his second kingdom, and which still owns his rightful dominion, was repulsed by a British army. I cannot close this communication to your Lordship, without expressing my official acknowledgements of the great assistance I have derived from Lieutenant-General Lord Forbes, as well as the other general officers, and indeed every department and rank of this army, during a long period of four months, in which the contiguity and constant menaces of an enterprising enemy have demanded from us a system of unabating vigilance, to which every mind has submitted with cheerfulness, but which your Lordship will believe has not been without its fatigue. The habitual, cordial, and friendly co-operation which I have received from Admiral Martin and the naval force under his orders during this interval of anxiety, I have before had occasion to mention to your Lordship.

Adjutant General Major General Campbell's Report to the Count of Maida, dated Messina, 18th September 1810.

Sir ;—Being apprized about a quarter past four this morning, that a detachment of the enemy's boats had approached and fired upon the cavalry picquet at St. Stephano, I deemed it expedient to repair towards that place; and on my way thither, discovered (before day-light) a smart fire of musketry, apparently near Mili. On my arrival at Mili, I found Lieutenant-colonel Adam, with the 21st regiment, very judiciously posted in that advantageous spot (supported by the 3d King's German Legion) with two six-pounders; and the riflemen of the King's German Legion in his front, beyond the Mili Fiumara, briskly exchanging shots with the enemy.—Thus situated, and when full daylight rendered all objects distinctly visible, I clearly observed about forty of the enemy's large boats disembarking troops between St. Stephano and Galati; which, as they gained the shore, pushed on and occupied the crest of the whole ridge of rising ground, extending from the place of their debarkation to the front and

right of the Mili Fiumara.—Every measure of precaution was adopted to occupy the mountain passes adjacent to the Mili position: and whilst thus employed, and eagerly watching the enemy's further movement, I observed not only a hesitation and period to his further advance upon the heights, but that he was actually hastily re-embarking his troops nearest the beach; occasioned, I have no doubt, by the spirited and unexpected manner in which he was brought to action by the 2d light infantry, under Lieutenant-colonel Fischer, which, moving from its cantonments of St. Placido, hung upon his rear and left. I had no sooner satisfied myself as to this point, than I directed the 21st regiment, with two 6 pounders, to move briskly forward by the great road and beach from Mili, preceded by the riflemen of the 3d and 4th King's German Legion, and flankers of the 21st regiment, which produced the double effect of precipitating the enemy's retreat to his boats, and throwing into our power the whole of the corps which had gained the heights, and others whom their boats abandoned to their fate.—I understand this corps to have been under the orders of General Cavignac, and to have consisted of two battalions of Corsicans, 1st battalion of the 2d Neapolitan light infantry (six companies,) 1st battalion of the 3d of the line Neapolitan infantry (six companies,) 1st battalion of the 4th of the line Neapolitan infantry (six companies,) in all about 3,500 men; of whom, one of the Corsican battalions, with a stand of colours, a Colonel Chief de l'Etat Major of division, a Lieutenant-Colonel-commandant, with forty inferior officers, including an Aide-de-camp of General Cavignac, and upwards of eight hundred soldiers, have surrendered prisoners of war at discretion.—It is now only necessary for me to add, that the corps which repulsed the enemy were Captain Joerres's troop, of the 20th Light Dragoons; the 2d light infantry battalion (to whom every praise is due for the spirited and masterly manner in which it made the first impression upon them;) the riflemen of the 3d and 4th King's German Legion; the 21st regiment; and a portion of the 3d King's German Legion; as also a detachment of the Royal Artillery, with field-guns, under Lieutenant Cotton.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"The English are a sober, THINKING people, and are more *intelligent* and more *solid* than any people I ever had the fortune to see."—LORD STORMONT'S Speech in the House of Lords, 1st Feb. 1792.

1158]

[1151

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XX.

The war being now over, Mr. Pitt's reasons ceased of course—The peace brings no golden payments at the Bank—Mr. Addington becomes Minister—Gives notice of an intention to continue the Act of 1797—Mr. Robson calls for papers, which are refused—He compares Bank-notes to assignats and is himself called to order—Mr. Addington's reasons for renewing the Act in April 1802—His reasons for another continuation of the Bill in February 1803—Mr. Tierney calls for inquiry—The Act renewed again, in Dec. 1803, till six months after peace.

Gentlemen,

In Letter XIX, page 1106, we traced the Bank Stoppage, or Restriction Act, down to the end of the last war, in the year 1802. We saw it introduced under pretence of the absolute necessity of it for a temporary purpose; we saw it passed, at first, for only *fifty two days*; and with every expectation held forth, that it would be repealed before the expiration even of that time; we then saw, that it not only lived for the fifty two days, but, at the expiration of that time, was prolonged for *five months*; and, when the end of that five months came, we saw it prolonged for the duration of the War, upon the ground, that the enemy had openly avowed his determination to effect the destruction of our public credit, and that, therefore, it was necessary to keep upon the defensive. This

was the precise ground stated by the Minister himself. The enemy had avowed his determination to *destroy our credit*, and therefore, the Bank was to be *protected from paying its promissory notes*, agreeably to the conditions on which these notes had been received in payment. The enemy had avowed his determination to blast the credit of England, and, therefore, the Bank of England was to stop payment with impunity, as long as the war should last.

Such were the reasons, such the doctrine, to which was at last driven the "Grand financier," Mr. Pitt, who had begun his career by bespeaking a column to his memory, on which the words "PUBLIC CREDITOR" should be inscribed; such was now the doctrine of the "heaven-born minister;" "the Pilot that weather'd the storm;" "the great statesman now no more." He weathered the storm so ably, that, at the end of only four years of his war against the Republicans of France, during which four years he had, perhaps, forty times foretold that France would sink beneath the weight of bankruptcy, he himself comes into that same House of Commons where his promises to ruin France had been so often heard, and there he calls upon the members to protect the Bank of England in non-payment of its notes; he calls upon them for a law to compel the Public Creditor to take his dividends in a paper not convertible into gold; and, his reason for this is, that the French, that those same French, that the bankrupt French, that the beggared French threatened to make war upon our finances! Aye, he, the boaster, who had made so many, so many scores, of triumphant comparisons between the situation of England and France; who had so many scores, I might say hundreds of times (for he frequently did it several times in one speech), represented England as so highly blessed in wealth and credit, while France was sunk into the lowest abyss of poverty and threatened with all the evils attendant upon a debased paper-money; he, this

very same man; the identical "heaven-born minister," now asked for a law to protect the Bank against the demands of the holders of its notes, and to compel the public creditor to receive his dividends in that same sort of notes or not at all; and, all this he did, because those same poor, ruined, beggared, and beaten French, had avowed their intention of making war upon our finances.

But, at any rate, this reason held good only during the war. The "heaven-born man," as we have seen in the last letter, expressly stated, that the measure was a mere war measure, intended to meet the hostility of the enemy; "to meet his efforts of desperation." But, it did not follow, he said, that the non-payment of cash would continue during the whole of the war; but merely while the enemy pursued the war in its then "*present shape*." So that, at all events, it was believed, or, it was intended to make this "*most thinking*" "people in the world" believe, that the measure would last only for the war at longest, and that when peace returned, they would once more get guineas for their notes, and that those of them who had dividends to receive, would receive them in gold if they chose, as they formerly used to do; and, this was one of the reasons why the nation so anxiously wished for peace.

Well, in 1802, *Peace came*! But, alas! it brought no guineas in payments at the Bank. It brought with it no golden payments to the Stock-holder, or *Public-Creditor*, as some people call him. Peace brought no repeal of the Bank Stoppage, or Restriction, Act. On the contrary, it did, as we have seen at page 1096, bring an extension of the duration of that Act from the 30th of April, 1802, to the 1st of March, 1803. And thus it was that the promise was kept. Thus it was that "the *most thinking* people in the world" saw their "heaven-born Minister's" doctrines verified.

But, what was now the *pretence* for continuing this act? The war was over. The shoutings and the bon-firings and the bell-rings for peace had taken place. Mr. ADDINGTON, the prime minister, and Lord HAWKESBURY, the negotiator, had been praised in all manner of ways for the "blessings of peace." What, then, could be the pretence for continuing the Stop-

page Act? You shall hear, Gentlemen; for it is impossible to do justice to the reason except in the words of the Minister himself and of those who supported him.

You must remember, Gentlemen, that just before the peace was begun to be negotiated, the "heaven-born" and some others, went out of office, and that Mr. HENRY ADDINGTON, now LORD VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH, succeeded him, as prime minister. To his lot, therefore, it fell to propose the continuation of the Stoppage Act, in peace; but, you should bear in mind, that this was, in fact, no *change of ministry*; it was merely a change of a *very few of the men* in power. All those who had voted for PITT, continued to vote for his successor, as did also Mr. PITT himself. So that the continuation of the Stoppage Act is not to be ascribed, in anywise, to this *change of men*, the people still in power being the same people who supported all the measures of the minister, PITT, and who, indeed, brought him back into power again in the year 1804.

It was on the 9th of April 1802, that the continuation was proposed by Mr. ADDINGTON; but, notice of his intention having been before given, Mr. ROBSON, on the 2nd of April, moved for certain papers, showing the nature of the affairs of the Bank, which was opposed by the Minister, ADDINGTON, who, without more ado, moved the *previous question* upon it. Whereupon Mr. ROBSON said, that this was using him and those who thought with him very ill. Notice had been given, he said, by the minister, of his intention to bring in a bill to continue the Act, which protected the Bank from paying in gold and silver, and, he wished to know how the affairs of the Bank stood, that he might be able to judge whether he ought to consent to such a measure or not. "He maintained that all Europe was contemplating the payment of specie by the Bank, as the criterion of the credit of the Country. If the Bank continued to issue paper, country banks would do the same without controul; they would issue their notes *without mercy*. It was, in his opinion, THE COMMENCEMENT OF A COURSE OF ASSIGNATS. (*Order! order! and question!*) *was called from every part of the House.*"

The question being put, it was carried

against Mr. ROBSON, without a division. He was not allowed to have the papers he wanted. It was unnecessary, he was told; and, when he ventured to compare bank notes to assignats, he was *called to order*. He was called to order for speaking *irreverently* of those notes, those promissory notes, which were by law rendered not payable agreeably to promise, and which law it was now proposed to continue.

Now we come to the Minister, ADDINGTON's, reasons for continuing this Act *after the end of the war*; and to those reasons we must pay particular attention. He, prefaced his proposition, as his predecessor always used to do, by very high language about the *ability* of the Bank to pay in coin. He said, in the debate of the 9th of April, "I have the satisfaction of being convinced, that the measure cannot furnish a pretence to the most timid man in the House, to suppose the Bank does not possess within itself the most ample means of satisfying the full extent of the demands which may be made upon it, by the payment of its notes in specie." In the debate of the 21st of April, he said, that "on the *solidity* of the Bank, he was entitled to say and assume, there was now no question, either in that House or elsewhere. On the DISPOSITION of the Bank to make payments in specie, he was also entitled to assume, nay he owed it to the Bank to ASSERT, they had manifested a readiness to do so. It was, however, thought necessary to continue this restriction for a while." Having said this, he said, that it was, of course, quite unnecessary to enter into any inquiry as to the state of the Bank's affairs; and, accordingly, it only remained for him to state the grounds, upon which he proposed the continuation of the measure. But, Gentlemen, pray bear in mind, that this Minister gave the country to understand, that the Bank Company had, even at that time, "manifested a readiness to make payments in specie," and this was now nearly nine years ago. Yet, Mr. RANDLE JACKSON now bestows something very much like abuse upon the Bullion Committee, because they recommend to the House to make the Bank Company begin to pay in specie in two years from this time. What should make the Bank Company angry with the Committee, if it was true, that they wished to pay in money so long as eight years and nine months ago?

The grounds which the Minister, ADDINGTON, stated for the continuation were as follows. In the debate of the 9th of April, he said: "The grounds on which I shall rest the proposition I have to make to the House are notorious; and it will be for the sober and dispassionate reflection of the House, whether the measure I shall submit does not necessarily result from facts and circumstances too well known even to require a particular statement of them. It cannot be necessary for me to inform the House, that the rate of exchange between this country and foreign parts is disadvantageous to ourselves..... It cannot be necessary for me to prove, that while the rate of exchange is disadvantageous to us, an augmentation of the circulating cash would create a trade highly injurious to the interest and commerce of this country. It is well known, that for several months past there has been a trade carrying on in purchasing guineas with a view to the exportation of them..... In addition to these reasons, the House will reflect upon the inconvenience which would unavoidably result from letting loose such a proportion of the coin of the country as would be circulated by taking off the restriction. I am not aware of any inconvenience that can possibly arise from continuing it. We have had the satisfaction, arising from the experience of three or four years of difficulty? we have had experience, that during such period, the credit of the Bank has undergone no diminution whatever. Bank notes have maintained their reputation and have been every where received cheerfully and readily..... Some Gentlemen are desirous that the Bank should pay in cash for notes of small denomination; but till there is a full and abundant supply of cash by opening the Bank entirely, it is extremely convenient to afford circulation to 1l. and 2l. notes. By the payment of them in specie, a general anxiety would be introduced of obtaining cash at the Bank. Notes of 1,000l. and 500l. would be changed for notes of 1l. and 2l. in order that they might be immediately changed again for cash. If a restraint was to be imposed with respect to the number of notes of small denomination, they would be driven out of circulation altogether; and there would be no small notes but those issued by Bankers."

There, Gentlemen, you have now before you the reasons, why this Act was continued *after the war*. The Minister, PITT, told the nation, that it was necessary during the war, in order to prevent the enemy from executing his vow of *destroying our credit*; and, the Minister, ADDINGTON, told the nation, that it was necessary *after the war was over*, because the rate of exchange was against us, because people were exporting guineas when they could lay hold of them, because to repeal the act would let coin loose, because the experience of years had shewn that the stoppage of cash payments had done no harm to the credit of the Bank whose notes were every where received cheerfully and readily, and, finally, because (pray mark!) if a part of the notes were to be paid in specie, *that would give rise to a general anxiety to obtain cash at the Bank*, and that people would change large notes into small ones, *in order immediately to change these latter for cash*.

So, then, MR. ADDINGTON, the people did, even in your time, like the gold better than the notes? Though you could not perceive, not you, any *inconvenience* from the continuation of the Act; though you had seen with *satisfaction* the experience of the years of suspension; though "the credit of the Bank had undergone no *diminution* whatever;" though the Bank notes had *maintained their reputation* and had been every where received cheerfully and readily: yet, notwithstanding all this, you object to make the small notes payable in gold, lest the holders of them should *run to the Bank and get cash for them*; lest this taste of the sweets of gold should excite a *general anxiety of obtaining cash at the Bank*; and lest large notes should be changed into small ones for the purpose of again changing these latter *into cash*. But, why was this to be feared? The Bank Directors were surely, the best judges of this; and, you say, not only that they are *able* to pay; but that they have manifested a *readiness* to pay their notes in specie. Now, *this being the case*, what danger was there of a run upon the Bank? And, if there had been a run, what danger was there in that, seeing that there were means amply sufficient to meet such run?

MR. ROBSON, whom we have seen called to order for speaking so irreverently, of Bank Notes, opposed the bill in its subsequent stages: he pointed out the advantages which the Bank derived from the

Act; he *foretold* what the Bullion Committee have now declared to *have come to pass*; in short, he did all that it was in his power to do to prevent the continuation of a measure, which a committee of that same House of Commons have now declared to have produced such fearful consequences; and this MR. ROBSON did while MR. HUSKISSON, who now tells us that *no one foresaw* the evil, not only suffered the measure to pass in silence, but was one of the majority of the Minister by whom the measure was proposed and put in execution.

Well, but, after all, the Act was to last *only ten months*; *only* till the first of March 1803; it was only, as the Minister's brother, MR. HILLY ADDINGTON, called it, "a *temporary provision*, 'till the effects of "the peace should have begun to operate." Only this. Nothing more. Yet did they, when the 1st of March, 1803, came, renew the Act again. Again did they pass a law to protect the able-and-willing-to-pay Bank against the demands of the note-holders! Again did they pass an Act, to continue in force till six weeks after the commencement of the then next session of parliament, the measure for preventing payments in cash, though peace had been made a *whole year*, and though they said, that the Bank was *able and ready* to pay.

Let us see, then, Gentlemen, what were the reasons given now. "The *most thinking* "people in the world," were, as we have seen, told the last time, that the Act of renewal was "a *temporary provision*, 'till "the effects of peace should have begun "to operate;" and, as peace had now lasted a whole year, what reason, what pretence, what excuse, what apology was now to be found? This is what we ought to keep our eye upon. We know well, that they renewed the Act; but, in order to be able to judge of what will be done *in future*, we must take care to keep in view the *reasons*, which, at the different renewals, were given for the measure.

When he came to propose the *second* renewal *after the war was over*, it must be confessed, that MR. ADDINGTON did appear to perceive the light in which he stood. He did appear sensible of his situation; and, doubtless, this was amongst the things, for which, as it was asserted by a pamphleteer soon afterwards, MR. PITT was *under obligations* to his successor. It

was on the 7th of February, 1803, that he moved for leave to bring in this bill. He begun by saying "that it was with the *utmost reluctance* that he submitted the proposition to the House, but the reasons which suggested it were too strong, and the *necessity too urgent*, to be resisted; that necessity, however, *he hoped, would soon disappear*; and, he *anxiously and impatiently* looked forward to the day, which he trusted was not far removed, when the Bank would be *at liberty* to resume its payments in *specie*." The grounds for proposing this measure he stated to be, that the *course of exchange* was still against this country, and, as the House "last year, considered that a sufficient argument for the measure, he would appeal to the candour and good sense of the House whether it would be expedient to allow the restriction to cease." He also said, "that a sudden issue of cash from the Bank would produce a run upon the country Banks, and a consequent run upon the Bank of England, which might be productive of most serious consequences." He further observed that, "the exchange being against us had arisen from the circumstance of *scarcity of corn*, which, of late years had caused so much Bullion to be sent out of the country, and that it was obvious, that we should wait the operations of a flourishing commerce to bring back some proportion of this vast amount of Bullion, before we attempted to permit the Bank to issue specie."

The whole world never, in my opinion, heard any thing like this before. Were it not upon record, in a manner not to be disputed, it would not, it could not, be believed. Mr. TIERNEY, and Mr. Fox, spoke against the motion, and particularly wished for an inquiry previous to the passing of such a Bill. Mr. Tierney said "according to the report of the committee of 1797, the proportion of cash and Bullion in the Bank amounted to ONE MILLION, when the Order of Council was issued, and some short time afterwards *this sum was increased to SIX MILLIONS*. Was it not now a fit object for enquiry; What had become of their six millions? if it was forth-coming to meet any exigency? and if it was, why should the Bank hesitate to resume their operation? They could not be afraid of a run upon them, for who could now think of any

"material advantage from hoarding gold?" Nevertheless, the bill passed; and thus was the Bank protected against demands upon them for cash, until six weeks after the commencement of the then next Session of Parliament, which Session began in November 1803.*

After what we have now seen, we can hardly expect to hear of any more reasons. It would, I think, have been utterly impossible to invent any pretext that Mr. ADDINGTON would have made use of; but, most fortunately for him, before parliament met, and, of course, before the Act expired, WAR had begun again. That was quite enough; and, without any scruple, hesitation, or ceremony, the Minister brought in a bill to prolong the Stoppage, or Restriction, till the *war should be over, and until six months after a definitive treaty of peace should be concluded*. He said, that, "though doubts had been entertained as to the propriety of the measure, during a period of peace, he had never heard its policy questioned during a period of war. Under the impression, therefore, that no doubts existed on the subject, he should take it for granted that no objection would be made, in the present instance, to a renewal of the measure. It was satisfactory to know that the credit of the Bank had remained firm and unshaken, during the past experience of the measure, and that its *sufficiency to make good its engagements, both was, and is, unaffected by even the slightest suspicion*."†

This was all. There was very little more said about the matter. All the anxiety that he expressed upon the former occasion, for the happy day of cash-payments to come, was now forgotten; or he had got an entirely new view of the matter. There were some very interesting debates upon the subject, in the House of Lords, in which LORD KING and LORD CLENVILLE took a part, and in which they

* The whole of this debate is very important, and also a subsequent one of the 11th February, 1803. They will be found at full length, and very accurately given, in the POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. III, pages, 1233 and 1247.

† See Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I. page 52. Where the reader will find Mr. ADDINGTON's grave ideas respecting *hoarding money*.

showed, that they were duly impressed with the dangerous consequences of thus continuing this Act in force;* but, what they said was of no avail. The Act was passed; it is, as you well know, Gentlemen, in force to this day; and, the proposition of the Bullion Committee is, that it shall be in force, to its present extent, at least, *only* two years longer.

When we take a review of the reasons for the passing of this Act, at the several times at which it has been passed; when we see how those reasons have *varied*; when we see how many times the expectation of a return to cash-payments has been disappointed; but, especially when we look well into the part which the *Bank Company themselves* have borne in these transactions; when we look at what passed between the Minister and the Bank Company *previous* to the Stoppage; when we look behind the curtain and see the *plan* laid for a private Meeting of the principal Bankers to settle upon the scheme for a general meeting; when we afterwards hear the Minister, in parliament, talking of that Meeting as of a thing in which he had had nothing to do, and citing it as a mark of the *public confidence in the Bank Paper*; when we take this review, Gentlemen, it is not, I think, possible, that any of us can ever again be deceived by *professions, promises, and outward appearance*, as far, at least, as relates to the subject of *Bank notes*.

I have now gone through the whole history of the Stoppage of money-payments at the Bank of England, which history, though it has, Gentlemen, taken up a good deal of time, will, I trust, be found well worth both our time and our labour. Without a knowledge of this history, it is impossible for any one to form so correct an opinion, as to the *future*, as he will be able to do with this history fairly imprinted on his mind. In this history he has before him the experience of thirteen years; and, from what has been, he will easily form his opinion as to what, under the operation of similar circumstances, is

* See Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 1. page 152 to 156. And page 304 to 319. These two debates are of great importance. There is scarcely any thing to be found in the Bullion Report, as touching the main points, which will not be found to have been said, upon this occasion, by one, or the other of these two Noblemen.

likely to be. We have, by toiling through this history, furnished ourselves with all the knowledge (of any real use here) possessed by the members of the Bullion Committee; and, perhaps, a little more; so that, we shall now enter into an examination of their production without any dread of difficulty in the progress, or of error in the conclusion.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your faithful friend,

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,
December 10, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS

PORTUGAL. THE WAR. — There is nothing new upon this subject but the *tone* of the venal press, which is wholly new, it having now ceased to talk about *annihilating* or *starting* the French; nay, it having begun to talk about *ultimate success* as a thing that we never were taught to expect. Oh! *thinking* people, if this does not produce some effect upon you, *what* will? Nothing but that which makes even brutes feel and perceive. — We are told, however, that provisions, stores, and reinforcements of all sorts, are hastening out to Lisbon; and, those prints, which have been most loud in their praises of Lord Talavera, and in their promises of destruction to Massena and his army, seem to *complain*, that reinforcements have not been *sooner* sent out. They say, that they “had hoped that reinforcements “would have been sent to him ‘ere now; “for that, however *great* his success, still “the troops ought to be sent in order to “render that success the more complete; “and, in the event of disaster, reinforcements might enable him to retrieve it, “and to turn the tide in his favour.” —

Thus, you see, then, reader, they can begin to talk of disaster. They have evidently been harbouring the idea, or, rather it has haunted their heads (as apparitions are wont to visit empty houses), for some time back; and, at last, they have screwed up their nerves to the naming of the thing. And, we are now told, we, sober, THINKING, intelligent, solid people, are now told, that, at all events and all hazards, reinforcements ought to be sent to fight, either offensively or defensively, against . . . ay, against an enemy, whom we were before told, we had *safe* in a trap, and who had, for weeks, been *stewing* down his horses to make soup of. — What a *thinking*

people we are. Aye, and those who are at large in this town, will not fail to hear from the lips of the "*loyal*" as confident hopes founded on the call for these reinforcements, as they before founded upon the assertions of our having caught the enemy in a trap. Aye; and they will still insist that he *is in a trap*, and that these reinforcements are *nevertheless wanted*. There is nothing that they will not, as to such matters, say, and that they will not swear, when swearing is necessary.—It seems, however, if the public prints are to be believed, that Napoleon is sending reinforcements towards Portugal, and, if he is, we shall not be long, before we hear of the effects of that movement. He seldom makes a movement in vain; and, if French reinforcements are really on their way to Portugal to any great amount, all that our Lord Marshal can possibly accomplish for us, is, I should suppose, to expend for us ten or a dozen millions of money, and, of course, make that much of addition to the national debt.

INVASION. PREPARATIONS FOR.—It is stated, and with a great deal of confidence, that Napoleon is putting an army on board his ships in the Scheldt, and that he is making very serious preparations in all the ports on the coast opposite the Eastern part of England. What degree of credit we ought to attach to this report, I cannot say; but, it is, I think, next to impossible to find any man in his senses, who will deny, that such preparations, if not actually making, are very likely to be made, in a short time. Indeed, to suppose, that Napoleon will not make such preparations, and that he will not, in the course of a year, make the attack, unless some material change in the circumstances of Europe take place, is folly in the highest degree. The Emperor does not mean to stop where he is. All of us agree in this. No one, even amongst those, who, to justify their sycophancy, affect to think that all is safe; no one even of these men will deny, that Napoleon's object is to subjugate England, and that nothing short of that will satisfy him. This being his object, then, why should we believe, that he will not use all the means in his power to accomplish it? Why should we suppose, that he will not make use of the shipping and seamen of Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, in order to annoy us? He is not to be told what effects the aspect of invasion would have

upon this country. He has seen specimens enough of it, and though the nature of the Bank Company's affairs is such, that they may now, as the Elder George Rose observed in his pamphlet, set a *run at defiance*; yet, would invasion, if seriously expected, produce effects, even in pecuniary matters, the extent of which it is not every noddle that can calculate, and that certainly would not be checked by ordinary and vulgar expedients.—When invasion was expected in 1803, LORD GRENVILLE suggested a plan for *giving security to the country bank notes*, in case of actual invasion. It was very ingenious, and proved that he had thought a great deal upon the subject. But, I cannot say, that I looked upon it as practicable. Yet, it was evident, that some precaution of this sort would become absolutely necessary if invasion began to wear a serious aspect; for, not only might whole districts be in the same situation that the City of Salisbury was in, a little while ago; but they might *remain in that situation*, 'till, perhaps, the power of law would be compelled to yield to the powers of hunger or of other feelings equally strong. In such a state of things, happy would be the man that had a *guinea*; but, as every one could not have a guinea, nor even a shilling, I think that the sooner the proposition of my LORD GRENVILLE is brought forward for discussion the better. For, to suppose, that the aspect of invasion will not soon present itself is to deceive ourselves most grossly. Present it self it will, and, it is the duty of every man to prepare himself for it.—As to the sending of the troops out of the country to reinforce Lord Talavera, while invasion is threatened on the other side of the channel, there are, it would seem, two opinions; but, the venal prints, who are crying aloud for troops to be sent to Lisbon, and who seem to think, that they are *going away too slowly*, tell us, "that even the *Volunteer Corps* of the County, "in which the French may land, supposing them to *elude the vigilance* of our fleets, *would be quite sufficient to give a good account of them*." And, then, we are further told, that it would be disgraceful to us, if our attention could be, for a moment, diverted from Portugal by Buonaparté's preparations for invading England! Famous swagger! "Twenty more: kill 'em!"—The same thing was, however, said, some months ago, when we were told, that a *regular soldier*

ought not to be left in England: that all, that every man, except the recruiting parties, ought to be sent and put under the command of the Viscount of Talavera. —Now, what these people say cannot be true, because JUDGE GROSE told me, that it was necessary to have FOREIGN TROOPS to assist in the defence of this country, which foreign troops are, I believe, still in this country, or, a great part of them, at least; and, it is not more than two months ago, since these same venal writers informed us, that a parcel of German deserters from the French army in Portugal, had been marched to join the German Legion at *Bezhill in Kent*. —So that, while they one day tell us of the existence of a corps of foreign troops in the heart of England and mention with seeming pleasure the additions made to those troops, they, the next day, tell us, that we do not want a regular soldier in England to defend it against the enemy, for whom our *Volunteers alone*, exclusive of the militia, would be more than a match. —Leaving the reader to bestow a little reflection upon these matters, I shall just observe, that, if Napoleon has really an intention to invade England, he has, thus far, acted very wisely in his management of the three wars going on in *Spain, Portugal, and Sicily*, which are so many most copious drains upon us for men and money, for all the sinews, the blood and bones, of war. If he means now to attack England, or Ireland, or both, he has provided three such diversions as were never before seen in any war. We have from 13 to 18 thousand men, perhaps, in *Sicily* and the adjacent islands. There is the King of Naples to keep them employed; and, we have to maintain this army with a fleet into the bargain, the employment of which has the same object, namely, the defence of *Sicily*. —We have another army and another fleet employed in the war for the recovery of *Spain*. —And we have a third, as we well know, in Portugal with another fleet. —We are a very warlike people! We have had 27 years of it out of the last 50 years; and, really, there is now less apparent chance of peace than ever. Every day seems to render peace less likely, which, I think, should induce us to think seriously as to the means of continuing the war; and, while I do not, for my part, see any immediate cause for alarm, I do think, that the proposition of Lord Grenville, relative to Bank notes,

in case of invasion, ought to be taken up and considered, without delay. LORD STANHOPE once proposed to have a large sum of gold collected, and to keep it untouched, in the hands of the government, to be ready in case of invasion, or of any very great alarm, that might induce people to refuse to sell their goods for bank-notes, and in which case, the men under arms could, of course, not be kept together. This, if invasion should assume a very serious aspect, would, perhaps, be prudent; and as to how the guineas would be got, as to whence they would come, that is a matter that we might safely leave to the parliament, which, considering its powers, would, doubtless, find no difficulty in accomplishing an object of this sort. —We should guard ourselves against false alarms, the fatal consequences of which were felt in 1797; but, we should, at the same time, not turn our eyes from the danger. We should look it in the face, be it what it may. The papers of this day assure us, that “the greatest activity prevails in the ports of Holland; that gun-boats are constructed in the Scheldt, in the Texel, Goree, and in the Maese; and that Danish and other seamen have been collected from all parts.” That there is, therefore, something going on, there can be little doubt; whether there be or not, it is our duty to be prepared; and, in preparations for invasion, I am of LORD STANHOPE’s opinion, that guineas are full as necessary as muskets.

PRISONERS OF WAR. — I am here about to insert a Letter, which was appeared in our public prints, as a circular from the Transport Board in answer to all the French Officers, prisoners in England, who have applied to be released. —This Letter, addressed, observe, to French Officers, *Prisoners in our power*, has in it a sort of an appeal to these Officers against the conduct of their own government, on whom the Letter throws the blame that these officers are still in prison. —The words of the Letter are these: —“TRANSPORT OFFICE, LONDON. —SIR—The Commissioners of his Majesty’s Transport Board have received your letter, dated the —, and they have directed me to inform you, that it is the determination of his Majesty’s Government, not to send back French Officers to their own country, until the French Government have released some English Officers, in

"exchange for the great number of French Officers who have obtained this favour from the British Government; or until the French Government have consented to a cartel, upon the fair principle of man for man, and rank for rank, conformably to the CONSTANT USAGE OF CIVILIZED NATIONS, which his Majesty's Commissioners have frequently proposed, though their efforts to accelerate an exchange have always been ineffectual.—I am, however, to inform you, that if the French Government will send back to England an Officer of your rank in exchange for you, or even certify officially to his Britannic Majesty's Commissioners, that upon your arrival in France, an English prisoner of your rank shall be released, you shall instantly obtain your release.—You must see, that in the present state of affairs, your Government alone is the cause of your detention in this country; but if you think proper to make any representations to your Government, you may rely upon it, that his Majesty's Commissioners will faithfully transmit them.—I am, Sir, Your very humble and obedient Servant, ALEX. McCLEAY, Secretary."—All I shall, or need, say upon this Letter is, that it was published in all the London newspapers of last week, and that from those papers I have copied it. The language of it is much too plain to be misunderstood; and, therefore, from me, it shall have nothing in the way of comment.—I shall, however, avail myself of this occasion to notice an error, into which I was led, in my former article upon this subject.—It was there stated, that we have 50,000 Prisoners belonging to France, and she more than 50,000 belonging to us and our allies. This was right; but, then I stated, that if we gave up 3 Frenchmen for one Englishman, one Spaniard, and one Portuguese, some of our own people (there being 12 thousand of them) would still remain in captivity. This was an error; because if we got back one Englishman for every three Frenchmen that we gave up, it is quite clear, that we should have all our men home by the time that we had given up 36 thousand of the Frenchmen; and, of course, we should have still 14 thousand Frenchmen to exchange for so many Spaniards and Portuguese. Why is not this done, then? I really can see no reason for the refusal to do this.—That such would be the effect of acceding to the terms proposed by the French, we shall clearly see, in a moment,

if we again look at the article in the COURIER, published in answer to the Moniteur. "France insisted, that, for every 3,000 French that we sent, the number returned by her should contain two foreigners for one Englishman." What, then, did this writer mean by saying, that we should leave our own soldiers and sailors lingering in captivity? Either he has not correctly stated the terms proposed by the Emperor, or he is quite wrong in supposing that such an exchange as was proposed would have left any of our own soldiers or sailors or countrymen of any description in captivity; for, as we have seen, they would all come home by the time that the French had got only 36 thousand of her people home.—Now, I am not, mind, certain, that this was the purport of the proposition made by France. The COURIER says it was, but the article in the MONITEUR does not. I should suppose, indeed, that it was not. I should suppose, that France proposed to exchange man for man and rank for rank, regarding our allies as part of ourselves, and giving up an equal number of each of the three nations, in proportion to the number of each that she possesses; and, in that case, if she possesses, more of the three nations taken all together than we possess of French, part of our people would remain in prison after the exchange was concluded; and part of the prisoners made from our allies would also remain in prison. It would, indeed, be very mortifying to see the poor fellows left in prison after the long-expected exchange had been accomplished; but, then, as was before observed, one cannot have, without any cost, such wars as those of Spain and Portugal. "Loss and gain, pain and pleasure, are mixed in this world," as is well observed by Mr. FORESIGHT, who, I suppose (though his biographer does not positively state the fact) must have been some great man, in his day. "Ups and downs, loss and gain, pain and pleasure, sours and sweets, are mixed in this world," says FORESIGHT, and so doubtless, says Mr. PERCEVAL, who, if we lament over the sufferings of our countrymen, in French Prisons, may very fairly tell us, that, if we ascribe this evil to the wars in Spain and Portugal and in Hanover, we must set the good against the evil, and take into view the advantages as well as disadvantages of these wars.—I can remember when the war in Spain began, and I never should have forgotten (even though I had been a little boy at

the time) the joy, which was expressed by the *Courier* and by the other ministerial news-papers, when they communicated the intelligence, that we had got on our side ALI MAHOMET (See Register, Vol. XIV, page 203,) who, "to shew that *he knows all*," called the French dogs, and encouraged the Spaniards to cut their throats, and to make them *squeak* like pigs! The *Courier* called this a very spirited proclamation.—The next thing to encourage us in this war was the *TURTLE PATRIOT* feast, at the City of London Tavern, where, in order to shew that they had "a stomach for the fight," they had amongst 400 of them, 2,500 pounds weight of *Turtle*, 40 haunches of Venison, besides four times as much, perhaps, of other things? It was at this feast, not like the feast of ALEXANDER "for Persia won," but a feast at the beginning for a war, and for *victories yet to come*; it was at *this feast* (See Register, Vol. XIV. page 225) that the war for king Ferdinand was, in fact, first announced, in a toast to "King *Ferdinand VII.*"—That a war, which set out with such good cheer should have any crosses and plagues in its progress may, possibly, be a subject of astonishment with some persons; but, be that as it may, the fact is so, and we must abide by the consequences.

SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS.—In page 880, of this volume, I took the liberty, for the reasons there stated, to insert an article respecting this gentleman, and to that article I now beg leave to refer the reader. Sir Richard, in the letter there copied from the *Morning Post*, expressed his confident expectation, that, after paying every creditor twenty shillings in the pound, *he* should have a clear surplus of *seventy or eighty thousand pounds*. His accounts have now been made up by an Accountant chosen, I believe, by the Assignees; he has had his third meeting before the Commissioners of Bankrupts; and, after making the largest possible allowances against him, it appears from those accounts, that he has a clear surplus of *fifty, seven thousand pounds*. This information I have from my own Printer, Mr. HANSARD, who is one of the creditors. It is stated also, but I do not assert it upon the same authority, that, during Sir Richard's career of about 14 or 15 years, he has paid about *fifty thousand pounds* to AUTHORS, including, perhaps, ENGRAVERS and other ARTISTS. —I must confess, that few things have

happened to give me greater satisfaction than the result of this inquiry into Sir Richard Phillips's affairs. It has not, however, surprized me; for I was morally certain, that he would not deliberately assert what he even suspected to be false. As to the difference between his estimate and that of the actual account, it is to be observed, that the account makes the *contingent* surplus nearly *seventy thousand pounds*; and, even this must, with all allowances that have been made, be greatly short of what the amount will be, when the management of the property returns again into his own hands.—I repeat, that, SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS has conferred great obligations upon *public liberty* and upon *literature*; the public, and literary men in particular, are his debtors; and, I have not the smallest doubt that he, whom nothing subdues, will yet have additional claims to the gratitude of both.

BEAUTY AND THE BEAST.—This may seem an odd sort of a title to a topic, coming under the general title of *POLITICS*. But, *Politics*, is a word that does not confine itself to the transactions in *parliament* and in the *field*: it embraces whatever is of public interest in commerce, in finance, in rural affairs, and especially in the *administration of justice*. In this last light there have few things of more consequence taken place, of late, than the recent trial of an action of damages against a *Clergyman* of the name of *Beresford*, for cutting and destroying a very famous picture, called "*Beauty and the Beast*," and the doctrines, brought forward upon which trial, are worthy of particular attention. —Those doctrines I have not room to lay before my readers here; but, I shall take an early opportunity of discharging this duty.—In the mean while, the PLAINTIFF, a Mr. DUBOST, who, it appears, is a very eminent French Painter, has published, in the *Morning Post* of to-day, a letter which I am sure the impartial and just reader will be glad to see inserted here. It is as follows:—"Sir;—As I "had no opportunity of replying on the "occasion of the late trial, I feel myself "called on to publish the correspondence "between me and Mr. Hope, which, together with my *Appeal published against the "calumnies of a Sunday Paper*, will convey to the public some idea of the cause "of my quarrel with that Gentleman. "The Press being the only medium "through which I can defend myself, I

"trust your liberality will give insertion to the few following facts. It will appear by them at least, that I am neither the "BEGGAR nor the RUFFIAN" I have been described. It is imperative on me to state that I am a native of Lyons; that my family was of the first respectability and fortune in France, previous to the Revolution; part of which fortune was lost in the general confusion of that period. I was well known at Paris, during the imprisonment of sir Sidney Smith, not only as an artist, but as a gentleman who mixed in the best society, and as a sportsman of no little celerity. The present coachman of sir Sidney Smith was my groom for two years, and if I advance an untruth, he is in this country to contradict my assertion. I came to England as an amateur of horses and as a professional man, to study the finest models of that animal to be seen in the world. The attentions which I received from numbers of the most respectable people in this country, induced me to make my stay longer; and I have now unfortunately a cause pending in the Court of Chancery, the protracted termination of which delays my departure. I have attracted the obloquy of many, by defending myself against the severe injury inflicted on me, I have, I hope, a mind able to despise the undeserved slanders by which I have been assailed. —I am, Sir, your obedient servant, ANTOINE DUBOST. — *London, Dec. 10, 1810.*" —I have not room for many words; but I think it right to say, that the proceedings on, and the result of, the trial induced me to read the "*Appeal*" of Mr. Dubost, and, that, for my own part, I never read any publication with a more perfect conviction of the truth of it, from one end to the other. The facts, which are numerous, are very curious and not less curious than interesting; and, what greatly recommends the work in my eyes, they are stated in an *explicit* manner; in a manner that exposes them to easy detection, if false. The reasoning is *fair and forcible*; and, merely as a composition, the pamphlet has, in my opinion, great merit. If written by a *foreigner*, it surpasses, as such, any thing I ever read. The manner in which the writer treats the idea of an *obligation* incurred by him in having resided a few days in the House of a Dutch Merchant, bespeaks the man of real talents and of honour, and demands

the gratitude of all those whose talents are not of a sort to be trucked against victuals, drink, and lodging.

—W^m. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
December 11, 1810.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SICILY.—*Dispatch from Sir John Stuart, Count of Maida, dated Messina, Sept. 22, 1810.—Published by the Government in England, in an Extraordinary Gazette, Nov. 19, 1810.*

Adjutant General Major General Campbell's Report to the Count of Maida, dated Messina, 18th September 1810.

(*Concluded from p. 1152.*)

To Lieutenant-Colonel Adam, of the 21st regiment, I was peculiarly indebted. His thorough knowledge of the country and passes would have enabled us to anticipate and check the enemy, had he endeavoured to move further than Mili.—I was accompanied by my Aid-de-camp, Captain A'Court, whose active exertions were conspicuous to all. I have also to mention, in terms of acknowledgment, Captains Hill and Freuller, Assistant-Adjutant-generals, and Lieutenant Burke, Aide-de-camp to Major-general Spencer. The whole of the conduct of the troops was cheerful and animated; and the best disposition in aid of us was exhibited by the peasantry of the country, who, with arms, and every other weapon of offence they could collect, flocked to our immediate assistance; and, what is most consolatory, we have not to regret the loss of a single officer killed or wounded. Two men of the 21st regiment, and one rifleman, were slightly wounded in this singular incursion of the enemy.—I have not been able accurately to ascertain the loss of the enemy. Two officers of the Corsican battalion are among their wounded, of which there were many, as well as killed, upon the field. His most material loss must have been upon his retreat, and in the boats, which were completely within the range, not only of our field-guns, but also of our musketry; one boat was sunk, one deserted to us, and many were disabled. Reports have also been received that several dead bodies have floated on shore near the scene of action. The peasantry have likewise brought in as prisoners a considerable number, who confessed themselves in the country.

PORTUGAL.—*Copy of a Letter from Marshal General Lord Wellington to his Excellency Don Miguel Pereira Forjaz.*—20th Oct. 1810.

•Most Excellent Sir,—Since the letter which I addressed to your Excellency on the 13th instant, the enemy has been employed principally in reconnoitring the positions occupied by our troops, and in fortifying his own. To accomplish the first object he has skirmished with the troops which form our advanced posts, and who have always behaved well. On the 14th the enemy attacked with infantry, supported by artillery, a small detachment of the 71st regiment, which formed the advanced guard of Sir Brent Spencer's division, near Sobral de Monte Agraco, and that for the purpose of covering a reconnoissance made by one of his parties. Our detachment, having at its head the Honourable Colonel Cadogan and Lieut.-Colonel Reynell, charged the enemy with the most distinguished gallantry, and compelled him to retire on the above-mentioned place. The whole of the 8th corps of the French army, and part of the 6th, arrived that evening on the plain near Sobral, and in consequence Sir B. Spencer's division was under the necessity of falling back from the advanced situation which it occupied. The gun-boats on the Tagus, commanded by Lieutenant Berkeley, and those with which Admiral Berkeley supports the right of the army near Alhandra, were engaged at the same time, and fired on the parties of the enemy employed in reconnoitring on that side, and were very useful. I have also the satisfaction of informing your Excellency, that the account which I transmitted in my former letter, of the 13th, relative to the march of two detachments of the troops under the command of General Bacellar, is since confirmed. Colonel Trant arrived near Coimbra on the 7th instant, and immediately attacked the advanced posts which the enemy had without the city, which he cut off and prevented them from entering the city, against which he marched rapidly. The resistance the enemy made did not last long. He took 80 officers prisoners, and 5,000 men, for the most part sick and wounded. I have the honour to enclose to your Excellency a copy of Colonel Trant's letter to Marshal Beresford, and also a copy of the Marshal's letter to me on occasion of this success.—On the following day Brigadier-

General Miller and Colonel Wilson arrived at Coimbra, with the detachments under their command. They have since taken nearly 350 prisoners, soldiers who had straggled from their regiments during the march, for the purpose of getting provisions.—Colonel Wilson has since advanced with a party of infantry and cavalry to Condeixa, and at the same time Brigadier-General Miller occupies Coimbra.—I send your Excellency enclosed a copy of a letter from Marshal Beresford, relative to these events.—A detachment of the garrison of Peniche, ordered out by Brigadier-General Blunt, has been equally successful, having taken 48 prisoners belonging to the enemy's rear-guard, and killing nine more than the number of the prisoners. Lieutenant-Colonel Waters, who has also attacked the rear-guard of the enemy, has made a number of prisoners.—The difficulties that the enemy experiences in procuring provisions, owing to his having invaded the country without establishing magazines, and without adopting means for securing his rear, or his communications with Spain, have imposed upon him the necessity of allowing his soldiers to straggle to procure provisions; in consequence of which not a day passes without a number of prisoners and deserters being brought in.—Every thing remains tranquil in the north of Portugal, according to the last accounts I received.

PORTUGAL.—*Copy of a Letter from General Beresford, to General Lord Wellington.* (Head-Quarters, Fort of Sobral, Oct. 17.)

My Lord,—I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that by letters from Brigadier-general Miller, dated Coimbra, I have been informed that our troops of the north entered that city on the 8th. It appears that Colonel Trant, from whom I have not yet received dispatches, was the first who entered that town with the troops of Oporto, and that Brigadier-general Miller and Colonel Wilson, with the troops of the Minho, and the cavalry, followed the enemy on the line of his march to the foot of the ridge of Caramuelo.—Brigadier-general Miller has made prisoners 350 of the enemy's army, who had straggled from the rest, and who were found robbing; and he is continually coming up with others. Colonel Wilson, with his advanced guard, entered Condeixa on the 10th, or 11th instant. The prisoners were sent to Oporto.

Second Letter.—Casal Cochim, Oct. 20.

My Lord,—Since I sent your Lordship the information received from General Miller, relative to the retaking of Coimbra, I have received from Colonel Trant a more circumstantial detail of that event, a copy of which I have the honour to send inclosed to your lordship.—The number of prisoners mentioned in the account of Colonel Trant appears to be greater than was supposed from the first details; while General Miller has added to them 3 or 400, whom he took plundering in the vicinity of Coimbra, who therefore must be added to the number of prisoners that were taken by Colonel Trant.—The circumstances and the manner in which Col. Trant retook Coimbra are a new proof of the activity and prudence with which he always fulfils the instructions that are given to him, and which doubtless deserve the approbation of your Lordship.

PORTUGAL.—*Extract of an Official Letter from Marshal General Lord Wellington, to his Excellency Don Miguel Pereira Forjaz, dated Head-Quarters, Pico Negro, Oct. 27, 1810.*

Most Excellent Sir—The enemy continue to occupy the same positions (in front of our army) which I mentioned to your Excellency in my former dispatches of the 20th instant. I nevertheless dispatched some troops to the side of Santarem, knowing that Gen. Loison, on the 23d, had marched for the same place, with the division under his command, and it appears, according to intelligence received from the Commanding Officer at Abrantes, under date of the 24th instant, that an enemy's corps of infantry and cavalry entered Thomar on that day.—All the information received from prisoners and deserters, which have arrived at this army, concur in constantly relating the miseries and difficulties which the enemy suffers in consequence of the great scarcity in all kinds of provisions.—They also state, that they were preparing materials for the construction of a bridge over the Tagus, but though we have a good view of that river from different points of the position which this army occupied, and officers and other individuals employed on the left bank of that river to observe the movements of the enemy, I have not been able to discover the place where this construction is carrying on, nor the part of the river to which it is to be applied, if it should be

completed.—The enemy likewise appear very anxious to obtain or construct boats, and with this view endeavoured on the 24th inst. to dislodge a party of ordenanzas (militia) from the post at Chamusea, in order to obtain possession of some boats that were there, but they did not succeed. On the side of Ramalhal and of Obidos, the excursions of the enemy's detachments are so confined and checked, that he, in fact, possesses no ground in the country except that on which his army is posted.—By General Silveira's last reports, dated the 17th inst. it appears that every thing remains quiet on the northern frontiers, nor had the said General received any intelligence of any troops having marched into Castile. The flying parties have become more bold and enterprising than they ever were. They formed a junction in the environs of Valladolid, at the beginning of October, to the number of 1,500 men, in order to take a convoy of money and contributions which the enemy had levied in the country; they proved however unsuccessful in that enterprize.—I have the honour to remain with particular consideration your Excellency's most obedient servant.

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HOLLAND.—*Decree of Napoleon for burning English merchandize.—Dated Fontainebleau, 19 Oct. 1810.*

Having considered the fourth and fifth articles of our Berlin Decree, of the 21st November, 1806, We have decreed, and do decree as follows:—Art. 1. All merchandize, of whatever sort, proceeding from English manufacture, and which is prohibited, existing at this moment either in the real entrepots, or in the warehouses of our customs, of whatever description it may be, shall be publicly burnt.—2. In future, all prohibited merchandize of English manufacture, proceeding either from our customs, or from seizures that may be made, shall be burnt.—3. All prohibited merchandize of English manufacture, which shall be found in Holland, in the grand Duchy of Berg, in the Hanseatic Towns, and, generally from the Meuse to the sea, shall be seized and burnt.—4. All the English merchandize to be found in our kingdom of Italy, under whatever description it may come, shall be seized and burnt.—5. All the English merchandize which shall be found in our Illyrian provinces, shall be seized and burnt.—6. All the English merchandize

which shall be found in the kingdom of Naples, shall be seized and burnt.—7. All the English merchandize which shall be found in the provinces of Spain occupied by our troops shall be seized and burnt.—8. All the English merchandize which shall be found in the towns, and within the reach of places occupied by our troops, shall be seized and burnt.

PRUSSIA.—King's Decree against English and Colonial goods.—23 Oct 1810.

We Frederick William by the grace of God King of Prussia, &c. By our Edict of the 10th instant, we ordered the suspension of the decree of the general Continental Tariff till the 20th only of this month, with respect to the colonial produce introduced to our States for consumption, in the conviction that whatever of those articles might be remaining could only proceed from the old stores, or originate in some of the late confiscations.—As, however, intelligence received in the mean time from the Commissaries sent to examine the state of the sea-ports, has given just reason to suspect that there are actually in several places dépôts more or less to be found of colonial produce, independently of what may be owing to the old stock; and as by this intelligence also, we are assured that in a variety of places the vigilance of our excise and custom-house officers and mercantile commissaries has led to the detection of considerable quantities of colonial wares, imported through the avarice of interested speculators, or kept back, from various pretences, for home consumption, we have therefore determined, by a general and unavoidable regulation, to prevent at the same time the loss threatened to our Exchequer, and those arts which in our States have been so obstinately attempted against the Continental system. We, therefore, decree as follows:—1. On sight of this, our excise officers employed in the several States of our Monarchy, are ordered to seize all colonial produce, and such wares as seem, from their quality, to be of English manufacture.—From this regulation are excepted the old stores of refined sugars, as well as the raw and fabricated, as also the present stock of the inland dealers and merchants.—The Principal Officer of Excise in each place respectively is charged with the execution of this order, and must carry it into immediate operation, seconded by the most considerable merchants, and

where necessary, the Military Officers of the district.—II. From the day of the publication of this decree, or at least the period at which it is made known at each place respectively, no merchant or agent shall dare to act contrary thereto, or to dispose of the goods so prohibited, permit them to be imported either in his own or any other name under pain of confiscation. Those manufactures seized in the ports, or in the inland towns, are to be deposited in a public magazine.—III. Also those merchants or agents whom the Excise officers do not suspect of having any Colonial wares, though not examined, must announce the same 24 hours after the publication of this decree, under pain of confiscation.—IV. Such goods as are seized on their way are to be laid under confiscation, either at the place of their ultimate destination, or at the first barrier they come to.—V. For the deciding of all questions with respect to the goods seized, in order that the owner may not sustain any unnecessary injury the Director of Excise is desired to take the subject under consideration without loss of time, assisted by such Officers as will be pointed out, and must transmit an account thereof within three days afterwards to the Minister of Finance. Inferior Officers are to give intelligence of the discoveries they make to the Provincial Officer.—VI. This intelligence shall contain—1. The name of the merchant, shipper, or agent of whom the goods have been seized.—2. The place where they have been seized.—3. Their quantity in number or gross and net weight.—4. Their quality.—5. What demand of consumption, or what danger incurred in the merchant, shipper, or agent, and what might be the profits he was to expect.—6. The way and manner in which the goods are seized.—7. The several circumstances that render it probable that such goods may be introduced at home, to the prejudice of English commerce.—The other three sections of this Proclamation are intended to regulate the conduct of the Commissioners in their ultimate decision, on the goods seized as above, and in what instances the owner may have restitution, or a compensation; the whole conformably to the spirit of the General Continental Tariff.

SPAIN.—Letter from the Duke of Dalmatia to the Minister at War. Xeres, 27 Oct. 1810.

The army will learn with regret

that the General of Division Sernamont, Commander in Chief of the Artillery, has finished his career before Cadix. This worthy and respectable General, whose name was connected with the most memorable exploits of the war, was employed in visiting the formidable works constructed by the 1st corps of the army, when a shell, thrown from one of the enemy's vessels, struck him in the breast. The same shot also killed Colonel Degennes, Director of the parks of artillery, and Captain Pinondelle, both very distinguished Officers.—His Majesty the Emperor will certainly feel for the loss of General Sernamont. There was not in his Majesty's service an officer who was more zealous in the discharge of his duty. Every thought of his was directed to the service, the glory of the Imperial armies, and the improvement in tactics of the illustrious corps of which he was one of the most distinguished Commanders.—The honours due to the rank of General Sernamont will be paid to him by the 1st corps of the army, and also to Colonel Degennes and Capt. Pinondelle. The heart of General Sernamont will be embalmed, to be conveyed to France, and placed at the disposal of the Emperor.—The General of Brigade, Daboville, has been provisionally nominated to the command of the artillery of the army, and the Chief of Battalion, Lignim, to that of the parks, until his Majesty shall have filled up these two vacancies. The Generals and superior officers of artillery, employed with the corps of the army, or on detachments in Spain, are hereby required to obey and cause to be obeyed, such orders as may be issued by Gen. Daboville.

HOLLAND.—*Order of the Duke of Plaisance, relative to the Public Claims. Amsterdam, 28 Oct. 1810.*

We the Prince Arch-Treasurer of the Empire, Duke of Plaisance, General Stadtholder of his Majesty the Emperor and King, have ordered and do order as follows:—Art. 1. The Council of Liquidation appointed by the Decree of the 23rd September last shall commence its functions on the 1st of November ensuing, at eleven o'clock in the morning.—2. All persons who may have claims upon or debts due from the State previous to the year 1810, are informed that they must submit their demands, with the particulars

annexed thereto, to the inspection of the before-mentioned Council of Liquidation.

—3. These demands and requests must be set out in the Dutch language, with an abstract in French, which abstract must contain briefly an account of the demand and the foundation on which the party rests his claim.—4. The said claims must be decided on in the course of three months at the farthest, and that period being elapsed, no further claim can be received but by authority from the Emperor, or by the person to whom his Majesty the Emperor shall have granted such authority.—5. In the event of this Council having terminated its duties previous to all the claims being sent in, such further claims cannot afterwards be admitted, but by a decree of his Majesty the Emperor, nor otherwise taken into consideration at all, but by the Court of Public Accounts, at Paris.—6. The principal Secretary and Government is to furnish to the general body of the Secretaryship of this Council the outline of the commission nominated for the purpose of liquidating the balance of the national debt for the year 1807, and previously with all the rates, plans, and particulars annexed, as are to be found in the archives of the Government.—7. The Ministers are to furnish, likewise to the said General Secretaryship all the particulars and accounts relative to the service of the year 1810, with the public orders belonging thereto to that period, which have been drawn up but not distributed, together with a note containing their advice upon the same.—8. The Court of Finances shall, in like manner, furnish to the said Secretaryship all the ordinances which remain still in their department, and which apply to the said period.—9. The Director-General of the Public Treasury shall, in like manner, furnish them with the Ordinances passed for payment of the demands antecedent to that period which may not yet have been carried into effect.—10. A similar proceeding shall take place relative to the exigencies of all functionaries that are dependant on the Government, and the same with respect to all persons to whom these Ordinances shall have been delivered, at the time the demands are made.—11. The Ministers, the Court of Finances, the Director-General of the Public Debt, and all Officers belonging to Government are charged with the execution of this Decree.

Treaty between Austria and France.

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, wishing to consolidate the state of peace happily re-established between Austria and the Confederation of the Rhine, by effacing in Germany even the very traces of the last war, have named for Plenipotentiaries, viz his Majesty the Emperor of the French, &c. M. Jean Baptiste Nompere, Count of Champagny, Duke of Cadore, &c. his Minister for Foreign Affairs; and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c. M. Clement Wenceslaus, Count of Metternich, Winneburg, Ochsenhausen, &c. his Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who after having exchanged their full powers, have agreed on the following Articles:—

Art. I. In execution of the Treaty of Vienna, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and the Sovereigns of the Confederation of the Rhine, shall raise, as has been done in France, the sequestrations placed on either part, before and during the late war, and in consequence of that war, on property possessed by individual title. The proprietors, whoever they may be, shall, within the space of two months after the ratification of the present Act, be re-established in the enjoyment of the said property, which shall be restored to them without exception or reserve, in the state in which it was before the said sequestration.

(*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF State Trials:

London, Dec. 1, 1810.

The Subscribers to this Work are respectfully informed, that, in future, it will be published, not in PARTS, but in VOLUMES ONLY: and such is the progress which has been made in it, that the Ninth Volume will be ready for delivery on the first day of January, 1811, and one Volume on the first day of every alternate Month, until the whole is completed. Of the TWO HUNDRED and EIGHTY-EIGHT Trials or Proceedings, of which the first Eight Volumes consist, ONE HUNDRED and SIXTEEN never before came into any

Collection. The following is a List of the Articles contained in the Eighth Volume:

* * *The new Articles are marked [N.]*

272. Proceedings against Richard Thompson, Clerk, for a High Misdemeanour against the Privilege of Parliament, A. D. 1680 [N.]
273. Case of James Skene, for treasonable Opinions and Declarations, A. D. 1680. [N.]
274. Case of John Niven, Captain of the Ship Fortune of London, for Leasing-making against James Duke of Albany and York, A. D. 1680 [N.]
275. Proceedings in Parliament against Edward Seymour, esq. a member of the House of Commons and Treasurer of the Navy, upon an Impeachment of High Crimes, Misdemeanours, and Offences, A. D. 1680.
276. Proceedings against Lord Chief Justice Scroggs before the Privy Council; and against the said Lord Chief Justice and other Judges in Parliament, A. D. 1680.
277. Proceedings in Parliament against Edward Fitzharris, upon an Impeachment for High Treason, A. D. 1681.
278. The Trial of Dr. Oliver Plunket, Titular Primate of Ireland, at the King's Bench, for High Treason, A. D. 1681.
279. The Trial of Sir Miles Stapleton, bart. at York Assizes, for High Treason, A. D. 1681.
280. The Trial of George Busby, at Derby Assizes, for High Treason, being a Romish Priest, A. D. 1681.
281. The Trial of Stephen Colledge, at Oxford, for High Treason, A. D. 1681.
282. The Trial of Slingsby Bethel, esq. at the Bridge-House in Southwark, for an Assault and Battery on Robert Mason, at the Election of Members of Parliament for the Borough of Southwark, A. D. 1681.
283. Proceedings at the Old Bailey, upon a Bill of Indictment for High Treason, against Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury, A. D. 1681.
284. The Trial of the Earl of Argyle, in Scotland, for Treason, A. D. 1681.
285. Proceedings before the King in Council, against Arthur Earl of Anglesey, Lord Privy Seal, upon account of a Book reflecting on the Conduct of James Duke of Ormond, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, A. D. 1682 [N.]
286. Proceedings against Temperance Lloyd, Mary Trembles, and Susanna Edwards, for Witchcraft, A. D. 1682 [N.]
287. Proceedings between the King and the City of London, on an Information in nature of a Quo Warranto, in the King's Bench, A. D. 1681—1683.
288. The Trial of Nathaniel Thompson, William Pain, and John Farwell, at the Guildhall of London, for writing, printing, and publishing Letters, importing that Sir Edmund-bury Godfrey murdered himself; as also for several Falsities relating to the said Matter printed in several Papers, called "The Loyal Protestant Intelligence," A. D. 1682.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 37.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1810. [Price 1s.

"Look before you leap."—OLD PROVERB.

1185]

[1186

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—Heavy as are the blows, which commerce has lately received, a blow greater than any of the rest seems now to await her. The dispute with the American States, relative to our restrictions upon their maritime trade, is of so long standing, and has been rendered so confused by the prodigious volumes, which the lawyer-like statesmen, on both sides of the water, have piled together upon the subject, that, in order to render the matter intelligible to my readers, and to furnish them with the means of coming to a just decision thereon, I think it necessary to go back to the origin of the dispute, to trace it down to the present time, and to subjoin to these my statements and observations all the authentic documents necessary to be referred to.—The public have seen the Proclamation of Mr. MADISON, the President of the American States, whence they will have perceived, that, unless we remove certain of our *Orders in Council* (which, indeed, are now in part become *laws*), all intercourse between this country and the States of America will be interdicted after the 2nd of February next, while the commercial communication between France and those States will be open, but will still be exposed to our obstructions.—The question for us to decide upon, is, whether the *Orders of Council*, of which America complains, *ought now to be revoked by us*. This is the question; and, as there is no time to be lost in deciding upon it, as the dispute is now come to a crisis, as there appears now to be nothing left but an immediate choice between *accommodation* and *hostility*, a decision is pressed upon us by considerations of interest as well as of honour.—The dispute originated in certain restrictions, imposed by us upon Neutral Commerce, contained in regulations of *Blockade*; which regulations the Emperor of France answered by others of a similar, or more violent sort. These drew other regulations from us. These produced others from him. We rejoined in the same sort of way. Both sides told

the Neutrals (or, rather, the *Neutral*, America being the only nation really in that state), that, *as long as she submitted to the regulations of the one party, she must expect to be obliged to submit to those of the other party*.—We will now see what those regulations, or restrictions were.—The first measure of this sort was adopted by England, and is described in the subsequent Papers, No. 1 (I have numbered them for the purpose of easy reference), which is a letter from Mr. Fox, 8th April, 1806, to Mr. MUNROE, then American Minister in England. In this letter it is stated, that the *king of Prussia* having taken possession of various parts of the *Electorate of Hanover*, and other dominions belonging to his Majesty, in a forcible and hostile manner, and having done other things injurious to English commerce, in violation of the just rights of his Majesty, and contrary to the established law and practice of nations in amity with each other; that for this cause, his Majesty had ordered a blockade of the entrances of the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Trave; and that all Neutrals would be treated accordingly, if they attempted to enter those rivers.—Thus these restrictions began, then, in a measure for which the conduct of the *king of Prussia* towards his Majesty's *German* dominions was the ground.—From Nos. 2 and 3, being Letters from Mr. Fox and Lord Howick to Mr. MUNROE, dated 16 May, and 25 Sept. 1806, it will appear that these restrictions were modified; but, Napoleon having conquered Prussia, or, at least, having overrun it, and taken possession of it, in the following month of November, he issued from BERLIN, the Decree, No. 4, in which Decree he declared the British Islands in a State of Blockade; he declared that all commerce with them was interdicted; that every thing belonging to English subjects should be confiscated; that no vessels (including Americans, of course) coming from England or her colonies should be admitted into any port; and that all vessels contravening, or attempting to contravene this Decree, should be confiscated.—Such

was the famous *Berlin Decree*, which, when the intelligence of its being issued reached England, drew forth (No. 5) the first of those measures of our government, which have become equally famous, under the name of the **ORDERS IN COUNCIL**. It was dated on the 7th of January, 1807, and it set forth, that, in consequence of the violation of the rights of nations committed by Napoleon, and expressed in his Orders, as given in the city of Berlin Decree, England would be justified in going much further, but that she contented herself with ordering, that no vessel should be permitted to trade from one port to another, both which should belong to, or be in possession of, Napoleon or his allies, or should be so far under their controul as that British vessels might not trade freely thereat; and that neutral vessels attempting to act contrary to this order, after being duly warned not to do it, should be captured, brought in, and considered as lawful prize.—In this state things continued during the remainder of the time that the late ministry remained in power. But, after their successors took the reins of government, more rigorous measures were adopted; and, under the dates of the 11th and 25th of November, 1807, (Nos 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14) nine Orders of Council were issued, laying new restrictions upon the commerce of Neutrals with the ports of France and countries depending upon, or under the influence of France. Indeed, these Orders put an end to all Neutral commerce, except by *licence* from England.—By way of retaliation for these new and additional restrictions, Napoleon issued, from MILAN, dated 17th December, 1807, the Decree known by the name of the *Milan Decree* (No. 15;) and, as our Orders had declared, that they should be continued in force *till the Berlin Decree was revoked*; so this Decree from Milan declared, that its restrictions and penalties should remain in force, *till the Orders in Council should be revoked*.—Both the hostile nations made an appeal to America (for she was the *only Neutral* in fact) in this way; each said to her: it is *your* fault for suffering our enemy to enforce such restrictions; it is for *you* to compel our enemy to respect your flag, and, *until you do that*, I will enforce against you my measure of retaliation, which I do, not in hostility towards you, but as my only means of self-defence against the tyrannical measures of my enemy.—America, as was

very natural in her situation, complained of *both*. She talked of *war*, to which she, however, had always a hearty dislike; and, after having tried negotiation in vain, she fell upon this expedient.—She protested against the grounds of justification taken by both parties; she declared that both had violated her rights; but, she, at last, determined to submit, for the present, while she endeavoured to prevail upon one party or the other to give way first, and to revoke their Orders or Decrees.—After long and fruitless efforts in this way, she passed, on the 1st of May, 1810, an Act, which she expected would have the effect desired. In this Act it was provided, that, if either Great Britain or France should, before the 31st of March, 1811, so revoke or modify her edicts, that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of America, the *fact* should be declared by the President by Proclamation, and that, then, if the other nation should not, in three months from that time, revoke or modify her edicts *in like manner*, the NON-INTERCOURSE ACT should be *revived against that nation*.—Thus things stood previously to the 5th of August 1810, on which day the French minister for foreign affairs communicated officially to Mr. ARMSTRONG, the American Minister at Paris, that the Decrees of *Berlin* and *Milan* were *revoked*, and that, *from the 1st of November, 1810, they would cease to be in force*, it being understood, that, in consequence of this revocation, the English should *revoke their Orders in Council*, and *renounce the new principles of Blockade which they had attempted to establish*. (See this Letter, in the present Volume, page 700.)—Mr. ARMSTRONG having communicated this notification to Mr. PINKNEY, the American Minister in London, the latter wrote on the 25th of August last (No. 16) to Lord WELLESLEY, our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informing him of what had been done in France, and, at the same time observed, that he took it for granted, that the revocation of the British Orders in Council would follow as a matter of course, and that he hoped to be enabled to announce to his government, that such revocation had taken place.—LORD WELLESLEY (No. 17) answered, that, whenever the repeal of the French decrees should have *actually taken effect*, and the commerce of neutral nations should have been *restored to the condition in which it stood previous to the promulgation of those decrees*, the King would

have the highest satisfaction in relinquishing a system, which the conduct of the enemy had compelled him to adopt.—This answer does not appear to have been relished much in America. It has a reservation in it, which does not seem to promise a full and unequivocal revocation, on our part, even when the revocation of the French Decrees shall have *actually taken place*; and, we know, that a revocation did not take place in England.—The French notification having been communicated to Mr. MADISON, the President of the American States, he issued his Proclamation, (No. 18.) agreeably to the above-mentioned Act of Congress passed on the 1st of May, 1810, which Proclamation, together with the Circular Letter of the Secretary of the American Treasury, have just been received, and they form the last document in the series which I now insert.—In consequence of the revocation of the French Decrees, and of the notification thereof in America, several ships have sailed from America for France, and have met (at least, so it is said) with the same treatment as they would have met with if those Decrees had never been passed; in short, that they have been received as Neutrals, carrying on a lawful commerce; have unladen their cargoes, and have sailed away unmolested in any manner whatever.—Others of them are said, in our public papers, to have been captured by our cruisers, and brought in for condemnation, and that they now *await their fate*, the Admiralty Judge, Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, having *suspended* his decision on them. Thus, then, when we have read the subjoined documents, we have the case fairly before us; for, though there have been other Orders in Council, modifying, or in some respects altering the Orders, here inserted, still, if these latter had never existed, those which are here inserted would have produced the dispute in its present shape.—We need not now agitate the question whether the making of our Orders in Council was just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient; they were made, they have been enforced to this day, and the question for us now to decide upon, is, *whether they ought now to be revoked*.—My opinion is that they ought to be *revoked*, and, indeed, that they ought to have been revoked in August last, upon the notification of the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees having been made to our government.—The reasons upon which this opinion is founded, I will

now state in as short and clear a manner as I am able, just observing first, that I am viewing the matter as a matter of *justice*; as a thing wholly depending upon *particular compact*, and not at all as a matter of *policy* or of *general principle*. I always thought the Orders in Council *just* and wise also, *as far as they went*. They did not go so far as I would have extended them; nor were they bottomed in a true and sound principle, the principle that SELDEN justified with the pen and that CROMWELL proclaimed from the cannon's mouth; that principle, which, when England can no longer maintain, and openly act upon, she may as well at once surrender her fleets and her dock-yards into the hands of Napoleon.—But, the question now before us is altogether of a different nature. It arises out of a particular compact or agreement, which, though not embodied into a single instrument, with the appendages of Dates, Signatures, and Seals, is, and ought to be, as binding as any treaty, made, like that lately made with the Prince Regent of Portugal, "in the name of the Most Holy and undivided Trinity."—How then stands the case?—We make certain maritime regulations, which induce Napoleon to issue the *Berlin Decree*. This Decree brings forth our *Orders in Council*. These produce the *Milan Decree*.—America complains of us both. Neither of us, the belligerent parties, attempt to stand by what we have done as acts *just in themselves*. We both expressly declare them to be acts of *retaliation*; and both declare, upon every occasion that presents itself, that, as soon as America shall have prevailed upon our opponent to revoke his regulations, we will revoke ours. Each party said to America: by submitting to the Decrees or Orders of my enemy, you injure me: and I must, therefore, in self-defence make you submit to similar Decrees or Orders, which I shall impose. But each declared, that, whenever the other party should revoke his Decrees or Orders, he would instantly revoke his.—Well, then, there appeared nothing wanting to accomplish the wishes of America but a *beginning* in this work of revocation. That it never could begin, unless one of the belligerent parties took the lead, was certain. This, at last, Napoleon (who is obstinate only when his interest requires it) did, and, apparently without any reluctance, as we have seen in the letter of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Armstrong. In that letter,

an OFFICIAL INSTRUMENT, it is declared, that the Decrees of Berlin and Milan "are *revoked*," and that they are to cease to have effect on the first day of November.

—Now, when this was communicated to our government, as we see it was, on the 25th of August last, by the American Minister here, in an OFFICIAL INSTRUMENT, why were not our Orders in Council, our *retaliatory* Orders in Council; why were they not also revoked in the *same way*: that is to say, why were they not *declared to be revoked*, and that they should cease to have effect on the 1st of November last?—The Orders were, from first to last, declared to be acts of *retaliation*; they express the *regret* of the King of England at being obliged to adopt measures so injurious to the commerce of Neutrals; they clearly convey the idea, that they are to continue in force no longer than the Decrees of the enemy, whence they have arisen; and, our Minister in America, in February 1808, declared to the American Government, "his Majesty's *earnest desire* to see the commerce of the world restored to that freedom, which is necessary for its prosperity, and his *readiness* to abandon the system which had been forced upon him, whenever the enemy should retract the principles which had rendered it necessary."—If these words had any meaning at all, they meant, that our Orders in Council would be revoked whenever the French should revoke their Decrees; for, in what other way were they to make a *retraction of their principles*? Indeed, no other sense can possibly be attributed to this declaration of our Minister in America; unless it be pretended, that the king of England meant, that France should make an express and formal confession of her having acted upon unjust or erroneous principles; and, I think, that there is no man with any pretensions to fairness, who will attempt to support an opinion, that the words of our Minister were either taken, or meant, in such a sense.—If, then, the reader be of opinion, as, I think, he must, that the letter of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Armstrong, fairly amounted to a *retraction of the principles* complained of by us, he will, of course, ask for the reasons, why his Majesty's *earnest desire* to see the commerce of the world restored to freedom, and his *readiness* to abandon the system forced upon him, did not produce the effects which were naturally to be expected from them: or, in

other words, what could now be the *reason* for not following *immediately* the example of the French, in revoking the Orders in Council.—Instead, however, of an immediate revocation, upon receiving, from the American Minister here, an Official Notification of the revocation of the French Decrees, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord Wellesley, answers, "that, whenever the repeal of the French Decrees shall have *actually taken place*, and the commerce of Neutral nations shall have been *restored to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of those Decrees*," then the King will relinquish his present system.—What, let me ask, was meant by the revocation having *actually taken place*? Had it not actually, that is to say, *really*, taken place? The French Minister says, "the Decrees are *revoked*." What was he to say more? In what way was an *actual* revocation to *take place*, if not in this way? And how was the fact to be communicated to us, except in the way in which it was communicated; that is to say, officially through the American Minister, to whom, or to whose government, the revocation would, of course, be announced by the Government of France?—Really, I cannot, for my part, form any notion of what we could require further; or, of what could further be demanded as a proof that the revocation of the French Decrees had *actually taken place*. Did Lord Wellesley mean, that we were to stop 'till the first day of November, in order to see, whether the French would *act* upon the revocation, agreeably to their promise? If this was what was meant, how did it agree with the declarations about the King's *readiness* to renounce a system that had been *forced* upon him, and which he so *earnestly* desired to do away? For, if we refused to *begin* our revocation, if we refused to *declare* it, if we refused to declare it even conditionally, how was it to be expected, or hoped for, that the French would *act* upon theirs at the day named in the Notification of the French Minister to Mr. Armstrong? What, in short, did such refusal, or postponement, amount to but this: that, though the French had officially declared to America the revocation of their Decrees, to be acted upon on a certain day, yet, such was our opinion of the parties, that we must see it acted upon, before we would *even declare* our revocation, to be acted upon at any time at all?—If the reader thinks that this was what we could not

reasonably expect any independent nation to hear with great complacency, that opinion will certainly be strengthened upon his being informed of the declaration of our Minister, in America, to the American Government, in February 1808, as laid before Congress in November of that year. He, according to these documents, then "communicated the several late Decrees" (Orders in Council) of his Government, "with expressions of the regret felt by his Britannic Majesty at the necessity imposed on him for such an interference" with Neutral commerce, and with assurances that His Majesty would readily "follow the example, in case the Berlin Decree should be rescinded; or, would proceed, *pari passu* with France, in relaxing the vigour of their measures."—Now, have we, in good earnest, acted up to this declaration? "*Pari passu*" (a term which the learned make use of to shew, I suppose, the utility of Latin) means here, *with equal pace*; or, *to keep pace with*; and, this declaration, of our minister, made in the King's name, clearly meant, not only that he would readily follow the example of France; that is to say, that he would do whatever she did, and as soon as she did it, towards the removal of the commercial restrictions altogether; but, that he would, in the meanwhile, *keep pace with her* in softening the rigour of his measures.—France, in August last, notifies officially to the American Minister, that she has revoked her Decrees, and that the revocation will be acted upon on the 1st of November. That notification is communicated officially to our government; and, to follow the example of France; "*readily to follow the example,*" evidently required an immediate answer on our part, that our Orders in Council were revoked, and that the revocation would be acted upon on the first of November. Instead of this, our answer, through Lord Wellesley, was, that we should wait till the French Decrees had actually taken place, and until the commerce of Neutral nations had been restored to the state in which it was previously to the promulgation of those Decrees; and, of course, our Orders in Council, our "*retaliatory*" measure, would still remain in force, till after the Decrees of France should be not only long revoked; but until after their operation had practically ceased. Was this, then, showing a readiness to follow the example of France in restoring to America the enjoyment of what we declared to be her just rights?

Was this *keeping pace* with France in her measures of relaxation? Was it, in fine, acting up to the declaration, made, in the King's name, to the American government in February, 1808, and upon the sincerity and good faith of which declaration, he it well observed, we built our claim to the forbearance of America as to the measures against us, which, at that time, she avowed herself to have in contemplation?—There is one argument, which, though I can hardly think it will be raised, it may not be amiss to state here; namely, that, though Napoleon has declared his Decrees to be revoked, and though that declaration has been officially announced to us by the American Minister first, and now by his Government, yet, such is the character of Napoleon, and such has been his conduct, that we ought not to place any reliance upon his declaration, and ought to consider it merely as the cloak for intended acts of fraud or violence. But, besides the outrage that the use of this argument would offer to the American government, who have not only, in the words of their minister, given credit to the sincerity of the French declaration, but have acted upon it in the issuing of the Proclamation before referred to, and in the admitting of French armed vessels into their waters; besides this outrage, we should, by the use of such an argument, give a signal proof of our own insincerity, seeing that we have recently held an inferior species of diplomatic communication with France, in the case of the negotiations for a Cartel, and that, through the medium of the Transport Board, our government has declared (See page 1167) that any French officer, now our prisoner, shall be liberated and sent back to France, "if the French government will certify officially to our Commissioners, that an English prisoner of equal rank shall be released by France." After this; after offering not merely to *keep pace* with France, but to act by way of anticipation upon her Official Promise, we shall not, I hope, see any attempt, in the American case, to act upon the principle, that no credit is to be given to the official promises or declarations of France.—Such are the reasons, on which I found my opinion, that our Orders in Council ought to have been revoked in August, and that the revocation ought to have been acted upon on the 1st of November last, and, of course, as that was not done, that we ought

now immediately to revoke them. It is a question of mere justice demanded by particular compact, clearly understood between the parties. It appears to me indisputable, that the fulfilment of this compact demands, on our part, such revocation. It is a question of good faith, and that being the case, no considerations of interest ought to stand in the way.—As to the expediency of the measure, if the obligations of good faith were wholly out of the question, being thoroughly convinced that, first or last, we must come to the plain, simple, unqualified assertion and maintenance of the *absolute sovereignty of the sea*, or make up our minds, or, rather, debase them, which, I trust, we never shall, to submit to become first an *inferior* nation, and next, by an easy transition, to become the vassal of France; being thoroughly convinced of this, and being, by every event that has lately occurred, and that is now likely to occur, strengthened in this conviction, I should look upon the injury, which, to the commercial and manufacturing part of the community, would unquestionably arise out of the threatened *non-intercourse* with America, as of too little importance to be, for one moment, put in the scale against any great maritime principle or maxim. Not that I am, by any means, disposed to under-rate that injury, which would be very great, which would spread far and wide, and which would, in all probability, double the quantity of the present distresses to men in trade, whose distresses are daily and hourly increasing, and who must be an object of the sincere compassion of every considerate man. But, even all this is not to be put in competition with the *independence of England*; and, I am decidedly of opinion, that that independence must be lost, or that we must give up a great part of the *commercial and manufacturing system*, that system so showy, and so pleasing to the eye, but that system, which, by the easy and ever-ready means which it offers to political Corruption, has done more harm to England than all the other causes of evil put together. The predominance of Commerce and Manufactures, National Debts and Paper-money, Taxation and Pauperism, Corruption and Degeneracy, have all been engendered, have grown up, and have multiplied, together.—This view of the state of the country has, however, nothing at all to do with the question, as to which we are now at issue with America. These

are matters for our own exclusive consideration. Very serious consideration they demand, and very awful is the prospect before us; but there is nothing even in that prospect, which ought to make us unmindful of what is due from us towards other nations.—Those, who are more immediately and deeply interested in the fate of the question, that is to say, persons engaged in commerce and manufactures, should, too, bear in mind, that, if they suffer from the result, the measure will have been adopted by those, whom they, in general, have uniformly supported; and that, therefore, they will have little reason to complain. The system, to which they have given their support, for the last 26 years, is the present system; and, therefore, if they have acted conscientiously in supporting it, they ought to admit the supposition, that the conduct of its immediate agents has been equally conscientious. So that, as far as relates to them, there seems to be little room left for well-grounded discontent, let the consequences be what they may.

The room, which the documents belonging to this subject necessarily occupy, notwithstanding the expedient of printing them in a smaller than the usual character, preclude the possibility of my introducing into the present number any other topic; for which, indeed, I am not sorry, because I wished to draw the reader's undivided attention to a question, which, in its consequences, may be of the greatest national importance, and which, while we are yet upon the brink, calls upon us to *look before we leap*.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
December 14, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Documents relative to the Dispute between England and these States, as far as belongs to the subject of the English Orders in Council.*

No. I.—*Mr. Fox to Mr. Monroe.—Downing Street, April 8, 1806.*

The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has received his Majesty's commands to acquaint Mr. Monroe, that in consequence of his majesty, the king of Prussia, having taken possession of various parts of the electorate of Hanover, and other dominions belonging to his Majesty, in a forcible and hostile manner, and having also notified, that all British ships shall

be excluded from the ports of the Prussian dominions, and from certain other ports in the north of Europe and not suffered to enter or trade therewith, in violation of the just rights and interests of his Majesty, and his dominions, and contrary to the established law and practice of nations in amity with each other; his Majesty has judged it expedient to establish the most rigorous blockade at the entrances of the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe and the Trave, and to maintain and enforce the same in the strictest manner, according to the usages of war, acknowledged and allowed in similar cases.—Mr. Monroe is therefore requested to apprise the American consuls and merchants residing in England, that the entrances of the above mentioned rivers are and must be considered as being in a state of blockade; and that from this time all the measures authorized by the law of nations, and the respective treaties between his Majesty and the different neutral powers, will be adopted and executed, with respect to vessels attempting to violate the said blockades after this notice.—The undersigned requests Mr. Monroe to accept the assurances of his high consideration. (Signed) C. J. Fox.

No. II.—*Mr. Fox to Mr. Monroe.—Downing Street, May 16, 1806.*

The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has received his Majesty's commands to acquaint Mr. Monroe, that the King taking into consideration the new and extraordinary means resorted to by the enemy for the purpose of distressing the commerce of his subjects, has thought fit to direct that the necessary measures should be taken for the blockade of the coast, rivers, and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, both inclusive; and the said coast, rivers and ports, are and must be considered as blockaded; but that his Majesty is pleased to declare that such blockade shall not extend to prevent neutral ships and vessels, laden with goods not being the property of his Majesty's enemies, and not being contraband of war, from approaching the said coasts, and entering into and sailing from the said rivers and ports, (save and except the coasts, rivers and ports from Ostend to the river Seine, already in a state of strict and rigorous blockade, and which are to be considered as so continued) provided the said ships and vessels, so approaching and entering, (except as aforesaid) shall not have been laden at any port belonging to or in the possession of any of his Majesty's enemies, and that the said ships and vessels, so sailing from the said rivers and ports, (except as aforesaid) shall not be destined to any port belonging to or in the possession of any of his Majesty's enemies, nor have previously broken the blockade.—Mr. Monroe is, therefore, requested to apprise the American consuls and merchants residing in England, that the coast, rivers, and ports above mentioned must be considered as being in a state

of blockade; and that from this time all the measures authorised by the law of nations, and the respective treaties between his Majesty and the different neutral powers, will be adopted and executed with respect to vessels attempting to violate the said blockade after this notice.—The undersigned requests Mr. Monroe, &c. &c. (Signed) C. J. Fox.

No. III.—*Lord Howick to Mr. Monroe.—Downing Street, September 25, 1806.*

The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has received his Majesty's commands to acquaint Mr. Monroe that the King having been pleased, on the 16th of May last, to cause it to be signified, that he had directed the necessary measures to be taken for the blockade of the coast, rivers and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, both inclusive; his Majesty is now pleased to declare, that so much of such blockade as extended from the river Elbe to the river Ems, both inclusive, is, for the present, discontinued, and that from the date hercof, the navigation of the coast, rivers and ports from the river Elbe to the river Ems, both inclusive, is as free as if such blockade had not taken place.—The undersigned requests Mr. Monroe to accept the assurances, &c. &c. (Signed) Howick.

No. IV.—*IMPERIAL CAMP.—Berlin, November 21, 1806.*

Napoleon, emperor of the French, and king of Italy, considering:—1. That England does not admit the right of nations as universally acknowledged by all civilized people:—2. That she declares as an enemy every individual belonging to an enemy's state, and, in consequence, makes prisoners of war, not only of the crews of armed vessels, but also of merchant vessels, and even the supercargoes of the same:—3. That she extends or applies to merchant vessels, to articles of commerce, and to the property of individuals, the right of conquest, which can only be applied or extended to what belongs to an enemy's state:—4. That she extends to ports not fortified, to harbours and mouths of rivers, the right of blockade, which, according to reason and the usage of civilized nations, is applicable only to strong or fortified ports:—5. That she declares blockaded places before which she has not a single vessel of war; although a place ought not to be considered blockaded, but when it is so invested as that no approach to it can be made, without imminent hazard; that she declares even places blockaded, which her united forces would be incapable of doing, such as entire coasts and a whole empire:—6. That this unequalled abuse of right of blockade has no other object than to interrupt the communications of different nations, and to extend the commerce and industry of England upon the ruin of those of the continent:—7. That this being the evident design of England, whoever deals on the continent in English merchandize, favors that design, and

becomes an accomplice :—8. That this conduct in England (worthy only of the first ages of barbarism) has benefited her to the detriment of other nations :—9. That it being right to oppose to an enemy the same arms she makes use of, to combat as she does, when all ideas of justice, and every liberal sentiment (the result of civilization among men) are disregarded :—We have resolved to enforce against England the usages which she has consecrated in her maritime code.—The present decree shall be considered as the fundamental law of the empire, until England has acknowledged, that *the rights of war* are the same on land as at sea ; that it cannot be extended to any private property whatever, nor to persons who are not military, and until the right of blockade be restrained to fortified places, actually invested by competent forces.

Imperial Decree of the 21st November, 1806.

Article 1. The British islands are declared in a state of blockade.—2. All commerce and correspondence with the British islands are prohibited. In consequence, letters or packets addressed either to England, to an Englishman, or in the English language, shall not pass through the Post Office, and shall be seized.—3. Every subject of England, of whatever rank and condition soever, who shall be found in the countries occupied by our troops, or by those of our allies, shall be made a prisoner of war.—4. All magazines, merchandize, or property whatsoever, belonging to a subject of England, shall be declared lawful prize.—5. The trade in English merchandize is forbidden. All merchandize belonging to England, or coming from its manufactories and colonies, is declared lawful prize.—6. One half of the proceeds of the confiscation of the merchandize and property declared good prize by the preceding articles, shall be applied to indemnify the merchants for the losses which they have suffered by the capture of merchant vessels by English cruisers.—7. No vessel coming directly from England, or from the English colonies, or having been there since the publication of the present decree, shall be received in any port.—8. Every vessel contravening the above clause, by means of a false declaration, shall be seized, and the vessel and cargo confiscated, as if they were English property.—9. Our tribunal of prizes at Paris is charged with the definitive adjudication of all controversies which may arise within our empire, or in the countries occupied by the French army, relative to the execution of the present decree. Our tribunal of prizes at Milan shall be charged with the definitive adjudication of the said controversies, which may arise within the extent of our kingdom of Italy.—10. The present decree shall be communicated, by our minister of exterior relations, to the kings of Spain, of Naples, of Holland, of Etruria, and to our allies, whose subjects, like ours, are the victims of the injustice and the barbarism of the English maritime laws.—Our ministers of exterior relations, of war, of marine, of finances,

of police, and our Postmasters General, are charged, each in what concerns him, with the execution of the present decree.

No. V.—*At a Court at the Queen's Palace, the 7th of January 1807, present, the King's most Excellent Majesty, in council.*

Whereas the French government has issued certain orders, which, in violation of the usages of war, purport to prohibit the commerce of all neutral nations with his Majesty's dominions, and also to prevent such nations from trading with any other country in any articles, the growth, produce or manufacture of his Majesty's dominions ; and whereas the said government has also taken upon itself to declare all his Majesty's dominions to be in a state of blockade, at a time when the fleets of France and her allies are themselves confined within their own ports by the superior valour and discipline of the British navy ; and whereas such attempts, on the part of the enemy, would give to his Majesty an unquestionable right of retaliation, and would warrant his Majesty in enforcing the same prohibition of all commerce with France, which that power vainly hopes to effect against the commerce of his Majesty's subjects ; a prohibition which the superiority of his Majesty's naval forces might enable him to support, by actually investing the ports and coasts of the enemy with numerous squadrons and cruisers, so as to make the entrance or approach thereto manifestly dangerous ; and whereas his Majesty, though unwilling to follow the example of his enemies, by proceeding to an extremity so distressing to all nations not engaged in the war, and carrying on their accustomed trade, yet feels himself bound by a due regard to the just defence of the rights and interests of his people, not to suffer such measures to be taken by the enemy, without taking some steps on his part to restrain this violence, and to retort upon them the evils of their own injustice ; his Majesty is thereupon pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, That no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, both which ports shall belong to or be in the possession of France or her allies, or shall be so far under their controul as that British vessels may not trade freely thereat ; and the commanders of his Majesty's ships of war and privateers shall be, and are hereby instructed to warn every neutral vessel coming from any such port, and destined to another such port, to discontinue her voyage, and not to proceed to any such port ; and any vessel, after being so warned, or any vessel, coming from any such port, after a reasonable time shall have been offered for receiving information of this his Majesty's order, which shall be found proceeding to another such port, shall be captured and brought in, and, together with her cargo, shall be condemned as lawful prize, and his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, and the judges of the high court of

admiralty and courts of vice admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain.—W. FAWKENER.

No. VI.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 11th of November, 1807, present the King's most excellent Majesty in Council.*

Whereas certain orders, establishing an unprecedented system of warfare against this kingdom, and aimed especially at the destruction of its commerce and resources, were sometime since issued by the government of France, by which "the British islands were declared to be in a state of blockade," thereby subjecting to capture and condemnation all vessels with their cargoes, which should continue to trade with his Majesty's dominions:—And whereas by the same order, "all trading in English merchandize is prohibited, and every article of merchandize belonging to England, or coming from her colonies, or of her manufacture, is declared lawful prize:"—And whereas the nations in alliance with France, and under her controul, were required to give, and have given, and do give, effect to such orders:—And whereas his Majesty's order of the 7th of January last, has not answered the desired purpose, either of compelling the enemy to recall those orders, or of inducing neutral nations to interpose, with effect, to obtain their revocation, but on the contrary, the same have been recently enforced with increased rigor:—And whereas his Majesty, under these circumstances, finds himself compelled to take further measures for asserting and vindicating his just rights, and for supporting that maritime power which the exertions and valor of his people have, under the blessing of providence, enabled him to establish and maintain; and the maintenance of which is not more essential to the safety and prosperity of his Majesty's dominions, than it is to the protection of such states as still retain their independence, and to the general intercourse and happiness of mankind.—His Majesty is therefore pleased, by and, with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all the ports and places of France and her allies, or of any other country at war with his Majesty, and all other ports or places in Europe, from which, although not at war with his Majesty, the British flag is excluded, and all ports or places in the colonies belonging to his Majesty's enemies, shall, from henceforth, be subject to the same restrictions in point of trade and navigation, with the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, as if the same were actually blockaded by his Majesty's naval forces, in the most strict and rigorous manner, and it is hereby further ordered and declared, that all trade in articles which are of the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed and considered to be unlawful; and that every vessel trading from or to the said countries or colonies, together with all goods and merchandize on board, and all articles of the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be cap-

tured and condemned as prize to the captors.

—But although his Majesty would be fully justified, by the circumstances and considerations above recited, in establishing such system of restrictions with respect to all the countries and colonies of his enemies, without exception or qualification; yet his Majesty, being nevertheless desirous not to subject neutrals to any greater inconvenience than is absolutely inseparable from the carrying into effect his Majesty's just determination to counteract the designs of his enemies, and to retort upon his enemies themselves the consequences of their own violence and injustice; and being yet willing to hope that it may be possible (consistently with that object) still to allow to neutrals the opportunity of furnishing themselves with colonial produce for their own consumption and supply; and even to leave open, for the present, such trade with his Majesty's enemies as shall be carried on directly with the ports of his Majesty's dominions, or of his allies, in the manner hereinafter mentioned.—His Majesty is therefore pleased further to order, and it is hereby ordered, that nothing herein contained shall extend to subject to capture or condemnation any vessel, or the cargo of any vessel, belonging to any country not declared by this order to be subjected to the restrictions incident to a state of blockade, which shall have cleared out with such cargo from some port or place of the country to which she belongs, either in Europe or America, or from some free port in his Majesty's colonies, under circumstances in which such trade from such free ports is permitted, direct to some port or place in the colonies of his Majesty's enemies, or from those colonies direct to the country to which such vessel belongs, or to some free port in his Majesty's colonies, in such cases, and with such articles, as it may be lawful to import into such free port; nor to any vessel or the cargo of any vessel, belonging to any country not at war with his Majesty, which shall have cleared out under such regulations as his Majesty may think fit to prescribe, and shall be proceeding direct from some port or place, in this kingdom, or from Gibraltar or Malta, or from any port belonging to his Majesty's allies, to the port specified in her clearance; nor to any vessel, or the cargo of any vessel, belonging to any country not at war with his Majesty, which shall be coming from any port or place in Europe, which is declared by this order to be subject to the restrictions incident to a state of blockade, destined to some port or place in Europe belonging to his Majesty, and which shall be on her voyage direct thereto; but these exceptions are not to be understood as exempting from capture or confiscation any vessel or goods which shall be liable thereto in respect of having entered or departed from any port or place actually blockaded by his Majesty's squadrons or ships of war, or for being enemies property, or for any other cause than the contravention of this present order.—And the commanders of his Majesty's ships of

war and privateers, and other vessels acting under his Majesty's commission, shall be, and are hereby instructed, to warn every vessel which shall have commenced her voyage prior to any notice of this order, and shall be destined to any port of France; or of her allies, or of any other country at war with his Majesty, or to any port or place from which the British flag as aforesaid is excluded, or to any colony belonging to his Majesty's enemies, and which shall not have cleared out as is herein before allowed, to discontinue her voyage, and to proceed to some port or place in this kingdom, or to Gibraltar or Malta; and any vessel which, after having been so warned, or after a reasonable time shall have been afforded for the arrival of information of this his Majesty's order, at any port or place from which she sailed, or which, after having notice of this order, shall be found in the prosecution of any voyage contrary to the restrictions contained in this order, shall be captured, and, together with her cargo, condemned as lawful prize to the captors.—And whereas countries not engaged in the war, have acquiesced in these orders of France, prohibiting all trade in any articles the produce or manufacture of his Majesty's dominions, and the merchants of those countries have given countenance and effect to those prohibitions, by accepting from persons styling themselves commercial agents of the enemy, resident at neutral ports, certain documents termed "certificates of origin," being certificates obtained at the ports of shipment, declaring that the articles of the cargo are not of the produce or manufacture of his Majesty's dominions, or to that effect.—And whereas this expedient has been directed by France; and submitted to by such merchants, as part of the new system of warfare, directed against the trade of this kingdom, and as the most effectual instrument of accomplishing the same, and it is therefore essentially necessary to resist it.—His Majesty is therefore pleased, and by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that if any vessel, after reasonable time shall have been afforded for receiving notice of this his Majesty's order, at the port or place from which such vessel shall have cleared out, shall be found carrying any such certificate or document as aforesaid, or any document referring to or authenticating the same, such vessel shall be adjudged lawful prize to the captors, together with the goods laden therein, belonging to the person or persons by whom, or on whose behalf any such document was put on board.

And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the judges of the high court of admiralty and courts of vice-admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein, as to them shall respectively appertain.

W. FAWKENELL.

No. VII.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 11th of November, 1807, present, the King's most Excellent Majesty in Council.*

Whereas articles of the growth and manufacture of foreign countries cannot, by law, be imported into this country, except in British ships, or in ships belonging to the countries of which such articles are the growth and manufacture, without an order in council specially authorizing the same:—His Majesty taking into consideration the order of this day's date, respecting the trade to be carried on to and from the ports of the enemy, and deeming it expedient that any vessel belonging to any country in alliance, or at amity with his Majesty, may be permitted to import into this country articles of the produce or manufacture of countries at war with his Majesty.—His Majesty, by and with the advice of his privy council, is therefore pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all goods, wares or merchandizes, specified and included in the schedule of an act passed in the forty-third year of his present Majesty's reign, intitled "An act to repeal the duties of customs payable in Great Britain, and to grant other duties in lieu thereof," may be imported from any port or place belonging to any state not at amity with his Majesty, in ships belonging to any state at amity with his Majesty, subject to the payment of such duties, and liable to such drawbacks as are now established by law upon the importation of the said goods, wares or merchandise, in ships navigated according to law; and with respect to such of the said goods, wares, or merchandise, as are authorized to be warehoused under the provisions of an act passed in the forty-third year of his present Majesty's reign, intitled "An act for permitting certain goods imported into Great Britain, to be secured in warehouses without payment of duty," subject to all the regulations of the said last mentioned act; and with respect to all articles which are prohibited by law, from being imported into this country, it is ordered, that the same shall be reported for exportation to any country in amity or alliance with his Majesty.—And his Majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered that all vessels which shall arrive at any port of the united Kingdom, or at the port of Gibraltar or Malta, in consequence of having been warned pursuant to the aforesaid order, or in consequence of receiving information, in any other manner, of the said order subsequent to their having taken on board any part of their cargoes, whether previous or subsequent to their sailing, shall be permitted to report their cargoes for exportation, and shall be allowed to proceed upon their voyages to their original ports of destination, (if not unlawful before the issuing of said order) or to any port at amity with his Majesty, upon receiving a certificate from the collector or comptroller of the customs at the port at which they shall so enter, (which

certificate the said collectors and comptrollers of the customs are hereby authorized and required to give) setting forth that such vessels came into such port in consequence of being so warned, or of receiving such information as aforesaid; and that they were permitted to sail from such port under the regulations which his Majesty has been pleased to establish in respect to such vessels. But in case any vessel so arriving shall prefer to import her cargo, then such vessel shall be allowed to enter and import the same, upon such terms and conditions as the said cargo might have been imported upon, according to law, in case the said vessel had sailed after having received notice of the said order, and in conformity thereto.—And it is further ordered, that all vessels which shall arrive at any port of the united Kingdom, or at Gibraltar or Malta, in conformity and obedience to the said order, shall be allowed, in respect to all articles which may be on board the same, except sugar, coffee, wine, brandy, snuff and tobacco, to clear out to any port whatever, to be specified in such clearance; and, with respect to the last mentioned articles, to export the same to such ports, and under such conditions and regulations only, as his Majesty, by any licence to be granted for that purpose may direct.—And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the judges of the high court of admiralty and courts of vice admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain. W. FAWCENNER.

No. VIII.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 11th November, 1807, present, the King's most Excellent Majesty in Council.*

Whereas the sale of ships by a belligerent to a neutral is considered by France to be illegal:—And whereas a great part of the shipping of France and her allies has been protected from capture during the present hostilities by transfers, or pretended transfers to neutrals:—And whereas it is fully justifiable to adopt the same rule, in this respect, towards the enemy, which is applied by the enemy to this country:—His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that in future the sale to a neutral of any vessel belonging to his Majesty's enemies, shall not be deemed to be legal, nor in any manner to transfer the property, nor to alter the character of such vessel: and all vessels now belonging, or which shall hereafter belong to any enemy of his Majesty, notwithstanding any sale or pretended sale to a neutral after a reasonable time shall have elapsed for receiving information of this his Majesty's order at the place where such sale, or pretended sale was effected, shall be captured and brought in, and shall be adjudged as lawful prize to the captors.—And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords

commissioners of the admiralty and the judges of the high court of admiralty and courts of vice admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein, as to them shall respectively appertain. W. FAWCENNER.

No. IX.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 25th of November, 1807, present, the King's most Excellent Majesty in Council.*

Whereas it has been represented that it would be expedient to fix certain periods at which it shall be deemed that a reasonable time shall have elapsed for receiving information, at different places, of his Majesty's order in council of the eleventh of November, instant, respecting the trade with his Majesty's enemies, and in their produce and manufactures; his Majesty taking the same into consideration, and being desirous to obviate any difficulties that may arise in respect thereto, and also to allow ample time for the said order being known to all persons who may be affected thereby, is pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order and declare, and it is hereby ordered and declared, that information of the said order of the eleventh of November instant, shall be taken and held to have been received in the places hereinafter mentioned, at the periods respectively assigned to them; namely,—Ports and places within the Baltic—December 21, 1807.—Other ports and places to the northward of Amsterdam—December 11, 1807.—From Amsterdam to Ushant—December 4, 1807.—From Ushant to Cape Finisterre—December 8, 1807.—From Cape Finisterre to Gibraltar, inclusive—December 13, 1807.—Madeira—December 13, 1807.—Ports and places within the straits of Gibraltar, to Sicily and Malta, and the west coast of Italy, inclusive—January 1, 1808.—All other ports and places in the Mediterranean beyond Sicily and Malta—January 20, 1808.—Ports and places beyond the Dardanelles—February 1, 1808.—Any part of the north and western coast of Africa, or the islands adjacent, except Madeira—January 11, 1808.—The United States, and British possessions in North America and the West Indies—January 20, 1808.—Cape of Good Hope, and east coast of South America, March 1, 1808.—India—May 1, 1808.—China, and the coast of South America—June 1, 1808.—And every vessel sailing on or after those days, from those places respectively, shall be deemed and taken to have received notice of the aforesaid order: and it is further ordered, that if any vessel shall sail within twenty days after the periods above assigned respectively, from any of the said places in contravention of the said order of the eleventh of November instant, and shall be detained as prize on account thereof, or shall arrive at any port in this kingdom, destined to some port or place within the restriction of the said order, and proof shall be made to the satisfaction of the Court of Admiralty in which such vessel shall be proceeded against, in case the same shall be brought in as prize, that the

loading of the said vessel had commenced before the said periods, and before information of the said order had actually been received at the port of shipment, the said vessel, together with the goods so laden, shall be restored to the owner or owners thereof, and shall be permitted to proceed on her voyage in such manner as if such vessel had sailed before the day so specified as aforesaid: and it is further ordered, that no proof shall be admitted, or be gone into, for the purpose of shewing that information of the said order of the eleventh of November instant had not been received at the said places respectively, at the several periods before assigned; and the right honorable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the judges of the high court of admiralty, and courts of vice admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain.

W. FAWKENER.

No. X.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 25th of November, 1807, present, the King's most Excellent Majesty in Council.*

Whereas his Majesty, by his order in council, dated eleventh of November instant, respecting the trade to be carried on with his Majesty's enemies, was pleased to exempt from the restrictions of the said order, all vessels which shall have cleared out from any port or place in this kingdom, under such regulations as his Majesty may think fit to prescribe, and shall be proceeding direct to the ports specified in the respective clearances; his Majesty, taking into consideration the expediency of making such regulations, is pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all vessels belonging to countries not at war with his Majesty, shall be permitted to lade, in any port of the United kingdom, any goods being the produce or manufacture of his Majesty's dominions, or East India goods, prize goods, (all such goods having been lawfully imported) and to clear out with, and freely to convey the same to any port or place in any colony in the West Indies, or America, belonging to his Majesty's enemies, such port or place not being in a state of actual blockade, subject to the payment of such duties as may at the time when any such vessels may be cleared out, be due by law on the exportation of any such goods, or in respect of the same being destined to the ports of the colonies belonging to his Majesty's enemies; and likewise to lade, clear out with, and convey as aforesaid, any articles of foreign produce or manufacture which shall have been lawfully imported into this kingdom, provided his Majesty's license shall have been previously obtained for so conveying such foreign produce or manufactures.—And it is further ordered, that any vessel, belonging as aforesaid, shall be permitted to lade in any port of the United kingdom any goods, not being naval or military stores, which shall be of the growth, produce,

or manufacture of this kingdom, or which shall have been lawfully imported, (save and except foreign sugar, coffee, wine, brandy, snuff, and cotton) and to clear out with, and freely to convey the same to any port, to be specified in the clearance, not being in a state of actual blockade, although the same shall be under the restrictions of the said order; and likewise to lade, clear out, and convey foreign sugar, coffee, wine, brandy, snuff, and cotton, which shall have been lawfully imported, provided his Majesty's license shall have been previously obtained for the exportation and conveyance thereof: And it is hereby further ordered, that no vessel shall be permitted to clear out from any port or place in this kingdom to any port or place of any country subjected to the restrictions of the said order, with any goods which shall have been laden (after notice of the said order) on board the vessel which shall have imported the same into this kingdom, without having first duly entered and landed the same in some port or place in this kingdom; and that no vessel shall be permitted to clear out from any port or place in this kingdom to any port or place whatever, with any goods the produce or manufacture of any country subjected to the restrictions of the said order, which shall have been laden after notice as aforesaid on board the vessel importing the same, without having so duly entered and landed the same; or any goods whatever which shall have been laden, after such notice, in the vessel importing the same, in any port or place of any country subjected to the restrictions of the said order, without having so duly entered, and landed the same in some port or place in this kingdom, except the cargo shall consist wholly of flour, meal, grain, or any article or articles the produce of the soil of some country which is not subjected to the restrictions of the said order, except cotton, and which shall have been imported in an unmanufactured state direct from such country into this kingdom, in a vessel belonging to the country from which such goods have been brought, and in which the same were grown and produced:—And it is further ordered, that any vessel belonging to any country not at war with his Majesty, may clear out from Guernsey, Jersey, or Man, to any port or place under the restrictions of the said order, which shall be specified in the clearance, not being in a state of actual blockade, with such articles only, not being naval or military stores, as shall have been legally imported into such islands respectively, from any port or place in this kingdom direct; and with respect to all such articles as may have been imported into the said islands respectively, from any port or place under the restrictions of the said order, it shall not be permitted to any vessel to clear out with the same from any of the said islands, except to some port or place in this kingdom: and the right honourable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the

judges of the high court of admiralty and courts of vice admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain.

W. FAWKENER.

No. XI.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 25th of November, 1807, present, the King's most Excellent Majesty in Council.*

Whereas his Majesty, by his order in council dated the eleventh of November instant, respecting the trade to be carried on with his Majesty's enemies, was pleased to exempt from the restrictions of the said order all vessels belonging to any country not at war with his Majesty, together with their cargo, which shall be coming from any port or place in Europe, which is declared in the said order to be subject to the restrictions incident to a state of blockade, direct to some port or place in Europe belonging to his Majesty, and also all vessels which shall be cleared out from Gibraltar or Malta, under such regulations as his Majesty may think fit to prescribe, and which shall be proceeding direct to the ports specified in their respective clearances:—And whereas it is expedient to encourage the trade from Gibraltar and Malta to countries under the restrictions of the said order, subject to regulations to be made in respect thereto: his Majesty is therefore pleased to prescribe the following regulations in regard to such trade, accordingly, and by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all sorts of flour and meal, and all sorts of grain, tobacco, and any other article in an unmanufactured state, being the growth and produce of any country not being subjected by the said order to the restrictions incident to a state of blockade, except cotton, and naval and military stores, which shall have been imported into Gibraltar or Malta direct from the country where the same were grown and produced, shall, without any licence, be permitted to be cleared out to any port or place not being in a state of actual blockade, without the same being compelled to be landed: but neither the said article of cotton, however imported, nor any article which is not the growth produce or manufacture of this kingdom, or which has not been imported in a British ship, or from this kingdom direct, (except fish) and which shall have been laden at the port of original shipment after the period directed by an order of this date, to be taken as the time at which notice of the said order of the eleventh of November shall be considered as having been received at such port of shipment, shall be permitted to be exported from Gibraltar or Malta, except to some port or place in this kingdom; and all other articles of the growth, produce, and manufacture of this kingdom, or which shall have been imported into Gibraltar or Malta in a British ship, or from some port or place in this kingdom, together with the article of fish, however imported, may be exported to any ports or places in the Mediterranean or Portugal, under

such licence only as is hereinafter directed to be granted by the governor of Gibraltar and Malta respectively:—And it is hereby further ordered, that licences be granted by the governors, lieutenant governors, or other persons having the chief civil command at Gibraltar or at Malta, respectively, but in his Majesty's name, to such person or persons as the said governors, lieutenant governors, or persons having the chief civil command, shall think fit, allowing such person or persons to export from Gibraltar direct, to any port in the Mediterranean, or to any port of Portugal, or to any port of Spain without the Mediterranean, not further north than Cape Finisterre, and from Malta direct to any port, being within the Mediterranean, with any articles of the produce or manufacture of his Majesty's dominions, and any articles which shall have been imported into Gibraltar or Malta from this kingdom, to whomsoever such articles shall appear to belong (not being naval or military stores) in any vessel belonging to any country not at war with his Majesty, or in any vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burthen, and being unarmed, belonging to the country to which such vessel shall be cleared out and going, and also to import in any such vessel or vessels as aforesaid, from any port within the Mediterranean, to Gibraltar or Malta; or from any port in Portugal or Spain as aforesaid, to Gibraltar, such port and such destination respectively to be specified in such licence, any articles of merchandize whatsoever, and to whomsoever the same may appear to belong; such articles to be specified in the bill of lading of such vessel, subject however to such further regulations and restrictions, with respect to all or any of the said articles so to be imported, or exported, as may be inserted in the said licences by the governors, lieutenant governors, or other persons having the chief civil command at Gibraltar or Malta, for the time being, respectively, as to them shall, from time to time, seem fit and expedient:—And it is further ordered, that in every such licence shall be inserted the names and residence of the person or persons to whom it shall be granted, the articles and their quantities permitted to be exported, the name and description of the vessel, and of the master thereof, the port to which the vessel shall be allowed to go, which shall be some port not under actual blockade; and that no licence so to be granted shall continue in force for longer than two months from its date, nor more than one voyage; nor any such licence be granted, or acknowledged to be valid, if granted to permit the clearance of any vessel to any port which shall be actually blockaded by any naval force of his Majesty or of his allies:—And it is further ordered, that the commanders of his Majesty's ships of war and privateers, and all others whom it may concern, shall suffer every such vessel, sailing conformably to the permission given by this order, or having any licence as aforesaid, to

pass and repass direct between Gibraltar, or Malta, and such port as shall be specified in the licence, in such manner, and under such terms, regulations, and restrictions, as shall be expressed therein:—And it is further ordered, that in case any vessel, so sailing as aforesaid, for which any such licence as aforesaid shall have been granted, and which shall be proceeding direct upon her said voyage, shall be detained and brought in for legal adjudication, such vessel with her cargo, shall be forthwith released by the court of admiralty or vice admiralty, in which proceedings shall be commenced, upon proof being made that the parties had duly conformed to the terms, regulations, and restrictions of the said licence; the proof of such conformity to lie upon the person or persons claiming the benefit of this order, or obtaining or using such licence, or claiming the benefit thereof:—And it is hereby further ordered, that no vessel belonging to any state on the coast of Barbary shall be prevented from sailing, with any articles of the growth or produce of such state, from any port or place in such state, to any port or place in the Mediterranean or Portugal, such port or place not being actually blockaded by some naval force belonging to his Majesty, or his allies, without being obliged to touch at Gibraltar or Malta:—And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the judges of the high court of admiralty and courts of vice admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein, as to them shall respectively appertain.

W. FAWKENER.

No. XII.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace the 25th of November, 1807, present, the King's most excellent Majesty in Council.*

Whereas his Majesty, by his order in council of the 11th of November instant, was pleased to order and declare, that all trade in articles which are of the produce or manufacture of the countries and colonies mentioned in the said order, shall be deemed and considered to be unlawful (except as is therein excepted); his Majesty by and with the advice of his privy council, is pleased to order and declare, and it is hereby ordered and declared, that nothing in the said order contained shall extend to subject to capture and confiscation any articles of the produce and manufacture of the said countries and colonies laden on board British ships, which would not have been subject to capture and confiscation if such order had not been made; and the right honourable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and courts of vice admiralty, and the judges of the high court of admiralty are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain.

W. FAWKENER.

No. XIII.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 25th of November, 1807, present, the King's most excellent Majesty in Council.*

His Majesty, taking into consideration the circumstances under which Prussia and Lubeck have been compelled to shut their ports against British ships and goods, is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all ships and goods belonging to Prussia which may have been seized subsequent to his Majesty's order of the nineteenth of November, one thousand eight hundred and six, and are now detained in the ports of this kingdom, or elsewhere, and all ships and goods belonging to inhabitants of Lubeck which are so detained, shall be restored upon being pronounced by the high court of admiralty, or any court of vice admiralty, in which they have been or may be proceeded against, to belong to subjects and inhabitants of Prussia or Lubeck, and not otherwise liable to confiscation; and that such ships and goods shall be permitted to proceed to any neutral port, or to the port to which they respectively belong; and it is further ordered, that the ships and goods belonging to Prussia or Lubeck shall not, until further orders, be liable to detention, provided such ships and goods shall be trading to or from any port of this kingdom, or between neutral port and neutral port, or from any port of his Majesty's allies, and proceeding direct to the port specified in their respective clearances.—And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the judges of the high court of admiralty and courts of vice admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein, as to them shall respectively appertain.—W. FAWKENER.

No. XIV.—*At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 25th of November, 1807, present the King's most excellent Majesty in Council.*

His Majesty taking into consideration the circumstances under which Portugal has been compelled to shut her ports against the ships and goods of his Majesty's subjects, is pleased by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all ships and goods belonging to Portugal which have been, and are now detained in the ports of this kingdom, or elsewhere, shall be restored, upon being pronounced by the high court of admiralty, or by the court of vice admiralty, in which proceedings may have been or shall be commenced to belong to subjects and inhabitants of Portugal, and not otherwise liable to confiscation; and that the said ships and goods shall be permitted to proceed to any neutral port, or to Portugal: And it is further ordered, that the ships and goods belonging to Portugal shall not, until further orders, be liable to detention; provided, such ships and

goods shall be trading to or from any port of this kingdom, or to and from Gibraltar or Malta, and proceeding direct to the port specified in their clearance, or between neutral port and neutral port, or between Portugal and the ports of her own colonies, or from any port of his Majesty's allies, and proceeding direct to the ports specified in their respective clearances; provided, such ports shall not be at the time in a state of actual blockade: And it is further ordered, that the ships of Portugal shall not be considered as entitled, under any treaty between his Majesty and Portugal, to protect any goods laden therein which may be otherwise subject to confiscation.—And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his Majesty's treasury, his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the judges of the high court of admiralty and courts of vice admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain.

W. FAWKENER.

No. XV.—IMPERIAL DECREE.—*Rejoinder to his Britannic Majesty's Order in Council of the 11th November, 1807. At our Royal Palace at Milan, December 17, 1807.*

Napoleon, emperor of the French, king of Italy, and protector of the Rhenish confederation.—Observing the measures adopted by the British government, on the 11th November last, by which vessels belonging to neutral, friendly, or even powers the allies of England, are made liable, not only to be searched by English cruisers, but to be compulsorily detained in England, and to have a tax laid on them of so much per cent. on the cargo, to be regulated by the British legislature:—Observing that by these acts, the British government denationalizes ships of every nation in Europe, that it is not competent for any government to detract from its own independence and rights, all the sovereigns of Europe having in trust the sovereignties and independence of the flag; that if by an unpardonable weakness, and which in the eyes of posterity would be an indelible stain, if such a tyranny was allowed to be established into principles, and consecrated by usage, the English would avail themselves of it to assert it as a right, as they have availed themselves of the tolerance of government to establish the infamous principle, that the flag of a nation does not cover goods, and to have to their right of blockade an arbitrary extension, and which infringes on the sovereignty of every state; we have decreed and do decree as follows:—Art. I. Every ship, to whatever nation it may belong, that shall have submitted to be searched by an English ship, or to a voyage to England, or shall have paid any tax whatsoever to the English government, is thereby and for that alone, declared to be denationalized, to have forfeited the protection of its King, and to have become English property.—Art. II. Whether the ships thus denationalized by the arbitrary measures of the English government, enter

into our ports, or those of our allies, or whether they fall into the hands of our ships of war, or of our privateers, they are declared to be good and lawful prize.—Art. III. The British islands are declared to be in a state of blockade, both by land and sea. Every ship of whatever nation, or whatsoever the nature of its cargo, so may be, that sails from the ports of England, or those of the English colonies, and of the countries occupied by English troops, and proceeding to England, or to the English colonies, or to countries occupied by English troops, is good and lawful prize, as contrary to the present decree, and may be captured by our ships of war, or our privateers, and adjudged to the captor.—Art. IV. These measures, which are resorted to only in just retaliation of the barbarous system adopted by England, which assimilates its legislation to that of Algiers, shall cease to have any effect with respect to all nations who shall have the firmness to compel the English government to respect their flag. They shall continue to be rigorously in force as long as that government does not return to the principle of the law of nations, which regulates the relations of civilized states in a state of war. The provisions of the present decree shall be abrogated and null, in fact, as soon as the English abide again by the principles of the law of nations, which are also the principles of justice and of honour.—All our ministers are charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the bulletin of the laws. NAPOLEON.

H. B. MARET.

Secretary of State.

No. XVI.—*Copy of a Letter from Mr. Pinkney, American Envoy in England, to Lord Wellesley, English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 Aug. 1810.**

I have the honour to state to your Lordship that I have received from Gen. Armstrong, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, a letter bearing date the 6th inst. in which he informs me that the Government of France has revoked the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, and that he has received a written and official notice of that fact in the following words:—"Je suis autorisé à vous déclarer, monsieur, que les Decrets de Berlin et de Milan sont révoqués, et qu'à dater du 1er Novembre ils cesseront d'avoir leur effet."—I take for granted that the revocation of the British Orders in Council of January and November 1807, and April 1809, and all other orders dependant upon, analogous to, or in execution of them, will follow of course; and I shall hope to be enabled by your lordship with as little delay as possible, to announce to my government that such revocation has taken place.

No. XVII.—*Answer of Lord Wellesley to the above.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the re-

* Taken from the American National Intelligencer, 20 Oct. 1810.

ceipt of your letter under date the 25th inst. On the 23d of February 1808, his Majesty's Minister in America declared to the Government of the United States, "His Majesty's earnest desire to see the commerce of the world restored to that freedom which is necessary for its prosperity, and his readiness to abandon the system which had been forced upon him, whenever the enemy should retract the principles which had rendered it necessary."—I am commanded by his Majesty to repeat that declaration, and to assure you that whenever the repeal of the French Decrees shall have actually taken effect, and the commerce of neutral nations shall have been restored to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of those Decrees, his Majesty will feel the highest satisfaction in relinquishing a system, which the conduct of the enemy compelled him to adopt.

No. XVIII.—*Proclamation of the President, and Circular of the Secretary of the Treasury.*—Dated 2nd November, 1810.

PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by the fourth section of the act of Congress, passed on the first day of May, 1810, entitled "An act concerning the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies, and for other purposes," it is provided, "that in case either Great Britain or France shall, before the third of March next, so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President of the United States shall declare by proclamation, and if the other nation shall not within three months thereafter so revoke or modify her edicts in like manner, then the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eighteenth sections of the act entitled "An act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies, and for other purposes," shall, from and after the expiration of three months from the date of the proclamation aforesaid, be revived and have full force and effect, so far as relates to the dominions, colonies, and dependencies, and to the articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the dominions, colonies, and dependencies of the nation thus refusing or neglecting to revoke or modify her edicts in the manner aforesaid. And the restrictions imposed by this act shall, from the date of such proclamation, cease and be discontinued in relation to the nation revoking or modifying her decrees in the manner aforesaid."—And whereas it has been officially made known to this government that the edicts

of France violating the neutral commerce of the United States have been so revoked as to cease to have effect on the first of the present month.—Now, therefore, I, James Madison, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim, that the said edicts of France have been so revoked as that they ceased on the said first day of the present month to violate the neutral commerce of the United States; and that, from the date of these presents, all the restrictions imposed by the aforesaid act shall cease and be discontinued in relation to France and her dependencies.—In testimony whereof, I have caused the Seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed, and signed the same with my hand at the city of Washington, this second day of November, in the year of our Lord 1810, and of the independence of the United States the thirty-fifth.

JAMES MADISON.

CIRCULAR.

To the Collectors of the Customs.

Sir,—You will herewith receive a copy of the Proclamation of the President of the United States, announcing the revocation of the edicts of France which violated the neutral commerce of the United States, and that the restrictions, imposed by the Act of May 1st last, accordingly cease from this day in relation to France. French armed vessels may, therefore, be admitted into the harbours and waters of the United States, any thing in that law to the contrary notwithstanding.—It also follows, that if Great Britain shall not, on the 2nd day of February next, have revoked or modified in like manner her edicts violating the neutral commerce of the United States, the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 18th sections of the "Act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies, and for other purposes," shall, in conformity with the act first above mentioned, be revived and have full force and effect, so far as relates to Great Britain and her dependencies, from and after the said 2nd day of February next. Unless, therefore, you shall before that day be officially notified by this department of such revocation or modification, you will, from and after the said day, carry into effect the above mentioned sections, which prohibit both the entrance of British vessels of every description into the harbours and waters of the United States, and the importation into the United States of any articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the dominions, colonies, and dependencies of Great Britain, and of any articles whatever brought from the said dominions, colonies, and dependencies.—I am, respectfully, Sir, your obedient servant,

ALBERT GALLATIN.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 38.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1840. [Price 1s.

"The Prince holds, that it is an undoubted fundamental principle of the Constitution, that the Powers and Privileges of the Crown are vested there, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and that they are sacred only as they are necessary to the preservation of that power and balance of the Constitution, which experience has proved to be the true security of the liberty of the subject."—PRINCE OF WALES'S Answer to the Propositions of 1788.

[1317]-----[1318]

PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

HAVING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XXI.

Appointment of the Bullion Committee.—Names of the Members.—Quantity of Bank-notes, compared with the quantity of real money.—Amount of Bank of England notes in 1797, and at this time.—Number of Country Banks.—Probable amount of their notes.—Amount of real money in the Bank of England.—Probable amount of real money, in the hands of the Country Bankers.

Gentlemen,

We have now arrived at a point whence we can see to the end of our discussion. We have seen how the Bank and the Stocks and the Bank Notes arose; we have seen that they all grew up with the National Debt and the Taxes; we have seen, that, at last, the Bank Notes became so large in amount that they could no longer be paid in money at the Bank Shop in Threadneedle Street; we have seen the means that have, in the several stages, been resorted to, in order to protect the Bank Company against the demands of its creditors, the holders of its notes; and we have had a pretty fair view of the conduct of all the parties concerned in these transactions. With the EVIL and with the causes of the Evil we are now well acquainted: it only remains for us to obtain as good information with respect to a REMEDY.

To discover and point out a REMEDY were the objects of the BULLION COMMITTEE, of whom I must speak here a little more fully than I hitherto have done. This Committee, consisting of the member, whose names you will find below*, was, as I stated in Letter I, appointed by the House of Commons, during the last session of parliament, "to inquire into the cause of the high price of Gold Bullion, and to take into consideration the state of the circulating medium, &c. &c. and to report the same to the House." They did so; and their Report was, by the House of Commons, ordered to be printed on the 5th of June last.

This Report, after showing that the Bank Notes have depreciated; after giving very clear proofs of this fact, and also of the fact that the depreciation must continue to increase, unless put a stop to by some means or other; after this, the Report recommends, as a remedy, that the Bank Company shall be, by law, compelled to pay their notes in cash, as formerly, in two years from this time; and, therefore, the only great object which remains for our consideration, is, whether this proposed remedy be practicable, or, whether it be one that cannot be put in practice.

In order to arrive at a correct conclusion as to this great question, upon which, as you must already have perceived, the very existence,* not only of the paper-money system, but also of the Stocks or

* Mr. Horner
Mr. Henry Thornton
Mr. Sharp
Mr. Huskisson
Mr. Tierney
Mr. Grenfell
Mr. Parnell
Mr. Brand
Mr. George Johnstone
Mr. Dickens
Mr. Magens

Mr. Davies Giddy
Mr. Abercrombie
Mr. Baring
Mr. Foster
Mr. Sheridan
Lord Temple
Mr. Percival
Mr. Long
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Manning,

Funds, entirely depends, we must, 1st, take a view of the *quantity of paper-money now afloat*, compared with the quantity of real money and bullion in the hands of the Bank Company and in those of the Country Bankers; 2nd, we must inquire into the *rate of the depreciation of the paper-money*; 3rd, we must inquire into the *means which the Bank Company would have of obtaining real money*, wherewith to redeem, or pay off, their notes, or any considerable part of them, and, if we shall find, that for them to do this would be impossible, our conclusion must be, that the Bank Company cannot return to their payments in gold and silver.

The discussion of these matters I shall divide into three Letters, in this first of which I shall take a view of the *quantity of paper money now afloat*, compared with the quantity of *real money* in the hands of the *Bank Company* and in those of the *Country Bankers*.

The amount of *Bank of England* notes in circulation before the Stoppage of payments in Gold and Silver, in the year 1797, was, as the Committee state, between 10 and 11 millions of pounds. But, as it was natural to expect, when the Bank Company was protected by Act of Parliament against the demands of their creditors, they immediately began to *increase* the quantity of their notes; and, let me ask, what lover of gain would not do the same? Where shall we find a private person of that description, who would not increase the issues of his promissory notes as long as any one would take them, if there were an Act of parliament to protect him against the demands of the holders of those promissory notes?

That the consequence, which was naturally to be expected, did take place was very well known, and had been clearly shown in the Register, and much commented upon therein, long before, several years before, the Bullion Committee existed, the readers of the Register need not be told. But, the Bullion Committee have *verified* the facts and opinions given, in this respect, in the Register; they have published to the world, through the channel of the House of Commons, that, what had been before published in the Register, relating to this matter, was *sound and true*.

They state, with regard to the amount

of the Bank of England notes, that, previous to the Stoppage of cash payments, in 1797, and the consequent Act of protection to the Bank, the amount of these notes "was between TEN and ELEVEN millions, hardly ever falling below NINE, "and not often exceeding ELEVEN;" and that, in May, 1810, the amount was upwards of TWENTY ONE millions.

Gentlemen, you who have so recently felt the effects of a paper-money, not convertible into gold and silver, look at this. You see, that the amount of the Bank of England notes has been doubled in the course of 13 years, even according to the account *given in by the Bank Company themselves*. It is not my intention to insinuate, that this account is not a true one; but, it is right that we should know, that this statement has been made by the Bullion Committee from an account made out and presented to the Committee by the Bank Company themselves; and that, therefore, we may rest perfectly satisfied, that the amount of the increase in their notes has not been stated too high.

But, as yet, we have seen only one limb, and, perhaps, the least fruitful of this paper-money tree. The other, the *Country Banks*, has been, according to all appearance, much more prolific. It appears from the Report, that, before the Stoppage, or Restriction law was passed, there were TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY Country Banks, and that, in April last, they had increased to SEVEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY ONE; which is an increase more than threefold as to the *number of Banks*, and, if we allow, as it is reasonable to do, that the notes of the old banks also increased in quantity, the addition in the whole amount must have been prodigious. No wonder that gold, and crown pieces, disappeared; for how were they to be expected to remain in circulation along with such masses of paper?

As to the *amount* of the *Country Notes* at either of the periods before-mentioned, or, at any period at all, the Bullion Committee say, that they are unable to *ascertain* it with any degree of precision; but, from certain returns obtained by them from the stamp office, they show, that, after making all allowances, and taking the matter in the most favourable point of view, there was, during the year 1809,

in the 5 and 10 pound notes alone, an INCREASE to the amount of more than THREE MILLIONS; and, from the other notes which appear to have been stamped in that year, there could not be an increase of less than TWO MILLIONS more in the Country notes for other sums. In that same year there was an increase of a MILLION AND A HALF in the amount of the Bank of England notes; so that, in the year 1809, the total amount of the increase of the Notes of all sorts could not be less than *six millions and a half*. And yet "the most thinking people" seem to be quite astonished, that they no longer see any guineas; that guineas are bought up and sent abroad; and that people in trade purchase, at a premium, with Bank Notes, the things called shillings and sixpences, from the keepers of the Turnpike Gates.

The amount of the Country notes, though it has not been ascertained by the Bullion Committee, and though they were unable to ascertain it, may be computed with a tolerable degree of accuracy, seeing that they have ascertained and stated, that there was, in the 5 and 10 pound notes alone, an increase to the amount of *three millions* of pounds in the year 1809, and in the whole of the Bank of England notes to the amount of *a million and a half*; for, unless any one can see, which I cannot, any reason for a greater proportionate increase in the Country Bank paper than in the London Bank paper, the question is nothing more than a very plain one in the Rule of Three (if one ought, in such a case, to be permitted to use the *Golden Rule*), and which question would thus present itself: if 1,500,000, of increase require a total amount of issues of 21,249,980, what total amount of issues will be required by an increase of 3,095,340. The Answer will be 43,000,000 and upwards. And, if we make our computation upon the increase of 5,000,000, we shall find the whole amount of Country Bank notes, in 1809, to have been 70,000,000 and upwards, which, there being 721 Country Banks, is less than 100,000 for each; and, it is well known, that many of them have half a million of notes out. Your great Bank, at Salisbury, had, I believe, notes out to the amount of 600,000 pounds.

Now, I am not aware of any thing that can be said against this mode of com-

putation. I am, for my own part, fully persuaded that it is fair; and, that the result of it is not very far from the truth. But, in order to leave no room for cavil, let us suppose the amount of the Country notes to be only one half what it ~~here~~ computed at. Even in that case there must be now in circulation paper promissory to the amount of 50 millions of pounds and upwards.

This, then, is the sum against which we have to set the coin and bullion, the gold and silver in the hands of the London Bank Company, and in those of the Country Bankers. What is the exact amount of this no one can tell, but every one must suppose, that comparatively, it is *very small indeed*; for, if this had not been the case with regard to the Bank Company, even in 1797, why did they not state the amount of their real money? Why were they so shy upon that score? And, indeed, if their stock of real money had not been *very low indeed*, why did they apply to the Minister to know when he would interfere? If they could, have stood a run of a week, they would have needed no Act of Parliament to protect them against the demands of the note holders. But this they could not stand; and there needs no other proof of the smallness of the quantity of their cash.

In Letter XV, page 837, we have seen, that the whole amount of their *Cash and Bullion and Bills discounted* was only 3,176,080 pounds, on the 25th of February, 1797. As was there asked, who is to say how much of this consisted of *Bills discounted*? If more than one half had consisted of cash and bullion they would not have been jumbled together with *Bills discounted*. Indeed, the cash, at that time, in possession of the Bank Company, was computed at 1,272,000 pounds, and, in a speech of Mr. TERNER, quoted in Letter XX, page 1161, it is stated at 1,000,000 of pounds. There is no *certainty* in this, to be sure; but, Gentlemen, we are quite certain of one thing, and that is, that when men, whether single, or in companies, have plenty of pecuniary means, they never are very anxious to *disguise* the fact.

Is it probable then, that the quantity of cash in the hands of the London Bank Company has *increased* since 1797? Is it likely that, if they had but about a *million* before they were protected against the demands of

the note-holders, they have *increased* the quantity *since*? Will "the *most thinking*" people believe this? If they will there is certainly no doubt but they are prepared for the verification of the old proverb about believing that the "moon is made of green cheese."

And, as to the Country Banks, to suppose that they contain any thing worthy of notice, in *gold or bullion*, would be too absurd to be treated seriously. The *moon-raking* adventure, which has been ascribed to a *Wiltshireman*, was thus applied by DEAN SWIFT at the memorable time of the South-Sea Bubble, when so many thousands and tens of thousands of families were ruined by jobbers and dealers in Funds and Stocks:

One night a fool went to bed,

Thus from a halloo taking down,

The *Gold-estate* for *gold and cash*,

And set a *Country Bank* for *cash*.

The point he could no longer doubt,

He ran, he leapt into the road,

There sprang and fell, and lay on his back out,

All covered o'er with stone and mud.

But, Gentlemen, foolish as our poor countryman was, in this case, he was not half so worthy of ridicule as we should be, if we, with all the information we now possess, or have, at least, had the means of possessing, were still to believe, that Country Bankers have, or ever will have, or can have, gold or silver sufficient to pay off a thousandth part of the notes that they have issued.

After taking this view of the matter; after comparing the amount of the Bank notes with the amount of the Cash and Bullion, in the hands of those by whom the notes have been issued, ought we to wonder, that those persons and all their friends deprecate the notion of paying again in cash? You have seen, Gentlemen, in the course of these Letters, that the Bank Company have been represented, upon several occasions, as being perfectly *ready* to pay again in cash, and that they have, upon all occasions, been represented as *able* to pay again in cash. You have, all along, heard the Stoppage spoken of as a *temporary* measure; as a measure to last only *for a time*; the pretences were lame, to be sure, but still there were pretences. Now, all this is

thrown aside, and they say, in plain terms, that not to pay in cash is a very good *permanent system*.

With such a mass of paper and so little coin and bullion, it was not to be expected, that the paper would not *depreciate* or fall in value: but, as I wish to make this depreciation the subject of a separate Letter, I shall here conclude by subscribing myself

Your faithful friend,

WM. COLBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,

December 17, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"Lord Wellington has been heard, in conversation with his officers, to laugh at Massena for getting so completely into the snare."—*COVENTRY*, 18th Nov. 1810.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—Following this Summary the reader will find dispatches from the Lord Marshal Viscount Talavera and Baron Domo, giving an account of certain reinforcements, which have passed, or are joining MASSENA, who, in addition to his title of Prince of Essling, is, we are told, by the ministerial newspapers, an old *Serjeant*, and, of course, was once a *Corporal*, a person of "coarse" manners, as must be expected from his having had *no education*.—We must bear these circumstances in mind, reader, because they will serve to explain many things that have happened, and that may yet happen.—In the meanwhile, let us look at the *intelligence*, contained in these official papers.—MR. SILVEIRA did, it seems, fall in with some of the French reinforcements upon their route, and harassed them a great deal; nay, it would appear, that he *beat* them; but, they, nevertheless, *kept on their way*; and, it seems, have since joined Serjeant Massena.—Our Lord Marshal writes to MR. FORJAZ (for the information of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent), that the Serjeant has not shewn much disposition to go away any further; and that he, the Lord Marshal, "*may possibly be induced to return to his position*;" but that he has *no apprehension of any danger from an attack being made upon him there*. And, the Portuguese Government, in a Proclamation, issued in consequence of the intelligence from Lord Talavera, orders all *corn, cattle, &c.* to be removed from the ground which the Serjeant's army before occupied, *lest the Serjeant and his army should return to it*.—

What! are there then, *cattle* and other means of subsistence yet to be found upon that same ground, where the Serjeant's army were so long *starving and stewing down their horses* to make soup of. These Serjeants are an odd sort of fellows. They do nothing in a genteel or regular way. That is not much wonder, being persons of *coarse manners* and of "*no education*," understanding not a word of either *Latin* or *Greek*, being, when at a loss for fact or argument or words, quite unable to litch in a quotation from Virgil or Horace wherewith to excite a simper in features, where frivolous stupidity stands personified, and wherewith to make vulgar ignorance pay an adulatory stare; being persons of this description, it is not much wonder that they should prefer the flesh of horses to that of *cattle*, and that they should go without bread in a country, whence it is now necessary to remove the *corn*.—But, after all, can it be true, that this same army of Massena, is about to come back again *in face of the lines of Torres Vedras*? To come back again into the *trap*? How they got out of the trap has always appeared wonderful to me. When we catch things in traps, they seldom get away without the loss of a foot or a tail, or getting a wound of some sort; and, at any rate, we never find them come back again voluntarily into the trap.—It is, however, time to drop this way of treating the subject, and to consider seriously what are our present prospects with regard to the war in Portugal, which has so long been made the means of deceiving and cheating the people of this duped country.—Hard is the labour now performed by the venal prints to persuade the public, that they ought not to be disappointed and chagrined, if the armies should remain in their present positions *during the winter*; and, indeed, they give us to understand, that, if our General is able to remain where he is till spring, he will have been *successful*, they say, "*eminently successful*," in the campaign.—Oh! ye "*most thinking*" "people" of all Europe, and that Lord Stormont had ever had the good fortune to meet with, pray do *think* a little upon this subject.—What was the object of this war? For what *purpose* did we engage to send 30,000 English troops to Portugal and to pay another 30,000 of Portuguese, having added, since, greatly to those numbers? For what purpose did we incur the enormous expence attending such a war? Was it not for the purpose of *defending* Portu-

gal? Was it not for the purpose of *keeping the French out of Portugal*? Was it not for the purpose of keeping them out, or *driving them back* after they got in? Was it not for the preserving of Portugal under the government of the Queen or the Prince Regent? Was not this the avowed object of the war? All the world knows that it was; all the world knows that this object was avowed over and over again. And, indeed, it is manifest that there could be no other rational object either avowed or entertained.—Well, then, if we do not succeed in this object, how is it possible for any one to have the impudence to tell us, that our efforts will have been attended with *success*?—But, though the *war* should fail of success, the *campaign*, we are told, may have been *successful*, and we are boldly told, this "*most thinking people*" are boldly told, that it has been successful, and that we ought to look upon Lord Talavera as a General, who has been "*eminently successful*."—As *how*, good venal gentlemen? He was fitted out with an army of 60,000 men. He marched to the frontiers of Portugal, the country that it was our professed object to defend. He stood there and saw the army of Massena besiege and capture the Spanish city of Rodrigo. He next, after having put a garrison into Almeida, a frontier town of Portugal, took up a new position and kept it while the French besieged and took that very Almeida. He then made retrograde movements; he took up new positions; he threw back his flanks; and so forth, till he came to Bussaco, where, having posted himself upon some ridges of hills, and being attacked by the French, he gained a *signal victory* over them, leaving, as he says, 2,000 of them dead upon the field of battle. Having gained this victory he instantly falls back with his victorious army, lest the beaten enemy should get in his rear, and cut off his retreat towards Lisbon. He now pushes on towards Lisbon with his victorious army, followed close at their heels by the beaten French army, till he reaches his lines at Torres Vedras, within about 20 miles of Lisbon and his ships.—Now, here really do not appear any very strong marks of *eminent success*; for the enemy has not been *kept out* of Portugal; he has not been *driven out* after he got in; and has *followed* (some people would call it *pursued*) our army from the frontiers of Portugal to within a few miles of their shipping.—Aye; but, this is

a shallow view of the matter. Our General intended to bring the French army to Torres Vedras, we were then told. He drew them after him to the spot, which he had fixed on for the field of battle from the very out-set of the campaign; and that the drawing of them to that very spot was the accomplishment of a plan maturely laid and most judiciously executed by the most able master in the art of war. Massena, we were told, was got into the trap that had been laid for him, and Lord Talavera laughed at him; all which the people of this country believed. — Oh! what a “most thinking people!”

— Well, having got him into the trap, having drawn him to that very spot on which our General wished to fight him, what next takes place? Why, he goes away from that spot, he withdraws from the trap, and is not attacked. While he lies there unmolested, he fortifies, behind him, a place so strongly, that our army, in attempting to harass him, is kept in check by his rear guard. And, after weeks waiting here, we are now told, by our general himself, that he may be induced to come back again into his lines, and that it is possible that the French may come after him, and take up their old ground opposite his lines. — Such, without any exaggeration, is the history of the campaign as it has been, by the venal prints, given to the people of England. And yet this people are still to be told, that the campaign has been “eminently successful.” — The situation of Lisbon, and of the small part of the country within the lines of our army, must necessarily be distressing in the extreme. Long ago, as will be seen by a reference to the documents inserted in the Register, the Portuguese government was obliged to fix a sort of MAXIMUM upon house-rent and lodgings, upon carriages and boats, and upon the necessities of life. The French have now spread out their detachments into the only part of the country to which Lisbon could send its surplus population, and, therefore, I should suppose, that the maintenance of the whole of the population must very soon fall upon us. The expence of this will be enormous. The provisions alone would, in the space of six months, cost several millions. It is quite impossible to calculate the cost; but that its amount must be very great every one must perceive. — There will, as I before observed, be compensations for losses and sufferings to be made; and, who is to find the means for that? In short, unless we

finally succeed in this Portuguese war, it is impossible for even those who view it in the worst light, to form an idea of the calamities that will arise out of it to this country. And yet, are there men impudent enough to assert, and others foolish enough to believe, or base enough to affect to believe, that the war will have been “eminently successful,” if our army should be able merely to keep their present quarters during the winter! — Again let me quote the words of Cowper:

Hear the just law, the judgment of the skies:
He that hates truth, shall be the dupe of lies:
And he that will be cheated to the last,
Delusion, strong as Hell, shall bind him fast.

It is useless to attempt to lay the blame of the delusion upon the venal impostors. They only labour in their vocation. The blame is with the people themselves; for, if they preferred truth to falsehood, truth they would have.

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. — King's Illness. — (Continued from page 1083). — At the place here referred to, an account of the proceedings, relative to this matter to the 29th of Nov., when the two Houses adjourned to the 13th of this month, when they met again, and having appointed a Committee of each to examine the Physicians, they adjourned until Monday the 17th instant, when they met again, for the purpose of receiving the reports of those Committees. — A full account of all these proceedings will, of course, be given in the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES*; and, therefore, I need here give but a mere outline of what has passed upon this occasion. — The HOUSE OF LORDS adjourned at once till next Wednesday; but, in the lower House, the Report having been laid upon the Table, and ordered to be printed, Mr. PERCEVAL, the Minister, said, that he should move that it be taken into consideration on Thursday next, when a call of the House is to take place. The House, he said he should propose to form into a committee of the whole on the “State of the Nation.” He further said, that he should then propose three preliminary resolutions: — “1st. “That on account of his Majesty's indis-

* Which will this Session and in future, be published in parts, so as to be put into the hands of the subscribers in a very short time after they have taken place.

"position he was unable to discharge the duties of the Kingly Office.—2d. That it was the duty of the House to see that the Kingly Office be properly filled.—And 3d. That it was necessary to provide for the proper discharge of the same by way of a Bill, to pass through both Houses of Parliament." Mr. PONSENBY said, that, to the first resolution he should agree; that, with regard to the second, there might be some difference of opinion; but that, as to the third, he should strenuously oppose it, being of opinion, that the proceeding meant to be engrafted on it could not fail to degrade the kingly office.—Mr. SHERIDAN is reported to have said that he "wished that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should, in the interval which would elapse before Thursday, take into his reconsideration what he had this night stated to the House. The right honourable Gentleman leaves out all the circumstances in which the present period differs from 1788. There was another method for the consideration of the House, much more constitutional and safe than the one which the Minister has proposed. The Right Honourable Gentleman cannot surely have known all the debates which took place in 1788. In the party heat of those days, many things were said, and much was done, with which he cannot well be acquainted. He cannot surely have considered the letter which the Prince of Wales thought proper to write on that occasion, a letter which does the highest honour to the Princely heart, and which contains arguments, all of which in his opinion were unanswerable. In the first two objects of the Resolutions proposed by the Right Honourable Gentleman, he had no doubt all would agree; but in endeavouring to supply that deficiency, with every security for his Majesty's safety there were two modes of proceeding; and he believed, that the mode which he should propose was both plainer and better than that proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There was a precedent, which since the Union with Ireland it was equally proper for this House to look up to, the precedent of the Irish Parliament in 1788, which voted an address to the Prince, that he would be pleased to take upon him the Regency, and expressing the confidence of both Houses of Parliament, that the Prince would consent to

"such resolutions and limitations as to these Houses should seem meet. He would propose to the House the precedent of the Resolution, when the Crown was offered to King William on his declaration, that he would accompany the Sovereign power with such limitations as might be judged necessary for the security of the subject. This mode was adopted by the best patriots of that day, and was not such a mode of proceeding fully sufficient for the rights and liberties of the subject? The Right Honourable Gentleman will in adopting it attain his object with the cordial and unanimous consent of all parties, without degradation of the Kingly power, and without throwing any reflections on a Prince deservedly dear to the nation."—Mr. PERCEVAL complained of Mr. SHERIDAN's having gone into argument in anticipation, and said that he did not despair of convincing the House that what he had to propose was proper, and not at all tending to degrade the Royal Authority.—Mr. ADAM said, that "the Chancellor of the Exchequer's communication kept the House entirely in the dark as to his future measures, and did not put the matter on a fair footing, so as to give a clear understanding of the subject to those who were to deliberate and decide between the two modes of proceeding. That from this imperfect communication the Right Honourable Gentleman was obliging the House to take a leap in the dark. He said, that besides the Resolutions to address the Prince to take upon himself the Government in his Majesty's name, there would be Resolutions incorporated into, or to accompany the Address, which would secure his Majesty's person being placed under such care, and protected by such regulations; as would ensure the King's return to the discharge of his Regal functions, the moment that he should be in a capacity to discharge them. That when these Resolutions, formed into an Address, were presented to his Royal Highness the Prince, the securities for the fulfilment of them by future statutory provisions would, as his Right Hon. Friend (Mr. Sheridan) had said be placed on the very basis on which the liberties of the people were secured at the Revolution."—After a few words more, of little importance, the motion for a call of the House on Thursday next passed, and the House adjourned to that day.—

Thus then, after the King has been declared unable to attend to public business for the space of nearly *two months*, a *bill*, it seems, is to be proposed on the 20th instant, to authorize some one to exercise the royal functions, which bill, to say nothing else of it, may be a month, or, *as long as the Houses please*, under discussion; and, of course, the exercise of the royal functions may still remain suspended for an *indefinite length of time*.—I have before stated fully my reasons against any *abridgment* of the Kingly powers, in the hands of the Prince, all which reasons apply with equal force against any *delay* in putting those powers into his hands; for, if the exercise of those powers can be, without injury to the nation, dispensed with for *months*, what must be the inevitable conclusion? If for *months*, why not for *years*? And, if for *years*, why not for *ever*?—It is, to me, as clear as the sun at noon day, that every measure of this sort strikes at the very foundation of the Kingly part of the constitution; and, I do think, that this is so plain, that I am utterly astonished how any man can view it, or pretend to view it, in any other light.—Looking upon what Mr. SHERIDAN said as corresponding with the sentiments of His Royal Highness, the Prince, I must confess, that it gives me great satisfaction, containing, as I regard it, a proof, that he is not eager to grasp at his father's power, and that he will not take it into his hands accompanied with any *degrading conditions*. It is true, that no conditions or limitations were suggested, or hinted at; but, if the precedent, as it is called, of 1788, of the two Houses in England, is to be followed as to a *bill* to vest him with the office of Regent, is it not to be presumed, that the *bill* then proposed will also be taken as a precedent? And, against the terms of *that bill*, we know that the Prince protested.—But, how can a *bill* be passed, or even entertained? On all sides it has been agreed, that the two Houses without a King are *not a parliament*. How, then, can they pass, or discuss a *bill*? It is allowed, on all hands, that they cannot, in their present state, pass a road or canal bill; and can they then, make a law to transfer the Kingly power from the hands of the King to those of the Prince of Wales! There appears to me to be something so manifestly inconsistent in this, that I must see the project seriously entertained, I must see the bill before the Houses and through some of

its stages, before I shall believe that it will ever be acted upon. *Who* is to consummate the work of making such a *law*? The Regent? Why, if it require a *law* to make him Regent, he cannot be Regent, till the law is *complete*; and, of course, he cannot give his sanction to a bill, by which he is to be constituted Regent. So that, if this measure, if this proceeding by the way of bill, should be adopted, we shall, for once in our lives, see an Act *passed*; a law *made* and *put in force*, upon the authority of the TWO HOUSES alone.—The mode of proceeding by way of *Address* is the natural way. It is a mode corresponding with our settled notions relative to the Kingly office and powers; it has no jumble or inconsistency in it, and, which is another great recommendation, it obviates all further *delay*, all further suspension of the exercise of those powers, which, as Mr. ADAM observed, are *trusting* in the hands of the King for the good of his people, an observation, which, as will be seen in my motto, was made by the Prince himself, in his Answer to the Propositions of 1788.—But, if the mode of proceeding of 1788 was improper *then*; if procrastination was then not to be tolerated, what are we to think of it *now*, when it is impossible that the Kingly functions can be suspended for a week without serious injury to the nation, unless we were to agree, that they are never of any use at all.—I do not, and I have not in any instance, viewed this as a *party* question; and, as such it ought never to be viewed; but, I cannot help observing, with regard to the paragraphs, which have appeared in the venal prints, respecting the *resolution of the Prince to make no changes of men in power*, first, that I do not believe the fact; but, secondly, and chiefly, that to make any mere changes of *men* would produce no consequences, in which the nation would feel at all interested, or in which they really would have any, even the smallest degree, of interest. I am not pretending, that one set of men may not have more *talents* than another set, but what of that, if those talents are not usefully exerted? I mean usefully for the *people*, and not exclusively for themselves.—Perhaps there never was, in the whole world, any nation exposed to so great danger as that to which England is now exposed. She has long held her head as high as the highest, and she must still so carry herself, or she must become a vassal, a dependence of France. There is no other

alternative. No *compromising*, no affected *moderation*, no submission *in part*, will save her, or even postpone her overthrow for one single hour. This is my decided opinion. And, in spite of the overwhelming power and implacable hostility, with which she is menaced, she still possesses in herself all the means, not only of *defence*, but of maintaining her wouted greatness.——These means, however, are of a nature not to be exerted without two things, *Conciliation in Ireland*, and a *constitutional reform of Parliament*; and to both which there is, I trust, every reason to suppose, that his Royal Highness, the Prince of Wales, is perfectly friendly. I was told this, and from what I deemed good authority, long ago; and I sincerely believe it.——These measures adopted, we might, indeed, laugh at Napoleon and his fleets. He will have fleets. It is useless to affect to laugh at the idea; for have them he will. It is not in our power to prevent his having fleets, and powerful fleets too; and, the way for us to set them at defiance is to unite the people of Ireland and England, and to give them one heart and one mind in their country's defence.——The Letter of Sir WILLIAM GEARY, which I subjoin to this Summary, speaks the sentiments of an honest uncorrupted English gentleman as to *parliamentary reform*, which, as he justly observes, is not less necessary to the preservation of the constitutional prerogatives of the king than to that of the rights and liberties of the people. Will the venal herd say that Sir WILLIAM GEARY is a *Jacobin*? It is likely they may; but, I trust, that the Prince of Wales has profited too much from the fate of so many old governments to listen to such assertions. He must, too, I should think, have observed at home, that those, who have been most strenuous in their endeavours to obtain a reform of the Commons' House of Parliament, have invariably set their face against all attempts to deprive the Crown of its just prerogatives, and, especially against all the numerous vile attempts to lower and degrade *him* in the eyes of the people. There have been, before parliament, several measures, relative to His Royal Highness, since Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, the great champion of Reform, has been a member of the House of Commons. Let the slanderers of the Honourable Baronet and the pretended friends of the Crown point to one of them, in which Sir Francis did not take the side of the Prince,

let them point to one single instance, in which he refused his hearty assent to any measure calculated to support the dignity and splendour of the Crown, or to afford personal gratification to any member of the Royal Family. They can point to no such instance; but, they may point to several, in which he has explicitly protested against such measures as tended to make any of the branches of the Royal Family *dependent upon the minister of the day*. The reader will want nothing to persuade him, that this conduct in Sir FRANCIS BURDETT did not arise from any motive of private interest. He wants nothing, and never has wanted any thing, from any part of the Royal Family, except what, in common with the rest of the people, he had a right to expect at their hands. There is nothing that they could bestow upon him, as an individual, that he would set any value upon, except marks of their esteem. He has, in this part of his conduct, been guided by the principles of the constitution; those same principles which have urged him, and which still will urge him, to call for a *parliamentary reform*; that reform, without which the people of this Kingdom, will, in my opinion, never be cordially united; and without which their country will never again enjoy one moment of real peace or safety.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Tuesday, 18th Dec. 1810.*

SIR WILLIAM GEARY'S LETTER ON PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

To the Editors of the Kentish Chronicle.

Oxen Hoath, Dec. 4, 1810.

Sirs,—It would have been a high gratification to me, to have stated at the late County Meeting, held at Maidstone, the means, which to my mind, appear adequate to bring about that Reform in Parliament, which was there decided upon as necessary, by an unanimous vote; but a conviction that a popular Meeting is ill calculated for the discussion of the detail of a subject, restrained me at the moment.——The means which appear to me as sufficient to secure this great national object are these:

1st,—That in all Boroughs the right of voting should be in the inhabitants paying rates or some Tax, proving an equivalent occupation.—That their numbers must

amount to not less than five hundred.—That the number of voters paying Rates, or some Tax, proving an equivalent occupation, should be returned to parliament every three years, and that any deficiency should be made up from the adjacent villages.—That all Boroughs at present inhabited by less than five hundred paying rates, or some Tax, proving an equivalent occupation, shall be disfranchised, and their Members added to the great towns not having the elective franchise, and to London and Westminster.

2ndly,—That the Poll for counties be taken by the districts in which the Justices act in their petty Session.—The Sheriff to appoint a sheriff depute for each district, who shall meet him with the Fells of their different districts at the County Town: and from these Polls he is to make his return.—Every voter to vote in the district in which he resides; his freehold to be registered in the district in which he resides, and also in the district in which the freehold is situated.—A voter, being a non-resident in the county, must vote in the district in which his freehold is situated

3rdly,—All voters to vote by ballot.

4thly,—Parliaments to be triennial.

By increasing the number of voters in Boroughs, and voting by ballot, corruption would be annihilated: the honest voter might exercise his franchise without fear of ruin, and the dishonest voter would not be able to barter his country's interest for his own; as no one would bribe a secret vote.—By voting by districts in Counties, Elections would be held without expence; and Candidates, who possess talents for business, and feelings calculated to maintain the honour of Parliament, to support a good Administration, and to oppose a bad one, would never be wanting in this country.—The voting by ballot is requisite to the freedom of Election.—That Parliaments should be triennial, is essential to the spirit of representation.—I have now stated what appears to me to be an easy remedy to a great and flagrant national evil.—I have stated a Plan of Reform in Parliament, which at the same time, I think, is moderate and radical. If I am mistaken, I trust justice will be done to my motive.—After the active part I have taken, as one of those who called the County Meeting, I have done but my duty in making this statement.—Some men, from the best motives, fear the discussion of this subject in the present situation of

the country. I own I fear the consequence of not discussing it.—The conquests on the Continent should deeply impress upon our minds this political truth, that the victories of a foreign foe are easy, when a people are rendered indifferent to the honour and glory of their country, by the imbecility of their political state.—The evil to be remedied is of a radical nature—it strikes at the root of all principle.—The barter of Ministerial Patronage for Parliamentary Influence is now notorious and established:—it extends through all professions and all departments of the state—a bar to merit, and a reward to corruption; thereby diminishing the salutary effects and consequences of the prerogative of the Crown, weakening the legitimate power and energy of the Executive through all its branches; and ultimately influencing and destroying the check of the democratic part of the Constitution—the vital principle of Liberty in our system of government.—I am, Sirs, Your humble Servant, WM. GEARY.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Extract of a Dispatch from his Excellency Marshal General Lord Wellington to his Excellency Don Miguel Pereira Forjaz, dated Cartaxo, November 24th, 1810.*

I have received accounts from General Silveira, the dates of which come down to the 16th inst. The advanced corps of the enemy having reached Pinhel, the above-mentioned General attacked and drove back their advanced posts on the 14th, taking 4 officers and many soldiers prisoners, and killing and wounding a great number. Gen. Silveira states that our loss consists of about 30 killed and nearly the same number wounded. He commends in the strongest terms the good conduct of the officers and soldiers, and particularly those of the Portuguese regiment, No. 24.—Inclosed I transmit to your Excellency a copy of the dispatch of Gen. Silveira, of the date the 16th of the present month.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR,—I yesterday had the honour to communicate to your Excellency the result of the action which I had with the enemy, though I am not able as yet to give you a more circumstantial account, as I have not received the returns of the different corps engaged, but I can assure your Excellency, that the loss of the enemy was greater than I stated it

yesterday, and I believe that ours does not exceed 25 or 30 men, and the number of the wounded was about the same. Yesterday, after the action, the enemy rallied in the plain leading from Valverde to Cobesso; and I collected my whole division on the other side of that village, and began to retire upon Pinhel, without the enemy daring to attack my rear-guard, as he believed that only a part of the troops had been engaged in the action, and that the principal force remained on the brow of the mountain, where I had placed some pieces of artillery for that purpose. I caused the troops to rest and refresh themselves at Pinhel. I then retired along this side of the river Tíga, and to-day marched into these quarters. The enemy entered Pinhel in the night, and immediately divided into two columns, one of which took the road to Marialva, and the other to Frixedas, though I cannot exactly vouch for the accuracy of this.—God preserve your Excellency. FRANCISCO DE SILVEIRA.—*Head-quarters, Francisco, Nov. 16, 1810.*—P. S. I am persuaded that the enemy for these two or three days, conformable to what the prisoners tell me, cannot attack me with more than 7,000 men.

PORTUGAL.—*Copy of an Official Communication from Lord Wellington to his Excellency Don Miguel Pereira Forjaz, bearing date the 21st Nov. 1810.*

The enemy has retreated from the position which he occupied during the last month, his right being supported by Sobral, and the left by Riba-Tejo. His retreat took place in the night between the 13th and 14th inst. in the direction of Alenquer and Alcoentre with his right, and his left fell back by the road of Villa Nova; in the same manner he continued his retreat the following days to the environs of Santarem. The allied Army filed off from the positions it occupied in the morning of the 15th instant following the enemy's march, and the advanced guard of this army reached Alenquer on the 15th of this month, while on the 16th the English horse with the advanced guard arrived in Azambujor and Alcoentre, and on the 17th in this place. During this movement about 400 of the enemy's troops were taken prisoners. The troops above-mentioned were followed on their march by the division commanded by Sir Brent Spencer, and by the 5th

division of foot under the orders of Major-Gen. Leith.—On the 17th inst. I received a report from Major-Gen. Fane, from the left banks of the Tagus, by which he informs me that the enemy has constructed a second bridge across the Zezere, the first which he threw over that river having been carried away by the floods. The said Major-General also acquaints me that the enemy detached the said day a large body of troops to Tolegau. I immediately ordered Lieut.-General Hill, with the corps under his command, to cross over to the left bank of the Tagus, and to embark for that purpose in Valluda in the boats which Admiral Berkeley had sent thither, for the purpose of facilitating the operations of the army.—On the 18th instant, the British cavalry and advanced guard found the enemy so strongly posted in front of Santarem, that it was utterly impossible to attack him with any hope of success; and although I am informed by our posts on the left bank of the Tagus, that the enemy continue to send troops and baggage along the road, which lies on the right bank of the Tagus, in the direction of Zezere, yet his advanced guard continues to maintain itself in the same post, having there, as well as in Santarem, a sufficient number of troops to hold out in the strong position of Santarem, and repel any attack which might be made on his front.—The incessant rain which we have had ever since the 15th inst. has destroyed the roads in such a manner, that I have, as yet, found it impossible to dislodge the enemy from the position which he occupies in Santarem; the bad condition of the roads is also the reason why the enemy continues so long in Santarem.—Although the enemy has moved large bodies of troops from Santarem to the eastward, I know not that he has as yet sent any considerable corps to the other banks of the Zezere. I cannot, therefore, as yet form any certain opinion whether the enemy means entirely to retreat from Portugal. His whole army being now present between Santarem and the Zezere, he finds himself in a situation which enables him to maintain the strong position he occupies until he shall have been joined by the reinforcements, which, I know, have reached the frontiers—I have not received any further intelligence from General Silveira, who finds himself on the frontiers of Upper Beira, since the 9th of this month. Under that day's date he informed me of the movements of the

enemy's different corps in Galicia, which, I suppose, consist in the whole of 20,000 men, and are at present employed in levying contributions of provisions for the army of Portugal. This intelligence has been confirmed by information received from Salamanca of a more recent date.—Having advanced from the position where I had taken post, and drawn the enemy to a point where he was compelled to fall back without attempting any attack, I feel obliged, in order to render justice to Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher, and to the officers of the Royal Engineers, to call your Excellency's attention to the diligence and skill with which they constructed the fortifications, whereby they rendered the said position so strong that any attack on the allied army must have proved extremely disadvantageous to the enemy.—The French army may be reinforced, and I may once more be induced to return to the same position, in the present state of the Peninsula, but I do not suppose that it will be in the power of the enemy to employ against it any force able to render the result of the conflict dubious. For these advantages we are indebted to Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, and the Officers of the Royal Corps of Engineers, among whom I must make particular mention of Capt. Chapman, who has already repeatedly rendered me the most signal services.—By my dispatches of the 20th Oct. I informed your Excellency, that the Marquis de la Romana had joined the allied army in the fortified position in front of Lisbon, bringing with him considerable detachments of the Spanish troops under his orders. The Marquis remains still with us, and favours me with very valuable advice and assistance.—During the time we occupied the above position the service was performed with the utmost regularity, and to my entire satisfaction—although the force by which it was defended consisted of different troops and divers nations.—Lieut.-General Sir B. Spencer, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, and all the Officers of the Staff of the Army, have continued to render me all the services in their power.—Head-Quarters, Cartaxo, Nov. 21, 1810.

WELLINGTON.

PORTUGAL.—*Supplement Extraordinary to the Lisbon Gazette, Nov. 25.—Official Dispatch from Marshal Beresford to his Excellency Miguel Pereira Forjaz.*

Most Excellent Sir—I have the honour,

with great satisfaction, to transmit to your Excellency the inclosed from General Silveira, dated 15th November, in which the Lords Governors of the kingdom will be informed of a glorious action near Pinhel, in which the enemy was completely defeated, and with considerable loss in killed and prisoners. We likewise discover in the same document the good conduct and valour of the native troops, and the distinguished manner in which that Commander contributes to the defence of the country.

Most Excellent Sir—We marched upon Pinhel while the enemy advanced upon Pereiro, Gamelas, and Valverde. This morning I attacked him, supposing his force to be much less considerable; but, although his force consisted of six squadrons and three of lancers, I had the success to put him to the route, and although his infantry was much superior in number to ours, 300 of his troops lie dead on the field and among them 8 or 10 officers. We have besides many prisoners, and with them 1 officer. I cannot by this opportunity enter into the details, but I have the pleasure to assure you of the good conduct of the officers and soldiers in general. The cavalry commanded by Luiz Paulino, deserve particular praise, as well as the chasseurs of the militia and the battalion of infantry, No. 24. Major F. Taxeira Lobo, behaved with the same spirit he displayed on the 4th of August, in Puebla. This officer, as well as Luiz Paulino, was slightly wounded by the Lancers. The commander of the vanguard, Colonel Ant. Man. de Carvalho, acted intirely to my satisfaction. My loss was very small, but we had 1 Brigadier and 2 Grand-majors, killed.—God preserve you.—Head Quarters, Camp at Pereiro, 4 p. m. 15th Nov. 1810.—FRAN. DE SILVEIRA PINTO DE FONSECA.

PROCLAMATION.

Nov. 24.—As it may be the intention of the enemy to occupy the position he had left in the neighbourhood of the fortification of *Linha*, and it being of the utmost consequence that we put in security the corn and other effects, which might fall into the hands of the French; in order that this may be effected with the activity and regularity useful to the public service, his Royal Highness has been pleased to direct your Adjutant Commissioner, Joac Gaudenio Torres, immediately to remove the said property under the protection of the said

fortress, transmitting to your Excellency the instructions to his deputies to facilitate the conveyance. For the same purpose boats and vessels are to be obtained from Serjeant Montinho Jose de Perne, to whom I have transmitted fit orders to have the same ready, sending them to the ports the said Commissioner shall point out. The same instructions are to be obeyed with respect to Commissioner Paco, Auditor General, of the Army, that this duty may be punctually fulfilled.—Your Lordship will publish this Edict where necessary, that the proprietors of the effects may be properly informed on the subject. God preserve you.

D. MIGUEL PEREIRA FORJAN.

*Treaty between Austria and France.
(Concluded from p. 1183.)*

—2. His Majesty, the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, wishing to do a thing agreeable to his majesty the Emperor of Austria, declares that he revokes his decree of the 24th of April, 1809, confiscating the property of the *ci-devant* Princes and Counts of the Germanic empire, and members of the Equestrian Order, offending against articles 7 and 31 of the act of confederation.—3. His Majesty the Emperor, as Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, shall inform all the Confederated States of the revocation pronounced by the above article, in order that all the sequestrations may be raised, and that the *ci-devant* Princes and Counts of the Germanic Empire, or members of Equestrian Order may be restored without delay to the possession of their property which shall be restored to them without any exception, and under the guarantee given by the act of the Confederation of the Rhine.—4. Each of the Princes, Counts, and Members above mentioned, shall, before the 1st of July 1811, declare whether he continues to accede to the regulation established by the act of Confederation, and subject to the Sovereign assigned him by that Act.—5. In case they should wish to become subject to Austria, which they shall in like manner declare, before the 1st of July 1811, the immediate property they possess in the territories of the Confederation shall be by them ceded to a member of their family, who shall be likewise subject to the Confederation, or exchanged for others situated in Austria, or sold.—6. The cession, in whatever manner it may take place, shall be com-

pleted within the space of six years from the 1st of January, 1810.—7. Conformable to Art. 27 of the act of the Confederation, those Princes, Counts, or Dukes of the late German Empire, shall not be permitted to dispose of their property at any price whatever, without having first made the offer, at the same price, to those Sovereigns under whose dominions they are placed; and if within the space of six months the offer shall not be accepted, the said Princes, Counts, or States, shall dispose, at pleasure, of their property, on the conditions under which they have been offered.—8. The Princes, Counts, or States of the Empire, become subjects to Austria, shall continue to enjoy, but only as Austrian subjects, the rights which the law of the country grants to strangers of acquiring by purchase or donation from the deceased immoveable property in the States of the Confederation of the Rhine.—9. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications of it exchanged at Paris, within the space of one month, or sooner if possible.

Done at Paris, 30th Aug. 1810.

(Signed) CHAMPAGNY, Duke of Cadore.
COUNT METTERNICH.

*FLORIDA (WEST.)—Declaration of Independence by the Representatives thereof.
26th September, 1810.*

It is known to all the world, with how much fidelity the good people of this territory have professed, and maintained alliance to the legitimate Sovereign, while any hope remained of receiving from him protection for their property and lives. Without making any unnecessary innovation in the established principles of Government, we had voluntarily adopted certain regulations in concert with our first Magistrate, for the express purpose of preserving this territory, and shewing our attachment to the Government which has heretofore protected us. This compact, which was entered into with good faith on our part, will for ever remain an honourable testimony of our upright intentions, and inviolable fidelity to our King and parent country, while so much as a shadow of legitimate authority remained to be exercised over us. We sought only a speedy remedy for such evils as seemed to endanger our existence and prosperity, and were encouraged by our Governor with solemn promises of assistance and co-operation. But those measures which

were intended for our preservation, he has endeavoured to pervert into an engine of destruction, by encouraging in the most perfidious manner, the violation of ordinances sanctioned and established by himself, as the law of the land.—Being thus left without any hope of protection from the parent country, by being betrayed by a magistrate, whose duty it was to have provided for the safety and tranquillity of the People and Government committed to his charge, and exposed to all the evils of a state of anarchy which we have so long endeavoured to avert; it becomes our duty to provide for our own security, as a free and independent state, absolved from all allegiance to a Government which no longer protects us.—We, therefore, the Representatives aforesaid, appealing to the Supreme Ruler of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do solemnly publish and declare, the several districts, composing the territory of West Florida, to be a *free and independent State*, and that they have a right to institute for themselves such form of Government as they may think conducive to their safety and happiness—to form treaties—to establish commerce—to provide for the common defence of all acts which may of right be done by a Sovereign and independent nation. At the same time declaring all acts within the same territory of West Florida, after this date, by any tribunal or authorities not deriving their power from the people, agreeable to the provisions of this Convention, to be null and void, and calling upon all foreign nations to respect this our Declaration, acknowledging our independence, and giving us such aid as may be consistent with the laws and usages of nations.—This declaration, made in Convention at the town of Baton Rouge, on the 26th day of September, in the year of our Lord 1810, we, the Representatives, in the name and on behalf of our constituents, do hereby solemnly pledge ourselves to support it with our lives and fortunes.

JOHN RHEA, President, and nine others.

ANDREW STEELE, Secretary.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation of the Government at Lisbon. 13th October, 1810.*

Portuguese;—The advance of the enemy's army, which, already weakened by want and by its past losses, yields reluctant obedience to the despotic orders of its Tyrant, announces to us the near approach of a battle. The numbers, the

tried valour of the combined army, their formidable position, and the impatience with which the troops call for the combat, all promise us a happy and glorious issue. The God of armies will bless our arms, and give us a complete victory. The Governors of the kingdom, the Marshal, the Army, and the whole Nation expect it, and have every reason to do so. But it is necessary, that on this occasion you guard yourselves against false rumours, which may be disseminated by timidity or ill intention. Be not alarmed at the passage of troops, at the arrival of wounded, at the rolling of carriages, and other movements, which are the necessary consequences of the operations of war. Do not give credit to any accounts that are not announced by the Government, of whose frankness you have had so many proofs. It will take measures for punishing the ill-disposed, who have the audacity to scatter false reports, with the severity required by circumstances. Portuguese! calmness, confidence, obedience, and we shall be happy.

FRANKFORT.—*Decree relative to Newspapers.—16th October, 1810.*

DECREE FOR THE GRAND DUCHY OF FRANKFORT.

We, Charles, by the Grace of God, Prince Primate, &c. By desire of his Majesty, the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector, &c. we have decreed and do decree as follows. That is to say:—Art. 1. All News-papers, whether French or German, published in our Grand Duchy, shall cease on the 1st of December, of this year; and we hereby revoke the privilege granted them.—Art. 2. From the 1st of January, 1811, only one Official Newspaper shall be published in our chief city of Frankfort, and no other political print shall appear throughout the whole territory.—Art. 3. This official Paper shall bear the title of "Gazette of the Grand Duchy of Frankfort," and the articles contained shall be inserted in the French and German languages.—Art. 4. Our Minister of the Police shall appoint the Editor to the Official Gazette.—Art. 5. Our Director of the Police at Frankfort shall be the Censor of this Official Gazette, and shall be answerable to us for its conduct. Our Minister of Police shall communicate to the Director those instructions by which he shall be governed.—Art. 6. Our Ministers of the Interior, of Justice and of the

Police, are charged with the due enforcement of this Decree.

SAXONY.—*Decree relative to English goods.*
—16th October, 1810.

We, Charles Augustus, by the Grace of God, King of Saxony, &c.—Since it has pleased his Majesty the Emperor of the French to communicate to us his wish that the new Tarif of Duties upon Colonial produce of the 5th August, adopted in his dominions, should be introduced into our royal territories; and since we are convinced of the necessity of this measure to liberate the Continent from the yoke of England, and to encourage the consumption of the internal products of our kingdom, which shall displace and render unnecessary all articles the produce of the colonies of Great Britain; and considering the great advantages which have already arisen in the Confederated States of the Rhine, we have been moved to order that the Tarif of Trianon be adopted throughout the duchy of Saxony, &c.

DENMARK.—*Notice published by order of the King, relative to English goods.*
—17th October, 1810.

His Majesty, on the 8th September last, issued a Royal Notice respecting the sale and seizure of colonial produce, and prohibiting the entrance of ships under American colours into any of his Islands or the Duchy of Holstein, excepting under certain circumstances therein specified, or on their being made prize by his Majesty's marine forces.—Experience has proved the general wisdom of this measure; but his Majesty has been informed, with much sorrow, that colonial produce, actually belonging to the enemies of his Crown, of the Emperor Napoleon, and of Continental Europe, has found its way into the Danish territories, and that certain American ships, ordered to be excluded, have been admitted into his ports.—Proofs of these facts have been afforded; but his Majesty has forbore to enter into the inquiry previous to giving a solemn warning to his subjects to refrain from such illegal practices, which place Continental Europe under the controul of the Tyrant of the Seas. This warning, therefore, is hereby given, and those who are discovered offending, after this notice, will be punished with merited severity.

BREMEN.—*Proclamation relative to English goods.*—19th October, 1810.

The Senate has appointed his Excellency Count Von Camphausen, President of the Council at Hamburgh, to execute the Decree of his Majesty the Emperor against contraband trade; and the Council has issued an order that each inhabitant shall produce a declaration of his concerns in forbidden goods. The Senate is determined to comply with this regulation in the strictest manner. By it also a form is to be delivered from house to house, to be filled up by the inhabitants in the presence of persons appointed by the Senate.—It gives the Senate great pleasure to remark that since the publication of the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, the public notices it has given have not been made in vain. They have no doubt that the same attention and obedience will be paid to the present.

FRANCE.—*Decree of the Emperor for burning English Merchandize.*—*Fontainebleau,*
19th October, 1810.

Having considered the fourth and fifth articles of the Berlin Decree, of the 21st Nov. 1806, We have decreed, and do decree as follows:—Art. 1. All merchandize, of whatever sort, proceeding from English manufacture, and which is prohibited, existing at this moment either in the real entrepôts, or in the warehouses of our customs, of whatever description it may be, shall be publicly burnt.—2. In future, all prohibited merchandize of English manufacture, proceeding either from our customs, or from seizures that may be made, shall be burnt.—3. All prohibited merchandize of English manufacture, which shall be found in Holland, in the Grand Duchy of Berg, in the Hanseatic Towns, and, generally from the Meuse to the sea, shall be seized and burnt.—4. All the English merchandize to be found in our kingdom of Italy, under whatever description it may come, shall be seized and burnt.—5. All the English merchandize which shall be found in our Illyrian provinces, shall be seized and burnt.—6. All the English merchandize which shall be found in the kingdom of Naples, shall be seized and burnt.—7. All the English merchandize which shall be found in the provinces of Spain occupied by our troops, shall be seized and burnt.—8. All the English merchandize which shall be found in the towns, and within

the reach of places occupied by our troops, shall be seized and burnt.

MECKLENBURGH.—*Edict of the Duke relative to English goods.*—10th Oct. 1810.

We Francis, by the Grace of God, Sovereign Duke of Mecklenburgh, &c.—Make known hereby.—Whereas, his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, &c. under date of the 5th of Aug. of this year, established a duty on all colonial produce of England or her dependencies. Therefore we, in pursuance of the same plan which his Majesty the Emperor and King has thought fit to adopt, as Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, have deemed it right, for the advancement of the general good, to support, as much as in our power lies, the continental system for the exclusion of colonial produce, wherever it shall enter our territories by sea, to lay on the same duties by the same tariff, which shall be in full force in our principality, from the time of the publication of this patent.

[Here follows the Tariff of the 5th of August, with some trifling alterations.]

For the purpose of raising this tax we hereby direct that all persons having in their possession colonial produce of any kind, shall deliver in an account thereof to our Custom-houses established at the ports of Rostock and Wismar; and we hereby call upon all officers of our revenue, and all our good and faithful subjects to render their assistance in enforcing this Decree, that all colonial produce may be prevented from entering our territories.

SWITZERLAND (Friburg).—*Regulations, relating to English goods.*

On the evening of the 19th, the seals were removed from the warehouses of the merchants, and an inventory was taken of dyed and spun cottons, which hitherto had not been considered as colonial or English merchandize, since they were not expressly named in the tariffs of the 5th August and 12th September last; a provisional sequestration was also placed on all English merchandize, of which the quantity is very small. Nowhere have more severe measures been taken than here against every kind of English goods.

BREMEN.—*Proclamation for raising sailors for the French Navy.*—30th Oct. 1810.

His Majesty the Emperor of France and King of Italy, in a Decree, dated Fontainebleau, the 28th of September of this year, had requested of the city of Bremen a certain number of able seamen for the Imperial sea-service.—All, therefore, who shall devote themselves to this service, are assured, in the strongest manner, that every sailor entering as a volunteer shall receive down 90 francs, and also a bounty to an equal amount, making together about 15 crowns of our currency.—All and every seaman experienced in the sea-service, residing in the city and territory of Bremen, are now hereby invited immediately to give in their names to Francis Tecklenborg, junior, in the Geeren, where they will have the necessary qualifications for the service explained to them, and the advantages, explained to them for such as enter as volunteers.—The Council expect that the present distresses, and the general stoppage of trade and commerce, particularly in regard to shipping, will induce those seamen who possess the necessary qualifications to embrace the present invitation, and not to reject the present opportunity of providing subsistence for themselves, and those who depend on them.

HAMBURG.—*Notice of the Senate, relative to Sailors for the French Service,* 14th Nov. 1810.

By a Decree of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, dated Sept. 28, 1810, a summons has been given for all sailors to enlist themselves in the French marine. Those, therefore, in this city, and belonging to the Hanse Towns, are ordered to comply with the same, by giving in a list of their last places of abode, that the necessary steps may be taken.—Also notice is hereby given, that every one who possesses a strong and sound constitution, between the ages of 22 and 34 years, who has for at least three years worked upon the North Sea or Baltic, in ships of 75 lasts burthen, should prepare themselves for service. The bounty offered by the Emperor is 90 francs; and on the part of this city an additional sum of 90 francs will be given.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"He did maintain the right; but taking the expediency of the case, could any thing be more easy than to supply the vacancy in the same manner in which it would be supplied by law in the event of the King's death? Was it not more expedient and more analogous to the Constitution, to place the power there, where by legal course it would in due time go? Was not that better than to go on with a weak and divided Government? Could any thing be more likely to cramp and painlseyse all the energies of the country than an executive in such a state? If it be true that the Kingly office has too much power, controul it. If the King had more than was necessary to animate exertions and to reward merit, and to repress crimes by punishments, it was as necessary to take it from a King as from a Regent."—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT'S Speech in the House of Commons, 20th Dec. 1810.

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[1250]

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

LIBEL CASE. MORNING POST.—The readers of the Register will recollect, that, last spring, just after Sir Francis Burdett had been, by the aid of an army equal, perhaps, to that in Portugal, sent to and lodged in the Tower; just after this memorable event had taken place, the venal prints, and especially the *MORNING POST*, began its attacks upon Mr. ROGER O'CONNOR, who happened to be in the House of Sir Francis at the time when the troops gained the victory over the Honourable Baronet and his wife and children. The venal prints having set the example, the brave, the valiant, the highblooded *ralliers* followed it with great alacrity; and, for several days, little was heard of in the fashionable world but at once stupid and malignant insinuations against Mr. O'CONNOR, all which were met by that Gentleman, who openly and fully refuted them, showed the baseness of the motives whence they had proceeded, and, in his Narrative, published in the Register on the 12th of May last, introduced to the knowledge of the people of England a chain of such horrible facts, as to the treatment he had experienced, that the venal gang seem to have been thereby most grievously annoyed. To be revenged on him for this, to work the *MEAN, MERCENARY*, and *MALIGNANT* crew went through the channel of the venal press. No attempts, however, did they make to answer the Narrative of Mr. O'CONNOR; but, they went back to the very time, when, as Mr. O'CONNOR complained he had been so cruelly persecuted, and they took the speeches, at that time uttered by his enemies, and published them as *proofs* in opposition to his statements.—In one of these speeches there was a charge, and a false charge, against Mr. HUGH BELL, a

most respectable merchant of London, whose name, the reader will observe, had been mentioned in Ireland, in the speech re-published by the Morning Post, for the purpose of doing injury to Mr. O'CONNOR at the time when the speech was made. It was said, as a *proof* of Mr. O'CONNOR's treasonable intentions, that he was in correspondence with Mr. HUGH BELL, who had, for some time, been confined in England upon a charge of High Treason.—Mr. Bell, when he saw this old falshood revived, resolved, it appears, to prosecute the promulgator of it. He, therefore, brought his action of damages against one BYRNE, who, it seems, is the proprietor of the Morning Post, in which paper, as being the most venal of the most venal, as being the very priuge of liars and calumniators, this foul and base and malignant slander was published.—It appears, that Mr. BELL was arrested upon suspicion, but, that he was immediately released, and, hence the reader will easily believe, that there was not even the shadow of a proof against him. Yet did the enemies of Mr. O'CONNOR in Ireland alledge that his being in correspondence with Mr. Bell was a *proof* of his being a traitor!—Reader, we yet feel, and we long shall feel, the effects of what was done in those days.—The result of the Trial will be seen below; for I have subjoined to this Summary the fullest report of it that I can find, looking upon it as of very great importance, in many points of view, both as to the present and to the future.—For, as to the thing itself, though even that is of importance, it is nothing at all when compared with the application of it at a future time; that time which I confidently hope I shall live to see.—There is, in the report of this trial, something that will have given real pleasure to every friend of freedom; and that is, the conduct, the manly and spirited con-

dict, of Mr. TOPPING, whose words will this day be in every mouth, and whose conduct will not fail to receive universal applause. This is the first gleam of spirit that I have seen at the Bar since Lord ERSKINE left it. Let us hope, that it is not a mere gleam; but, when I look at the Bar, when I see what it is composed of, and what are the political baits which are held forth to it, I must confess, that I have but very little expectation of ever seeing it, under the present system, any thing better than what it now is.—To Mr. TOPPING, however, the thanks of every man, who has any wish that there should be any freedom, or any thing like freedom, left, are due. He spoke out; and he spoke out in the *proper place* too.—The answer of the ATTORNEY GENERAL, as reported in the Times, puzzles one as to the mode of expressing one's feelings at it. It is, however, impossible to help laughing, first at seeing this man now the *defender* of the most famous libeller that ever wrote or published. Not only was the thing he was now defending a *falsehood*; not only was it a most *foul* and *malignant* slander; not only was it published from the most *malignant motives*; but, the man who published this libel was, and is, a notorious libeller; a notorious publisher of malignant falsehoods; nay, it was that same man, who, in his paper of the 6th of October last, asserted, that "the Corsican Tyrant" [meaning the Emperor of France] "and his ministers, boasted of the monstrous vice," for which the unnatural wretches of Vere Street had just been *piloried*; and who had the infamy to assert in his same paper, that "I abused the British Papers for speaking ill of such monsters, and that I told the people, that it was of no consequence whether they were governed by the Vere Street gang, or by a virtuous sovereign and ministers."—This is the man, or these are the men, for I believe there are *two*, who conduct this venal print; this is the man, *whom* the Attorney General now stood forth to defend, against the complaint of an honest gentleman who had been foully libelled by him.—The reader will not fail to look well at the report of his speech; and to note down the doctrines there set forth; and especially the manner, in which he answered Mr. TOPPING. It is this answer that is the *good thing*.—As to his being so well known from his boyhood up to this day; there may, perhaps, be, and, I dare say, there are, some people who have

known him all that while. Most of us have been known all our lives by some body or other; so that there was nothing very rare in his case. Like the rest of us, his *beginning* is known, but there is nothing to boast of in that being known. If he could have foretold his *end*, indeed, there might have been something worth hearing.

—This same news-paper proprietor, defended upon this occasion by the Attorney General, published, in the same print of the 16th of November last, that all those members of the House of Commons, who had, on the 15th VOTED AGAINST THE MINISTER, were persons, "whose nature is debased by the vile views of faction, and whose unmanly feelings and ungenerous hearts forbid their sympathy," in the case of the King.—Now, you know, reader, that Mr. GALE JONES was sent to Newgate for several months, because he made it a *question*, whether Mr. YORKE had acted right, in clearing the Gallery of the House of Commons.—No one has yet noticed this article of the Morning Post, which paper, he it observed, highly applauded the sending of Mr. Jones to prison.—

But, what I wish to nail the reader's attention to, is this fact, that it is the Attorney General, who is, in the case of the libel on Mr. Bell, the *defender* of the Morning Post. We shall return to this subject again; for, it is of too much importance to be let off with little said about it, and, besides it must become a matter of *future discussions*, or, if it does not, it is perfectly useless for us to discuss any thing at all.

—Let the whole transaction, therefore, be regarded as a thing put upon record for *future use*; a thing to be returned to; a thing that waits for the best and most convenient time of using it. But, I must beg the reader to go through it all; and, to be sure not to omit reading the Judge's speech at the end. That speech, above all things, should be borne in mind. It should be read over and over; every word should be well weighed; for, *hereafter*, it will be found to be a thing for the people at large to understand well.—There are some men, who would fain have us think of nothing but of the dangers to be apprehended from the schemes of Napoleon; but, such men are either fools or knaves. They are either duped themselves, or they wish to dupe others. We are much more interested in what is going on in England than in what is going on in France or Holland or Italy or in the Confederated States of the Rhine.—Never

tell me of Napoleon's fleets while I have objects like this trial before my eyes. What are his fleets and his armies and his schemes to us; what are they, or of what consequence can they be, while we have these libel trials, while we have such proceedings as these now referred to, before us. The man is an idiot, if he disinterestedly feel any concern about Napoleon's preparations; if all such concern do not shrink quite into nothing, while he has under his eye transactions at home, like those of which we are now speaking.—I cannot help writing a word or two here upon the manner of Mr. Bell's proceeding against this calumniator. He did not pursue him by way of information or indictment; he did not prosecute him for publishing falsehoods, and at the same time leave him no chance of proving his innocence; he took no unfair advantage of any sort of the foul and malignant asperser of his character; he appealed to the old common law of the land; he brought his action against him, for damages; he left him at full liberty to justify his conduct, by proving that what he had done was *wrong* to Mr. Bell; in short, Mr. Bell put it upon this issue; if what you have said be *true* you are *innocent*; if what you have said be *false* you are *guilty*. Mr. Bell did not shut up the lips of the accused, at the moment that he preferred an accusation against him. He did not tie his hands, while he set others on to beat him. He acknowledged, in his mode of prosecution, that *truth* is not a libel.—The Morning Post of the 20th has the impudence to insinuate; that the Jury acted contrary to their consciences, in giving a verdict of £.500 damages. Have the men, who write in this paper, or who publish their lucubrations through it, forgotten, that they thought, or at least, took occasion to say, that the sentence upon me was too light.—The public are obliged to Mr. Bell, for pulling out this BYRNE by the ears, and holding him up like a pole-cat dragged from his hole. There is an *associate* of this reptile, of whom we shall catch hold, before it be long, though he thinks himself at this time, very safe.—I strongly recommend to the reader, to peruse, with great attention, the whole of the proceedings in this case; for, I repeat it, they are of ten thousand times more interest to Englishmen than are all the preparations of Napoleon.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.—Nor is the case

of the Jew, DE YONGE, a thing to be forgotten. The reader will recollect, that, at page 162, I published an account of the trial of this man, who, in the manner recorded at page 166, was found *guilty*.—Upon the occasion referred to, I argued the case for the Jew; and to that argument I beg leave to refer the reader.—Well, what was *done*, to the Jew, who had thus been convicted? Nothing at all in the way of executing the law upon him. His Counsel, Mr. MARRYATT, obtained a reservation of the point of *law*, and DE YONGE was held to bail, in the meanwhile.—Since that, on the 9th of November Mr. MARRYATT moved, (as will be seen by the report inserted in another part of this sheet) for a rule to show cause why the verdict against De Yonge should not be set aside; and, he grounded his motion principally upon the arguments made use of before by me, at the place above referred to.—The JUDGE (Lord Ellenborough, the same that tried DE YONGE) appears, from the Report, to have told Mr. MARRYATT, that *time pressed upon the court* then; but that he might take a rule; that is to say, might argue the matter for his client.—But (now mark, reader!) then rises the Attorney General, and, according to the report, observes, that a question, "turning upon the *same point*, "had occurred before the Chief Justice "of the Common Pleas on the last Circuit, "who had directed it to be put into a case, "and submitted to the Twelve Judges."—It appears that he then agreed to delay the committal of DE YONGE, until the decision of the Judges had taken place.—This is what the news-paper Report of this trial says.—Upon all these proceedings we ought to keep our eye; for, as will be soon felt, they are connected with, they are interwoven with, the very vitals of THE SYSTEM. Great events generally begin by trifling things. How many instances have we of this in our history. Jew DE YONGE, unless I am very much deceived, is destined to have his name handed down to posterity.—From the very first appearance of this case, I was convinced of the importance of it. If pushed on, I was sure that it would end in producing or leading to most important consequences.—Let it be remembered; never let it be forgotten, that a *trip* was laid for DE YONGE by persons employed for the purpose; and, yet, you see, it is not yet finally decided, that the man has committed any crime at all.—This is the thing

for the reader to bear in mind, and that will, I trust, be borne in mind by some member of parliament, capable of bringing the matter forward in a proper and effectual way.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. KING'S ILLNESS. (Continued from page 1234.)
 —We saw, at the place here referred to, that the House of Lords adjourned, on the 17th, to Wednesday, the 19th, and that the House of Commons, after having ordered the printing of the Evidence of the Physicians, adjourned to Thursday, the 20th instant.—In the mean time the Report of the Committees, containing the evidence of the Physicians, was published; and, though that report will, in a few days, appear at full length, in the 1st Part of the Parliamentary Debates of the present Session, it will be necessary to state here some of the principal facts now brought to light.* It appears, then, from this Report, that none of the King's family have set eyes on him since about the 29th of October, but that the Lord Chancellor (Eldon) and the Minister (Perceval) have been admitted to him more than once. It appears, that the King's eye-sight is nearly, if not wholly, gone. It appears, that he is in ill-health *bodily*, exclusive of the disorder of his mind. It appears that this disorder has been upon him in some degree from the *third* of October last. And, indeed, there appears to me, after the reading of the whole of this Report, to be but very little ground to hope for a recovery. The Physicians say, indeed, that *they* have strong hopes of *final* recovery; but, it is not their *expressions* of hope that we ought to attend to so much as to the *reasons* which they give for that hope; and, I think the reader will agree with me, that there is but too much ground for fearing, that their hope has been built upon their loyal *wishes* rather than upon the facts, which they detailed to the Committee.—Dr. WILLIS makes a distinction between *insanity* and *mental derangement*; and Dr. BAILLIE talks of the King's being *hurried*. These are quite new ideas; or, at least, they are new words. And, what is the use of them? When pressed hard to say WHY the usual causes

should not, in this case, produce their usual effects, the Doctors seem not to have been very ready to answer. Indeed, how should they? For, what is the King, in this respect, more than a man? Nature has made no exceptions in favour of kings. They are flesh and blood and bones as well as the meanest of their subjects. All attempts, therefore, to make the King's a peculiar case must fail, with every man who has sense enough to comprehend common facts, and independence enough to draw his conclusions from the evidence that is satisfactory to his own mind.—The COURIER newspaper, says, that Dr. WILLIS's able and scientific reply to the question: "What is the distinction between *mental derangement* and *insanity*?" will afford a *clear view* of the nature and state of his Majesty's disorder.—The truth is, that the Doctor's definitions, as given in the Report, are *any thing but clear*. They may puzzle some people; but, as to giving any body *clear* information, I think that is impossible.—This distinction is, too, a *discovery*; it is quite *new*; it never was heard of before; and, one cannot help being struck with the singularity of the discovery having been reserved for this particular and important occasion.—The Doctor talks about *delirium*, that is what is vulgarly called being *light-headed*, or, as he explained it, that sort of state which people are in when they *talk in their sleep*! And is this all? No, this is not all; but, the disorder is, it seems, of *this cast*.—Why, reader, there is hardly any human being of the age of 20 years, who has not, at some time or other, had this species of *delirium*.—What is *insanity*? What is the meaning of that word? What is its plain, its received, meaning? It means a *want of the use of a person's senses*. And when we say, that a man is *insane*, we mean that he is *out of his senses*; that his mind is deprived of its *reason*. Is not this the deplorable and lamented state of his Majesty? And, if it be so, of what use are scientific distinctions? And why are we to be flattered with the belief, that his disorder, which has now lasted more than two months, and during which Sweden has been added to France, is something of the *cast of a delirium*, the symptom of which is the patient's talking in his sleep!—Sir H. HALFORD is questioned thus, relating to the *date of the commencement of the King's disorder*, in this instance.—"Had you opportunity of seeing the King, before the 25th

* Seeing, however, that the Register has a wider and more immediate circulation, I shall, at the end of this Summary, insert the Examination of Dr. WILLIS, whose evidence is the most interesting.

"of October?—Yes; I saw his Majesty every day, three times, from the 3rd of October.—Did you, in the interval between the 3rd and the 25th of October, perceive any symptom of indisposition about the King?—*I sometimes thought his Majesty's manner agitated; but there always seemed an occasion of this, in the report which was made respecting the Princess Amelia.—Was that agitation of a nature to excite any particular apprehensions in your mind, with regard to his Majesty's mental health?*"

"—No, not at that time.—Not at any time between the 3rd and the 25th of October?—No.—You have said, that on the 25th of October, the King was not so much mentally indisposed as to incapacitate him from business, or amount to mental derangement, and you have said, the King is so indisposed now; when did the symptoms become so urgent as to amount to incapacity for business, and to establish a character of mental derangement?"

"—His Majesty's symptoms increased rapidly on the 28th of October."

What other things may have been done, in the King's name, since the 3rd of October, I know not; but, as the public well know, the *Order of the Bath*, has been conferred upon Marshal Beresford since the "Victory of Busaco," the news of which was published by our Government on the 14th of October. So that this must necessarily have been done after the time that Sir HENRY HALFORD "sometimes thought his Majesty's manner agitated."—Dates are often troublesome things; and this date of the King's agitated manner blows up, at once, the whole of the story about the *Ring* and *Posy*, which, from the very outset, I looked upon as a fabrication of the venal prints, but, for what purpose, I could not tell.—In the *Courier* of the 25th of October we were told: "Our beloved Sovereign completes the 50th year of his reign to-day, and it will give the highest satisfaction to every class of society to hear, that his Majesty's general health (alluding to an exception with regard to his sight) is as well as it has been at any former period of his life."

—This was published in the *Courier* in the *Evening* of the 25th, you will observe.

—Not a word was said about any illness of the King, till the 30th, when the venal *Morning Post* told us, that it was "rejoiced to state, that his Majesty's indisposition was only a slight cold, and that the Lord

"Chancellor and Mr. Perceval had transacted official business with him the day before."—It now appears in evidence before the Committee, that Sir H. Halford had seen him three times a day between the 3rd and the 25th of October; and, that he became so ill, that none of his family could see him, at the very time when these venal writers were "rejoiced to state, that his indisposition was only a slight cold;" and that on the 25th of Oct. on the very day when the *Courier* told us, that his health was as well as at any former period of his life, he was, as is now given in evidence, become wholly incapable of attending to any business whatever, and was in what Doctor Willis calls a state of mental derangement.—I do not point out these facts by way of exposing the mere falsehoods of these venal men. That has been amply done before. The exposure here is of another order; and calls for the particular attention of this abused public.

—It was on the very same day, the memorable 25th of October, that the venal prints first put forth the story about the *Ring*, of which, when it afterwards appeared that the King was afflicted with his former unhappy malady, they converted to the use of having produced that malady, of being the sole cause of it, which, of course, if believed, would be accompanied with the persuasion, that the malady was of a temporary nature. Accordingly when the fact of the King's illness was forced out by the want of a previous step for the prorogation of the parliament, the *Morning Post* told us, that it had been occasioned by the presenting of the *Ring* to him, the affecting inscription upon which caused him to burst into tears, with the most heart-touching lamentations.—But, we now find, from the evidence published, that Sir H. Halford had seen the King three times a day from the 3rd of October, and had, between that and the 25th, observed that his manner was agitated.—

The exact state of the King, at the time when the *Order of the Bath* was conferred upon Marshal Beresford, would be worth knowing, and will, probably, be known: but, I must confess, that I should think it much more valuable to get at the bottom of the story about the *Ring*, which, from the first time I saw it in the venal prints, appeared to me to be not only a falsehood, but a fabrication of the most consummate kind; a stroke of political fraud proceeding from the brain of no bungling hypocrite.—Though

well calculated to deceive people in general, this story appeared to me to carry falshood and deceit upon the face of it; for, was it to be believed, that her Majesty and that the other branches of the Royal family would be so little mindful of the King as to suffer his feelings to be exposed to such a trial? And then, the *Posy*, or *Motto*, upon the Ring, was spoken of as if it had been instantly read by his Majesty, which, as the reader will perceive, was impossible; and, is it to be believed, that the Queen, and the Physicians, in attendance, would suffer, under such circumstances, that *Motto* to be read to him, and especially at a time when Sir Henry Hallford who saw him *three times a day*, could observe in him an *agitated* manner? No: this is not to be believed; and, therefore, while we leave their *objects* to be *guessed* at, we must pronounce the substance of this story to be a sheer fabrication on the part of the writers in the *Morning Post* and *Courier*.—The falshoods, published by these prints, relating to the King's indisposition; the detected and now *proven* falshoods, must necessarily produce a very injurious effect, upon the public mind, as to the future stages of his Majesty's disorder, if that disorder should take a favourable turn. For, who would believe what was published in future, until *proof* of it appeared as perfect as if given in a court of justice? In short, in these attempts made by the venal prints, there has been more done to injure the King, if injury to him from public opinion relating to the state of his mind be possible, than has been done, or attempted to be done by all these who, at any time, have entertained the greatest dislike to kingly government in this country.—We will now take a short view of what has, since the publication of my last Number, been done in the House of Commons, which, indeed, is no other, than a resolution, passed, on the 20th instant, after a debate of many hours, by a majority of 112 (there being 269 for it and 157 against it) to proceed by the way of *Bill* to the appointment of a *Regent*. It is useless to make any further remarks upon this; for, I am not aware of any thing that can be said in addition to what was said thereon in my last, at page 1231.—But, what is of still greater importance than the *mode* of proceeding is, the *substance* of what is to be proposed to the Prince as to the *limitations* talked of; and, if the Houses are to proceed by way of *Bill* upon the ground of *precedent*; if

they are to do this now, because it was intended to be done in 1788, what reason is there that they should not, upon the same ground, make a Regency with the *limitations* that were then intended to be made?—At page 1036, I entered pretty fully into the reasons against those intended limitations; and, though I have very narrowly watched the venal prints from that day to this, I have not seen one single argument, nor any thing in the shape of an argument, urged against what I there advanced.—That the limitations, which the minister intends to propose are the same, or nearly the same, as those submitted to his Royal Highness, and objected to by him in 1788, we cannot doubt, after the speech of Mr. Perceval, in the House of Commons, on the 20th instant, as that speech is reported in the *Morning Chronicle*, and from which speech I here insert an extract: “Before I proceed to weigh the grounds of preference upon these two courses, I feel the propriety, as I previously stated, to lay before the House a general view of what I intend further to propose in execution of this measure. It is in my view that his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales should be appointed to exercise the office of Regent, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, during the continuance of the King's indisposition. That, generally, all the powers of the Government should be committed to his hands. That to her Majesty the Queen should be entrusted the care and guardianship of the King's person. I think it also necessary that due provisions should be made to notify the King's recovery, and chalk out the course of proceeding by which his Majesty may be enabled to re-assume his functions. These three provisions should have no limit in point of time, except what should arise from the duration of the King's indisposition. But with respect to all the powers of Majesty, I do feel that, taking all the circumstances connected with the King's indisposition into consideration, a limit should be placed on the prerogatives of the crown, when in the hands of the Regent. It was evident, from the evidence produced before the House, and the state of his Majesty's health in his former disorders, that we are to look at no distant period for his recovery, although no specific time was mentioned by his physicians. The House will also perceive that they have proceeded

“to ascertain the course and progress of his Majesty’s present disorder by a reference to his former complaint. And as to that complaint, we have the authority of the late Dr. Willis, in 1788, that the shortest period in which in such disorders recovery could be expected was six weeks, that the average period was for five or six months, and that from twelve months to twelve and a half was the extreme point at which, if the most encouraging symptoms of recovery did not present themselves, the prospect became almost hopeless. Under these circumstances it became the House, looking at the probability of his Majesty’s recovery at no distant period, to take ample security for his complete restoration to the functions of his Royal Authority. That the dignity of the Executive office could not be impaired by any due limitation arising from such considerations I most sincerely feel; and therefore I should think that a restriction upon the exercise of these powers in the hands of the Regent for twelve months, most advisable, taking care that the limitation should expire during the sitting of Parliament, and at least six weeks after it was convened. It would then be open for Parliament to reconsider the subject, or if they did not think that duty necessary, the termination of the restriction would have the advantage of having occurred under the eye and superintendence of the Legislature. Upon these grounds, I think that there should be a suspension for the same period of the power of granting any rank or dignity in the Peerage, with certain exceptions. Also, that all pensions and offices granted should continue only during the continuance of the Regent in office, unless subsequently approved and confirmed by his Majesty. And lastly, that to her Majesty the Queen, with the care of his Royal Person, should be committed the appointment to the several offices connected with his Majesty’s Household, subject to the reconsideration of Parliament.”

So that the abridgments of the kingly power, while in the hands of his Royal Highness, are, in fact, to be substantially the same as those proposed in 1788, and, of course, all the arguments urged against them will now apply with equal force. There is a difference merely in point of duration: the kingly powers now proposed to be withheld from the Prince, are to be withheld for only twelve months. That’s all.

Only twelve months, and to expire in six weeks after the meeting of the Parliament! Just in the same way as the Bank Stoppage Bill. But, then, the matter is to be open to the re-consideration of the two Houses. That is to say, they, the same Houses who have been recently sitting; these same Houses, may, if they choose, still continue the limitations. So that the Prince can never know, when he is to have his full powers, though he is now nearly about 50 years of age!—But, the limitations for a year must be attended either with harm or good. If with harm, then why run the risk of this harm? If with good, what argument will it be possible for the most ingenious man to discover, for taking off those limitations, whether the power continue in the hands of the Prince, or be restored to his father?—This is called a limited monarchy; and, it is the opinion of most men that I have ever conversed with, that, if there be a freely chosen House of Commons, the kingly part of the powers are limited enough. But, if they can be further limited; if it be found, that, in practice, they are now more extensive than is necessary; if this be demonstrated to the people by the experience of a year; what is to prevent the people from calling for their diminution in future?—Are we told, that it is not meant to be shown that the powers of the King are too extensive generally; and that, in fact, the proposed limitations are meant, on the contrary, to preserve to the present King, if he should recover, the exercise of certain of the kingly powers, or the revision of the exercise of them, during a year, or shorter period, of his incapacity.—What an idea is this? So; when the King shall again be capable of doing business, he is to revise what his son has done; and to annul, or ratify, his grants at his pleasure! From this how easy and how natural is the transition to the establishing of an annulling and ratifying power in the two Houses, and at all times? And then we are not many steps from an excellent model for a Republican Government!—If the Prince were to conduct the affairs of the nation well to the end of the year, without the possession of those powers, which Mr. Perceval proposes to withhold from him, who would be the man to propose the putting of those powers into his hands? Nay, what reason would there be for it? And what reason would there be for restoring those powers

to the King himself, if he were then to recover? Unless, indeed, it be contended, that the Kingly powers are held as possessions of *his own*, and for *his own sake*, and not as the Prince declared in 1788, "as *trants* for the benefit of the people?"

—According to the proposition of Mr. Perceval, the government is to go on for a year, if the King should continue incapable so long, with certain of the powers wholly withheld from the Prince, but there are others which he may exercise subject to the King's *revision*, when he shall recover. So that, when his Majesty shall be in a state to resume the functions of royalty, he will have to revise, under the advice, perhaps, of one set of Ministers, what the Prince has done, under the advice of another set of Ministers. This would be well known before hand; men would not know whom they were to look to; all would be weakness, all uncertainty; and that, too, at a time, when nothing but *union and wisdom* acting together can save the kingdom from irretrievable ruin.—Mr. WHITBREAD, at the close of an admirable speech, said: "The Ministers were resolved, to render the Prince almost a mere pageant, and to deprive him of the power, which was necessary to the discharge of his office. A certain General said, Give me an army of 40,000 men, and if I invade this country, I shall either entirely subdue it, or make it not worth having: so in like manner the Minister may say, Give me these restrictions, and if I have not the power, I will at least make power not worth the having? Why would you tie up the hands of the head of the Executive? Why would you attempt to shade the splendour of the Throne? Is the splendour of the Throne calculated to make the man who fills that Throne happy? No, it can make no man happy. —It exists for the benefit of the nation. Is not that Regent completely under your subjection? Can you not annihilate him when you please? You made him with the *Great Seal*—you may annihilate him with the *Great Seal*—he has no security. The Parliament has six weeks for consideration after the commencement of a Session of Parliament, whether he is again to be continued with the power with which he is to be invested. You bring him to your bar. If your constitution can go on in this way, is a serious consideration. It may turn out well; but you are taking a leap in the

dark. If it walks this course, *it will walk for ever*. The Right Honourable Gentleman talks of Jacobins; but what Jacobins ever proposed more alarming measures than this? He would have us to preserve the Royal Authority, not for the people for whom it was intended, but for the King. Say, then, that it is for the King. It is not for the King alone, but for his successors. Comparing the Prince with King William, we had certainly additional reason for confidence in the Prince. Was there such security from King William as a King as we have from George Prince of Wales, that he will execute the office of Regent with duty to the people and affection to the King? Do we know a more delicate hand than his into which his Royal Father should be confided? but he wished that he should rather be under the guardianship of the Queen. In whose guardianship has the King been these seven weeks? In the hands of these usurpers. I asked in the Committee a question of the Physicians, which, from my being over-ruled, received no answer. I asked who sent for a certain Physician? I was stopped; but I now repeat it as important authority. Who has exercised all the Royal functions these seven weeks? Has the Crown no regal power to hold a Court Martial; no power to send a regiment out of the country? Let them give us an account of themselves. Is this a state in which things like these ought to go on? We know that he is only accessible by one sense. Let us reflect, that even when the King is perfectly well, it is impossible for any information to be conveyed to him, but through the medium of his Ministers, and sometimes, perhaps, of his minions."

—After this there is little to be said; but, I cannot help making one more observation.—Suppose, at the end of nine or ten months, the King were to die. Away, of course, according to the present constitution of our government, would go all the limitations. But, what a spectacle would this be for the country? What a thing for the people to behold? Their reasoning must lead them in one of these two directions: either they would look upon the Prince as having been thought an unsafe repository of the royal powers withheld from him, and, if so, how would they like to see those powers fall, all at once into his hands: to see him to-day, under a state of limitation and controul, and to-morrow, without any limitation or controul at all

over him? What reason, what sense, could they possibly see in this? What would they naturally think of a constitution, that, one day, *withheld certain powers from their Chief Magistrate by law*; and the next day suffered those same powers to *drop into his hands*?—If the measure did not succeed in causing the people to look upon the Prince as an *unsafe depository* of the royal powers withheld from him, they must of necessity look upon those powers as being *at all times unnecessary* to their welfare; and, if this were their conclusion, the effect of the measure, in these times especially, need be pointed out to no man in his senses.—Let it be observed, too, that the powers proposed to be withheld from the Prince are precisely those powers, which, if once dispensed with, for any length of time, *many persons* might not wish to see revived. They are powers, which give *influence to the Crown*; and the exercise of which impose, in most cases, *burdens upon the people*. Methinks, that “the *King's Friends*” should be careful how they give the people a *practical proof*, that the constant existence and exercise of such powers are not necessary to the well-being of the nation.—It is said, that his Royal Highness's Brothers have all protested against this scheme of limitations; and no wonder; for in it they must see the fate of the Kingly government involved.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 21st Dec. 1810.*

KING'S ILLNESS.

Examination of DR. ROBERT DARLING WILLIS, by a Committee of the House of Lords and Commons, on the 14th of Dec. 1810.

Has any amendment already taken place in the course of his Majesty's disorder; and does the appearance of such amendment continue at present?—A considerable amendment has taken place, from the commencement of his Majesty's disorder, which still continues.

What difference is there, if any, between the state of his Majesty at present, and that in which he was, when you were examined before the Privy Council?—It is extremely difficult to measure degrees of a complaint of this sort; the character of it has, in some measure, changed; but I think his Majesty, upon the whole, full

as well now, as when I was examined before the Privy Council.

Did you ever attend his Majesty before, in complaints of this kind?—In the year 1801.

Is the character of the present complaint the same as that in the year 1801?—In the commencement, it was exactly similar.

How in its progress?—In its progress also.

Do you conceive that his Majesty's increased age, since that period, is at all likely to influence, one way or the other, his ultimate recovery?—Judging from the symptoms of the case, I have no reason to think the age will have any influence.

Do you think the defects of his Majesty's sight will have any influence, one way or other, on his ultimate recovery?—I think it may be the means of retarding his recovery, but not of preventing the ultimate recovery.

Do you think that his Majesty's increased age will have any influence upon the duration of the disorder?—I do not consider that in this instance, the age will have any influence upon the disorder.

Have you ever met with a case, in your practice, that you consider as parallel to that of his Majesty?—If age is necessary to make up the parallel, perhaps not.

Have you ever known a person, as old as his Majesty, and with the same defect of sight, recover from a derangement of mind?—I have never seen a person, at his Majesty's age, labouring under a similar complaint to his Majesty's, taking all the circumstances of the complaint together.

In the general run of cases, which have come within your knowledge, in the course of your practice, has increased age, in your opinion, had any influence upon the recovery of the patient, or otherwise?—Not where the case was exactly similar to his Majesty's.

I understood you to say, you had never met with a case exactly similar to his Majesty's?—Taking age, and other circumstances of his Majesty, into consideration.

In the general run of cases, which have come under your observation, do you conceive the age of the patient to have had any influence upon his complaint?—It may be difficult to answer that question, without stating the particular species of his Majesty's complaint: his Majesty's

complaint does not appear, to me, to be connected with age; it is a complaint, produced by an accidental circumstance, which would have produced that complaint, at any time, in his Majesty, during the last 22 years. There is no mark of age in the symptoms; there are none of those symptoms, which usually attend complaints of that description, arising from age; and it appears to me, therefore, that his Majesty is as likely to recover, notwithstanding his age, from this complaint, as he would from any other accidental complaint he might labour under.

Have you known several instances of persons, who have laboured under derangement of mind, at particular and different periods of their lives, with intervals between the dates of derangement?—Several.

Have you considered such persons, as more or less likely to recover, in consequence of advanced age?—The opinion must depend upon the symptoms of the case at the time.

Do you then consider increased years, as a circumstance not bearing itself, or carrying, in itself, any influence upon a complaint of this nature?—Generally speaking age would have a considerable influence; but no symptoms, which in general arise from age in other persons, have made their appearance in his Majesty; I therefore conclude, that age will have no effect here.

Do you conclude, that age, in an unbroken constitution, has no influence upon the probability of recovery, or otherwise, from this disorder?—Provided I saw no symptoms of the effect of age in the individual, I should say not.

Can you at all contemplate in your own mind any period in which you think his Majesty's recovery likely?—No.

You attended the King in the year 1801, for the first time?—Yes.

Did you sign the bulletins that were issued in that illness?—No.

Did you see the bulletins that were issued in that illness?—Yes, I did.

Did you concur in the propriety of those bulletins, as expressing the real state of the King's health to the public?—Yes, I did.

Did you concur in the opinion, expressed to the public by the Physicians, by the cessation of the bulletins, that the King was perfectly recovered?—To the best of my recollection, the King was re-

covered, and fully capable of doing business: there were some little remains of hurry about his Majesty; nothing further; that I have any recollection of.

Do you mean to say, that those marks of hurry, about his Majesty, were apparent at the time the bulletins ceased; and the Physicians thereby announced to the public, that his Majesty was perfectly recovered?—The symptoms of hurry, certainly, occasionally remained.

Were the symptoms of hurry, such as to create a necessity for any restraint upon his Majesty, after the bulletins ceased?—Not till a relapse took place.

A relapse then, did, in point of fact, take place, after the illness in the year 1801?—A relapse took place, after the bulletins ceased.

What interval was there, between the cessation of the bulletins and the relapse?—I have no means of ascertaining, at this moment, when the bulletins ceased.

What length of time, do you conceive, took place, between the cessation of the bulletins and the relapse?—I have a perfect recollection of the relapse, but I have no recollection when the bulletins ceased.

Between the cessation of the bulletins, and the relapse, did his Majesty transact public business with his servants?—His Majesty's servants had access to him.

Had they access, after the usual manner, without the presence or permission of any medical attendant, or any person deputed by any medical attendant?—Certainly.

Nobody was ever present, at the time the interviews took place between his Majesty and his servants?—Not to my knowledge.

When, and where, did the relapse decidedly shew itself?—At the Queen's house, on the 14th or 15th of March.

By whom was it first perceived?—I really cannot call that to my recollection.

Had you been in the habit of visiting the King, occasionally, from the time of the cessation of the bulletins, to the period of the relapse decidedly taking place?—I had not ceased to see the King daily.

When did you, yourself, perceive the symptoms of a decided relapse in the King?—I presume, either on that evening or the next morning.

How long did that relapse continue?—But a very short time with any violence.

How long was it, before his Majesty was restored to the state in which the Physicians had reported him to be perfectly

recovered?—It is impossible for me to charge my memory with the number of days, at this distance of time; to the best of my recollection a few days only.

When did you discontinue your attendance on the King, altogether, in the year 1801?—On the 3d of June.

Had the King's hurry, which you have described, entirely ceased before you ceased attending upon the King?—I think, not entirely.

Do you conceive those hurries were vestiges of and dependent upon the mental complaint of the King?—Certainly.

When you speak of the King's recovery for the purpose of transacting public business, do you understand it in the same way as you would the same words applied to an individual, that he was competent to the transaction of all his business, public and private, and to the complete management of his affairs?—Most assuredly.

Since you ceased to attend the King in June, 1801, when were you since called to his Majesty?—On the 6th of last month.

Did not you attend the King in the year 1804?—No.

Since you have been called in to the King, do you recollect having objected to any proposal made for an interview between the King and the Lord Chancellor?—Yes.

Had you known, that it was intended to propose to the King, to see the Chancellor, should you have objected to his being told of it?—I should, certainly, have objected.

Do you think that any beneficial effect was produced, to his Majesty's mental health, by the interview between the King and the Chancellor?—No.

Has any prejudicial effect resulted from it?—I am not aware that any prejudicial effect arose.

On the night of the Chancellor seeing the King, did you see any effect, good or bad, produced, that you attributed to the visit of the Chancellor?—Not that I could attribute to the visit of the Chancellor.

What was the reason assigned by the Physicians for wishing the King to see the Chancellor?—Some of the Physicians had formed an idea that the Chancellor would have some influence on the King's mind.

In point of fact, was the King worse that night than he had been the preceding night?—The King had a remarkably good night.

When did you last see his Majesty?—This morning about 9 o'clock.

What was his state at that time?—Nearly in the same state that the King has been, for the two or three last days.

Had he passed a good night?—A tolerably good night, not equal to the preceding.

Do you esteem it an unfavourable circumstance, that sleep should not be attended with its natural effect of refreshment and composure, in a malady of the nature of that with which the King is affected?—It only marks the stage of the complaint. It uniformly takes place, early, in complaints of this description, that sleep does not benefit the mind, it only recruits the constitution at large.

Does sleep, now, benefit the King's mind, more than it did in the earlier stages of this disorder?—Most undoubtedly.

Does it benefit his mind, as much as it did in the corresponding stages of his disorder, heretofore?—I am scarcely able to discover the exact parallel situation.

Have you now, or had you lately, under your care, any patients of the age of the King?—Not affected exactly as his Majesty is.

Have you had any patients, mentally deranged, of or about that age?—No, I think not.

Have you had patients mentally deranged, of about the same age, under your care?—I have had persons under states of insanity of the King's age, not perhaps under mental derangements similar to the King's.

What is the distinction between mental derangement and insanity?—The Committees must be aware of the extreme difficulty of giving a definition unpremeditated. I will describe the character of the different states. I consider the King's derangement more nearly allied to delirium than insanity; whenever the irritation in his Majesty arises to a certain point, he uniformly becomes delirious. In delirium, the mind is actively employed upon past impressions, upon objects and former scenes, which rapidly pass in succession before the mind, resembling in that case, a person talking in his sleep. There is also a considerable disturbance in the general constitution, great restlessness, great want of sleep, and total unconsciousness of surrounding objects. In insanity, there may be little or no disturbance, apparently, in the general constitution; the mind is occupied upon some fixed assumed idea, to the truth of which, it will pertinaciously adhere, in opposition to the plainest evi-

dence of its falsity; and the individual is acting, always, upon that false impression: in insanity, also, the mind is awake to objects which are present. Taking insanity, therefore, and delirium, as two points, I would place derangement of mind somewhere between them. His Majesty's illness uniformly partakes more of the delirium than of the insanity.

Do you mean to say that the King is at any time unconscious of surrounding objects?—When I first saw his Majesty, on the 6th of November, he was perfectly unconscious of surrounding objects.

Was that his state on Tuesday last?—

No.

Was there derangement on Tuesday?—There was derangement on Tuesday.

Then, on Tuesday, did his Majesty's disorder bear the characteristic of insanity, and on the 6th of November of delirium?—It has never borne the character of insanity; it never gets beyond derangement, according to the scale I have just laid down.

Does this apply to the illness of 1801, as well as to the present?—Strictly.

What is the present state of the King's bodily health, in your opinion?—The King is far from being in a good state of health, at this time.

Are the symptoms of bodily indisposition sufficient to account for all the derangement of mind, which is perceived in his Majesty?—Fully sufficient to account for the present symptoms of the state of his mind.

Is there a greater absence of sleep, now, than there was a fortnight ago?—For six days, there was more regular sleep, than there has been for some days past; when I say a fortnight, I am perhaps not quite accurate to the time.

Do you attach any, and what importance, to a patient, having previously had repeated attacks of mental disorder?—Provided I see no consequences arise from the repetition of the disorder, I should attach no importance to it.

In his Majesty's case have you observed any consequences of the kind you allude to?—I have observed none.

Did not the Chancellor know, before he was actually introduced to the King, that you concurred, upon the whole, in thinking it would be better he should see the King, than that he should not?—Having started the objections which I did to the Chancellor's admission, I proposed going over to the King, to see in what state

of expectation his Majesty was: knowing that he had been apprised of the Chancellor's visit to Windsor. I found him then in such a state of expectation, that it was a doubt whether as much irritation would not arise from keeping the Chancellor away, as from admitting him: and I therefore assented, as a choice of evils, that the Chancellor should go in.

Having stated, that his Majesty's complaint is more nearly allied to delirium than insanity; will you have the goodness to state, whether, in your opinion, it is on that account, more easily cured?—On that account I think it much more easily cured.

In your opinion, has the apprehension on the mind of a patient, of the recurrence of mental malady after repeated attacks, any, and what effect, in producing a renewal of such attacks?—It must depend very much upon the nature of the mind of the individual; no general reasoning could be formed on that question.

Do you think it has on the mind of his Majesty?—I have no reason to think that it has.

Are relapses more to be apprehended, on the recurrence of the malady, than after the period of the first attack?—I do not know that it is, necessarily, to be looked for; it has certainly taken place in this instance.

If a patient had been under your care, more than once, would you not expect the return of that patient more than after the first attack?—Certainly.

LIBEL TRIAL.

Action of Mr. HUGH BELL against BYRNE, the proprietor of the Morning Post.—Tried at Guildhall, before Lord Ellenborough, 19th Dec. 1810.—Damages 500l.—From the Times, Dec. 20, 1810.

Mr. Topping stated, that this was an action of damages, brought by Mr. Hugh Bell, a respectable merchant of this City, against Mr. Nicholas Byrne, the sole proprietor of the paper called the Morning Post. The defendant was charged in the declaration with publishing a false and scandalous libel to the injury of the plaintiff's feelings and character.—The learned Counsel, after some general observations, went into the history of the transaction. About the period when the arrest of Sir Francis Burdett engrossed so much of the public attention, a correspondence chiefly consisting of letters and

documents under the name of Mr. Roger O'Connor, had appeared in Cobbett's Political Register. An article appeared in the Morning Post of the 15th of last May, purporting to be an abstract or report of the speech of the Attorney-General for Ireland, at the time when a motion was made in the Irish House of Commons relative to Mr. O'Connor and other State prisoners. The speech comprehended several letters, shewing the connection between the Irish State prisoners and some persons who had attracted the attention of the Government in this country. These letters were followed in the article by comments on the characters alluded to; and the comment attached to Mr. Bell's name in the article, was, *that he had been confined on a charge of high treason, in England, in February, 1798.* This was totally untrue; and yet its effect upon the character of a peaceable and respectable man must be most serious, if it were not done away by the measures which were now adopted, at once to clear the plaintiff's character and to punish the defendant. He (Mr. Topping) knew very little of the Morning Post, as it seldom fell in his way; but it was apparent, that the circulation of such a charge, in London, must be highly detrimental to any man, in a country where reputation was the great treasure of a man. But the character of a due regard and obedience to the laws and government under which he lived was most essential, and it was that important branch of character that the slander of the libeller was intended to cut away. In the present instance, there could be no defence, though there might be a feeble attempt at justification. But that would sink under the advocate; and the Jury would only have to consider, what should be the compensation to the plaintiff. The cause was from many circumstances a singular one, but not the least of its singularities was, that it produced the Attorney-General in the new character, of defender of a gross, malicious, slanderous libel. That Learned Counsel had been used to other exertion of his great powers: he had now to act the part of one screening the malevolence of the libeller. At other times, that Learned Counsel was seen, pressing in a different direction, and mustering the whole of his strength to beat down the cause of the accused. Of these efforts, one must say, in the sentiment of Shakespeare,

"O! it is excellent

“To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous
“To use it like a giant.”

However, in the present instance, even his powers must fail; *defence was a new field to him*; he must now perform on a new instrument; and he would probably be as awkward a performer upon that as he was upon the flageolet case, yesterday. The present case was, on the part of the plaintiff, of the simplest order. A reputable man had been traduced—the injury had been offered through a medium that must make it the most extensive. A compensation for that injury was sought of the jury, and there could be no doubt that they would do what justice required.

A person from the Stamp-office attended to prove the paper of the 15th of May.

The part of the article to which the Counsel for the plaintiff particularly referred was a letter from Mr. Arthur O'Connor to his brother, Mr. R. O'Connor, mentioning that he had disposed of some property to Sir Francis Boddett, and pointing out the present plaintiff as the agent to whom he had left the conduct of the sale, and other particular business of the same kind. This was followed by the comment of the Irish Attorney-general, that the persons who were alluded to in the correspondence were of the most suspicious order, such as Sweeney, a state prisoner, Hugh Bell, a man who had been arrested in London, in February, 1798, on a charge of high treason, &c. This report was reprinted in the Morning Post of the 15th of May last.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL, on the part of the defendant, said, that as the Counsel for the prosecution had professed to give a simple statement, it should be met, on his part, by a simple defence. The circumstances of the publication were few, inartificial, and such as must perfectly do away the charge of particular malice against the plaintiff. When on an occasion which was probably fresh in the memory of the Jury, Mr. Roger O'Connor had brought himself into the public eye by certain correspondences; it became the habit of his friends, to talk of him as a man of unimpeached loyalty. Those correspondencies were canvassed in the different public prints; and among the rest the Morning Post, not having, probably, the same entire faith in Mr. O'Connor's merits, gave its readers a report of a speech spoken by an eminent Law Officer in the House of Commons of Ireland. The report touched upon some circumstances of his connection with persons not

highly reputable as loyal or honest subjects. This report was taken from the Dublin Journal of some years back. The Jury had already heard how far the present plaintiff's name was animadverted on. It was merely in a *cursorial and accidental manner*; without any peculiar allusion, without any peculiar mark of malice, but merely as a part of the current paragraph. If the printer had exercised any thing like *thought* upon the subject, he would *probably* have omitted the plaintiff's name. The whole statement was taken from a paper openly published, openly circulated, and yet untainted by the plaintiff in his zeal for vindication. If there ever had been evil in the thing, it had been done, and had passed away in the years which had since passed. This was to be looked to, and to be the great consideration with the Jury. *The trial of the malicious intention lay with them; for the charge of malice was only to be substantiated by proof of intention.* It was in this sense that he (the Attorney-General) was inclined to judge of the language which had been so singularly used by the Learned Counsel on the opposite side. It was impossible not to consider it as extraordinary, as very extraordinary and strange. The proper name for a charge of that nature coming against a person in his (the Attorney-General's) situation, was, *slandrous and scandalous*; but as there was, it was to be presumed, no malicious intention, it should receive an answer. *What! was the charge of professional severity, of pushing hard against the persons accused of libel, to be laid upon him? The whole course of his professional life was before the world. He was known from his boyhood, and there was not an hour of his life that had a stain upon it; he had never pressed the law; he would make no other reply to the singular and most unnecessary expressions which had so hastily escaped the Counsel on the opposite side. It was to be presumed, there was no malicious intent in this; and the plaintiff in the case ought to feel in the same way. There could be no intention to injure him; the publication of the paper was for a purpose with which he had no possible connection. There was no imputation of treason meant now to be fixed on the plaintiff. He was exonerated from it, and of course the injury was nothing. It would be admitted, that loyalty was a valuable part of the character of a British merchant, or of a British man; but the Jury would*

consider the *desire to injure, and the injury done.* If they came to the question of damages, they would make it a short one. The case seemed clear, and the Jury would proportion their judgment accordingly.

Mr. Pasley, from the Secretary of State's Office, was called to give evidence of the warrant for arresting the plaintiff, in March, 1798.

The warrant was read; it directed that Mr. Hugh Bell, of Charter-house-square, should be arrested on suspicion of high-treason. The warrant was signed by the late Duke of Portland. Mr. Pasley knew nothing of the trial of Arthur O'Connor, at Maidstone.

Cox, a King's messenger, had received the warrant on the 6th of March, 1798. He arrested Mr. Bell at eight o'clock in the morning of the 7th of March. He searched the bureau and desks for papers, and intercepted the prisoner's letters. At eleven, he conveyed his prisoner to the Secretary of State's Office: Mr. Wickham was there: did not think he saw Mr. Canning. About half past one, prisoner was discharged from before the presence of the Privy Council. Witness had then nothing more to do with him, and heard no more of him till this time.

Mr. TOPPING, in reply, could not repress his astonishment at the manner in which the Attorney-General had taken up words which he had used in the opening statement. It was not becoming a man, to bring his personal feelings before the Court; but he would be unfitting his station—he would be unfitting the gown he wore, as King's Counsel—if he could be silent under the language which the Attorney-General had used. No; he was not to be deterred, he was not to be influenced by the “*vultus instantis tyranni.*” “*Scandalous and slanderous!*” Did the Attorney-General think, he was to stand up, and to

“*Bestride the bar,
“Like a Colossus, whilst others
“Were to walk under his huge legs, and peep about,
“To find themselves dishonourable graves.*”

No; life was not to be endured on such a covenant. To use the words of the great poet again,

“*I had as lief not be, as live to be
“In awe of such a thing as myself.*”

The Attorney-General should be made to feel this. It should be a lesson to him the longest day he had to live.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH. Mr. Topping, it is perhaps better not to pursue this line. The words which occurred could not have been meant so strongly as you think. They merely passed as things of that kind generally do; it is painful when they excite such notice as at present.

MR. TOPPING. My Lord, the language was not to be endured, or passed over. I owe a vindication to the Court, I owe it to myself.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH. I know, Mr. Topping, there is no malignity in your disposition. I cannot doubt that; but it is better that things of this kind should go to as little length as possible.

MR. TOPPING. My Lord, I have the highest deference for the Court: and I will not enlarge on what has been said. But I know that what passes here must go forth to the public; and I owe it my profession, I owe it to myself, to throw off so degrading an imputation as that thrown upon me by the Attorney-general. The sentences shall be brief and few. But I must not sink before any man who thinks to browbeat me into submission.

He then recapitulated the facts of the case, and concluded by saying that the defendant, from even the justification which he had put in, must have been conscious of the fatshood of the charge, and that the Jury should consider the case of the plaintiff as that which might be their own.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH briefly stated the evidence. If it had appeared that the warrant was on a charge of high-treason, the justification would have been made out, and a verdict must have gone for the defendant; but the warrant only was, on suspicion of high-treason. It was certainly improper, that a person's name should have been introduced as the plaintiff's was; but the Jury would take it into their serious consideration, in apportioning damages, how the evil was palliated, by its having been done so long since, by the consideration of the rumour having extended as widely as probably it would ever extend. The Dublin Journal came over to London, and was probably sometimes in the hands of the present Jury; so that the additional circulation by the Morning Post could not have the effect of much additional injury. A verdict must be found for the plaintiff.

The Jury, without leaving the box, found for the plaintiff—Damages 500*l.*

JACOBIN GUINEAS.

Case of DE YONGE, who was tried in August last, and found guilty of SELLING GUINEAS; and whose cause came on again, in the King's Bench, on the 9th of November.

MR. MARRYATT moved for a rule to shew cause why the verdict in this case should not be set aside, and a verdict for the Defendant entered. The indictment under which the Defendant had been tried, charged him with purchasing the current coin of the kingdom at more than the current value; a point had been saved by the Noble and Learned Lord who tried the cause (Lord Ellenborough,) but after the strong opinion expressed by his Lordship, he (Mr. Marryatt) felt that he must be obliged, in stating the case of his Client, to enter into the subject at some length.—LORD ELLENBOROUGH assured the Learned Counsel, that he was quite prepared to change his opinion if he should be convinced that it was erroneous.—MR. MARRYATT submitted, that the 5th and 6th of Edward VI. by which the offence charged is the exchanging gold or silver for more in value than such gold or silver coin is current for at the time, could only be conceived to have reference to a former Act of the 23d of Edward III. by which it was declared, that it should not be lawful to take in exchange silver for gold or gold for silver, receiving more than the current value of either. Whoever did so receive, or exchange any gold or silver coin of the realm, it was by the said Act, enacted, should forfeit the same; and by the statute of Edward VI. besides forfeiture of the coin so exchanged, this offence was to be punished by imprisonment for one year, and by fine, at the pleasure of the Court. He admitted that the Defendant in this case had received for fifty guineas fifty six Bank of England notes for 1*l.* each, and a dollar, valued at five shillings, being at the rate of 22*s.* 6*d.* for every guinea. He admitted also, that this was an increased sum above the value of a guinea, on the one hand, or that it was a proof of the depreciation of Bank notes on the other. But he submitted, that this was no offence.—The question here to be considered was, had the Defendant given more in value of coin for coin?—If he could buy a thing cheaper for coin than otherwise, this was no offence. The value of a Bank note was not fixed by law—the public were not bound to take

Bank notes, nor were they esteemed a legal tender. What then was there to hinder any man from saying for what value or consideration he would take it? This was clearly the interpretation to be put on the Act of Edward VI. as connecting it with the statute of Edward III., the former statute not inflicting any new prohibition, but only superadding penalties to those contained in the former Act. The statute does not say, that these penalties shall attach if a man takes or gives goods or notes for more than their current value, but confines itself to the case where a man may take more than its value for the current coin of the realm.—**LORD ELLENBOROUGH** said, that the Court would be glad to hear the Learned Counsel further on this point, if the time did not press. This was a motion of great importance, and the Learned Gentleman might take his rule.—**MR. MARRYATT** then stated, that the Acts which had a bearing on this case were numerous, being more than ten in number, and at the time these Acts were passed Bank notes had no existence.—It was then ordered that the Defendant should remain at liberty, on bail, till the question should be finally determined.—The **ATTORNEY GENERAL** stated, that a case which had been tried before Sir James Mansfield, in Staffordshire, and which involved the same question, had by his Lordship been reserved for argument before the Twelve Judges. He thought it might be convenient that both cases might be argued at the same time.—**MR. MARRYATT** agreed, that his Client should be personally in attendance at this argument, and thus the motion was disposed of.

OFFICIAL PAPER.

SWEDEN.—*Declaration against England and English Trade, Nov. 19, 1810.*

We, Charles XIII. &c. &c. &c. make known; whereas in order to maintain our relations with his Majesty the Emperor of the French; &c. &c. we have been induced to declare War, and to break off all commerce and other communication between our Kingdom and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; we

have accordingly ordered, as we do hereby order and enjoin, That in case, contrary to our expectation, any English vessel or vessels should be at present in any of the ports of our Kingdom, such vessel or vessels shall immediately be detained. And, with a due observance of whatever has been enacted in the Decrees already issued in this respect, we do order, that no English ships of war, merchant ships, and, without exception, all vessels coming from Great Britain, her Colonies, and the States under her immediate Government, or carrying goods being of the produce or manufacture of, or belonging to, the Crown of Great Britain and her subjects, shall not, under the severest responsibility, be permitted to enter any Swedish port.—And conformable to the measures adopted in other States on the Continent against the importation of English colonial goods, we are graciously pleased to order, that such goods must not, from any town or place in our Kingdom, after this our gracious Decree shall have been duly made known there, be exported to foreign places on the Continent.—Accordingly, and as the stock of colonial goods now in the Kingdom is sufficient for some time for the want of our subjects, we have thought it necessary to prohibit all importation into the Kingdom of such goods, or colonial goods of whatever origin the same may be, or under whatever flag they may arrive.—And, therefore, after the publication of this Decree, no vessel whatever, laden with colonial goods, shall be permitted to put into any Swedish harbour. For the rest we shall separately order a due and careful investigation to be made, in order to ascertain whether, and to what extent, English or colonial goods, after the 23rd of April, have, under any flag whatever, been illegally imported into the Kingdom; and we will then order, how, and in what manner, the said goods shall be legally disposed of. And the concerned high and low Officers and servants are to pay due attention that what has thus been ordered with respect to the first and second article be carried into execution.—Given in the Palace of Stockholm, the 19th day of November, 1810.

CHARLES.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 40.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1810. [Price 1s.

"Legal Tenders have been the cause of the overthrow of every financial system into which they have been introduced."—ESSAY on American Paper money.

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PAPER AGAINST GOLD:

BEING AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

TRADESMEN AND FARMERS

IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

LETTER XXII.

The question of Legal Tender in Bank of England Notes—Two Letters received from Correspondents as to the true construction and practice of the Act of 1797—How far the Bank of England Notes are a legal tender—They are so as far as relates to debts due from the Bank of England including the Dividends—Not so with regard to debts and contracts between man and man—Any holder of a Country Bank-note may compel the payment of it in the Coin of the kingdom—This proved by the decision in the Case of Grigby against Oakes—The opinions of the four Judges in that Case—The justice of this decision—The reason why people have not hitherto compelled the Country Bankers to pay their notes in coin.

Gentlemen,

The proposed subject of this Letter, was, an inquiry into the rate of the depreciation of the paper-money; but, two letters, which I have received, in the last six days, the one from Glasgow and the other from the neighbourhood of Exeter, induce me to devote this present Letter to the answering of them, they being upon the very important subject of the legal tender.

The writer of the first letter expresses his doubts as to the correctness of my exposition of the Bank Stoppage, or Restriction Act, (See Letter XVI, page 908,) and wishes that I would give him my opinion again, after having taken time to revise what I before said upon this part of the

subject. My correspondent near Exeter, who tells me that he is a farmer, thanks me for the useful information that he is so good as to say he has received from this series of Letters, and begs me, in a very earnest manner, to tell him, whether I am quite sure, that I was correct, when I said, that any holder of Country Bank notes might compel the payment of them in gold and silver. Both these gentlemen have put their names to their letters; but, as the same doubts and uncertainties may have occurred to others of my readers, I shall give my answer in this public manner, and, after having so done, there will, I trust, remain no doubt or uncertainty at all.

I stated to you, Gentlemen, in Letter XVI, that, as far as related to debts due from the Bank of England, the notes of that Bank were, by the Act of 1797, called the Bank Stoppage, or Restriction, Act, made a legal tender; that is to say, that the creditor was compelled to take those notes in payment, or to go without any payment at all. If, for instance, any one of you has a Bank of England note of ten pounds, and carry it to Threadneedle Street for payment, the Bank Company may compel you to take other of their notes in payment, or, they may, if you refuse such notes in payment, refuse you payment in any thing else.

It is the same with regard to the payment of the dividends, that is to say, the interest of the Stocks or Funds. If, for instance, our neighbour, GRIZZLE GREENHORN, when she goes to receive her half-year's interest upon her Stock, which, you know, is paid her by the Bank Company, were to say: "pay me in good gold and silver," would, or might, receive for answer, an assertion, that the law, the Act of 1797, protected the Bank Company against such an unreasonable demand. In a word, the Bank Company might refuse, absolutely refuse, to pay her her interest in any thing but their own promissory notes; and, then, if she tendered them those promissory notes for payment, they might refuse to pay them in any thing but other of

their own notes; that is to say, they would be ready to give her *fresh promises to pay* in lieu of the promises to pay which they had given herbefore; but, she could not compel them to give her one shilling's worth of gold or silver, except there might be due to her, in the way of interest, any *fractional part of a pound.*

Thus far, then, the Bank Company's notes are a *legal tender.* And, in the affairs between man and man, if such notes be *once accepted and received* in payment of any debt whatever, they are, *after such acceptance and receipt,* to be considered as a legal payment in that case. If, for instance, I owe my neighbour a hundred pounds, and tender him Bank of England notes in payment, and he *receives* them in payment to the amount of the sum due to him, he is paid, I am acquitted of my debt; he cannot afterwards sue me for the debt, upon the ground, that I have not paid him *money*, as he might do in the case of other promissory notes, if there were no particular agreement to bar him.

But, here the legal tender of Bank of England notes stops. They are not *yet*, in any other case, put upon a footing with money. As to all the transactions between man and man, except in the above circumstances, which can occur only where the Bank of England itself is a party, no person is obliged to take Bank of England Notes in payment of any debt, or legal demand. And, this is a thing well worthy of the attention of all those, who have it in contemplation to enter into contracts which are to have a *future operation*; for, if the value of gold and silver, compared with that of Bank notes, should continue to increase, those who now make contracts for payments to be made some years hence, should bear it constantly in mind, that the party to whom they will have to make such payment, will, at all times, have it in his power *to insist upon gold coin in payment.*

If this be the law, without any other exceptions than those above named, it follows, of course, that I can have not the least hesitation in telling my Devonshire correspondent, that I am *quite sure*, that any holder of a *Country Bank* note has it, at all times, in his power *to compel the payment of it in gold or silver coin from the King's mint and of full weight and due fineness.* I know, that a different notion has

prevailed; and, I have heard it said, or seen it stated in print, that this *compulsion* cannot be effected; because, it has been said, if you were to bring your action of debt against Paperkite and Co. they would *pay the amount into Court in Bank of England notes*; and that, upon proof of their having done this being produced, the Court would stop the proceedings, or at least, throw all the costs there-after incurred, upon you.

This would, indeed, make the Bank of England notes a legal tender *in fact*, though not *in law*; or, in other words, it would make an Act of Parliament a mere delusion, a shuffle, a cheat, a base premeditated fraud. But, this is all a mistake; it is not founded in fact; the Courts would attempt to do no such thing; for, if one could, in any case, suppose the inclination to exist in the mind of a Judge, he would not do it, nor think of it, in the face of what has already been done.

The question has been *decided*, and that, too, with all possible solemnity, as will appear from the case which I am now about to lay before you, and the perusal of which will remove all doubts whatever upon the subject. There appears to have been no doubt about the *letter* of the law, in the mind of either of my correspondents; but they both doubt of its *interpretation in the Courts*; and the last mentioned gentleman says, that, though upon the *fact* of the Act, there is nothing to warrant the supposition, that a holder of a *Country Bank* note could not compel the payment of it in gold and silver, yet he thinks, that such holder would, by the judicial construction of the Act, be defeated in any attempt to compel such payment; and, he seems to think, that this is pretty clearly demonstrated in the fact (as he supposes it to be), that no one has ever yet attempted to compel *Country Bankers* to pay their notes in gold and silver.

He will, doubtless, be surprised to find, that the attempt has not only been *made*, but that it fully *succeeded.* In the year 1801, four years after the Bank Stoppage, or Restriction, Act was passed, a Mr. GRIGBY, in the county of Suffolk, went to the Bank Shop of Messrs. OAKES and Co. of St. Edmunds Bury, and, in presenting them one of their own Five Guinea notes for payment, demanded *money.* The Bankers tendered him a *five pound Bank of*

England note, and five shillings, which he refused to receive, saying, that the five pound Bank of England note was *not* money, and that he would not take it. The Bankers told him, that, if he wanted specie for his accommodation, they would let him have it. He declined to receive it in that way; he said that he stood in no need of it as an accommodation; that he demanded it as a *right*; and that, unless they paid him in the coin of the kingdom, he would bring an action of debt against them. Upon this ground they refused him payment in coin, whereupon he brought his action and obtained a verdict in his favour at the Assizes; but the question of law was, upon the motion of the Defendant's counsel, reserved for decision by the Judges; and the following is the Report of the Case, as argued before, and determined by the four Judges, of the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, on the 19th of Nov. 1801.

"GRIGBY against OAKES and Another.
 "—This was an action on a promissory note; the Defendants as to all but five guineas pleaded *non assumpsit*, and as to the remaining five guineas they pleaded a tender. The cause came on to be tried at the Summer Assizes for Suffolk, before Mr. Baron Hoitham, when a verdict was found for the Plaintiff, with one shilling damages, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the following case. The Defendants are Bankers at Bury St. Edmunds, and issued the note in question for five guineas, payable on demand to the bearer. On the 31st of January last, the Plaintiff carried several notes to the shop of the Defendant, and demanded payment. He first presented other notes, to the amount of 50 guineas, for which he received payment, partly in Bank of England notes and partly in cash, the cash being ten pounds, and being the proportion of money they usually pay. He then presented the note in question, for which the Defendants tendered in payment a 5*l.* Bank of England note and five shillings in silver. This the Plaintiff refused on the ground that the tender was partly in a Bank of England note, objecting to such note, and insisted on being paid wholly in money. The Defendants refused to pay wholly in money. The Plaintiff did not at the time say he wanted money for his own particular accommodation, but stated that he came on purpose to have cash for the note, or

"to bring an action if payment in money was refused.

"The question for the opinion of the Court was, Whether under the circumstances before stated, the Plaintiff was entitled to recover?

"Sergeant SHEPHERD, for the Defendants, argued, that though unquestionably previous to the passing of the 37 Geo. 3, c. 45, commonly called the Bank Act, a bank note would not have been a legal tender, yet that, since the passing of the above act such notes must be considered as cash, for that the necessary consequence of the above act being to absorb a vast proportion of the actual cash of the country, the Legislature must have intended to give a new character to bank notes by way of substitute; that they had specifically declared them to be a good tender so as to prevent an arrest, and yet if the same spirit which actuated the present Plaintiff in the commencement of this action was to continue to influence his conduct, and that of others also, a Defendant, though exempted from arrest, might ultimately be taken in execution, though ready to pay in bank notes, since he might possibly be unable to satisfy the judgment obtained against him altogether in money; because even if a sale of his goods took place, the Sheriff might not be able to avoid receiving a large proportion of bank notes from the purchasers; that, indeed, in some respects, bank notes were privileged by the 37 Geo. 3, c. 45, beyond cash, inasmuch as a tender of them in satisfaction of a debt operated to discharge a party from arrest, which was not the case with a tender of money, which must be pleaded in bar; and that no contrary inference could be drawn from the 8th section of the act, which declared payments in bank notes to be equivalent to payments in cash, if made and accepted as such, because that must have been the case before the passing of the act, and therefore that clause must be deemed nugatory.

"Sergeant SELWYN, on the other side, was stopped by the Court.

"LORD ALVANLEY, (*Chief Justice*).—The question for the Court to decide is a mere question of law, arising, as it has been contended, out of the provisions of the 37 Geo. 3, c. 45. In fact we are called upon to say whether it follows as a necessary consequence from that act, that a tender in bank notes is equivalent

"to a tender in money? It may be very
 "true that individuals may be occasion-
 "ally subjected to great inconveniences
 "from the operation of that act; but are
 "we therefore to say that the Legislature
 "has enacted that which the provisions of
 "the act do not warrant? If we were at
 "liberty to refer to our own private know-
 "ledge of the language that was held in
 "Parliament while this act was pending,
 "no doubt could be entertained upon the
 "subject. We know that it was very
 "much canvassed at that time, Whether
 "or not the Legislature ought to go the
 "length of declaring bank notes a good
 "legal tender? If, therefore, it had been
 "intended by the Legislature so to make
 "them, that intention would have been
 "expressed in such clear terms that no
 "question could have arisen upon the
 "subject. Indeed, it is expressly pro-
 "vided, in the 2nd section of the act, that
 "if the Governor and Company of the
 "Bank of England shall be sued on any
 "of their notes, or for any sum of money,
 "payment of which in their notes the
 "party suing refuses to accept, they may
 "apply to the Court in which such pro-
 "ceedings are instituted, to stay proceed-
 "ings during such time as they are re-
 "stricted from paying in cash. But with
 "respect to individuals it was not intended
 "to prevent any creditor, who should be
 "so disposed, from captiously demanding
 "a payment in money, though such a
 "creditor is deprived of the benefit of ar-
 "resting his debtor. Thank God, few
 "such creditors as the present Plaintiff
 "have been found since the passing of the
 "act! But yet, whatever inconveniences
 "may arise, and to whatever length they
 "may go, Parliament and not this Court
 "must be applied to for a remedy. In-
 "convenience arising from the operation
 "of an act of Parliament, can be no
 "ground of argument in a Court of law;
 "and even if it were, still I should enter-
 "tain no doubt, that it was the intention
 "of the Legislature to make bank notes a
 "legal payment only in certain cases by
 "them expressed, and that in all other
 "cases they should remain upon the
 "same footing upon which they stood be-
 "fore the act, except as to the exemption
 "from arrest, which they afford to the
 "party tendering them in payment. The
 "8th section of the act, which has been
 "treated as nugatory in the argument,
 "however it may enact nothing new, still
 "appears to me pregnant with the inten-

"tions of parliament, and to speak loudly
 "the resolution not to alter the character
 "of bank notes, but in those cases which
 "are specially provided for. Without
 "however referring to any of those spe-
 "cific clauses, and arguing from them as
 "to the intent of the Legislature, I should
 "be clearly of opinion, that the present
 "Plaintiff is entitled to our judgment in
 "his favour.

"Judge HEATH. I am of the same opi-
 "nion. The question for us to decide is,
 "whether a tender in Bank notes is a
 "good legal tender? Now the 37 Geo.
 "3. c. 45. appears to me to negative that
 "question; for the several provisions of
 "the act making them a good legal ten-
 "der in certain excepted cases, excludes
 "the idea of their being so generally in
 "cases not provided for by the act. It
 "has been argued, however, that the ope-
 "ration of the act will in many cases be
 "very injurious, unless we determine it
 "to be a necessary inference from the
 "act that Bank notes were intended by
 "the Legislature to be put upon the same
 "footing as cash. But whatever incon-
 "veniences may arise, the Courts of Law
 "cannot apply a remedy. I think,
 "indeed, the Legislature acted wisely,
 "having the recent example of France
 "before their eyes, to avoid making bank
 "notes a legal tender; for in France we
 "know that legislative provisions of that
 "kind in favour of paper currency only
 "tended to depreciate the paper it was de-
 "signed to protect, and were ultimately re-
 "pealed, as injurious in their nature."

"Judge ROOKE. I am of the same
 "opinion."

"Judge CHAMBER. This case appears
 "to me almost too plain for argu-
 "ment. It has been thought that the
 "Courts went a great way in holding
 "a tender in bank notes to be a good ten-
 "der, if not objected to at the time.
 "Certainly that was an innovation;
 "though perhaps a beneficial one. But
 "the act upon which the present question
 "arises affords nothing but arguments
 "against the inference attempted to be
 "drawn by it. Surely the observation
 "that in some respects the Legislature
 "have put bank notes on a more favoura-
 "ble footing than cash, leads to a con-
 "clusion directly contrary to that which
 "it was intended to support. If the Le-
 "gislation have not gone far enough it is
 "for them, not for us, to remedy the de-
 "fect. Indeed, by making bank notes a

"good tender in certain cases, specifically provided for, they appear to me to have negatived the construction we are now desired to put upon the act."

It will hardly be doubted, that I have copied this report with great care. I have, indeed, given every word of it; but, for the satisfaction of my correspondents, to whom I am really obliged for their inquiries, I will add, that the report is taken from a well known Law-Book, entitled, "*Bosanquet's and Puller's Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Court of Common Pleas and Exchequer Chamber and in the House of Lords, from Michaelmas Term, in the 40th year of the reign of George III. (1799) to Michaelmas Term, in the 42nd Year of the same reign (1801), both inclusive.*"

After reading this report, there cannot remain, in the mind of any man, the smallest doubt upon this subject. Here is the fact, in practice as well as in theory, clearly established, that any holder of a *Country Bank note*, payable to bearer on demand, or the holder of any such note, except of the Bank of England, may, at any time, when he pleases, demand payment of such note in the gold and silver coin issued from the King's mint, that coin being of legal weight and fineness. And, if such payment be refused, upon demand, the holder of such note may immediately proceed to sue for such payment, which, if the party sued has the means, he must finally pay in coin, together with full costs of suit.*

And, indeed, if this was not the law, the Bank of England notes would be a *legal tender* to all intents and purposes; for, the issuers of these notes being protected by law against the holders of them, the holder of a *Country Bank note* would have no claim upon the Country Banker, or upon any body else, for coin. The man who chooses to take a Bank of England note, does it knowing that he cannot

* The *shilling damages*, mentioned in the first part of the above Report, is merely the *nominal damages*, which it is the custom to lay, in cases where the object, as in this case, is to ascertain the question of right. But, the Plaintiff had his *costs of suit* in this case, as every other plaintiff must have, who brings an action in a similar way, and on similar grounds.

force any one to pay him its nominal amount in coin; and, therefore if he choose to take it, he has no reason to complain. Persons, who buy Stock, know that they are to be paid their interest in Bank of England notes; and, therefore, they have no reason to complain. But, if either of you sell your corn or your wool, and take a *Country Bank note* for it, that is to say, the promissory note of your neighbour, you expect to have the *real worth* of your corn, or your wool; and, of course, you expect to be paid by your neighbour in the *real money of the kingdom*, which money, as I have now shewn you, you have a *legal*, as well as a *moral*, right to demand.

Let any one should raise a doubt upon the circumstance of Mr. GRIGBY's demand having been founded upon a note given for *guineas* instead of *pounds*, I beg you to observe, that this circumstance was not even alluded to by either of the Judges, or by the Counsel who argued against Mr. GRIGBY. You will perceive, besides, that the Judges speak generally of *all debts*, except those only due from the Bank of England itself. The decision is founded upon the broad principle, that Bank of England notes may be refused in all cases, except only those wherein the Bank of England itself is the debtor, including the dividends upon the National Debt, and there the Bank is regarded as the debtor to the Stock holder.

It is also worthy of your observation, that, though the Chief Justice seemed to think, that it might become necessary to make the Bank of England Notes a *legal tender* in all cases, another of the Judges expressed himself as decidedly of opinion, that such a measure would be both unjust and impolitic; and, indeed, that it would be, in part, at least, to imitate the measures of ROBESPIERRE, who compelled the people of France to take paper-money upon pain of death.

If it should be asked, why other persons have not done as Mr. GRIGBY did, the answer is, that the people of this country, generally speaking, have really thought, that, by the Act of 1797, the Bank of England notes were made, to all intents and purposes, a *legal tender*, and, of course, that, if a man refused to take them in payment, he had not the means of forcing the debtor to pay him in any other sort of thing.

Nor is this generally prevailing error to be much wondered at, seeing what were the means made use of at the time of the Bank Stoppage. When you reflect upon the famous meeting and resolutions at the Mansion-House in London, the secret history of which I have given you. When you reflect upon the effect of these Resolutions, issued under the signature of the Lord Mayor; followed, as they immediately were by Resolutions, of a similar purport, from the Privy Council, and from the Justices assembled in Quarter Sessions, in the several counties. When you reflect on the official manner, and the authoritative air of all these promulgations, you will cease to wonder, that the Resolutions to take and pay the paper of the Bank of England were, by the mass of the people, regarded as having the force of law.

Now, however, you know the true value of those Resolutions; you know what is, and what is not, the law, relating to this important matter, in which every man of you is so deeply interested, and on your judgment and discretion with respect to which may depend the permanent welfare of yourselves and your families, to assist in the advancement of which welfare has always been, and always will be, a principal object of the labours of

Your faithful friend,
W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Monday,
December 24, 1810.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

LIBEL TRIAL. MORNING POST.—In my last Number I not only noticed the late prosecution of BYRNE, the proprietor of the Morning Post, for libelling Mr. HUGH BELL, but I inserted the newspaper Report of the Trial itself.—On the 22nd instant, this man inserted the following notification in his paper.—“We thank our numerous friends for the very gratifying expression of their feelings with which they have favoured us upon the subject of a late extraordinary verdict. Never, perhaps, was public astonishment more universally or forcibly expressed than on this occasion; and the Public may rest assured that until the matter is set right, we will never lose sight of the subject.”—Oh! his “numerous friends,” of the “fashionable world,” I suppose! I wonder he had not published a regular bulletin, and a list of the kind inquirers,

who had left their names.—Verily this is too stale a device even to impose upon the “fashionable world.”—*Inquiries!* What, the gentleman is ill, is he? Kind inquiries after him! Oh, the consummate coxcomb! as if there were one single thing in human shape that could possibly have any other feeling than that of the most contemptuous risibility upon such an occasion.—But he complains, does he? Aye, and he arraigns the verdict too. He calls it an “extraordinary verdict;” he says that the verdict has called forth universal “public astonishment;” and he says that he will never lose sight of the subject, “till the matter is set right.” What, then, the verdict was wrong, was it? The venal gentleman differs from most people upon that point, I believe; but, at any rate, it is not amiss to hear him complain of verdicts; him who has constantly not only approved of every heavy sentence upon every other author or publisher, but who has complained that they have been let off too lightly, and who has only wanted the wit to make their sufferings a subject of merriment, and who, in the use of his despicable talent at punning, called Mr. GALE JONES, Gaol Jones. He, this jester at the fate of other publishers, is a proper person, it is becoming in him, truly, to talk of the “extraordinary verdict,” of the “public astonishment,” occasioned by a verdict, which makes him disgorge 500 pounds for having most grossly and malignantly libelled, having held up as a traitor, a perfectly respectable and loyal gentleman.—He will say, perhaps, that he has treated many and many other such men in the same way. That is very true; but that is no justification for having thus treated Mr. BELL, and most people will, I suppose, think it an aggravation.—There is hardly, nay, there is not one, man in England, Ireland, or Scotland, who has been at all conspicuous as a friend of public liberty, whom this man has not, first or last, represented as a traitor. Not as a malcontent of a demagogue or a factious person, but as a friend of France, as a friend of the country’s known enemy, that is to say, a traitor. And now, behold! because only one out of hundreds demands, in the fairest possible way, justice for these false and wicked accusations, the calumniator cries out *hardship*, and tells the world, that his “numerous friends,” are leaving their cards to inquire how he does, as if he were a lady in the straw! A goodly group, truly, these kind inquirers would form if

one could see them collected together. —In my former article upon this subject, I omitted to mention the name of Mr. CLIFFORD, who has, upon numerous occasions, shewn that sort of *spirit*, which is, now-a-days, so rarely to be met with at the bar, or at least, as far as I have been able to perceive.

LIBEL TRIAL. ANTI-JACOBIN REVIEW.

—In another part of this Number will be found the report of the trial of MESSRS. CRADOCK and JOY, of Paternoster Row, publishers of the *Anti-Jacobin Review*, against whom an information was granted, in the Court of King's Bench, for a libel on a Doctor HODGSON of Oxford, published in the said work, which imputed to the Doctor the most base conduct that can be conceived; nothing less than that of keeping back a letter, which a brother Clergyman entrusted him to put in the post, and by the means of which act, he, the Doctor, secured to himself an office in the University, which the letter was intended to put into the hands of another Clergyman. —This wicked libel, the whole story of which, like that in the *Morning Post*, was, it appears, *false*, was, the reader will observe, published in the *Anti-Jacobin Review*. This base attack upon a man's character, and that, too, from motives too evident to point out to any one who reads the report of the trial, has, the reader will bear in mind, found its way into the world under the garb of *Anti-Jacobinism*. —This work has, however, existed by such means. It has administered food to the most base and malignant and corrupt part of the community, who alone have touched it, for many years past. —It has been the constant calumniator of every man who has been regarded as an enemy to corruption. —The two booksellers, who have thus exposed themselves to punishment, are not much to be pitied: They must have known the general contents of the work. They must have known its malignant tendency. They must have known, that it has been merely a vehicle of political falsehood and deception, under the name and garb of literary criticisms. And, if they find it *worth their while* to screen the *author*, they, of course, ought to suffer for what he has done. —They have published *falsehoods*; and, if those falsehoods are injurious to their neighbour's character, they ought to suffer for publishing them. They are not, it is true, the *authors*; but, they choose to

stand in the author's shoes, and of course, we are to conclude, that they are to be compensated for it. Indeed, viewing the matter in this light, there is much less mercy due to them than there would be to the author himself; for, to be *known* as the author of a base falsehood is part of the punishment, and, to *know* his malignant adversary is part of the satisfaction to the injured person. Therefore, if these booksellers, from whatever weighty considerations, choose to screen the author of a base falsehood from this part of his punishment, and to deprive the injured person of this part of his satisfaction, they must of course, expect to sustain this much of punishment more than would be due to the author, however malignant a wretch he may be, and however dirty his motives; and, there is good reason to suppose, that the author here screened, is, in either respect, hardly to be matched. To keep this man from exposure is a most detestable act; an act injurious to the public at large, to whom he ought to be known, and to whom, in all his Protean shapes he ought, he must, be, one of these days, openly exhibited, together with all his various means of existence. —In the meanwhile, the booksellers, MESSRS. CRADOCK and JOY, as they have chosen, to stand god-father for him, will, of course, find a religious consolation in answering for his sins, albeit a task of no common magnitude. —The proceedings upon this trial, from which it appears, that the *proprietors* are kept wholly out of sight, naturally suggest the question, *why* the proprietors of *Reviews* and *Magazines*, and other periodical publications, should not be made amenable to the law for *enregistering* their names as well as the *proprietors* of *daily* and *weekly* papers? I do not pretend, that any proprietor at all *ought* to be made so liable, though I do not see any great objection to it. This is quite a *new* thing in our laws. But, I contend, that there is no reason whatever for the making of the latter liable to such regulations, which reason *must* not apply with equal force to the case of the former. —The publication of any thing the *truth* of which can be proved, ought, in my opinion, to be considered as *legal*, as it is, I understand, now established by express law in the state of New York. And, the only check upon persons disposed to publish mischievous truths from malignant motives, would be the reproach, or ill opinion, of their neighbours; which, indeed, would be an

effectual check. But, if the *name* of the *author* and of the *proprietor* were kept from the public; if there were no means of coming at those names; then there would be no check at all to an author, or proprietor, who was able to pay a venal wretch for encountering the detestation of his neighbours and of the public.—But, be the opinions of men what they may upon this point, there can be no doubt, I think, that the names of the proprietors of *Reviews* and *Magazines* and all other periodical publications, ought to be registered, if the names of the proprietors of *daily* and *weekly* papers ought to be registered. If it be right that the names of the latter should be inscribed in the government records, why not the names of the former; and especially while, under the title of *literary criticisms*, they deal in factious politics, and are, in fact, some of the most calumnious writers of the day? The names of these *learned gentlemen* would not, in some cases, do any good to their works, indeed; but that can be no reason for their being kept from the public eye. They ought to be known; and the authors ought to be known, too, for *what they are*. They ought no longer to be hidden behind the curtain.

PRISONERS OF WAR.—In the present Number I begin the insertion of the Official Documents relating to the late negotiation for an exchange of Prisoners of War, between England and France. These papers we shall, hereafter have to observe upon; for, it never can be imagined, that they are *answered* by calling the French negotiator “the son of Jacobinism,” as is done by a most voluminous writer in the Times. The French writer is no more to be answered in this way than Massena is to be fought in this way; for he, too, may be called “the son of Jacobinism.” Such expressions may afford a momentary gratification to some few weak persons; but, such writers may be assured, that they will have no effect at all with any man of sense. Such men will ask for an *answer* to the *Moniteur*, and for the *beating* of Massena, and will care not a straw whether they be sons of Jacobinism, or not.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—Really this adventure begins to wear a lowering aspect. No battle yet! We were to have a battle in *six days* after, our Marshal General had drawn the French to Torres Ve-

dras. Oh! how many falsehoods has this “*thinking people*” sucked in, since I have been in Newgate, about which time the campaign in Portugal began. I have, during this campaign, had better opportunities of watching the progress of the delusions practised upon the public; and, really, though I had a pretty full persuasion, that no nation ever was so cheated, I had before but an imperfect conception of the extent of such cheatery.—The accounts we *now* receive from Portugal are very barren; but, they contain quite enough to convince me, that the state of our affairs is of a most unpromising nature; for, while the proclamations issued at Lisbon clearly show the great distresses there from the scarcity of provisions, we now know that the French have an abundance of every thing, and that their army has received great reinforcements. That we shall be able to *attack* that army seems now to be no longer believed. What, then, is to be the end of all this? What is finally to be produced by the expending of all these millions of money? What sort of *protection* is Portugal finally to receive?—These are questions, which, for the present, I must leave the reader to answer; but, that the whole of this war, the planning as well as the execution, must become matter of investigation, there can, I should suppose, be very little doubt.

KING'S ILLNESS. THE REGENCY.—From the reports and statements, published in the news-papers since my last, it would appear that his Majesty is in a worse state than he has been, at any time since the commencement of his malady. Of the *truth* of this, however, I can *know* nothing; and, a very good rule for the public to observe is, to believe *nothing* that they see upon the subject in the news-papers; for, the fact is, none of us *know*, or can *know*, any thing at all of the matter.—With regard to the proposed *Regency*, however, every man may know something, and may offer his opinion thereon. I have offered mine pretty fully already, and I was, I believe, the first public writer who did express any opinion at all upon the subject.—Every day's events since that time, and every opportunity for reflection, have tended to convince me, that my opinion was correct.—There has appeared, in the ministerial news-papers, and particularly in the *Courier* of the 21st instant, an article giving a history of what has taken place

between the Prince of Wales and his Brothers and the Minister, Mr. Perceval, relating to the proposed Regency. I shall insert this article here, not only as a document to be referred to hereafter, but as a subject for present commentary.—“The Chancellor of the Exchequer has not yet had an interview with the Prince; though it was confidently stated yesterday that he had had. But he requested to be honoured with one in a respectful Letter which he addressed to his Royal Highness, inclosing for his Royal Highness’s consideration, the plan of the proceeding for a Regency, with certain limitations, which it was his intention to submit to the House of Commons; and expressing a hope that he might be honoured with his Royal Highness’s command to wait on him to know his pleasure on the subject.—The Prince of Wales signified to Mr. Perceval, that as no step had yet been taken on the subject in the two Houses of Parliament, he did not think it consistent with his respect for the two Houses to give any opinion on the course of proceeding which had been submitted to him. On a former occasion it was not until the Resolution had been come to by both Houses, that the matter was submitted to him; and then he had felt it to be his duty to express his opinion distinctly on the subject; and to that opinion he had ever since invariably adhered; and the answer of his Royal Highness concludes with expressing his most earnest wishes that the speedy re-establishment of his Majesty’s health would make any measure of the kind unnecessary.—This Answer was sent to Mr. Perceval on Wednesday evening.—The Prince of Wales communicated to all the branches of his illustrious family, the Plan of the Regency, which had been transmitted to him, upon which the *whole of the Royal Dukes*, with one consent, drew up a Declaration and Protest, which they signed, stating in substance:—“That, under-“ standing from his Royal Highness the“ Prince of Wales, that it was intended“ to propose to the two Houses, the“ measure of supplying the Royal Au-“ thority, by the appointment of a Re-“ gency, with certain limitations and“ restrictions, as described; they feel it“ to be their duty to declare, that it was“ the unanimous opinion of all the male“ branches of his Majesty’s family, that“ they could not view this mode of pro-

ceeding without alarm, as a Regency so restricted, was inconsistent with the prerogatives which were vested in the Royal Authority, as much for the security and benefit of the people, as for the strength and dignity of the Crown itself; and they, therefore, most solemnly protest against this violation of the principles which placed their family on the Throne.” To this Declaration and Protest we understand an Answer was last night received by the Princes from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in which, after the usual recital of the tenor of the Royal Document, he proceeds to state—“That he had submitted it to the consideration of his Majesty’s confidential Servants—that however much they had to regret that the course of proceeding which they had adopted, on the melancholy occasion of his Majesty’s illness, had not had the good fortune to receive the approbation of the illustrious persons, the male branches of the Royal Family, yet they continued to consider it as the only legal and constitutional course in which they could be supported by precedent; that it was the course prescribed in the year 1788-9—when it had not only been adopted, after long and painful discussion, by the two Houses of Parliament, but had received the universal approbation of the country at large—and they were still further gratified by the reflection, that on the re-establishment of his Majesty’s health, the proceedings pursued in Parliament upon that occasion had received his Majesty’s gracious confirmation, and had been even honoured with expressions of his personal gratitude.”—Now, if all this be true, it will serve to explain a good deal of what was before not easily to be reconciled to reason.—The Prince tells Mr. PERCEVAL, that he remains firm in his opinions, expressed in 1788; and this Mr. Perceval learns from him on the Wednesday. On Thursday the parliament meets, and now, for the first time, we hear that the limitations of 1788 are to be again resorted to; we hear this, for the first time, after the Prince has declined to admit Mr. Perceval to an interview!—The public will bear this in mind. They will also bear in mind, that the ministerial prints, for several weeks, and from the moment that a Regency was first talked of, always

were forward to say, that, as to *limitations*, the difference of circumstances would render those of 1788 *unfit* for the present time. This, as the public will well remember, was stated by those prints over and over again. But, they THEN said, that they were well informed, that His Royal Highness the Prince, MEANT TO MAKE NO CHANGE IN THE MINISTRY.—The public will bear this in mind. 'This is what ought never to be lost sight of.' The two assertions ran together; 1st, that the circumstances of the present times *did not call for the limitations of 1788*, and, 2nd, that the Prince meant to make *no change in the ministry*.—At this time they affected to laugh at the Opposition, whom they described as having received "an intimation from a certain quarter, that their talents would not be wanted." They told them, that they would still have to wander in the dreary shades of Opposition. They jeered them without mercy. All the town knows, that a report was, all this while industriously spread, that the Prince had settled every thing with the present ministers, who were to propose for him an *unlimited Regency*, and who, in return, were to be *kept in place*.—But, now behold! when this report turns out to be false, as every man of discernment knew it to be from the first; when it appears that the Prince of Wales adheres to the principles declared by him twenty two years ago; and, when it further appears, that he has declined to admit a visit from Mr. Perceval; now these same prints defend the project for *reviving the limitations of 1788 in their full extent*, though they had, while they told us that the Prince meant to make *no change in the ministry*, expressly said, that those limitations would be *unfit* under the *change of circumstances* that had now taken place. Now that these venal prints find, that the Prince would not admit Mr. Perceval to an interview, they can no longer see any unfitness in the limitations of 1788, and have entirely lost sight of all the important change in the circumstances.—This is too plain for any man to misunderstand; and, understanding it, what man is there, who does not applaud the conduct of the Prince, and who does not clearly perceive, that he has pursued that line of conduct which was dictated by honour and by a just estimate of his own rights and of his duties towards the people? It is, therefore, for the people to show, in a regular and constitutional way,

that they entertain a due sense of what is due to him from them upon this momentous occasion.

W^m. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
December 25, 1810.

LIBEL CASE.

Prosecution of Messrs. CRADOCK and JOY, publishers of the Antijacobin Review, for a libel on the Revd. Dr. HODGSON—Tried at Guildhall, 21 Dec. 1810—Before J. d. Ellenborough.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL stated, that this was an information against Messrs. Cradock and Joy, of Paternoster-row, for a libel published against the Rev. Fordsham Hodgson, Principal of Brazenose College, Oxford. An information against the defendants had been obtained in the Court of King's Bench, and they professed to be extremely surprised that it should have been obtained; but when the libel was stated, it would only appear surprising that any man of common sense could doubt its tendency, and its fitness to be made the object of punishment. The libel was published in the Anti-Jacobin Review of last December, and was as follows:—"When a vacancy occurred in Brazenose College, by the promotion of the late Principal, Doctor Hodgson called on a senior Fellow of that College, residing in the vicinity of London, and enquired whether he meant to stand for the situation. The senior Fellow immediately told him, that there was another who had stronger claims than either of them; that he would acquaint him with the vacancy, and give him his interest on the election. The senior Fellow wrote a letter to his friend, and the Rev. Doctor Hodgson took the charge of it, to put it in the post. It unfortunately, however, never reached the person for whom it was designed, and the worthy Doctor used the golden opportunity with so much ardour, that he secured the prize; while the first intelligence of the vacancy reached the Gentleman alluded to, from the worthy Doctor himself, as Principal of Brazenose College."—The imputation in this was plain. Doctor Hodgson was accused of a most dishonest and base act. Were the defendants to be surprised, that they should be visited as the libellers? But they had another escape. They say, they only state facts, without comment or

observation. This in some cases might avail, but in the present it was actually worth nothing. They had been called on for the name of the informer: they had not thought proper to deliver him up, and it would now be left to the jury, whether the character of Dr. Hodgson was to be at the mercy of those libellers. The whole thing was unfounded. Dr. Hodgson had been at Liverpool till within two days of his election, and, therefore, his visit in the vicinity of London was altogether impossible.—The publication being proved,—Mr. Curwood, for the defendants, was sorry the defence had not fallen into other hands; but the Jury would understand, that the expences of employing King's Counsel were the probable reasons of calling upon him, to meet the Attorney-general in a field, where that learned person's talents had been so fully exercised. The publication in question arose out of a subject which had exercised and divided some of the ablest minds in the Empire; it was the Catholic Question: and that heat and bickerings should have arisen from it could not be wondered at. The author of the paper was a man of great respectability, who had seen Dr. Hodgson singularly active at three different times against the Catholic claims, when they were discussed at Oxford. He next saw the Doctor equally active in supporting the election of Lord Grenville, a man who was conceived to be the leading advocate of the Catholic claims. But not to proceed farther in this history, there was no intention on the part of the defendants to affix any imputation on Dr. Hodgson's honour. He might be highly respectable for any intention which they had of representing him as otherwise.—The Learned Counsel here went into a short detail of the history of libel, ending with the Act by which the intention was made cognizable by the Jury. The publication could not convey to the feelings of a man of a rightly ordered mind, an idea of what was understood by libel. Let it be taken as it stood. The first paragraph narrated the visit, and the taking charge of the letter. This was no libel. The next said that the letter had, unfortunately, not reached its destination, and that the worthy Doctor had used this opportunity to obtain the prize. There was no libel in saying that a letter did not come to hand, or that the candidate for any situation was active in his canvass. The law required some plain,

obvious, tangible intent. If it were to be measured by feeling, nothing could be more vague than law. The excellent understandings of the Jury would suggest to them grounds of defence which might escape the Counsel; but they would be eminently cautious of allowing a precedent, which might affect the most harmless correspondence of any man in the community.—LORD ELLENBOROUGH said, that this indictment was preferred against the defendants for fastening an imputation of the most offensive kind upon the present Principal of Brazenose College. It was for the Jury to consider, whether such an injury must not and ought not to be felt most sensibly by a man holding the important situation of the prosecutor. Must not a charge involving the baseness of a breach of trust of the lowest kind be painful and injurious to a man, whose character might be so easily touched, and to whom perfect purity of reputation was necessary for his peculiar duties? The question for the Jury was, whether it was not a charge of the basest conduct, that a man entrusted with a letter, under the circumstances of the case, should have put it in the fire, or suppressed it, and taken advantage of his own act to forward his own purposes? Men might think differently, but for his (Lord Ellenborough's) part, he must feel the greatest reluctance in sitting down beside the person who could be guilty of so dishonourable an artifice. The case of trials for libel was like all others that came before a Jury; the Jury gave their verdict from a view of the circumstances, liable to the opinion of the Judge on the law of the case. In the present instance he could have no doubt in pronouncing the publication to be a libel. The Jury would, however, form their own opinion.—The Jury immediately returned a verdict of GUILTY.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

NAPLES.—*Ceremony of burning English goods.*—4th Nov. 1810.

In pursuance of a Decree of his Majesty of the 4th inst. and in obedience to the orders of the Minister of Finance, the Director General of the Customs, accompanied by the Inspector General and the Director, proceeded to the chief-custom-house of this Capital, and caused to be delivered to him the keys of all the principal warehouses. He proceeded to a

minute and rigorous examination of all the British merchandize produced by prizes, sequestration, or confiscation in the custom-house.—All these articles were composed of muslins, chintzes, Manchester goods, calicoes, painted floor-cloths, India goods, cotton cloths and velvets, ironmongery, tin, and other merchandize, amounting to more than 60,000 ducats. A great fire was kindled in the square, where all these commodities were unpacked, opened, and burned piece by piece, under the inspection of a numerous detachment of custom-house-officers, under the orders of their principal. The fire lasted from noon to five o'clock.—So novel a sight attracted an immense crowd. The greatest order prevailed. It was even perceived that the public manifested sentiments of satisfaction at seeing a conflagration, which, independent of the fatal blow that it gives to English commerce, announces to that Government the fate which awaits all the productions of her industry that traitorous artifices may throw upon our coasts.

FRANCE.—*Decree of the Emperor, relating to the Pope's Palace.*—8th Nov. 1810.

Napoleon, by the Grace of God and the Constitution, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, &c. &c.—Considering the 15th article of the Senatus Consultum of the 17th February, stating that there should be prepared for the Pope palaces in the different places of the Empire where he might choose to reside, and that there would necessarily be one at Paris and one at Rome: upon the report of our Minister of Religious Worship, we have decreed and do decree as follows:—Article 1. The Palace of the Pope, at Paris, shall be the ancient Palace of the Archbishop, which will be embellished, and have an augmentation in domains and buildings, agreeably to our Decree of the 10th of February last; together with the furniture, the purchase of which was ordered by the same Decree.—2. The Archbishop of Paris shall only remain in this palace during the time that it is unoccupied by the Pope.—3. Our Minister of Religious Worship is charged with the execution of the present Decree.

SAXE GOTHA.—*Order, relative to English Goods,* 28th Oct. 1810.

We, Charles Frederick, &c. — By a former order of the 31st March, 1810, the admission of English goods into our dominions was forbidden, but since that period, we have learnt that this law has been frequently evaded. We therefore have been induced to command, that it shall be carried into execution with the greatest severity, and that it shall embrace all colonial produce according to the general system of the Continent.—We, therefore, have decreed,—I. That all English goods in the public warehouses, or private stores, shall from this day be confiscated.—II. The Custom House Officers are commanded to commence the strictest examinations into the nature and quantity of colonial produce in all places, and they are to take possession of the same, and clear it away into the public receptacles. They are likewise ordered to seize all English goods on their transit, and to send in inventories of the same to the Secretary of our Government as soon as possible.

SWEDEN.—*Letter of Bernadotte to the King, upon landing in Sweden, and in answer to the King's presenting him with the Swedish Orders,* 1st Nov. 1810.

Sire; Conscious that the repeated honours done me, not only by your Majesty, but by the Swedish Nation, can never be recompensed, I cannot but labour under great difficulty, in the expression of the gratitude I feel to so noble a King of so noble a Nation. Your Majesty and the People of Sweden may rest fully assured, that their interests and welfare shall ever be nearest my heart, and that I will rather sacrifice that life which they have deemed worthy of such distinction, than suffer them to be injured or encroached upon.—It could not be without some degree of pain and reluctance that I accepted the high dignity of being made Crown Prince of Sweden, aware as I am of my incapacity, born and bred a soldier, to perform the arduous and important duties of that station. The honours with which your Majesty has been graciously pleased to invest me, shall never be sullied by the wearer; and it shall be my constant study to add new lustre to their brightness.—Feeling myself, as I have already observed, wholly incompetent to express my gratitude, I have the great honour to be your Majesty's most humble, devoted, and affectionate, &c.

FRANCE.—*Circular Letter to the Bishops, relative to the Pregnancy of the Empress, 11th Nov. 1810.*

To the Archbishops and Bishops.—M. the Bishop of ———. It is with the most infinite satisfaction that I am able to announce to you the happy pregnancy of the Empress, my very dear spouse and companion. This proof of the benediction of God spreading over my family, and which imparts such happiness to my people, induces me to write you this letter, to inform you that it will be most agreeable to me that you ordain particular prayers for the preservation of her person. I pray God, M. the Bishop ———, to hold you in his holy keeping.—NAPOLEON.—*Done at our Palace at Fontainebleau, Nov. 11, 1810.*

FRANCE.—*Letter of Napoleon to the President of the Senate, relative to the Pregnancy of the Empress.—12th November, 1810.*

M. Le Conte Garnier, President of the Senate. The satisfaction which we experience in consequence of the pregnancy of our very dear and well-beloved spouse has induced us to write you this letter, in order that you may in our name communicate to the Senate this event, as essential to our happiness as it is to the interests and policy of our empire. The present having no other object, we pray God, M. le Comte Garnier, President of the Senate, to hold you in his holy and worthy keeping.

ITALY.—*Decree of the King, relative to English goods.—1st November, 1810.*

Art. 1. The Decree of the 31st of August of this year is repealed. The duties on goods therein named shall be paid according to the tariff affixed to our Decrees of the 24th Feb. 1809, and 16th May, 1810. Art. 2. From the day of the publication of the present Decree, throughout our Kingdom of Italy, no other kinds of cloths, cottons or silks shall be permitted, not obtained from manufactories in the Empire of France, and they shall be accompanied by the certificate of origin, a form to be directed by the French Government, with the necessary documents to give it authenticity, and to prevent fraud. Art. 3. Our minister of Finances is charged with the execution of this Decree.

FRANCE.—*Decree uniting the Valais to France.—12th November, 1810.*

Napoleon, &c.—Considering that the route of the Simplon, which connects the empire and our kingdom of Italy, is of use to more than sixty millions of people; that it has cost more to the Treasuries of France and Italy than eighteen millions, which expence would be entirely useless, if the trade through it did not find accommodations and security; that the Valais has not adhered to any of the engagements it entered into, when we ordered the works for opening this grand communication to be commenced; wishing, moreover, to put an end to the anarchy which prevails in that country, and to cut short the oppressive claims to sovereignty of one part of the population over the other, we have decreed and ordered as follows:—Art. 1. The Valais is united to the Empire.—2. This territory is to form a department under the name of the Department of the Simplon.—3. This department will be included in the seventh military division.—4. Immediate possession shall be taken of it in our name, and a Commissary-General shall be appointed to govern it for the remainder of the year.—5. All our Ministers are charged with the execution of the present Decree.

FRANCE.—*Decree relative to the Press.—18th November, 1810.*

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, &c. &c.—On the report of our Minister of the Interior, respect being had to the 3d, 5th, and 6th articles of our decree of the 5th Feb. 1810, containing regulations with regard to printing and bookselling;—Considering that the reduction and settling of the number of printers must necessarily leave presses, founts, types, and other printing materials, in the possession of many individuals not licensed, or may make them pass into other hands; and that it is important to know the holders of them, and the use which they propose to make of them;—Our Council of State being heard,—We have decreed, and do decree as follows:—Art. 1. From the first of January, 1811, those of our subjects who shall cease to follow the business of printer, and, generally, all those who, not following the said business, shall find themselves proprietors, possessors, or holders of presses, founts, types, or other printing materials, must within one month make

declaration of the said articles, in the department of the Seine, to the Prefect of Police, and in the other departments, to the Prefect.—From this arrangement are excepted rolling presses, for the purpose of copying.—Art. 2. The Prefect of Police at Paris, and the Prefects of departments, shall transmit the said declarations to our Counsellor of State, Director-General of Printing and Bookselling, with their opinion, on applications to be authorized to keep the said presses and materials, for the purpose of continuing to use them, which applications must be subjoined to the declarations.—3d. Our Director-general of Printing and Bookselling shall render an account of every thing to our Ministers of the Interior and of Police, on the report of whom decision shall be given by us.—4th. Makers of images, dominos, and tapestry are subject to the dispositions contained in the 1st article of the present Decree.—5th. Acts in contravention to the present Decree shall be punished by imprisonment from six days to six months, and prosecuted and proved conformably to the regulations in sect. 2, title 8, of the Decree of the 3d Feb. 1810.—6th. Our Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, and our Ministers of the Interior and of general Police, are charged, each in his department, with the execution of the present Decree, which shall be inserted in the Bulletin of the Laws.

PRISONERS OF WAR.—*Official Documents, from No. I. to No. XVIII. (with an Introduction) relating to the late Negotiation for an Exchange of Prisoners of War, between England and France; Extracted from the Times news-paper, into which it had been translated from the French Paper, the Moniteur.*

INTRODUCTION.

Since the commencement of the present war, France and England have not had a single cartel for an exchange of prisoners. That which has opposed till this hour this object, so important to humanity, is, it is understood, a difference upon the following points:—England will consider only her own subjects as prisoners. She will not extend this advantage of an exchange to the Germans, Spaniards, Portuguese, and her other allies, fighting in her cause, or joined with her own army.—The second point in dispute is the capitulation of General Walmoden, on the conquest of Hanover, 17,000 men then surrendered

prisoners of war. England will not acknowledge them, although the greater part of them, officers as well as soldiers, have since entered into her service, in violation of the capitulation, and of the law of nations.—During eight years these points have created long discussions.—In April, 1810, an English Commissary arrived at Morlaix. To remove these difficulties a negotiation was commenced, which lasted eight months without success.—France proposed two bases:—The first was, to renew that of 1780. By the cartel of 1780, the prisoners of both nations were exchanged *en masse*, covering the difference by a sum of money.—This basis being declined, France proposed a total exchange of prisoners of the two belligerent masses, man for man, rank for rank. The men who formed a part of the same army, who joined in the same movements, and co operated in the same operations, were sureties for each other. In proposing this second basis, France went too far; she consented to give up her surplus of Spanish prisoners, that is to say, she would abandon more than 20,000 prisoners beyond the number she should exchange.—This second basis alone was discussed during eight months. England pretended to adopt the principle. The exchange was deemed concluded; but in her proposal for a cartel, England exposed her true views. It was observed, that while she appeared to adopt the principle of the exchange, she held out a snare. She endeavoured under this pretext to withdraw the prisoners that she has in France, in exchange for an equal number of French prisoners which are in England; and she would then find some pretext for detaining the remaining 20,000 Frenchmen who should still remain unexchanged, leaving in France the Spaniards, about whom she cares nothing. This trick was too gross; England accepted the principle of a general exchange, and at the same time reserved to herself the power of making only a partial exchange, when she should have all her own prisoners in London; for it certainly was not the value which she put upon the Spanish prisoners, that would have induced her to respect the treaty, and send the remainder of the French prisoners to France. The English negotiators termed this a concurrence in the principle of the exchange, man for man, and rank for rank, of the two masses of prisoners, but not to be accomplished simultaneously; therefore they threw

down the mask, and broke off the negotiation, when the conditions of a cartel were presented, which should be executed with good faith, and founded upon the principle, that is to say, making an exchange of 3,000 Frenchmen and their allies, against 3,000 English and their allies, in the proportion in which they should be found in the masses, that is to say, 3,000 French against 1,000 English and 2,000 Spaniards. With respect to the capitulation of Walmoden, they could not come to an agreement on it. England would give no more than 3,000 French for the 17,000 Hanoverians. France, from a spirit of conciliation, reduced her pretensions to one-third, that is to say, to 6,000 French, although it was proved that, of the 17,000 Hanoverians, more than 9,000 had served, or were serving now, in the English ranks.—After this preamble, the *Moniteur* contains eighteen official papers:—

No. I. May 23, is a short note from M. Dumoustier, inclosing the following project for a cartel:—

No. II.—*Plan for a Cartel*.—Art. I. All the French, Italians, and all others in the service of France or Italy, all the Dutch and Neapolitans, and all other subjects of Powers friendly to France, or in the service of these Powers, who are at present prisoners of war in England in Spain, Sicily, Portugal, the Brazils, or in any other country, the ally or dependent of England, or occupied by English troops, shall be set at liberty, without exception or regard to rank or quality.—The same shall take place with respect to Russians, Danes, and all others in the service of Russia and Denmark, who are prisoners of war in England, or in countries allied to or dependent on England.—II. All English, and all others in the service of England, all Sicilians, Portuguese, Spaniards, Hanoverians, and other subjects of Powers allied to England, and all others in the service of these Powers, who are at present prisoners of war in France, Italy, Holland, Naples, or any other country the ally or dependent of France, or occupied by French troops, shall be set at liberty, without exception, or regard to rank or quality.—The same shall take place with respect to prisoners of war belonging to England and her Allies, at present detained in Russia, or Denmark, and in countries allied to or dependent on these Powers.—III. It is understood that in execution of the two preceding articles,

every prisoner of war, belonging to the two belligerent masses, made before, up to, and inclusive of the day of signing the present cartel, shall be liberated within a period which shall be ultimately agreed upon for each country above mentioned.

—IV. The execution of the above articles shall take place in the following manner:

—1st, All prisoners of war of France and Italy, detained in England or in English possessions or dependencies, of whatever rank or quality, shall be conveyed, without delay and in mass, to their country, where they shall be given up to French Commissaries named to that effect.—2dly. All prisoners of war of England, detained in France, in Italy, and in the dependencies of France and Italy, of whatever rank or quality, shall be conveyed, without delay, and in mass, to their country, where they shall be given up to English Commissaries appointed for that purpose.—3dly. All the Hanoverians forming part of the army of Hanover, who have been or are in the service of England, shall remain undisturbed in their property: they shall be considered as exchanged by this cartel, or to have been so; and those of that army, at present in Hanover, shall be freed from the obligation imposed upon them by the capitulation of —. 4thly. All French detained in Spain, or in the countries belonging to Spain, and all Spaniards detained as prisoners of war in France or in Spain, being to be set at liberty, the exchange shall take place either through the medium of the French Generals and the Governments of the Spanish towns which are opposed to them, or by sending by sea to Toulon or Rochefort the French detained in the different towns and isles of Spain, or by being sent to the advanced posts of the different corps of the French army in Spain.—5thly. The liberation of Spaniards, prisoners of war in France, shall take place by successive convoys, to England or the different towns of Spain, which shall be agreed upon, of 500 Spaniards for 500 French, in proportion as the latter shall have been given up by the Spanish Government. When all the French prisoners of war detained in Spain shall have been thus exchanged for an equal number of Spanish prisoners, all that remain of Spanish prisoners in the power of France, made before, up to, and inclusive of the day of signature of this cartel, shall be sent to England, or to such towns in Spain as may be agreed upon; in such way, that in fulfilment of this ar-

icle there shall not remain in France any of the said Spanish prisoners of war.—6thly. The mode of liberating the Portuguese and Sicilian prisoners of war, detained in France, shall be the same with that pointed out in the preceding article.—V. The British Government, in application of the principles agreed upon in the present cartel, shall come to an understanding with the Russian and Danish Governments, as to what concerns each of these Governments.—VI. There shall be appointed a French Commissary, and an English Commissary, to reside, the former in London and the latter in Paris, for the purpose of watching over the execution of the Convention.—VII. Provision shall be made, by a particular convention, for what regards prisoners, who may be made ultimately on either side, so as to alleviate the misfortunes of war by all that humanity can inspire in favour of those who are its victims.

No. III. May 25. Note from Mr. Mackenzie, stating, that as he was not prepared to treat for a general exchange of prisoners belonging to all the belligerent Powers, he therefore asks permission to write to his government.

No. IV. May 26. M. Dumoustier declares to Mr. Mackenzie, that if England will not accede to the principle of general and absolute liberation of all the prisoners of war of the two belligerent masses, he is authorised to propose the cartel of 1780 between France and England as the basis.

No. V. June 23. A note from Mr. Mackenzie to M. Dumoustier, announcing that the counter-project is arrived from London.

No. VI. Is the project, which is in substance the same with a second project presented on the 22d September, and which was inserted in p. 1044.

No. VII. July 2.—*Note of M. Dumoustier.*—The undersigned Commissary appointed for the exchange of French prisoners of war, has laid before his Government the note and counter-project of cartel which Mr. Mackenzie sent to him on the 3d of June. He has received orders to make to them the following reply:—The counter-project presented by Mr. Mackenzie in the name of his Government, for the establishment of a Cartel, lays down, like the project of the under-

signed, the principle of the general liberation of the prisoners of the belligerent masses. Once agreed upon that point, it would appear impossible not to agree upon the means of its execution; for we have not agreed upon the principle, in order to adopt, on the one side or the other, such measures as may tend to annul or elude its most important consequences.—It is in this point of view that the counter-project becomes the subject of consideration.—It has for object to make at first a partial exchange of English prisoners for an equal number of French prisoners, and then to make the exchange of the remainder of the French prisoners depend upon the result of the negotiations which shall be opened for that purpose with the Spanish Juntas.—But these Juntas are not a single Government; that of Galicia has nothing in common with the Junta of Cadiz, nor the latter with that of Valencia.—These Governments change their course every instant, according to the popular storms; no business can be of a consecutive nature with them; and the liberation of the French prisoners who shall remain in England cannot be submitted to the decisions of such assemblies.—The French Government is convinced that the Juntas of Galicia, Valencia, and other insurgent Governments in Spain, will have submitted or disappeared very shortly; therefore it becomes evidently impossible to execute with them the paragraphs 11 and 12 of the article 4 of the counter-project of the British Government; and at the same time it may be foreseen that England may refuse to liberate French prisoners who may remain in her power after the exchange of English prisoners.—Thus the adoption of the counter-project to the British will be no more than a partial exchange, which liberates the whole of the English prisoners, and part of the French prisoners only; and the general principle of liberation, on which both Governments agree, will be unexecuted.—Whether the Spanish Juntas shall refuse the proposed exchange, or that it will be found impossible to treat with these meetings, or that they are on the eve of dissolution, are three obstacles in the way of the execution of the paragraphs cited in articles XI and XII, and which must prevent the liberation of the French in the English prisons.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

V. L. XVIII. [41.] LONDON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1831. [1313.]

"My most serious objection, to the proposed, refers to the unconstitutional application of the public money. I object to the sums advanced to the princes of the blood, without the consent of Parliament. I do not think it decent or becoming that the princes of England should be dependent on the bounty of the day. If they wanted relief, they ought to have made application to the House of Commons, and not come and to receive bounties from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I recollect, however, and I believe it is a fact, that whenever they have applied to this House in a constitutional way, for that relief to which they were entitled, their claims have been rejected. This has been particularly evinced in the applications of that illustrious Member of the Family, who enjoys, as he deserves, the particular affection and confidence of the people; and is therefore, perhaps, an object of jealousy to some. But whenever these princes have appealed to ministers privately, that assistance has been unconstitutionally granted which ought only to have flowed from Parliament. It is a subject of regret and surprise, that what Parliament has refused, should be bestowed by ministerial influence."—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT'S Speech upon the Civil List Grant, 2nd July, 1807.

1313]

[1314

TO THE

READERS OF THE REGISTER.

The TABLE OF CONTENTS, the INDEX, &c. to the present Volume, will be included in the two next Numbers, that is to say, in the two first Numbers of the next Volume; but, they will be so printed as to be conveniently separated from the Numbers in which they are included; and the reader will have nothing to do but to take them out and put them to their proper Volume.—This was thought to be preferable to the publishing of a Double Number, and will be attended with the additional advantage of my being enabled to complete the Tables of Prices, &c. up to the last day of the year.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

KING'S ILLNESS. THE REGENCY. — It is, it would seem, now become impossible any longer to disguise the fact of the King being extremely ill; and, it is worth observation, that in the chief of the venal prints, the COURIER, a letter appeared on Saturday last, stating that the King was much better; that a material change for the better had taken place; when, as it now appears, the King was, at the very time spoken of in this sham letter, in a very dangerous way.—All that we read in these venal prints is calculated to deceive and cheat the public. The falsehoods,

which they have promulgated, upon this subject, since the fact of the King's illness could no longer be kept wholly from the public, surpass, perhaps, any thing of the kind that even this nation has ever before witnessed.—What a shame is this in itself! But, when one comes to look into the real cause of it, how much blacker does the thing become? Why these falsehoods? Why should the truth be withheld from the public? Why should these frauds have been thus continually practised? Every man's mind will suggest the proper answer, and will, at the same time teach him to hold in detestation the men, in whose minds the falsehoods have manifestly been hatched.—In my last Number, I pointed out very clearly how the language of the venal prints had changed, upon the subject of the proposed limitations, since it was discovered, that the PRINCE would not admit Mr. PERCEVAL to an interview. They were all decided for no limitations at all, while they were asserting that His Royal Highness would make no change in the ministry. They coupled the opinion with the assertion. They were equally clear and unambitious as to both. But, the moment they had to confess, that the PRINCE had refused to see Mr. PERCEVAL, that moment they discovered, that all the limitations of 1788 ought now to be imposed. They had before said expressly, that the material change of circumstances that had taken place since 1788, called for a change in the plan of a Regency, and particularly, that the limitations then thought necessary, could not be thought necessary now; but the moment they found that the PRINCE had refused to see Mr. PERCEVAL, they tacked suddenly about, and could perceive that

those limitations, in their full extent, were absolutely necessary; and, indeed, the *Courier* of the 26th instant says, that "*the circumstances have changed, but the change is in favour of the necessity of restrictions.*"—One would wonder how any man was to be found capable of baseness like this. The fact must be seen to be believed of human nature. It serves, however, to show us what are the sort of men and the sort of means opposed to the lodging of the Royal Authority, full and undivided, in the hands of the Heir to the throne.—We have before taken a general view of the tendency, in a constitutional point of view, of imposing limitations upon His Royal Highness. But, are the people aware of the way in which some part of these limitations would operate, in a *pecuniary* point of view? Are they aware of the new and heavy burdens that must, in consequence of such limitations, be imposed upon them?—Some explanation is necessary here.—One part of the project of 1783 was to withhold from the Prince the appointment of the several offices connected with the King's Household, and also to keep from him the allowance for the King's *Privy Purse*. Both these were to be placed in the hands of Her Majesty, the QUEEN, who was to have a Council to aid her.—The offices of the Household are very considerable, in point of number and emolument, and, of course, of influence. The allowance for the King's *Privy Purse* is a sum of not less than 60,000 pounds a year, which, as the reader will observe, is wholly independent of, and over and above, all the expences of the household and all the settled and *known* expences or disbursements of the King. It is so much money which he may, and does, dispose of *just as he pleases*. He may give it away, or lay it up, or do what he likes with it.—This, in a kingly government, may, or may not, be proper; but, however men may differ in opinion as to the general propriety of it, all must agree, I think, that the *privy purse* ought to go with the *Royal Authority*, because it is given for the purpose of supporting the splendour of the throne, which is regarded as necessary to the welfare of the people.—The project of 1783, is, it would seem from the language of the venal prints, to be acted upon, if the two Houses agree to it; and, of course, His Royal Highness, the Prince, would, in such case, have to exercise the functions of Royalty, without a *Household Establish-*

ment, or a *Privy Purse*; or, the people would have to bear *new taxes* to defray the expences of both; so that, the King's incapacity to perform the duties of his high office, would bring upon the people the burden of *two households and two privy purses*.—And for what? Can any man answer me that question? Will the most venal of the venal tribe tell me for what reason this ought to be? Can any such man find out, or attempt, a justification of such a measure? Can any man discover an apology for it; can he make up any, even the slightest pretence or excuse for it?—Let us hear what has been said by the *Courier* of the 25th instant, as to this point, which will enable us to judge of the reasons that can be urged in defence of such a measure.—He first tells us what passed in the House of Commons respecting it:—"After the Gallery was cleared, Mr. Wynn asked Mr. Perceval "whether, in the event of the House "agreeing to the Restriction, which would "deprive the Regent of the nomination of "the Officers of the Household, he proposed "to follow the plan given notice of by "Mr. Pitt in 1783, of allowing to the "Regent an additional regal establishment, "and imposing fresh taxes, to defray "the expence of it, to which Mr. Perceval answered in the affirmative."—Having quoted this passage, the venal man sets about an anticipation of what will be objected to such a measure; and he then, in the manner that we shall see, endeavours to answer the objections which he anticipates.—"From the "above paragraph we are led to apprehend it is the design of opposition to make "the same absurd cry against assigning "the Prince a due income for the maintenance of his new dignity, which was raised "in 1789. Do the opposition now intend "to raise the same silly objection? "Fresh "taxes!" This it is supposed will touch "John Bull in the tender point? Under "the idea that John is a sordid ungenerous wretch; is this a bait thrown out to "catch a little popularity? If it be, those "who have thrown it are shallow panders "of the base passions of the people, the most "mischievous advisers the Prince of Wales "can have about him. Is it not obvious "how many unpleasant recollections must arise "from a discussion of the Prince's pecuniary "affairs; recollections which all good men "must wish buried in oblivion? Will not ill-natured remarks be made upon the offer "of conducting so high an office, without

"any additional provision, by a personage who has found the provision already assigned insufficient for his support, and the chief grounds of whose unpopularity, now happily nearly obliterated, were his debts? Would these gentlemen have the Prince declare, that mortgaged and hampered as his income already is, insufficient as he has found it, yet still he is willing and able to undertake an office of far greater expence, without any additional allowance? Would they have the Regent, so nearly our King as he will be, live in a private style, walking the streets in a brown coat, maintaining neither state nor dignity? And all this for the low grovelling motive of catching a little popularity from the mob, by not imposing fresh taxes? Were the Ministers to propose such a plan, then indeed they might be accused of degrading Royalty; and there would be heard against them a loud cry of just indignation. It is singular, that while acclamour is raised against cramping the Regent's power, those persons who raise it, who call themselves his friends, should advise him to cramp it in the most essential point—the pecuniary provision for his state and dignity. Such canting may please Sir Francis Burdett, and his rabble; and were this the first time of its being heard, we should ascribe it to the counsels of the worthy Baronet. No: The Regent must have a provision suited to his rank and dignity; and suitably to that rank and dignity he must live. He must hold a Court, have Levees and drawing-rooms, and appear surrounded with splendour in public. All men of sense allow that this splendour is essentially necessary to ensure a due respect for Royalty; and at least of any can it be dispensed with in these times. Many instances might be given of Royalty falling into contempt by the plain appearance and familiar habits of those on whom it had devolved. The sages of the Burdett school have often recommended that the servants of the State should work without pay; but we trust they will not be gratified by seeing a Regent without any pecuniary provision as such, and without a regal establishment; even although such an arrangement should render necessary the imposition of "Fresh Taxes?"—Now, reader, after repeating to you, that this is taken from the COURIER news-paper of the 25th instant, and begging you to bear in mind what the character and description of that paper

is, let me ask you if you, in your whole life, ever cast your eyes upon any in which the MEAN, MERCENARY, and MALIGNANT mind was so clearly visible? The man, who penned, or who dictated, or who approved of this, must join to the most profound hypocrisy, a degree of malignity rarely to be met with even in that malignant school, in which he has been educated. In most other writings, however false and base upon the whole, we find something of an unexceptionable sort; but here all is falsehood or misrepresentation; all is malignant and base.—No answer is here given, or attempted to be given, to the complaint which is anticipated, that the people would have to sustain the burden of two Regal establishments. No: to answer that complaint was impossible; and, therefore, in the vindictiveness of his heart, the author of this paragraph, this leader of those venal men who call themselves "the loyal;" who have assumed the exclusive appellation of King's friends; this man, who has, at the same time, the impudence to impute disloyal motives to others, makes use of the occasion to endeavour to excite popular dislike of the Heir Apparent to the throne, and that, too, by insinuations as false as they are malignant.—The Prince is here told, that, if any objection be made to the contemplated measure, the discussion will give rise "to many unpleasant recollections belonging to his pecuniary affairs, which all good men" [Oh! the base hypocrite!] "must wish buried in oblivion," and then he is told, that the "chief grounds of his unpopularity, are his debts."—In the first place, it is false to say, as it is here clearly said, that His Royal Highness is, or ever has been, unpopular with any part of the people, except such as were misled by the hypocritical cant of those, whose selfish purposes it answered to misrepresent him, to discolour all his actions; to spread out every speck into abroad and odious blemish, and who, be it well remarked, while they were the unqualified defenders of the unbounded profligacy of foreign courts, for the sustaining of whom against their indignant people, they were willing to see wasted the blood and sweat of England, hunted, with the nose of the Beagle and the eyes of the Lynx, for faults in the Prince of Wales. In short, that man must not have lived in England; that man must have heard nothing of England, who does not know, that to misrepresent, to undermine, to

blacken, to pull down and to keep down, to render of no weight or consequence, the Prince of Wales, has, for many years, been the leading feature in the policy of those, who have been the worst enemies of the people of England that the people of England ever knew; the merciless enemies of them in their property, their liberty and their lives; and, who, under the garb of loyalty, have really done all that in them lay to extirpate all the just and useful prerogatives of the Crown.—“The debts of the Prince!” And, *why* had he debts that he was unable to pay? Not because he expended more than it became him to spend; but because that which he ought to have received was withheld from him. He never ought to have been reduced to the necessity of making any application to parliament, or to any body else. It was as necessary that he should have the means of munificence as that the King should have such means. But, it was always the wish of the persons spoken of above, that he should, as often as possible, be reduced to a state that compelled him to make applications for money, and that, upon all such occasions, there should issue forth a fresh swarm of insinuations against him, while a hundred times the amount of his wants was expended upon others without calling forth the slightest animadversion.—The reader will not fail to observe, that the very persons, who are now promulgating these revived insinuations against the Prince, and who, as was before observed, have, for many years past, taken every opportunity of exhibiting him to the people as a squanderer of their money; these very persons, have, upon all occasions, been the defenders of grants, however enormous and unmerited, to others. In all such cases, they have talked of the necessity of such grants to the support of the splendour of the throne and the kingly government; they have insisted that the King ought to have the power of granting even the *reversions*, three or four deep, of sinecure places; they have defended the sinecure system; they have called such places the freeholds of the patentees; they have, in all such cases, called it *cant* and hunting after *popularity* to oppose such grants; but, in cases, where money was wanted for the Prince of Wales, they have assumed the language of *economy*, have talked of the *burthens* of the people, have caused the matter to be discussed till it became the topic of every farm-house, and

have, in their detestable publications, of various sorts and endless number, held him forth as the great, and almost the only, spender of the public money.—How unjust this is, how flagrantly false, any one will see who looks into the Lists of Places and Pensions, where he will find that Lord ARDEN, the Brother of Mr. PERCEVAL, receives, as the proceeds of a sinecure, full *one third part* as much as is allowed to His Royal Highness, the Heir Apparent to the Throne, and of which sinecure, be it not forgotten, Mr. PERCEVAL himself has the *reversion*! His Royal Highness is not allowed more than *twice* as much as has been, for years, received by the Marquis of Buckingham; and he is not allowed more than about *four times* as much as is received, in net profits, by Mr. GARNIER, the patentee of the Office of *Apothecary General* to the Army!—Now, I put it to the reader, whether there ever was a more foul attack, ever more base insinuations, than those now revived and propagated by the enemies of the Prince; and whether the people ought not, by all the constitutional means in their power, to show their abhorrence of such proceedings and attempts.—The reviving and propagating of such insinuations clearly demonstrate the *real character* of the persons, with whom they evidently originate, and whose “*loyalty*” and “*friendship for the King*” have now received a most satisfactory explanation. These are professions calculated to deceive and to cheat the nation, and intended for that sole purpose. Those who use them would now tear to pieces, if they could, the kingly government, rather than see it in the hands of the Prince of Wales; and this only because they are aware, that his Royal Highness would not use it for purposes for which *they* would wish to see it used. If he were ready to make the use of it that *they* desire, not a word should we hear from them about the *necessity of limitations*; not a word about *regard for the King*, for, in fact, they have no feeling of affection or of COMPASSION, as is clearly shown in the whole of their publications, of every sort and shape.—Such is their “*loyalty*”; such is the conduct of those, who, by way of excellence, call themselves “*the loyal*,” and against all such, and men of such principles, let us hope that it is quite unnecessary to put his Royal Highness upon his guard.—This venal writer chooses to suppose that which no man has said or meant. He chooses to represent those who are op-

posed to the measure of limitations generally and to the creating of a *new Household* in particular; he chooses to represent these persons as *wishing the Regent to have no regal establishment, but to see him walking the streets in a brown coat.* This he chooses to assume, *because* he anticipates, that we shall object to *new taxes* in order to uphold an *additional regal establishment.*—What an impudent misrepresentation is this! And what a contempt must such a man have for the understandings of his readers!—No: we do not wish the Regent to walk the street in a brown coat and to be unable to cope with Lord ARDEN or Mr. PERCEVAL in point of expenditure. We do not wish the Regent to be without a regal establishment. We do not wish him to be stripped of all the splendour belonging to the kingly office. We wish *just the contrary*; we wish him to have all the powers and *all* the splendour of a king of England: but, as we know that there *already* is a regal Establishment, we wish him to have *that*, as long as it shall be necessary for him to fill the high Office, to which that establishment belongs.—This venal writer impudently takes it for granted, that we consent, or, at least, that it will finally be determined to *withhold from His Royal Highness the PRESENT Household*, the present regal establishment; when the fact notoriously is, that it is now a question to be decided, in the two Houses, whether the present establishment is to be withheld from the Prince, or not: it is notorious that this is the question now at issue; and yet this writer, with impudence truly characteristic of venality, speaks of the thing as *settled*; speaks of the question as *decided*; speaks of the thing, in short, as if the present regal establishment was, by common consent, to be withheld from the Prince. Such barefaced misrepresentation as this *may* impose upon some people; but one would hope, that the number capable of being so imposed upon must be very few indeed.—Another trick resorted to is to speak of the imposing of *new taxes*, for the purpose of providing a household for the Regent, as an act of *magnanimity on the part of the Minister*; as if he were willing to face the *unpopularity* that might arise from such a measure. And here the example of Mr. PITT is quoted, who, in answer to the complaints of the Opposition in 1788, said, that, before he went out of office, he himself would propose the taxes necessary for a new establishment for the Re-

gent.—How *magnanimous* this was! He would incur the unpopularity of imposing new taxes for the sake of the Regent! What a flimsy pretence? The new taxes were to be imposed for the sake of *himself* and his party, who would, of course, have been the Council of Her Majesty, in whose hands the old establishment was to be kept. There then was, as there now is, a regal Establishment; and, in order that that might remain under his influence, the Minister would lay on new taxes to make another for the Prince. He would have made the people pay the expences of a new establishment, in order that he and his party might still possess all the influence belonging to the old one. What rare magnanimity! What kindness towards the Prince!—The enemies of kingly government have always placed amongst its evils the great expences attached to the regal state. Its friends have been obliged to acknowledge that the thing was, in itself, an objection; but that it was far overbalanced by certain advantages; and, they have, at the same time, contended, that such expences were, in fact, made for the sake of the people, and not for the sake of the King, that they were necessary to the kingly office, which office was necessary to the welfare of the people. Now, what becomes of all this reasoning, what becomes of this defence of Kingly establishments, if we are to see the present establishment withheld from him, who is to fill the office of King; if we see it separated from the Office, and held in hand as a mere personal possession? If we see it kept back for the use of the King, and that, too, during the time that he shall be known, and officially declared, to be incapable of performing any of the functions of that office, to render which efficient for the service of the people, such establishment is held to be necessary, and upon which ground alone the supporting of it is justified.—Then again, suppos the King should recover? The Prince, in that case, would have to lay down his *new establishment*. There would be another change, and that too, of no very agreeable kind. Whereas, if he take, as I trust he will, the present Household and Establishment, there would be no change at all of a nature to produce any disagreeable impression. He would merely have to give up the Office, with all that belongs to it, to his Father, without any new expences or any of those difficulties that must inevitably arise in the other case.—And, why should not this be?

What reason is there for keeping the old establishment in the hands of *other persons*? The King himself cannot use it? To him no splendour can be necessary; and, as to the Queen, it is well known, that she could not retain the establishment, a moment after the King's death, and, of course, that it cannot be fitting, that she should possess it now. Indeed, it in no wise belongs to her; she has a provision of her own, or, at least, appropriated to herself; the household belonging to the Office of the King, and that, too, for the benefit of the people. For whom, then, is this vast establishment to be kept up at the same time that the people are called upon to support another for the Prince? For whom? Who is to have the management of it? Who is to possess the benefit of it? Who is to have the political influence derived from its possession? In short, how is it possible to find out a pretence, even a shadow of reason, for such a measure?—The venal writer, after having, in the manner above-described, misrepresented the question; after having impudently taken for granted, that, by common consent, the old establishment is to be withheld from the Prince, and that the opponents of the Ministers wish that no new taxes should be imposed for the purpose of making a new regal establishment; after this, he says, that all men, "except SIR FRANCIS BURDETT and his rabble, wish the kingly office to be surrounded with splendour. He then says, that the *cost* against taxation may please them, who have often recommended that the servants of the state should work without pay."—If in falsehood there can be degrees, these are the most false of this venal and malignant man's assertions. SIR FRANCIS BURDETT has never represented taxes as unnecessary; he has never attempted to represent taxes, in the abstract, as an oppression. He is too wise to entertain such an opinion, and has too much integrity and sincerity to affect to believe it. I might content myself with this denial, and leave the malignant accuser to prove his charge; but, I will not so content myself. I will prove the negative, and hold up the malignant accuser to public scorn.—On the 2nd of July, 1804, when the Minister came to Parliament for a large grant (501,842*l.*) to pay off the arrears only of the King's Civil List, SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, upon the subject of taxation, said, "I repeat; that feeling the pressure of the times, and the misapplication of the public money, I am

"averse to every thing that has a tendency to increase our difficulties. I am, however, far from wishing to make a general declaration against every species of taxation. I am of opinion, on the contrary, that taxation, properly applied, may be as beneficial as the moisture absorbed by the sun from the earth, which, falling again in rains and dews, fertilizes the soil. But, how different that taxation, which is extorted from the industry of the people, and applied only to corrupt their morals, and undermine their freedom! Such is the system which has been the ruin of other countries, and is likely to be the ruin of this if the constitutional interposition of parliament does not prevent it."—This has always, upon similar occasions, been his language. Let the malignant son of venality, therefore, reforge his accusation, or let his foolish readers believe him, if they will. He knows well, that neither SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, nor any man of his principles, has ever expressed a sentiment resembling those here imputed to them; but, he also knows, that SIR FRANCIS BURDETT is the implacable, the mortal, foe of *seat-selling* and of *corruption* and *public robbery* of every sort; and it is for this that the MEAN, MERCENARY and MALIG-NANT men hate him, and would willingly see him broiled alive. For this it is that they thus labour, that they incessantly toil, to misrepresent his opinions and his views; being well assured, that, if his wishes be accomplished, they are destroyed.—Very unfortunate indeed was this venal man in introducing SIR FRANCIS BURDETT as one of those, who would wish to see His Royal Highness the Prince walking the streets in a brown coat, and stripped of all the splendour belonging to his rank; for, not only has the Honourable Baronet never let fall an expression to warrant such a charge, but he has, upon divers occasions, and upon every occasion when he with propriety could, expressed sentiments of an exactly opposite cast. He has not only, upon every such occasion, expressed his wish, that the several branches of the Royal Family should have a suitable and splendid establishment, observing, that it was not this that would oppress the people, that this was comparatively nothing, that the people never did, and never ought to grudge this, and that, indeed, one of the great sins of the system of which he complained, was, that it kept down the Royal Family, while it oppressed the people. This has been uniformly his language, as

often as occasion has served; and, he has been particularly strong upon all these occasions, in protesting against the *illiberal treatment*, as to pecuniary matters, experienced by His Royal Highness, the Prince of Wales. Of this fact those who are at all acquainted with what has passed in the political world will want no particular proof; but, as the MEAN, MERCENARY and MALIGNANT men have put forward the accusation, I cannot refrain from quoting another passage from Sir FRANCIS's speech of 2nd July, 1801, upon the Civil List grant then proposed:—"My most serious objection," said he, "to the vote proposed, refers to the *unconstitutional application* of the public money. I advert to the sums advanced to the princes of the blood, *without the consent of Parliament*. I do not think it decent or becoming that the princes of England should be dependent on the minister of the day. If they wanted relief, they ought to have made application to the House of Commons, and not condescend to receive bounties from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I recollect, however, and the reflection gives me pain, that whenever they have applied to this House in a constitutional way, for that relief to which they were entitled, their claims have been rejected. This has been particularly evinced in the applications of THAT IL-
LUSTRIOUS MEMBER OF THE FAMILY, who enjoys, as he deserves, the particular affection and confidence of the people; and is therefore, perhaps, AN OBJECT OF JEALOUSY to some. But, whenever these princes have appealed to ministers privately, that assistance has been constitutionally granted, which ought only to have flowed from Parliament. It is a subject of regret and surprise, that what Parliament has refused should be bestowed by ministerial influence."—Such have always been the sentiments of Sir FRANCIS BURDETT upon this subject; and yet, these venal men have the impudence to hold him forth as a person, who wishes to degrade the Royal Authority and the Royal Family; as a person who wishes to Regent "to walk the streets in a brown coat;" as a person who is desirous of using his great influence with the people to persuade them, that all taxes are unnecessary and oppressive, and that the several branches of the Royal Family, and the Prince of Wales in particular, ought to be regarded as squanderers of the people's earnings.—And this these venal men do at

the same moment, that they are exerting all their influence to revive the base insinuations respecting the Prince's expences; at the same moment that they have the impudence to talk of "the *unpopularity* arising from his debts;" at the same moment that they are taunting him with having his income anticipated, "mortgaged," and hampered," and are, in short, leaving nothing untried to place him in a light at once the most odious and most contemptible. These are the men who assume to themselves the appellations of "the loyal," and of "King's friends;" these are the men, who have, for years, been representing as Jacobins and Levellers and Traitors, all those who wished, and who still wish, for a reform of abuses, a destruction of seat-selling and of corruption, but who have never wished for any thing that should take from the King or his family any part of their just prerogatives, or any of the means of supporting the dignity and splendour belonging to their high rank and station.—There are, too, I have been told (and I heard it with a mixture of surprise and indignation) men, who call themselves "the Prince's FRIENDS," who have taken upon them to say, that Sir FRANCIS BURDETT was not to be considered in that character. If they meant by Prince's Friends, those who may have espoused his cause for their own sakes; who have been looking to him, because it was their last and only hope; because it was useless for them to look elsewhere; if this be what they mean by "Prince's friends," Sir Francis does, certainly, not make one of them. But, will any one of these gentlemen (and, I trust, they are few in number) show me how and when they have shown their friendship towards the Prince? Will they show me how and when they have given proofs of this friendship? And, will they show me; will the best of them show me, how they are so ABLE to serve the Prince as Sir Francis Burdett has been, and now is? Will they show me, will any of them undertake to prove to me, that their opinions are likely to go further with the nation, than the opinions of Sir Francis Burdett? Will they attempt to say, that, either in England, in Ireland, or in any part of the world, the opinions of Sir Francis Burdett will not, upon any public matter, and especially upon a matter of this sort, weigh as much as theirs?—Sir Francis Burdett, as I once before observed, wants nothing of the Prince but what every man may

reasonably wish for, namely, his good opinion; he appears from his publicly declared sentiments, always to have regarded him as having been treated in an illiberal manner, and as having been, by foul means, attempted to be undermined in the public opinion. He has looked upon his treatment as *unjust*, and that, without any other motive, was sufficient to put an independent and honest English Gentleman on his side; and especially when he saw the Prince assailed by those foul insinuations, which seem now to be revived with all their original malignity.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 28th Dec. 1810.*

COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES.—On *Tuesday next*, the 1st of January, will be ready for delivery, the *THIRTIETH, SIXTIETH, and SEVENTH VOLUMES*, comprising the whole of the Debates and Proceedings, in both Houses, during the Last Session of Parliament.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PRISONERS OF WAR.—*Official Documents, from No. I. to No. XVIII. relating to the late Negotiation for an Exchange of Prisoners of War, between England and France.*—(Continued from p. 1312.)

The only and incontestible means of executing completely a concerted principle of a general exchange, is to convey to the coast of Calais all the French prisoners, and those of the powers allied to France, which are in England. To bring also all the English prisoners, with a number from the allies of England, making together a number equal to that of the French, or the allies of France, who are prisoners in England, and there make the exchange.—By this means an exchange, which only depends on the will of the two Governments, will be effected.—From Calais, the British government may transport the Spanish prisoners to the ports of Spain still in a state of insurrection, or do what they please with them. This plan is simple and without obstacle, because it suits well enough both governments. All the French prisoners in the power of England, and all the English in the power of France, being liberated by these means, the surplus of the Spanish prisoners shall be exchanged against the French prisoners in Spain; and to this end the Bri-

tish Government promised its intervention, as far as circumstances rendered it practicable to bring about the exchange.—The undersigned flatters himself, that the justice of these observations will strike the British Commissary; and that he will perceive that the execution of a principle acknowledged by the two Governments cannot be made to depend on the will of insurrectional governments; which, if the immense forces which the repose of the Continent places at the disposal of France are considered, evidently cannot last for the time necessary to execute the whole of the articles of the counter-project.—It is not in the spirit of pride or presumption that the undersigned insists on this last operation, but only to complete the proof that that even taking place, the execution of paragraphs 11 and 12 in the 4th art. of the counter-project would become impossible, and the situation of the French prisoners remaining in England would be desperate and without example.—In striking the actual balance of prisoners of war between France and England, it is evident, from a report of the population of both nations, that there is of one side and the other a proportion nearly equal of prisoners of war; consequently there is an equal proportion of wishes in France and in England for their liberation, an equal proportion of warranty for the treatment which they may experience, and an equal power of making reprisals, if circumstances should render it necessary.—But if we begin to deliver up all the English prisoners.—England finds herself immediately uninterested in this species of misfortune; so much so, that the Frenchmen detained in England will find themselves without warranty of exchange, and without warranty of the treatment which they expect.—On this reasoning is established the principle of a general exchange, and the principle agreed upon. It is this argument which, in reason, in policy, and humanity, admits not the execution of means tending directly or indirectly to modify the consequence. The undersigned raises not a question which could be misplaced here, in entering into a detail of the deplorable situation of the French prisoners in England, crowded in hulks, where they are deprived of all exercise. Cooped up by thousands in the prison of Dartmoor, described, by all the reports which have reached us, as situated in the most unwholesome spot in England; breathing in this

prison, as in the hulks, and, perhaps, worse, a fetid and corrupted air, they have contracted contagious disorders, which carries them off by hundreds, or which terminates in diseases incurable; to say the least of them, while they remain, England will not derive any advantage from them.—The undersigned does not oppose to this situation of the French prisoners, the good treatment received by the English prisoners in France; distributed in large citadels situated in the most healthy cities of the empire, they exercise themselves in all the extent of these places as freely and familiarly as our own people; and those among them who are laborious often obtain the reward which they deserve from their talents and industry. So far from having contagious maladies, they have fewer diseases among them, perhaps, than if they were perfectly free.—The undersigned will make no more observations on the number of Hanoverians mentioned in the counter-project, nor on the omission of Russia and Denmark, which are to be taken into consideration with France, in a treaty for the exchange of their prisoners of war.—No discussion can take place on these incidental questions until the bases of the negotiation are settled.—The undersigned has the honour, &c.

No. VIII. (August 1.) is a note from Mr. Mackenzie to M. Dumoustier. He begins by regretting that throughout the whole of M. Dumoustier's note, a style of expression and discussion prevails, very ill calculated to promote the object which they both profess to have in their view. After some farther observations on the suggestion of M. Dumoustier, he proceeds thus:—The principal objection stated against the counter-project is, that the fulfilment of its execution depends upon the will of others. This is inevitable in a transaction in which so many different Governments are interested. It is impossible to avoid some delay, or to guarantee under all possible circumstances the execution of a principle, however general its adoption may be. An objection similar to this, advanced against the British counter-project, might be well-applied to the French project; since notwithstanding the enunciation of the principle of the universal exchange in some of its articles, the execution of this principle, as far as appertains to the exchange between France and Spain (without naming any other Governments) depends on the consent of the respective Governments. The only point

proposed, which should be definitively decided, was the restitution to France, without delay, and in mass, of all the French prisoners in England, and to England of all the English prisoners in France: a stipulation, all the advantages of which, notwithstanding the singular argument of M. Dumoustier, is on the side of France. Even according to the proposition last transmitted, the full execution of the principle, as to all the French prisoners in Spain, and the surplus of Spanish prisoners in France, would depend on the success of the intervention of the British Government with that of Spain.—M. Dumoustier will therefore remark, that in establishing that the execution of a principle, adopted at the same time by the English Government and that of France, should not be left at the discretion of what he thinks proper to call the insurrectional governments of Spain, he substitutes for a principle really adopted, viz. the general exchange of all the prisoners on all sides, the principle put forward by France, viz. The liberation of all the French prisoners in England, for all the English prisoners in France; and then, because the measure proposed does not agree in certain points with the execution of a principle which England does not admit, he complains that it annuls or eludes the consequences the most important of the principle which England does admit.—Again:—"It was not within the competence of the functions with which M. Dumoustier and the undersigned are charged, to establish, or even to discuss the question, relative to the Government of Spain. The undersigned must, however, observe, that a Government capable of putting armies in motion, and capable of making prisoners of its enemies, is, at least, competent to treat with those enemies for the exchange of its prisoners. That Government, which Great Britain acknowledges for her ally, ought, at least, to be consulted by her as to what concerns her interests, her sentiments, and her honour. It is for that Government to decide, whether it wishes to obtain the deliverance of so many thousands of Spaniards, who may co-operate in its defence, in allowing for the price of that advantage the deliverance of so many thousands of Frenchmen who may co-operate in attacking her.—It does not belong to the undersigned to anticipate upon the probability of the duration, and on the final issue of the contest; but if the overthrow

of this Government is so certain and so near, that there is not even time to communicate the terms of a cartel, he cannot refrain from asking what are become of all the arguments employed with so much warmth to induce Great Britain to exchange the French prisoners in her power for the Spanish prisoners in the power of France? If the war with Spain is in fact so near its end, what reason can there be that in such a case Great Britain should be ready to make a sacrifice for their exchange?—It should still be observed, that the plan now proposed by M. Dumoustier differs considerably from that proposed in the French project; by which the alternative was established, of sending the Spanish prisoners in France into England, or into the different towns in Spain, which might be agreed upon. This last part of the alternative is alone admissible. It is not just that the embarrassment and the expence of the transport of her allies to their respective countries should fall upon Great Britain. The only proper and equitable principle is, that each of the contracting parties should engage to transport into their respective countries the prisoners which are found in their possession.—The undersigned is charged, in consequence, with informing M. Dumoustier, that this part of the proposition contained in his note is not admissible. Mr. Mackenzie is further ordered to add to M. Dumoustier, that the British Government does not feel itself bound in justice to make any addition to the humane and liberal proposition which has already been made in its name. It does not find itself disposed to depart in any degree from its tenour.—Nevertheless, to establish the sincerity of its desire to effect an exchange and a cartel, if possible, in a point of view still more clear, the undersigned is authorised to propose an additional article, which ought entirely to remove the apprehensions of the French Government of the possibility of a continuation of the captivity of its subjects, after all the British subjects shall have been liberated.—After some further remarks, Mr. Mackenzie continues:—M. Dumoustier disavows an intention of agitating a question which he feels is misplaced, relative to the treatment of French prisoners in England; yet, notwithstanding his disavowal, he enters into this misplaced question. Mr. Mackenzie will not imitate him; but simply assures him, that the discussion itself is not more misplaced than the enumeration of facts which M.

Dumoustier advances is erroneous. If any convenient opportunity offered to enter into those details, the undersigned declares that the British Government will be able clearly to prove that the information on which the French Government founds its opinion on this subject is altogether without foundation. He is sorry to be obliged to observe, that all comparison which could be made between the situation and treatment of prisoners in Great Britain and in France respectively cannot turn out but in favour of the former.—The British Government has charged Mr. Mackenzie to declare, that the number of Hanoverians having been fixed after the most attentive researches and consideration which could be given to the subject, he cannot depart from his proposition with regard to them.—With regard to Denmark or Russia, Mr. Mackenzie cannot conceal his surprize that M. Dumoustier could maintain, that there existed, with respect to them, a material omission in the British project, of which the first, the second, and the sixth article, comprehend the allies of both parties. If Russia and Denmark are allies of France, they will find themselves comprehended in these articles. If they are not so, what right has Great Britain or France to mix their interests in this convention.—Nevertheless, Mr. Mackenzie is authorised to announce, that there will be no difficulty in extending the principle of the British project in regard to the Russian and Danish prisoners respectively; and that the British Government is ready to enter into an arrangement with these two Powers, upon the bases of the project which has been offered in their name.

Additional Article proposed.—In case the Spanish Government to which the terms of this Convention will be communicated, should not signify its assent thereunto within three months from the date of the signature, the French subjects, who may be prisoners in Great Britain or her possessions after the exchange of prisoners respectively, as expressed in the five first paragraphs of the fourth article, shall be liberated successively, without delay, by successive conveyances of one thousand men each, on proper receipts, in the form which shall be agreed upon, and upon the positive engagement (ratified by the French Government) that they shall not serve either upon sea or land, against Great Britain, or any of her allies, in any part of the world, before they be regularly

exchanged for similar British prisoners, who, by the chance of war, may fall into the hands of the French, and who shall consequently be liberated, from time to time, until the surplus of French prisoners formerly mentioned shall be exhausted. A similar exchange will take place according to the 5th and 6th paragraphs of the fourth article.—All the Officers not exchanged, and those who may be permitted to return to France, as is expressed above, must also be considered as if they were upon their parole of honour, and shall be bound to transmit a regular report of the place of their residence to the British agent in France, as was the practice last war.

IX. *Letter from Mr. Mackenzie to M. Dumoustier.*—*Morlaix, August 28, 1810*—Sir,—Having waited with anxiety for some communication upon the decision of the French Government, whether acceptance or refusal, relative to the proposition which I had the honour of presenting you on the morning of the 2d instant, which has hitherto detained the messenger and the vessel, I went myself to your house at the expiration of fifteen days, and declared to you verbally, “that I received instructions to wait with patience during that time for an answer to the propositions which have been made, and that in case they were not agreed to by the French Government, I should return to England.” I am at present desired to inform you, that the British Government feels itself repugnant to conclude, that the disposition of the French Government is of a nature which renders a prolongation of the negotiation useless; and I am ordered to beg you will have the goodness to demand my passports for my immediate return to England, &c.

No. X. August 30. Is a reply from M. Dumoustier, to the preceding note from Mr. Mackenzie. He rejects the additional article; and after some arguments in favour of considering the Spaniards and Portuguese as British, he concludes with the following propositions:—1st. That the French Government offers a general exchange, man for man, and rank for rank, considering Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French, Italians, &c. upon an equality. This is most just and reasonable.—2dly. France also consents that all the French prisoners should be sent to France, and all the English to England; but as the number of French prisoners exceeds that of the English, they shall be sent to France on their parole, subject to the conditions

of the additional article of the 1st of August.—Lastly, France at once consents that all French prisoners in England should be liberated; but she never can consent to liberate only a part, and abandon the majority in England, without guarantee or hope.

No. XI. Another project of a Convention for the exchange of prisoners, presented by M. Dumoustier.

No XII. *Note of Mr. Mackenzie.*—The undersigned Commissary for the exchange of prisoners of war has transmitted to his Government the note of M. Dumoustier of the 30th of August, together with the project there referred to; and is charged, in answer to that communication, to inform M. Dumoustier, that his last project is in many respects inadmissible; but it appears by his note that he raises no objection as to the basis of the British project, and that the difficulties regard merely two points of detail, namely, in the first place, that which regards the additional article regulating the disposal of the surplus of French prisoners remaining in England, on the supposition of Spain refusing to accede to the convention; and secondly, that which respects the number of French prisoners to be liberated on account of the Hanoverian army of Count Walmoden.—The British Government has considered these two points with the same disposition which it has ever bestowed in doing away the difficulties, and has contributed to the final success of the negotiation by every reasonable concession; and finding that, though adhering faithfully to the principles which it has before manifested, and which it still maintains, changes might be introduced in the details of the Convention of a nature to give satisfaction to the wishes of the French Government on that subject, it is freely disposed to offer them, in expectation that these alterations in the terms of its project, being the last which can be made on its part, will be found also the most acceptable, and that they will enable the French Government to furnish its assistance heartily, and candidly, to bring this prolonged discussion to a happy termination.—As, on the first point, the objections of M. Dumoustier had a reference to the setting at liberty the surplus French prisoners in England, and to the determination of an exchange between France and Spain; and as the point upon which he insists is the liberation, without delay, of all the French prisoners in England, in exchange for those of Great Britain and her allies now in France; the British Go-

Government has consented to make such a modification in its project as may be able to fulfil that object which M. Dumoustier has considered of such great importance.—Instead, therefore, of sending (according to the stipulations of the original British proposal) the exchange of the surplus of French prisoners remaining in England, for the surplus of Spanish prisoners remaining in France, even to the full completion of exchange, man for man, and rank for rank, between France and Spain, Mr. Mackenzie is authorised to consent that the exchange of the surplus of French prisoners who possibly might remain in England at the conclusion of the cartel between France and England, should take place immediately, and without waiting for the conclusion of the exchange of man for man, and rank for rank, between France and Spain; or, in other words, the British Government consents to anticipate the exchange of the surplus, and thus to accelerate, by this concession on their part, the liberation of so many French and Spanish captives.—The undersigned is charged to declare, in addition, that by a communication which has been made by the Spanish Government, through its Minister residing in London, the British Government is fully authorised to accept, without more delay, the exchange of Spanish prisoners in return for French prisoners, in the proportion above-mentioned; and that the Spanish Government has equally made known its disposition to accede to a convention for a general exchange, agreeably to the terms which for this end may be agreed on, under the mediation of Great Britain; and Mr. Mackenzie cannot help observing, that this circumstance renders the entire discussion on the additional articles useless and superfluous.—As to the second objection raised by M. Dumoustier, relative to the number of prisoners to be given up in regard to the Hanoverian army of Walsleben, he requires that in reckoning that number, those who might have entered into the service of Great Britain should be taken into consideration. The British Government is disposed, in like manner, to accede to this proposition; but the extension which M. Dumoustier has given to this demand is altogether inadmissible; no computation which could be made with any degree of exactness could raise the amount of the loss of those Hanoverians to the British service beyond the number of 1,000, in place of what was before offered as an equivalent. Mr. Mackenzie is

authorised to consent that 3,000 French prisoners, instead of 2,000 formerly stipulated, be set at liberty, in consideration of the Hanoverians comprehended in the capitulation of Count Walsleben, who either now are or who may have hitherto been in the British service; that number of 3,000 being independent of the total amount of 1,905 men, immediately to be liberated in regard to the garrison of St. Domingo, as has been agreed upon in the communication made by the Commissioners of the Transport-office to M. Riviere, of the 19th of January last.—Mr. Mackenzie has the honour of presenting now to M. Dumoustier, the minute of a project, which does not differ from that before offered by the British Government, but in the alterations necessary to be made with regard to those two points; and at the same time to inform him, that no other alteration, or the giving up of any thing, can on any account be admitted.—In presenting his final proposal to the French Government, and in offering to it the bounds of a series of concessions to which the British Government has been carried, from sentiments of humanity and conciliation, Mr. Mackenzie is charged to impress on M. Dumoustier the conviction of the number, the extent, and the value of these concessions, and to recal to his attention how every new step of this negotiation has been accompanied with a new proof of liberality and candour on the part of the British Government.—The points in dispute relative to the capitulation of St. Domingo and the exchange of the civil subjects of Great Britain for French naval and military prisoners of war, and to an equivalent for the Hanoverians, to an exchange of French prisoners in England for those of other countries in the hands of France, and to the immediate liberation of French prisoners for Spanish, and to the chance of a surplus which might remain without any balance, have been successively conceded by Great Britain; though, conformably to precedents, and also agreeably to received usages, she might in turn, insist on some reciprocal concessions on the part of the French Government.—Mr. Mackenzie must in conclusion observe, that in virtue of the above-mentioned concessions, the French Government, in acceding to the liberal propositions now offered, for the last time, by the British Government, will obtain the setting at liberty of almost 5,000 men, independently of the final liberation of 45,000 other Frenchmen, who are now

in the power of Great Britain.—Mr. Mackenzie has the honour of renewing to M. Dumoustier the assurances of his high consideration

No. XIII. Is the project inserted in the Times of the 27th of November.

No. XIV. *Note of M. Dumoustier to Mr. Mackenzie*, delivered October 7.—

The undersigned Commissioner for the exchange of prisoners of war, has transmitted to his Government the Note of Mr. Mackenzie of the 22d of September, and the Project of Convention annexed thereto. He is directed, in answer to this communication, to declare that this arrangement will meet with no opposition on the part of the French Government, provided the British Government consents to modify the first, second, and fourth paragraphs of the fourth Article of the Project, as shall be mentioned below. In the first paragraph, it is wished that the following alteration should be made:—"All British prisoners, of all ranks and degrees, detained in France or Italy, or in the dependencies of France and Italy, shall be set at liberty, and their exchange shall immediately commence after the ratification of this Convention, by sending them to Deal or Portsmouth, or any other port in the Channel that shall be agreed on, or by assigning over to the hands of the British Commissary, who shall be nominated to receive them, a thousand English prisoners, and two thousand of the allies of England, for three thousand French prisoners, or of the allies of France, who shall be set at liberty by the British Government, as stated in the said paragraph." In the second paragraph it shall be stated, "that all the French prisoners of all ranks and degrees now detained in Great Britain, or in the British possessions, shall be set at liberty; their exchange shall take place immediately after the signature of this Convention, and shall be carried into effect by successively sending to Morlaix, or to any other French port in the Channel that may be agreed on, or by assigning over into the hands of the French Commissaries appointed to receive them, three thousand Frenchmen for one thousand English, and two thousand of the allies of England, in proportion as the French Government shall release them. It shall be at the discretion of the British Commissaries to send the Spanish prisoners to England, or to any part of Spain they please. The prisoners shall be at the disposal of the British Government, but to be maintained by France so long

as they shall remain on the French territory.—In the fourth paragraph it is wished that the number of eight thousand Hanoverians to be exchanged for eight thousand French, be altered to that of three thousand, as stated in the project, which will occasion a total exchange of seventeen thousand Hanoverians who have capitulated, for less than half of their number.—The undersigned, on condition that these alterations be admitted, is authorized to sign the British project. The alterations are founded on a principle from which France cannot depart—that of not consenting to the liberation of the great mass of English prisoners, but on condition that the mass of French prisoners is liberated at the same time.—This principle is that which has always been admitted, and particularly in 1780, when, to gain the object, the excess of French prisoners was met by a ransom in money.—England being unable to refuse acceding to an exchange of prisoners, including the Hanoverians, Portuguese, and Spaniards, admits the principle; and in that state of the question, she cannot deny the justice of an exchange, man for man, and rank for rank.—This mode of proceeding will establish very nearly a general and simultaneous exchange of all the French and all the English prisoners. The Spaniards that may afterwards remain in France, and the allies of the French that may be in England, may be included under the 6th and following article.—Mr. Mackenzie will observe, from the simplicity of this answer, that it has not been a subject of discussion at Paris; it is conformable to all that the undersigned has hitherto said in the discussions that have taken place, that if England only wishes a partial exchange, the negotiation may be considered as retrograde and broken off; but if she wishes in good earnest a general exchange, it is impossible to conceive any reason to prevent her adopting the only means of removing all doubts.—The undersigned can only here repeat that the French Government will never consent to give up the English prisoners that are in their power, for a part only of French that are in possession of England, and to leave the other part without guarantee in the hands of the British Government.

No. XV. *Note from Mr. Mackenzie.*—Morlaix, Oct. 16, 1810. Sir:—The determination of the French Government, thus repeated, to adhere to the rejection of the final proposition of the British Go-

vernment, prevents the accomplishment of the general liberation of all the prisoners of war; and compels me, in compliance with my instructions, to demand that you will have the goodness to provide for me the necessary passport for my immediate return to England. I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XVI. *Note of M. Dumoustier.*—Morlaix, Oct. 16, 1810. Sir:—I hereby answer your letter of the 8th inst. in which you say that we add the unexpected obstacle of loading the British Government with the arrangement of the expence and difficulties attending the conveyance of the Spanish prisoners, &c. This assertion is not exactly true, and I am directed again to repeat to you what I have always hitherto had the honour of stating, that any question respecting money will never prove an obstacle to the French Government, and that it will never be behind on any subject of this nature. The British Government may determine as it pleases; to all its wishes France will give her assistance, provided that, in consequence of the principle admitted in 1780, the exchange be made *en masse*, and that all the French shall return to their own country at the same time that the English shall return to theirs. This condition is, and from the first day of negotiation must have been, the "*sine qua non*." Every other consideration can only be regarded as matter of conciliation. It is the fourth time, Sir, that I have the honour of repeating to you the determination of my Government.

No. XVII. *Note of M. Dumoustier.*—Morlaix, Oct. 26. Sir:—The letter which I had the honour of writing you on the 16th inst. must have fully convinced you of the desire with which my Government has been uniformly animated, of removing, by all the sacrifices in its power, the difficulties started by England against the carrying into effect a general exchange, which must necessarily liberate, at the same time, on both sides, the great bulk of the prisoners of war.—You will, without doubt, do me the justice, Sir, that on my part I have always seconded as much as was in my power, the conciliatory disposition of my Government. I again give you another proof of it in consenting to split the difference with you on the question respecting the Hanoverians, and in only asking 6,000 French instead of 8,000, in exchange for 17,000 Hanoverians, comprised in the capitulation of Field Marshal Count Walmoden. I have, &c.

No. XVIII. *Note of Mr. Mackenzie.*—Sir:—I have the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 26th inst., and am happy to observe there is a conciliatory disposition on the part of the French Government; but, I feel, at the same time, a painful sensation in seeing that you limit yourself to the proposing of a diminution of the number (so often declared as inadmissible) of the French prisoners demanded in exchange for the Hanoverians of the army of Count Walmoden.—I have had the honour of repeating very frequently my orders, which in this respect were positive; and I have now to inform you for the third time, that the British Government adheres to the just and equitable plan of convention, finally modified for the immediate exchange of all prisoners of war; and that in case it should not be accepted, I am ordered to return immediately to England.

Mr. Mackenzie sailed on the 6th of November.

PORTUGAL.—*Extract of an Official Communication from Marshal General Lord Wellington, to his Excellency Miguel Pereira Forjaz, dated Cantaro, Dec. 1, 1810.*

The corps of the enemy's troops, the advanced guard of which engaged with the troops commanded by General Silveira on the 14th of the last month of November, moved to the left, and made its appearance on the 19th in the Subgal in the Coa, where it marched in the direction of Belmonte and Fundas, and taking the two roads which lead to the Zezere through Lower Beira, reached to Cardigan on the 25th of the same month.—The militia of Lower Beira, continually hung on the rear of the enemy, and caused him a considerable loss. The said detachment of the enemy's troops consists of those which left Portugal with Gen. Foix, who went to Paris, and of those belonging to the three corps of the army of Portugal which were left in Salamanca, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida, to garrison the said places, of 3 or 4 battalions detached from the 8th corps, by order of the Emperor, under the command of General Serras, for the purpose of manœuvring on the frontiers, and of the convalescents of the army of Portugal, composing in the whole, a force of about 2,400 men.—It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of the said reinforcements, but in my estimation it does not exceed 8,000 men.—The troops who com-

pose the 9th corps form the garrisons of those places in Castile, whence the troops were withdrawn, who lately entered Portugal.—The enemy continues to maintain himself in Santarem, the strength of which position has been considerably increased; he has also fortified a post in Punhete, on the left bank of the River Zezere, and another in the environs of Pernes and Alcanhede, on the right of the position of Santarem, and watches with the most careful attention all our movements in that direction. The weather has been constantly very bad ever since the middle of November, the cross roads are altogether impassable for artillery, and very difficult for the passage of infantry, while at the same time the waters are out, and the low grounds overflowed. All the accounts which I receive from Lisbon unanimously assure me, that the Spanish flying parties continue to act with the utmost activity, and that their operations against the enemy have of late proved very successful.

Extract of a Letter from his Excellency Marshal Gen. Lord Wellington, to his Excellency Don Miguel Pereira Forjaz, dated Dec. 8, 1810.

No alteration of importance has taken place in the position of the enemy's troops since this 1st inst. the date of my antecedent dispatches, which I transmitted to your Excellency relative to the operations of the campaign. I have no accounts from Cadiz since the 19th of last month.

PORTUGAL.—Published in the London Gazette, 25th Dec. 1810.—A Dispatch, of which the following is a copy, was received last night at the office of the Earl of Liverpool from Lieutenant-General Viscount Wellington, dated Caxaro, Dec. 8th, 1810.

My Lord;—The detachment of the enemy's troops commanded by General Gardanne, which had returned to Sobrino Formosa, have continued their march to the frontier, and by the last accounts had entered Spain.—I have not heard that this detachment had any communication with the enemy's troops on the left of the Zezere, from whom they were distant about three leagues. I understand that, having lost some prisoners, taken by a patrol and by a party of the ordenanza, which accompanied the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Ponsonby on reconnaissance from Abrantes to the river Codes, they made very particular enquiries respecting the position of Lieutenant-General Hill's

corps, and the means which the Allies possessed of crossing the Tagus at Abrantes; and, having commenced their march from Cardigos towards the Codes in the morning, they retired about eleven with great precipitation, and continued their retreat in the same manner till they reached the frontier.—They were followed by the ordenanza, who did them much mischief on the march, and took much baggage from them. The enemy destroyed many horses and mules which could not keep up with them; and this march, if it was ordered by superior authority, and is connected with any other arrangement, had every appearance, and was attended by all the consequences, of a precipitate and forced retreat.—No alteration of any importance has been made in the position of the enemy's troops since I addressed your Lordship.

SWEDEN.—Declaration of War against England, 17th Nov. 1810.

We, Charles, by the Grace of God, King of Sweden, of the Goths and Vandals, &c. &c. Heir to Norway, Duke of Schleswig, Holstein, &c. &c. make known. Whereas, in order completely to do away the doubts which have been expressed concerning the situation of our kingdom with respect to England, and in order in a more official manner, to confirm the ties of amity and confidence that exist between us and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, and King of Italy; as also, in order, on our part, to contribute to the common object of the Powers of the Continent, namely, the conclusion of a general and speedy peace, we have been induced hereby to declare war against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. We do therefore graciously order and enjoin, that all navigation, trade, and intercourse by the mail, and by all other correspondence by letter, under what name soever it may be, from and to all the ports, cities, and places, situate in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, shall, under penalty, according to the laws and decrees in that behalf made, entirely cease from this day. Accordingly, our gracious will and pleasure is, that our Field-Marsals, Lord-Governors, Commanding-Generals, Admirals, Lords-Lieutenants, and all other of our Commanders by land and sea, shall each in their several districts and departments, together with the Officers under their command, not only adopt measures for the due and

prompt publication of this our gracious Order, for the information of the Public, but also for the due and strict adherence thereto. And all those concerned are obediently to regulate themselves accordingly.—In further testimony whereof we have personally signed these presents, and caused the same to be affixed by our Royal Seal.—The Palace of Stockholm, the 17th November, 1810.

CHARLES (L. S.) J. A. BORTZELL.

PRUSSIA.—Decree, dated Nov. 16, 1810, respecting the general Suppression of Ecclesiastical Establishments in the Kingdom of Prussia.

We Frederick William, by the Grace of God King of Prussia &c. considering that the designs for which ecclesiastical Institutions and Convents have hitherto been endowed are not consonant with the objects and necessities of the present times; considering that these designs may in part be better accomplished by different means;—That all neighbouring States have adopted the same measures;—That the punctual discharge of the contribution to France can only be effected by this expedient;—And that, by these means, we may diminish the heavy claims upon the private property of our subjects, we do decree as follows:—Art. I. All convents, and other ecclesiastical institutions, bailiwicks, and commendaries, whether of the Protestant or Catholic religion, shall from this day be considered as the property of the state.—Art. II. All convents, &c. shall, by degrees, be abolished; and care shall be taken of the compensation of all persons who now inhabit them, or have claims upon them.—Art. III. From the day of the date of the present Decree, no annuities shall be allowed, no novices shall be admitted, and no person instituted to any office belonging to them. Without our consent, no change of property shall be made, no capitals shall be collected, no debts contracted, and no inventories transferred. All contracts made in opposition to those directions are null and void.—Art. IV. We shall provide for the sufficient recompense of the Chief Ecclesiastical Officers, and with their advice for the liberal pensioning of the Priests of the Schools; and also for those Convents that are employed for the education of youth,

and the care of the sick, which suffer in their revenue by the above measure, or which may appear to require new funds.

SPAIN.—Decree of the Cortes for a Monument of Gratitude to the King and People of England.—Dated Isle of Leon, 1st Nov. 1810.

The Cortes General and Extraordinary, actuated by the most lively and sincere gratitude towards his Most Sacred Majesty George the Third, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, for the generous interest he has displayed and for the most important assistance he has afforded to the Spanish nation, in liberally supplying her with arms, money, troops, ships, and stores, from the first moment in which the Provinces raised the loud acclaim of independence and fidelity to their legitimate Sovereign King Ferdinand VII., insidiously ensnared, captured, and insulted by the unprincipled Usurper of the Throne of France, Napoleon Buonaparté:—hereby decree, that a public Monument shall be erected to his Majesty George the Third, in testimony of the National gratitude of Spain, not only to an august, generous Sovereign, but to the unconquerable English Nation for the aid and patriotism which she has evinced in the glorious cause of Spain. The Cortes at the same time declare, that the Spanish Nation will not lay down her arms until she has secured her independence, the absolute integrity of the Spanish Monarchy in both worlds, and recovered it for her lawful Sovereign, Ferdinand VII. acting always with the concurrence, and in the most perfect harmony, with the King of Great Britain, in pursuance of the strict amity, and the perfect and indissoluble alliance, solemnly stipulated in the treaty of the 14th of January 1809. The Council of Regency will take care to make known to his Majesty, respecting the most solemn and appropriate manner in which the same can be executed, and will also submit to the Cortes the plan which it thinks will be the best for carrying such national intention into effect. The Council conceives it proper, in the first instance, with a view to the attainment of the desired object, that this Decree shall be printed, and publicly circulated.

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* The Binder will notice that No. 7 is Signature H
 8 K
 9 *K
 I, having been omitted.

TABLES.

TABLE of the Number of CHRISTENINGS and BURIALS within the Bills of Mortality, from Jan^y 26, 1810, to December 25, 1810.

Epochs.	CHRISTENED		BURIED.															Total Buried.	
	Male.	Female	Under 2	2 to 5	5 to 10	10 to 20	20 to 30	30 to 40	40 to 50	50 to 60	60 to 70	70 to 80	80 to 90	90 to 100, &c.	Males	Females			
			Years.	5	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	&c.					
y.....	672	656	372	211	55	40	62	111	109	97	85	48	20	1	644	571			
gust.....	946	877	584	276	95	51	81	153	133	97	119	85	22	3	877	830			
ember.....	746	772	539	224	77	46	91	112	138	100	95	71	24	6	809	777			
tober.....	811	745	588	217	71	60	88	110	143	107	93	76	20	2	859	762			
.....	732	625	487	204	76	51	102	118	146	120	117	77	22	5	809	725			
.....	1146	1092	715	297	125	89	147	207	263	221	151	84	10		1281	1219			
.....	5,652	4,766	3,284	1,729	193	143	571	851	934	1,173	513	202	27		5,931	4,881			
Total Christen... 9,818																			
Total Buried... 100, 100																			

Table of the Price of MEAT, SUGAR, SALT, and COALS, in LONDON, from July 1810 to December 1810, inclusive.

	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	
st...	s. d. 6 0	s. d. 5 4	s. d. 5 4	s. d. 5 0	s. d. 5 8	s. d. 6 0	
stton	6 0	5 8	6 4	5 6	6 0	6 0	
rk...	6 8	7 0	7 4	6 8	6 8	7 4	per Stone of 8lb. to sink the offal.
.....	47 10	48 8	49 8	47 6	44 8	44 2	Oct.
.....	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	Bushel
.....	59 6	60 9	60 0	60 0	71 9	61 6	Chald.

Price of the QUARTER LOAF, according to the A. size of Bread in LONDON, for the Year 1810, taking the average of the four sizes in each Month.

	s. d.	s. d.
January.....	1 4	1 5
February.....	1 0	1 5
March.....	1 2	1 3
April.....	1 2	1 3
May.....	1 3	1 3
June.....	1 5	1 3
July.....	1 5	1 5
August.....	1 5	1 5
September.....	1 3	1 3
October.....	1 3	1 3
November.....	1 3	1 3
December.....	1 3	1 3
Average Price during the Year	1 3	1 4

Table of the Price of the English Three per Cent. Consols, from July 1810 to December 1810, inclusive.

y.	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
1	71 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	65 1/2	66 1/2
2	71 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	65 1/2	66 1/2
3	71 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	65 1/2	66 1/2
4	71 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	65 1/2	66 1/2
5	71 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	65 1/2	66 1/2
6	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
7	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
8	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
9	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
10	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
11	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
12	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
13	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
14	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
15	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
16	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
17	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
18	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
19	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
20	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
21	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
22	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
23	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
24	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
25	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
26	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
27	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
28	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
29	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
30	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
31	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
32	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
33	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
34	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
35	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
36	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
37	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
38	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
39	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
40	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
41	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
42	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
43	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
44	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
45	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
46	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
47	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
48	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
49	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
50	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
51	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
52	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
53	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
54	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
55	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
56	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
57	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
58	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
59	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
60	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
61	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
62	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
63	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
64	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
65	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
66	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
67	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
68	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
69	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
70	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
71	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
72	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
73	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
74	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
75	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
76	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
77	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
78	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
79	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
80	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
81	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
82	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
83	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
84	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
85	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
86	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
87	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
88	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
89	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
90	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
91	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
92	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
93	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
94	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
95	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
96	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
97	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
98	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
99	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2
100	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	66 1/2	60 1/2	66 1/2

Number of BANKRUPTCIES announced in the London Gazette, between 20th of Dec. 1809, and 20th of Dec. 1810.

From 20 Dec. 1809, to 20 Jan. 1810.....	84
20 Jan. to 20 Feb.	118
20 Feb. to 20 March.....	119
20 March to 20 April.....	104
20 April to 20 May 125	
20 May to 20 June.....	112
20 June to 20 July 132	
20 July to 20 Aug.....	133
20 Aug. to 20 Sept. 102	
20 Sept. to 20 Oct.....	139
20 Oct. to 20 Nov.....	273
20 Nov. to 20 Dec. 299	
Total.....	1670

LIST OF HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTERS, 1810.

CABINET MINISTERS

Earl Camden	President of the Council.
Lord Eldon	Lord High Chancellor
Earl of Westmorland	Lord Privy Seal
Earl Bathurst	President of the Board of Trade
Right Hon. Spencer Perceval	First Lord of the Treasury (Prime Minister)
Right Hon. Charles Philip Yorke	Chancellor and Under Treasurer of the Exchequer, also Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
Lord Mulgrave	First Lord of the Admiralty
Right Hon. Richard Ryder	Master-General of the Ordnance.
Marquis Wellesley	Secretary of State for the Home Department.
Earl of Liverpool	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
	Secretary of State for the Department of War and the Colonies

NOT OF THE CABINET.

Right Hon. Robert Saunders Dundas	President of the Board of Control for the Affairs of India
Right Hon. George Canning	Vice President of the Board of Trade and Treasurer of the Navy
Vicecount Palmerston	Secretary at War
Lord Charles Somerset	Joint Paymaster-general of the Forces.
Right Hon. Charles Long	
John Lubbock	Joint Postmaster-general.
Earl of Sandwich	
Richard Wharton, esq.	Secretaries of the Treasury.
Charles Arbuthnot, esq.	
Mr. John Bouverie	Master of the mints.
Mr. John Gibbs	Attorney General.
Sir John Plummer	Solicitor-General.

SENIORS IN THE MINISTRY OF IRELAND.

Duke of Richmond	Lord Lieutenant
Lord Manners	Lord High Chancellor.
W. Wellesley Pole	Chief Secretary.
Right Hon. John Foster	Chancellor of the Exchequer.

